GAUDENCIO B. PANTILO III, motion within three (3) days upon receipt of the Order.
motion within three (3) days upon receipt of the Order. Three (3) days later,
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262
Complainant, [Formerly OCAProsecutor
08-3056-RTJ] Canoy granted Melgazos motion.[8]
- versus - Present:
JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This administrative complaint against Judge Victor A. Canoy (Judge Canoy) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29 in Surigao City stems from a
complaint filed by Gaudencio Pantilo III (Pantilo), charging Judge Canoy with
several counts of gross ignorance of the law and/or procedures, grave abuse of
authority, and appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Pantilo prays for Judge Canoys disbarment in relation to Criminal Case No.
8072 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide entitled People of the
Philippines v. Leonardo Luzon Melgazo.
The facts of the case, as gathered from the records, are as follows:
The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim in the
above-mentioned criminal case, recounts in his letter-complaint that, on
September 3, 2008, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he, along with police
officers Ronald C. Perocho (Perocho) and Santiago B. Lamanilao, Jr.
(Lamanilao), acting as escorts of Leonardo Luzon Melgazo (Melgazo), the
accused in Criminal Case No. 8072, went to the City Prosecutors Office,
Surigao City, to attend the inquest proceedings.[1] Later, at around 8 oclock in
the evening, Pantilo was informed by Perocho that Melgazo had been released
from detention.[2]
The following day, September 4, 2008, Pantilo went to the Surigao
City Police Station to verify the information. Upon arriving there, Custodial
Officer Anecito T. Undangan told him that Melgazo had indeed been released
at around 6:30 p.m. on September 3, 2008, as shown in the Police Logbook of
Detention Prisoners and as authorized by Chief of Police Supt. Ramer Perlito
P. Perlas.[3] Further, the logbook showed that Melgazo was temporarily released
upon the order of Judge Canoy after he posted bail in the amount of thirty
thousand pesos (PhP 30,000), as evidenced by O.R. No. 0291794 dated
September 3, 2008.[4]
Pantilo proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court to request a
copy of the Information, only to find out that none had yet been filed by the
[5]
Surigao City Prosecutors Office. Puzzled, he inquired from the City
Prosecutors Office the details surrounding the release of Melgazo. He learned
that no Information had yet been filed in Court that would serve as the basis for
the approval of the bail. Likewise, he also learned from the City Police Station
that no written Order of Release had been issued but only a verbal order
directing the police officers to release Melgazo from his detention cell. [6] One
of the police officers even said that Judge Canoy assured him that a written
Order of Release would be available the following day or on September 4, 2008
after the Information is filed in Court.
On September 5, 2008, Melgazo filed a Motion for the Release of
his impounded vehicle as physical evidence pending the trial of the case.[7] The
motion was received by the Office of the Clerk of Court at 8:30 a.m. that day
and was subsequently raffled in the afternoon. In the Notice of Hearing of the
said motion, Melgazo prayed that it be heard on September 5, 2008 at 8:30 a.m.
According to Pantilo, this clearly violated the rules which require that the other
party must be served a copy of the motion at least three (3) days before the
hearing.
Nevertheless, Judge Canoy issued an Order dated September 5,
2008, directing Assistant City Prosecutor Robert Gonzaga (Prosecutor
Gonzaga), the prosecutor-in-charge of the case, to give his comment on the said
I.P.I. No. Gonzaga submitted his comment. And despite his opposition, Judge
Subsequently, Pantilo filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Canoy
which was later denied.
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR., Aggrieved, Pantilo filed a letter-complaint dated November 3, 2008
LEONARDO-DEbefore CASTRO,
the Office of the Court Administrator charging Judge Canoy with (1)
DEL CASTILLO, gross
and ignorance of the law and procedures; (2) grave abuse of authority; and (3)
PEREZ, JJ. appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct). Pantilo also
prays for Judge Canoys disbarment.
Promulgated:
On January 5, 2009, the Court Administrator required respondent judge to
February 9, 2011comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt.
Accordingly, on February 5, 2009, Judge Canoy filed his comment,
arguing that the facts in this case were exceptional. In his comment, he admitted
that the inquest proceedings of Melgazo before Prosecutor Gonzaga concluded
around 5:00 p.m. on September 3, 2008, after which, Melgazo, with his counsel,
Atty. Cacel Azarcon, went to his office to post bail for Melgazos provisional
liberty.[9] He noted that because of the time, most of the clerks in his office and
the Office of the Clerk of Court had already gone home. Thus, it was no longer
possible to process the posting of bail and all the necessary papers needed for
the release of Melgazo.
Bearing in mind the constitutional right of the accused to bail and
coupled with the insistence of Melgazos counsel, Judge Canoy summoned
Prosecutor Gonzaga and inquired about the result of the inquest proceedings.
Thereupon, Prosecutor Gonzaga relayed to him that the charge against Melgazo
was for Reckless Imprudence with Homicide and the recommended bail bond
was thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000). However, since it was already past 5:00
p.m., Prosecutor Gonzaga claimed that he could no longer file the Information
and that it would have to be filed the next day.[10]
Despite all this, Judge Canoy informed Prosecutor Gonzaga that he
would allow Melgazo to post bail in the amount recommended. He then called
Mrs. Ruth O. Suriaga (Suriaga), Clerk IV, Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC, Surigao City, to accept as deposit for bail the thirty thousand pesos (PhP
30,000) from Melgazo.[11] Likewise, he instructed Suriaga to earmark an official
receipt which would have to be dated the following day or September 4, 2008.
Accordingly, he summoned the escorting police officers, Perocho
and Lamanilao, and verbally ordered them to release Melgazo from detention.
He also said that the written order would be issued the following day.[12]
In his defense, Judge Canoy invokes the constitutional right of the
accused to bail and Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which does not require that a person be charged in court before he
or she may apply for bail.[13] To his mind, there was already a constructive bail
given that only the papers were needed to formalize it.[14] It would be
unreasonable and unjustifiable to further delay the release of the accused.
Nevertheless, he submits that if he would be faulted for such act, he does
humbly concede but he merely acted in accordance with what he deemed best
for the moment x x x.[15]
As to his Order dated September 8, 2008 directing the release of the
vehicle subject of the case, he contends that there was no deliberate intent to
disregard rules and procedure. In fact, he points out that the prosecution was
given three (3) days within which to file its comment on the motion of the
accused. The grounds raised by both parties were well taken into consideration,
but he found the grounds raised by Melgazo to be more reasonable and practical
and, hence, he granted the motion.
Similarly, he denied the motion for inhibition filed by Pantilo owing
to the absence of an express imprimatur of the prosecutor handling the case.
On February 9, 2009, Pantilo filed his Reply to the Comment
arguing that there is no such thing as constructive bail under the rules. He adds
that, while he does not dispute the accuseds right to post bail, the granting of
such should be in harmony with the rules, i.e., an application or motion to that
effect and a corresponding order from the court granting the motion.
On October 18, 2010, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez issued his
evaluation and recommendation on the case. In his evaluation, the Court
1
Administrator found that respondent judge failed to comply with the documents
required by the rules to discharge an accused on bail. Further, the Court
Administrator noted that Judge Canoy also has another pending case (but filed
on a later date, September 3, 2009): OCA-IPI No. 09-3254-RTJ,
entitled Cristita Conjurado Vda. de Tolibas v. Judge Victor A. Canoy for Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.
Consequently, he recommended the following: (1) the instant
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (2) Judge
Canoy be fined forty thousand pesos (PhP 40,000) with a stern warning that a
commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Courts Ruling
We find the evaluation and recommendations of the Court Administrator well-
founded.
It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to
bail,[16] more so in this case when the charge against Melgazo, Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, is a non-capital offense. However, the
letter-complaint focuses on the manner of Melgazos release from detention.
Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any
person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. In the case at bar,
Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the grant of bail with the
Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the absence of any written application,
respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation
from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114.
In addition to a written application for bail, Rule 114 of the Rules prescribes
other requirements for the release of the accused:
SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail.The accused or any
person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the
nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city,
or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the
court, or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a
proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of section 2
of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from
custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail
and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the
excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to
whoever made the deposit.
In the case at bar, Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not deposit the
amount of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest collector
of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. In clear departure
from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, Judge Canoy instead verbally ordered Clerk IV
Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, to accept the
cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit, and to
date it the following day. Worse, respondent judge did not require Melgazo to
sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2,
Rule 114 to be complied with by Melgazo. Immediately upon receipt by Suriaga
of the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from Melgazo, Judge Canoy ordered the
police escorts to release Melgazo without any written order of release. In sum,
there was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR
collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking
signed by Melgazo, and no written release order.
As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as
constructive bail, there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the
noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random
to the prejudice of the rights of another.
In BPI v. Court of Appeals, We underscored that procedural rules have their
own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to
be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice,
or whimsicality.[17] In other words, [r]ules of procedure are intended to ensure
the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in
judicial and extrajudicial proceedings.[18] In this case, the reason of Judge
Canoy is hardly persuasive enough to disregard the Rules.[19]
From the foregoing, the Court finds Judge Canoy guilty of a less serious charge
of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars under Sec. 9, Rule
140 for which a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but not exceeding PhP 20,000 is
the imposable penalty under Sec. 11(b), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. A fine
of PhP 11,000 would be the appropriate penalty under the circumstances of the
case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Victor A. Canoy is
found GUILTY of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars. He is meted the penalty of a FINE of eleven thousand pesos (PhP
11,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar or analogous
infractions in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

SEC. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements.All kinds of

bail are subject to the following conditions:

(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and

unless cancelled, shall remain in form at all stages of the
case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was
originally filed in or appealed to it;

(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court

whenever required by the court or these Rules;

(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial

without justification and despite due notice shall be
deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such
case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and

(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the

court for execution of the final execution.

The original papers shall state the full name and address
of the accused, the amount of the undertaking and the
conditions required by this section. Photographs
(passport size) taken within the last six (6) months
showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused
must be attached to the bail.

2
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, G.R. No. 189122 obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of
Petitioner, society and those of the accused.[9]
P Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail
resent: pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of
C that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle
O that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity
R but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the
O accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. [10]
N THE FACTS
A
, Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for
J the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
. of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day
, of reclusion temporal as maximum.[11]

C He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[12] Pending appeal, he filed

h an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced
a age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
i flight on his part.
r
p The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. [13] It invoked the
e bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to
r extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution
s and only for strong reasons. Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that
o bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing
n medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner
,
VELASCO, JR., failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such
- v e r s u s - NACHURA, gravity that his continued confinement during trial will
PERALTA and permanently impair his health or put his life in danger.
MENDOZA, JJ. x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does
not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
THE COURT OF APPEALS confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be
and PEOPLE OF THE attended by his personal physician.[14]
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March 17, 2010 For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail
could be allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact
x---------------------------------------------------x of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case
and made a prima facie determination that there was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
[15]
DECISION Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his

CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his
release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, [1] is
the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be
done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the dubious
interval, often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?[2] Bail acts as
a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial
liberty and societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.[3]
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who
has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately
unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.[4] An accused not released on bail
is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal
and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. [5] Even if the conviction is
subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal
includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his
case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.[6] On the other hand, society
has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an
individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious
enough to warrant prison time.[7] Other recognized societal interests in the
denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from
court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the
avoidance of delay in punishment.[8] Under what circumstances an accused may
application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of
bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court
is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted
to an appellant pending appeal.
THE ISSUE
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail
pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant
of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent
any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the
trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense

3
 from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same
bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist,
or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while
under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in
either case. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application
for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of
more than six years imprisonment should automatically be granted.
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of
procedural and substantive rules.
BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS
FORBID GRANT OF PETITION
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to
challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the
interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[16]
Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for bail
pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial
thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the
prosecution,[17] however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his
claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence
of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of
Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his
application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital
offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without
or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal
in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively
lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail pending
appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but
it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction.[18] Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The
abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[19] It
must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation
of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be
a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. [20]
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail
pending appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and
whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was
ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or
imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals
exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of
petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was
the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By making
a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail,
the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it
raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion
in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application
and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.[21] In this
connection, Lee v. People[22] is apropos:
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown
that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not
correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute
errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and
conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed
by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally
frowns upon this remedial measure as regards
interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review
by certiorari will not only delay the administration of
justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.[23] (emphasis supplied)
WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5,
RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS
INTERPRETATION
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding
six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said
paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or
commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
4
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense
while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating
the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not
present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the
said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in
the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an
authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the
availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in
the following rules:
xxxxxxxxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial
Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one
of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial
Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years, and any of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be
granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x[24] (emphasis
supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another
authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or
deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-
negating[26] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are
absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where
none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse
of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists.If it so determines, it has no other option except to
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants
bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the
appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other
than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it may either allow or
disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second
scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise
thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence
of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is
so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to
deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two
different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the
import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the
grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the
penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding
six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is
always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the
determination of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances
exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is
present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere
fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the
five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist
of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely
curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular
factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice.[28] Choice
occurs where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of
options), there is more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the
outcome left to the decision maker.[29] On the other hand, the establishment of
a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.[30] Thus, by severely
clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere
fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where
the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the
provision that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is discretionary.
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this
case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve
the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed
reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the
facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter.[31] In view of the
grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all
circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his
conviction is affirmed.[32] It should also give due regard to any other pertinent
matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character
and reputation of the applicant,[33] among other things. More importantly, the
discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal
necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is
not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be
determined by the appellate court.[34] In other words, a threshold requirement
for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely
intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue. [35] This must be so;
otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting
appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail
pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong
presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was
sound,[36] specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no
5
judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for
substantial error.[37]
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting
the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies
the expressio unius est exclusio alterius[38] rule in statutory construction.
However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant
to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to the following or other
similar circumstances. Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations
other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be
considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to
unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial
court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of
the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal
in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will
be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six
years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is
more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-
negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without
those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that
bail pending appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses,
compared to those convicted of less serious crimes?
PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY
AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL
Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and
evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under
Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before
conviction by the Court of First Instance. After judgment
by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court
of First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail
as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction
by the Court of First Instance. After conviction by the
Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application,
be bailed at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital
offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No
person in custody for the commission of a capital offense
shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6,
Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All
persons in custody, shall before final conviction be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law
at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital
offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
(emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in
Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of
the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter
of right; exception. All persons in
custody, shall before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a
matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or
an offense which, under the law at
the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail,
is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an
accused who is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no
longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly
imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense
charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar
with respect to future as well as pending cases before the
trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following
policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the
accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an
offense which under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by a penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial
is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or
of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, he may be allowed to remain free on his
original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless
the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114,
Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a
capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after
trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense
than that charged in the complaint or information,
the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph
shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital
offense or an offense which under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail
is punishable by reclusion perpetuaand is out on bail and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused
shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his
appeal.
6
 As to criminal cases covered under the third
rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before
his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty,
the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to
surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice to
the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall
inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which,
the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this
Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the
accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the
Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain
under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered
within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond
shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by
this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be
dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his
bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular
No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the
said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All
persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by
law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the
accused to continue on provisional liberty under the
same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more
than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled,
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have
previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has
violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense
while on probation, parole, under
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused
or his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution
of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice
to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A
capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to
Rule 114 were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do
now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more
restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to
the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with
leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after
conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor
of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made
applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail
before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not
punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to
bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not
for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.[39]
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94
made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid
down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94
by clearly identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail
pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More
importantly, it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of
Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the
1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter
of right before final conviction.[40] Under the present rule, bail is a matter of
discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant
to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the presence of bail-negating
conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that
those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court
for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
where bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail
pending appeal? What is more in conformity with
an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors
the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial
of bail after due consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the
circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown
on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States
7
where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail
emanated.[41] While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless
shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other SO ORDERED.
democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the
allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial
discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should be exercised not
with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons. [42] In fact, it has even
been pointed out that grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and
exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section
5.[43]

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

The importance attached to conviction is due

to the underlying principle that bail should be granted
only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty
or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is
removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be
absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried
and convicted the presumption of innocence which
may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted,
and the burden is upon the accused to show error in
the conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate
punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the
accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if
liberated on bail than before
conviction.[44] (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and

relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals[45] (promulgated
in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail
pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.

A FINAL WORD

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged

with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
x x x (emphasis supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence

terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. [46] From then
on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being
repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial
court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-
standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history
and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination
that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on
bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal
laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays
often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus
may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release
conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites
frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal
justice system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on

the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 32159, with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

8
 LORNA M. VILLANUEVA,
Complainant,
- versus -
JUDGE APOLINARIO M. BUAYA,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In a verified affidavit-complaint[1] dated March 15, 2005, complainant Lorna
M. Villanueva, assisted by her father Pantaleon Villanueva, charged respondent
Acting Presiding Judge Apolinario M. Buaya of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Abuse of Authority.
[2]
In an affidavit-complaint executed on June 5, 2004, Villanueva accused then
Vice-Mayor Constantino S. Tupa of Palompon, Leyte, (of the crime of
Qualified Seduction. She later filed another complaint against the same accused
for violation of Section 5, paragraph (b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610 (otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act)[3] with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Palompon, Leyte.
MTC Judge Delia Noel-Bertulfo forwarded the case to the Office of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor after finding probable cause for two counts of
violation of Section 5, paragraph (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, allegedly
committed on October 29, 2002 and December 16, 2002. Judge Noel-Bertulfo
allowed Tupa to post bail in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) for each case.
On September 27, 2004, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Prudencio O.
Borgueta, Jr. issued a Joint Resolution on Review,[4] recommending the filing
of two separate informations for violation of Section 5(b) in relation with
Section 31,[5] of R.A. No. 7610 against the accused. He likewise recommended
the cancellation of the bail bond of P100,000.00 (per case) posted by Tupa as,
under Section 31, Article XII of R.A. No. 7610, if the offender is a public officer
or employee, the penalty provided in Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 [6] is
imposed in the maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua. Thus, bail is not a
matter of right. He also added that the cancellation of the bail bond was all the
more appropriate since there was strong evidence of guilt against the accused
based on Villanuevas affidavit-complaint and her material declarations during
the preliminary investigation. The accused did not refute these declarations and,
in fact, even admitted the alleged sexual acts in his counter-affidavit and
through his statements during the clarificatory hearing.
Based on the above recommendation, the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte filed
two separate Informations[7] for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610, in relation with Section 31, Article XII of the same law, against Tupa
before RTC, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte. No bail was recommended in both
cases.
Judge Eric F. Menchavez, then Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17, of
[8]
Palompon, Leyte, issued a warrant for the arrest of Tupa. However, the
warrant was not served because Tupa went into hiding and could not be
located. Meanwhile, Judge Menchavez was reassigned to the RTC in Cebu
City. This led to the designation of Judge Apolinario M. Buaya as Acting
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17 on December 8, 2004.
On the very same day (December 8, 2004), Tupa allegedly surrendered
voluntarily to SPO2 Charito Daau of the Ormoc City Police Station and filed
with the RTC, Branch 17 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Grant Bail (ex-
parte motion).[9] Tupa argued that the Prosecutor, in recommending the denial
of bail, erred in considering the special aggravating circumstance provided in
Section 31, Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 in the computation of the penalty to
be used as basis in determining his right to bail. Citing People of the Philippines
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131
v. Intermediate
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2241-RTJ)Appellate Court,[10] Tupa contended that for purposes of the
right to bail, the criterion to determine whether the offense charged is a capital
Present: offense is the penalty provided by the law, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.
[11]
CARPIO MORALES,In anJ.,
Order
Chairperson,
issued on the same day the ex-parte motion was filed, without
BRION, hearing and without notice to the prosecution, Judge Buaya granted the ex-
BERSAMIN, parte motion and ordered the release of Tupa on bail.
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ. On December 16, 2004, Villanueva moved to reconsider the order granting
the ex-parte motion. She argued that an application for bail should be heard and
Promulgated: cannot be contained in a mere ex-parte motion. Judge Buaya noted that
November 22, 2010
Villanuevas motion for reconsideration was submitted by the private prosecutor
without the conformity of the public prosecutor, as required under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Without acting on the merits of the said motion, Judge
Buaya issued an order allowing the accused to submit his comment or
opposition within ten days; thereafter, the matter would be submitted for
resolution.
Judge Buayas differing treatment of the ex-parte motion and her motion for
reconsideration apparently irked Villanueva, prompting her to file the present
administrative complaint against the RTC judge. She observed the seeming bias
and unfairness of Judge Buayas orders when he granted the ex-parte motion
without the required notice and hearing; on the other hand, he did not act on her
motion for reconsideration because it was not in the proper form, but allowed
the accused to comment on her motion.
In an Indorsement dated May 4, 2005,[12] then Court Administrator Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr. required Judge Buaya to comment on the administrative
complaint filed against him. The Court Administrator likewise required the
Judge to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
violation of his professional responsibility as a lawyer, pursuant to the
Courts En Banc Resolution dated September 17, 2002 in A.M. No. 02-9-02-
SC.[13]
Judge Buaya vehemently denied the charges against him in his Comment.[14] He
argued that the crime charged against Tupa was a bailable offense; when bail is
a matter of right, no hearing of the motion to grant bail is required. Thus, he
stood by his order granting the accused temporary liberty, through bail, without
a hearing. His assailed order, reiterated in his comment, held that a hearing
would be superfluous and unnecessary given the peculiar and special
circumstances attendant to the case. During the preliminary examination, the
investigating judge already passed upon and fixed the amount of bail for the
temporary liberty of the accused. In fact, the accused had availed of and
exercised his constitutional right to bail by posting the necessary bond. In his
view, the prosecution, in canceling the bail bond in its joint resolution for
review, acted to the prejudice of the accuseds paramount right to liberty. Judge
Buaya, therefore, asked for the dismissal of the present administrative
complaint for lack of merit.
Villanueva filed a Reply[15] contending that Judge Buayas assailed order on
the ex-parte motion was contrary to the Rules of Court requirement that a
motion to grant bail must be set for hearing to afford the State and the prosecutor
their day in court. She further accused Judge Buaya of being manifestly partial
as evidenced by the two temporary restraining orders (TROs) he issued in favor
of the accused in another case for quo warranto,[16] then pending before the
RTC, Branch 17. She observed that the first TRO read more like a decision on
the merits even though the case had not yet reached the pre-trial stage. The
second TRO, on the other hand, was allegedly issued without a hearing and was
antedated.
Prior to the Office of the Court Administrators (OCAs) action on the
administrative complaint, the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
00449,[17] rendered its decision[18] on the bail issue, granting the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by Villanueva, thus annulling and setting
aside Judge Buayas order granting bail to Tupa. Villanueva furnished the OCA
with a copy of the CA decision.
On May 9, 2008, then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao further evaluated
the merits of the case and opined that the issue of whether or not bail was a
matter of right in the present case is judicial in nature. She preferred not to
resolve the administrative complaint based on the CA decision (which found
the offense non-bailable) since the decision was not yet final and executory at
that time. However, she found Judge Buayas precipitate haste in granting the
accused bail to be unjust. She reasoned out that since there was doubt on
whether the offense was bailable, basic considerations of fair play should have
compelled Judge Buaya, at the minimum, to consult with the prosecution and
9
the other judge (who issued the warrant of arrest) on the reason for not
recommending bail. Court Administrator Elepao, therefore, recommended that
the present administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative
case and that Judge Buaya, for lack of prudence, be reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt
with more severely.
By Resolution of July 9, 2008,[19] this Court required the parties to manifest,
within ten days from notice, whether they were submitting the matter for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.
In his Manifestation,[20] Judge Buaya maintained his position that the offense at
issue is a bailable offense, therefore, bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not
required. He further alleged that the investigating prosecutor (who
recommended that no bail should be granted to Tupa) was pressured to reverse
the investigating MTC judges recommendation for bail during the preliminary
investigation stage. The prosecutor allegedly asked for a transfer of assignment
from Palompon, Leyte to Tacloban, but his request was denied, prompting him
to resign and work in a private bank.
As added proof of the lack of merit of the present administrative case filed
against him, Judge Buaya furnished this Court with the Affidavit of Desistance
and Declaration Against Interest[21] executed by Villanueva, together with the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes[22] of her October 11, 2007 testimony before
Presiding Judge Celso L. Mantua of the RTC, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte.
In both documents, Villanueva retracted her accusations against Tupa and
totally denied the occurrence of the alleged acts of lasciviousness committed
against her by the accused. Judge Buaya alleged that Villanueva was merely
used by certain political figures in their locality, and was pressured to file the
criminal cases against their former vice-mayor and the present administrative
case against him.
THE COURTS RULING
As a preliminary matter, we cannot give any weight to Judge Buayas
unsubstantiated allegation that the prosecutor who had recommended bail was
only pressured to make his recommendation. This allegation, aside from being
unsubstantiated, is totally irrelevant to the case whose issue is the propriety of
the action of the judge in granting bail ex-parte, not the action of the prosecutor
in recommending that no bail be granted.
The complainants desistance is likewise not legally significant. We
reiterate the settled rule that administrative actions cannot depend on the will or
pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, accept and
condone what is otherwise detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the
unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary
power. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and
decide the complaint against the respondent. Where public interest is at stake
and the Court can act on the propriety and legality of the conduct of judiciary
officials and employees, the Court shall act irrespective of any intervening
private arrangements between the parties.[23]
On many occasions, we have impressed upon judges that they owe
it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law they are supposed
to apply in a given controversy.[24] They are called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant
with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence. [25]
With the numerous cases already decided on the matter of bail, we
feel justified to expect judges to diligently discharge their duties on the grant or
denial of applications for bail. Basco v. Rapatalo[26] laid down the rules
outlining the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation x x x;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for
the purpose of enabling the court to exercise
its discretion x x x;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution x x x; [and]
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of
the [bail bond]. x x x Otherwise, petition
should be denied.
In the present case, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to
grant bail on the same day that it was filed by the accused. He did this without
the required notice and hearing. He justified his action on the ex-parte motion
by arguing that the offense charged against the accused was a bailable offense;
a hearing was no longer required since bail was a matter of right.Under the
present Rules of Court, however, notice and hearing are required whether bail
is a matter of right or discretion.[27] Likewise, jurisprudence is replete with
decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, where bail is a
matter of discretion.[28]
Judge Buaya further argued that in granting the ex-parte motion, he
was merely correcting a reversible error. Believing that the offense committed
was bailable in nature, he opined that when the investigating prosecutor revoked
the bail already posted by the accused, the prosecutor gravely violated the
accuseds constitutional right to bail. Judge Buaya firmly relied on the previous
order of the investigating MTC judge who, according to him, correctly fixed the
amount of bail. Thus, conducting a bail hearing on the ex-parte motion was no
longer necessary. Even assuming, however, that the previous order of the
investigating MTC judge was correct in granting bail to the accused, reliance
on a previous order granting bail does not justify the absence of a hearing in a
subsequent petition for bail.[29]
The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail
hearing in petitions for bail. Where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or
the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt
of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order
for the judge to properly exercise this discretion, he must first conduct a hearing
to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.[30] This discretion lies not
in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecutions evidence of guilt
against the accused.
In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing
for a petition for bail is required in order for the court to consider the guidelines
set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of
bail.[31] This Court has repeatedly held in past cases that even if the prosecution
fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused,
the court may still require the prosecution to answer questions in order to
ascertain, not only the strength of the State's evidence, but also the adequacy of
the amount of bail. [32]
One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the Court
the duty to maintain professional competence at all times.[33] When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of
the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the Court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.[34]
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Acting Presiding Judge Apolinario M.
Buaya of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, of Palompon,
Leyte, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of
Authority, and is hereby FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
merit a more serious penalty.
SO ORDERED.
10
EDUARDO SAN MIGUEL, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749 only the bail recommended by the prosecutor was considered withdrawn did not
Complainant, [Formerly OCA IPI-01-1342-RTJ] relieve the respondent of any liability.

Present: In his Comment[3] dated March 8, 2002, respondent explained that the motion
to cancel the prosecutor's recommended bail in Crim. Case No. 00-0736 did not
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., need any hearing because the court could act upon it without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party. When he canceled the bail, the cancellation referred
Chairperson, to the P60,000.00 and not the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres. The
September 17, 2001 Order canceling the bail does not speak of the cancellation
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, of the P120,000.00 bail and the same was reaffirmed in a subsequent Order
on November 21, 2001. The right of complainant to be heard in the motion to
CALLEJO, SR., withdraw bail was never violated nor his right to bail impaired. Complainant
could have posted the P120,000.00bail fixed by Judge Alumbres or could have
CHICO-NAZARIO, and seasonably moved for the lifting of the warrant, but he did not. The Order of
cancellation is dated September 17, 2001 while the Information for murder was
NACHURA, JJ. filed against complainant on September 14, 2001 or three days earlier. Thus,
the cancellation was in due course because complainant was already detained
JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ
for the non-bailableoffense of murder three days before the cancellation was
ordered.
MACEDA, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, In the Agenda Report[4] dated September 17, 2002, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
Las Pias City, Promulgated:
EVALUATION: The complaint is meritorious.
Respondent. April 4, 2007
The complainant is correct in saying that the order
x--------------------------------------------------x dated September 17, 2001 of respondent denied him his
right to bail. This order was issued upon motion of the
prosecution which motion was quite explicit of what was
sought to be cancelled. The motion in part reads:
RESOLUTION
xxx

2. In the said warrant of

arrest the Honorable
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. Court recommended
bail in the amount
of P120,000.00 to
Before us is the Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated November 28, 2001 of Eduardo secure the provisional
M. San Miguel (complainant) charging release of the accused.
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda (respondent), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Undersigned most
Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Pias City with Gross Ignorance of the Law, respectfully moves for
Manifest Partiality, Gross Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Evident Bad the cancellation of this
Faith and Gross Inexcusable Negligence, relative to Criminal Case No. 00- recommended bail
0736, entitled People of the Philippines v. Eduardo M. San Miguel and Socorro amount due to the
B. Osorio, for Violation of Section 15, Article III, Republic Act (R.A.) No. actuations of both
6425.[2] accused towards the
authority of this
Complainant was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation, distribution and Honorable Court.
delivery of .50 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, punishable
by prision correccional. He jumped bail. On May 10, 2001, then xxx
Judge Florentino Alumbres issued a bench warrant and canceled his bail bond PRAYER
in the amount of P60,000.00 and fixed a new bail bond in the amount
of P120,000.00. Complainant was arrested on September 8, WHEREFORE, premises
2001. On September 12, 2001, the state prosecutor filed a Motion to Cancel considered, it is most respectfully
Recommended Bail on the ground of reasonable belief and indications pointing prayed that the allowance for bail
to the probability that accused is seriously considering flight from granted to the accused to secure
prosecution. The Motion was set for hearing on September 19, their provisional liberty provided
2001. On September 17, 2001, complainant filed an Opposition to the in the Warrant of Arrest dated
Motion. On the same day, or two (2) days before the scheduled hearing, May 10, 2001 be CANCELLED
respondent issued an Order granting the Motion. During the hearing as there is reasonable ground to
of September 19, 2001, respondent opted to consider complainants Opposition believe and all indication, point to
as a motion for reconsideration and merely ordered the prosecutor to file a reply the probability, that both accused
thereto. On November 21, 2001, respondent issued an Order clarifying his are seriously considering flight
Order of September 17, 2001. from the prosecution of the instant
case. x x x
Complainant comes to this Court alleging that his right to procedural due
process was gravely violated when respondent issued the September 17, 2001 It is thus clear that what the prosecution prayed for was
Order without giving him the opportunity to comment on the same. The the cancellation of the bail of P120,000.00 set by
issuance of the September 17, 2001 Order shows respondent's gross ignorance Judge Alumbres in his Warrant of Arrest dated May 10,
of the law as the offense charged is neither a capital offense norpunishable 2001. This necessarily meant that the prosecution
by reclusion perpetua. His right to bail is not a mere privilege but a wanted complainant to remain in jail without
constitutionally guaranteed right that cannot be defeated by any order. Clearly, bail. Hence, when respondent granted the motion in his
the intendment of the September 17, 2001 Order was to deny him of his order dated September 17, 2001, he in effect denied
constitutional right to bail. The issuance of the November 21, 2001 Order that complainant his right to bail. It can not be denied that

11
 since complainant was charged with an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua and life
imprisonment and since he has not yet been convicted,
bail in his case is still a matter of right. (Section 4, Rule
114, Rules of Court) This is true notwithstanding the fact
that he previously jumped bail. In such a case,
respondent should have increased the amount of bail or
set certain conditions to ensure complainant's presence
during the trial, but he can not deny altogether
complainant's right to bail.
xxx
In order to prove his point that he never intended to deny
respondent his right to bail, respondent used as example
Socorro Osorio, the other co-accused, who was able to
gain her provisional liberty by posting a bail
of P120,000.00. This is untenable. Ms. Osorio was able
to post bail only on November 26, 2001 (Rollo, p. 5) or
five (5) days after respondent issued
his clarificatory order of November 21, 2001. It is
important to recall that the first order of respondent, that
dated September 17, 2001, gave the clear impression that
bail has been cancelled and from that date up to the time
he issued the order dated November 21, 2001 clarifying
his position, or a period of two (2) months, complainant
stayed in jail because he has lost his right to bail as a
result of the patently erroneous and illegal order of
respondent Judge. Hence, respondent is liable for gross
ignorance of the law for having denied complainant's
right to bail in a case where bail was a matter of
right. Besides, the prosecution's motion was granted two
(2) days before the scheduled date of hearing thereby
depriving the accused of his right to due process.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for
the consideration of the Honorable Court our
recommendations that the instant complaint be RE-
DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and
respondent be FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with
a WARNING that commission of a similar offense in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.[5]
In the Resolution of November 27, 2002, the Court required the parties to
manifest if they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings. Difficulties were encountered in notifying the parties.
Finally, on September 18, 2006, respondent manifested his willingness to
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
In its undated Letter-Reply,[6] the Postmaster of Las Pias informed the Court
that the letter addressed to complainant under Registry No. 59265 dated June
23, 2005 was returned unservedwith the notation RTS-Deceased.
Thus, in the Resolution of January 29, 2007, the Court deemed the case
submitted for resolution.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, all persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right.
Records show that complainant was charged with violation of Section 15,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425 which is punishable
by prision correccional. Following the provisions of the Constitution and the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, complainant is entitled to bail as a matter
of right.
Records show that the prosecutor's Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail was
very precise in its prayer, i.e., that the allowance for bail granted to the accused
to secure his provisional liberty provided in the Warrant of Arrest dated
May 10, 2001 be canceled as there is reasonable ground to believe and all
indications point to the probability that accused is seriously considering flight
from the prosecution of the case.
Two days before the scheduled date of hearing of the prosecutors
Motion, respondent issued the Order dated September 17, 2001, to wit:
ORDER
Considering the allegations in the Motion to Cancel
Recommended Bail filed by the State Prosecutor that
both accused are considering flight, especially accused
San Miguel who is facing a number of grave criminal
charges, and the probability of the accused jumping bail
is very high to warrant the cancellation of the
recommended bail, and it appearing that the accused
x x x jumped bail on May 10, 2001, the x x x motion is
GRANTED. The bail recommended xxx is considered
withdrawn.
SO ORDERED.[7]
However, respondent continued with the hearing on September 19, 2001. He
considered the Opposition to the Motion as a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Order granting the withdrawal by the prosecution of the recommended
bail.[8] This may have rectified the mistake committed by respondent as the
latter took into consideration that the accused has a right to due process as much
as the State;[9] but then, no evidence was adduced to prove that complainant was
seriously considering flight from prosecution, which was very critical to the
granting or denial of the motion of the prosecution to cancel bail.
In his Order dated November 21, 2001, to wit:
ORDER
The question is whether or not the increased bail
of P120,000.00 fixed by
x x x Hon. Florentino M. Alumbres, in the Warrant of
Arrest he issued on May 10, 2001 x x x was also
withdrawn by the Order dated September 17,
2001 granting the prosecution's withdrawal of its
recommended bail.
The answer is in the negative.
On September 19, 2001 Atty. Sebrio xxx manifested that
x x x the bail fixed by Judge Alumbres was not affected
by the withdrawal of the prosecution's recommended
bail. That is correct. Any of the accused, therefore, could
have applied for bail thereunder. They could have even
moved for the lifting of the warrant dated May 10. But,
they did not.
It is clear from the [September] 17 Order that only the
bail recommended by the prosecutor was considered
withdrawn. Such Order does not speak of cancellation of
the P120,000.00 bail fixed by the former Presiding Judge
x x x.
SO ORDERED.[10]
respondent clarified that the bail fixed by Judge Alumbres was not affected by
the withdrawal of the prosecution's recommended bail; only the bail
recommended by the prosecutor in the amount of P60,000.00 was considered
withdrawn in the Order of September 17, 2001. This belated order cannot
exonerate respondent from liability. The bail in the amount of P60,000.00was
already forfeited as a consequence of complainant's jumping bail. [11] How then
12
can respondent claim that he merely canceled the recommended bail
of P60,000.00 when the same had already been forfeited? The only
recommended bail that remains subject of the Motion of the prosecutor is the
increased bail in the amount of P120,000.00. Thus, there remains no other
conclusion except that respondent canceled the recommended bail in the
increased amount of P120,000.00. The Order of September 17,
2001 effectively deprived complainant of his constitutional right to bail when it
was issued two days before the scheduled hearing on September 19, 2001.
The OCA was right in observing that it was a mere afterthought on the part of
respondent in issuing the clarificatory Order, for how can the latter cancel
the P60,000.00 bail when the same was already forfeited as a consequence of
complainant's jumping bail?
And even granting for the sake of argument that complainant was also charged
with the crime of murder on September 14, 2001, or three days before the Order
of cancellation was issued, respondent failed to consider that what was being
prayed for by the prosecutor was the cancellation of the recommended bail for
violation of R.A. No. 6425 and not that of the crime of murder.
Respondent's asseveration that the cancellation of the bail without due hearing
was justified considering that complainant was already detained for the non-
bailable offense of murder three days before the cancellation was ordered, is
misplaced.
As we opined in Andres v. Beltran,[12] it is a misconception that when an
accused is charged with the crime of murder, he is not entitled to bail at all or
that the crime of murder is non-bailable. The grant of bail to an accused charged
with an offense that carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua x x x is
discretionary on the part of the trial court. In other words, accused is still
entitled to bail but no longer "as a matter of right." Instead, it is discretionary
and calls for a judicial determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong in
order to grant bail. The prosecution is accorded ample opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on
the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is strong.[13]
[14]
As we held in Sy Guan v. Amparo, where bail is a matter of right and prior
absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be allowed
irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of
probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no
greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as would
reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such
amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision that excessive bail shall
not be required.[15]
Anent the allegation that complainant was deprived of his right to due process,
we find the same meritorious.
Sec. 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Respondent's issuance of the September 17, 2001 Order two days prior to the
scheduled hearing without considering complainant's Opposition to the Motion,
effectively deprived the latter of his constitutional right to due process. As
above stated, during the September 19, 2001 hearing, respondent considered the
Opposition to the Motion as a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order,
albeit, the prosecutor was merely ordered to file its reply thereto without
adducing evidence to prove the high probability that complainant will jump
bail.
Respondent's issuance of the assailed Order before the scheduled hearing is
premature and is tantamount to misconduct. Thus, we find respondent guilty of
simple misconduct. Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part
of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of
parties or to the right determination of the cause.[21] It generally means
wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate
or intentional purpose. Respondent may not be held guilty of gross misconduct
because the term gross connotes something out of all measure; beyond
allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful. [22] In this case, complainant
was not able to post bail because there is no other way for a lay man to interpret
the assailed Order except that it effectively canceled the bail bond fixed by
Judge Alumbres, thereby depriving him of his right to temporary liberty as a
result of respondent's erroneous Order.
WHEREFORE, Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC, Branch 275,
Las Pias City is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and FINED in the
amount of P5,000.00 with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Upon review of the TSN of the September 19, 2001 hearing, we find that the
prosecutor failed to adduce evidence that there exists a high probability
of accused's jumping bail that would warrant the cancellation of the
recommended bail bond. Following then the above ratiocination, respondent's
only recourse is to fix a higher amount of bail and not cancel
the P120,000.00bail fixed by Judge Alumbres.

Well-entrenched is the rule that a partys remedy, if prejudiced by the orders of

a judge given in the course of a trial, is the proper reviewing court, and not with
the OCA by means of an administrative complaint. [16] As a matter of policy, in
the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous.[17] A judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment unless there
is proof that the error is made with a conscious and deliberate intent to commit
an injustice. Thus, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his official duties makes him liable therefor.[18] The
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. [19]

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a judge must
not only be erroneous; more important, it must be motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.[20] Complainant, having failed
to present positive evidence to show that respondent judge was so motivated in
granting the Motion without hearing, can not be held guilty of gross ignorance
of the law.

13
G.R. No. 199113
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the
Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari
filed by Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner assailed the
Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of
probable cause.
The factual antecedents:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian
citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife
returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-
square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004,
they came to know that the portion where they built their house is
public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the
said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the
ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463)
against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate
General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and
that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property
from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property
was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the
same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal
suits between him and private respondent’s family.
6 is not left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to
On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of
Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said
resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s
MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by
petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to
warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any
proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing
the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of
Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012)
and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his
arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of
Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law
relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that
R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign
citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine
citizenship before its enactment when the governing law was
Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which
petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re- acquired his Philippine
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing
order denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his
application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR
Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the
applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six
months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the
motion for reconsideration.14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for
certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an
accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable
cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the
March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-
born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-
acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the
act of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and
not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of
allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner
trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his
defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction,
to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for
falsification, the lower court has disregarded the undisputed
fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that
by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was
14
 by legal fiction "deemed not to have lost" it at the time of his
naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was
said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal
residence in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be
arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to
Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the
right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to question
the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before
the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of
due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s
argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without
merit.1âwphi1 It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on
Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine
citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be
applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still
not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he had not
alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in
the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is
stressed that in falsification of public document, it is not necessary that
the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to
petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which
may be properly raised and proved in a full- blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the
Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the
MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable
Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said
court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC
correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough
and personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their
respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be
indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the
MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of
probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic:
"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis
supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed "not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the
conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country
who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for
both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of
a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, "re-acquired"
for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos
who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine
Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms
"re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident
from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall
be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was
lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country
is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its
title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the
provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the
procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the
case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new
law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and
retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that
interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred because
it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in
this case it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question
of law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a
non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He
further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born
Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18,
2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of
Representative Exequiel Javier:
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under
Section 3 of the Senate version, "Any provision of law on the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their
Philippine citizenship.
15
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their
citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this
Act are deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here.
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the
effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship.
But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the
effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the
distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who
became, let’s say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are
considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost
their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural
born citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just
want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is
precisely retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to
those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63.Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can
agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending
Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is
deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the
effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship
applying to future instances. So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here
making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very
important for certain government positions, ‘no, because natural-born
citizens are only qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s
one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation,
Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for
those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the
future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of
natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time
of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings
in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already
lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos
who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the
new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225
without any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of
reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more
favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation
to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual,
or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The
elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172
of the RPC are:
(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer
or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position;
(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA
63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by
which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification
of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination
of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However,
custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other
than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a
motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held
that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
in Santiago v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since
the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as
a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody
of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is
not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
16
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an
accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to
the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body
of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

xxxx

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it

concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago,
seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

xxxx

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by
the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of
the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person.Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if
a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail,
he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis
supplied)

Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion

for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating
that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such
erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in
denying the said motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8,

2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in
Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

17
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 148769. January 28, 2003]
EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 149116. January 28, 2003]
EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner
Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation
and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to
Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the
accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose
Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of
Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation,
a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in February 2000
ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the
poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and
support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators
and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation,
received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson
through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received
the donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundations
treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundations account with the
Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused
then President Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several
illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game
known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the
Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons. Among
such complaints were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim.
Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim.
Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and
Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed
as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February
21, 2001. The other respondents likewise filed their respective counter-
affidavits.The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary
investigation of the complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint
resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and
several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan
several Informations against former President Estrada, who earlier had
resigned from his post as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. One of these Informations, docketed as Criminal Case No.
26558, charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the
Ombudsman filed an amended Information in said case charging
Estrada and several co-accused, including petitioner, with said
crime. No bail was recommended for the provisional release of all the
accused, including petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division
which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The amended
Information reads:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as
follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on
SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit public
fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.
7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-
accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE,
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS,
and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000
SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDERED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
18
 CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR
LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS [189,700,000.00] MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS,
GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsmans
Joint Resolution finding probable cause against him for plunder. The
next day, April 6, 2001, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation.[2] Petitioner likewise
filed on said date, this time with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and
Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of Probable
Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a
Reinvestigation of the Charges against accused Edward Serapio.[3]
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amended Information charging
petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.[4]
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
on April 25, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to
justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused, including
petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the
same date for the arrest of petitioner.[5] When apprised of said order,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to
Philippine National Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has
since been detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including
petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the
meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. [6] For
his part, petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20,
2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail
as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition
for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of
the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule.However, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an
order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be
heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and
even before the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their
respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the
hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition for bail on
May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners
petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early
arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a
motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and
petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning
the propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the
hearing on his (petitioners) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001
resetting the hearings on petitioners petition for bail to June 18 to 28,
2001 to enable the court to resolve the prosecutions pending motions as
well as petitioners motion that his petition for bail be heard as early as
possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying petitioners April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court
ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had already been resolved in
its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold petitioner
and his co-accused for trial.[7] Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001 Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring
the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused in Criminal
Case No. 26558 during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain
of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent
powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines
best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the
case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing
considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial.[8]
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on
June 18, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001
canceling the said bail hearing due to pending incidents yet to be
resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26, 2001.[9]
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001
Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed
because on said date petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion
to quash the amended Information on the grounds that as against him,
the amended Information does not allege a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the
amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative
of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in
paragraph (a) of the amended Information to have been illegally
received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in
Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended Information
charges him of bribery and illegal gambling.[10] By way of riposte, the
prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed
to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that
petitioners motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to
his petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the
hearing on the petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558
for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the
motion to quash of petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan
could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution,
petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the
Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the
Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of
his right to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have waived their
right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and,
premised on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of
petitioners guilt of plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail
after due proceedings.[11]
19
 Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix
his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioners motion to quash the amended Information. Petitioner,
through counsel, received on said date a copy of said resolution. [12] The
motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was also resolved by the
Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No.
26558, petitioner manifested to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to
file a motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying
his motion to quash and for the deferment of his arraignment. The
Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no provision in the
Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayans rules granting the right to
petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of an interlocutory order
issued by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan
proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling
the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769, alleging that the
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding
the fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amended Information
against him do not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is
charged, under the said amended Information, for more than one
offense. Jose Jinggoy Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with the
Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of a resolution of
the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition
for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing the
Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April
6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001 Resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING
PETITIONER SERAPIOS MOTION TO
QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
I as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED
INFORMATION AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO
DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio,
does not allege a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio,
does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of
an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C. The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information and alleged to have been illegally received
or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as
defined in Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE
THAN ONE OFFENSE.[13]
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information,
he is charged with plunder only in paragraph (a) which reads:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on
SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-
accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;[14]
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the
amended Information of a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as
amended. Neither does the amended Information allege a pattern of
criminal acts. He avers that his single act of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal resolution does not
constitute the requisite combination or series of acts for plunder. He
further claims that the consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or
kickbacks in furtherance of said resolution turned over to and received
by former President Joseph E. Estrada on several occasions does not
cure the defect in the amended information. Petitioner insists that on the
face of the amended Information he is charged only with bribery or illegal
gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of
the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by former President Joseph E. Estrada
in confabulation with his co-accused is not ill-gotten wealth as defined in
Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of
them shall be included in the complaint or information.[15]
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form
what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the
proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definition and elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the
requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in the Information
is to inform an accused of the nature of the accusation against him so
as to enable him to suitably prepare for his defense.[16] Another purpose
is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.[17] The use of derivatives
or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.[18]
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all
the accused, including petitioner, connived and conspired with former
President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or
means. And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner and
his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or
indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate amount
of P545,000,000.00. In Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third
20
Division), et al.,[19] we held that the word series is synonymous with the
clause on several instances; it refers to a repetition of the same
predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We further
held that the word combination contemplates the commission of at least
any two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that
plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended information charges accused
therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of the
same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law and that:
x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several
instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those
who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This
predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the
enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x x.[20]
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the
same is evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence need
not be alleged in the Information.[21]
The Court also ruled in Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan[22] that the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17
inclusive of the P545 million alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended
information is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated in Section 1, paragraph
1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as amended, and that all the accused in
paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended information conspired and
confederated with former President Estrada to enable the latter to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including
petitioner, are charged of having conspired and confabulated together in
committing plunder. When two or more persons conspire to commit a
crime, each is responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation of
law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of them.[23] Conspirators
are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield
one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declarations of each,
while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and
declarations of all.[24]
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended
Information of bribery and illegal gambling and others. The
Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not charged with the
predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling but is charged only with
one crime that of plunder:
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION
CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information
charges more than one offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code), malversation of public funds or property (Article 217, Revised
Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and
Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information
are not charged as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of
plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d)
thereof does not make any express reference to any specific provision of laws,
other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a
separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. The said
acts which form part of the combination or series of act are described in their
generic sense. Thus, aside from malversation of public funds, the law also
uses the generic terms misappropriation, conversion or misuse of said
fund. The fact that the acts involved may likewise be penalized under other
laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as predicate acts of the
crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or to
be understood as allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished
under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. [25]
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face
of the amended Information that petitioner and his co-accused are
charged only with one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts
or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts merely
constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and independent
of the crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion
contending that:
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY
DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIOS URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31
MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY DISREGARDED
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED
GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW
SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE
IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN
INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO.[26]
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying his omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause; and to
direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges
him. Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally
disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of
discretion in charging him with plunder. He further argues that there
exists no probable cause to support an indictment for plunder as against
him.[27]
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman
does not even mention him in relation to the collection and receipt
of jueteng money which started in 1998[28] and that the Ombudsman
inexplicably arrived at the conclusion that the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation was a money laundering front organization put up by Joseph
Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even though the latter presented
evidence that said Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private
foundation.[29] More importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not
indicate that he knew that the P200 million he received for the
Foundation came from jueteng.[30]
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1)
the P200 million he received does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as
defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080;[31] (2) there is no evidence
linking him to the collection and receipt of jueteng money;[32] (3) there
was no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving
the P200 million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.[33]
Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is
premised on the absolute lack of evidence to support a finding of
probable cause for plunder as against him,[34] and hence he should be
spared from the inconvenience, burden and expense of a public trial.[35]
21
 Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government
prosecutors is not beyond judicial scrutiny. He asserts that while this
Court does not ordinarily look into the existence of probable cause to
charge a person for an offense in a given case, it may do so in
exceptional circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the
orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts
of the officer are without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.[36] Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for a
reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned joint
resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner
from the charge of plunder and committed errors of law or irregularities
which have been prejudicial to his interest.[37] He also states that during
the joint preliminary investigations for the various charges against
Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge was
only one of the eight charges against Estrada et al., he was not furnished
with copies of the other complaints nor given the opportunity to refute
the evidence presented in relation to the other seven cases, even though
the evidence presented therein were also used against him, although he
was only charged in the plunder case.[38]
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners omnibus motion. They assert
that since the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner
with the crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is bound to assume
jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try the same. They further
argue that a finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and
prefatory of the eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the
accused, and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose his
defenses in a full blown trial where his guilt or innocence may finally be
determined.[39]
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners omnibus motion asking
for, among others, a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans joint resolution did not
raise the grounds of either newly discovered evidence, or errors of law
or irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds
upon which a motion for reconsideration may be filed.[40]
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to
charge petitioner with plunder as a co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada.[41]
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan[42], the Court ruled:
x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the
Ombudsmans discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this
Court said:
x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish
probable cause for filing of information against the supposed offender.
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,[43] the Court ruled thus:
Furthermore, the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in
nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the contention that the
Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner
is liable for estafa through falsification of public documents, petitioner is
clearly raising questions of fact here. His arguments are anchored on the
propriety or error in the Ombudsmans appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot
be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the
consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither question of
fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is
concerned, we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
respondents which would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari.
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing their resolution and joint resolution,
respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court
finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and
the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against petitioner for
plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
petitioners motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the
amended Information. In its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that probable
cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of
plunder, thus:
In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended
Information dated 18 April 2001 charging the accused with the offense of
PLUNDER and examining carefully the evidence submitted in support thereof
consisting of the affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and several other pieces of documentary evidence, as
well as the respective counter-affidavits of accused former President Joseph
Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose Jinggoy Pimentel Estrada dated February
20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21, 2001 and Edward S. Serapio
dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds that probable cause for
the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of
accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, John Doe. a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and
Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas.[44]
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioners
omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary
investigation was fully conducted in accordance with Rule II,
Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to
Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
of 1989); and that all the basic complaints and evidence in support
thereof were served upon all the accused.[45] It was in light of such
findings that the Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the
allegation that accused therein (including petitioner) were deprived of
the right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsmans Resolution dated
April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after
the conduct of preliminary investigation in connection therewith. In
addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans resolution, but failed to show in his
motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or that the
preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities,
which are the only grounds for which a reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans resolution may be granted.[46]
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not
a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute.[47] The
absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground
for quashing the Information.[48] If the lack of a preliminary investigation
does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a
motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the
court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it be said that petitioner
had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the opportunity to
refute the charges against him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.[49] As the Court held in Webb vs. De
Leon, [a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.[50]
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor
or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation,
courts as a rule must defer to said officers finding and determination of
probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable
22
cause is the function of the prosecutor.[51] The Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity
or that its findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are
not supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayans resolution
denying petitioners motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to
substantiate petitioners claim that it gravely abused its discretion in
ruling that there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.[52]
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals[53] that an accused
shall not be deemed to have waived his right to ask for a preliminary
investigation after he had been arraigned over his objection and despite
his insistence on the conduct of said investigation prior to trial on the
merits does not apply in the instant case because petitioner merely
prayed for a reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered
evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary investigation had been conducted
by the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended Information, and
that petitioner had participated therein by filing his counter-
affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had already denied his
motion for reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration
thereon prior to his arraignment.[54] In sum then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of
the parties, the issues for resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner
should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be
conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the
amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail; (3)
Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of
the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4)
Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition
to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence
of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5) Whether petitioner
was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and
should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July
10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a plea of not guilty for
him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned
first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone
and must, of necessity, be heard immediately.[55] Petitioner maintains
that his arraignment before the bail hearings are set is not necessary
since he would not plead guilty to the offense charged, as is evident in
his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the Senate
investigation of the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation
before the Ombudsman.[56] Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced
even if it would present all its evidence before his arraignment because,
under the Revised Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt is
mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution,[57] and petitioner admitted that he cannot repudiate the
evidence or proceedings taken during the bail hearings because Rule
114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that
evidence present during bail hearings are automatically reproduced
during the trial.[58] Petitioner likewise assures the prosecution that he is
willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a bail bond should he be
granted bail.[59]
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail
hearings may be commenced, because it is only upon arraignment that
the issues are joined. The People stress that it is only when an accused
pleads not guilty may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to
the charge, there would be no more need for him to file said
petition. Moreover, since it is during arraignment that the accused is first
informed of the precise charge against him, he must be arraigned prior
to the bail hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity of the
bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of the
charge against him, especially considering that, under Section 8, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented during such
proceedings are considered automatically reproduced at the
trial.[60] Likewise, the arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings
diminishes the possibility of an accuseds flight from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had only if an accused
escapes after he has been arraigned.[61] The People also contend that
the conduct of bail hearings prior to arraignment would extend to an
accused the undeserved privilege of being appraised of the prosecutions
evidence before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty reduction. [62]
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001
and a plea of not guilty had been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his
behalf, thereby rendering the issue as to whether an arraignment is
necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in petitioners case moot,
the Court takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling precepts
thereon pursuant to its symbolic function of educating the bench and
bar.[63]
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an
accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition
for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived
of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.[64] An accused
need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, [65] this Court ruled on the issue
of whether an accused must first be arraigned before he may be granted
bail. Lavides involved an accused charged with violation of Section 5(b)
Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable
by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The
accused therein assailed, inter alia, the trial courts imposition of the
condition that he should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post
bail. We held therein that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be
granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash.[66]
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to
mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede
arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as
he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is
filed against him.[67] The Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be
understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition
for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against
him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where
he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released
on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on
trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.[68]
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned
before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail
is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even
prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an
application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is
arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is
entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may
be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a
situation, bail would be authorized under the circumstances. In fine,
the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before
proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a
motion to quash during the pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner
maintains that a motion to quash and a petition for bail are not
inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each other. While he
agrees with the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some
instances result in the termination of the criminal proceedings and in the
release of the accused therein, thus rendering the petition for bail moot
23
and academic, he opines that such is not always the case; hence, an
accused in detention cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome of a
motion to quash and decide whether or not to file a petition for bail or to
withdraw one that has been filed.[69] He also insists that the grant of a
motion to quash does not automatically result in the discharge of an
accused from detention nor render moot an application for bail under
Rule 117, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.[70]
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an
application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail
is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of
Court.[71] Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person
charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time
securing his appearance at the trial.[72] As stated earlier, a person may
apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue
of his arrest or voluntary surrender.[73]
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode
by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. [74] An
accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule,
before arraignment.[75]
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily
antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek
provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an
offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of
his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail
the validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It must be
conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or
Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is
granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released,
the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that
the hearings on the petitions for bail of petitioner and accused Jose
Jinggoy Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said
case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would
negate his right to have his petition for bail resolved in a summary
proceeding since said hearings might be converted into a full blown trial
on the merits by the prosecution.[76]
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the
court from having to hear the same witnesses and the parties from
presenting the same evidence where it would allow separate bail
hearings for the accused who are charged as co-conspirators in the
crime of plunder.[77]
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal
Case No. 26558 to participate in the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan
explained that the directive was made was in the interest of the speedy
disposition of the case. It stated:
x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused
Serapio were to be excused from participating in the hearing on the motion for
bail of accused Serapio, under the pretext that the same does not concern them
and that they will participate in any hearing where evidence is presented by
the prosecution only if and when they will already have filed their petitions for
bail, or should they decide not to file any, that they will participate only
during the trial proper itself, then everybody will be faced with the daunting
prospects of having to go through the process of introducing the same witness
and pieces of evidence two times, three times or four times, as many times as
there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is not conducive to
the speedy termination of a case. Neither can such procedure be characterized
as an orderly proceeding.[78]
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings
of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition
for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case
against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a
joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different
accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial
against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the
Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the
State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the
witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of
accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the
complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving
petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the
observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has a stake,
with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual
protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About
them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that
fashion has become rampant over the earth.[79]
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,[80] this Court
held that in a petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a
summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving
and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent
with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight
of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or
enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the
evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be offered therein. It may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to
the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused
will of course avoid duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution
and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially
so if both movants for bail are charged of having conspired in the
commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially
the same evident against them.However, in the cases at bar, the joinder
of the hearings of the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the
case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different
matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing
of petitioners petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a completely
different dimension. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As
against former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a
full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail
hearing. Moreover, following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose Jinggoy Estrada can
only be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-
paragraph (a) of the amended Information since it is not clear from the
latter if the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with
each other to assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold
that petitioner can only be charged with having conspired with the other
co-accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances, money x x x from illegal
gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling.[81] Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution
needs to adduce to prove that the evidence against him for the charge
of plunder is strong are those related to the alleged receipt or collection
of money from illegal gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information. With the joinder of the hearing of petitioners
petition for bail and the trial of the former President, the latter will have
the right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for
the prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. If
petitioner will adduce evidence in support of his petition after the
prosecution shall have concluded its evidence, the former President may
insist on cross-examining petitioner and his witnesses. The joinder of the
hearing of petitioners bail petition with the trial of former President
Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay
the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain
provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied
by the respondent court. The indispensability of the speedy resolution of
24
an application for bail was succinctly explained by Cooley in his
treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with
reasonable certainty insure the attendance of the accused to answer the
accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when
the effect is to subject him in a greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a
guilty person, while as yet it is not determined that he has not committed any
crime.[82]
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No.
26558, is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner
it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy
termination of the case,[83] the Court finds that it gravely abused its
discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of
former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly.It bears stressing that
the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the
pre-eminent position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have
the matter of his provisional liberty resolved without unnecessary
delay,[84] only to make a volte face and declare that after all the hearing
of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose Jinggoy Estrada and the trial as
against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be held
simultaneously. In ordering that petitioners petition for bail to be heard
jointly with the trial of the case against his co-accused former President
Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and
unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of
petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
its discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition
for bail with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E.
Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioners allegations that the prosecution tried to
delay the bail hearings by filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it
is petitioner and his co-accused who caused the delay in the trial of
Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of numerous manifestations and
pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.[85] They assert that they filed the
motion for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment around
the original schedule for the bail hearings which was on May 21-25,
2001.[86]
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital
offenses.[87] In support thereof, they cite Article III, Sec 13 of the
Constitution, which states that
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.[88]
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provide:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonement, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right, exception.All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.[89]
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not
absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail
pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is
not a matter of right but is discretionary upon the court. [90] Had the rule
been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for an application for
bail by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114, Section
8 which states:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application
for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence
presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced
at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness
for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify.[91]
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the
evidence of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not
strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an application for bail
by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be
conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to
discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an
accused is strong.[92] The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity
to present all the evidence it may deems necessary for this
purpose.[93] When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of
guilt is strong, it is the courts duty to deny the application for
bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a
matter of right.[94]
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at
this stage of the proceedings. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had
refused to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail
application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing
thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive,
expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to
the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan
had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners application for
bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several
motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be resolved by the
court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was eventually
scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did
not push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application for
bail is therefore not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the
prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from
the following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1)
leave to file motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation
and to direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2)
conduct a determination of probable cause as would
suggest the issuance of house arrest; (3) hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and other
proceedings pending determination of probable cause;
Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;
Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or
Service of Warrant of Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail or
For Release on Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;
Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando,
Bulacan, dated May 11, 2001;
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001,
praying for Resolution of May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail
hearings be set at the earliest possible time;
Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or
Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;
Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus
Motion, dated June 13, 2001, praying that he be allowed to
file a Motion for Reinvestigation; and
Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.[95]
25
Motions filed by the prosecution:
Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;[96]
Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada,
Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated May 8,
2001;[97]
Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Omnibus Motion to Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated May
25, 2001;[98] and
Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and
Transcription in Filipino, dated June 19, 2001.[99]
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the
aforesaid delay by their filing of the following motions:
Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7080 and praying that the Amended Information be quashed;
Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that he be (1) excluded from the
Amended Information for lack of probable cause; (2)
released from custody; or in the alternative, (3) be allowed to
post bail;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated
April 25, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying
that they be placed on house arrest during the pendency of
the case;
Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed
by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May
2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada, praying by reinvestigation of the case by the
Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of the case;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001,
filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for five (5) within
which to respond to the Opposition to Motion to Quash in
view of the holidays and election-related distractions;
Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated
May 10, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial
arrangement, dated May 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest;
Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by
Jinggoy Estrada;
Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be allowed to be confined
in Tanay;
Motion to charge as Accused Luis Chavit Singson, filed by
Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, seeking reconsideration of denial of
requests for house arrest, for detention in Tanay or Camp
Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as
Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed
by Jinggoy Estrada;
Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the resolution
compelling them to be present at petitioner Serapios hearing
for bail be reconsidered;
Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada;
Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada stating that Bishop Teodoro
Bacani favors their house arrest;
Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their right to be present at the June
18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings and reserving their right to
trial with assessors;
Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest;
Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents; and
Possible Trial with Assessors, dated June 19, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs,
dated June 20, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, asking for free dates for parties, claiming that denial
of bail is cruel and inhuman, reiterating request for gag order
of prosecution witnesses, availing of production, inspection
and copying of documents, requesting for status of alias
case; and
Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada,
requesting for permission to attend some municipal affairs in
San Juan, Metro Manila.[100]
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases
where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an
application for bail by an accused charged with a capital offense, the trial
court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on said application.[101] The
rationale for such requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta.
Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:[102]
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter
of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very
nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted
to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited
or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
26
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own petitioners petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the
evidence in rebuttal.[103] Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself
is partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail.[117] It cannot be
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until
availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but
the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail and
on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such
resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding
discretion in refusing to grant bail,[118] or has not even exercised said
that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be
discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the
granted bail.
court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas to proceed.
corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is entitled to the issuance of
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be
said writ because the State, through the prosecutions refusal to present
unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayans resolution of the
evidence and by the Sandiganbayans refusal to grant a bail hearing, has
pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to
failed to discharge its burden of proving that as against him, evidence of
forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.
guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that
the prosecution launched a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, rendered as follows:
the prosecution moved for petitioners arraignment before the
commencement of bail hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for 1. In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are
petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it DISMISSED. The resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of
was only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it would said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the evidence in chief,
meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the 2. In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
prosecution presented its entire case upon the accused; and argued that resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex L of the petition,
petitioners motion to quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and ordering a joint hearing of petitioners petition for bail and the trial of
therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these two Criminal Case No. 26558 as against former President Joseph E. Estrada
remedies.[104] He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also SET
questioned orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings ASIDE.
effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law. [105]
No costs.
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan
of new orders canceling the bail hearings which it had earlier set did not SO ORDERED.
render moot and academic the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, since said orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of
petitioners right to bail.[106] He argues further that the fact that he was
arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself
negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his
contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,[107] where the Court held
that habeas corpus extends to instances where the detention, while
valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.[108]

However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper

because petitioner was arrested pursuant to the amended information
which was earlier filed in court,[109] the warrant of arrest issuant pursuant
thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities.[110]

As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. [111] In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid
arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as
the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut through barriers
of form and procedural mazes.[112] Thus, in previous cases, we issued
the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law,
had later become invalid,[113] and even though the persons praying for
its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty.[114]

The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does
not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had
jurisdiction to issue the same[115] applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan
on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended
information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner
had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25,
2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.

The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile[116] that habeas corpus will lie
where the deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become
arbitrary in view of subsequent developments finds no application in the
present case because the hearing on petitioners application for bail has
yet to commence. As stated earlier, the delay in the hearing of
27
 [G.R. No. 119255. April 9, 2003]
TOMAS K. CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ENCARNACION VALDES-CHOY, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in an action for specific
performance[2] filed in the Regional Trial Court[3] by petitioner Tomas K.
Chua (Chua) against respondent Encarnacion Valdes-Choy (Valdes-
Choy). Chua sought to compel Valdes-Choy to consummate the sale of
her paraphernal house and lot in Makati City. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision[4] rendered by the trial court in favor of Chua.
The Facts
Valdes-Choy advertised for sale her paraphernal house and lot
(Property) with an area of 718 square meters located at No. 40
Tampingco Street corner Hidalgo Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati
City. The Property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162955
(TCT) issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City in the name of
Valdes-Choy. Chua responded to the advertisement. After several
meetings, Chua and Valdes-Choy agreed on a purchase price
of P10,800,000.00 payable in cash.
On 30 June 1989, Valdes-Choy received from Chua a check
for P100,000.00. The receipt (Receipt) evidencing the
transaction, signed by Valdes-Choy as seller, and Chua as buyer,
reads:
3
0
J SELLING PRICE P10,800,000.00
u
n EARNEST MONEY P100,000.00
e PARTIAL PAYMENT 485,000.00
1
9
8 ____________________585
9 ,000.00
RECEIPT
RECEIVED from MR. TOMAS K. CHUA PBCom Check No. 206011 in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P100,000.00) as
EARNEST MONEY for the sale of the property located at 40 Tampingco cor.
Hidalgo, San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila (Area : 718 sq. meters).
The balance of TEN MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P10,700,000.00) is payable on or before 15[5] July 1989. Capital Gains Tax
for the account of the seller. Failure to pay balance on or before 15 July 1989
forfeits the earnest money. This provided that all papers are in proper order.[6]
CONFORME: ENCARNACION VALDES
Seller
TOMAS K. CHUA
Buyer
x x x.[7]
In the morning of 13 July 1989, Chua secured from Philippine
Bank of Commerce (PBCom) a managers check
for P480,000.00. Strangely, after securing the managers check, Chua
immediately gave PBCom a verbal stop payment order claiming that this
managers check for P480,000.00 was lost and/or misplaced.[8] On the
same day, after receipt of Chuas verbal order, PBCom Assistant
VicePresident Julie C. Pe notified in writing[9] the PBCom Operations
Group of Chuas stop payment order.
In the afternoon of 13 July 1989, Chua and Valdes-Choy met with
their respective counsels to execute the necessary documents and
arrange the payments.[10] Valdes-Choy as vendor and Chua as
vendee signed two Deeds of Absolute Sale (Deeds of Sale). The first
Deed of Sale covered the house and lot for the purchase price
of P8,000,000.00.[11] The second Deed of Sale covered the furnishings,
fixtures and movable properties contained in the house for the purchase
price of P2,800,000.00.[12] The parties also computed the capital gains
tax to amount to P485,000.00.
On 14 July 1989, the parties met again at the office of Valdes-
Choys counsel. Chua handed to Valdes-Choy the PBCom managers
check for P485,000.00 so Valdes-Choy could pay the capital gains tax
as she did not have sufficient funds to pay the tax. Valdes-Choy issued
a receipt showing that Chua had a remaining balance of P10,215,000.00
after deducting the advances made by Chua. This receipt reads:
July 14, 1989
Received from MR. TOMAS K. CHUA PBCom. Check No. 325851 in the
amount of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS ONLY
(P485,000.00) as Partial Payment for the sale of the property located at 40
Tampingco Cor. Hidalgo St., San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila
(Area 718 sq. meters), covered by TCT No. 162955 of the Registry of Deeds
of Makati, Metro Manila.
The total purchase price of the above-mentioned property is TEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS only, broken down as follows:
BALANCE DUE TO
ENCARNACION VALDEZ-CHOY P10,215,000.00
VVVVVVVVVVVV
PLUS P80,000.00 for documentary
stamps paid in advance by seller ___80,000.00
P10,2
95,00
0.00
x x x.[13]
On the same day, 14 July 1989, Valdes-Choy, accompanied by
Chua, deposited the P485,000.00 managers check to her account with
Traders Royal Bank. She then purchased a Traders Royal Bank
28
managers check for P480,000.00 payable to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue for the capital gains tax. Valdes-Choy and Chua
returned to the office of Valdes-Choys counsel and handed the Traders
Royal Bank check to the counsel who undertook to pay the capital gains
tax. It was then also that Chua showed to Valdes-Choy a PBCom
managers check for P10,215,000.00 representing the balance of the
purchase price. Chua, however, did not give this PBCom managers
check to Valdes-Choy because the TCT was still registered in the name
of Valdes-Choy. Chua required that the Property be registered first in his
name before he would turn over the check to Valdes-Choy. This angered
Valdes-Choy who tore up the Deeds of Sale, claiming that what Chua
required was not part of their agreement.[14]
On the same day, 14 July 1989, Chua confirmed his stop payment
order by submitting to PBCom an affidavit of loss [15] of the PBCom
Managers Check for P480,000.00. PBCom Assistant Vice-President Pe,
however, testified that the managers check was nevertheless honored
because Chua subsequently verbally advised the bank that he was lifting
the stop-payment order due to his special arrangement with the bank.[16]
On 15 July 1989, the deadline for the payment of the balance of
the purchase price, Valdes-Choy suggested to her counsel that to break
the impasse Chua should deposit in escrow the P10,215,000.00
balance.[17] Upon such deposit, Valdes-Choy was willing to cause the
issuance of a new TCT in the name of Chua even without receiving the
balance of the purchase price. Valdes-Choy believed this was the only
way she could protect herself if the certificate of title is transferred in the
name of the buyer before she is fully paid. Valdes-Choys counsel
promised to relay her suggestion to Chua and his counsel, but nothing
came out of it.
On 17 July 1989, Chua filed a complaint for specific performance
against Valdes-Choy which the trial court dismissed on 22 November
1989. On 29 November 1989, Chua re-filed his complaint for specific
performance with damages. After trial in due course, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Chua, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Applying the provisions of Article 1191 of the new Civil Code, since this is an
action for specific performance where the plaintiff, as vendee, wants to pursue
the sale, and in order that the fears of the defendant may be allayed and still
have the sale materialize, judgment is hereby rendered:
I. 1. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the Court not later than five (5) days
from finality of this decision:
a. the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 162955 registered in her name;
b. the covering tax declaration and the latest tax receipt evidencing payment of
real estate taxes;
c. the two deeds of sale prepared by Atty. Mark Bocobo on July 13, 1989,
duly executed by defendant in favor of the plaintiff, whether notarized or not;
and
2. Within five (5) days from compliance by the defendant of the above,
ordering the plaintiff to deliver to the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court the
sum of P10,295,000.00 representing the balance of the consideration (with the
sum of P80,000.00 for stamps already included);
3. Ordering the Branch Clerk of this Court or her duly authorized
representative:
a. to make representations with the BIR for the payment of capital gains tax
for the sale of the house and lot (not to include the fixtures) and to pay the
same from the funds deposited with her;
b. to present the deed of sale executed in favor of the plaintiff, together with
the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 162955, real estate tax receipt and
proof of payment of capital gains tax, to the Makati Register of Deeds;
c. to pay the required registration fees and stamps (if not yet advanced by the
defendant) and if needed update the real estate taxes all to be taken from the
funds deposited with her; and
d. surrender to the plaintiff the new Torrens title over the property;
4. Should the defendant fail or refuse to surrender the two deeds of sale over
the property and the fixtures that were prepared by Atty. Mark Bocobo and
executed by the parties, the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby
authorized and empowered to prepare, sign and execute the said deeds of sale
for and in behalf of the defendant;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff;
a. the sum of P100,000.00 representing moral and compensatory damages for
the plaintiff; and
b. the sum of P50,000.00 as reimbursement for plaintiffs attorneys fees and
cost of litigation.
6. Authorizing the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court to release to the
plaintiff, to be taken from the funds said plaintiff has deposited with the Court,
the amounts covered at paragraph 5 above;
7. Ordering the release of the P10,295,000.00 to the defendant after deducting
therefrom the following amounts:
a. the capital gains tax paid to the BIR;
b. the expenses incurred in the registration of the sale, updating of real estate
taxes, and transfer of title; and
c. the amounts paid under this judgment to the plaintiff.
8. Ordering the defendant to surrender to the plaintiff or his representatives the
premises with the furnishings intact within seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt of the proceeds of the sale;
9. No interest is imposed on the payment to be made by the plaintiff because
he had always been ready to pay the balance and the premises had been used
or occupied by the defendant for the duration of this case.
II. In the event that specific performance cannot be done for reasons or causes
not attributable to the plaintiff, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant:
1. To refund to the plaintiff the earnest money in the sum of P100,000.00,
with interest at the legal rate from June 30, 1989 until fully paid;
2. To refund to the plaintiff the sum of P485,000.00 with interest at the legal
rate from July 14, 1989 until fully paid;
3. To pay to the plaintiff the sum of P700,000.00 in the concept of moral
damages and the additional sum of P300,000.00 in the concept of exemplary
damages; and
4. To pay to the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as reimbursement of
attorneys fees and cost of litigation.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Valdes-Choy appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the
decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals handed down a new
judgment, disposing as follows:
29
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another one is rendered:
(1) Dismissing Civil Case No. 89-5772;
(2) Declaring the amount of P100,000.00, representing earnest money as
forfeited in favor of defendant-appellant;
(3) Ordering defendant-appellant to return/refund the amount of P485,000.00
to plaintiff-appellee without interest;
(4) Dismissing defendant-appellants compulsory counter-claim; and
(5) Ordering the plaintiff-appellee to pay the costs.[19]
Hence, the instant petition.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court found that the transaction reached an impasse
when Valdes-Choy wanted to be first paid the full consideration before
a new TCT covering the Property is issued in the name of Chua. On the
other hand, Chua did not want to pay the consideration in full unless a
new TCT is first issued in his name. The trial court faulted Valdes-Choy
for this impasse.
The trial court held that the parties entered into a contract to
sell on 30 June 1989, as evidenced by the Receipt for the P100,000.00
earnest money. The trial court pointed out that the contract to sell was
subject to the following conditions: (1) the balance
of P10,700,000.00 was payable not later than 15 July 1989; (2) Valdes-
Choy may stay in the Property until 13 August 1989; and (3) all papers
must be in proper order before full payment is made.
The trial court held that Chua complied with the terms of the
contract to sell. Chua showed that he was prepared to pay Valdes-Choy
the consideration in full on 13 July 1989, two days before the deadline
of 15 July 1989. Chua even added P80,000.00 for the documentary
stamp tax. He purchased from PBCom two managers checks both
payable to Valdes-Choy. The first check for P485,000.00 was to pay the
capital gains tax. The second check for P10,215,000.00 was to pay the
balance of the purchase price. The trial court was convinced that Chua
demonstrated his capacity and readiness to pay the balance on 13 July
1989 with the production of the PBCom managers check
for P10,215,000.00.
On the other hand, the trial court found that Valdes-Choy did not
perform her correlative obligation under the contract to sell to put all the
papers in order. The trial court noted that as of 14 July 1989, the capital
gains tax had not been paid because Valdes-Choys counsel who was
suppose to pay the tax did not do so. The trial court declared that
Valdes-Choy was in a position to deliver only the owners duplicate copy
of the TCT, the signed Deeds of Sale, the tax declarations, and the latest
realty tax receipt. The trial court concluded that these documents were
all useless without the Bureau of Internal Revenue receipt evidencing
full payment of the capital gains tax which is a pre-requisite to the
issuance of a new certificate of title in Chuas name.
The trial court held that Chuas non-payment of the balance
of P10,215,000.00 on the agreed date was due to Valdes-Choys fault.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that Chuas
stance to pay the full consideration only after the Property is registered
in his name was not the agreement of the parties. The Court of Appeals
noted that there is a whale of difference between the phrases all papers
are in proper order as written on the Receipt, and transfer of title as
demanded by Chua.
Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
found that all the papers were in order and that Chua had no valid reason
not to pay on the agreed date. Valdes-Choy was in a position to deliver
the owners duplicate copy of the TCT, the signed Deeds of Sale, the tax
declarations, and the latest realty tax receipt. The Property was also free
from all liens and encumbrances.
The Court of Appeals declared that the trial court erred in
considering Chuas showing to Valdes-Choy of the PBCom managers
check for P10,215,000.00 as compliance with Chuas obligation to pay
on or before 15 July 1989. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Chua
did not want to give up the check unless the property was already in his
name.[20] Although Chua demonstrated his capacity to pay, this could not
be equated with actual payment which he refused to do.
The Court of Appeals did not consider the non-payment of the
capital gains tax as failure by Valdes-Choy to put the papers in proper
order. The Court of Appeals explained that the payment of the capital
gains tax has no bearing on the validity of the Deeds of Sale. It is only
after the deeds are signed and notarized can the final computation and
payment of the capital gains tax be made.
The Issues
In his Memorandum, Chua raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER THERE IS A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE OF
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY;
2. WHETHER VALDES-CHOY MAY RESCIND THE CONTRACT IN
CONTROVERSY WITHOUT OBSERVING THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE 1592 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE;
3. WHETHER THE WITHHOLDING OF PAYMENT OF THE BALANCE
OF THE PURCHASE PRICE ON THE PART OF CHUA (AS VENDEE)
WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING AND MAY
NOT BE RAISED AS GROUND FOR THE AUTOMATIC RESCISSION
OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE;
4. WHETHER THERE IS LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE
COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE EARNEST MONEY IN THE
AMOUNT OF P100,000.00 AS FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF VALDES-
CHOY;
5. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT IS IN ACCORD WITH
LAW, REASON AND EQUITY DESERVING OF BEING REINSTATED
AND AFFIRMED.[21]
The issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the transaction
between Chua and Valdes-Choy is a perfected contract of sale or a mere
contract to sell, and (b) whether Chua can compel Valdes-Choy to cause
the issuance of a new TCT in Chuas name even before payment of the
full purchase price.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
There is no dispute that Valdes-Choy is the absolute owner of the
Property which is registered in her name under TCT No.162955, free
from all liens and encumbrances. She was ready, able and willing to
deliver to Chua the owners duplicate copy of the TCT, the signed Deeds
30
of Sale, the tax declarations, and the latest realty tax receipt. There is
also no dispute that on 13 July 1989, Valdes-Choy received PBCom
Check No. 206011 for P100,000.00 as earnest money from
Chua. Likewise, there is no controversy that the Receipt for
the P100,000.00 earnest money embodied the terms of the binding
contract between Valdes-Choy and Chua.
Further, there is no controversy that as embodied in the
Receipt, Valdes-Choy and Chua agreed on the following terms: (1) the
balance of P10,215,000.00 is payable on or before 15 July 1989; (2) the
capital gains tax is for the account of Valdes-Choy; and (3) if Chua fails
to pay the balance of P10,215,000.00 on or before 15 July 1989, Valdes-
Choy has the right to forfeit the earnest money,provided that all papers
are in proper order. On 13 July 1989, Chua gave Valdes-Choy the
PBCom managers check for P485,000.00 to pay the capital gains tax.
Both the trial and appellate courts found that the balance
of P10,215,000.00 was not actually paid to Valdes-Choy on the
agreed date. On 13 July 1989, Chua did show to Valdes-Choy the
PBCom managers check for P10,215,000.00, with Valdes-Choy as
payee. However, Chua refused to give this check to Valdes-Choy until
a new TCT covering the Property is registered in Chuas name. Or, as
the trial court put it, until there is proof of payment of the capital gains
tax which is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a new certificate of title.
First and Second Issues: Contract of Sale or Contract to Sell?
Chua has consistently characterized his agreement with Valdez-
Choy, as evidenced by the Receipt, as a contract to sell and not a
contract of sale. This has been Chuas persistent contention in his
pleadings before the trial and appellate courts.
Chua now pleads for the first time that there is a perfected contract
of sale rather than a contract to sell. He contends that there was no
reservation in the contract of sale that Valdes-Choy shall retain title to
the Property until after the sale. There was no agreement for an
automatic rescission of the contract in case of Chuas default. He argues
for the first time that his payment of earnest money and its acceptance
by Valdes-Choy precludes the latter from rejecting the binding effect of
the contract of sale. Thus, Chua claims that Valdes-Choy may not validly
rescind the contract of sale without following Article 1592[22] of the Civil
Code which requires demand, either judicially or by notarial act, before
rescission may take place.
Chuas new theory is not well taken in light of well-settled
jurisprudence. An issue not raised in the court below cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal, as this is offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.[23] In addition, when a party deliberately
adopts a certain theory, and the case is tried and decided on that theory
in the court below, the party will not be permitted to change his theory
on appeal. To permit him to change his theory will be unfair to the
adverse party.[24]
Nevertheless, in order to put to rest all doubts on the matter, we
hold that the agreement between Chua and Valdes-Choy, as evidenced
by the Receipt, is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale. The
distinction between a contract of sale and contract to sell is well-settled:
In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the
delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement,
reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of
the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses
ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract
is resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the
vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the
price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an
event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming
effective.[25]
A perusal of the Receipt shows that the true agreement between
the parties was a contract to sell. Ownership over the Property was
retained by Valdes-Choy and was not to pass to Chua until full payment
of the purchase price.
First, the Receipt provides that the earnest money shall be
forfeited in case the buyer fails to pay the balance of the purchase price
on or before 15 July 1989. In such event, Valdes-Choy can sell the
Property to other interested parties. There is in effect a right reserved in
favor of Valdes-Choy not to push through with the sale upon Chuas
failure to remit the balance of the purchase price before the
deadline. This is in the nature of a stipulation reserving ownership in the
seller until full payment of the purchase price. This is also similar to
giving the seller the right to rescind unilaterally the contract the moment
the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period.[26]
Second, the agreement between Chua and Valdes-Choy was
embodied in a receipt rather than in a deed of sale, ownership not having
passed between them. The signing of the Deeds of Sale came later
when Valdes-Choy was under the impression that Chua was about to
pay the balance of the purchase price. The absence of a formal deed of
conveyance is a strong indication that the parties did not intend
immediate transfer of ownership, but only a transfer after full payment of
the purchase price.[27]
Third, Valdes-Choy retained possession of the certificate of title
and all other documents relative to the sale. When Chua refused to pay
Valdes-Choy the balance of the purchase price, Valdes-Choy also
refused to turn-over to Chua these documents.[28] These are additional
proof that the agreement did not transfer to Chua, either by actual or
constructive delivery, ownership of the Property.[29]
It is true that Article 1482 of the Civil Code provides that
[W]henever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be
considered as part of the price and proof of the perfection of the contract.
However, this article speaks of earnest money given in a contract of
sale. In this case, the earnest money was given in a contract to sell. The
Receipt evidencing the contract to sell stipulates that the earnest money
is a forfeitable deposit, to be forfeited if the sale is not consummated
should Chua fail to pay the balance of the purchase price. The earnest
money forms part of the consideration only if the sale is consummated
upon full payment of the purchase price. If there is a contract of sale,
Valdes-Choy should have the right to compel Chua to pay the balance
of the purchase price. Chua, however, has the right to walk away from
the transaction, with no obligation to pay the balance, although he will
forfeit the earnest money. Clearly, there is no contract of sale.The
earnest money was given in a contract to sell, and thus Article 1482,
which speaks of a contract of sale, is not applicable.
Since the agreement between Valdes-Choy and Chua is a mere
contract to sell, the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a
suspensive condition. The non-fulfillment of the condition prevents the
obligation to sell from arising and ownership is retained by the seller
without further remedies by the buyer.[30] Article 1592 of the Civil Code
permits the buyer to pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long
as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him
either judicially or by notarial act. However, Article 1592 does not apply
to a contract to sell where the seller reserves the ownership until full
payment of the price.[31]
Third and Fourth Issues: Withholding of Payment of the Balance
of the Purchase Price and Forfeiture of the Earnest Money
Chua insists that he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase
price but withheld payment because Valdes-Choy did not fulfill her
contractual obligation to put all the papers in proper order.Specifically,
Chua claims that Valdes-Choy failed to show that the capital gains tax
had been paid after he had advanced the money for its payment. For the
same reason, he contends that Valdes-Choy may not forfeit the earnest
money even if he did not pay on time.
There is a variance of interpretation on the phrase all papers are
in proper order as written in the Receipt. There is no dispute though, that
as long as the papers are in proper order, Valdes-Choy has the right to
31
forfeit the earnest money if Chua fails to pay the balance before the
deadline.
The trial court interpreted the phrase to include payment of the
capital gains tax, with the Bureau of Internal Revenue receipt as proof
of payment. The Court of Appeals held otherwise. We quote verbatim
the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this matter:
Delivery is not only a necessary condition for the enjoyment of the thing, but is
The trial court made much fuss in connection with the payment of the capital
gains tax, of which Section 33 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977,
is the governing provision insofar as its computation is concerned. The trial
court failed to consider Section 34-(a) of the said Code, the last sentence of
which provides, that [t]he amount realized from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the sum of money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received; and that the computation of the capital
gains tax can only be finally assessed by the Commission on Internal Revenue
upon the presentation of the Deeds of Absolute Sale themselves, without
which any premature computation of the capital gains tax becomes of no
moment. At any rate, the computation and payment of the capital gains tax has
no bearing insofar as the validity and effectiveness of the deeds of sale in
question are concerned, because it is only after the contracts of sale are finally
executed in due form and have been duly notarized that the final computation
of the capital gains tax can follow as a matter of course. Indeed, exhibit D, the
PBC Check No. 325851, dated July 13, 1989, in the amount of P485,000.00,
which is considered as part of the consideration of the sale, was deposited in
the name of appellant, from which she in turn, purchased the corresponding
check in the amount representing the sum to be paid for capital gains tax and
drawn in the name of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which then
allayed any fear or doubt that that amount would not be paid to the
Government after all.[32]
x x x.
We see no reason to disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
In a contract to sell, the obligation of the seller to sell becomes
demandable only upon the happening of the suspensive condition. In
this case, the suspensive condition is the full payment of the purchase
price by Chua. Such full payment gives rise to Chuas right to demand
the execution of the contract of sale.
It is only upon the existence of the contract of sale that the seller
becomes obligated to transfer the ownership of the thing sold to the
buyer. Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines a contract of sale as follows:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and
the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the existence of the contract of sale, the seller is not
obligated to transfer ownership to the buyer, even if there is a contract
to sell between them. It is also upon the existence of the contract of sale
that the buyer is obligated to pay the purchase price to the seller. Since
the transfer of ownership is in exchange for the purchase price, these
obligations must be simultaneously fulfilled at the time of the execution
of the contract of sale, in the absence of a contrary stipulation.
In a contract of sale, the obligations of the seller are specified in
Article 1495 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as
well as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale. (Emphasis supplied)
The obligation of the seller is to transfer to the buyer ownership of the
thing sold. In the sale of real property, the seller is not obligated to
transfer in the name of the buyer a new certificate of title, but rather to
transfer ownership of the real property. There is a difference between
transfer of the certificate of title in the name of the buyer, and transfer of
ownership to the buyer. The buyer may become the owner of the real
property even if the certificate of title is still registered in the name of the
seller. As between the seller and buyer, ownership is transferred not by
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the buyer but by
the execution of the instrument of sale in a public document.
In a contract of sale, ownership is transferred upon delivery of the
thing sold. As the noted civil law commentator Arturo M. Tolentino
explains it, -
a mode of acquiring dominion and determines the transmission of ownership,
the birth of the real right. The delivery, therefore, made in any of the forms
provided in articles 1497 to 1505 signifies that the transmission of
ownership from vendor to vendee has taken place. The delivery of the thing
constitutes an indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring ownership.
Our law does not admit the doctrine of transfer of property by mere consent;
the ownership, the property right, is derived only from delivery of the thing. x
x x.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
In a contract of sale of real property, delivery is effected when the
instrument of sale is executed in a public document. When the deed of
absolute sale is signed by the parties and notarized, then delivery of the
real property is deemed made by the seller to the buyer. Article 1498 of
the Civil Code provides that
Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of
the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred.
Similarly, in a contract to sell real property, once the seller is
ready, able and willing to sign the deed of absolute sale before a notary
public, the seller is in a position to transfer ownership of the real property
to the buyer. At this point, the seller complies with his undertaking to sell
the real property in accordance with the contract to sell, and to assume
all the obligations of a vendor under a contract of sale pursuant to the
relevant articles of the Civil Code. In a contract to sell, the seller is not
obligated to transfer ownership to the buyer. Neither is the seller
obligated to cause the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name
of the buyer. However, the seller must put all his papers in proper order
to the point that he is in a position to transfer ownership of the real
property to the buyer upon the signing of the contract of sale.
In the instant case, Valdes-Choy was in a position to comply with
all her obligations as a seller under the contract to sell. First, she already
signed the Deeds of Sale in the office of her counsel in the presence of
the buyer. Second, she was prepared to turn-over the owners duplicate
of the TCT to the buyer, along with the tax declarations and latest realty
tax receipt. Clearly, at this point Valdes-Choy was ready, able and willing
to transfer ownership of the Property to the buyer as required by the
contract to sell, and by Articles 1458 and 1495 of the Civil Code to
consummate the contract of sale.
Chua, however, refused to give to Valdes-Choy the PBCom
managers check for the balance of the purchase price. Chua imposed
the condition that a new TCT should first be issued in his name, a
condition that is found neither in the law nor in the contract to sell as
evidenced by the Receipt. Thus, at this point Chua was not ready, able
and willing to pay the full purchase price which is his obligation under
the contract to sell. Chua was also not in a position to assume the
principal obligation of a vendee in a contract of sale, which is also to pay
the full purchase price at the agreed time.Article 1582 of the Civil Code
provides that
Art. 1582. The vendee is bound to accept delivery and to pay the price of the
thing sold at the time and place stipulated in the contract.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the contract to sell stipulated that Chua should pay
the balance of the purchase price on or before 15 July 1989. The signed
Deeds of Sale also stipulated that the buyer shall pay the balance of the
32
purchase price upon signing of the deeds. Thus, the Deeds of
Sale, both signed by Chua, state as follows:
Deed of Absolute Sale covering the lot:
xxx
For and in consideration of the sum of EIGHT MILLION PESOS
(P8,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, receipt of which in full is hereby
acknowledged by the VENDOR from the VENDEE, the VENDOR sells,
transfers and conveys unto the VENDEE, his heirs, successors and assigns,
the said parcel of land, together with the improvements existing thereon, free
from all liens and encumbrances.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
Deed of Absolute Sale covering the furnishings:
xxx
For and in consideration of the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,800,000.00), Philippine Currency, receipt of which
in full is hereby acknowledged by the VENDOR from the VENDEE, the
VENDOR sells, transfers and conveys unto the VENDEE, his heirs,
successors and assigns, the said furnitures, fixtures and other movable
properties thereon, free from all liens and encumbrances.[35](Emphasis
supplied)
However, on the agreed date, Chua refused to pay the balance of the
purchase price as required by the contract to sell, the signed Deeds of
Sale, and Article 1582 of the Civil Code. Chua was therefore in default
and has only himself to blame for the rescission by Valdes-Choy of the
contract to sell.
Even if measured under existing usage or custom, Valdes-Choy
had all her papers in proper order. Article 1376 of the Civil Code provides
that:
of P10,215,000.00, representing 94.58% of the purchase price, is not
customary in a sale of real estate. Such a condition, not specified in the
contract to sell as evidenced by the Receipt, cannot be considered part
of the omissions of stipulations which are ordinarily established by usage
or custom.[41] What is increasingly becoming customary is to deposit in
escrow the balance of the purchase price pending the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of the buyer. Valdes-Choy suggested this
solution but unfortunately, it drew no response from Chua.
Chua had no reason to fear being swindled. Valdes-Choy was
prepared to turn-over to him the owners duplicate copy of the TCT, the
signed Deeds of Sale, the tax declarations, and the latest realty tax
receipt. There was no hindrance to paying the capital gains tax as Chua
himself had advanced the money to pay the same and Valdes-Choy had
procured a managers check payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
covering the amount. It was only a matter of time before the capital gains
tax would be paid. Chua acted precipitately in filing the action for specific
performance a mere two days after the deadline of 15 July 1989 when
there was an impasse. While this case was dismissed on 22 November
1989, he did not waste any time in re-filing the same on 29 November
1989.
Accordingly, since Chua refused to pay the consideration in full on
the agreed date, which is a suspensive condition, Chua cannot compel
Valdes-Choy to consummate the sale of the Property.Article 1181 of the
Civil Code provides that -
ART. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the
extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the
happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
Chua acquired no right to compel Valdes-Choy to transfer ownership of
the Property to him because the suspensive condition - the full payment
of the purchase price - did not happen. There is no correlative obligation
on the part of Valdes-Choy to transfer ownership of the Property to
Chua. There is also no obligation on the part of Valdes-Choy to cause
the issuance of a new TCT in the name of Chua since unless expressly
stipulated, this is not one of the obligations of a vendor.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the
CV No. 37652 dated 23 February 1995 is AFFIRMED in toto.
interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of
stipulations which are ordinarily established. SO ORDERED.

Customarily, in the absence of a contrary agreement, the

submission by an individual seller to the buyer of the following papers
would complete a sale of real estate: (1) owners duplicate copy of the
Torrens title;[36] (2) signed deed of absolute sale; (3) tax declaration; and
(3) latest realty tax receipt. The buyer can retain the amount for the
capital gains tax and pay it upon authority of the seller, or the seller can
pay the tax, depending on the agreement of the parties.

The buyer has more interest in having the capital gains tax paid
immediately since this is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a new Torrens
title in his name. Nevertheless, as far as the government is concerned,
the capital gains tax remains a liability of the seller since it is a tax on
the sellers gain from the sale of the real estate. Payment of the capital
gains tax, however, is not a pre-requisite to the transfer of
ownership to the buyer. The transfer of ownership takes effect upon
the signing and notarization of the deed of absolute sale.

The recording of the sale with the proper Registry of Deeds[37] and
the transfer of the certificate of title in the name of the buyer are
necessary only to bind third parties to the transfer of ownership. [38] As
between the seller and the buyer, the transfer of ownership takes effect
upon the execution of a public instrument conveying the real
estate.[39] Registration of the sale with the Registry of Deeds, or the
issuance of a new certificate of title, does not confer ownership on the
buyer. Such registration or issuance of a new certificate of title is not one
of the modes of acquiring ownership.[40]

In this case, Valdes-Choy was ready, able and willing to submit to

Chua all the papers that customarily would complete the sale, and to pay
as well the capital gains tax. On the other hand, Chuas condition that a
new TCT be first issued in his name before he pays the balance

33
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376 March 5, 2014
[Formerly OCA LP.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ]
MA. LIZA M. JORDA, City Prosecutor's Office, Tacloban
City, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Tacloban City, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377
[Formerly OCA LP.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ]
PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Tacloban City, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court are Consolidated Complaints dated March 29,
20111 and March 25, 20112 filed by Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao, Office of
the City Prosecutor, Tacloban City and Ma. Liza M. Jorda, Associate
City Prosecutor, Tacloban City, respectively, against respondent Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, for Grave Abuse of Authority,
Irregularity in the Performance of Official Duties, Bias and Partiality,
relative to Criminal Case Nos. 2009-11-537,3 2009-11-538, 2009-11-
539 entitled People v. Danilo Miralles, et al.
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ
City Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao,
Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S.
Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City
The complaint stemmed from Criminal Case Nos. 2009-11-537; 2009-
11-538 and 2009-11-5394 for Qualified Trafficking and Violation of
Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, which were filed
against Danilo Miralles (Miralles), et al. before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Tacloban City where respondent Judge Bitas presides.
Complainant alleged that on January 15, 2010, accused Miralles,
through counsel, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of a Warrant of
Arrest. On the same day, respondent Judge issued an order taking
cognizance of the same and directed Prosecutor Anthea G. Macalalag
to file her comment on the motion. The prosecution then filed its
comment/opposition and moved for the issuance of the required
warrant for the arrest of Miralles. No warrant of arrest was issued
against Miralles.
On February 2, 2011, respondent judge issued an Order which states:
After the prosecution presented their witnesses, the Court finds that
there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial for Violation of 4 (a
& e) of R.A. 9208 and, therefore, the court orders Lynna Brito y Obligar
to file a bail bond of Forty Thousand Pesos (Php₱40,000.00) for her
temporary liberty. Danilo Miralles is, likewise, ordered to put up a bail
bond of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) for each of the three (3)
cases.
Subsequently, on February 4, 2011, Sheriff Jose Cabcabin of the
Office of the RTC Clerk of Court issued a certification that Miralles
surrendered to him to avail of his right to bail. The cash bail bond in the
amount of ₱120,000.00 was approved by respondent judge on the
same day.
Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his duties
and violated mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court when he did
not issue a warrant of arrest against the accused Miralles, who was
charged with two (2) non-bailable criminal offenses. As early as
November 19, 2009, criminal complaints against Miralles for Qualified
Trafficking were already filed, yet respondent judge never issued a
warrant of arrest for Miralles despite accused's presence during the
court hearings.
Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced bail of ₱40,000.00 for
accused Miralles even without any petition for the fixing of bail. In fact,
complainant reiterated that even after respondent judge found probable
cause to hold accused Miralles for trial, he did not order the arrest of
the accused. Instead, respondent judge summarily granted a reduced
bail in the absence of a motion to fix bail and the prosecution was not
given the opportunity to interpose its objections. Complainant claimed
that such acts of respondent judge were evident of his bias towards
accused Miralles.
In his Answer, respondent judge reasoned that it was wrong to arrest
Miralles, because the court was still in the process of determining
whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the accused for trial. He
explained that Miralles had always made himself available during the
hearings for the determination of probable cause; thus, the court
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
After the hearing for the determination of probable cause, the court
ruled that there is no strong evidence presented by the prosecution. On
February 4, 2011, accused Danilo Miralles surrendered to Sheriff Jose
Cabcabin and posted ₱40,000.00 bail for each of the three (3) cases,
or a total of ₱120,000.00.
Respondent judge claimed that there was no more need for a petition
for bail, because in the judicial determination of probable cause the
court found that the evidence against accused was weak. 5
Respondent judge further averred that complainant did not know the
facts of the case and whether the evidence for the prosecution is
strong, yet he was faulted for granting bail and for not issuing a warrant
of arrest. He stressed that when the court has acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, there is no more need to issue a
warrant of arrest. Respondent judge pointed out that Miralles always
made himself available, hence, he believed that the ends of justice had
not been frustrated. He insisted that there is no anomaly in the
procedure because a warrant of arrest will be issued only upon the
finding of probable cause. In this case, however, he was able to post
his bail bond before a warrant of arrest can be issued against him.
Thus, the warrant of arrest had become fait accompli.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3625-RTJ
Ma. Liza M. Jorda, Associate City
Prosecutor, Tacloban City v. Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7,
Tacloban City
This complaint, borne from the same criminal cases, has substantially
the same facts involving accused Danilo Miralles referred to in A.M.
OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ.
Complainant, Prosecutor Liza M. Jorda, Associate City Prosecutor,
alleged that during the hearing on the Petition for Involuntary
Commitment of the minor victim Margie Baldoza, to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), respondent judge
propounded a series of questions which appeared to mitigate Miralles'
34
role in the crime charged. The pertinent portion of which is quoted as
follows:
Q. Did you see Danny shouting at you and get angry as what you have
stated in the record of the court?
A. No.
xxxx
Q. In other words, you are only for a presumption that it is Danny who
is getting angry where in fact you have seen him at anytime?
A. It was Lynna whom he was [scolding] because the women under her
are stubborn.
Q. You have seen him scolding to (sic) your nanay Lynna?
A. She would be called to the room in the Office and there she would
be scolded.
Q. You have not seen nanay Lynna and Danny Miralles in the office,
you have not seen them?
A. No.
Q. Never have you (sic) seen them?
A. No.
Q. So did you come to the conclusion that she [was] being scolded by
Danny Miralles?
A. Yes.6
Complainant pointed out that respondent judge's line of questions went
beyond judicial authority and discretion. Upon investigation,
complainant claimed to have discovered that the family members of
respondent judge are close associates of Miralles.
Prompted by said events, complainant filed a motion for inhibition on
December 14, 2009 against respondent judge. Respondent judge
denied the motion. During the hearing on December 15, 2009,
complainant alleged that respondent judge publicly humiliated her and
exhibited his anger and animosity towards her for filing the motion for
inhibition.7 Respondent judge was quoted saying, among others things,
that:
"I don’t want to see your face! Why did you file the motion for inhibition
when it should have been Attorney Sionne Gaspay who should have
filed the same[?]"
"You better transfer to another court! You are being influenced by
politicians. I am not a close family friend of the Miralles(es), it is my
sister who is now in the United States who was close to the
Miralles(es)."
"So you are questioning the integrity of this court, you better transfer to
another court."
"I don’t want to see your face."8
Complainant added that when she was supposed to conduct the cross-
examination, respondent judge stated off-the-record: "I don’t want you
to participate anymore," and refused to allow her to do the cross-
examination.
In support of her allegation, complainant presented the Joint
Affidavit9 of Carmela D. Bastes and Marilou S. Nacilla, social workers
who were present during the December 15, 2009 hearing of the subject
case, and corroborated that indeed respondent judge uttered the
abovementioned statements to complainant in open court in the
presence of court personnel and the lawyers of the parties.
Due to the continued hostility of respondent judge towards complainant
during the subsequent hearings of the case, complainant opted to
transfer to another court, pursuant to an office order issued by City
Prosecutor Ruperto Golong.
In a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit10 dated April 8, 2011,
complainant raised the possibility of "misrepresentation." She alleged
that it was made to appear that a hearing on the subject case was
conducted on February 2, 2011, when in fact there was none. She
claimed that the Order dated February 2, 2011 appeared to have been
inserted in the records of the case, when in fact no hearing transpired
that day.
On April 7, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed
respondent judge to comment on the complaint against him. 11
In his Answer and Comment12 dated May 10, 2011, respondent judge
denied the allegations in the complaint and contended that complainant
was piqued when he blamed her for making baseless assumptions. He
claimed that complainant was incompetent as showed by the lack of
evidence against Miralles.
Respondent judge further averred that, contrary to complainant's
allegation that it was her option to transfer to another court, it was he
who caused her transfer. He accused complainant of lacking in
knowledge of the law and that she appeared for politicians and not for
the Republic of the Philippines.
Regarding complainant's accusation that he was close to the
Miralleses, respondent judge explained that it was his sister who was a
classmate of one Nora Miralles. He claimed that he is unaware of any
personal relation between Nora Miralles and the accused Danilo
Miralles. He insisted that complainant merely assumed things even if
she has no evidence that he knew Danilo Miralles.
Respondent judge also admitted that he indeed stopped complainant
from conducting a cross-examination on the witness during the hearing
for involuntary commitment, because the lawyer for petitioner DSWD
should be the one actively participating in the case, and not the
prosecutors. He, however, added that the court had already ordered
that minor Margie Baldoza be committed to the DSWD Home for Girls
pending resolution of the criminal cases.
As to the other allegations in the Complaint, respondent judge
commented that these were mere rehash of the complaint filed in A.M.
OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ and reiterated that the evidence found
against accused Miralles during the judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause in the trafficking case was weak.
Therefore, he ordered the posting of ₱40,000.00 bail by the accused.
Respondent judge claimed that he merely acted upon the evidence
presented and made a resolution on what was right for the case.
In her Reply13 dated May 21, 2011, complainant refuted respondent
judge's allegation of incompetence against her and insisted on
respondent's apparent bias in favor of Miralles. She argued that
respondent judge granted bail to the accused even when there was no
motion to fix bail and no hearing was conducted thereon. Despite the
finding of probable cause, respondent judge did not issue a warrant of
arrest against the accused. Complainant also reiterated the
35
controversy surrounding the appearance of an Order dated February 2,
2011, when in fact no hearing transpired that day.
In his 2nd Indorsement14 dated June 14, 2011, respondent judge
denied that he falsified any document. He explained that his
stenographer made a mistake in placing the date as February 2, 2011
instead of February 3, 2011, the date when the hearing was
conducted. He attached the affidavits15 of his court stenographer and
court interpreter in support of his explanation.
On May 11, 2001, the OCA directed Judge Bitas to file his Comment
on the instant complaint.
In a Resolution16 dated September 12, 2011, upon the
recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred A.M. OCA I.P.I. No.
11-3625-RTJ to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
On October 12, 2011, the Court, in a Resolution,17 resolved to
consolidate A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ (Prosecutor Leo C.
Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City) with
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ (Ma. Liza M. Jorda v. Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City).
In its Report and Recommendation18 dated February 14, 2013,
Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan, Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, found respondent judge guilty of grave abuse of authority
and gross ignorance of the law, and recommended that respondent
judge be fined in the amount of ₱20,000.00 for A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-
3645-RTJ and fined anew in the amount of ₱20,000.00 for A.M. OCA
I.P.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ.
RULING
We adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice, except as to the
recommended penalty.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts
may be erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of
judgment, absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and
deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This does not mean, however,
that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in
the performance of his official functions.
In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking,
which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two Million Pesos
(₱2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos (₱5,000,000.00).
Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a
matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge
after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the
application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable
before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s
evidence is weak or strong.19
As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, with life imprisonment
as one of the penalties prescribed for the offense charged against
Miralles, he cannot be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
in accordance with Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.20
Here, what is appalling is not only did respondent judge deviate from
the requirement of a hearing where there is an application for bail,
respondent judge granted bail to Miralles without neither conducting a
hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Respondent judge's
justification that he granted bail, because he found the evidence of the
prosecution weak, cannot be sustained because the records show that
no such hearing for that purpose transpired. What the records show is
a hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, not a hearing
for a petition for bail. The hearing for bail is different from the
determination of the existence of probable cause. The latter takes
place prior to all proceedings, so that if the court is not satisfied with
the existence of a probable cause, it may either dismiss the case or
deny the issuance of the warrant of arrest or conduct a hearing to
satisfy itself of the existence of probable cause. If the court finds the
existence of probable cause, the court is mandated to issue a warrant
of arrest or commitment order if the accused is already under custody,
as when he was validly arrested without a warrant. It is only after this
proceeding that the court can entertain a petition for bail where a
subsequent hearing is conducted to determine if the evidence of guilt is
weak or not. Hence, in granting bail and fixing it at ₱20,000.00 motu
proprio, without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence,
respondent judge denied the prosecution of due process. This Court
had said so in many cases and had imposed sanctions on judges who
granted applications for bail in capital offenses and in offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, without giving
the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is
strong.21
Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge's act of fixing the
accused's bail and reducing the same motu proprio is not mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of
respondent judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an
error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad
faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.22
Likewise, we are convinced that respondent judge’s actuations in the
court premises during the hearing of the petition for commitment to the
DSWD constitute abuse of authority and manifest partiality to the
accused. Indeed, respondent judge’s utterance of: "I don’t want to see
your face!";
"You better transfer to another court!; You are being influenced by
politicians" was improper and does not speak well his stature as an
officer of the Court. We note the improper language of respondent
judge directed towards complainants in his Answers and Comments
where he criticized them for their incompetence in handling the subject
case. Respondent Bitas' use of abusive and insulting words, tending to
project complainant’s ignorance of the laws and procedure, prompted
by his belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is
obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable.
Complainants, likewise, cannot be blamed for being suspicious of
respondent’s bias to the accused considering that the former can be
associated with the accused following his admission that his sister was
a classmate of one Nora Miralles. Considering the apprehension and
reservation of the complainants, prudence dictates that respondent
should have inhibited himself from hearing the case. Such abuse of
power and authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and
from the public.23
In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be
scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the
suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence
their objectivity. Not only must judges possess proficiency in law, they
must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants
and their counsel of the judges’ competence, integrity and
independence.24 Even on the face of boorish behavior from those he
deals with, he ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a
gentleman and a high officer of the court.25
The use of intemperate language is included in the proscription
provided by Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
thus: "Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all the activities of a judge." It bears stressing that as a
dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament
at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. He must maintain
composure and equanimity.
36
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed
with a heavy burden and responsibility of keeping the faith of the
public. Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of
public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.

We come to the imposable penalty.

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.

No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified
as a serious charge. Under Section 11 (A) of the same Rule, as
amended, if respondent judge is found guilty of a serious charge, any
of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the

benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations;
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits

for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding

₱40,000.00.

This is not the first time that respondent judge was found guilty of the
offense charged. In the case of Valmores-Salinas v. Judge Crisologo
Bitas,26 the Court had previously imposed a fine of ₱10,000.00 on
respondent judge for disregarding the basic procedural requirements in
instituting an indirect contempt charge, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bail are so clear and
unmistakable that there can be no room for doubt or even
interpretation. There can, therefore, be no excuse for respondent
judge's error of law. It hardly speaks well of the legal background of
respondent judge, considering his length of service when he failed to
observe procedural requirements before granting bail. To top it all, the
actuations of respondent judge towards the complainants, as shown by
his use of abusive and insulting words against complainants in open
court, and his correspondence with the Court, are evident of his
partiality to the accused. All these taken into consideration, respondent
judge deserves a penalty of suspension of three (3) months and one
(1) day for the two (2) cases, instead of ₱20,000.00 fine for each of the
cases, as recommended by the Investigating Justice.

WHEREFORE, respondent JUDGE CRISOLOGO BITAS, Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, is hereby
SUSPENDED from the service for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY without pay, and WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe
penalty.

SO ORDERED.

37
 [A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751. June 10, 2003]
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, complainant,
vs. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, RTC,
Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated December 7, 2001 filed with the Office
of the Court Administrator, Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the
Bureau of Immigration (BOI) charged Executive Judge Ernesto P.
Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
(Branch 46) with Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Criminal Case
No. R-5075 for Estafa, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto M.
Peaflorida.
Complainant alleged: On September 14, 2001, the Bureau of
Immigration (BOI) Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued Summary
Deportation Order (SDO) No. ADD-2001-057 against Ernesto M.
Peaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he is an overstaying and
undocumented alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of Commonwealth
Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
Peaflorida is also a fugitive from justice since he stands indicted in the
United States for health care fraud which resulted in more than
$1,376,000.00 losses to the U.S. Federal Government. No appeal was
filed with the Office of the President. The SDO became final and
executory on October 15, 2001. On the same date, respondent issued a
Notice of Arraignment requiring the production of Peaflorida on
November 19 and 20, 2001. On the scheduled hearing of November 19,
2001, respondent denied the P40,000.00 bail recommended by the
Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional release of the accused on the
ground that the crime Peaflorida was charged with involved large scale
estafa, a non-bailable offense. Respondent ordered the commitment of
Peaflorida to the Provincial Jail in Magbay, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro. However, later on that same day, the BOI received information
that respondent had allowed the release from detention of Peaflorida,
who is an alien federal fugitive, without the interdepartmental courtesy
of affording prior notice to the BOI of such action. She is appalled not
only by the respondents employment of legal subterfuges in ordering the
release of Peaflorida whose Summary Deportation Order had already
become final and executory, but also by the respondents bad faith in
deceiving them into surrendering the custody of an undesirable alien
federal fugitive to the Provincial Jail at Magbay, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro.[1]
In his Comment, dated March 22, 2002, respondent explained: On
November 20, 2001, Peaflorida filed an urgent motion to fix bail. When
the prosecution and the defense jointly manifested that it would be fair
and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the provisional release of
the accused Peaflorida at P250,000.00, he granted the motion to fix bail
on November 21, 2001; and, at the time he issued the Order fixing the
bail bond of the accused at P250,000.00, he was not aware that a
deportation order had already been issued by the BOI against the
latter.[2]
In a Resolution dated January 15, 2003, the Court re-docketed the
administrative complaint as a regular administrative matter and required
the parties to manifest within ten days from notice if they are willing to
submit the case for decision based on the pleadings filed by the
parties.[3]
In compliance, the complainant and the respondent manifested
their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the pleadings. [4] In
addition to his manifestation, however, respondent averred: Upon
learning that an order of deportation was issued against Peaflorida, he
ordered the cancellation of the bail bond posted by Peaflorida and issued
a warrant for the latters arrest on April 26, 2002; and that Peaflorida
voluntarily surrendered himself on October 24, 2002 and is presently
detained at the Provincial Jail of Occidental Mindoro.[5]
In its Evaluation Report, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) recommends to the Court that respondent be fined P5,000.00 for
Gross Ignorance of the Law, reasoning that:
After going over the records of the case, it is very evident that respondent
Judge acted with undue haste in issuing the order granting bail considering the
fact that in his earlier Order dated November 19, 2001, he did not grant a bail
of P40,000.00 which the Provincial Prosecutor had previously recommended
for the provisional release of the accused. His denial was based on the ground
that the case filed against the accused could be considered large-scale Estafa,
an unbailable offense. Respondent Judge should not have granted bail simply
on the lack of readiness on the part of the prosecution to present any witness
to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong but should have
endeavored to determine the existence of such evidence.
Under the present rules, a hearing is required before granting bail whether it is
a matter of right or discretion. The prosecution must always be given an
opportunity to present within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the Court may resolve the motion for bail. If the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
searching and clarificatory questions.
Moreover, since the accused was accompanied by the personnel of the Bureau
of Immigration when brought to the RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, for his arraignment in Criminal Case No. R-5075respondent Judge
could have easily verified from his escort if the former was being detained for
other crimes aside from the one where he was being arraigned in respondents
sala. Had he done so, respondent could have been informed outright by the
B.I. personnel escort that the accused had already been the subject of a
Summary Deportation Order and, thus, he could have deferred action on the
latters (accused) Motion to Fix Bail and afforded the Bureau of Immigration
the chance and opportunity to interpose their objection to the grant
thereof.[6] (Citations omitted).
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
OCA.
Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail
whether it is a matter of right or discretion. [7] A hearing is indispensable
for the court to ask searching questions from which it may infer the
strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused, in
cases where the offense is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.[8] After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution and
based thereon, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as
to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate
the guilt of the accused.[9] Otherwise, the order granting or denying the
application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence
for the prosecution which contains the judges evaluation of the evidence
may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense.[10]
The herein respondent granted bail to the accused Peaflorida
without conducting a hearing despite his earlier pronouncement in the
Order dated November 19, 2001 denying bail as he considered the crime
the accused Peaflorida was charged with to be a non-bailable offense.
The manifestation of the prosecutor that he is not ready to present any
witness to prove that the prosecutions evidence against the accused is
strong, is never a basis for the outright grant of bail without a preliminary
hearing on the matter.[11] A hearing is required even when the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection
to the motion for bail.[12]
The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the defense that it
would be fair and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the
provisional release of the accused at P250,000.00 does not justify the
granting of bail without a hearing in a case involving a non-bailable
offense. A hearing is necessary for the court to take into consideration
the guidelines in fixing the amount of bail[13] set forth in Section 9, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
38
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. - The judge who issued the warrant or
granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering
primarily, but not limited to the following factors:
(a) Financial liability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstance of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
latters arrest on April 26, 2002 upon learning that an order of deportation
was issued against the latter;24 that accused Peaflorida voluntarily
surrendered himself on October 24, 2002 and that he is presently
detained at the Provincial Jail of Occidental Mindoro,25 cannot serve to
exonerate him or even mitigate the penalty due him. Significantly, the
order of revocation was made only on April 26, 2002, or five months after
the issuance of the erroneous Order of November 21, 2001 which was
sought to be corrected. It is unfathomable that respondent realized his
fallacious granting of bail only after he filed his Comment herein dated
March 22, 2002. The Order of April 26, 2002 is but a futile attempt to
evade respondents administrative liability which had already attached
five months before when he granted bail without the required hearing.
Fundamental knowledge of the law and a reasonable understanding of
recent jurisprudence ought to have guarded respondent against the
precipitate and unjustified granting of bail or should have at least
prompted him to invalidate the same immediately thereafter,26 not five
months later after a complaint against him had been filed by BOl
Commissioner Domingo.

(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Needless to stress, judicial discretion is the domain of the judge
and the duty to exercise discretion cannot be reposed upon the will or
whim of the prosecution or the defense. Respondent should have
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong and
endeavored to determine the propriety of the amount of bail
recommended. To do away with the requisite bail hearing is to dispense
with this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness.[14] It must always
be remembered that imperative justice requires the proper observance
of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper
dispensation.[15]
There is no evidence of malice or bad faith on the part of
respondent when he granted bail to Peaflorida. Complainant failed to
prove that respondent had prior knowledge of the existence of a
deportation order or that the latter was informed by the BOl of the
deportation order dated September 14, 2001. The deportation order
became final only on October 15, 2001. Prior thereto, respondent issued
on September 18, 2001 a hold-departure order against Peaflorida.
Respondent directed the BOI not to allow Peaflorida from leaving the
country since a warrant for his arrest was already issued by the
court.[16] On October 15, 2001, the Notice of Arraignment in Criminal
Case No. R-5075 was served to Peaflorida through the BOI.[17] In the
hearing of November 19, 2001, the personnel of the BOI escorted
Peaflorida by reason of the warrant of arrest and hold departure order
issued by the court.18
As to the recommended penalty by the OCA, the amount of
P5,000.00 appears to be commensurate with respondents infraction
which amounts to gross ignorance of law. Under Section 8 of A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline
of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross
ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge which carries with
it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine of more
then P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. However, considering
that malice or bad faith on the part of respondent has not been
established by the complainant, and, in the absence of a showing that
respondent had earlier been found to have committed an administrative
offense,27 the Court deems it just and reasonable to impose upon
respondent a fine of P5,000.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent Executive Judge Ernesto P.
Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
(Branch 46) is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is hereby
FINED the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further
STERNLY WARNED that the commission of similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely by this Court.
SO ORDERED.

From these facts, we cannot simply conclude that respondent had

prior knowledge of the deportation order and maliciously thwarted its
effect by granting bail to Peaflorida. However, respondent cannot
escape administrative liability by invoking unawareness of the
deportation order. Absent evidence of malice, respondents lack of
knowledge of the deportation order will only free him from administrative
liability for gross misconduct but not for gross ignorance of the law for
disregarding the rules on bail.

The Court has held that a judge cannot be held administratively

liable for an erroneous ruling on first impression, and malice cannot be
inferred from his having rendered a decision rectifying an earlier
impression without proof beyond doubt of a conscious and deliberate
intent on his part to commit an injustice by such acts. 20 Nonetheless, so
basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the
grant of bail that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of
the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof. 21 Having
accepted the exalted position of a judge, respondent owes the public
and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. When a judge displays
utter lack of familiarity with the basic rules of law, he erodes the publics
confidence in the competence of our courts. 22 Ignorance of the law
excuses no one - certainly not a judge.23

Respondents explanations that he ordered the cancellation of the

bail bend posted by the accused Peaflorida and issued a warrant for the

39
 ANITA ESTEBAN, G.R. No. 135012 crime for which he was arrested and detained. His
arrest and detention for another criminal case does
Petitioner, not affect the character of the cash bail posted by
applicant-movant in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-
88(95), SLC-27(97), SJC-30(97) and SJC-31(97)
as deposited pending the trial of these
cases. Money deposited as bail even though made
by a third person is considered as the accuseds
Present:
deposit where there is no relationship of principal
and surety (State vs. Wilson, 65 Ohio L-Abs, 422,
115 NE 2d 193). Hence, the money so deposited
- versus - takes the nature of property in custodia legis and is
to be applied for payment of fine and costs. And
PANGANIBAN, J., such application will be made regardless of the fact
Chairman, that the money was deposited by a third person.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,

the application for cancellation of bail bonds is
CORONA, and hereby DENIED.
*
CARPIO MORALES, JJ. SO ORDERED.
HON. REYNALDO A.
ALHAMBRA, in his Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[6] but was denied in
capacity as Presiding Judge, an Order dated August 20, 1998.[7]
Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, San Jose City, Hence, the instant petition assailing the twin Orders as having
and GERARDO been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
ESTEBAN, jurisdiction.
Promulgated:
Respondents. Petitioner states that she is constrained to bring this matter
directly to this Court as the issue is one of first impression.[8]

Petitioner submits that by surrendering the accused who is now

in jail, her application for cancellation of bail in the four criminal cases is
September 7, 2004 allowed under Section 19, now Section 22, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon
application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the
D E C I S I O N prosecutor, the bail may
be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or
proof of his death.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The bail shall be deemed automatically
In this present petition for certiorari,[1] Anita Esteban seeks to
cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal
annul the Orders dated July 9, 1998 and August 20, 1998 issued by Judge
of the case, or execution of the judgment of
Reynaldo A. Alhambra, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
conviction.
Branch 39, San Jose City, in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SJC-27(97),
SJC-30(97) and SJC-31(97). The Orders denied petitioners application for In all instances, the cancellation shall be
cancellation of the cash bail posted in each case. without prejudice to any liability on the
bail. (Underscoring supplied)
Gerardo Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases. His
sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted cash bail Petitioners submission is misplaced.
of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty.
The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation
While out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal where, among others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to the
cases, Gerardo was again charged with another crime for which he was court that ordered the latters arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application
arrested and detained. by the surety or bondsman, cancels the bail bond.
Fed up with Gerardos actuation, petitioner refused to post We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not
another bail.[2] Instead, on June 18, 1998, she filed with the trial court an surrender the accused, charged in the four criminal cases, to the trial
application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four court. The accused was arrested and detained because he was charged in a
criminal cases.[3] She alleged therein that she is terminating the cash bail by subsequent criminal case.
surrendering the accused who is now in jail as certified to by the City Jail
Warden.[4] Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form
[5]
of cash deposit which, as mandated by Section 14 (formerly Section 11) of
In an Order dated July 9, 1998, respondent judge denied the same Rule 114, shall be applied to the payment of fine and costs, and
petitioners application, thus: the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to any person who
made the deposit. Section 14 provides:
xxx
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The
In these cases, accused was allowed
accused or any person acting in his behalf may
enjoyment of his provisional liberty after money was
deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal
deposited with the Clerk of Court as cash
revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the
bail. Applicant-movant (now petitioner) did not
amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended
voluntarily surrender the accused. Instead, the
by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the
accused was subsequently charged with another
case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of
40
 deposit and a written undertaking showing
compliance with the requirements of Section 2 of
this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from
custody. The money deposited shall be considered
as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs,
while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the
accused or to whoever made the
deposit. (Underscoring supplied)

The Rule thus treats a cash bail differently from other bail
bonds. A cash bond may be posted either by the accused or by any person
in his behalf. However, as far as the State is concerned, the money deposited
is regarded as the money of the accused. Consequently, it can be applied in
payment of any fine and costs that may be imposed by the court. This was
the ruling of this Court as early as 1928 in Esler vs. Ledesma.[9] Therein we
declared that when a cash bail is allowed, the two parties to the
transaction are the State and the defendant. Unlike other bail

bonds, the money may then be used in the payment of that in which the
State is concerned the fine and costs. The right of the government is in the
nature of a lien on the money deposited. We further held in the same case
that:

x x x. Similar cases have frequently

gained the attention of the courts in the United
States in jurisdictions where statutes permit a
deposit of money to be made in lieu of bail in
criminal cases. The decisions are unanimous in
holding that a fine imposed on the accused may be
satisfied from the cash deposit; and this is true
although the money has been furnished by a third
person. This is so because the law contemplates
that the deposit shall be made by the
defendant. The money, x x x, must accordingly be
treated as the property of the accused. As a result,
the money could be applied in payment of any fine
imposed and of the costs (People vs.
Laidlaw [1886], Ct. of App. Of New York, 7 N. E.,
910, a case frequently cited approvingly in other
jurisdictions; State of Iowa vs. Owens [1900], 112
Iowa, 403; Mundell vs. Wells, supra.). But while as
between the State and the accused the money
deposited by a third person for the release of the
accused is regarded as the money of the accused,
it is not so regarded for any other purpose. As
between the accused and a third person, the
residue of the cash bail is not subject to the claim of
a creditor of property obtain (Wright & Taylor vs.
Dougherty [1908], 138 Iowa, 195; People vs.
Gould [1902], 78 N. Y. Sup., 279; Mundell vs.
Wells, supra.).[10]

In fine, we fail to discern any taint of grave abuse of discretion

on the part of respondent judge in denying petitioners application for
cancellation of the accuseds cash bail.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

41
 ATTY. JULIANA ADALIM-WHITE, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1738 On October 29, 2001, respondent filed his Comment admitting that
(formerly OCA IPI No. 01- he issued an order allowing Manuel Bagaporo, Jr. (Bagaporo) to be released
Complainant, 1325-RTJ) upon recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, Alexandrino
R. Apelado, Sr. Respondent avers that: Bagaporo was convicted by the trial
Members: court of the crime of frustrated murder and meted the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from four years and two months to eight years and one
day; Bagaporo served sentence; subsequently, he filed an application for
release on recognizance; in support of his application, Provincial Jail Warden
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
Apelado issued a certification to the effect that Bagaporo has been confined
PUNO, at the Provincial Jail since February 9, 1996 and is already entitled to parole;
another certification was issued by Supervising Probation and Parole Officer
PANGANIBAN, Eulalia R. Columbretis showing that Bagaporo had applied for parole in line
with the Department of Justices Maagang Paglaya Program. Respondent
QUISUMBING, contends that on the basis of these certifications and on the rule that bail being
discretionary upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
YNARES-SANTIAGO, death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court granted Bagaporos
application for bail upon recognizance of Apelado.[3]
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
In our Resolution of November 25, 2002, we directed the parties to
- versus - CARPIO,
manifest to this Court if they are willing to submit this case for resolution on
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, the basis of the pleadings filed.[4]

CORONA, In his Manifestation dated January 27, 2003, respondent requested

that a formal investigation be conducted to enable him to face his
CARPIO-MORALES, accuser.[5] On the other hand, despite due notice, complainant failed to
comply with the November 25, 2002 Resolution of this Court.
CALLEJO, SR.,
On November 16, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on
AZCUNA, the ground of lack of evidence and that complainant is not interested in
prosecuting her complaint.[6]
TINGA,
In our Resolution of February 7, 2005, we referred the instant case
CHICO-NAZARIO, and to Justice Lucas P. Bersamin of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation,
report and recommendation on grounds that desistance of a complainant is
HON. JUDGE ARNULFO O. GARCIA, JJ. not a basis for dismissing an administrative case and because there is a need
BUGTAS, Presiding Judge, RTC, to establish certain facts surrounding the complained acts allegedly committed
by respondent.[7] Thereafter, the Investigating Justice set the case for hearing
Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern
on various dates.
Samar,
Promulgated:,
On April 15, 2005, respondent again filed a Motion to Dismiss on
Respondent. the ground that complainant failed to appear during the hearings set by the

November 17, 2005 Investigating Justice on March 30 and 31, 2005.[8]

On April 29, 2005, the Investigating Justice issued a Resolution

denying respondents Motion to Dismiss and resetting the hearing for the last
time on May 31, 2005, with warning that the case shall be deemed submitted
for study, report and recommendation should the parties fail to appear at the
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: date set for hearing.[9]

Before us is a verified letter-complaint dated August 10, 2001, filed by Atty.
Juliana Adalim-White against Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, Branch
2, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, for ignorance of the
law relative to Criminal Case No. 10772 entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Manuel Bagaporo, Jr.
The full text of the letter-complaint is as follows:
I bring to the attention of your Honors the act
of Honorable Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, Presiding Judge,
Branches I and II, Regional Trial Court, Borongan,
Eastern Samar for ordering the Release on Recognizance
[of] Mr. Manuel Bagaporo, Jr., a convict of frustrated
murder before terminating service of the minimum
penalty, and pending the approval of the prisoners
application for parole.
Thank you.[1]
In an Indorsement dated August 28, 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator directed respondent to file his comment to the complaint.[2]
In a Manifestation dated May 13, 2005, complainant indicated her
desire to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and
annexes filed.[10] On the other hand, respondent sent a telegraphic
communication dated May 31, 2005 manifesting that the CA may consider the
case submitted for resolution; and praying that he be allowed to submit a
memorandum.[11] The Investigating Justice granted respondents motion.[12] On
June 30, 2005, respondent filed his Memorandum through registered mail.[13]
On August 18, 2005, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report
and Recommendation to this Court with the following findings:
The undersigned Investigating Justice
concludes that Judge Bugtas was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and gross neglect of duty for
committing the following acts and omissions in relation
to the case of convict Bagaporo, Jr., to wit:
1. Due to the penalty imposed on him,
Bagaporo, Jr. should have been committed to the
National Penitentiary upon his conviction (whether or
not he appealed). The failure of Judge Bugtas, if he was
the trial judge, to issue forthwith the mittimus to
commit Bagaporo, Jr. as a national prisoner under
42
Presidential Decree No. 29 to the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City was a serious disobedience to Circular
No. 4-93-A dated April 20, 1992.
2. In acting on Bagaporo, Jr.s application for
release, Judge Bugtas supposedly relied on the
recognizance of Provincial Jail Warden Apelado, Sr. and
on the other documents submitted in support of the
convicts application for release on recognizance. Judge
Bugtas contends that his act did not constitute a
violation since bail was discretionary upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
The undersigned Investigating Justice does
not accept Judge Bugtas good faith because Judge
Bugtas was apparently lacking in sincerity. He was not
unaware that Bagaporo, Jr. was serving final sentence
for which his indeterminate penalty had a minimum of
4 years and 2 months. When Judge Bugtas ordered the
release, Bagaporo, Jr. had not yet served even the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence, a fact that
Judge Bugtas should have known through a simple
process of computation. Even if he was informed of
Bagaporo, Jr.s pending application for parole, Judge
Bugtas had no legal basis to anticipate the approval of
the application and to cause the convicts premature
release. He was thus fully aware that Bagaporo, Jr. could
not be released even upon the recognizance of the
Provincial Jail Warden.
3. Judge Bugtas act of prematurely releasing
the convict in effect altered the final sentence of
Bagaporo, Jr. The undersigned Investigating Justice
submits that Judge Bugtas thereby violated Art. 86,
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua,
reclusion temporal, prision
mayor, prision
correcional and arresto mayor.
The penalties of reclusion
perpetua, reclusion
temporal, prision mayor, prision
correccional and arresto
mayor shall be executed and
served in the places and penal
establishments provided by the
Administrative Code in force or
which may be provided by law in
the future.
Judge Bugtas could give no acceptable
explanation for his act. A convicts release from prison
before he serves the full term of his sentence is due
either to good conduct allowances or to the approval of
his application for parole. The former is granted to him
by the Director of Prisons (now Director of the Bureau
of Corrections), pursuant to Art. 99, Revised Penal Code;
the latter, by the Board of Pardons and Parole that was
created and constituted pursuant to Act No. 4103, as
amended. Obviously, the grant is not a judicial
prerogative.
Consequently, Judge Bugtas arrogated unto
himself authority that pertained under the law to an
administrative official or agency.
4. Judge Bugtas contends that his order of
release on recognizance was correct considering that
the convict had already been in custody for a period
equal to the minimum imprisonment meted out by the
trial court. To support his contention, he cites Sec. 16,
Rule 114, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 16. Bail, when not
required; reduced bail or
recognizance. No bail shall be
required when the law or these
Rules so provide.
When a person has
been in custody for a period
equal to or more than the
possible maximum imprisonment
prescribed for the offense
charged, he shall be released
immediately, without prejudice
to the continuation of the trial or
the proceedings on appeal. If the
maximum penalty to which the
accused may be sentenced
is destierro, he shall be released
after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody
for a period equal to or more
than the minimum of the
principal penalty prescribed for
the offense charged, without
application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released
on a reduced bail or on his own
recognizance, at the discretion of
the court.
The undersigned Investigating Justice opines
that Judge Bugtas contention compounds his already
dire situation. He seems to believe that the quoted rule
applies to a convict like Bagaporo, Jr. He has no
realization at all (or, if he has, he conceals it) that the
rule applies only to an accused undergoing preventive
imprisonment during trial or on appeal; and that the
rule has absolutely no application to one already serving
final sentence. Such ignorance, whether pretended or
not, is terrifying to see in a judicial officer like Judge
Bugtas, a presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court.
5. Judge Bugtas labors under a mistaken
notion about the Indeterminate Sentence Law, that
once the convict has been in custody for the duration of
the minimum of the indeterminate sentence, he may be
released even if his application for parole is still pending.
He thereby ignores that the benefit under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is accorded to the convict
only after the Board of Pardon and Parole has
determined his application favorably after considering
all the cogent circumstances.
It is crucial that Judge Bugtas be reminded
that the convict must remain in prison pending the
consideration of the convicts application for parole by
the Board of Pardons and Parole, for there is no
assurance of the grant of his application.
6. In any case, Judge Bugtas should have
outrightly denied the application of the convict for
release on recognizance not only because the convict
had yet to complete even the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence but also because the convict
must serve his sentence even beyond the minimum
43
 unless in the meantime the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections granted him the allowances for good
conduct that offset the unserved portion pursuant to
Art. 97 and Art. 99, Revised Penal Code; or unless the
Board of Pardons and Parole approved the convicts
application for parole.[14]
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent be fined
in the amount of P25,000.00.[15]
We agree with the Investigating Justice that respondent is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law but not as to the recommended penalty.
Respondent is being charged with ignorance of the law for having
ordered the release of Bagaporo pending approval of the latters application
for parole and before his completion of the minimum period of the sentence
imposed upon him.
Respondent contends that his order allowing the release on
recognizance of Bagaporo is in consonance with the provisions of Section 16,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Bail when not required; reduced bail
or recognizance. No bail shall be required when the law
or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a
period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may
be sentenced, he shall be released immediately,
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial
thereof or the proceedings on appeal. In case the
maximum penalty to which the accused may be
sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or
more than the minimum of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, without application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on
his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court.[16]
Based on the above-quoted Rule, respondent argues that since Bagaporo had
already been in prison for a period which is equal to the minimum of his
sentence, his release on recognizance is in order. Respondent also contends
that he simply exercised his discretion in allowing Bagaporo to be released on
bail on the strength of the provisions of the first paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court which provides that upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.[17]
We are not persuaded.
At the outset, it must be noted that Bagaporo was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four years and two months
to eight years and one day. It is not disputed that he began to serve sentence
on February 9, 1996. Counting four years and two months from said date the
minimum period of Bagaporos sentence should have been completed on April
9, 2000. Hence, we agree with the observation of the Investigating Justice that
it is wrong for respondent to claim that Bagaporo had already served the
minimum of his sentence at the time that he was granted bail on recognizance,
that is, on February 16, 2000.[18]
Furthermore, it is patently erroneous for respondent to release a
convict on recognizance.
Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in
prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final judgment and after the
convict has started to serve sentence. It provides:
SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment;
exception. An accused shall not be allowed bail after
the judgment has become final, unless he has applied
for probation before commencing to serve sentence, the
penalty and the offense being within the purview of the
Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for
probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under
his bail, but if no bail was filed or the accused is
incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release
on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member
of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after
the accused has commenced to serve sentence.[19]
The only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of
Court is when the convict has applied for probation before he commences to
serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview
of the Probation Law.
In the instant case, there is no showing that Bagaporo applied for
probation. In fact at the time of his application for release on recognizance, he
was already serving sentence. When he was about to complete service of the
minimum of his sentence, he filed an application for parole. However, there is
no evidence to show that the Board of Pardons and Parole approved his
application. We agree with the Investigating Justice in holding that a convicts
release from prison before he serves the full term of his sentence is either due
to good conduct allowances, as provided under Act No. 1533[20] and Article 97
of the Revised Penal Code, or through the approval of the convicts application
for parole. A good conduct allowance under Act No. 1533 and Article 97 of the
Revised Penal Code may be granted by the Director of Prisons (now Director
of the Bureau of Corrections), while the approval of an application for parole
is sanctioned by the Board of Pardons and Parole. In addition, a convict may
be released from prison in cases where he is granted pardon by the President
pursuant to the latters pardoning power under Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution.[21] In the present case, aside from the fact that there is no
evidence to prove that Bagaporos application for parole was approved by the
Board of Pardons and Parole, there is neither any showing that he was
extended good conduct allowances by the Director of Prisons, nor was he
granted pardon by the President. Hence, there is no basis for respondent in
allowing Bagaporo to be released on recognizance.
Moreover, respondent should know that the provisions of Sections
5 and 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court apply only to an accused undergoing
preventive imprisonment during trial or on appeal. They do not apply to a
person convicted by final judgment and already serving sentence.
We have held time and again that a judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.[22] It
is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of
well-settled authoritative doctrines.[23] He should strive for excellence
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the rule of law.[24] When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that
would be gross ignorance of the law.[25] In the present case, we find
respondents ignorance or utter disregard of the import of the provisions of
Sections 5, 16 and 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as tantamount to gross
ignorance of the law and procedure.
As to the imposable penalty, Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a
serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, the imposable penalty,
in case the respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, ranges from a
fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00 to dismissal
from the service.
This is not the first time that respondent judge was found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and procedure. In Docena-Caspe vs.
Bugtas,[26] respondent was fined P20,000.00 for having granted bail to an
accused in a murder case without conducting hearing for the purpose of
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. He was warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Hence,
we deem it proper to impose the penalty of P40,000.00.
44
 WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas is found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

45
 [A.M. No. RTJ-03-1780. September 14, 2005]
AMADO L. DE LEON, complainant, vs. JUDGE PATROCINIO R.
CORPUZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, San Fernando
City, Pampanga, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In a complaint[1] dated April 12, 2002, one Amado L. De Leon
charged Judge Patrocinio Corpuz of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 44, San Fernando City (Pampanga), with grave abuse of
authority.
The complaint alleges that on April 10, 2002, respondent judge
approved the application for bail of Noe dela Fuente, accused of fourteen
(14) counts of swindling (estafa) and fourteen (14) violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22[2] before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2,
Guagua, Pampanga, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 18143 to 18170.
At the time respondent approved the bail posted for the accused, Judge
Jesusa Mylene C. Suba-Isip, Presiding Judge of the MTC of Guagua,
Branch 2, where the cases were filed, was in her court the whole day.
Hence, she should have been the one to act on the accuseds application
for bail, not respondent judge.
On April 18, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
referred the complaint to Executive Judge Isagani M. Palad of the RTC
of Guagua, Pampanga for discreet investigation and report.
In his Report dated April 30, 2002, Executive Judge Palad stated:
That on April 10, 2002, the arrest of accused Noe dela Fuente was effected by
SPO2 Enrico Nonato, Warrant Server, PNP Guagua Police Station.
Certification is hereto attached as Annex D;
That likewise on even date April 10, 2002, the accused filed his personal bail
bonds, provided by Summit Guaranty & Insurance Company, Inc., which
were approved by Judge Patrocinio R. Corpuz, RTC, Branch 44, City of San
Fernando, Pampanga; on said date Judge Jesusa Mylene C. Suba-Isip
reported for duty and very much available for the purpose of approving
said question subject bail bond of the accused. Copies of the Order, the
Certification and Court Calendar are hereto attached as Annexes E, F, G, H, &
I, respectively.
x x x (Underscoring ours)
In his comment on the complaint, respondent denied the charge
or any irregularity in approving the 14 bailbonds of accused Noe dela
Fuente. Respondent explained that the accused, accompanied by SPO2
Nonato Enrico, appeared before him in his court at about the close of
office hours on April 10, 2002. They told him that there were no more
judges in the courts of Guagua and that he was the only judge present
in the courts of San Fernando City. The accused then presented his bail
furnished by the Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc. After finding
that the bail is in order, he (respondent) issued an Order approving the
same.
Eventually, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez submitted
his Report with the following recommendation:
1. The instant complaint against Judge Patrocinio Corpuz,
RTC, Branch 44, San Fernando City, Pampanga be
RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
and
2. Judge Corpuz be FOUND GUILTY of Grave Abuse of
Authority for fixing and approving bail bonds in
Criminal Case Nos. 18143 to 18170 despite the
presence of the judge before whom the said cases
are pending, in clear abuse of Section 17, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court and that he be FINED in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.[3]
In our Resolution dated April 7, 2003, we required the parties to
manifest, within twenty (20) days from notice, whether they are
submitting the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records
submitted.
Only respondent submitted the required manifestation. On April
18, 2004, he retired compulsorily.
Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC.17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the
court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality, If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality
other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional
Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge.
In Cruz v. Yaneza,[4] we held:
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is
arrested in the same province, city, or municipality where his case is
pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city, or municipality
other than where his case is pending. In the first situation, the accused may
file bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the absence or
unavailability of judge thereof, with another branch of the same
court within the province or city. In the second situation, the accused has two
(2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where his case is pending or
second, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the province, city, or
municipality where he was arrested. When no regional trial court judge is
available, he may file bail with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
In the instant case, accused Noe dela Fuente was arrested by
virtue of the warrants of arrest[5] all dated April 9, 2002 issued by Judge
Isip of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 2, where the cases were
then pending. The accused was arrested in the same municipality.
Following the above Rule and our ruling in Cruz, the application for bail
should have been filed with the MTC of Guagua, Branch 2. Significantly,
respondent does not dispute that Presiding Judge Isip was then present
the whole day. If she was absent or unavailable, then the accused
should have filed his application for bail with another branch of the
same court within the Province of Pampanga or San Fernando City.
Here, we cannot understand why respondent approved the
accuseds application without first determining whether MTC Judge Isip
is absent or unavailable, and if so, whether there are other MTC or
MTCC Judges within the province of Pampanga or San Fernando City.
Considering his long service in the judiciary, he must have known he has
no authority to act on the accuseds application for bail.
In his Report, DCA Perez stated in his Evaluation that:
The undersigned believes that the issue here is whether on the basis of the
previous approval of bailbonds by Judge Patrocinio Corpuz, Section 17, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court was abused by the said judge.
After a careful evaluation of the record of this case, the undersigned is of the
opinion that there are good grounds to believe that the aforementioned section
of the Rules of Court was indeed abused by Judge Corpuz. Section 17, Rule
114 provides that:
46
SEC.17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the Respondent judge committed gross misconduct by blatantly
court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the disregarding the Rules and settled jurisprudence. Such offense has
judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, been defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
municipality. x x x negligence.[9] In Spouses Adriano and Hilda Monterola v. Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, Jr.,[10] we ruled: The observance of the law, which respondent
judge ought to know, is required of every judge. When the law is
Under the afore-cited section, it is very clear that Judge Corpuz can only act
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; x
on applications for bailbond in the absence or unavailability of the judge of
x x failure to consider a basic and elementary rule, a law or principle
the court where the cases are pending. The latter is primarily responsible for
in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
approving/disapproving such applications for bail due to the pendency of the
undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too viscious
said cases in his/her court. Judge Corpuz can only act secondarily. Also, it
that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith
must be shown that the judge of the Court where the cases are pending is
and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
indeed absent or unavailable before another judge can act on applications for
bail lodged before him. The undersigned believes that Judge Corpuz failed Canon 1 (Rule 1.01) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that
in this aspect. He should have called first the presiding judge of MTC, a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
Branch 2, Guagua, Pampanga (Judge Jesusa Mylene C. Suba-Isip) and independence. Canon 3 states that A judge should perform his official
inquired whether the latter is absent or unavailable before he acted on duties honestly and with impartiality and diligence. By his actuations,
the application for bailbonds in Criminal Cases Nos. 18143 to 18170. As respondent judge has shown his lack of integrity and diligence, thereby
shown by the Report dated 30 April 2002 submitted by Executive Judge blemishing the image of the judiciary.
Isagani M. Palad, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, bailbonds for Criminal
Cases Nos. 18143 to 18170 (28 counts) entitled People of the Philippines Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, gross
vs. Noe dela Fuente for Violation of B.P. 22, were indeed approved by misconduct is classified as a serious charge. As to the penalty to be
Judge Corpuz despite the fact that Judge Jesusa Mylene C. Suba-Isip, the imposed, Section 11, A (3) of the same Rule provides:
judge who issued the warrant of arrest, was very much available for the
purpose of approving said bailbond. (Underscoring ours)
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of
the following sanctions may be imposed:
We find respondents protestation of good faith and eagerness to
uphold the constitutional right of an accused to bail bereft of merit.
Records show that he likewise granted bail to all the accused in the xxx
following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 00-33639, pending before the
MTCC of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 1, on April 19, 2002; (2) 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Criminal Case No. 56084-89, MTCC of Pasig City, Branch 71, on April
23, 2002; (3) Criminal Case No. 12408, RTC of San Fernando City,
Branch 42, on April 27, 2002; (4) Criminal Case No. 02-088-90, MCTC WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Patrocinio R. Corpuz, now
of Mabalacat-Magalang, Pampanga, on May 2, 2002; (5) Criminal Cases retired, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby FINED in
Nos. 6067-68, MTC of Floridablanca, Pampanga, on May 2, 2002; (6) the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to be deducted from
Criminal Case No. 02-3108-9, RTC of Macabebe, Pampanga, on May his retirement benefits.
3, 2002; (7) Criminal Case No. 12439, RTC of San Fernando City, SO ORDERED.
Branch 42, on May 10, 2002; (8) Criminal Case No, 12437, RTC of San
Fernando City, Branch 48, on May 10, 2002; (9) Criminal Case No. 02-
186, RTC of Angeles City, on May 10, 2002; (10) Criminal Case No. G-
5823, RTC of Guagua, Pampanga, on May 13, 2002; and (11) Criminal
Case No. 02-108, MCTC of Mabalacat-Magalang, Pampanga, on May
21, 2002. The bailbonds in these cases were furnished by the First
Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. and Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co.,
Inc.

In granting bail, it is imperative that a judge be conversant with the

procedures provided by the Rules and basic legal principles. A judge
presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also
live by it.[6] The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges
are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.[7] When the judge himself becomes a
transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office
in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.[8]

Sad to say, respondent failed to live by the above standards when

he approved accused dela Fuentes bailbonds and issued release orders
without authority and in breach of the Rules.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended, provides:

SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:

xxx

3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

xxx

47
ESTER F. BARBERO, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1682 Judge Dumlaos approval of Medinas bail and his order to release Medina were
unlawful.
Complainant,

On 15 July 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an

Present: affidavit-complaint[4] from Barbero charging Judge Dumlao with gross
ignorance of the law. In its 1stIndorsement[5] dated 7 August 2003, the OCA
directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-
complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 1st Indorsement. In its
PUNO, C.J.,
1st Tracer[6] dated 11 November 2003, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to
QUISUMBING, comment on the affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 1st Tracer. In
its 2nd Tracer[7] dated 10 March 2004, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to
YNARES-SANTIAGO, comment on the affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 2nd Tracer. In
CARPIO, a Resolution[8] dated 6 April 2005, the Court directed Judge Dumlao to
comment on the affidavit-complaint and to show cause why he should not be
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, administratively dealt with for ignoring
the OCAs directives. Judge Dumlao ignored the 6 April 2005 Resolution.
CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,
In a Resolution[9] dated 17 August 2005, the Court reiterated its 6 April
- versus - AZCUNA, 2005 Resolution. Judge Dumlao ignored the 17 August 2005 Resolution. In a
Resolution dated 6 February 2006, the Court fined Judge Dumlao P500 for
TINGA,
ignoring its directives and directed Judge Dumlao to comply with the 17
CHICO-NAZARIO, August 2005 Resolution. Judge Dumlao ignored the 6 February
VELASCO, JR., 2006Resolution. In Resolutions dated 18 September 2006 and 19 February
2007, the Court considered Judge Dumlao to have waived his right to
NACHURA, comment on the affidavit-complaint and resolved to proceed with the
administrative case based on the pleadings already filed.
REYES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

The Court finds Judge Dumlao liable for gross ignorance of the law and for
BRION, JJ. violation of Court directives.

JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAO, Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Municipal Trial Court, Promulgated:

San Mateo, Isabela, SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed
may be filed with the court where the case is pending,
Respondent. June 19, 2008 or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in
the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than
DECISION where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with
any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
PER CURIAM: therein.

This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Ester

F. Barbero (Barbero) against Judge Cesar M. Dumlao (Judge Dumlao),
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela.

Barbero filed a criminal case[1] for estafa against a certain Herman A. Medina
(Medina). The case was raffled to Judge Anastacio D. Anghad (Judge Anghad),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region II, Branch
36, Santiago City, Isabela. On 19 February 2003, Judge Anghad issued a
warrant of arrest[2] commanding the proper officer to arrest Medina.
Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest. However,
Judge Dumlao approved Medinas bail and, on 9 May 2003, issued an
order[3] commanding the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the
Philippine National Police to release Medina. Barbero alleged that
In Cruz v. Judge Yaneza,[10] the Court held that:
There are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the
application for bail must be filed in the court where the
case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, the application for bail must be filed
with another branch of the same court within the
province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality other than where the case

48
 is pending, bail may be filed with any regional trial
court of the place. (Emphasis ours)
The criminal case Barbero filed against Medina was pending before
the RTC of Santiago City. Judge Anghad of the RTC issued the warrant of
arrest, and Medina was arrested by virtue of that warrant.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person under
detention by legal process shall be released except when he is admitted to
bail. Section 19 provides that the accused must be discharged upon approval
of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with Section
17. Section 17 provides that the bail may be filed with the court where the case
is pending, unless (1) the judge in that court is absent or unavailable, or (2) the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the
case is pending. If the judge is absent or unavailable, the bail should be filed
with another branch of the same court. If the accused is arrested in a province,
city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, the bail should be
filed with any RTC of the place.
In the present case, there was no showing that Judge Anghad was absent or
unavailable or that Medina was arrested outside Santiago City. Thus, Medinas
bail should have been filed with Judge Anghad. Even if Judge Anghad were
absent or unavailable or even if Medina were arrested in San Mateo,
Judge Dumlao would still be liable because the bail should have been filed with
another branch of the RTC in Santiago City or with the RTC of San Mateo,
respectively.[11]
Since the criminal case was pending before the RTC of Santiago City and there
was no showing that Judge Anghad of the RTC was absent or unavailable,
Judge Dumlao lacked authority to approve the bail and order Medinas release.
Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlaos acts of approving Medinas bail and
ordering Medinas release were not in accordance with law
[N]apag-alaman ko x x x na [si Medina] ay basta na lang
pinakawalan ni x x x Judge Cesar M.
Dumlao ng Municipal Trial Court ng San Mateo, Isabela
x x x;
[A]ng ginawa ni Judge Cesar M. Dumlao ay hindi
naaayon sa batas sapagkat wala siyang
kapangyarihang pakawalan x x x [si Medina];
[N]apag-alaman ko rin na ang pagrerelease na ginawa
ni Judge Dumlao ay base sa [bail] na ipinakita sa kanya;
[S]a akin
pong pagkakaalam, lahat po ng [bail] sa criminal
cases ay dapat aksyunan at aprubahan ng hukom o jud
ge na siyang may hawak ng asunto;
xxxx
[K]ung maaari po sana, dahil sa kawalang respeto [ni J
udge] Cesar
M. Dumlao sa ating batas x x x, ipinakikiusap [ko] na sa
na ay imbestigahan ang nasabing pagmamalabis at ka
walan ng respeto[.]
The Court directed Judge Dumlao several times to comment
on Barberos allegations. Judge Dumlao opted to ignore all of the Courts
directives. By his silence, Judge Dumlao admitted the truth of the
allegations. In Palon, Jr. v. Vallarta,[12] the Court held that silence is admission
of the truth of the charges:
Respondent judge failed to comment on the complaint
or file any responsive pleading or manifestation despite
receipt of notice to do so. x x x The natural instinct of
man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or
imputation and defend himself. It is against human
nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the
face of false accusations. Hence, silence x x x is an
admission of the truth of the charges.Respondent
judge is deemed to have admitted the charges against
him. (Emphasis ours)
This is the second time Judge Dumlao unlawfully approved the bail and
ordered the release of Medina. The instant case has exactly the same set of
facts as Lim v. Dumlao.[13] In that case (1) complainant filed two criminal cases
for carnapping and theft against Medina; (2) the criminal cases were filed with
the RTC, Judicial Region II, Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela; (3) Judge
Fe Albano Madrid of the RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Medina; (4)
Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest; (5)
Judge Dumlao approved the bail of Medina; and (6) Judge Dumlao ordered the
release of Medina.
In Lim,[14] the Court held that:
It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by
complainant against Herman Medina were pending
before
the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela,
Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of arrest was issued by
Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the said
court. The order of release therefore, on account of the
posting of the bail, should have been issued by that
court, or in the absence or unavailability of
Judge Madrid, by another branch of
an RTC in Santiago City. In this case, however, there is
no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable
at the time of the posting of the bail bond. In fact,
complainant Lim avers that on the day [Judge Dumlao]
ordered the release of Medina,
Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago
City, Isabela were at their respective posts.
It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has
no authority to grant bail to an accused arrested
outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements
of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x xmust be complied with
before a judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes
that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the
law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. Where x x x the law is straightforward
and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if
one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.
[Judge Dumlao] undeniably erred in approving the bail
and issuing the order of release. He is expected to
know that certain requirements ought to be complied
with before he can approve Medinas bail and issue an
order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary
that it leaves little room for error. (Emphasis ours)
The acts of approving bail and ordering the release of accused whose cases are
pending before other courts constitute gross ignorance of the law.[15] Gross
ignorance of the law is a serious offense[16] punishable by (1) dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to anypublic
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; (2)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000.[17]
Aside from Lim, the Court also found Judge Dumlao grossly ignorant of the law
in Pascual v. Judge Dumlao.[18] In that case, Judge Dumlao (1) hastily ordered
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) without notice and
hearing; (2) ordered the issuance of the TRO even though there was no
showing of any grave or irreparable injury; (3) hastily granted a motion to
deposit harvest without notice and hearing; and (4) failed to order the sheriff
to render an accounting of the harvest.
49
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
provides that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial
office. Judge Dumlao lacks this prerequisite.
Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court by repeatedly refusing to comment on
the affidavit-complaint. In its 1st Indorsement dated 7 August 2003, 1st Tracer
dated 11 November 2003, and 2nd Tracer dated 10 March 2004, the OCA
directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In its
Resolutions dated 6 April 2005, 17 August 2005, and 6 February 2006, the
Court fined Judge Dumlao P500, directed him to comment on the affidavit-
complaint, and directed him to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with for refusing to
comment. Judge Dumlao unjustifiably ignored all six directives.
Court resolutions directing judges to comment on administrative complaints
are not mere requests. Judges are duty-bound to obey them fully and
promptly.[19] In refusing to comment on the affidavit-complaint for almost five
years and despite several directives from the Court, Judge Dumlao blatantly
demonstrated gross misconduct, outright disrespect, indifference, and a
recalcitrant streak in his character.[20]
This is the third time Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court. In Office of the
Court Administrator v. Dumlao,[21] the Court found him liable for ignoring its
directives. In that case, the Court held that:
It appears that Judge Dumlao ignored and continued
to ignore this Courts directive requiring him to file his
comment on complainant Sinaon, Jr.s administrative
complaint. He had been afforded more than ample time
within which to file the required
pleading. x x x [S]everal Resolutions had been issued by
the OCA and this Court requiring Judge Dumlao to
comment on the complaint against him.The first
Resolution was issued as early as 2 August 2002 and the
last was issued almost three years later, or 5 July 2005,
by which time, the Court already deemed waived
Judge Dumlaos right to file his comment and considered
the case submitted for decision based on the pleadings
filed. Subsequently, Judge Dumlao again failed to
comply with the order of this Court to file his
manifestation in the re-docketed administrative
complaint (concerning his non-filing of the comment)
despite due notice.
Judge Dumlao had been given more than ample time
to abide with the orders of this Court, yet he
persistently failed to do so. Judge Dumlao neither
offered any reason nor raised any defense for his
failure to comply with the mandates of this
Court. Nothing was heard from Judge Dumlao as to
what had prevented him from complying with the
Courts directives. Such insolence should not go
unpunished. (Emphasis ours)
In Lim,[22] the Court also found Judge Dumlao liable for ignoring its
directives. In that case, the Court held that, We agree with the OCA that
[Judge Dumlao] must be held administratively liable for his unjustified failure
to comment on an administrative complaint. This constitutes gross
misconduct and insubordination.
Violation of Supreme Court directives is a less serious offense[23] punishable by
(1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one nor more than three months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.[24]
Aside from Lim, Pascual, and Office of the Court Administrator,
Judge Dumlao has another administrative case decided against
him. In Morales, Sr. v. Judge Dumlao,[25] the Court found him liable for
violating SC Administrative Circular No. 1-90. In that case, the Court held that:
[Judge Dumlaos] claim that he did not know how he
inadvertently signed the notarized revocation of power
of attorney in this case betrays a deficiency of that
degree of circumspection demanded of all those who
don the judicial robe. It is, in fact, an open admission of
his negligence and lack of care in attending to the
incidents brought before him for adjudication. This kind
of judicial carelessness runs contrary to Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that:
A judge should perform official
duties honestly, and with
impartiality
and diligence. [(Emphasis ours)]
While we do not expect judges to have an encyclopedic
recollection of applicable laws, jurisprudence or
administrative circulars we issue periodically in the
discharge of their responsibilities, they nevertheless
have the bounden duty to keep abreast with the law and
the changes therein as well as the decisions of this
Court. As a trial judge, [Judge Dumlao] is the visible
representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct he is expected to be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence to maintain public confidence in the legal
system.
Inefficient judges are equally impermissible in the
judiciary as the incompetent and dishonest ones. Any of
them tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings it
to public contempt, dishonor or disrespect and must
then be administratively dealt with and punished
accordingly.
Judge Dumlao has amply demonstrated his incorrigibility and unfitness to be a
judge. He is undeterred by the several penalties and stern warnings the Court
has given him. The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty for it
cannot tolerate any conduct that diminishes the faith of the people in the
judicial system.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Cesar M. Dumlao, Municipal Trial Court,
San Mateo, Isabela, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW and VIOLATION OF SUPREME COURT DIRECTIVES. Accordingly, the
Court DISMISSES him from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to
any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
50
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1175. March 9, 1999]
VICTORINO CRUZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE REYNOLD Q. YANEZA,
MeTC, Branch 54, Navotas, Metro Manila, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
RAFFY TULFO of Radio DZXL furnished the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) with a copy of the unsworn letter-complaint of a certain
Victorino Cruz, complainant herein, dated 13 March 1998 against respondent
JUDGE REYNOLD Q. YANEZA of MeTC-Br. 54, Navotas, Metro
Manila. Cruz complained of the alleged irregular approval of bail bonds and
issuance of release orders by Judge Yaneza in violation of Sec. 17, Rule 114, of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
On 17 June 1998 the OCA referred the letter-complaint to Executive
Judge Benjamin M. Aquino Jr. of RTC-Br. 72, Malabon, Metro Manila, with
instructions to conduct a discreet investigation.
In a Report dated 27 July 1998 Judge Aquino confirmed that Judge
Yaneza had been improperly approving bail bonds and irregularly issuing
release orders for accused whose cases were pending outside of his jurisdiction,
to wit:
1. At 5:25 p.m. on 25 August 1997 Judge Yaneza issued a release
order for Dario Daquilog y Mabalacad who was detained at the DILG-
PARAC Detention Center in connection with Crim. Case No. Q-97-
72204 pending before RTC-Br. 218, Quezon City.
2. On 11 February 1998 Judge Yaneza issued a consolidated order
in Crim. Cases Nos. 7992-AF, 7994-AF, 7995-AF of RTC-Brs. 26, 24,
28 and 86, Cabanatuan City, commanding the release of the accused
Consolacion F. de la Cruz, detained at the PNP-CIG Detention Center,
Camp Crame, Quezon City. In Crim. Case No. 7995-AF no bail was
recommended for the provisional liberty of de la Cruz. Also, the bail
bonds were presented to respondent Judge in his office at 7:00 p.m.
3. At 1:30 p.m. on 28 February 1998, a Saturday, Judge Yaneza
issued a release order relative to Crim. Cases Nos. 28102-22 pending
before MeTC-Br. 34, Quezon City. The accused was detained at PNP-
BDO, Camp Karingal, Sikatuna, Quezon City.
4. On 21 March 1998, a Saturday, Judge Yaneza issued a release
order for Henry Lasay who was detained at the PNP-WPD, U.N. Avenue,
Manila, in connection with Crim. Case Nos. 14111-14116 pending
before RTC-Br. 48, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
5. On 5 April 1998, a Saturday, Judge Yaneza issued a release
order relative to Crim. Case No. 2618 pending before RTC-Br. 34,
Balaoan, La Union.
6. On 8 April 1998 Judge Yaneza issued a release order relative
to Crim. Case Nos. 080-98 to 099-98 pending before MTC-Balagtas,
Bulacan.
7. On 16 June 1998 Judge Yaneza issued a release order relative
to Crim. Case No. 41-98 pending before RTC-Br. 5, Lemery, Batangas
while the corresponding JDF fees were not paid. The accused was
detained at PNP-WPD, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
8. On 23 June 1998 Judge Yaneza also approved the bail bond for
Julieta Sta. Maria y Moya who is charged in Crim. Case No. 90381
pending before MeTC-Br. 41, Quezon City, while the accused was
detained at the Quezon City Jail-Station 7, Araneta Center, Cubao,
Quezon City.
9. On 23 June 1998 Judge Yaneza approved the bail bond of
Melissa Laurente Manlangit who was charged with Crim. Case No. Q-
98-77419 before the RTC-Br. 87, Quezon City. Laurente at that time was
detained at the Quezon City Jail-Araneta Police Station, Cubao, Quezon
City.
10. On 2 July 1998 Judge Yaneza approved the bail bond of
Hassan Hussin y Sabdani who was accused in Crim. Case No. Q-98-
77567 pending before RTC-Br. 107, Quezon City, and issued a release
order although the accused was detained at the PNP-CPDO, Camp
Karingal, Quezon City. The release order was issued at 7:40 p.m.
11. On 3 July 1998 Judge Yaneza approved the bail bond of
Librada Natividad who was accused in Crim. Case nos. (30)50301-20
pending before MeTC-Br. 39, Quezon City, and correspondingly issued
a release order therefor although accused was detained at the DILG-
BJMP, NCR, Valenzuela Municipal Jail. The release order was issued at
7:15 p.m.
12. At 7:25 p.m. on 3 July 1998 Judge Yaneza approved two (2)
bail bonds and issued the release order of Carlito Baydo y Cabiong who
was detained at the Baler Police Station, Quezon City in connection with
Crim. Cases Nos. Q-98-77603-04 pending before RTC-Br. 80, Quezon
City.
13. At 5:45 p.m. on 15 July 1998 Judge Yaneza approved the bail
and issued the release order of Elenita Bacares y Lambino in connection
with Crim. Cases Nos. 2072-2087 pending before RTC-Br. 34, Gapan,
Nueva Ecija. The accused was detained at the PNP-CPD CID, Camp
Karingal, Sikatuna, Quezon City.
14. On 17 July 1998 Judge Yaneza issued a release order for
Adriano Dizon y Santos who was detained at the PNP-CPDO, Quezon
City in connection with Crim. Cases No. 98-90795 pending before
MeTC-Br. 41, Quezon City.
15. On 17 July 1998 Judge Yaneza issued a release order for
Adonis Malacora who was detained at the PNP-NPDO, Malabon Police
Station, Malabon, Metro Manila, in connection with Crim. Case No.
89005 pending before MeTC-Br. 41, Quezon City.
16. On 17 July 1998 Judge Yaneza approved the bail bond of
Manuel E. Fabros y Deliquiado, then detained at the Central Police
District Police Station No. 7, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, in
connection with Crim. Case No. 98-90729 pending before MeTC-Br. 41,
Quezon City.
17. On 19 July 1998, a Sunday, Judge Yaneza issued a release
order to Teresita Agayatin y Ayuntan who was detained at the PNP-
WPD Warrant Section, U.N. Avenue, Manila, in connection with Crim.
Case No. 98-0714 pending before RTC-Br. 118, Pasay City.
18. On 21 July 1998 Judge Yaneza issued a release order for
Maria Luz Catindig y Gamboa, then detained at the PNP-CIDG, NCR,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, in connection with Crim. Case No. 98-086
pending before RTC-Pasay City.
19. On 21 July 1998, at 6:05 p.m. Judge Yaneza issued a release
order for Jerry Chan y Victoriano who was detained at the PNP-NPD,
Malabon Police Station, Malabon, Metro Manila, in connection with
Crim. Case No. 7656-98 pending before MeTC-Br. 56, Malabon.
20. On 25 August 1998 Judge Yaneza approved the bail bond
relative to Crim. Case No. RC-0135-Cr. Pending before his sala despite
non-payment of JDF fees.
21. On 23 September 1998 a release order was issued relative to
Crim. Case No. 98-0045-CR pending before the sala of Judge Yaneza
despite non-payment of JDF fees.
22. At 6:05 p.m. on 7 October 1998 Judge Yaneza issued a release
order relative to Crim. Case No. 9947 pending before the RTC of
Malabon while the corresponding JDF fees were not paid.
The accused had already been convicted in Crim. Cases Nos.
18045-46 pending before Executive Judge Aquino but because of the bail
bond approved and the order issued by Judge Yaneza, the accused was
released.
23. On 18 October 1998 Judge Yaneza issued a release order
relative to Crim. Case No. 20933 pending before the RTC of Malabon
while the corresponding JDF fees were not paid.
51
 24. On 19 October 1998 and relative to Crim. Cases Nos. 189164-
66 pending before MeTC-Br. 50, Caloocan City, Judge Yaneza issued a
release order while the corresponding JDF fees were not paid.
25. On 9 November 1998 at 6:10 p.m. Judge Yaneza issued a
release order relative to Crim. Cases Nos. 7751-98 pending before
MeTC-Br. 55, Malabon.
In his answer dated 13 August 1998 Judge Yaneza admits having
approved bail bonds posted by the accused who were detained outside of
Navotas and whose cases were pending in courts outside of his
jurisdiction.Nevertheless, according to him, he approved the bail bonds and
issued corresponding release orders in good faith and not for any pecuniary
consideration. He maintains that there is nothing irregular in his conduct as it
did not in any way prejudice the rights of the other litigants. Furthermore, he
claims that he only approved the bail bonds and issued release orders for
personal fulfillment and spiritual satisfaction in extending expeditious
assistance to the hapless and pitiful detention prisoners. He condemns the filing
of the instant letter-complaint, with complainant hiding behind the anonymity
of a fictitious name and intended merely to embarrass and malign respondents
integrity.
Moreover, Judge Yaneza alleges that he is constrained to work overtime,
sometimes even Saturdays and Sundays, because he has lost trust and
confidence in his clerk of court who is allegedly incompetent and lacks
dedication to his work. He avers that it is during his overtime work that requests
for action on bail bonds are normally presented. In the questioned bail bonds he
issued, he was almost overwhelmed with pity as the accused were usually poor,
oppressed and beleaguered, hence, he approved their bail bonds.
Notwithstanding the letter-complaint of Victorino Cruz, and in stubborn
defiance of this Court's directive for him to explain his anomalous approval of
bail bonds and consequent issuance of release orders, Judge Yaneza continued
with his misconduct and wrongdoing. On 27 August 1998 Executive Judge
Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr. reported that Judge Yaneza approved the bail bonds
and issued release orders in the following cases in various courts outside his
jurisdiction, to wit:
1. Crim. Cases Nos. 7-835 to 7-837-98 for BP 22 pending before
the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
2. Crim. Cases Nos. 7-838 to 7-843-98 for BP 22 also pending
before the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan; and
3. Crim. Case No. 7528 for falsification of public documents
pending before the MCTC, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
Perhaps due to the brewing antagonism which further strained the
relationship between respondent Judge and his branch clerk of court, the former
issued Office Order No. 04-98 authorizing four (4) of his court personnel, aside
from the clerk of court and cash clerk, to receive payments and issue official
receipts relative to docket and other fees paid by litigants. Because the
personnel thus designated by respondent Judge were not bonded, hence not
authorized by law to receive payments, the OCA on 31 August 1998 directed
respondent Judge to desist and refrain from implementing his Office Order No.
04-98.
Thereafter, on 15 September 1998, respondent Judges Clerk of Court
Roman M. Gatbalite submitted copies of bail bonds approved and release orders
issued by respondent Judge for cases pending in courts outside his jurisdiction
1. Crim. Case No. 90-591 pending before MTC-Br. II, Angeles
City;
2. Crim. Case No. 98-2419 pending before RTC-Br. 273,
Marikina City; and
3. Crim. Cases Nos. 14111-14116 pending before RTC-Br. 48,
Puerto Princesa, Palawan.
Notably, in addition to the instant case, respondent Judge Yaneza along
with his Staff Clerk Bethsaida Miranda is confronted with another
administrative complaint docketed as OCA IPI No. 98-586 filed by spouses
Rogelio and Elvira Conje for extorting money from complainant-spouses in
consideration of the approval of their application for bail in Crim. Cases Nos.
RC-0058-71 pending before his sala. The complaint has yet to be resolved.
After a thorough evaluation, together with the independent investigation
and report of Executive Judge Aquino, the OCA found
The records of the instant administrative case sufficiently provide a conclusive
basis for respondent judges administrative liability. His unlawful act of
approving the bail bond and ordering the release of an accused charged with
an explicitly non-bailable offense pending in another court far away from his
station is an anomaly so glaring on a matter so basic that to suggest that the
act was done in gross ignorance is to insult even the most nave. To offer as an
excuse to this Court that he did so, not out of ignorance, but in good faith is to
administer a double insult to common sense x x x x
Clearly, respondent judge cannot justify his actions of approving bail bonds
and issuing release orders of accused persons detained outside of his territorial
jurisdiction and who have pending cases in other courts on the pretext of a
feigned authority under the rules. For the rule is clear and does not permit the
liberal interpretation that respondent judge claims he is entitled to apply to the
rules. The unjustified and unlawful acts of respondent judge in the premises
constitute grave misconduct amounting to corruption. The acts complained of
were in persistent and patent disregard of the well-known legal rules that
compassion and pity which purportedly motivated him to approve the bail
bonds and to release the accused in illegal circumstances will not serve to
exonerate him from administrative liability. Respondent judges actions were
corrupt and were indeed motivated by an intention to violate the law. The
issuance of the questioned release orders after office hours, during Saturdays
or Sundays and at the residence of respondent judge is indisputably irregular,
unlawful and anomalous and is totally inconsistent with any claim of good
faith in the performance of his judicial functions.
Despite the filing of this administrative complaint and even after his attention
was called to the matter, respondent judge has continued approving bail bonds
and issuing release orders for cases outside of his jurisdiction.These willful
transgressions of the law are absolutely reprehensible and definitely
inexcusable x x x
The OCA then recommended that an investigation on the bonding
companies that usually flocked the sala of respondent Judge be conducted and
Judge Yaneza be immediately dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
leave and retirement benefits and privileges with prejudice to reinstatement or
re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
Section 17, par. (a), of Rule 114, as amended by Administrative Circular
No. 12-94, provides:
(a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with another branch of the same court within the province or city. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where
the case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of
said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused
is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is
pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality
other than where his case is pending. In the first situation, the accused may file
bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the absence or unavailability
of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province
or city. In the second situation, the accused has two (2) options. First, he may
file bail in the court where his case is pending or, second, he may file bail with
any regional trial court in the province, city or muncipality where he was
arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.
Interestingly, almost all the cases wherein respondent Judge approved
bail bonds and issued release orders were not pending before his sala. To
complicate matters, the accused were neither arrested nor detained within the
territorial jurisdiction of respondent Judges court
(1) Crim. Cases Nos. 7992-AF, 7994-AF, 7995-AF are pending in
RTC-Brs. 24, 26, 28 and 86 of Cabanatuan City while the accused was
52
detained at the PNP-CIG Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon
City. Significantly, no bail was recommended in these cases.
(2) Crim. Cases Nos. 28102-22 are pending before MeTC-Br. 34
of Quezon City while the accused was detained at PNP-BDO, Camp
Karingal, Quezon City.
(3) Crim. Cases Nos. 14111-14116 are pending before RTC-Br.
48, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan while the accused was detained at
WPD, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
(4) Crim. Case no. 41-98 is pending before RTC-Br. 5, Lemery,
Batangas while the accused was detained at PNP-WPD, U.N. Avenue,
Manila.
(5) Crim. Case No. 90381 is pending before MeTC-Br. 41,
Quezon City while accused was detained at the Quezon City Jail, Station
7, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City.
(6) Crim. Case No. Q-98-77419 is pending before RTC-Br. 87,
Quezon City while accused was detained at the Quezon City Jail, Araneta
Police Station, Cubao, Quezon City.
(7) Crim. Case No. Q-98-77567 is pending before RTC-Br. 107,
Quezon City while accused was detained at PNP-CPDO, Camp Karingal,
Quezon City.
(8) Crim. Cases Nos. (30)50301-20 are pending before MeTC-Br.
39, Quezon City while accused was detained at DILG-BJMP, NCR,
Valenzuela Municipal Jail.
(9) Crim. Cases Nos. Q-98-77603-04 are pending before RTC-Br.
80, Quezon City while accused was detained at Baler Police Station,
Quezon City.
(10) Crim. Cases Nos. 2072-2087 are pending before RTC-Br. 34,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, while accused was detained at the PNP-CPD CID,
Camp Karingal, Sikatuna, Quezon City.
(11) Crim. Case No. 98-90795 is pending before MeTC-Br. 41,
Quezon City while accused was detained at the PNP-CPDO, Quezon
City.
(12) Crim. Case No. 89005 is pending before MeTC-Br. 41,
Quezon City while accused was detained at the PNP-NPDO, Malabon
Police Station, Malabon.
(13) Crim. Case No. 98-90729 is pending before MeTC-Br. 41,
Quezon City while accused was detained at the CPD, Station 7, Araneta
Center, Cubao, Quezon City.
(14) Crim. Case No. 98-0714 is pending before RTC-Br. 118 of
Pasay City while accused was detained at the PNP-WPD Warrant
Section, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
(15) Crim. Case No. 98-086 is pending before RTC-Pasay City
while accused was detained at the PNP-CIDG, NCR, Camp Crame,
Quezon City.
(16) Crim. Case No. 7656-98 is pending before MeTC-Br. 56 in
Malabon while accused was detained at the PNP-NPD, Malabon Police
Station, Malabon.
There were also cases pending before the courts in La Union, Bulacan
and Caloocan. Unfortunately, it cannot be determined from available records
whether the accused in the aforementioned cases were arrested in a place within
respondent Judges territorial jurisdiction.
In any case, respondent Judge claims in his Supplemental
Explanation that he approved the bail bonds mainly in good faith interpretation
and application of Section 17 in relation to Section 19, Rule114 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, and that it was never his intention to disregard the right
accorded to the State and the private complainant to be given the opportunity
to oppose the grant of bail to the accused in some instances.On the same note,
he attempts to impress upon this Court that, in all instances that (he) was asked
to approve bail x x x (he) conscientiously and carefully examined the documents
thus presented xxx for xxx evaluation to ascertain compliance with the said Rule
(114).
We believe otherwise. Judge Yaneza cannot shield himself from the
consequences of his persistent deviant activities by the simple invocation of
good faith and the supplication that he was only moved by pity for the poor and
forsaken accused. The numerous cases and series of events previously adverted
to manifest without any modicum of doubt the gravity of his incompetence and
arbitrariness. As a judge, respondent must have the basic rules at the palm of
his hands as he is expected to maintain professional competence at all
times.[1] Since Judge Yaneza presides over MeTC-Br. 54 in Navotas, Metro
Manila, his territorial jurisdiction is confined therein. Therefore, to approve bail
applications and issue corresponding release orders in cases pending in courts
outside his territorial jurisdiction, some even in courts as far as Nueva Ecija and
Palawan,particularly so where the accused are detained thereat and not in his
jurisdiction and therefore cannot personally appear before him as required,
constitute ignorance of the law so gross as to amount to incompetence and even
corruption.
Respondent Judge argues in his Supplemental Explanation that it is
his honest belief and interpretation that his single-sala MeTC in Navotas, being
part of the Metropolitan Trial Court salas spread out in Metro Manila, has the
lawful authority to act on bail bonds posted by accused in criminal cases lodged
in other courts salas, within Metro Manila or otherwise detained within Metro
Manila which (he) honestly deems a contiguous area, in situations or occasions
that the handling trial court judge is absent or not available.
We remain unconvinced. The above commentary is not only tiresome; it
is futile. This Court has the duty and prerogative to define the territorial
jurisdiction of each branch of court. Thus, in Sec. 18 of BP Blg. 129 it is stated
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional
Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said
branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall
be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people
of the different parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants and
witnesses as inexpensive as possible (emphasis supplied).
Such prerogative was exercised by this Court when it issued Administrative
Order No. 3 defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in
the National Capital Region[2] thus
1. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila over the
City of Manila only.
2. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats Quezon City
over Quezon City only.
3. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City
over Pasay City only.
4. Branches CXX to CXXXI, inclusive, with seats at Caloocan
City over Caloocan City only.
5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati over
the Municipalities of Las Pias, Makati, Muntinlupa, and Paraaque.
6. Branches CLI to CLXVIII, inclusive, with seats at Pasig
comprising the municipalities of Mandaluyong, Marikina, Pasig,
Pateros, San Juan, and Taguig.
7. Branches CLXIX to CLXX, inclusive, with seats at Malabon
over the municipalities of Malabon and Navotas.
8. Branches CLXXI to CLXXII, inclusive, with seats at
Valenzuela over the municipality of Valenzuela over the municipality of
Valenzuela only (emphasis supplied).
The Regional Trial Courts with seats in Malabon exercise appellate
jurisdiction over cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts located in
Malabon and Navotas. It is thus clear that the territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts stationed in Malabon is limited to the municipalities of
Malabon and Navotas. By necessity, the Metropolitan Trial Courts with seats in
Malabon and Navotas have, likewise, limited jurisdiction therein.
53
 Judge Yaneza cannot seek refuge in Sec. 35 of BP Blg. 129 which grants
authority to any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge and Municipal
Circuit Trial Judge to hear and decide applications for bail in criminal cases in
the province or city where the absent Regional Trial Judge sits. Neither can he
take shelter under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Rule 114. [3]
Section 35 of BP Blg. 129 and Secs. 17 and 19 of Rule 114 are to be
construed and applied in conjunction with each other. The abovecited rules do
not give the Metropolitan Trial Judge blanket authority to grant applications for
bail. There are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail
must be filed in the court where the case is pending. In the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, the application for bail may be filed with
another branch of the same court within the province or city. Second, if the
accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case
is pending, bail may be filed with any regional trial court of the place. If no
judge thereof is available, then with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
The documents presented before this Court in the instant administrative
case are manifest testimonies of the glaring errors committed by respondent
Judge. He approved bail applications for cases not pending before his sala. The
accused were not arrested in places within his territorial jurisdiction. Neither
did he attempt to show the unavailability of the other regional trial court judges
who have the priority in terms of hearing the bail applications. Sadly,
respondent judge did not only commit this error once or twice or thrice, but
several times. Considering the frequency by which he committed this egregious
error, we are perplexed and at the same time alarmed, that this has become a
pernicious habit on his part. We therefore seriously doubt his protestations that
he approved bail bonds and issued release orders for the poor, helpless and
beleaguered accused out of pity and not for any monetary consideration. We
simply cannot accept his justification that he was never impelled by any bad
motive or malevolent intent, bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, corruption and
immorality.
Neither are we moved by respondent Judges asseverations that in all
instances that (he) was asked to approve bail xxx (he) conscientiously and
carefully examined the documents thus presented xxx for prior evaluation to
ascertain compliance with Rule 114. If this were true, he would not have
succumbed to his apparent predilection to approve bail bonds and issue release
orders considering that a mere passing glance by a seasoned and conscientious
judge of the documents thus presented before him would reveal his lack of
authority to act on them. He would have been basically guided by the wordings
of a warrant of arrest
To Any Officer of the Law:
GREETING:
You are hereby commanded to arrest _________________________ who is
said to be at _________________________ and who is charged before me
with the crime of _________________________ and to bring him before me
as soon as possible to be dealt with according to law.
The bail for his temporary liberty is hereby fixed at P________ each, which
may be furnished by him either (a) by depositing the amount of the bond in
the office of the municipal/city treasurer of the municipality/city where the
accused is arrested, and the receipt therefor forwarded to this Court, or (b) by
purchasing the proper money order made payable to the order of this Court
and sent to the same Court, or (c) by personal bail bond for double the amount
therein fixed executed by two or more solvent bondsmen who are either
freeholders or householders and residents in the Philippines to be determined
either by the Judge of the Regional Trial Court of the Judicial Region or by
the Judge of MeTC/MuTC/MCTC of the municipality/city where the accused
may be arrested, who are hereby authorized to approve either one of said
bonds, and to order the provisional liberty of the accused, immediately
thereafter, and who shall forward to this Court all the papers of the
proceedings (emphasis supplied)
[4]
It is futile for respondent Judge to cite Paz v. Tiong as it only confirms
his practice of approving bail bonds in cases pending outside of his territorial
jurisdiction and where the accused were arrested likewise in places outside of
his territorial jurisdiction, which is not in consonance with the rules duly
promulgated by this Court. We reiterate what we have said in Paz v. Tiong
Respondent had absolutely no authority to approve the bailbond and issue the
orders of release. He totally ignored and disregarded Section 14 of Rule 114 x
x x x As afore-stated, Criminal Case No. 2859-A was pending before Branch
54 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Alaminos, Pangasinan, and only
said Regional Trial Court may approve the bailbond and issue the release
order. The record is devoid of any showing that no RTC judge was
available to act on the bail bond. Neither does the record show that the
accused was arrested in another province, city, or
municipality. Respondent judge, therefore, had no reason or authority to
act as he did (emphasis supplied).[5]
In Adapon v. Domagtoy[6] we also stated -
But even assuming that bail could be granted in this case, it was not within the
jurisdiction of the respondent judge to grant the same. Bail may be granted by
the court in which it is properly filed x x x x
The criminal cases are pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte. The order of release should have been issued if at all,
by that court, or in the absence or unavailability of Judge Jose Comon who
hears the cases in the MCTC of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, then by another
branch of an MCTC within Surigao del Norte. However, there is no proof that
Judge Comon was absent or unavailable on 5 May 1995 to grant the bail x x x
x If judge Comon was indeed absent or unavailable, there is no evidence on
record that respondent judge tried to ascertain or confirms this fact.
Furthermore, there is no evidence presented that the accused Bondoc was
arrested in the municipality of Sta. Monica, Burgos, to clothe respondent
judge with authority to grant the bail and issue the order of release in the
absence of any RTC judge. Respondent judge avers that accused was arrested
in the house of Arsenio Mindaa in Dapa, which statement makes his order of
release all the more untenable because the arrest was allegedly made in Dapa
while the order of release issued by respondent judge in his capacity as
presiding judge of the 11th MCTC of Santa Monica-Burgos. Respondent
judge, therefore, granted bail and issued the order of release without
jurisdiction.
In another case,[7] Judge Yaneza acknowledged receipt of P160,000.00
cash bond in violation of Sec. 14, Rule 114 which provides:
Sec. 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accuse or any person acting in his behalf
may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue, or
provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount fixed by the court or
recommended by the fiscal who investigated or filed the case, and upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of Section 2 hereof, the accused
shall be discharged from custody. Money thus deposited shall be considered
as bail and applied to the payment of any fine and costs and the excess, if any,
shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit (emphasis
supplied).
This rule is uniformly embodied in every warrant of arrest which
respondent, as a trial judge, should be familiar with. Unfortunately, he blatantly
disregarded this basic and elementary rule.
Respondent Judge aggravated his improperties and misconduct when he
summarily granted bail on 11 February 1998 to accused Consolacion F. dela
Cruz charged with illegal recruitment in large scale punishable with life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00. In such case, bail is not a matter of
right and the grant of bails falls within the sound discretion of the judge. And
in order for the judge to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct
a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. As decreed
in Almeron v. Sardido[8] -
In exercising such judicial discretion, however, a judge is required to conduct
a hearing wherein both the prosecution and the defense present evidence that
would point to the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt.The discretion
of the judge lies solely in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the
evidence presented during the hearing and not in the determination of whether
or not the hearing and itself should be held for such a hearing is considered
mandatory and absolutely indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be
54
in a position to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or
strong.
Thus, when a judge grants bail to a person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without
conducting the required hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or
incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith
or excusable negligence.
Further, in Basco v. Rapatalo[9] we said
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused
is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing
even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave
the application for bail to the discretion of the court.
Judge Yaneza, in granting bail to accused dela Cruz without any hearing,
deprived the prosecution of the opportunity to contest her application for bail,
thus denying the People due process.[10] Worse, the case was pending not in
respondents sala in Navotas but in RTC-Br. 86, Cabanatuan City. Neither was
dela Cruz detained in Navotas which is the limit of respondent judges territorial
jurisdiction but at the PNP-CIG Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon
City. We cannot therefore concede to respondents argument that he had not
injured anybody, neither the handling trial court judge, the government, the
private complainant nor the accused.
Likewise, we cannot accept respondent Judges ratiocination that he only
approved the bail application of dela Cruz upon being unduly swayed by the
personal representations and formal sworn asseverations of her (the accuseds)
nephewHenry G. Fernandez and servicing bonding agent Jocelyn S.
Florido that the accuseds motion to post bail has been heard and granted by the
handling court sala as of 10 February 1988 upon recommendation of the trial
court prosecutor. Had he verified the facts for himself before eagerly granting
bail he would have discovered that the motion to set bail had only been
submitted for resolution before the handling court sala and there was as yet no
positive action on the matter.
We are not the least impressed with the haste with which respondent
Judge would approve bail bonds and applications for bail. On the contrary, we
are appalled. Utmost diligence is required of trial judges in granting bail,
especially in cases where bail is not a matter of right. Certain procedures must
be followed in order to be assured that the accused would be present during
trial. As a responsible judge respondent must not be swayed by the mere
representations of the parties; instead, he should look into the real and hard facts
of the case. He must be impartial not only in appearance but also in fact.
Respondent Judge avers that requests or applications for bail were
usually made during his overtime work as he was constrained to work beyond
regular office hours because he no longer trusted his hostile, unwieldy,
uncooperative and charlatan clerk of court who refuses to work. This argument
is so tenuous that it should not even be considered at all. Being the judge, he
exercises administrative authority over his court personnel, including his clerk
of court. As part of his professional competence, respondent Judge is expected
to possess management skills which he must put to good use for the efficient
functioning of his sala.
While complaints against judges should be sworn to, we did not hesitate to take
cognizance of the instant unsworn letter-complaint for the following
reasons: First, the allegations against respondent Judge were supported by
documents which could be readily verified. Second, Executive Judge Aquino
confirmed the infractions committed by respondent Judge. Third, the Office of
the Court Administrator found the allegations to be true. Fourth, respondent
Judge practically admitted all pertinent allegations. As we stated in Macalintal
v. Teh[11] -
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority
upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross
incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he
is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judges
dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only
if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be
accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
While the practice of granting bail (initial) not strictly in conformity with
Rule 114 has been tolerated to a certain extent for the sake of securing the
prompt release of the detained accused charged with bailable offenses, the
regularity with which Judge Yaneza has resorted to this modus operandi and
the zeal with which he has applied himself to the task is nothing short of
remarkable. On the banal pretext that the bonding company lacked material
time to catch up with the handling judge or the latter was no longer available
since it was past office hours, respondent Judge would issue release orders
without due regard for the rules.
Indeed, we cannot help perceiving a pattern here where the judge, in
connivance with certain bonding firms, attempts to corner the very lucrative
business of granting bail by ensuring that he is always accessible, even on
Sundays, in his office or at home and regardless of the time. And there is that
serious concern that in all these, respondent Judge has acted not out of feigned
ignorance or a heightened sense of compassion for the hapless accused but out
of a desire to materially benefit from his endeavors. In other words, with
respondent Judge we are no longer speaking of ignorance of the law for that
would be too simplistic but of corruption which if left unchecked will further
erode public confidence in the judiciary. If judges wantonly misuse the powers
vested in them by law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of
justice but even oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due
process.[12]
Respondent Judge cites a litany of cases to justify his mistakes and to
mitigate whatever penalty may be imposed on him. He stresses that, if ever, this
would be his first offense and that, upon receipt of the memorandum from the
OCA, he has contritely stopped absolutely from acting on bail bonds in criminal
cases lodged in other court salas. He likewise claims a considerably long and
exemplary service in the judiciary, with an above-average rate of disposition,
and adding for good measure that generally no real party in interest has been
materially injured nor prejudiced by the acts complained of.
In vain. As found by the OCA, a clearer case than this for the imperative
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor can hardly be found. Respondent
Judges flagrant flaunting of fundamental rules and his persistent and deliberate
heedlessness thereof is palpable. Having been a judge for some time, as he
claims, respondent should know that no position in the government service
exacts a greater demand on honesty and integrity of the individual than a seat
in the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent JUDGE REYNOLD Q.
YANEZA of MeTC-Br. 54, Navotas, Metro Manila, to have grossly abused his
authority in irregularly approving bail bonds and issuing release
orders. Consequently, he is ordered DISMISSED from the service effective
immediately with forfeiture of his retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. He is further ordered to
IMMEDIATELY CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the functions of the
office from which he is removed.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to look into the
involvement of FIRST QUEZON CITY INSURANCE CO., INC., MEGA
PACIFIC INSURANCE CORPORATION and ZENITH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, the bonding companies which reportedly provided most of
the bail bonds approved by respondent Judge, to determine their culpability, if
any, in connection therewith. In this regard, the Office of the Court
Administrator is directed to enlist, if need be, the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation to ensure the success of the investigation and to submit
its report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
55
[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1368. October 23, 2003]
JUDGE JOSE GODOFREDO M. NAUI, RTC, Branch 37, Bambang,
Nueva Viscaya, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARCIANO C.
MAURICIO, SR., MTCC, Branch 1, Palayan City, Nueva
Ecija, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 24, 1998, Presiding Judge Godofredo M. Naui,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,
issued a warrant for the arrest of Pedro de Guzman, the accused in
Criminal Case No. 1053-37, for Estafa, raffled to the said branch. The
court fixed the amount of P30,000.00 as bail bond for the provisional
release of the accused.
Early in the morning of April 1, 1998, police officers of the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in
Cabanatuan City, served the warrant on de Guzman, who was then in
the poblacion of General Natividad, Nueva Ecija and placed him under
arrest. Instead of surrendering De Guzman and delivering him to judge
who issued the warrant, the arresting officers brought him to Barangay
Mag-asawang Sampaloc, General Natividad, Nueva Ecija. The police
officers proceeded to the house of Judge Marciano C. Mauricio, Sr.,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. De
Guzman offered to deposit to Judge Mauricio, Sr. the cash amount
of P30,000.00 as cash bond to secure his provisional liberty. The Judge
agreed, and thereafter prepared and signed a Release Order dated April
1, 1998 directing the arresting officers to release De Guzman, and
ordering the clerk of court, MTCC, Palayan City to forward all the
pertinent papers, documents, fingerprints, pictures, etc., of De Guzman,
relative to the bond posted by him to Judge Mauricio, Sr.
On the same day, Police Inspector Serafin Valdez of the PNP-CIS
informed Judge Naui, via a 1st Indorsement, of the service of the
warrant of arrest on De Guzman and the latters subsequent release after
depositing the amount of P30,000.00 as bail bond. A copy of the release
order issued by Judge Mauricio, Sr. was attached thereto.
On April 2, 1998, De Guzman returned to the house of Judge
Mauricio, Sr., and requested that he be allowed to retrieve
the P30,000.00 he had earlier deposited with the Judge. He explained
that needed the amount to pay the services of his counsel, and offered
to post a surety bond as a substitute to secure his provisional liberty. The
Judge agreed and returned the amount to De Guzman. De Guzman
prepared and signed a handwritten Pagpapatunay where he
acknowledged receipt of the said amount from Judge Mauricio, Sr. De
Guzman, however, failed to post the surety bond as promised, and thus
remained free without bail.
On June 15, 1998, Officer-in-Charge Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao of
the RTC, Branch 37, sent a letter to the clerk of court of the MTCC,
Palayan City, requesting that the original copy of the release order
issued by Judge Mauricio, Sr., the original copy of the receipt therefor,
and the addendum to the cash bond of de Guzman be immediately
forwarded to the Judge Nauis sala. The said clerk of court did not
respond. Another Letter dated September 18, 1998 reiterating this same
request was sent to the MTCC, Palayan City, this time demanding
compliance within five days from receipt thereof; otherwise, De
Guzmans cash bond would be cancelled and a new warrant of arrest
against him would be issued. There was, likewise, no response. A third
Letter dated October 26, 1998 was sent to the same court, where the
request for the immediate transmittal of the requisite documents and
papers was reiterated.
In a Letter dated November 23, 1998, Clerk of Court Rosita L.
Bagan of the MTCC, Palayan City replied to the series of requests
directed at her office. She explained that when she received the first
letter-request, Judge Mauricio, Sr. had not been to office as he was
suffering from diabetes and intermittent memory loss and was
undergoing treatment for his ailment. When Judge Mauricio, Sr. reported
for work, she showed the first letter to the Judge, but the latter Judge
told her that he could not recall having issued such a release order. The
Judge assured her that he would look into the matter. She further
declared that she showed the second and third letters to Judge Mauricio,
Sr., but that the latter had suffered a mild stroke and sustained a fracture
from a nasty fall. She explained, thus:
This is now my dilemma, I could not send you the requested documents
because the Honorable Judge Mauricio has not yet located the same and he
(Judge Mauricio) could not remember where he placed said documents.
Considering that the letter is now the third request for said purpose I have
decided to frankly inform you of my situation. Under the situation, all that I
could do is to gently remind our Judge to try to remember and locate the said
documents which at the inception were in his possession and has never
reached my desk.[1]
In the meantime, the arraignment of De Guzman in Criminal Case
No. 1053-37 was set twice, and the accused failed to
appear. On December 7, 1998, the RTC issued an Order of Arrest for
de Guzmans apprehension, for his failure to appear before the Court,
and for Judge Mauricio, Sr.s failure to forward the documents/papers
relative to the bail bond of the said accused.
On motion of de Guzman, the RTC set aside its December 7,
1998 Order. De Guzman was arraigned on January 18, 1999, and
entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution forthwith complained that
the MTCC clerk of court had not yet forwarded to the documents relative
to the bond of the accused with the RTC. De Guzmans counsel prayed
that he be afforded more time to make the appropriate inquiries from the
MTCC clerk of court.
The RTC set the trial on August 5, 1999. On said date, de Guzman
and his counsel failed to appear, prompting the court to re-issue a
warrant of arrest against de Guzman. De Guzman remained at large.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) thereafter received a
Letter-Complaint dated August 5, 1999, from Judge Naui, charging
Judge Marciano Mauricio, Sr. with gross negligence. The matter was
docketed as A.M. OCA No. 99-804-MTJ. In a 1st Indorsement
dated November 12, 1999, the OCA requested Judge Mauricio, Sr. to
file his Comment. The respondent judge complied with the directive and
filed his Comment on January 24, 2000.
In the meantime, due to his weakening condition, the respondent
judge applied for disability retirement, under Republic Act No. 910, as
amended. In a Resolution dated March 28, 2000, this Court granted the
respondent judges application, effective November 16, 1999.
In a Resolution dated August 22, 2001, the Court adopted the
recommendation of Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, directing
the parties to manifest their willingness to submit the case for resolution
on the basis of the pleadings submitted.
In the interim, Judge Mauricio, Sr. filed with this Court Urgent
Motions for the Release of Retirement Benefits, manifesting that he is
on the verge of the end of his earthly journey, and in view of his present
state of health which has been steadily deteriorating, he was in dire need
of finances to safe-keep his life. He likewise averred that should he be
found guilty of the offense charged against him, the penalty that may be
imposed may not be so extreme as to warrant the forfeiture of his entire
retirement benefits. The respondent appealed to the Court to grant such
release, and expressed willingness to withhold therefrom a considerable
amount to answer for whatever liability may be imposed upon him by
reason of the instant administrative complaint.
In a Report dated July 21, 2001, the DCA Perez found Judge
Mauricio, Sr. guilty of simple misconduct and recommended that,
considering the judges state of health, he be ordered to pay a fine in the
amount of P5,000.00, which amount was to be deducted from the latters
retirement benefits. According to DCA Perez:
56
We take exception to the manner by which the respondent Judge allowed the
posting of the cash bond and the withdrawal of the same by the accused and
his family.
The evidence on record disclosed that respondent judge allowed the accused
to post his cash bond right in the confines of his (respondents) residence
at 6:25 a.m. of April 1, 1998 (Release Order dated April 1, 1998). Respondent
even admitted in his comment that he personally prepared the Release Order.
The following day (April 2, 1998), the accused returned to respondents
residence and the latter allowed the accused to withdraw the cash bond, on the
pretext that the accused would secure a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond.
As the accused did not post the surety bond he promised, he in effect enjoyed
temporary liberty without the required bond. This eventuality was facilitated
by the erroneous practice of respondent judge of conducting official function/s
is in his residence. This should not be countenanced.
We find this practice improper if not anomalous as the residence of a judge is
not an extension of his office or vice-versa. Such act constitutes misconduct in
office for which respondent judge should be sanctioned. [2]
We are not in full accord with the recommendations of the Deputy
Court Administrator.
It bears stressing that respondent judge was not authorized to
entertain, much less accept, the bail bond of De Guzman. Section 17,
paragraph (a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 17. Bail, where filed.(a) bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the
court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality
other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional
Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.[3]
De Guzman was arrested in Gen. M. Natividad, Nueva Ecija, a
place other than where the criminal case filed against him was pending.
Pursuant to the above rule, De Guzman had two options: to post bail in
the court where his case was pending, or to post bail with any regional
trial court in the province, city or municipality where he was arrested. In
the absence of a regional trial court judge, he could file his bail bond with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.[4]
In this case, De Guzman did not file his bail bond with the RTC,
Branch 37 where his case was pending; neither did he post bail with the
court where he was arrested. Instead, he opted to post his cash bond
with the respondent, the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the MTCC
in Palayan City. Paragraph (a) of Section 17, paragraph (a) of Rule 114
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge in the place
where the arrest was made may entertain and accept a bail bond only
when no regional trial court judge is available. There is no showing that
there was no regional trial court judge in Nueva Ecija available when De
Guzman went to the respondent to deposit his cash bond.
What is more nettlesome is that De Guzman deposited his cash
bond in the residence of respondent. As aptly put by DCA Perez, the
residence of a judge is not an extension of his office.[5] The respondent
judge should have instructed De Guzman on the proper procedure: to
post bail in the court where his case was pending, or with the regional
trial court where he was arrested. Worse, the respondent himself
received the amount of P30,000.00 posted by De Guzman as his bail
and prepared the release order right in the confines of his own home.
According to Section 14, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 14. Deposit of cash as bail.The accused or any person acting in his behalf
may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue, city or
provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount fixed by the court or
recommended by the fiscal who investigated or filed the case, and upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of Section 2 hereof, the accused
shall be discharged from custody. Money thus deposited shall be considered
as bail and applied to the payment of any fine and costs and the excess, if any,
shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit.[6]
Irrefragably, only the collector of internal revenue, city or
provincial, city or municipal treasurer is authorized to receive bail in
cash. A judge is not one of those authorized to receive a deposit of cash
bail; nor should such cash be kept in the judges office, much less in his
own residence.[7]
The respondent judge committed another procedural lapsus when
he failed to forward the receipt of the cash bail, release order and
supporting papers to the RTC of Nueva Ecija where the criminal case
filed against De Guzman was pending. He was bound to do so under
Section 19 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides:
SEC. 19. Release on bail.The accused must be discharged upon the approval
of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with Section 17
hereof.
Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the
judge accepting the bail shall forward the bail, the order of release and other
supporting papers to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good
reason, require a different one to be filed (idem, supra).
The respondent judge should forwarded the records pertaining to
the bail bond immediately after he received the bail same. Instead of
depositing the cash bond with the nearest collector of internal revenue
or treasurer, the respondent received the cash amount of P30,000.00
and released the said amount to De Guzman the next day. Inexplicably,
the respondent judge allowed De Guzman to go scot-free, instead of
having him ordered re-arrested for failure to substitute the cash bond
with a surety bond.
In fine, we find the respondent, guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and gross negligence.
In Atty. Daniel O. Osumo vs. Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano,[8] the
Court said:
As we pointed out in Caas v. Castigador observance of the law which he is
bound to know and swore to uphold is required of every judge. When the law
is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything
less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of law. In short, when
the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of
law.
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles. Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge
must be studious of the principles of law, and Canon 18 mandates that he
should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of
the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a
judge under the sanction of law.
The Code of Judicial Conduct also enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence. Indeed, respondent judge owes it to the
public and the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy. In order to render substantial justice and to maintain public
confidence in the legal system, judges are expected to keep abreast of all laws
and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that magistrates
must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Thus, it
has been held that when the judges inefficiency springs from a failure to
consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of
his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position
57
and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. [9]

In recommending a fine of P5,000.00, DCA Perez took into

consideration the respondents state of health, as well as the fact that the
Court approved the latters application for disability retirement. We are in
accord with the said recommendation. In the similar case of Julius N.
Raboca, vs. Judge Alejandro Velez,[10] the Court also took into account
the therein respondents failing health and the fact of his compulsory
retirement, and considered a P5,000.00 fine reasonable under the
circumstances. [11]

WHEREFORE, the Respondent Judge is fined the amount of Five

Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.

SO ORDERED.

58
G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on
behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service
of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily
submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending
action against him and assured of the opportunity to present his
defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect
one’s right to due process.
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 presents the core
issue whether there was a valid substituted service of summons on
petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction. Petitioner Manotoc
claims the court a quo should have annulled the proceedings in the trial
court for want of jurisdiction due to irregular and ineffective service of
summons.
The Facts
Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled Agapita
Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v.
Imelda ‘Imee’ R. Marcos-Manotoc 2 for Filing, Recognition and/or
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano seeks the
enforcement of a foreign court’s judgment rendered on May 1, 1991 by
the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of
America, in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-
Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case No. 86-0207 for wrongful
death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military
intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command,
direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence
of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then
Revised Rules of Court.
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a
Summons 3 on July 6, 1993 addressed to petitioner at Alexandra
Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No.
29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.
On July 15, 1993, the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were
allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of
petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. 4 When petitioner
failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default through
an Order 5 dated October 13, 1993.
On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of counsel,
filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of
summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of
defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her
dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section
8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was
found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a
resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on
personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4)
defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment
rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Manotoc
presented Carlos Gonzales, who testified that he saw defendant
Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra Homes only two times. He also
identified the Certification of Renato A. de Leon, which stated that Unit
E-2104 was owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc.; and at the time the
Certification was issued, the unit was not being leased by anyone.
Petitioner also presented her Philippine passport and the
Disembarkation/Embarkation Card 7 issued by the Immigration Service
of Singapore to show that she was a resident of Singapore. She
claimed that the person referred to in plaintiff’s Exhibits "A" to "EEEE"
as "Mrs. Manotoc" may not even be her, but the mother of Tommy
Manotoc, and granting that she was the one referred to in said exhibits,
only 27 out of 109 entries referred to Mrs. Manotoc. Hence, the
infrequent number of times she allegedly entered Alexandra Homes did
not at all establish plaintiff’s position that she was a resident of said
place.
On the other hand, Agapita Trajano, for plaintiffs’ estate, presented
Robert Swift, lead counsel for plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, who testified that he participated in
the deposition taking of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.; and he confirmed
that Mr. Marcos, Jr. testified that petitioner’s residence was at the
Alexandra Apartment, Greenhills. 8 In addition, the entries 9 in the
logbook of Alexandra Homes from August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993,
listing the name of petitioner Manotoc and the Sheriff’s Return, 10 were
adduced in evidence.
On October 11, 1994, the trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to
Dismiss on the strength of its findings that her residence, for purposes
of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the documentary evidence of
respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the presumption that the
sheriff’s substituted service was made in the regular performance of
official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the
contrary. 11
On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded Manotoc’s plea for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 12
Undaunted, Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition 13 before the Court of Appeals (CA) on January 20, 1995,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36214 seeking the annulment of the
October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of Judge Aurelio C.
Trampe.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 17, 1997, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, 14 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The
court a quo adopted the findings of the trial court that petitioner’s
residence was at Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, which was also the residence of her
husband, as shown by the testimony of Atty. Robert Swift and the
Returns of the registered mails sent to petitioner. It ruled that the
Disembarkation/Embarkation Card and the Certification dated
September 17, 1993 issued by Renato A. De Leon, Assistant Property
Administrator of Alexandra Homes, were hearsay, and that said
Certification did not refer to July 1993—the month when the substituted
service was effected.
In the same Decision, the CA also rejected petitioner’s Philippine
passport as proof of her residency in Singapore as it merely showed
the dates of her departure from and arrival in the Philippines without
presenting the boilerplate’s last two (2) inside pages where petitioner’s
residence was indicated. The CA considered the withholding of those
pages as suppression of evidence. Thus, according to the CA, the trial
court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid
substituted service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised
Rules of Court.
59
On April 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 15 which
was denied by the CA in its Resolution 16dated October 8, 1997.
Hence, petitioner has come before the Court for review on certiorari.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors for the Court’s
consideration:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS
ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN
QUESTION (ANNEXES A AND B) IN DEFIANCE OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER
THROUGH A SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 8, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS A VALID SERVICE OF
SUMMONS ON AN ALLEGED CARETAKER OF PETITIONER’S
RESIDENCE IN COMPLETE DEFIANCE OF THE RULING
IN CASTILLO VS. CFI OF BULACAN, BR. IV, G.R. NO. L-55869,
FEBRUARY 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 632 WHICH DEFINES THE
PROPRIETY OF SUCH SERVICE UPON MERE OVERSEERS OF
PREMISES WHERE A PARTY SUPPOSEDLY RESIDES.
III. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS
ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE RESIDENCE OF THE
HUSBAND IS ALSO THE RESIDENCE OF HIS WIFE CONTRARY TO
THE RULING IN THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. DE
COSTER, G.R. NO. 23181, MARCH 16, 1925, 47 PHIL. 594.
IV. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS
ERROR IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE ON EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS UNDER SECTIONS 17 AND
18, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. 17
The assigned errors bring to the fore the crux of the disagreement—the
validity of the substituted service of summons for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
The Court’s Ruling
We GRANT the petition.
Acquisition of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service
of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When
the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or
when there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of the court
which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void." 18 In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the
defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy
of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable
reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable
period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted
service of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and in
derogation of the usual method of service." 19 Hence, it must faithfully
and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance with the
rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the
issue of due process as of jurisdiction." 20
Requirements for Substituted Service
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to
this case provides:
SEC. 8. 21 Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal
service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
We can break down this section into the following requirements to
effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service. 22 Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is
given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in
person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is
defined as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for
a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the
rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." 23 Under the
Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the
court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return
of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the
validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias
summons if the service of summons has failed. 24 What then is a
reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to
demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff,
"reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the
sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of
the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the
sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for
service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which
the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the
Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the
succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons
can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service
on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons
with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and
speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice.
Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal
service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is
expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff
must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the
process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be
available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.
"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least
two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts
were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. 25 The
efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of
the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or
house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the
summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on
60

Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published
by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the fact of
failure. 26 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated
November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should
be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of
service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or
residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion
then residing therein." 27 A person of suitable age and discretion is one
who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance
of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions
which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding
of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". 28 Thus, to be of
sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and
understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and
fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the
defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take
appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of
confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or
at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship
with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt
of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described
in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular
place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in
charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service
will be made must be the one managing the office or business of
defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must
have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the
defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects
arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be
contained in the Return.
Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar
Let us examine the full text of the Sheriff’s Return, which reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were
made to serve the summons with complaint and annexes issued by
this Honorable Court in the above entitled case, personally upon the
defendant IMELDA ‘IMEE’ MARCOS-MANOTOC located at Alexandra
Condominium Corpration [sic] or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No.
29 Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of the
day but to no avail for the reason that said defendant is usually out of
her place and/or residence or premises. That on the 15th day of July,
1993, substituted service of summons was resorted to in accordance
with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of said
summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz,
caretaker of the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto,
Receptionist and Telephone Operator of the said building, a person of
suitable age and discretion, living with the said defendant at the given
address who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said processes but
he refused to sign (emphases supplied).
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this Honorable
Court of origin, duly served for its record and information.
29
Pasig, Metro-Manila July 15, 1993.
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the
absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons
on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in
the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the
conclusion that personal service has become impossible or
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many
occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x
personally," "at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for
the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or
residence or premises." Wanting in detailed information, the Return
deviates from the ruling—in Domagas v. Jensen 30 and other related
cases 31—that the pertinent facts and circumstances on the efforts
exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the
Return. It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific
dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were made. Given the
fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in the
present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent
facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be
described with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service.
Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioner’s address in the
Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff
Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to
locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only
states that respondents were "informed, and so [they] allege" about the
address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted
service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the
defendant through more direct means. 32 More so, in the case in hand,
when the alleged petitioner’s residence or house is doubtful or has not
been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal
service to have been pursued persistently.
In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 33 it may be true that the Court held
that a Sheriff’s Return, which states that "despite efforts exerted to
serve said process personally upon the defendant on several
occasions the same proved futile," conforms to the requirements of
valid substituted service. However, in view of the numerous claims of
irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a
great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and
appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful
legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of
the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in
broad and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and
circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on
the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and times of
the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the
alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the
Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts
were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and those
resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal
service.
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in
inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their precise
duties relating to substituted service—for it would be quite easy to
shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly,
considering that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by a
defendant because of an irregular or void substituted service, it is but
only fair that the Sheriff’s Return should clearly and convincingly show
the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate,
there is still a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the
summons must be left with a "person of suitable age and discretion"
residing in defendant’s house or residence. Thus, there are two (2)
requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of
suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house
or residence of defendant. Both requirements were not met. In this
case, the Sheriff’s Return lacks information as to residence, age, and
discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriff’s general
61
assertion that de la Cruz is the "resident caretaker" of petitioner as
pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and
telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz
is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit considering
that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a
male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioner’s allegation
that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative,
it is necessary to have additional information in the Return of
Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to sign the Receipt
for the summons is a strong indication that he did not have the
necessary "relation of confidence" with petitioner. To protect
petitioner’s right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a
case against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown
to clearly comply with the rules.
Return in the Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or
attempt to personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff
Cañelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts in
general terms lacking in details as required by the ruling in the case of
Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Cañelas’ Return did not
mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the
substituted service is void.
On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra
Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our
findings that the substituted service is void has rendered the matter
moot and academic. Even assuming that Alexandra Homes Room 104
is her actual residence, such fact would not make an irregular and void
substituted service valid and effective.

It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons

must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
in the circumstances authorized by the rules. 34
Even American case law likewise stresses the principle of strict
compliance with statute or rule on substituted service, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED and the assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October 8,
1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and the October 11, 1994 and
December 21, 1994 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.No costs.

The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted or SO ORDERED.

constructive service must be strictly pursued. 35There must be strict
compliance with the requirements of statutes authorizing substituted or
constructive service. 36

Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in certain

situations authorized in the place of personal service when the latter is
inconvenient or impossible, a strict and literal compliance with the
provisions of the law must be shown in order to support the judgment
based on such substituted or constructive service. 37 Jurisdiction is not
to be assumed and exercised on the general ground that the subject
matter of the suit is within the power of the court. The inquiry must be
as to whether the requisites of the statute have been complied with,
and such compliance must appear on the record. 38 The fact that the
defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not render
the service effectual if in fact the process was not served in
accordance with the requirements of the statute.39

Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to

demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements of
the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure).

Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted

service, the proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be
annulled.

The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty. It reasons out that "[t]he certificate of
service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out
herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate,
the evidence must be clear and convincing." 40

The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine.

However, for the presumption to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show
that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the
summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically
narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that the
substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and
discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise,
the Return is flawed and the presumption cannot be availed of. As
previously explained, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas did not comply with
the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.

In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 41 it was held that "x x x

the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by
the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the
sheriff’s return is defective (emphasis supplied)." While the Sheriff’s

62
.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA
LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.
Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present
special civil action, is petitioner's so-called "Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite
the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the issue to us, as will
hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the
interest of an early resolution hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best
summarized to readily provide a clear understanding and perspective
of our disposition of this matter, thus:
1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against
herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the
Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at
P15,000.00. 1
3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago," 2 which pertinently states in part:
xxx xxx xxx
3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she
suffered extensive physical injuries which required
surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries,
specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth,
prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme
pain. Further, she cannot for an extended period
be on her feet because she is still in physical pain.
....
4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam
Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable
Court that she be considered as having placed
herself under the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings and further seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond
of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be
accepted.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting
in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted,
and that by this motion, she be considered as
having placed herself under the custody of this
Honorable Court and dispensing of her personal
appearance for now until such time she will (sic)
have recovered sufficiently from her recent near
fatal accident.
Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully
prayed that the warrant for her arrest be
immediately recalled.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional
liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at
the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her
physical appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner
filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other
legal fees.4
5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez
filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused Miriam
Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old
NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at
around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was
accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur
Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left
unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. 5
6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
also on May 21, 1991, setting the arraignment of the accused for May
27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991
which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First
Division of said court on or before June 5, 1991.6
7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond
be cancelled and that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a
recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining under
bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing,
an intention she would like to prove as baseless.7
8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a
subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal
Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No.
3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-
94897 (for libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining
order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, from
proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in
issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that according to
petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was
inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of
conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any
remedial right to meet said contingency.
9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a)
the arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the Supreme
Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel
her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel. 8
10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary
63
restraining order previously issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's
resolution dated September 10, 1992.
11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner which
reads as follows:
Considering the information in media to the effect
that accused Santiago intends to leave the country
soon for an extended stay abroad for study
purposes, considering the recent decision of the
Supreme Court dismissing her petition
promulgated on January 13, 1992, although the
same is still subject of a Motion for
Reconsideration from the accused, considering
that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor
that she has not (sic) even posted bail the same
having been by reason of her earlier claim of being
seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaken
by a restraining order issued by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May
24, 1991, the accused is ordered not to leave the
country and the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure
of the accused unless authorized from (sic) this
Court.10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement
made by petitioner, which was widely publicized in both print and
broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States to
accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that
she would be addressing Filipino communities in the United States in
line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft
and corruption.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues
that:
1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the hold departure order considering that it
had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic
principles of judicial comity and due deference
owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold
departure order despite the pendency of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this
Honorable Court.
3. The right to due process of law, the right to
travel and the right to freedom of speech are
preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in
the Constitution but also in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly
impaired only under stringent criteria which do not
obtain in the instant case.
4. The hold departure order in the instant case
was issued under disturbing circumstances which
suggest political harassment and persecution.
5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in
the bench and bar and her characteristic
transparency and candor, there is no reasonable
ground to fear that petitioner will surreptitiously
flee the country to evade judicial processes.11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been
arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that
she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared
before said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and legally
untenable.
It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial
court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court
or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.12 The voluntary appearance of the accused,
whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by
filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.13
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine
whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of
bail bond.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing
of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash
Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein
she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed
herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of
the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that
the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly
accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having
placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now
be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that
jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of
P15,000.00 for her provisional release as evidenced by Official Receipt
No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even attached as
Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further
buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for
the cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her
provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of
the foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily
admit her acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of the
cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the
injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not
personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond,
thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this
case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the
cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her
personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from
her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn
around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on
the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the
cash bond posted in her absence.
II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of
judicial comity when it issued the hold departure order despite the
pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court
which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial
comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings
undertaken by a coordinate court, with more reason should it operate
to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from
interfering with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was
64
still pending before this Court. She contends further that the hold
departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order previously
issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
the criminal case pending before it.
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present
case on January 18, 1992 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in
this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order it
previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her
motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary
restraining order, hence respondent court continued to be enjoined
from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of
the motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention which
is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless
otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction
shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or
during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of
a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction
shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of
an appeal,14 and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations
should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale
therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a
judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary
injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. 15
It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction
may be immediately effective, even though it is not final.16 A dismissal,
discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or
temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the
restraining order or temporary injunction17 and no formal order of
dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution.18 Consequently, a
special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an
injunction.19 There must be a new exercise of .judicial power.20
The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since
been duly explained, to wit:
. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of
the two clauses quoted, held that an appeal from
an order dissolving an injunction continued the
injunction in force. The evils which would result
from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by
Judge Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. He said:
"Although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on
their face or so false in their allegations that if he
should apply on notice for an injunction, any court
would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one,
yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or
court commissioner who will improvidently grant
one ex parte, which the court on the first and only
hearing ever had dissolves, he can, by appealing
and filing a bond, make the ex parte injunction
impervious to all judicial interference until the
appeal is determined in this court." . . . Such a
result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with
all known rules of equity practice that no court
should adopt such a construction unless
absolutely shut up to it by the clear and
unequivocal language of the statute. . . . .21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was
reiterated in a case squarely in point and of more recent vintage:
The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July
21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a
stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature,
despite the petitioners then pending motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its
writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
17435 cleared the way for the implementation by
the SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No.
191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of
Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the
dissolution of a preliminary injunction is
immediately executory. It shall not be stayed after
its rendition and before an appeal is taken or
during the pendency of an appeal. . . . .22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question
that with the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and the lifting of the
restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from
acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein
petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied with finality in our
resolution dated September 10, 1992.
Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special
civil action for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction
over the case therein. Whether generated by misconception or design,
we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no
reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or
similar procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents
and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers
over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the
inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending
before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil
action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a
lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there
is no writ of injunction restraining it.23 The inevitable conclusion is that
for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the
special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is
nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and
proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive
writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain
its jurisdiction over the principal action.
III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order
violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech.
First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without
notice and hearing. Much is made by petitioner of the fact that there
was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed
by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero motu by
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those
expressly conferred on them.24 These inherent powers are such
powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction;25 or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
courts,26 as well as to the due administration of justice;27 or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted
powers;28 and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and
render it effective in behalf of the litigants.29
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental
powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in
the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws
and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence,
demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing
out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be
taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such
65
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even
though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters
which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory
orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction.30 Such being the case, with
more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive
measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the
court or the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of
the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon
the particular circumstances. 31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a
matter of fact, even made a public statement that she had every
intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies
abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the
Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan
to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure
order, in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To
reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent
court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for
abroad to pursue further studies, there is no sufficient justification for
the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and that under
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be
impaired only when so required in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have
declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at
the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and
grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the
aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations
assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at
all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,32 to the effect that:
A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines
bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment
and the state of the burden of keeping him,
pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of the court as
if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what the law
may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in
People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):
. . . the result of the obligation
assumed by appellee (surety)
to hold the accused amenable
at all times to the orders and
processes of the lower court,
was to prohibit said accused
from leaving the jurisdiction of
the Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders and
processes will be nugatory,
and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the courts from
which they issued does not
extend beyond that of the
Philippines they would have
no binding force outside of
said jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987
Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel
only on the grounds of "national security, public
safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty
of travel may be impaired even without Court
Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as
may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which
did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197,
p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
international travel imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to
travel upon application of an interested party (See
Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center,
No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
should by no means be construed as delimiting the
inherent power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in
criminal cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Section 6, Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within
the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered
as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law. The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the
People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest
that criminal prosecutions should run their course
and proceed to finality without undue delay, with
66
 an accused holding himself amenable at all times
to Court Orders and processes.33

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a

propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may
be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction,
or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice must be
stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of
this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has
to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such
policy includes the matter of petitions or motions involving hold
departure orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases
therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very
same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass
upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions
therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a
hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu propio by said
court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies
therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper
submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for travel
abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts
may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through
the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid
grounds their actuations therein.

WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us

for resolution, the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

67
G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 on
November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26,
1994 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, are
challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal
by certiorari through a petition which raises issues centering
mainly on said petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an
amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of
multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing
of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in
Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time.
The original information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the
Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City,1 had initially indicted
for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie
Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the
alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the
spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was
apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later
escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up
to the present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was
implicated in the crime. In an amended information dated
October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein.
As herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew
him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in
said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit
dated March 30, 1989 but which he later retracted on June
20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind
behind the massacre of the Bucag family.3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan
de Oro City from the case per his resolution of July 7, 1989,
the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation
and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a
resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989,
petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said
criminal case in a second amended information dated
October 6, 1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as
a co-accused all the way to this Court in G.R. No. 96080
entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M.
Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon,
Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en
banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court
sustained the filing of the second amended information
against him.4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start
with the issuance of an arrest warrant for petitioner's
apprehension but, before it could be served on him,
petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a
motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the
same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly
furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the
private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November
5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for
bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State
Prosecution's Office appeared for the prosecution. 5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol
College General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his
counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over
the person of their client to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of
said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in
the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand,
informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive
of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor
opposing the application for bail and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail
judge.6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo
announced that he was waiving any further presentation of
evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November
5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the
amount of P200,000.00. The following day, November 6,
1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to
travel by then, managed to personally appear before the
clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount
thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that
ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the
scheduled court hearings of the case.7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed
twenty (20) days later on November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon
who allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on
the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus
order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6)
months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent
Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus were
the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner
annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on
the ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of
petitioner's application for bail, he was not yet "in the custody
of the law," apparently because he filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had
voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart from the
circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was
strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was
recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held
that the grant of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the
prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded
an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail
contrary to the requirements of due process. Hence, this
appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this
Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et al.,9 his filing of the
aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively
conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short,
for all intents and purposes, he was in the custody of the law.
In petitioner's words, the "invocation by the accused of the
court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to
vest the court with jurisdiction over the person of the
accused and bring him within the custody of the law."
68
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record
negates the existence of such strong evidence as would bar
his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution,
by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further
presentation of evidence to oppose the application for bail
and whose representation in court in behalf of the
prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim
to a denial of procedural due process. Finally, petitioner
points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed
in respondent court after an unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and
the equities involved in this case, the Court finds for
petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearing before any court as required under the conditions
specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an
accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction
and yet secure his appearance at the trial.10 As bail is
intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the
same cannot be posted before custody over him has been
acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest
or voluntary surrender.11 As this Court has put it in a case "it
would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free."12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and
prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an
accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the
requirements therefor.13 Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan,
etc., et al.,14 where the petitioner who had been charged with
kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering
himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court
to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending
trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said
petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have
either been arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of
their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective
mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his
provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even
wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against
him as it is available to "all persons"15 where the offense is
bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or
limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law.16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the
custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of
a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or
by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to
Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper
authorities.17 in this light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond."
Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital
recuperating from serious physical injuries which she
sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she
expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having
placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan)
for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings." On
the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan
authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her
provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance
in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane
consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure
order against her, she question the jurisdiction of that court
over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the
ground that "she neither been arrested nor has she
voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not
validly posted bail since she never personally appeared
before said court" In rejecting her arguments, the Court held
that she was clearly estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the
urgent ex parte motion for bail she had earlier recognized
such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail
was accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to
its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of
bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired
by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he
had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he
was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore,
be considered as being constructively and legally under
custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which
attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court,
for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to
have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the
law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court
which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest
is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by
his submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest.19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
"house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being
"confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his
counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and
to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby
Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute
costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance
to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court,
notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific
whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the
arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have
taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the
physical custody of the authorities, since he was then
incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just
over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or
placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the
constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial
court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they
never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through
his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal
control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail
with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of
his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by
unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court.
Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for
his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any
attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the
law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since
the day he was charged in court, up to the submission
application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
69
 At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual
confinement at the hospital on account of an acute ailment,
which facts were not at all contested as they were easily
verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his good faith and of his
actual recognition of the authority of trial court, petitioner's
counsel readily informed the court that they were
surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis Oriental
Chapter.20 In other words, the motion for admission to bail
was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the former
practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of
the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had
happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy
employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to
avoid arrest should the application therefore be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that
before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114,
as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before
conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its
personal nature21 and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is
placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of
innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. 22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial
court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail
as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances
where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment23 and the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper
application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the
accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in
accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other
hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the
part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory
in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion
of the court,24 is required with the participation of both the defense and
a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty
of the applicant.25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution
to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the
prosecution must be give an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before
the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the
accused to due process.27 If the prosecution is denied this opportunity,
there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence
of which the court's order in respect of the motion or petition is
void.28 At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal.29 When, eventually, the court issues an order
either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.30 The court, though,
cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely
objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are
insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law
requires.31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a
violation of procedural due process when the court below allowed
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State
Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole
government prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and
who received his copy of the motion only on the day after the hearing
had been conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that
Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to waive the presentation of
any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to
submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition,
they argue that the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable time" to
oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor acted as the collaborating counsel, with State
Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the basis
of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon
which was sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly
received by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the same
date. This authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it
was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only
on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This
was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of
Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II
Erlindo Abejo to enter their appearance as collaborating government
prosecutors in said criminal case.32 It was in fact by virtue of this
arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor
Perseverando Arana entered their appearance as collaborating
prosecutor in the previous hearing in said case.33 Hence, on the
strength of said authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing
for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor
Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on
November 5, 1992.
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo
was allegedly not familiar with the case, he nonetheless was
explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado,
whose office received its copy of the motion on the very day
when it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed
Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the
prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the
application for bail and that they were submitting the matter
to its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that
the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was
waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence.
When the court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not that
was the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo,
the latter readily answered in the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO
ABEJO:
I was informed to appear in
this case just now Your
Honor.
COURT:
Where is your Chief of Office?
Your office received a copy of
the motion as early as
October 28. There is an
element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your
Honor, I was only informed
just now. The one assigned
here is State Prosecutor
Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital
70
attending to his sick son. I do
not know about this but before
I came I received an
instruction from our Chief to
relay to this court the stand of
the office regarding the motion
to admit bail. That office is
neither supporting nor
opposing it and we are
submitting to the sound
discretion of the Honorable
Court.
COURT:
Place that manifestation on
record. For the record, Fiscal
Abejo, would you like to
formally enter your
appearance in this matter?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the
government, the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office
represented by State
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.
COURT:
By that manifestation do you
want the Court to understand
that in effect, at least, the
prosecution is dispensing with
the presentation of evidence
to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong, the denial .
..
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that
manifestation, Your Honor.
COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the
Prosecution willing to submit
the incident covered by this
particular motion for resolution
by this court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Without presenting any further
evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.34
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution,
on the instructions of Regional State prosecutor Zozobrado,
had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this
should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were
"neither supporting nor opposing" the motion. What is of
significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was
"submitting (the motion) to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court." By that, it could not be any clearer. The
prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of
evidence en contra and this it did at the proper forum and
stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory
hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied
itself that such was the position of the prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,35 it was
stressed that where the trial court has reasons to believe that
the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for
bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a
gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest
of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as
the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is
strong. And, in the very recent administrative matter Re: First
Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de
Leon,Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia
A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge
Deodoro Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas,
etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor interposes no
objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should
nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there
diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is
really not contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process,
could therefore be attributed to the trial court here as regards
its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript
of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of
November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993
abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural
rules. As summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower
court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety
of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution.
Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite
summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the
defense, and only after sifting through them did the court
conclude that petitioner could be provisionally released on
bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and
up to the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation
of the conditions of his bail.
As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the
opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable
period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that
the Regional State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy
of the application for bail on the very same day that the it
was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted
from said date up to the day of the hearing on November 5,
1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week to muster
such evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that
hearing in opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the
circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The
fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the
application only on November 6, 1992 is beside the point for,
as already established, the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the People.
4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor
is the indubitably unreasonable period of time that elapsed
before it questioned before the respondent court the
resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court through a
special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General
submits that the delay of more than six (6) months, or one
hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable
due to the attendant difficulties which characterized the
71
 prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then,
the certiorariproceeding was initiated before the respondent
court long after trial on the merits of the case had ensued in
the court below with the active participation of prosecution
lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the
definitive rule now in that the special civil action
for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the
three months,38 the same to be reckoned by taking into
account the duration of time that had expired from the
commission of the acts complained to annul the same.39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the
resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order dated
March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as
well as said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the
Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

72
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991 Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER,
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
vs.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R.
MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V.
No. 93177.
BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL
The Solicitor General for respondents.
COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO
CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU,
COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A.
VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.

No. 95020 August 2, 1991 CRUZ, J.:

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO,
COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT
PA., respondents.
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO
GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ
PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA,
LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ.
ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ.
LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT.
JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON
PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY
SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO,
COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN
PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO.
14, respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP
DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT.
COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP
Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL,
1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ
PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T.
RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON
III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS
PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito
Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo
Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey
Sarroza.
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve
practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same
incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to
9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67
(Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman)
and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial
Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against
them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to
try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of
GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to
peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that
he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set
aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas
corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional
objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial
Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order
No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena
dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to
wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the
undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90
73
 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then
and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits
of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the
charge/charges against you for violence of AWs
_______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO
DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on
the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of your
right to submit controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of
the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and
medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the
proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant
them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was
done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21,
1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the
motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their
respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of
the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which
to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of
the charges as mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and specifications
must be signed by a person subject to military law, and
under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or
has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the
same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial
until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall
have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as
to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of
charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in
the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full
opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine
witnesses against him if they are available and to present
anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense
or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine
available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges
are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be
accompanied by a statement of the substance of the
testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely
of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to
reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was
denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and
they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948
manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory
challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14. They
invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14
ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued
under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990,
but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a
writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the
answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14,
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional
liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the
order for his release and to declare in contempt the commanding
officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also
complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release
him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional
liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col.
Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional
intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined
exception is applicable and covers all military men facing
court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders
of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner
and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does
not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on
the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside
and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-
Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on
the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and
which may as well include other persons facing charges
before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before
General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its orders
of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot
as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed
with this Court a petition for habeas corpuson the ground that they
were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled
to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no
formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a
year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were
given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial
investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and
then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when
they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits.
On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration
which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they did on
March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel
resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the General
Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due
process because the investigation was resolved against them owing to
their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been
expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the
aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence."
They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be
dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM
No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.
74
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an
opportunity to be heard.1âwphi1 If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by
the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to
conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino,1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does
not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it
is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the
jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336
U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation
procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counter-
part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408)
can properly be construed as an indispensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General
court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve
important functions in the administration of court-
martial procedures and does provide safeguards
to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a
defendant could object to trial in the absence of
the required investigation. In that event the court-
martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities
could consider the same contention, reversing a
court- martial conviction where failure to comply
with Article 70 has substantially injured an
accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because pre-trial
investigations fall short of the standards prescribed
by Article 70. That Congress has not required
analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-
martial is an indication that the investigatory plan
was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional
level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the
Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trial investigation,
court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But
this holding has been expressly repudiated in later
holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later
interpretation has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are directory, not
mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of
a court-martial. The War Department's
interpretation was pointedly called to the attention
of Congress in 1947 after which Congress
amended Article 70 but left unchanged the
language here under consideration. compensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-
martial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any
pretrial investigation under article of war 71 would of course
be altogether irregular but the court-martial might
nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is
similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil
courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation
does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the
regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, that issue was resolved more than two years ago
in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners,
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets,
charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny
and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj.
Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had
investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent
records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of
Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies
on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz,
the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner
provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering
that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of
suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were
not certified in the manner provided under said decrees, i.e.,
that the officer administering the oath has personally
examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit, does not
invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado,
wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their
counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an
untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges
against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the
witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never
even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so
that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in
accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in
accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order
No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by
Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the
Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when
empowered by the President, the commanding officer of a
major command or task force, the commanding officer of a
division, the commanding officer of a military area, the
superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding
officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint
general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the
accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be
tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent
authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De
Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it because the order itself
said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not
been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the
Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of
Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its
president and members. It is significant that General De Villa has not
disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he
would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked.
On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the
other respondents by the Solicitor General.
75
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was
originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of
War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special
courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial
judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall
determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not
receive a challenge to more than one member at a time.
Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be
presented and decided before those by the accused are
offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory
challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be
challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v.
Alejandro,3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army,
after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1
(otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a
handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the
United States military and naval academies who were on
duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth
of officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that
the officer corps of the developing army was numerically
made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects
of the national defense program. Because of these
considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges
should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only
challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed.
Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act
No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the
approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any
peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a
court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958,
when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army
became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of
the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive
program of training and education in military law,
encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines.
This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War
11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal
surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very
large number, and a great many of the officers had been
indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental
circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June
12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge,
with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not
be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8,
empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military
tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other
cases as may be referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the
Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters
relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory
challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for
cause may be entertained to insure impartiality and good
faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined
by a majority of the members excluding the challenged
member. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged
member. A successfully challenged member shall be
immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or
the National Security Code, which was a compilation and codification
of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the
continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State."
The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in
this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045
proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout the
Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and
declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant
thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the
other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of martial
law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the
reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the
law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa
lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est
anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to
peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the
apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18
of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows
the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right
to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To
repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law
was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it
could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out
under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom
Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of
martial law. It is curious that the present government should invoke the
rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused
officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory
challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to
delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped
that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At
any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present
circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this
Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without
regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem
only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of
the petition for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas
corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts
of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents are
officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of
War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and
otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the
Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case
of Yang v. Court of Appeals4 where this Court held that "appeals from
the Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively
cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
76
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer
to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused
officers before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or
correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and
that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But
it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted
discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to
as "grave abuse of discretion" — as to give rise to a defect in
their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this
action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and
prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions
for habeas corpusand quo warranto.5 In the absence of a law providing
that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of
the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can
exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R.
Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available
in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill
of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that
"the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where
the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor
General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason
to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on
the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that
mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of
democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms
by the government for the discharge of their duties and
responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from
the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their
activities outside of and against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon
this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents
constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say
1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on
bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already
discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they
could freely resume their heinous activity which could very
well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,
including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a
system consonant with their own concept of government and
justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would
violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty
requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated
and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are
denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot
say they have been discriminated against because they are not
allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that
they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest,
our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on
February 18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February
26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the
charge memorandum and specifications against the private
respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant
to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial
investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March
20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of the charges,
charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their
counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a
delay of more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the
charges against the private respondents. However, this was explained
by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to
complete it pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year
because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men
were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other
witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and these
inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation
was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved
were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In
some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers,
have already been disbanded. After the charges were
completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by
the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate
the following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must
stress the point that if the participation of petitioner in
several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of
Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and
no charges can be filed against him or the existence of
a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major
General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner.
Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military
officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of
War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71
thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try
the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release
him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in
investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may
even be punished as a court martial may direct.6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by
Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice of
appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was
ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period
for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run
until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on
March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents' contention,
therefore, the decision had not yet become final and executory when
the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on
March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the
following observations of the Court in Arula:
77
 The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as
exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition an argument to deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no
for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a
jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent government of laws, not tradition.
acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the
exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
reexamination is in order.
appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself
to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have
not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of
jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the
acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated,
however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered
released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for

lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the
respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the
right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the
orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice

Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny bail to accused military
personnel.

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before
conviction, with the only exception of "those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong."1 The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be
impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended."2 To deny the
military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the
inclusive meaning of "all persons" — the coverage of the right.

I believe that military officers fall within "persons".

The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say

1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the
assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he
sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly
disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous
activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted
authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with
a system consonant with their own concept of government and
justice."3 But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers
roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to bail?
Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be
reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society?

We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason

why the petitioners should not be granted the same right.

78
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial
Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to
notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued?
Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the
answer to these two novel questions is "No." The explanation of and
the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in
this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23,
2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s
application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the
issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds
probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez.
Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be
issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section
9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this
Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s
temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php
1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender
to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the
respondent in its Hold Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the
cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of
Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine
Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied
by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate
action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069,
also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and
was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of
Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice
(DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity
of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this
Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -
- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers
and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a
comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court
issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 --
after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed
its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of
America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May
18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed
as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that
Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15,
1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following
charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of
Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26
US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code
Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in
violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title
18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the
Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest"
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed
before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed
that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of
Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing,
petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the
trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an
alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to
post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15,
2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001
Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez
was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4,
2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
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Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this
Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first
hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest
warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize
bail, in the absence of any law that provides for
such power.
‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule
114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended,
which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases
for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in
extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of
the existence of special circumstances.
‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in
extradition proceedings, the public respondent
received no evidence of ‘special circumstances’
which may justify release on bail.
‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no
special circumstance exists that will engender a
well-founded belief that he will not flee.
‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are
ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the
Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated
on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled ‘Eduardo T.
Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-G.R. SP No. 64589,
relied upon by the public respondent in granting
bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the
subject bail orders.’" 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1)
whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for
his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.
Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for
Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals
(CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five
extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive
issues.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully
considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the
filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2)
the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis
therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage
of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and
avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits
the following reasons: "(1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court
of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues
and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this
Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to
have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the
Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17ruled on the issue by
disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision
as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same
attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the
extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by
the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would
resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give
them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of
the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition
treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not
prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule,
though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of
law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As
a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a
sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that
have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by
the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the
present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public
interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and
important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent
cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz,
Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.
As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is established policy. x x x.’
80
 Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary
jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy
justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an
end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed
by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners
to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only
result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher
interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate
what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the
merits of the case.’
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto
and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in
cases where special and important reasons or exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important
issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take
cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter
of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to
guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or
construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in
the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to
its intent. 25Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the
implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in
properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression
of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of
suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the arrest and the
custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international
travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to
another for the purpose of committing crime and evading
prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly,
governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with
criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have
come to look upon extradition as the major effective
instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of
crime." 30 It is the only regular system that has been devised
to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to
try them in accordance with municipal and international
law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the
recognition of the principle that criminals should be
restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and
punish them is that the number of criminals
seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the
extent that efficient means of detection and the
threat of punishment play a significant role in the
deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a
State, so the existence of effective extradition
arrangements and the consequent certainty of
return to the locus delicti commissi play a
corresponding role in the deterrence of flight
abroad in order to escape the consequence of
crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition
arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious
criminal receives direct encouragement and thus
indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in
suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into]
by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming
the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest
purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy
refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and
progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the
Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of
its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international
travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we
cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with
other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in
our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the
Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto
have examined, and that both accept and trust, each other’s legal
system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized
representative’s signature on an extradition treaty signifies our
confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to
protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. 35 That
signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon
extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the
criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for
its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the
constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is
sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with,
the process of extradition does not involve the determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he
81
 will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that
are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition
proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings
involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal
proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition
proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered
extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a prima facie
case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment
becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar
practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide
discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of the nation’s foreign relations before making the
ultimate decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called
upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be
extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will
only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a
measure of international judicial assistance through which a person
charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with
the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the
assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of
that jurisdiction. 38The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in
court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with
the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the
Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the
national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes
comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill
our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the
world community. Such failure would discourage other states from
entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that
hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith
with our obligations under the Treaty. 42 This principle requires that we
deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions
precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In
other words, "[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that
the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the
accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government
is under obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the
Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused,
should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This
prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience 44 of the
executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the
accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to
thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons
sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein
respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in
the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable --
eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting
state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight.
He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee.
Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity,
from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing
the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has
been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives
him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner
pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that
those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers
and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be
hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty
without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific
law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo,
the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the
presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It
states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing,
Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the
petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer
the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may
issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused
which may be served any where within the Philippines if it
appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends
of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer within the
time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set
another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of
arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the
accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
(Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately
setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the
negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law,
uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
82
opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48and
giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments.
Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
"immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere
superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of
urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that
accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial
court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out
the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition.
From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -
- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of
Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the
Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial
attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal
Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G,
evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of
the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly
authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged
in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness
[excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and
enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J
"Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with
enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L
"Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit
of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an
impression from these records adequate for him to make an initial
determination of whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He
could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed
as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that
the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he
actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable
cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US
Government in support of [its] request for extradition of
herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the
existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing
against the extraditee." 50
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing
the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already
evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence,
after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did
exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the
matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt
of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving
the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision.
Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the
law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this
point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing
every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend
something reasonable and something not inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with
previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore,
the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable
meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be
extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for
hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to
prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could
have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have
been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or
affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge
required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose
of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient
supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment,
or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor
as to the existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was
not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest,
judges merely determine personally the probability, not the
certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not
conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of
probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to
see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges
merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the
present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the
practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage
would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence
during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at
this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie
83
finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima
facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly
make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also
anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal
action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures
more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for
at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in
view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the
proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents,
the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima
facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b)
they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the
person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally
examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition
may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined,
then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of
the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the
petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the
issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be
given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our
opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in
extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional
provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought
to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged
with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of
Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as
practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition
proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the
subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
"conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right
to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the
right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the
present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He
should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that,
constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without
due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to
due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out
that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. 64 Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an
extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is
enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity
to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition
for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process
and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either,
in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That
his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by
(1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents
after a determination that the extradition request meets the
requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition
judge’s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best
serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest;
and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court’s custody, to apply
for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in
that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state
before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His
invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already
had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he
ran away.
84
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase
the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent
Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve
the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of
liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales
against the government’s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty
obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the
suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a
vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be
carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government
interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards
and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their
actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to
increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through
overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be
extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the
absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty --
expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings,
adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would
be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to
hide from or evade their prosecutors.1âwphi1.nêt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into
place with and gives life to Article 14 67 of the Treaty, since this practice
would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting
state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending
the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the
emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition
cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave
abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate
rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we
believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the
grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process
extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic
and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so
hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under
the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once
granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and
since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and
fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-
tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct
foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of
police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial
prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this
power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international
and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded
or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the
sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances
that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for
provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these
circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected
as a member of the House of Representatives. On that basis, he
claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the
Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it
ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant
to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations
on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a
more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they
do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his
full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws.’ This simply means that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility
to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of
the people’ are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts
that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention
the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending
on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed,
the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function
depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to
nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature.
A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to
serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain
peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted
a prisoner into a different classification from those others
who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly
or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of
or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
85
 We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty
of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to
the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that
the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences
of the extradition case against their representative, including his
detention pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered
and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim
that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant
him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition
proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the
pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must
emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are
resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its
annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or
innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant
to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith,
unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at
issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely
anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all
the more reason would the grant of bail not be justified. Giving
premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the
grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail
to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This we
cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim,
he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet,
he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the
preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact
cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves
forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting
government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the
Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and
still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is,
upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by
the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into
custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously
denied. In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing
evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in
accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe,
is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular,
Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient
opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and
exhaustively private respondent’s claim to bail. As already stated, the
RTC set for hearing not only petitioner’s application for an arrest
warrant, but also private respondent’s prayer for temporary liberty.
Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then
position papers on the application for bail, both of which were
separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the
Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties.
Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a
procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this
Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties --
particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with
additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and
"Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main
topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be
repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear factual and
evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous
pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked
for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no
need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the
factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal
arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of
persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited
Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned
justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully
passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will
not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already
very delayed proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires to be
summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate
speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a
firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly
"disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition." We
believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it
to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special
cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of
potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these
ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to
determine whether the request expressed in the petition,
supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be
adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought
is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to
assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the
fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so
that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is
deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty
partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the
latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent
to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined.
Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available.
It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police
86
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order
has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the
the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
facie presumption is that the person would escape again if granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by
given the opportunity. private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila
is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all
deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and
Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie
finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The
magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit
further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants
SO ORDERED.
or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the
judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the
potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and
to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.

5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may

apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of
absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there
is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b)
there exist special, humanitarian or compelling
circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the
requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
peculiar facts of each case.

6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due

process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed,
available during the hearings on the petition and the answer
is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of
extradition.

7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights,

a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the
conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the
limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the
prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent
organs of government.

8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not

a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power
to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus,
the Executive Department of government has broad
discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight

functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise
grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions,
delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way,
lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only
inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due
to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner’s
simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should
not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and
escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock,
frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice
and international cooperation.

10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted

with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays
and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

87
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the
two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila
(presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil
Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20,
2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail;
and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate
the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both
Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in
the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then
British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June
20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of
China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of
arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order
of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the
petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest
against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory
on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an
Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was
granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion
of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following
conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that
accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer
the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court,
will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all
the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the
above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated
April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing
in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee
has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the
right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
88
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting
in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail
shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to
resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be
granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held
that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does
not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v.
Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J.,
later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply
to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right
to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are
not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following
trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has
gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being
given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding
duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the
rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and
the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed
on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human
rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly
be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable
doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states
was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century.
For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in
the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts
characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace,
and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle,
Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject
of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human
rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which
the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained
in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding
upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff
v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective
deportee, held that under the Constitution,3the principles set forth in
that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every
person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in
Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available
to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of
the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s
ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have
likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail
to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail
persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In
fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in
detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings,
taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a
Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary
certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After
noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the
Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who
has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used
"is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail
was applied to deportation proceedings.
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In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no
formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the
Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights
in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why
it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation
cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations
of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection
of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold
him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him
or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative
duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is
not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal,
an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty
obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine
the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-
blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he
fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by
the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal
law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the
requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest
of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and
that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,
bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may
be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23,
1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the
trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been
detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of
any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a
serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to
grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the
same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due
process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in
mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered
into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee
of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the
grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail
on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
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