UNIVERSITY OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPCION, INC.

, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, UNIVERSITY
OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPCION TEACHING AND
NON-TEACHING EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, respondents.

Facts:

The employer institution and the Union met twice to negotiate a CBA. Later on,
the Union filed a notice of strike alleging deadlock in the CBA negotiations and
unfair labor practices (mass termination of teaching and non-teaching employees,
interference with union activities, discrimination, and harassment) which the
petitioner denied. The parties then had a conciliation wherein they had agreed on
certain issues. In a subsequent conciliation conference, petitioner and the Union
agreed to submit to voluntary arbitration the issue concerning the exclusion of
confidential employees from the collective bargaining unit. The petitioner presented
to the Union a draft of the CBA which the latter rejected stating that they had not yet
agreed on the manner of computing net incremental proceeds but the Petitioner
insisted that Union is bound to comply as the inclusions in the draft allegedly
embodies all items agreed upon during conciliation. A second notice of strike was
issued. Gloria Bautista and Gloria Fernandez, both union members were fired.
Petitioner filed with the NLRC Regional Arbitration a complaint against the Union
and its officers for unfair labor practices which the NLRC forwarded to the Secretary
of Labor. hereafter, the NCMB conducted a strike-vote balloting, which resulted in a
strike. The Secretary of Labor issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor
dispute who issued a return to work order to which the Union filed a Motion for
Reconsideration that Bautista and Fernandez be included in such order as they were
dismissed during the pendency of the notice of strike. Petitioner suspended five (5)
union members for failing to report to work within the period specified by the
Secretary of Labor. Petitioner, invoking the ruling of the voluntary arbitrators that
certain classes of employees cannot be a part of the bargaining unit, also terminated
the employment of twelve union members – supposedly holders of confidential
positions – for refusing to resign from the Union. The Union filed its Third Notice of
Strike, therein alleging mass termination of employees, continuous intimidation of
union members and defiance by the petitioner of the orders of the Secretary of Labor.
The Secretary then issued the suspension of the effects of the suspension and
termination of the following union members until the determination of the legality of
such suspension and termination. During the conciliation held, the Union stated
that there was no CBA to speak of because what were agreed upon during the
conciliation conference did not reflect the true intention of the parties and there
was misunderstanding on the economic package and requested for the reopening
of negotiations. Finding the strike staged by the Union to be legal, the Secretary of
Labor resolved the labor dispute between the petitioner and the Union by directing the
parties to execute a collective bargaining agreement.
Issue:

Whether or not there was a perfected CBA between the parties.

Law Applicable:

CIVIL CODE:

Article 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.

Case History:

NCMB - tried to settle the CBA matters of the parties

Secretary of Labor - took over the matter when the third notice of strike was issued
and issued a return to work order. Held that the strike held by the Union was proper.

Ruling:

No, there was still no new collective bargaining agreement because the parties
had not reached a meeting of the minds.

A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) refers to the negotiated contract between a

legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and
all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit, including
mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries. As in all other
contracts, there must be clear indications that the parties reached a meeting of the
minds.

In this case, no CBA could be concluded because of what the union perceived as
illegal deductions from the 70% employees' share in the tuition fee increase from
which the salary increases shall be charged. Also, the manner of computing the net
incremental proceeds was yet to be agreed upon by the parties.

Petitioner insisted that a new collective bargaining agreement was concluded

through the conciliation proceeding before the NCMB on all issues specified in the
notice of strike. Although it is true that the university and the union may have reached
an agreement on the issues raised during the collective bargaining negotiations, still
no agreement was concluded by them because, among other reasons, the DOLE
Secretary, who assumed jurisdiction on January 23, 1995 only was set to resolve the
distribution of the salary increase of the covered employees. The Court of Appeals
found that "there are many items in the draft-CBA that were not even mentioned in
the minutes of the July 20, 1994 conference."

Considering the parties failed to reach an agreement regarding certain items of

the CBA, they still have the duty to negotiate a new collective bargaining
agreement in good faith, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Labor
Code.

Opinion:

With the facts and matters mentioned in the foregoing case, I must agree with the
decision of the court that there was no CBA perfected. It would be unfair for the
employer institution to insert items in the document and deem it valid as a CBA even
though it is not in the minutes of the meeting. There indeed is no meeting of minds as
the document contains.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION
INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), and RITO MANGUBAT,
respondents.
Facts:

GMC employed 190 workers in its plants in Cebu and Lapu-Lapu, all members
of its certified Union. The GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of
three years. A day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed
CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days.
However, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who
stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious
affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing
to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal. GMC wrote a letter to
the unions officers stating that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union
which no longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to
dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on
how the company may improve its operations. The union officers wrote a letter
disclaiming any massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a
manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.
GMC dismissed one union member on the ground of incompetence so the latter
requested that it go through the grievance procedure to which the GMC advised them
to refer to its letter previously. The union filed a complaint with the NLRC
Arbitration alleging unfair labor practice on the part of GMC for: (1) refusal to
bargain collectively; (2) interference with the right to self-organization; and (3)
discrimination. The labor arbiter dismissed the case with the recommendation that a
petition for certification election be held to determine if the union still enjoyed the
support of the workers.
The union appealed to the NLRC. NLRC ordered GMC to abide by the CBA
draft that the union proposed for a period of two (2) years. In its decision, the NLRC
pointed out that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715, the duration of a CBA,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, is five (5) years. All other provisions
of the CBA are to be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its
execution. Thus, the NLRC held that respondent union remained as the exclusive
bargaining agent with the right to renegotiate the economic provisions of the
CBA. Consequently, it was unfair labor practice for GMC not to enter into
negotiation with the union. It was also held that the individual letters of withdrawal
from the union submitted by 13 of its members confirmed the pressure exerted by
GMC on its employees to resign from the union. Thus, the NLRC also found GMC
guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to
self-organization. The union filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of the union.

Issue:
 Whether or not GMC should still honor negotiations with the union.

Law Applicable:

LABOR CODE:

ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective

Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained
and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and
Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of
such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3)
years after its execution.…

ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an

employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:

...

(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;

ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain

collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement.…

ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be

observed in collective bargaining:

(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
 ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining
agreement. ....It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue
in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the
60-day period [prior to its expiration date] and/or until a new agreement is reached by
the parties.

Case History:

NLRC Arbitration - dismissed; recommendation for certification election to

determine if it had support of the workers.
NLRC - set aside the labor arbiters decision; unfair labor practice not ot negotiate
with the union.
COURT OF APPEALS - ruled in favor of the union; GMC guilty of unfair labor
practice for violating the duty to bargain collectively and/or interfering with the right
of its employees to self-organization, and (2) imposing upon GMC the draft CBA
proposed by the union for two years to begin from the expiration of the original CBA.

Ruling:

Yes, the law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for
five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until
the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union
requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA, it was still the
certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said
renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA. The unions
proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of
effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It was obvious
that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For
refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic
terms of the CBA. GMC committed an unfair labor practice.

Opinion:

In my opinion, letters of resignation or withdrawal of confidence from the current

SEBA should be given weight and attention by the employer and the courts.
Nonetheless, I also think that such letters should undergo an intricate procedure in
order to ensure that such is not a mere result of pressure from the employer. Within a
span of 5 years, it is not impossible that the members might lose confidence not only
with regards to its vision but also as to its competence. Members should also be given
voice as to whether the interests of the union still voices out theirs.

SAN JUAN DE DIOS EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION EMPLOYEES

UNION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS;
MA. CONSUELO MAQUILING, LEONARDO MARTINEZ, ANDRES AYALA,
VIRGINIA ARLANTE, ROGELIO BELMONTE, MA. ELENA GARCIA and
RODOLFO CALUCIN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
SAN JUAN DE DIOS EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC. (HOSPITAL)
and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts:

The foundation fired Rodolfo Calucin, Jr., then Executive Secretary of the Union,
had been employed at the Foundation as a medical clerk for almost twelve years. He
was informed that, per its records, he had incurred five (5) sets of tardiness for
1993, in addition to the two other sets he had incurred in the year 1992, and that
such tardiness had affected his efficiency. He was required to explain, in writing,
within seventy-two hours from receipt of the letter, why his services should not be
terminated for gross and habitual neglect of his duties. In his reply, he claimed that he
had already served the maximum suspension of one week, from October 11 to 17,
1993, for his past tardiness. He furthered that he had not incurred tardiness for the
past four months. Moreover, his superior had given him a performance rating of FAIR,
as of October 1993. Calucin, Jr. filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal on August 1,
1994 before the National Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission. On the same date, the Union filed a Notice of Strike before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), docketed as NCMB, grounded on the
following: (a) illegal dismissal of Calucin, Jr., a union officer; (b) discrimination; (c)
union busting; (d) harsh enforcement of the companys code of discipline; and, (e)
violation of CBA provisions. The Secretary of Labor then issued a return to work
order which they did not follow. The Foundation filed a petition before the NCMB to
declare the strike illegal. The petition was certified to the NLRC. The Secretary issued
another RTWO. The Union requested that some employees of certain shifts be
ordered to return to work on a later date considering that they have been on the picket
line for the past few days but the Foundation denied. The twenty-seven employees
who worked the said shifts were not allowed to go back to work. The SOLE issued an
order directing the Foundation to comply with its directives. In the meantime, the
Foundation accepted the twenty-seven employees, subject to the resolution of its
motion for reconsideration which was denied. Nevertheless, the Foundation refused to
give the twenty-seven employees the equivalent of their salaries for the period they
were refused reinstatement. This prompted the employees, through the Union, to file a
complaint against the Foundation before the NLRC.
Issue:

(a) whether or not the strike staged by the officers and members of the Union was
illegal;
(b) whether the petitioner Unions officers were legally dismissed; and,
(d) whether or not the respondent Foundation committed an unfair labor practice
when it terminated the employment of petitioner Calucin, Jr.

Law Applicable:

LABOR CODE:

Article 264 (a) paragraph 2

No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first

having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without
first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary
strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout.

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any

unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such
lawful strike.

Article 282

Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of

the following causes:

1. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful

orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

2. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

3. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;

4. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his

employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and

5. Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Case History:

NLRC - dismissed the claim of unfair labor practice arising from the illegal dismissal
of Rogelio Calucin, Jr. It ruled that Calucin, Jr.s dismissal was based on his continued
tardiness for the year 1992 to 1993, which affected his efficiency as reflected by his
performance rating and, therefore, sanctioned by Article 282(b) of the Labor Code.

The NLRC found that the Unions claim of discrimination amounting to unfair labor
practice was unsubstantiated
As regards the Foundations refusal to pay the money claims of the twenty-seven
employees, the NLRC ruled that the same was sanctioned by law, considering that the
aforesaid employees refused to return to work even after the SOLE already issued a
RTWO.

Ruling:

(A)
Yes, the strike staged by the Union from August 26, 1994 to August 31, 1994 was,
at its inception, legal and peaceful. However, the striking employees defiance of the
August 26, 1994 RTWO of the SOLE rendered the strike illegal. Consequently, under
Article 264 (a) paragraph 2 of the Labor Code, the officers and members of the Union
who refused to return to work after the issuance of the certification/RTWO were
deemed to have lost their employment status.

(B)
Yes, despite the receipt of an order from then SOLE to return to their respective
jobs, the Union officers and members refused to do so and defied the same.
Consequently, then, the strike staged by the Union is a prohibited activity under
Article 264 of the Labor Code. Hence, the dismissal of its officers is in order. The
respondent Foundation was, thus, justified in terminating the employment of the
petitioner Unions officers.

(C)
No, the records of this case do not show any hint that Calucins dismissal is due to
his trade union activities. On the other hand, per findings of the public respondent, the
Foundation was able to support with documents how Calucin declared himself
irrelevant in the Foundation through his tardiness and shallow excuses such as
fetching the water, cooking breakfast, seeing to it that his kids took breakfast before
going to school, preparing packed lunch for himself and even the diversions from the
usual route of jeepneys that he rode in on these days that he was absent are all lame
excuses that amount to lack of interest in his work. His lackluster work attitude
reached his highest point when he filed for a leave of absence of three months to join
his brothers business venture. Furthermore, it is not true that his attendance improved
in 1993 because the records show that in 1993, his tardiness worsened to the point that
his repeated tardiness went beyond the maximum contemplated in the Foundations
Code of Discipline.
Opinion:

I agree that the tardiness and exhibits of lack of interest to work by Rodolfo
Calucin, Jr. are frustrating and by applying the law, he would indeed be rightfully
terminated. Nonetheless, there might be a better work environment for a lot of
institutions if the law mandated them to grant incentives to employees who have
served them for quite a long period of time (ex: every 5 or 10 years of employment).
Assessing Calucin’s action, he might be getting tired of doing his work. For who
would not be if you have been doing the same thing for 12 years (providing good
service for the past 11 years or so) only to be greeted by a suspension and then a
termination? It would have been better if the law mandated a vacation incentive or
something of the sort.