In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N | CARPIO, J.: The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the
requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession.
Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of
legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the
morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even
if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking
of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent
a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation
of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the
Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of
the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law
and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet
a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC
a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion
in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not
allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative
body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty
candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent
to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of
Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same
resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
against him.
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which
was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before
the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant
alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent
appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a
lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC
as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001.
The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on
his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that
respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a
law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for
Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as
secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
 Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22
May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan.In the first paragraph
of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned
Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly
D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized
by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate
of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19
May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition
filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the
winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated
that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the
legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings,
without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing
fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is
a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can
be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably
strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations
but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held
in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the
Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who
engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt
of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took
the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law
does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court
or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting
unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed
to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge
that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent
him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was
no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to
the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT
Facts: Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
before the scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the
lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law
to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent
the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue: Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar
Ruling: the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires
the use of legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court.
A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can
be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.
Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991
Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1,
Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry,
a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and
the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
CRUZ VS CABRERA
SECOND DIVISION[ A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.
Facts: Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of
2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his
behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors;
during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.
Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the
court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him
before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer,
having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s
imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to
discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases
respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words
“appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally with the intention
to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant
before the public.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law
Ruling:
1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna”
does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant
respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of
the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers
should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment,
because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone
even contemptuous language.
2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating
personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted.
— In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the
prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of
the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum.
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO,
Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
DOCTRINE: the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually
rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the
ambit of the term "practice of law."
NATURE: Disbarment complaint
FACTS:
1. Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and
Special Administratrix of his estate. Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and
the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc, a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government.
PCGG sequestered it and its operations ceased.
2. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. until his
appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan.
3. employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint
entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as
I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). Taggat employees alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat
after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and
wages without valid cause
4. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to
conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal
complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation
of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
5. Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
a. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility-
guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,
being the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very
well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat
employees.
b. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor- Engaging in the private practice of
law while working as a government prosecutor. He received
retainer’s fees which respondent claims to only consultation
fees.
6. Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for the violations
committed.
7. Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed,
respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five years and
refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was
merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was
adverse and contrary to her expectation.
8. Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit
respondent from hearing the criminal complaint and states that
complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression
that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed
9. While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order
issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was
reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor. Hence, the
criminal complaint was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was engaged in private practice of law
while being a public official.
YES. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of law. The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage
in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal
profession. It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application
of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience.
ISSUE: whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
HELD: YES. A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent
owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any
matter in which he previously represented him."
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant,
Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control"
of Taggat. Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat,
herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of
Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of
Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240.
It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a
former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former
client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations
that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict.
Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related,
or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal
Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former
Personnel Manager of Taggat.
RULING. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (conflicting interest.) In the present
case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue
in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1
April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with
Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act
No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Respondent is mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x
x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a
government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with [his] official functions."
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
ALAWI V. ALAUYA AM No. SDC-97-2-P – February 24 1997 Narvasa
SUBJECT: Canon 9 – Assisting in unauthorized practice of law
FACTS: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of EB Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd of Davao City, a real estate housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City.
Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installment
by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the Villarosa & Co. and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corp. (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed
a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. and to NHMFC advising of the
termination of his contract with Villarosa & Co., as his consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence. According
to him, he was induced by Alawi to sign a blank contract on the assurance that
Alawi would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she never
did.
Alawi, in response, filed a verified complaint praying that Alauya be dismissed or
disciplined, for the reason, among other that he usurped the title of attorney which
only regular members of the Philippine Bar may use.
In response, Alauya first submitted a preliminary comment in which he questioned
the authority of Atty. Marasigan, Asst. Div. Clerk of Court who signed the notices
of resolution, to require explanation of him, pertaining him as a mere assistant and
that the resolution was a result of strong link between Alawi and Atty. Marasigan’s
office.
Alauya justified his use of the title “attorney” by the assertion that it is lexically
synonymous with “counselors-at-law”, a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counselor” is
often mistaken for “councilor”, “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting
a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
ISSUE: WON respondent Alauya is allowed to used the title “attorney” although
only passing the Shari’a Bar.
HELD: No! Persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-pledged members of the
Philippines Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one has
been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who was been admitted to the
Philippines Bar, may both be considered “counselors,” in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The
title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree
in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the IBP and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is only
them who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. Respondent’s
disinclination to use the title of “counselor” does not warrant his use of the title
attorney.
As a member of the Shari’s Bar and an officer of the Court, Alawi is subject to a
standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a
man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected that he
accord respect for the persons and the rights of others at all times, and that his
every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated,
but cannot be excused, but his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged. Alauya was reprimanded for use of excessively intemperate insulting or
virulent language, i.e, language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the
title attorney; and is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
Encarnacion Banogon vs Melchor Zerna
154 SCRA 593 – Legal Ethics – Speedy and Proper Administration
of Justice
In 1926, a judgment favorable to Zerna was issued by a cadastral
court. In 1957 or thirty one years later, Banogon filed a motion to
amend the 1926 decisions. An opposition was filed by Zerna in the
same year. Banogon’s counsel repeatedly failed to set for hearing
and in 1971 or fourteen years later, Zerna filed for a motion to
dismiss which was granted by reason of Banogon’s filing being out
of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not Banogon’s suit should prosper.
HELD: No. He slept on his rights hence laches had set in. The
Supreme Court also took time to remind lawyers to judiciously
study facts and laws so as to avoid the filing of improper cases such
as this case where the filing of motions and pleadings was way out
of time. One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for
lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point
of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. As
officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the
proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by
filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary. Lawyers do not advance the cause of law or their clients
by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not
deserve the attention of the courts.
Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)
Legal Ethics : Definition
Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an
accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On
October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for
the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced
discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his
position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him
and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time
service which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this
certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the
motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse of discretion?
Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of
fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The
legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a
mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to
aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that
such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the
lawyer's zeal.
Ratio:
“The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their
office are Judges, or other officials or employees of the superior
courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as
counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as
defendant-appellant’s counsel after his appointment as Register of
Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by
the new counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams
CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of
an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel
de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in
a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right
of the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due
process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard
and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809,
March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide
the accused with a counsel de officio for such action as it may deem
fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
vs. Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)
Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749
23JUL

FACTS: Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his

IBP dues.He was also cited in the complaint as not paying his
professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his
pleadings filed in court. It was also an alleged falsity when he
included his “IBP-Rizal 259060” where in fact he was not in good
standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as Pasay
City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and
he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also
had criminal case involving estafabut was appealed pending in the
Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the
IBP dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code

of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law

for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.

RATIO: Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve

him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues. Rule 139-A
provides:

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions

of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys.

Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges
Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of
2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his
behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors;
during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange
transpired:
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the
case, replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his
appearance xxx xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is
misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx.
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court
to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the
public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared
for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of
complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his
honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent
was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng
appear, pumasa ka muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and
humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer
of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics
that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding
appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed
on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a
vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against
whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further
complainants illegal practice of law; complainants complaint occurred during a judicial
proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was
appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an
order stating [i]n todays hearing both lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent
stated: Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant)
who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer, to which complainant replied:
The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court
that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that
complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he
is not a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he stated pumasa ka muna out
of indignation because of complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it
is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation
against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: It is a settled
principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings
are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another
malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family
pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able
to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an
Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is
likewise denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under
Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against
Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court Hay naku
masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed by the Honorable
Courts Third Division which stated among others: That the questioned remarks of
respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainants
actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already
lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer
arrogance on the part of the complainant. Respondent prays that the complaint against
him be dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for a period of three
months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that
respondents averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged
communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of
the case in question under trial before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court
against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and
later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136
respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in
contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in
the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979
docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his
dealing with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in
the manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him that appear
ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only
abusive but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor
passed the bar examination required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it
was his purpose relative to complainants appearance in court; although the latter
appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements
of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his
professional dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this
case.
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and
set aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the
dismissal of the case for lack of merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the
procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and
decision by the Board of Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and
evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the
Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submittal of the Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of the
requirement that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons
on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record,
thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point
out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case
any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or
the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal
reasoning.[2]
In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any
misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling.
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case.
Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime
and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the
Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases.[3] This case falls within the exception.
We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent
pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges
impression of complainants appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January
14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled
for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or reproof. It is but
a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument
between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account
for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that
the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.[5]
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from
litigating personally his cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized
by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision,
thus:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress -- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as
their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as
those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.
Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own
actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. One
does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by
rendering first aid to himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the
prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.[7]
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers
of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly.[8] Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum.[9]
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his
duties as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.: The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition
against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special
Administratrix of his estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former
President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the
operation of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential
Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its
operations ceased in 1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a
criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago,"
docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged
that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the
death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid
cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the
preliminary investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending
the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article
116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should
have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by
Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated
the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to
accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private
practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant
presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee
for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months
of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private
practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was
merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse
and contrary to her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had
resigned from Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no
longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his
sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent
contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he
performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a
motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead
complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental
reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was
her impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as
gleaned from complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12
February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam
Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my
Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and
told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not
representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was
merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that
respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the
cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this
accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of
the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government
prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends
that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation.
Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that
rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-
Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by
Taggat without the respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a
case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all
show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these
consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor
complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the
criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by
respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set
aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4
January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina
M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner
Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa
("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP
Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution")
dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s
Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of
interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the
prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government
prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a
penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his
role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A
determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No.
97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal
Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant,
Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and
control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein
Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat.
Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of
Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are
very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain
to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very
much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to
Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to
refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which
he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not
represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten,
however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to
matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters
relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled
as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was
for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have
been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had
not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S.
No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of
Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid
salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the
employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with
as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with
these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an
employee of the corporation and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein
Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering
legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter
had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in
the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994
ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647).
The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice
of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In
re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required
the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and
instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to
safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the
private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds
respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA
6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the
prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44However, this rule is subject
to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not
apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned
is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client
relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in
"unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory
prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his]
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent
represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine
conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer
will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer
owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain
from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he
previously represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in
1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer
connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence
must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former
client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment.
The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal
complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On
that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any
confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat
in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was
labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing
conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The
intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s
interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not
for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her
allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law
is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat
intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as
alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish
between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent
performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to
complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he
signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as
correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in
RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the
Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute
infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees –
unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01
of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he
received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government
prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct
when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently
and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession
and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of
office and in his dealings with the public. 54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees
engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six
months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for
respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court
VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates,
and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my
intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and
your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent
which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic
language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state
on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort
to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my
interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need
to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co.
at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and
which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD
26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin
T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking
for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable
from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things,
he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,
rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and
the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing
loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between
me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took
to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated
February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the
same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan
and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also
wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme
Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May
1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,
Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996
-- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler,
forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as
irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea
that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic)
** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.
Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from
the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of
Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he
questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him,
this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal
Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less
aggressive, even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him
a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated
that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines
of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
 And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996,
Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental
anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from
his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he
gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with
the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and
as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money
he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the
official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was
induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where
the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy
from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not
do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt
of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice,
Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting
of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant
Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his
two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed
as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not
use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he
made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury
to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters,
Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts **
** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled
him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with
Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real
facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was
merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.[16] Section 4
of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times
respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct
must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs
or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a
right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and
an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for
most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which
is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others
at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had
been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one
who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel
or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney"
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.
His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege,
the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the
use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that
any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA
MUNOZ, petitioners, vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and
the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental (Branch III).
CRUZ, J.:
It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court
way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision
was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended
petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on
March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the
petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion
for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then came to
us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge.2
These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and
lawyers.
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in
1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late.
Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. 3
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory
because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private
respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the
issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private
respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in
their the pursuant thereto.4
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926,
became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the
petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it
occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged
predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the
1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein
petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition
for review. 5
While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not
yet become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been
registered, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of
re-opening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the
same party be denied this remedy before the decree is issued? 6
Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now
pretend that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been
registered and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?
Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran 7 where it was
held:
... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of
the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on
the grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree."
Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may first blush seem that the petition
for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on
further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the
Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating
that such petitioners must be presented before the expiration of one year from the
entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there
can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final
decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We therefore hold that a
petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time the rendition
of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the
final decree of registration. (Emphasissupplied).
A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this
doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was
not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now.
Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an
end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."8
There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the
judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered
away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final
and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and
manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and
indisputable. 9
This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection
bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a
technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to
our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the
parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish
such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends
for which they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before.
We do so again. 10
Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for
the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto
had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the
petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition
instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they
were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in
possession of the land in dispute.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of
them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their
purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen
popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not
to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most
of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit
and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions
that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened
enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a
case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already
congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the
courts.
This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is
immediately executory. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Paras, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay
City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of
respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed
to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1One of the grounds for such a
motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election
Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to
devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by
respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of
the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this
case."2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested
and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation
in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new
position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly
asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel
could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for
the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into
consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is
not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious
reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent
on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he
continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much
less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk
an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good
standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964,
was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to
discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a
motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny
such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two
defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an
urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full
time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of
petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6,
1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having
proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent
motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficiospeaks for itself.
It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on
February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the
municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge
spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of
the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of
October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot
continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution
there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which
the government would rest, the motion for postponement is denied.
When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar
on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial
would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the
civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby
designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained
postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963,
October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9,
1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7,
1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11,
1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging
indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby
transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is
reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least
eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all
the way from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that
there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the
accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an
election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends
of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to
continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already
rested its case."6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than
duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the
neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an
irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a
surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an
opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a
profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is
understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required
of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found
in People v. Daban:7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that
membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its
exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft.
Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance
of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of
justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de
oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration
should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."16
lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his
paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar
de oficio must be fulfilled."8 in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have
sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the
Lahesa,9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his
penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no
from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and
of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above,
criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11reiterated that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as
such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase
counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good
a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the
himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of
best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the
to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused- promptings of self-interest.
defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against
of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and petitioner.
a little less of self-interest."12
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
Barredo, J., took no part.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was
only due to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a
counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be
rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief
Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal
cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it
has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is
poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present
Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that
the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney
in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June
29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for
the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail
to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on
the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees
due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976,
they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification
of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings
would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred
to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-
Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order
applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions
of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is
stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official
national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,'
composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter
be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following
words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine
with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike
his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is
not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law,
define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for
the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a
previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In
the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
 ... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all
the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive
Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of
the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of
the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance
of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual
fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of
which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment
of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the
court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder
of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing
the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is
to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated
on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree
No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the
demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme
lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle
of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy
(Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals
from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and
validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal
grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X
of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro.
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling
Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court
with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by
the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself
to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely
deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he
is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer
to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the
practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of
the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was
confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or
statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court
— appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice
... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives
the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are
inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It
is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to
uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to
protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.
..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution
when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass
upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A
and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of
are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the
Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y.
Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought
exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that
after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of
the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated
to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in
the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues
for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since
the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for
comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its
comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based
on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in
the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the
IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual
dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved
by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-
A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP
members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of
Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to
help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that
there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination
and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner
could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention
to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped.
It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its
members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this
Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual
dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that
what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive
practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering
that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived
from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of
annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right
without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law
by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community
where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to
exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service
from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized
by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics
or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification
of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration
of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives
and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is
a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation,

while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation,
it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray
the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with
it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of
law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his
required payment of the annual dues.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,[11] one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails
the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic
move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment
of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount
assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005,
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension
from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of

membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that
the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of,
or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from

payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the
IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership
in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP

Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of
members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues
during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to
comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of

removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial

Edillon,[10] in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its

being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a
number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R.
Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he
only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least
three years already, as shown by the following attached sample
pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission"
dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B .......-"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion"
dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br.
259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for
extension of Time to File Required Comment and
Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not
Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A,
Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate
action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar
Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty.
Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional
tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension
of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy
furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas, as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin.
Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim.
Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the
Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995,
November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant,
bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above
his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also
attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati,
denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal
Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997,
by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R.
Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in
1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his
membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint
within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in
1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted
member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer
in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme
Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for
Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was
set aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City
Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had
the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In
fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of
which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at
Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior
Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432
which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the
subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered
 by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP
member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the
exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and
deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing
at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or
payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as
an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such
dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the
contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and
until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22,
1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case
is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents
suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication
of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A",
"B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal
259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP
Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since
1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432
which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In
fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he
alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per
his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited
practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the
court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number
in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law
practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as
appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the
years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a
"limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with
the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as
a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice
of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is
"limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to
the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in
view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues
and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid
his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to
all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day,
he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now
intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner
Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2,
Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected
2
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership
in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach
by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is
entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that
an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
to judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law
in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship
is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225
can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his
pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,
subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of
such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de
Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.