G.R. No. 119063 January 27, 1997
Alaga, which he
JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and ADELA TEODORA P.
SANTOS, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed an Affidavit of
Complaint with the Q.C. Prosecutor’s Office,
charging his wife, private respondent Adela
Teodora P. Santos with Bigamy.
In the RTC trial, it was mentioned that the
accused was previously married with Reynaldo
Quiroca, and without the said marriage having
been dissolved, subsequently contracted the
second marriage with the petitioner.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash
alleging prescription of the offense as ground.
She contended that by the petitioner’s
admissions in his testimony in a Civil Case and in
his complaint filed with the Civil Service
Commission, the petitioner discovered the
offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Art
91 of the RPC, the period of prescription of the
offense started to run therefrom. Thus, the
offense charged prescribed in 1989, or 15 years
after its discovery by the petitioner.
The CA, although gave credence to the
respondent’s evidence and recognized that the
15 year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed.
However, the quashal of an information based
on prescription could only be invoked before or
after arraignment and even on appeal.
Hence, this appeal to remand the case in the
RTC for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible
error in affirming the Trial Court’s order
granting the motion to quash the information
for bigamy based on prescription.
HELD:
The petitioner’s contention that a motion to
quash cannot go beyond the information in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which states that
the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably
unmeritorious. Even People v.
cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as
provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2,
and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117, viz.,
(a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double
jeopardy. His additional claim that the
exception of extinction can no longer be raised
due to the implied repeal of the former Section
4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by
its non-reproduction after its revision, is equally
without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of
the said Section 4 ever took place. While there
is no provision in the new Rule 117 that
prescribes the contents of a motion to quash
based on extinction of criminal liability, Section
2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections 3, 4,
and 5 of the old Rule 117. The said Section 2
reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Foms and contents. — The motion to
quash shall be in writing signed by the accused
or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the
factual and legal grounds therefor and the court
shall consider no grounds other than those
stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged. (3a, 4a, 5a).
It is clear from this Section that a motion to
quash may be based on factual and legal
grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability
and double jeopardy are retained as among the
grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of
the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that
facts outside the information itself may be
introduced to grove such grounds. As a matter
of fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed
where the ground invoked is that the
allegations in the information do not constitute
the offense charged. Thus, in People v. De la
Rosa, SC stated:
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on
the ground that the allegations of the
information do not constitute the offense
charged, or any offense for that matter, should
be resolved on the basis alone of said
allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. However, as held in
the case of People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516,
additional facts not alleged in the information,
but admitted or not denied by the prosecution
may be invoked in support of the motion to
quash.
In Criminal Case No. 92-27272, the trial court,
without objection on the part of the
prosecution, allowed the private respondent to
offer evidence in support of her claim that the
crime had prescribed. Consequently, the trial
court, upon indubitable proof of prescription,
correctly granted the motion to quash. It would
have been, to quote De la Rosa, “pure
technicality for the court to close its eyes to
[the fact of prescription) and still give due
course to the prosecution of the case” — a
technicality which would have meant loss of
valuable time of the court and the parties.
G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004
JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth
Division), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the
ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS,
INC., respondents.
Facts:
Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel
Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were
charged with Malversation through Falsification
of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan.
The Information alleged that Ramiscal, et. al.
misappropriated and converted the amount of
P250,318,200.00 for their personal use from the
funds of AFP-RSBS.
Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an
“Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of
Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant
of Arrest.” He argued, that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the case because the
AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent
Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and
Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued, the
Sandiganbayan sustained Ramiscal, et. al.’s
contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity.
Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and
ordered the dismissal of their criminal case.
Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration,
the prosecution filed the present special civil
action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS
REPRESENTED BY ALBANO & ASSOCIATES ARE
PRIVATE INJURED PARTIES ENTITLED TO
INTERVENE AS THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN
THE SUBJECT CASES
Held: Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party
may also be a private individual whose person,
right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same
punishable act or omission of the accused,or
that corporate entity which is damaged or
injured by the delictual acts complained of.
Such party must be one who has a legal right; a
substantial interest in the subject matter of the
action as will entitle him to recourse under the
substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is
sufficient or that he has the legal right to the
demand and the accused will be protected by
the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such
interest must not be a mere expectancy,
subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of
the party must be personal; and not one based
on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right
of some third and unrelated party.
Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also
be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS,
the respondent AGFOI does not have a legal
right to intervene in the criminal cases merely
and solely to enforce and/or protect the
constitutional right of such members to have
access to the records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are
such members entitled to intervene therein
simply because the funds of the AFP-RSBS are
public or government funds. It must be stressed
that any interest of the members of the AFP-
RSBS over its funds or property is merely
inchoate and incidental. Such funds belong to
the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical personality
separate and independent of its
members/beneficiaries.
As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended
party is the government, which was allegedly
deprived by the petitioner and the other
accused of the capital gains and documentary
stamp taxes, based on the actual and correct
purchase price of the property stated therein in
favor of the AFP-RSBS. The AGFOI was not
involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the
crimes charged; neither was it prejudiced by the
said transactions, nor is it entitled to the civil
liability of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it
is not the offended party in the said cases.
Senador vs. People and Jaime
GR No. 201620, March 6, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner Ramoncita Senador entered
into a consignment agreement of various kinds
of jewelry worth over P700k with Rita and
Cynthia Jaime. Senador was given fifteen (15)
days to sell the jewelry and remit the money
less her commission. Unsold jewelries shall also
be returned by petitioner to respondent
Cynthia. The fifteen-day period lapsed and
petitioner failed to sell them or remit the
money. Several demands were not enough for
Ramoncita to comply with her obligations.
Cynthia filed a criminal case against petitioner
for estafa. In the information, the private
complainant was Cynthia. However, it was
proved during trial that Rita was the actual
private complainant. Petitioner contends that
her constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her
was violated, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.
RTC found petitioner guilty. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the erroneous
designation of the offended party violates the
constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her
HELD: No, the erroneous designation of the
offended party does not violate such
constitutional right when the crime involved is
estafa. Senador’s reliance on Uba is misplaced.
In Uba, the appellant was charged with oral
defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the
identity of the person against whom the
defamatory words were directed is a material
element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the
person injured is material.
On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador
was charged with estafa, a crime against
property that does not absolutely require as
indispensable the proper designation of the
name of the offended party. Rather, what is
absolutely necessary is the correct identification
of the criminal act charged in the information.
Thus, in case of an error in the designation of
the offended party in crimes against property,
Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court
mandates the correction of the information, not
its dismissal.
Citing Sayson vs People (GR No. L-51745,
October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 680):
In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime
against property under the Revised Penal Code,
since the check, which was the subject-matter
of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of
convicting the accused, that it was established
during the trial that the offended party was
actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr.
nor Bank of America as alleged in the
information.
We conclude that in offenses against property,
if the subject matter of the offense is generic
and not identifiable, such as the money
unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in
the designation of the offended party is fatal
and would result in the acquittal of the accused.
However, if the subject matter of the offense is
specific and identifiable, such as a warrant, as in
Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and
Ricarze, an error in the designation of the
offended party is immaterial. The error in the
designation of the offended party in the
information is immaterial and did not violate
Senador’s constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against in one form as in the other. In this case, the
her. amendment made which does not change the
nature of the crime alleged does not affect the
Eduardo G. Ricarze vs. CA, Caltex Phils. Inc., essence of the offense or cause surprise or
PCIBank deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
G.R. No. 160451, February 9, 2007 the new averment had each been held to be
one of form and not of substance. As provided
Facts: by the Rules of Court, after the entry of the
Eduardo Ricarze (employed as a collector- plea, only a formal amendment may be made
messenger of City Service Corporation) is but with leave of court and if it does not
assigned to collect checks payable to Caltex. He prejudice the rights of the accused. In the case
opened a bank account in the name of Dante at bar, the amendment is allowed because it is
Gutierrez, a regular customer of Caltex, forged settled that the same does not prejudice the
the signatures on the dorsal portions of the rights of Ricarze. In addition, it was held that in
stolen check and deposited it in that same bank case of offenses against property, the
account. He was charged by the officers of designation of the name of the offended party
Caltex with estafa through falsification of is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the
commercial documents. In the original criminal act charged in the complaint or
information filed by the prosecutor, Caltex information can be properly identified.
appeared to be the offended party because the
prosecutor was not informed that PCIBank
credited certain amount to Caltex. After
arraignment and plea, PCIBank appeared as the
complainant. Ricarze averred that the
information can no longer be amended because
he had already been arraigned under the
original information, and that doing so would
place him in double jeopardy. On one hand,
PCIBank contended that PCIBank had re-
credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of
the indemnity, hence, the PCIBank had been
subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex
as private complainant.

Issue:
Whether or not an information can be amended
even after the accused had been arraigned and
entered his plea.

Holding:
The Supreme Court held that the amendment in
the name of the complainant is of form. The
test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by
the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and
whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information