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Culture Documents
Introduction
The term “posthuman” has been a part of academic parlance for some time
and is increasingly used in discussions that engage with how biotechnologies
can affect and modify embodied life, altering our understanding of what
counts as human in the present day. Central to the notion of the posthuman,
and the related posthumanist position1—both empirically and theoretically—
is the decentering of Man as the measure of all things. The posthuman
unsettles the unity and possessive individualism of the subject central to
the doctrine of liberal humanism. It undermines the conception of the
sovereign human as a singular, self-contained consciousness operating with
universal rationality and unquestioned dominion over the world. Instead, the
posthuman subject is conceived as radically relational—with technology, with
the environment and with other species—and, as a result, has fluid and
multiple identities (Braidotti, The Posthuman).
At the core of the posthuman, understood in this way, is a reconception of
the human body, which decenters the dualism prevalent in humanistic
thought. The posthuman body is not a discrete entity under complete control
of a self-governing rational subject. Instead, under the posthuman paradigm,
the body is necessarily relational, fluid, and multiple. Furthermore, central to
many conceptions of the posthuman body is the idea of enhancement and, to
this end, the intrinsic malleability of the body through engagement with
science and technology (Nayar 3). Contemporary representations and instan-
tiations of the posthuman body are often closely aligned to that which Donna
Haraway terms the “cyborg” body. A “hybrid of machine and organism,” the
cyborg is an entity unbound from essentialisms and dualisms, capable of
being re-crafted by biotechnologies (Haraway, “Manifesto for Cyborgs” 65).
As a result, the posthuman entails an expanded notion of embodiment that
CONTACT Luna Dolezal luna.dolezal@tcd.ie Trinity Long Room Hub, Trinity College Dublin, College Green,
Dublin 2, Ireland.
1
The terms posthuman and posthumanities are in fact not synonymous. Scholars in the posthumanities are
concerned with a critique of liberal humanism and an interest in animal studies, while the posthuman articulates
a technologically mediated subjectivity that extends the notion of what it means to be human. Although the
aims of the posthumanities may diverge from the posthuman position, both make central a critique the subject
of liberal humanism.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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disrupt the limiting binaries that had traditionally defined women and
femininity.2 In fact, Haraway’s renowned “Cyborg Manifesto” proposes a
reconception of the feminist subject liberated from essentializing binaries
and the traditional limits of the body. There are, as Braidotti writes in her
discussion of Haraway’s posthuman conceptions of the body, “enthralling
promises of possible re-embodiments” (“Posthuman, All Too Human” 204).
She explains: “Multiple, heterogenrous, uncivilized, they show the way to
multiple virtual possibilities … the classical ‘other than’ the human are thus
emancipated from the category of pejorative difference and shown forth in a
more positive light” (“Posthuman, All Too Human” 204). Rather than posi-
tioning technology and the posthuman as patriarchal structures, feminist
thinkers reconceived them as a means to redefine the social role of women.
Hence, there is a palpable sense of possibility, creativity, and plurality when
considering the posthuman malleability of the body. Gender and race, for
instance, are not fixed categories, and the traditionally limiting parameters for
“normal” embodiment are destabilized. Braidotti explains, “Sexualized, racia-
lized and naturalized differences, from being categorical boundary markers
under Humanism, have become unhinged … leading to the elaboration of
alternative modes of transversal subjectivity” (The Posthuman 98). She argues
that these alternative modes of subjectivity “extend not only beyond gender and
race, but also beyond the human” (The Posthuman 98). As a result, the potentials
for diversity and enhanced experience that posthumanism holds are compelling,
and for this reason it has captured the cultural imaginary. Hollywood blockbus-
ters and popular science fiction are replete with posthuman figures. These
figures include a variety of animal, alien, and transsexual hybrids with super-
human physical capacities (Graham). The posthuman body as it is imagined in
fiction and film, and increasingly made manifest in movements such as body
hacking, transhumanism, and posthuman performance art, is about the exciting
and seemingly limitless possibilities of enhanced experience and bodily diversity.
However, what is surprising in theoretical writing about the creative and
political potentials for posthumanism, as Stuart Murray notes in his book
Disability and the Posthuman: Bodies, Minds and Cultural Futures, is that
Braidotti, Haraway, and many other posthuman theorists fail to theorize the
connection between disability and posthuman subjectivity (Murray). This
lacuna is surprising, Murray argues, as disability is arguably the site where
the posthuman body has the most tangible traction. In fact, it seems obvious
that posthuman bodies already proliferate in the realm of what is categorized
as disability. These are bodies that are often intertwined with prostheses and
technology and demonstrate a wide range of physical and neurological
diversity. Furthermore, discussions about the posthuman center on issues
See for instance Haraway, “When We Have Never Been Human”; Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects; and Haraway, Simians,
2
who are concerned with the human body’s porous and malleable nature when
it comes to its interaction with animals, tools, and technology (Smith and
Morra). Surpassing its meaning in a medical context of an artificial limb or
implement that is attached to the body in order to restore or replace a bodily
lack due to illness, defect, accident or disability, prosthesis has come to signify
augmentation, enhancement, and a posthuman fascination with cyborg
bodies. The prosthesis is the blending of human, animal, and the technological
to triumphantly overcome the allegedly natural limitations of the human body.
Consider the well-known case of Oscar Pistorius who was barred in 2008 from
competing for a slot on the South African track and field Olympic team
because his prosthetic legs gave him an unfair advantage over the able bodied
runners. In fact, prosthetic technologies are swiftly becoming more sophisti-
cated and instantiating more than a restoration of the body, but concrete
possibilities for superhuman enhancement. As a result, prostheses are quickly
becoming the site where we see the potent political possibilities for the posthu-
man body to destabilize and transform the very category of disability.
In the third film of the Cremaster cycle, Mullins appears as the ultimate
posthuman figure, morphing between animal, monster, cyborg, and fantasy
figures. In Cremaster 3, Mullins’s legs are “wearable sculpture” (Mullins,
“12 Pairs of Legs”), and she appears as a variety of personas with radically non-
normative embodiments, including: the character Oonagh, wife to the Irish giant
Fionn MacCumhail; the Entered Novitiate who morphs into a cheetah divinity;
an unidentified woman cutting potatoes with a device attached to the foot of her
leg that is molded out of earth. At the end of the film she appears as a bleeding,
blindfolded, and noosed Madonna figure astride a chariot tethered to five lambs.
She is wearing transparent legs that end in tentacles, which are in fact made out
of polyurethane, or bowling ball material (Smith 60). A striking image is her role
as the cheetah divinity—a reference to the posthuman athletic potential afforded
by her Cheetah Foot legs. In this role, Mullins appears as a figure that is half-
woman and half-cheetah with a movable tail and articulated paws at the end of
tapered furry cheetah legs. In this semi-human form, Mullins’s bodily malle-
ability makes explicit the cultural imaginary of the posthuman: destabilizing the
category of human, enhancing physical capability, and blurring the line between
human and animal embodiment.
Mullins, herself, is inspired by Barney’s vision in the Cremaster films. In a
TED Talk, she speaks of the importance for creativity, poetry, and “whimsy”
with respect to body malleability and posthuman experimentation. She
muses: “Poetry is what elevates the banal and neglected object to a realm
of art. It can transform the thing that might have made people fearful into
something that invites them to look … and maybe even understand”
(Mullins, “12 Pairs of Legs”). Inspired by the dominant cultural imaginary
of posthuman bodies in speculative fiction and film, Mullins is outspoken
about animals and superheroes serving as inspiration to create “super-abled”
bodies that move “away from the need to replicate human-ness as the only
aesthetic ideal” (Mullins, “12 Pairs of Legs”). She is explicit about the
potential creativity has for representations of disability and non-normative
human bodies.
Mullins herself embraces the potential that her use of prosthetics affords
her to play with conventions when it comes to bodily form. In the Portraits of
Aimee Mullins series by the well-known photographer Howard Schatz, we see
highly stylized images of Mullins—reminiscent of a fashion photo shoot—
utilizing her prosthetic legs in athleticized postures not usually available to
double-amputees (Schatz). As Maria Neicu points out in her discussion of
these photographs, “the prosthetic limb does not represent a need to hide or
replace the biological loss with a disguised normality.” On the contrary,
Neicu argues, “by refusing conformation to social expectation, it stands as
a symbol of a power to create whatever it is that the wearer wants to create in
that space” (51). Images such as these demonstrate how utilizing cutting-edge
technologies, under a posthuman paradigm, have the potential to liberate
68 L. DOLEZAL
Literally, that’s exactly how it is” (Goldswasser 49). She says: “I love that I can
go anywhere and pick out what I want—the shoes I want, the skirts I
want. … It’s like a Barbie foot under this. … It’s just stuck in this position,
so I have to wear a two-inch heel. There’re [sic] veins on the feet, and then
my heel is pink, and my Achilles’ tendon—that moves a little bit” (Mullins,
“Changing My Legs”). These legs make her 5’8’’ and require that she wear
two-inch heels. She has five pairs of lifelike “pretty legs”—all built with
different heel heights complete with hair follicles and freckles (O’Brien).
Prosthetist Bob Watts, who designed and fabricated these legs, comments:
“These are sort of my fantasy legs … when you’re making two legs … there’s
twice as much freedom, because there’s also no reason why you can’t make
them absolutely identical and ideal. Aimee offered me an opportunity to
make the perfect female leg” (Goldswasser 49).
The objectifying and normalizing implications of Mullins’s “pretty legs”
are apparent. Although Mullins has appeared in many fashion shoots that
subvert the imperatives of mainstream normalized bodily ideals, it is sug-
gested that her “true” identity is expressed most fully when she wears her
Barbie-esque pretty legs. In an interview about her recent appointment as
Global Ambassador for L’Oréal Paris we read, “[Aimee Mullins’s] ambition
has been to shed the disabled tag. ‘And now it has happened,’ she says. ‘With
L’Oréal, I get to be Aimee Mullins, model. No qualifier. And that means
everything to me” (O’Brien). Notably, in the promotional material for
L’Oréal, Mullins appears in her pretty legs and her status as a double
amputee is imperceptible. It is arguable that Mullins effectively shed the
“disabled” tag in the avant-garde and cyborg-esque images discussed above
and through her real-life accomplishments in the realms of sports and
fashion. In fact, she is indubitably more physically capable and accomplished
than the majority of her “able” bodied peers. However, it seems that Mullins
finds some liberatory potential in effacing her bodily difference through the
use of her “pretty legs”: she asserts, “the doll ideal is liberating rather than
limiting” (Goldswasser 49).
It is no coincidence that Mullins feels most “herself” in the legs that afford
her the most mainstream cultural currency. Here we see the common phe-
nomenon of women’s “creative” choices about individual bodily expression
falling into the narrow normalized ideals that they perceive will best augment
their “body capital” (Bourdieu 204). For instance, in the image used in People
magazine’s feature of Mullins in 1999 as one of the 50 Most Beautiful People of
that year, her use of prosthetics is undetectable. In this image, she wears her
pretty legs and poses in a chiffon party dress, seated and reaching over her legs
in a gesture which, as Petra Kuppers notes, is “kinesthetically familiar to a
person with flesh legs” (Kuppers). This seemingly “natural” gesture of holding
or stroking her legs is depicted repeatedly in images and videos of Mullins
where her physical difference is effaced and a normalized embodied ideal is
WOMEN’S STUDIES 71
represented in its place, such as the opening image of Mullins used for the
L’Oréal television advertisement “Find Your True Match with Aimee Mullins.”
This advertisement, which is ostensibly about diversity—it features a range
of skin tones and stars a “disabled” model—demonstrates the potential for
the pernicious appropriation of posthuman body malleability to promote
normalized body ideals. While Mullins “passes” as able-bodied in the open-
ing image of the advertisement, there is a fleeting reference to her status as a
double amputee: a brief montage of Mullins running on the metallic spring-
like prosthetic legs she uses for sports. This reference to Mullins’s posthuman
potential serves two purposes: first, to reassure us that L’Oréal’s concern for
women’s bodies extends beyond the superficial dictates of beauty and cos-
metics; and, second, to remind us of Mullins’s career as an athlete, implicitly
invoking discourses of overcoming adversity, empowerment, and freedom.
The advertisement can be read as a sinister parody of passing, which as
Sander Gilman notes is a type of “silent validation” where one endeavors to
be “accepted without comment” (Gilman 26, emphasis in original). In this
advertisement, Mullins “passes” as able-bodied, and the skin tone of her
prosthetic legs “passes” as real. At the same time, the thirty-three tones in
the True Match range, suggesting a variety of racial skin colors, reference the
plight of raced bodies using cosmetics to try and pass as white. Implicitly
connecting racial difference with disability, the advertisement promotes
bodily diversity, while simultaneously expunging its material traces.
Mullins’s function in the L’Oréal promotion—beyond bringing socially con-
scious kudos to a multinational cosmetics company—seems to be to promote
the idea that body malleability is useful in that it can be a means to efface
bodily difference and help one triumphantly achieve normalized body ideals.
The ostensible diversity that L’Oréal and the True Match advertisement
invoke is in fact very limited. The images of Mullins seem to tell us that being
differently embodied can be celebrated, just as long as you can do all things
that normal—read: white, young, beautiful, athletic—bodies can do, or in
fact, as in the case of Mullins, do them even better. Illustrating what Robert
McRuer’s terms the “compulsory able-bodiness” (McRuer 2) of contempor-
ary neoliberalism, the representation of Mullins in this advertisement
occludes the more mundane realities and prejudices that people struggling
with limb-loss actually face. Diversity, in this advertisement, is not about real
bodily differences, but is, as Lennard Davis asserts in his critique of the
contemporary “discourse of diversity,” “equated with sameness” (Davis,
“Why Is Disability Missing”). As Davis notes, the abnormal and the extre-
mely marginal are excluded from diversity, and only those bodily differences
that can be realized or modified through consumer choices are palatable in
the discourse on diversity.
Hence, as the case of Aimee Mullins demonstrates, the potential for true
transgressive bodily diversity that the posthuman body holds is being
72 L. DOLEZAL
Conclusion
In this article, I have traced representations of Mullins’s posthuman embodi-
ment from the avant-garde fringe to the mainstream high-profile worlds of
fashion, sports, and advertising. By examining representations of Mullins, it is
evident that there has been a tangible shift in how disability and people with
disabilities are represented through the use of the posthuman imaginary. In fact,
until very recently, representations of disabled individuals played on limiting
and negative stereotypes (Nayar 105). This is made manifest in fictional figures
where the in-complete human body—the “cripple” or prostheses user—is cast as
morally or socially deficient. Nayar, in his discussion of the objectification of
disability in popular culture, lists several examples of disabled villains with
prostheses who are featured in films such as Bruce Lee’s Enter the Dragon
(1973), James Bond films such as Goldfinger (1964), and the Harrison Ford
film The Fugitive (1993). This type-casting of the disabled malefactor suggests
that “the individual’s predilection for evil acts is somehow connected to his
deformity or disability” (Nayar 104). Ideas connecting disability to deficiency,
personal inadequacy, or moral failing are reinforced by such representations.
What the posthuman offers disability politics is a tangible shift in the
representation, materialization, and, hence, conception of disability and non-
normative modes of human embodiment. As Schatz’s photographs of
WOMEN’S STUDIES 73
cheetah represents the posthuman and the potentials for a relational, multiple
subjectivity. On the other hand, the cheetah is symbolic of the possessive and
triumphant individualism of the humanist subject: she is a lone figure who is
ruthless, efficient, fast, and solitary.
As a consideration of the various representations of Aimee Mullins
demonstrates, the transgressive potential of the posthuman is diffused as it is
appropriated into the mainstream. Mullins’s malleable posthuman body becomes
just another means to promote the body malleability enabled by fashion,
cosmetics, and aesthetic surgeries as her use of prostheses is figured as some
sort of fashion choice. As a result, the malleable body is not a site liberatory
posthuman potential, as imagined by the transgressive feminist politics of the
1990s or disability politics of the present day, but instead becomes merely another
means to promote the possessive individualism of the humanist subject and the
most banal patriarchal tendencies of mainstream consumerism.
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