G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961 (par. [c], see.

(par. [c], see. 8), while an "employee" refers to "any person who performs services
for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and
IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL who receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment",
SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an
MANILA, petitioner-appellant, employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under
vs. the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee. including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service
in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.
Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-appellee. From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social
Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship
of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
those expressly excluded.
On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel,
Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should —
filed with the Social Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all
following the principle of ejusdem generis — be limited to those who carry on
religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or
"undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are
indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any kind" in the definition
Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as
is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." The
amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request was
contention cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies only where
based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and
there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the
charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and activities organized for profit.
Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American
Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security
Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the definition of the term
Commission in its Resolution No. 572, series of 1958, denied the request. The
"employer" is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising
charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant,
constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The
within its meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an
request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series
exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had
of 1958; hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No.
the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized
1161, as amended.
for profit or gain, it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to
include the Government and yet make an express exception of it.
Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the
System shall be compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and
It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services
sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a the service of an
performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable
employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the Commission may not
purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof
compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall have been
(sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been
in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for
deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957.
membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees,
This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and
and if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at
religious institutions within the scope of the law.
least six employees x x x." The term employer" as used in the law is defined as
any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines
any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only
services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, employment for profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate,
except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or portions of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in
instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" those discussions touching upon the question of whether the law should be limited
to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length
upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon
the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by
the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are
corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.
Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and,
consequently, following the rule laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the
Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases 1,
applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The cases
cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved
expressly limits its application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural
establishments, or enterprises. .
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line
with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of
the Social Security Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs against
appellant.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.
Bengzon, J., reserves his vote.

Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy
of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a
social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people
throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It
affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full
accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people." Being in fact a
social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living
conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its
provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture.

There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the
coverage of the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against
the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of any priest who
might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed to the System created by
the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely
held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are
impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or
disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the
Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a
priest but because he is an employee.

Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law
impairs appellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of
appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in
its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the
nature of taxes on employment." Together with the contributions imposed upon the
employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said

G.R. No. L-26298 September 28, 1984
CMS ESTATE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION, respondents.
Sison Dominguez & Cervantes for petitioner.
The Legal Counsel for respondent SSS.
CUEVAS, J.:
This appeal by the CMS Estate, Inc. from the decision rendered by the Social
Security Commission in its Case No. 12, entitled "CMS Estate, Inc. vs. Social
Security System, declaring CMS subject to compulsory coverage as of September
1, 1957 and "directing the Social Security System to effect such coverage of the
petitioner's employees in its logging and real estate business conformably to the
provision of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended was certified to Us by the defunct
Court of Appeals 1 for further disposition considering that purely questions of law
are involved.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation organized primarily for the purpose of
engaging in the real estate business. On December 1, 1952, it started doing
business with only six (6) employees. It's Articles of Incorporation was amended on
June 4, 1956 in order to engage in the logging business. The Securities and
Exchange Commission issued the certificate of filing of said amended articles on
June 18, 1956. Petitioner likewise obtained an ordinary license from the Bureau of
Forestry to operate a forest concession of 13,000 hectares situated in the
municipality of Baganga, Province of Davao.
On January 28, 1957, petitioner entered into a contract of management with one
Eufracio D. Rojas for the operation and exploitation of the forest concession The
logging operation actually started on April 1, 1957 with four monthly salaried
employees. As of September 1, 1957, petitioner had 89 employees and laborers in
the logging operation. On December 26, 1957, petitioner revoked its contract of
management with Mr. Rojas.
On August 1, 1958, petitioner became a member of the Social Security System
with respect to its real estate business. On September 6, 1958, petitioner remitted
to the System the sum of P203.13 representing the initial premium on the monthly
salaries of the employees in its logging business. However, on October 9, 1958,
petitioner demanded the refund of the said amount, claiming that it is not yet
subject to compulsory coverage with respect to its logging business. The request
was denied by respondent System on the ground that the logging business was a
mere expansion of petitioner's activities and for purposes of the Social Security
Act, petitioner should be considered a member of the System since December 1,
1952 when it commenced its real estate business.
On November 10, 1958, petitioner filed a petition with the Social Security
Commission praying for the determination of the effectivity date of the compulsory
coverage of petitioner's logging business.
After both parties have submitted their respective memoranda, the Commission
issued on January 14, 1960, Resolution No. 91, 2 the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Premises considered, the instant petition is hereby denied and
petitioner is hereby adjudged to be subject to compulsory
coverage as of Sept. 1, 1957 and the Social Security System is
hereby directed to effect such coverage of petitioner's employees
in its logging and real estate business conformably to the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 609 of the
Commission.
These two (2) resolutions are now the subject of petitioner's appeal. Petitioner
submits that respondent Commission erred in holding —
(1) that the contributions required of employers and employees
under our Social Security Act of 1954 are not in the nature of
excise taxes because the said Act was allegedly enacted by
Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State, not of its
taxing power;
(2) that no contractee — independent contractor relationship
existed between petitioner and Eufracio D. Rojas during the time
that he was operating its forest concession at Baganga, Davao;
 (3) that a corporation which has been in operation for more than
two years in one business is immediately covered with respect to
any new and independent business it may subsequently engage
in;
(4) that a corporation should be treated as a single employing unit
for purposes of coverage under the Social Security Act,
irrespective of its separate, unrelated and independent business
established and operated at different places and on different
dates; and
(5) that Section 9 of the Social Security Act on the question of
compulsory membership and employers should be given a liberal
interpretation.
Respondent, on the other hand, advances the following propositions, inter alia:
(1) that the Social Security Act speaks of compulsory coverage of
employers and not of business;
(2) that once an employer is initially covered under the Social
Security Act, any other business undertaken or established by the
same employer is likewise subject in spite of the fact that the latter
has not been in operation for at least two years;
(3) that petitioner's logging business while actually of a different,
distinct, separate and independent nature from its real estate
business should be considered as an operation under the same
management;
(4) that the amendment of petitioner's articles of incorporation, so
as to enable it to engage in the logging business did not alter the
juridical personality of petitioner; and
(5) the petitioner's logging operation is a mere expansion of its
business activities.
The Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government "to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines, and shall provide
protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death" (Sec. 2,
RA 1161, as amended). It is thus clear that said enactment implements the general
welfare mandate of the Constitution and constitutes a legitimate exercise of the
police power of the State. As held in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., et al. vs. SSS 3 —
Membership in the SSS is not a result of bilateral, concensual
agreement where the rights and obligations of the parties are
defined by and subject to their will, RA 1161 requires compulsory
coverage of employees and employers under the System. It is
actually a legal imposition on said employers and employees,
designed to provide social security to the workingmen.
Membership in the SSS is therefore, in compliance with the lawful
exercise of the police power of the State, to which the principle of
non-impairment of the obligation of contract is not a proper
defense.
xxx xxx xxx
The taxing power of the State is exercised for the purpose of raising revenues.
However, under our Social Security Law, the emphasis is more on the promotion of
the general welfare. The Act is not part of out Internal Revenue Code nor are the
contributions and premiums therein dealt with and provided for, collectible by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. The funds contributed to the System belong to the
members who will receive benefits, as a matter of right, whenever the hazards
provided by the law occur.
All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to
the System for covered employees in its employ. These
contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not 'in the
nature of taxes on employment.' Together with the contributions
imposed upon employees and the Government, they are intended
for the protection of said employees against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional
mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people.4
Because of the broad social purpose of the Social Security Act, all doubts in
construing the Act should favor coverage rather than exemption.
Prior to its amendment, Sec. 9 of the Act provides that before an employer could
be compelled to become a member of the System, he must have been in operation
for at least two years and has at the time of admission at least six employees. It
should be pointed out that it is the employer, either natural, or judicial person, who
is subject to compulsory coverage and not the business. If the intention of the
legislature was to consider every venture of the employer as the basis of a
separate coverage, an express provision to that effect could have been made. independent contractor but merely an employee of petitioner; and should be
Unfortunately, however, none of that sort appeared provided for in the said law. entitled to the compulsory coverage of the Act.

Should each business venture of the employer be considered as the basis of the
coverage, an employer with more than one line of business but with less than six
employees in each, would never be covered although he has in his employ a total
of more than six employees which is sufficient to bring him within the ambit of
compulsory coverage. This would frustrate rather than foster the policy of the Act.
The legislative intent must be respected. In the absence of an express provision
for a separate coverage for each kind of business, the reasonable interpretation is
that once an employer is covered in a particular kind of business, he should be
automatically covered with respect to any new name. Any interpretation which
would defeat rather than promote the ends for which the Social Security Act was
enacted should be eschewed. 5
The records indubitably show that petitioner started its real estate business on
December 1, 1952 while its logging operation was actually commenced on April 1,
1957. Applying the provision of Sec. 10 of the Act, petitioner is subject to
compulsory coverage as of December 1, 1952 with respect to the real estate
business and as of April 1, 1957 with respect to its logging operation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. With
costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner contends that the Commission cannot indiscriminately combine for

purposes of coverage two distinct and separate businesses when one has not yet
been in operation for more than two years thus rendering nugatory the period for
more than two years thus rendering nugatory the period of stabilization fixed by the
Act. This contention lacks merit since the amendatory law, RA 2658, which was
approved on June 18, 1960, eliminated the two-year stabilization period as
employers now become automatically covered immediately upon the start of the
business.

Section 10 (formerly Sec. 9) of RA 1161, as amended by RA 2658 now provides:

Sec. 10. Effective date of coverage. — Compulsory coverage of

the employer shall take effect on the first day of his operation, and
that of the employee on the date of his employment. (Emphasis
supplied)

As We have previously mentioned, it is the intention of the law to cover as many

persons as possible so as to promote the constitutional objective of social justice.
It is axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute and moreover the
legislative in tent must be given effect. 6

Petitioner further submits that Eufrancio Rojas is an independent contractor who

engages in an independent business of his own consisting of the operation of the
timber concession of the former. Rojas was appointed as operations manager of
the logging consession; 7 he has no power to appoint or hire employees; as the
term implies, he only manages the employees and it is petitioner who furnishes
him the necessary equipment for use in the logging business; and he is not free
from the control and direction of his employer in matter connected with the
performance of his work. These factors clearly indicate that Rojas is not an

G.R. No. L-21642 July 30, 1966
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CANDELARIA D. DAVAC, ET AL., respondents;
LOURDES Tuplano, respondent-appellant.
J. Ma. Francisco and N. G. Bravo for respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and E.
T. Duran for petitioner-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the resolution of the Social Security Commission declaring
respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits
payable for the death of Petronilo Davac.
The facts of the case as found by the Social Security Commission, briefly are: The
late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. became
a member of the Social Security System (SSS for short) on September 1, 1957. As
such member, he was assigned SS I.D. No. 08-007137. In SSS form E-1
(Member's Record) which he accomplished and filed with the SSS on November
21, 1957, he designated respondent Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and
indicated his relationship to her as that of "wife". He died on April 5, 1959 and,
thereupon, each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac and Lourdes Tuplano) filed
their claims for death benefit with the SSS. It appears from their respective claims
and the documents submitted in support thereof, that the deceased contracted two
marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano on August 29, 1946, who bore
him a child, Romeo Davac, and the second, with Candelaria Davac on January 18,
1949, with whom he had a minor daughter Elizabeth Davac. Due to their conflicting
claims, the processing thereof was held in abeyance, whereupon the SSS filed this
petition praying that respondents be required to interpose and litigate between
themselves their conflicting claims over the death benefits in question.1äwphï1.ñët
On February 25, 1963, the Social Security Commission issued the resolution
referred to above, Not satisfied with the said resolution, respondent Lourdes
Tuplano brought to us the present appeal.
The only question to be determined herein is whether or not the Social Security
Commission acted correctly in declaring respondent Candelaria Davac as the
person entitled to receive the death benefits in question.
Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 1792, in force
at the time Petronilo Davac's death on April 5, 1959, provides:
1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or total and permanent
disability under such conditions as the Commission may define, before
becoming eligible for retirement and if either such death or disability is not
compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he or, in case of
his death, his beneficiaries, as recorded by his employer shall be entitled
to the following benefit: ... . (emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, the beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer is
the one entitled to the death benefits. In the case of Tecson vs. Social Security
System, (L-15798, December 28, 1961), this Court, construing said Section 13,
said:
It may be true that the purpose of the coverage under the Social Security
System is protection of the employee as well as of his family, but this
purpose or intention of the law cannot be enforced to the extent of
contradicting the very provisions of said law as contained in Section 13,
thereof, ... . When the provision of a law are clear and explicit, the courts
can do nothing but apply its clear and explicit provisions (Velasco vs.
Lopez, 1 Phil, 270; Caminetti vs. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 61 L. ed. 442).
But appellant contends that the designation herein made in the person of the
second and, therefore, bigamous wife is null and void, because (1) it contravenes
the provisions of the Civil Code, and (2) it deprives the lawful wife of her share in
the conjugal property as well as of her own and her child's legitime in the
inheritance.
As to the first point, appellant argues that a beneficiary under the Social Security
System partakes of the nature of a beneficiary in life insurance policy and,
therefore, the same qualifications and disqualifications should be applied.
Article 2012 of the New Civil Code provides:
 ART. 2012. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation
under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by
the person who cannot make any donation to him according to said article.
And Article 739 of the same Code prescribes:
ART. 739. The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
xxx xxx xxx
Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the benefits accruing from
membership in the Social Security System is a donation, or that it creates a
situation analogous to the relation of an insured and the beneficiary under a life
insurance policy, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant case, to state that the
disqualification mentioned in Article 739 is not applicable to herein appellee
Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no
proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband Petronilo. 1
Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits accruing from
membership in the Social Security System do not form part of the properties of the
conjugal partnership of the covered member. They are disbursed from a public
special fund created by Congress in pursuance to the declared policy of the
Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system
which ... shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age
and death."2
The sources of this special fund are the covered employee's contribution (equal to
2-½ per cent of the employee's monthly compensation); 3 the employer's
contribution (equivalent to 3-½ per cent of the monthly compensation of the
covered employee);4 and the Government contribution which consists in yearly
appropriation of public funds to assure the maintenance of an adequate working
balance of the funds of the System. 5 Additionally, Section 21 of the Social Security
Act, as amended by Republic Act 1792, provides:
SEC. 21. Government Guarantee. — The benefits prescribed in this Act
shall not be diminished and to guarantee said benefits the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines accepts general responsibility for the
solvency of the System.
From the foregoing provisions, it appears that the benefit receivable under the Act
is in the nature of a special privilege or an arrangement secured by the law,
pursuant to the policy of the State to provide social security to the workingmen.
The amounts that may thus be received cannot be considered as property earned
by the member during his lifetime. His contribution to the fund, it may be noted,
constitutes only an insignificant portion thereof. Then, the benefits are specifically
declared not transferable,6 and exempted from tax legal processes, and
lien.7Furthermore, in the settlement of claims thereunder the procedure to be
observed is governed not by the general provisions of law, but by rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission. Thus, if the money is payable to the
estate of a deceased member, it is the Commission, not the probate or regular
court that determines the person or persons to whom it is payable. 8 that the
benefits under the Social Security Act are not intended by the lawmaking body to
form part of the estate of the covered members may be gathered from the
subsequent amendment made to Section 15 thereof, as follows:
SEC. 15. Non-transferability of benefit. — The system shall pay the
benefits provided for in this Act to such persons as may be entitled thereto
in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Such benefits are not
transferable, and no power of attorney or other document executed by
those entitled thereto in favor of any agent, attorney, or any other
individual for the collection thereof in their behalf shall be recognized
except when they are physically and legally unable to collect personally
such benefits: Provided, however, That in the case of death benefits, if no
beneficiary has been designated or the designation there of is void, said
benefits shall be paid to the legal heirs in accordance with the laws of
succession. (Rep. Act 2658, amending Rep. Act 1161.)
In short, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it is
not so in this case), it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive
the benefits (unless they are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only
when there is no designated beneficiaries or when the designation is void, that the
laws of succession are applicable. And we have already held that the Social
Security Act is not a law of succession.9
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the resolution of the Social
Security Commission appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, concur.

G.R. No. 119891 August 21, 1995
BEN STA. RITA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review an Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
("CA") in CA-G.R. SP. No. 34384 which ordered the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"),
Branch 92, Quezon City, to reinstate Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426 filed against
petitioner Ben Sta. Rita.
Petitioner Sta. Rita was charged in the RTC with violating Section 2(a) in relation
to Sections 22(d) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise
known as the Social Security Law. The Information alleged that petitioner, "as
President/General Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co., Inc. a compulsorily (sic) covered
employer under the Social Security Law, as amended, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully fail, neglect and refuse and still fails, neglects and refuses to remit
to the Social Security System contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employees
Compensation for its covered employees."1
Petitioner Sta. Rita moved to dismiss said criminal case on the following grounds:
1. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and;
2
2. That the RTC has no jurisdiction over this case.
The RTC sustained petitioner's motion and dismissed the criminal case filed
against him. It ruled that the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the
Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Social Security System
("SSS") extending the coverage of Social Security, Medical Care and Employment
Compensation laws to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels was null and
void as it was entered into by the Administrator of the SSS without the sanction of
the Commission and approval of the President of the Philippines, in contravention
of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended. 3
The People, through the Solicitor General, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the order of dismissal issued by
the trial court. Respondent appellate court granted the petition and ordered the
Presiding Judge of the trial court to reinstate the criminal case against petitioner. A
motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 17
April 1995.
Thereafter, petitioner filed in this Court a motion for extension of thirty (30) days
from the expiration of reglementary period within which to file a petition for review
on certiorari. The Court granted the motion and gave petitioner until 9 June 1995 to
file the petition with warning that no further extension will be given. Despite the
warning, the petition was filed only on 13 June 1995 or four (4) days after the due
date. Moreover, it failed to comply with requirement no. 2 of Circular No. 1-88, as
amended and Circular No. 19-91 of the Court as it did not contain an affidavit of
service of copies thereof to respondents. It was only on 14 July 1995, through
an ex-parte manifestation, that the affidavit of service was belatedly submitted to
this Court.
In the Petition for Review, petitioner Sta. Rita contends that the Filipino seafarers
recruited by B. Sta. Rita Co. and deployed on board foreign vessels outside the
Philippines are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No. 1161 under Section 8 (j) (5)
thereof:
Terms Defined
EMPLOYMENT — Any service performed by an employee for his
employer, except —
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Service performed on or in connection with an alien vessel by an
employee if he is employed when such vessel is outside the Philippines.
 xxx xxx xxx
According to petitioner, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the DOLE
and the SSS is null and void as it has the effect of amending the aforequoted
provision of R.A. No. 1161 by expanding its coverage. This allegedly cannot be
done as only Congress may validly amend legislative enactments.
Petitioner prays that the Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426 and that the Order of
the RTC dismissing the same be upheld.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a
party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules. 4 These rules,
particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business.5 Petitioner's failure to seasonably file the Petition
and its failure to comply with the aforequoted Circulars of the Court necessitate the
denial of the Petition.
Besides, even if the Petition had been filed on time and had complied with the
Circulars, it would still have to be denied as petitioner has failed to show that
respondent appellate court committed any reversible error in rendering the
assailed decision.
The Court agrees with the CA that the Information filed against petitioner was
sufficient as it clearly stated the designation of the offense by the statute, i.e.
violation of the Social Security Law, and the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense, i.e., petitioner's failure to remit his contributions to the
SSS. The CA found that there is prima facie evidence to support the allegations in
the Information and to warrant the prosecution of petitioner.
Respondent appellate court correctly upheld the validity of the Memorandum of
Agreement entered into between the DOLE and the SSS. Upon the one hand,
contrary to the trial court's finding, the Memorandum of Agreement was approved
by the Social Security Commission per the Commission's Resolution No. 437,
dated 14 July 1988.6 Upon the other hand, the Memorandum of Agreement is not a
rule or regulation enacted by the Commission in the exercise of the latter's quasi-
legislative authority Under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended, which
reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission. — For the attainment of its
main objectives as set forth in section two hereof, the Commission shall
have the following powers and duties:
(a) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President,
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act.
xxx xxx xxx
What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to record the understanding
between the SSS on the one hand and the DOLE on the other hand that the latter
would include among the provisions of the Standard Contract of Employment
required in case of overseas employment, a stipulation providing for coverage of
the Filipino seafarer by the SSS. The Memorandum of Agreement is not an
implementing rule or regulation of the Social Security Commission which, under
Section 4 (a) abovequoted, is subject to the approval of the President. Indeed, as a
matter of strict law, the participation of the SSS in the establishment by the DOLE
of a uniform stipulation in the Standard Contract of Employment for Filipino
seafarers was not necessary; the Memorandum of Agreement related simply to the
administrative convenience of the two (2) agencies of government.
Moreover, the Court finds no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 8 (j) (5) of
R.A. No. 1161, as amended, absolutely exempts Filipino seafarers on board
foreign vessels from the coverage of the SSS statute. Section 8 (j) (5) simply
defines the term "employment" and does not in any way relate to the scope of
coverage of the Social Security System. That coverage is, upon the other hand,
set out in Section 9 of R.A. No. 1161 as amended, which defines the scope of SSS
coverage in the following terms:
Sec. 9 Compulsory Coverage. — (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be
compulsory upon all employees not over sixty years of age and their
employers; Provided, . . . .
(b) Fillpinos recruited in the Philippines by foreign employers for
employment abroad may be covered by the SSS on a voluntary basis. (As
amended by Sec. 2, P.D. No. 177, S-1973 and Sec. 6, P.D. No. 735-S-
1975) (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that the Memorandum of Agreement is in line with paragraph 9 (b) of
the Social Security statute quoted above. The Memorandum of Agreement
provides, inter alia, that:
 xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises,
the parties hereto agree and stipulate that one of the conditions that will
be imposed by the Department of Labor and Employment is the contract
for overseas employment is the registration for coverage of seafarers with
the Social Security System, through the manning agencies as the
authorized representatives of the foreign employers in conformity with
Section 9, paragraph (b) of the Social Security Law (R.A. No. 1161, as
amended), subject to the following terms and conditions:
xxx xxx xxx7
It is, finally, worthy of special note that by extending the benefits of the Social
Security Act to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels, the individual
employment agreements entered into with the stipulation for such coverage
contemplated in the DOLE-SSS Memorandum of Agreement, merely give effect to
the constitutional mandate to the State to afford protection to labor whether "local
or overseas."9 Nullification of the SSS stipulation in those individual employment
contracts, through nullification of the Memorandum of Agreement, constituted
serious reversible error on the part of the trial court. That petitioner should seek to
deprive his countrymen of social security protection after his foreign principal had
agreed to such protection, is cause for dismay and is to be deplored.

(Emphasis supplied) The Court of Appeals properly held that the reinstatement of the criminal case
against petitioner did not violate his right against double jeopardy since the
dismissal of the information by the trial court had been effected at his own
Thus, the Standard Contract of Employment to be entered into between foreign
instance. 10 There are only two (2) instances where double jeopardy will attach
shipowners and Filipino seafarers is the instrument by which the former express
notwithstanding the fact that the case was dismissed with the express consent of
their assent to the inclusion of the latter in the coverage of the Social Security Act.
the accused. The first is where the ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence
In other words, the extension of the coverage of the Social Security System to
for the prosecution; and the second is where the criminal proceedings have been
Filipino seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in the contract of employment
unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. 11 Neither
signed by employer and seafarer; that same contract binds petitioner Sta. Rita or
situation exists in the case at bar. There is no legal impediment to the
B. Sta. Rita Company, who is solidarily liable with the foreign
reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426 against petitioner Sta. Rita.
shipowners/employers.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for having been filed late,
It may be noted that foreign shipowners and manning agencies had generally
for failure to comply with applicable Court Circulars and for lack of merit. The
expressed their conformity to the inclusion of Filipino seafarers within the coverage
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against
of the Social Security Act even prior to the signing of the DOLE-SSS Memorandum
petitioner.
of Agreement. Thus, the Whereas clauses of the Memorandum of Agreement state
that:
Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
WHEREAS, in the 74th Maritime Session (ILO) held from September 24 to
October 9, 1987 in Geneva, it was agreed that as an internationally
accepted principle, seafarers shall have the right to social security
protection;

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, after a series of consultations with seafaring unions and

manning agencies, it was the consensus that Philippine social security
coverage be extended to seafarers under the employ of vessels flying
foreign flags;

xxx xxx xxx8


G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS,
represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66531 and its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The antecedents are as follows:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner,
died on December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a
claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in
her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was
born on October 29, 1991.2 Her claim for monthly pension was settled on February
13, 1997.3
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter 4 dated April 2, 1997 from
Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for death
benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately
more than six years before, and lived with another man on whom she has been
dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with
Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a certain Romeo dela Peña.
In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the original birth
certificate5 of one Jefren H. dela Peña, showing that the latter was born on
November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that
the two were married on November 1, 1990.
As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly
pension in September 1997. It also conducted an investigation to verify Leticia’s
allegations. In a Memorandum6 dated November 18, 1997, the Social Security
Officer who conducted the investigation reported that, based on an interview with
Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablo’s first cousin and neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales (also a
neighbor). She learned that the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna;
Jenelyn7 and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with one Romeo C. dela Peña; and
Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo while
she was still pregnant with Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Mariquita
also confirmed that Pablo was not capable of having a child as he was under
treatment.
On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel
Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume
the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within 30
days the amount of ₱10,350.00 representing the total death benefits released to
her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to August 1997 at ₱1,150.00 per month. 8
Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a reconsideration of the said
decision.9 However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the
claim.10
This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the
Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC) on
February 20, 1998.11 Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the
deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant. The case was docketed as
SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.
The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the
following: (1) Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage certificate; (2) Janet’s certificate of
live birth; (3) Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablo’s certificate of death.
In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn testimonies and
documentary evidence showing the disqualification of the petitioners as primary
beneficiaries, the claims were barren of factual and legal basis; as such, it was
justified in denying their claims.12
In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child of
Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s
father. They asserted that Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived together as
husband and wife under one roof. In support thereof, they attached a Joint
Affidavit13 executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu, where
they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until the
latter’s death. In Janet’s birth certificate, which was registered in the Civil Registry
of San Fernando, it appears that her father was Pablo and her mother was
Rosanna. As to the alleged infertility of Pablo, the claimants averred that Dr.
Macapinlac denied giving the opinion precisely because he was not an expert on
such matters, and that he treated the deceased only for tuberculosis. The claimant
likewise claimed that the information the SSS gathered from the doctor was
privileged communication.14
In compliance with the SSC’s order, the SSS secured Confirmation
Reports15 signed by clerks from the corresponding civil registers confirming (1) the
fact of marriage between Pablo and Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2) the fact of
Jefren dela Peña’s birth on November 15, 1996; (3) the fact of Jeylnn’s birth on
October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablo’s death on December 8, 1996.
The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the SSS to verify the
authenticity of Pablo’s signature as appearing on Jeylnn’s birth certificate from his
claim records, particularly his SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit
application.16 The SSS complied with said directive and manifested to the SSC
that, based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablo’s signature in the birth
certificate was made by the same person who signed the member’s record and
other similar documents submitted by Pablo.17
The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac for clarificatory questions with regard to their respective sworn
affidavits.18 Vivencia testified that she had known Pablo and Rosanna for more
than 30 years already; the couple were married and lived in Macabacle, Dolores,
San Fernando, Pampanga; she was a former neighbor of the spouses, but four
years after their marriage, she (Vivencia) and her family moved to Sto. Niño
Triangulo, San Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit the two, especially
during Christmas or fiestas; the spouses’ real child was Jeylnn; Janet was only an
adopted child; the spouse later transferred residence, not far from their old house,
and Janet, together with her husband and son, remained in the old house. 19
On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a neighbor of Pablo and
Rosanna for 15 years and that, up to the present, Rosanna and her children,
Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were still her neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn were the
children of Pablo and Rosanna but she did not know whose child Jefren is. 20
According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she was
just taken in by the spouses because for a long time they could not have
children;21 however, there were no legal papers on Janet’s adoption. 22Later on,
Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn; after the latter’s baptism, there was a
commotion at the house because Romeo dela Peña was claiming that he was the
father of the child and he got mad because the child was named after Pablo; the
latter also got mad and even attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove them away
from the house; since then, Pablo and Rosanna separated; 23 she knew about this
because at that time their mother was sick, and she would often visit her at their
ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna were also staying; Rosanna was no
longer living in their ancestral home but Janet resided therein; she did not know
where Rosanna was staying now but she knew that the latter and Romeo dela
Peña were still living together.24
Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also summoned for
clarificatory questions.25 During the hearing, Mariquita brought with her
photocopies of two baptismal certificates: that of Jeylnn Aguas, 26 child of Pablo
Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez born on October 29, 1991, and that of Jenelyn H.
dela Peña,27 child of Romeo dela Peña and Rosanna Hernandez, born on January
29, 1992.
On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of
merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund to the SSS the amount of
₱10,350.00 erroneously paid to her and Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the
deceased. The SSC likewise directed the SSS to pay the death benefit to qualified
secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their absence, to his legal heirs. 28
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it
appearing that she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Peña during the
subsistence of her marriage to Pablo. The SSC based its conclusion on the birth
certificate of Jefren dela Peña stating that his mother, Rosanna, and father, Romeo
dela Peña, were married on November 1, 1990. The SSC declared that Rosanna
had a child with Romeo dela Peña while she was still married to Pablo (as
evidenced by the baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H. dela Peña showing that she
was the child of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and that she was born
on January 29, 1992). The SSC concluded that Rosanna was no longer entitled to
support from Pablo prior to his death because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn,
the SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her father,
there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The
SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same
person and concluded, based on the latter’s baptismal certificate, that she was the
daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. It also gave credence to the
testimonies of Leticia and Mariquita that Jeylnn was the child of Rosanna and
Romeo dela Peña. As for Janet, the SSC relied on Leticia’s declaration that she
was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.29
The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but their
motion was denied by the SSC for lack of merit and for having been filed out of
time.30 The claimants then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The fallo
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered DECLARING petitioners as ENTITLED
to the SSS benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. The case is hereby
REMANDED to public respondent for purposes of computing the benefits that may
have accrued in favor of petitioners after the same was cut and suspended in
September 1997.
SO ORDERED.31
In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that
they were the children of the deceased. According to the appellate court, for
judicial purposes, these records were binding upon the parties, including the SSS.
These entries made in public documents may only be challenged through
adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may not be altered by mere
testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no
evidence to show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died.
Rosanna’s alleged affair with Romeo dela Peña was not properly proven. In any
case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Peña during her marriage to Pablo,
the same would have been a void marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her
not dependent for support upon Pablo and negate the presumption that, as the
surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her husband. 32
The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the CA denied for
lack of merit.33 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate court, contending that it
I
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS IS ACTUALLY
DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT UPON THE MEMBER DURING HIS
LIFETIME TO QUALIFY AS PRIMARY BENEFICIARY WITHIN THE
INTENDMENT OF SECTION 8(e), IN RELATION TO SECTION (k) OF
THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED.
II
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN AGUAS ARE
ENTITLED TO THE PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM THE DEATH
OF PABLO AGUAS.34
Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 735, which defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse
dependent for support upon the employee." According to petitioner, Rosanna
forfeited her right to be supported by Pablo when she engaged in an intimate and
illicit relationship with Romeo dela Peña and married the latter during her marriage
to Pablo. Such act constitutes abandonment, which divested her of the right to
receive support from her husband. It asserts that her act of adultery is evident from
the birth certificate of Jefren H. dela Peña showing that he was born on November
15, 1996 to Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. Petitioner submits that Rosanna
cannot be considered as a dependent spouse of Pablo; consequently, she is not a
primary beneficiary.35
As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not entitled to the
pension because, based on the evidence on record, particularly the testimonies of
the witnesses, they are not the legitimate children of Pablo. It argues that, in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial authority under Section 5(a) of the Social Security Act,
the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of respondents’ relationship with the
member to determine whether they are entitled to the benefits, even without
correcting their birth certificates.36
Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to prove that Rosanna
committed acts of adultery or that she married another man after the death of her
husband. They contend that Janet and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned only
on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family Code, none of which were
proven in this case.37
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.
The petition is partly meritorious.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by the Court in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.38 In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of
the CA.39 It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to review, examine, and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. 40 However, the
Court may review findings of facts in some instances, such as, when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the CA are contrary
to those of the trial court or quasi-judicial agency, or when the findings of facts of
the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.41 The Court finds these instances present in this case.
At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates those
who are entitled to death benefits:
Sec.13. Death benefits. – Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered employee’s
death, (a) his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the basic monthly pension,
and his dependents to the dependent’s pension: Provided, That he has paid at
least thirty-six monthly contributions prior to the semester of death: Provided,
further, That if the foregoing condition is not satisfied, or if he has no primary
beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit
equivalent to thirty times the basic monthly pension: Provided, however, That the
death benefit shall not be less than the total contributions paid by him and his
employer on his behalf nor less than five hundred pesos: Provided, finally, That the
covered employee who dies in the month of coverage shall be entitled to the
minimum benefit.
Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of an
SSS member as follows:
SECTION 8. Terms defined. – For the purposes of this Act the following terms
shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age provided
that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or
mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the employee; and the
legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular
support.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent
parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be the secondary
beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designated
by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary.
Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right
thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence
required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies,
is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.42
The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has
sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the
signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the
Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also
show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and the
marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore
evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v.
Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon,43 extensively discussed this presumption
–
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded
on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious
illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, 44 and in
proper cases Article 171,45 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.46
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. 47 In this case, there is no showing that
Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s
status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth
certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his specimen
signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a
competent evidence of paternity.48
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet
because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be
availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s
parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during
the subsistence of that marriage.49 It should be noted that respondents likewise
submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate. However, the Court
cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn’s because it
was not verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy,
without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by the civil
register of the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated in the certificate.
In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein.50 Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the
real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that
Janet’s adoption did not undergo any legal proceedings; hence, there were no
papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only
"legally adopted" children are considered dependent children. Absent any proof
that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider her a
dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary
beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for
support from the employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two
qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is
dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna presented proof to
show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage
certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or not
Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the
time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged
to support each other,51 but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the
other is something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of
marriage alone.
In a parallel case52 involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court
defined a dependent as "one who derives his or her main support from another.
Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or
sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid of someone
else." It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent spouse as
"the legitimate spouse dependent for
support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it obvious
that a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband
died, and lived with other men, was not dependent on her husband for support,
financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the Court denied her claim
for death benefits.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from
her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband,
absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband
and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to
presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown
that she is capable of providing for herself.
Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been
complied with, particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the time
of his death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence adduced by
Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until his
death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where they made
such declaration.
Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their testimonies before the SSC
will not prevail over the categorical and straightforward testimonies of the other
witnesses who testified that Rosanna and Pablo had already separated for almost
six years before the latter died. Except for the bare assertion of Carmelita that the
couple never separated, there was no further statement regarding the witnesses’
assertion in their affidavits that the couple lived together until Pablo’s death. On the
contrary, Leticia narrated that the two separated after Jeylnn’s baptism as a result
of an argument regarding Romeo dela Peña. According to Leticia, there was a
commotion at their ancestral house because Romeo dela Peña was grumbling why
Jeylnn was named after Pablo when he was the father, and as a result, Pablo
drove them away. The SSC’s observation and conclusion on the two baptismal
certificates of Jeylnn and Jenelyn convinces this Court to further believe Leticia’s
testimony on why Pablo and Rosanna separated. As noted by the SSC:
It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela Peña are one
and the same person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on October 29, 1991 was baptized at
the Metropolitan Cathedral of San Fernando, Pampanga, on November 24, 1991
as the child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez. Jenelyn H dela Peña, on the So, buhay pa si Pablo ……
other hand, was born on January 29, 1992 to spouses Rosanna Hernandez and
Romeo dela Peña and baptized on February 9, 1992. It will be noted that Jenelyn Mrs. Dizon:
dela Peña was born approximately three months after the birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It
is physically impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively to two …. nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.
children in so short a time. x x x The testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac that
Rosanna was driven away by Pablo after the baptism of Jeylnn because of the
commotion that was created by Romeo dela Peña who wanted Jeylnn to be Hearing Officer:
baptized using his name explains why Jeylnn was again baptized in the Parish of
Sto. Niño in San Fernando using the name Jenelyn dela Peña. They changed her Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?
date of birth also to make it appear in the record of the parish that she is another
child of Rosanna.53 Mrs. Dizon:

On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that Rosanna was no longer Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.
living at Pablo’s house even before he died, and that she is still living with Romeo
dela Peña up to the present. Mariquita testified as follows: Hearing Officer:

Hearing Officer: Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?

Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo? Mrs. Dizon:

Mrs. Dizon: Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh, dahil namatay na
yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling, yung tiyahin ko, kapatid ng nanay ko. Noon madalas
Ngayon at kahit na noon. ako noong buhay pa yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling dahil kami ang nag aalaga sa
kanya.
Hearing Officer:
Hearing Officer:
Kailan namatay si Pablo?
Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Mrs. Dizon:
1996.
Oo.
Hearing Officer:
Hearing Officer:
Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?
Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Mrs. Dizon:
Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.
Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.
Hearing Officer:
Hearing Officer:
Saan naman?
Mrs. Dizon:
Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.54
In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to
the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that
she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was
merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it; hence,
she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the
legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since
she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still
dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death
benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March
17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC
Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security
System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a
beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626. 2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since
February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees'
Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his
untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office,
in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you
are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally
adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC),
which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against
petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the
ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from
the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather,
petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision 7 in
Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February
4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality. 8 Consequently, as argued by
the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not
petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary
beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the
ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are
the "dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the
primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when
there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate
parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the
appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up
the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption
divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the
adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal
parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right
to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein
appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied
by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due
and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased
biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving
due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for
reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the
covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and,
thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for
death benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was allegedly
not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by
the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally
adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant
[petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the
adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as
such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the
deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under
the Social Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim
the benefit legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the
adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their
jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece
of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate. 13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died
on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of
adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. 15 As such, it was error for the
ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio,
has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death
benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in
this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent
parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children
who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o
approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the
settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC
has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the
above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and
determined atthe time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of
the employee’s death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged
natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not
over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor
mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority;
Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child
shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are
no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or
more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from
the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for
regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age,
or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and
incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no
longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As
held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and
petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and,
consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor
Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an
unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of
the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in
elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune
Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial
deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase
"dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this
Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should
beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a
general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not
make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule
ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the
termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it
embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken
of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited
sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the
afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its
general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the
ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the
law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents"
are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in
need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not
intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the
risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent
parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries."
Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents,
then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The
manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the
phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate,
illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is
in contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to
the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as
worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under
Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such
postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. 18 In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against
illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that
limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of
reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being
implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest that requires
protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand
and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better
fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents
may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or
death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly
interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the
legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to
strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV,
Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the
ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive
death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental
authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner
not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under
the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate
parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee
enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such
qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not
overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated
legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary
beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old,
petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be
overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that
when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree,
John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case
at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, 21 who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the
biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No.
855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or
the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and
the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration
of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s
parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, 23 justifies the retention of
vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the
consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for
himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552
was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to
which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the
instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state
policies behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest
of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best
interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and
upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his
duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our
mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could
reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s
biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological
parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome
instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of
the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be
governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary
rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall
be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of
the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and
those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the
same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental
authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive
parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second
chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from
him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have
been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in
the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority resulted
in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence
on John can be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC.
As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a
housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7)
children. But since she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing children"
as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in
1985.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John
repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In
fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate 25 executed in Brazil,
and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of
the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the
ECC’s assailed Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in
filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with
the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental
authority over John, petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they
lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, 28 named petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social
Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related
deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not
related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of
indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way,
considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of
circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration
ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and
John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made
petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary
under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis.
Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right
to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of
the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the
benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John
Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 REYES, R.T., J.:

AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband for
support is not qualified to be his beneficiary.

The principle is applied in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), awarding benefits to respondent Gloria de los Santos.

The Facts

Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, were
married on April 29, 1964 in Manila. Less than one (1) year after, in February 1965,
Gloria left Antonio and contracted another marriage with a certain Domingo Talens
in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with him
until 1983. They had three children: Alain Vincent, Arlene, and Armine.

In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US). On May 8, 1986,
she filed for divorce against Antonio with the Superior Court of Orange, Sta. Ana,
California. On May 21, 1983, she executed a document waiving all her rights to
their conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce was granted on November
5, 1986.

On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their
union produced one child, May-Ann N. de los Santos, born on May 15, 1989. On
her part, Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant, an American citizen, on July 11,
1987, in the US.

On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended his records at the Social Security System
(SSS). He changed his beneficiaries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila de
los Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de los Santos; and from Erlinda
de los Santos to Armine de los Santos.

Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on began
receiving monthly pension. He died of respiratory failure on May 15, 1999. Upon
G.R. No. 164790 August 29, 2008 his death, Cirila applied for and began receiving his SSS pension benefit,
beginning December 1999.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and LORELIE B. SOLIDUM, Branch Manager,
Cubao Branch,petitioner, On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s death benefits with the
vs. SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied because she was not a qualified
GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent. beneficiary of Antonio. The SSS letter of denial dated September 1, 2000 stated:

DECISION We regret to inform you that your claim is denied for the following
reason/s:
 We received documents showing that you have remarried in the United
States to one Larry T. Constant. You were also the one who filed for
petition for dissolution of your marriage with the deceased member, which
was in fact granted by the Superior Court of California, County of Orange.
These circumstances are sufficient ground for denial as the SSS law
specifically defines beneficiaries as "the dependent spouse, until he or she
remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted and
illegitimate children who shall be the primary beneficiary." x x x2
SSC Disposition
Gloria elevated her claim to the Social Security Commission (SSC). On February
12, 2001, she filed a petition to claim death benefits, with a prayer that she be
declared the rightful beneficiary of the deceased Antonio. 3
The SSC motu proprio impleaded Cirila as respondent in the case, it appearing
that she was another claimant to the death benefits of Antonio. Upon receipt of the
summons, Cirila moved to dismiss the petition of Gloria. She argued that Gloria
had no personality to sue because the latter is neither a dependent nor a
beneficiary of Antonio, as evidenced by the E-4 form accomplished and submitted
by him when he was still alive. Gloria had also remarried an American citizen in the
US. And that she, Cirila, was the true and legal wife of Antonio.
Cirila likewise reasoned out that the authority to determine the validity of the two
marriages of Antonio lay with the regular courts. Since Gloria had already filed for
settlement of the intestate estate of Antonio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
the petition she filed with the SSC should be considered as forum shopping.
Gloria opposed the motion to dismiss. She contended that her marriage to Larry
Constant was not the subsequent marriage contemplated under the Social
Security Law (SS Law)4 that would disqualify her as a beneficiary; that the decree
of divorce issued by a foreign state involving Filipino citizens has no validity and
effect under Philippine law. Lastly, Gloria remonstrated that there was no forum
shopping because the petition she filed before the RTC did not involve the issue of
her entitlement to SSS benefits.
The SSC denied the motion to dismiss. After submission of position papers from
both sides, it issued a Resolution, dated February 13, 2002, 5 dismissing Gloria’s
petition with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that May-Ann de los
Santos, daughter of Antonio and private respondent Cirila de los Santos is
the secondary beneficiary of the former and as such, she is entitled to the
balance of her father’s five-year guaranteed pension.
Accordingly, the SSS is hereby ordered to compute the balance of the five-
year guaranteed pension less the amount of P21,200 representing the
total of the monthly pensions and dependent’s pension previously received
by private respondent Cirila Nimo and minor May-Ann de los Santos,
respectively, and to pay the latter, through her natural guardian Cirila
Nimo, the difference between the two amounts, if any. If there was
overpayment of pension, the private respondent is hereby ordered to
forthwith refund the amount thereof to the SSS.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
The SSC deemed that Gloria abandoned Antonio when she obtained a divorce
against him abroad and subsequently married another man. She thus failed to
satisfy the requirement of dependency required of primary beneficiaries under the
law. The Commission likewise rejected her efforts to use the invalidity of the
divorce, which she herself obtained, to claim benefits from the SSS for her
personal profit.
However, despite all the sophistry with which petitioner, through her
counsel, sought to justify her acts in the USA, the petition must fail. The
petitioner, who was primarily responsible for obtaining the decree of
marital dissolution from an American court, now wishes to invoke the very
invalidity of her divorce and subsequent marriage in order to lay hands on
the benefit she seeks. It is sheer folly, if not downright reprehensible, for
the petitioner to seek to profit from committing an act considered as
unlawful under Philippine law. This Commission will not allow itself to be
used as an instrument to subvert the policies laid down in the SS Law
which it has sworn to uphold at all times. x x x7 (Emphasis added)
The SSC added that since the marriage of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter was
likewise not a qualified beneficiary. The fruit of their union, May-Ann, was
considered as an illegitimate child and qualified as a secondary beneficiary. May-
Ann was entitled to 50% of the share of the legitimate children of Antonio in
accordance with Section 8(k) of the SS Law. 8 However, considering that the
legitimate children of Antonio have reached the age of majority, May-Ann is the
only remaining qualified beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100% of the benefit.
R.A. No. 8282, which is the law in force at the time of retiree Antonio’s death on
May 15, 1999, provides as follows:
"Section 12-B. Retirement Benefits. x x x
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries
as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the
monthly pension. Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries
and he dies within sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly
pension, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump
sum benefit equivalent to the total monthly pensions
corresponding to the balance of the five-year guaranteed period,
excluding the dependents’ pension." (Emphasis supplied)
Since Antonio de los Santos retired on March 1, 1996, and began
receiving monthly pension since then, the determination of who his primary
beneficiaries were at that times should be based on the relevant provisions
of the applicable prevailing law then, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, which is
quoted hereunder:
"Section 8. Terms Defined. x x x
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parents, and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants
and illegitimate children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries.
In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designed
by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary." (Emphasis
supplied)
Applying these provisions to the case at hand, May-Ann de los Santos as
the illegitimate child of Antonio and Cirila is considered her father’s
secondary beneficiary who, in the absence of a primary beneficiary x x x,
becomes entitled to the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension as
Antonio died just three (3) years after he began receiving his retirement
pension, pursuant to Section 12-B par. (d) of the SS Law, as amended. 9
CA Decision
Gloria appealed the above SSC Resolution to the CA. She insisted that she, as the
legal wife, was the qualified beneficiary to Antonio’s death benefits.
The CA agreed with the SSC in its determination that the marriage of Gloria and
Antonio subsisted until his death and the subsequent marriages contracted by both
of them were void for being bigamous. But contrary to findings of the SSC, the CA
found that being the legal wife, Gloria was entitled by law to receive support from
her husband. Thus, her status qualified Gloria to be a dependent and a primary
beneficiary under the law. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is
GRANTED and the appealed Resolution dated February 13, 2003, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent SSS is DIRECTED to
compute the amount of benefits to which petitioner is entitled under the
law.10
Issues
Petitioner SSS and the concerned Branch head present a lone issue for Our
consideration: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS STILL QUALIFIED AS A PRIMARY
BENEFICIARY OF DECEASED SSS MEMBER ANTONIO, UNDER SECTION 12-
B IN RELATION TO SECTION 8(e) and (k) OF THE SS LAW.11
The controversy revolves on who between respondent Gloria, the first wife who
divorced Antonio in the US, or Cirila, the second wife, is his primary beneficiary
entitled to claim death benefits from the SSS.
Our Ruling
At the outset, let it be recalled that in 2005, this Court ruled in Dycaico v. Social
Security System12that the proviso "as of the date of retirement" in Section 12-B(d)
of Republic Act No. 8282,13 which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries," is
unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses. For
ready reference, the concerned provision is reproduced below:
SECTION 12-B. Retirement Benefits. – (a) A member who has paid at
least one hundred twenty (120) monthly contributions prior to the semester
of retirement and who (1) has reached the age of sixty (60) years and is
already separated from employment or has ceased to be self-employed or
(2) has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, shall be entitled for as
long as he lives to the monthly pension; Provided, That he shall have the
 option to receive his first eighteen (18) monthly pensions in lump sum
discounted at a preferential rate of interest to be determined by the SSS.
xxxx
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of
the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension;
Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries and he dies within sixty
(60) months from the start of his monthly pension, his secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the total
monthly pensions corresponding to the balance of the five-year
guaranteed period, excluding the dependents’ pension. (Emphasis added)
In deciding that death benefits should not be denied to the wife who was married to
the deceased retiree only after the latter’s retirement, this Court in Dycaico
reasoned:
x x x In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham
marriages or those contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to
claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other spouse.
x x x However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their
entitlement to survivor’s pension based on whether the marriage was
contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of
the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of
the policy objective of the law, i.e., "provide meaningful protection to
members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss of
income or financial burden." x x x14
That said, the reckoning point in determining the beneficiaries of the deceased
Antonio should be the time of his death. There is no need to look into the time of
his retirement, as was the course followed by the SSC in resolving the claim of
respondent. We note, however, that considering the circumstances of this case,
the Dycaico ruling does not substantially affect the determination of Antonio’s
beneficiaries.
The SS Law clearly and expressly provides who are the qualified beneficiaries
entitled to receive benefits from the deceased:
"Section 8. Terms Defined. – For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall,
unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependents – The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate
child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not
reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been
permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries – The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided,
That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent
(50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member, his/her
dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent
(100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall
be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the
foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her
secondary beneficiary.
As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent against
the deceased Antonio was not binding in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law,
only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.15 The divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria while she was still a
Filipino citizen and thus covered by the policy against absolute divorces. It did not
sever her marriage ties with Antonio.
However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find that
she is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to
fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio.
Social Security System v. Aguas16 is instructive in determining the extent of the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed
required "dependency" under the SS Law. In Aguas, the Court ruled that although Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Social Security
a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, whether one is actually Commission is REINSTATED.
dependent for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact of
marriage alone.17 SO ORDERED.

Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura,
and lived with other men, was not dependent upon her husband for support, JJ., concur.
financial or otherwise, during the entire period.

Said the Court:

In a parallel case involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the
Court defined a dependent as "one who derives his or her main support
from another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else for support;
not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will,
power, or aid of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law
likewise defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent
for support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it
obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until
her husband died, and lived with other men, was not dependent on her
husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period.
Hence, the Court denied her claim for death benefits.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de

facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon
the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is
proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his
death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the
husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for
herself.18

Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate
occasions, to live with two different men. The first was in 1965, less than one year
after their marriage, when she contracted a second marriage to Domingo Talens.
The second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the US, obtained
a divorce, and later married an American citizen.

In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a primary

beneficiary of her deceased husband.
YOLANDA SIGNEY, G.R. No. 173582
Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO,
and GINA SERVANO, represen- Promulgated:
tative of GINALYN and RODELYN
SIGNEY,
Respondents. January 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
TINGA, J:

We are called to determine who is entitled to the social security benefits of

a Social Security System (SSS) member who was survived not only by his legal
wife, but also by two common-law wives with whom he had six children.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure assails the 31 March 2004 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
affirming the resolution of the Social Security Commission (SSC), [3] as well as
the 23 July 2004 Resolution[4] of the same court denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In his
members records, he had designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as primary
beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. On 6 July
2001, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS.
[5]
She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife,
Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor
children namey, Ginalyn Servano (Ginalyn), born on 13 April 1996,
and RodelynSigney (Rodelyn), born on 20 April 2000.[6]
Petitioners declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for
the same death benefits on 13 July 2001 in which she also declared that both she
and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa
(Editha) was the legal wife.
In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death
benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased. [7]
The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001,[8] denied the death
benefit claim of petitioner. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor
children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS
Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between petitioner and
the deceased was null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted
on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local
Civil Registry of Cebu City.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition[9] with the SSC in which she attached
a waiver of rights[10] executed by Editha whereby the latter waived any/all claims
from National Trucking Forwarding Corporation (NTFC) under the supervision of
National Development Corporation (NDC), Social Security System (SSS) and
other (i)nsurance(b)enefits due to the deceased Rodolfo Signey Sr., who died
intestate on May 21, 2001 at Manila Doctors, and further declared that I am legally
married to Mr. Aquilino Castillo and not to Mr. Rodolfo P. Signey Sr.[11]
In a Resolution[12] dated 29 January 2003, the SSC affirmed the decision of
the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to the SSS field investigation and the
confirmed certification of marriage showing that the deceased was married
to Editha on 29 October 1967, than to the aforestated declarations of Editha in her
waiver of rights. It found that petitioner only relied on the waiver of Editha, as she
failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert the confirmed
marriage certificate. The SSC also found, based on the SSS field investigation
report dated 6 November 2001 that even if Editha was the legal wife, she was not
qualified to the death benefits since
she herself admitted that she was not dependent on her deceased husband for
support inasmuch as she was cohabiting with a certain Aquilino Castillo.[13]
Considering that petitioner, Editha, and Gina were not entitled to the death
benefits, the SSC applied Section 8(e) and (k) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282, the
SSS Law which was in force at the time of the members death on 21 May 2001,
and held that the dependent legitimate and illegitimate minor children of the
deceased member were also considered primary beneficiaries. The records
disclosed that the deceased had one legitimate child, Ma. Evelyn Signey, who
predeceased him, and several illegitimate children with petitioner and with Gina.
Based on their respective certificates of live birth, the deceased SSS members four
illegitimate children with petitioner could no longer be considered dependents at
the time of his death because all of them were over 21 years old when he died on
21 May 2001, the youngest having been born on 31 March 1978. On the other
hand, the deceased SSS members illegitimate children with Gina were qualified to
be his primary beneficiaries for they were still minors at the time of his
death, Ginalyn having been born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn on 20 April 2000.
[14]
The SSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in an
[15]
Order dated 9 April 2003. This order further elaborated on the reasons for the
denial of petitioners claims. It held that the mere designation of petitioner and her
children as beneficiaries by the deceased member was not the controlling factor in
the determination of beneficiaries. Sections 13, 8(e) and 8(k) of the SSS Law, as
amended, provide that dependent legal spouse entitled by law to receive support
from the member and dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children of the member shall be the primary beneficiaries of the latter.
[16]
Based on the certification dated 25 July 2001 issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, the marriage of the deceased and Editha on 29
October 1967 at the Metropolitan Cathedral, Cebu City was duly registered under
LCR Registry No. 2083 on 21 November 1967. The SSS field investigation reports
verified the authenticity of the said certification. [17]
The SSC did not give credence to the waiver executed by Editha, which
manifested her lack of interest in the outcome of the case, considering that she was
not entitled to the benefit anyway because of her admitted cohabitation
with Aquilino Castillo. Moreover, the SSC held that considering that one of the
requisites of a valid waiver is the existence of an actual right which could be
renounced, petitioner in effect recognized that Editha had a right over the benefits
of the deceased thereby enabling her to renounce said right in favor of petitioner
and her children. The declaration by Editha that she was not married to the
deceased is not only contrary to the records of the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City which state that they were married on 29 October 1967 but also
renders nugatory the waiver of right itself, for if she was not married to the
deceased then she would have no rights that may be waived.
Petitioner had argued that the illegitimate children of the deceased with
Gina failed to show proof that they were indeed dependent on the deceased for
support during his lifetime. The SSC observed that Section 8(e) of the SSS Law, as
amended, provides among others that dependents include the legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and has not reached 21 years of age. The provision vested the
right of the benefit to his illegitimate minor children, Ginalyn and Rodelyn,
irrespective of any proof that they had been dependent on the support of the
deceased.[18]
Petitioner appealed the judgment of the SSC to the Court of Appeals by
filing a Petition for Review[19] under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the SSC in its 31 March
2004 Decision. Resolving the determinative question of who between petitioner
and the illegitimate children of the deceased are the primary beneficiaries lawfully
entitled to the social security benefits accruing by virtue of the latters death, it held
that based on Section 8(e) of R. A. No. 8282, a surviving spouse claiming death
benefits as a dependent must be the legal spouse. Petitioners presentation of a
marriage certificate attesting to her marriage to the deceased was futile, according
to the appellate court, as said marriage is null and void in view of the previous
marriage of the deceased to Editha as certified by the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City.
The appellate court also held that the law is clear that for a child to be
qualified as dependent, he must be unmarried, not gainfully employed and must
not be 21 years of age, or if over 21 years of age, he is congenitally or while still a
minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally. And in this case, only the illegitimate children of the
deceased with Gina namely, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, are the qualified beneficiaries
as
they were still minors at the time of the death of their father. Considering petitioner
is disqualified to be a beneficiary and the absence of any legitimate children of the
deceased, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased
should be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries, the Court of
Appeals concluded.[20]
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
in a Resolution[21] dated 23 July 2004. It found that there was no new matter of
substance which would warrant a modification and/or reversal of the 31 March
2004 Decision.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner raises issues similar to the ones which have been adequately
resolved by the SSC and the appellate court. The first issue is whether petitioners
marriage with the deceased is valid. The second issue is whether petitioner has a
superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children
of the deceased.
There is no merit in the petition.
We deemed it best not to disturb the findings of fact of the SSS which are
supported by substantial evidence [22] and affirmed by the SSC and the Court of
Appeals. Moreover, petitioner ought to be reminded of the basic rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts.[23]
It is a well-known rule that in proceedings before administrative bodies,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not binding. [24] The important
consideration is that both parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard and they
availed themselves of it to present their respective positions on the matter in
dispute.[25] It must likewise be noted that under Section 2, Rule 1 [26] of the SSC
Revised Rules of Procedure, the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of
law shall not be controlling. In the case at bar, the existence of a prior
subsisting marriage between the deceased and Editha is supported by substantial
evidence. Petitioner, who has fully availed of her right to be heard, only relied on
the waiver of Editha and failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise
controvert the confirmed marriage certificate registered under LCR Registry No.
2083 on 21 November 1967. She did not even try to allege and prove any infirmity
in the marriage between the deceased and Editha.
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits,
Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 [27] is very clear. Hence, we need only apply
the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.[28]
Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:
SEC. 8. Terms Defined.For the purposes of this Act, the
following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have
the following meanings:
xxx
(e) Dependents The dependent shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive
support from the member;
2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted,
and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or
if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while
still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of
self-support, physically or mentally; and
3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the
member.
xxx
(k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or she
remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary
beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent
illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the
share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member,
his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one
hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the
dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the
member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any other
person designated by the member as his/her secondary
beneficiary.
SEC. 13. Death Benefits. Upon the death of a member
who has paid at least thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior to
the semester of death, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled
to the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no primary
beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a
lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36) times the monthly
pension. If he has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly
contributions, his primary or secondary beneficiaries shall be
entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the monthly pension
times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or
twelve (12) times the monthly pension, whichever is higher.
(Emphasis supplied).
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is
disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate child, it
follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be
entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that
for a minor child to qualify as a dependent, [29] the only requirements are that he/she
must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed. [30]

In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were
born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of
the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS
Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only
50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the THIRD DIVISION
deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary
beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 165545
Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, Chairperson,*
-versus- CARPIO, Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioner. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON,
Respondent. Promulgated:
SO ORDERED.
March 24, 2006
x----------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated June 23, 2004[2] and Resolution
dated September 28, 2004[3] reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 2003 [4] and
Order dated June 4, 2003[5] of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case
No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.

On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice)
contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.[6]

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition [7] to
declare Alice presumptively dead.
 By Order of December 10, 1970,[8] the CFI granted the petition, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the
petition notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice
Diaz is hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes,
except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED. (Underscoring supplied)
[9]
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or
on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent)
in Casiguran, Sorsogon.[10]
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security
System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.
[11]
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was
granted P12,000[12] by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death
benefits[13] which was also granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998.[14]
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and
one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the
death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in
his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third
with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid
for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez
(Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13, 1999 [15] averring that they are
two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as
early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action
to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally know
that Alice is still very much alive.[16]
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to
be the brother and guardian of Aliz P. Diaz, filed before the SSS a claim for death
benefits accruing from Bailons death, [17] he further attesting in a sworn
statement[18] that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children[19] subsequently filed claims for death
benefits as Bailons beneficiaries before the SSS. [20]
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster,
Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to
respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund of the amount paid to her
from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the
claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support
during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed
pension to Bailons beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided
under the law, after the amount erroneously paid to respondent has been
collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have
been misled by misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz
[sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the Petition to Declare
Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead, did not become final. The
presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it
invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife,
Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the deserting spouse,
his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the
deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita
Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To
require affidavit of reappearance to terminate the second marriage
is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [ sic] Diaz, the
 first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.[21]
(Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,
[22]
advised respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed
Bailons funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, [23] the SSS advised respondent
of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion
rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was
contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her presence being contrary proof against the validity of the order. It thus
requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total
amount of monthly pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to
May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death
benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12, 1999.[24] In a subsequent letter dated
November 27, 1999[25] to the SSC, she reiterated her request for the release of her
monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before
any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his
beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,
[26]
maintained the denial of her claim for and the discontinuance of payment of
monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not deprived of her right to
file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition[27] against the SSS before the SSC for the
restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning,
under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she
received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings forcibly and coercively
prevented her from spending any amount during Bailons wake. [28]
After the SSS filed its Answer [29] to respondents petition, and the parties
filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit [30] dated
August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she is the widow of
Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to
declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could
have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents residence in Barcelona,
Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and
Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of
respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was just a common-law-
wife. Accordingly it disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds,
that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse
and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to
the SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death benefit
she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May
1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-
Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the demise of
SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e)
and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its
prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of
its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.[31] (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this
Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that the petitioner
is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact
that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon
(10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the
 deceased member represented in bad faith. This Commission
accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its
Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,[32] revealing that Alice (a.k.a.
Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation
from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by
the deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud upon the
unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving
the deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear
that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first
marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously
annulled, invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of
the parties thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation
conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning
spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that
the petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased
member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary
beneficiary, to the latters death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the
legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of Clemente
Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit
she received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until
May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who
actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente
Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was
earlier given to her by the SSS as funeral benefit. [33] (Underscoring
supplied)
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration[34] having been denied by Order
of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for review[35] before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2,
2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to
pay respondent all the pension benefits due her. Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the
issue of whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now RTC,
declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but,
more importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and
Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and
on its own, declare the latters decision to be bereft of any basis.On
similar import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly
declare the first marriage subsisting and the second marriage null
and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person
presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that the
person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris
tantum, the second marriage contracted by a person with an absent
spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent court
that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of
the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse,
which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law
contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly
declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its
own investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC
declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the
authority to review the decision of the regular courts under the
pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its
members. Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the
findings of the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision
of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the
contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually
possesses the authority to declare the decision of the RTC to be
without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the
principle of fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality
 considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample
opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an
Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no longer
practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first
marriage to restore as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and
Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latters
death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because the
second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente
Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because
the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry
where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile,
the respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision
of the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and
void.[36] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions
Reconsideration[37] which were both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS present petition for review on certiorari [38] anchored on the
following grounds:
I The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION.[39]
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings
of facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and
Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine to whom, between
Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section
5[40] of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give
respondent due process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that the observations and findings relative to the CFI
proceedings are of no moment to the present controversy, as the same may be
considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSCs finding of the existence of a
prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice
has a better right to the death benefits.[41]
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS
coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such
power, however, it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts
of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI
Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same, making
its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alices marriage on the
one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondents marriage on the other.
for
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted
as an appellate court. The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle
with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine the
beneficiaries of the SSS.
effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine
their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.[42]
Article 83 of the Civil Code[43] provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been
absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless
the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the
three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of
these exceptional cases is deemed valid until declared null and void by a
competent court. It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party
assailing the second marriage.[44]
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15
consecutive years[45] when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death,
which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of
remarriage.[46]
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a
presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the
burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to
prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to
prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended
when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the
innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his
second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of
life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with
such first spouse.[47] (Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, [48] it is
terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent
spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent
marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the
parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being
judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the
above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an
action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration
of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. [49]
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent
marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance,
even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate
such marriage.[50] Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of
the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as
provided by law.[51]
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit
of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the
case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the
death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall
arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised,
because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be
questioned except in a direct action for annulment.[52] (Underscoring
supplied)
 Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio[53] instructs:

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been

void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the
Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the
first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when
she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment
became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had
died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring
that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime
of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of
any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from
such voidable marriage must be carried out in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, as expressly provided in Section 2
of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
[54]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only SECOND DIVISION
during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. G.R. No. 175952 April 30, 2008
[55]
Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.[56] SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC. and
Bailons and respondents marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is SEMIRARA COAL CORPORATION, respondents.
rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
DECISION
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised
has been rendered unnecessary. TINGA, J.:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. In this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioner Republic of the Philippines represented by the Social
No costs. Security System (SSS) assails the Decision2

SO ORDERED. dated 31 August 2006 of the Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution3 dated 19 December 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Following are the antecedents culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals:
On 13 February 2004, Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. (AG &
P) and Semirara Coal Corporation (SEMIRARA) (collectively referred to as
private respondents) filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against SSS before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 3, docketed
as Civil Case No. 7441. The complaint alleged that:
xxx
3. Sometime in 2000, plaintiff informed the SSS in writing of its premiums
and loan amortization delinquencies covering the period from January
2000 to May 2000 amounting to P7.3 Million. AG&P proposed to pay its
said arrears by end of 2000, but requested for the condonation of all
penalties;
4. In turn, the defendant suggested two (2) options to AG&P, either to pay
by installment or through "dacion en pago";
5. AG&P chose to settle its obligation with the SSS under the second
option, that is through dacion en pago of its 5,999 sq. m. property situated
in Baguio City covered by TCT No. 3941 with an appraised value of
about P80.0 Million. SSS proposes to carve-out from the said property an
area sufficient to cover plaintiffs’ delinquencies. AG&P, however, is not
amenable to subdivide its Baguio property;
6. AG&P then made another proposal to SSS. This time, offering as
payment a portion of its 58,153 square meter-lot, situated in F.S. Sebastian,
Sto. Niño, San Pascual, Batangas. In addition, SSS informed AG&P of its
decision to include other companies within the umbrella of DMCI group
with arrearages with the SSS. In the process of elimination of the
companies belonging to the DMCI group with possible outstanding
obligation with the SSS, it was only SEMIRARA which was left with
outstanding delinquencies with the SSS. Thus, SEMIRARA’s inclusion in
the proposed settlement through dacion en pago;
7. AG&P was, thereafter, directed by the defendant to submit certain
documents, such as Transfer Certificate of Title, Tax Declaration covering
the subject lot, and the proposed subdivision plan, which requirements
AG&P immediately complied;
8. On April 4, 2001, SSS, in its Resolution No. 270, finally approved
AG&P’s proposal to settle its and SEMIRARA’s delinquencies
through dacion en pago, which as of March 31, 2001 amounted
to P29,261,902.45. Approval of AG&P’s proposal was communicated to it
by Ms. Aurora E.L. Ortega, Vice-President, NCR-Group of the SSS in a
letter dated April 23, 2001. … ;
9. As a result of the approval of the dacion en pago, posting of
contributions and loan amortization to individual member accounts, both
for AG&P and SEMIRARA employees, was effected immediately
thereafter. Thus, the benefits of the member-employees of both companies
were restored;
10. From the time of the approval of AG&P’s proposal up to the present,
AG&P is (sic) religiously remitting the premium contributions and loan
amortization of its member-employees to the defendant;
11. To effect the property transfer, a Deed of Assignment has to be
executed between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Because of SSS failure
to come up with the required Deed of Assignment to effect said transfer,
AG&P prepared the draft and submitted it to the Office of the Vice-
President – NCR thru SSS Baclaran Branch in July 2001. Unfortunately,
the defendant failed to take any action on said Deed of Assignment
causing AG&P to re-submit it to the same office of the Vice-President –
NCR in December 2001. From its original submission of the Deed of
Assignment in July 2001 to its re-submission in December 2001, and SSS
returning of the revised draft in February 28, 2003 AG&P was consistent
in its regular follow ups with SSS as to the status of its submitted Deed of
Assignment;
12. On February 28, 2003, or more than a year after the approval of
AG&P’s proposal, defendant sent the revised copy of the Deed of
Assignment to AG&P. However, the amount of the plaintiffs’ obligation
appearing in the approved Deed of Assignment has
ballooned from P29,261,902.45 to P40,846,610.64 allegedly because of
the additional interests and penalty charges assessed on plaintiffs’
outstanding obligation from April 2001, the date of approval of the
proposal, up to January 2003;
 13. AG&P demanded for the waiver and deletion of the additional interests
on the ground that delay in the approval of the deed and the subsequent
delay in conveyance of the property in defendant’s name was solely
attributable to the defendant; hence, to charge plaintiffs with additional
interests and penalties amounting to more than P10,000,000.00, would be
unreasonable….;
14. AG&P and SEMIRARA maintain their willingness to settle their
alleged obligation of P29,261,902.45 to SSS. Defendant, however, refused
to accept the payment through dacion en pago, unless plaintiffs also pay
the additional interests and penalties being charged;
xxx
Instead of filing an answer, SSS moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. In an order dated 28
July 2004, the trial court granted SSS’s motion and dismissed private respondents’
complaint. The pertinent portions of the assailed order are as follows:
Clearly, the motion is triggered on the issue of the court’s jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the nature of the instant complaint. The length and
breadth of the complaint as perused, boils down to the questions of
premium and loan amortization delinquencies of the plaintiff, the option
taken for the payment of the same in favor of the defendant and the
disagreement between the parties as to the amount of the unpaid
contributions and salary loan repayments. In other words, said questions
are directly related to the collection of contributions due the defendant.
Republic Act No. 1161 as amended by R.A. No. 8282, specifically
provides that any dispute arising under the said Act shall be cognizable by
the Commission and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by
the Commission. Hence, a procedural process mandated by a special law.
Observingly, the running dispute between plaintiffs and defendant
originated from the disagreement as to the amount of unpaid contributions
and the amount of the penalties imposed appurtenant thereto. The
alleged dacion en pago is crystal clear manifestation of offering a special
form of payment which to the mind of the court will produce effect only
upon acceptance by the offeree and the observance and compliance of the
required formalities by the parties. No matter in what form it may be, still
the court believes that the subject matter is the payment of contributions
and the corresponding penalties which are within the ambit of Sec. 5 (a) of
R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282.
WHEREFORE, the Court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the instant complaint, the motion is granted and this case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
Private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order but the same was
denied in an Order dated 15 September 2004.
Consequently, private respondents filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals
alleging that the trial court erred in its pronouncement that it had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint and in granting the motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s challenged order,
granted private respondents’ appeal and ordered the trial court to proceed with the
civil case with dispatch. From the averments in their complaint, the appellate court
observed that private respondents are seeking to implement the Deed of
Assignment which they had drafted and submitted to SSS sometime in July 2001,
pursuant to SSS’s letter addressed to AG& P dated 23 April 2001 approving AG&P
and SEMIRARA’S delinquencies through dacion en pago, which as of 31 March
2001, amounted to P29,261,902.45. The appellate court thus held that the subject
of the complaint is no longer the payment of the premium and loan amortization
delinquencies, as well as the penalties appurtenant thereto, but the enforcement of
the dacion en pago pursuant to SSS Resolution No. 270. The action then is one for
specific performance which case law holds is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. 5
SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but the
same was denied in a Resolution dated 19 December 2006.
Now before the Court, SSS insists on the Social Security Commission’s (the
Commission) jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to Section 5 (a) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8282. SSS maintains the Commission’s jurisdiction over all
disputes arising from the provisions of R.A. No. 1161, amended by R.A. No. 8282
to the exclusion of trial courts.6
The main issue in this case pertains to which body has jurisdiction to entertain a
controversy arising from the non-implementation of a dacion en pago agreed upon
by the parties as a means of settlement of private respondents’ liabilities.
At the outset, it is well to restate the rule that what determines the nature of the
action as well as the tribunal or body which has jurisdiction over the case are the
allegations in the complaint.7
The pertinent provision of law detailing the jurisdiction of the Commission is
Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282, otherwise known as
the Social Security Act of 1997, to wit:
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes.– (a) Any dispute arising under this Act
with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or
any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission,
and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission,
or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the
Commission and decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days
after the submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and
settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission.
The law clearly vests upon the Commission jurisdiction over "disputes arising
under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties
thereon or any matter related thereto..." Dispute is defined as "a conflict or
controversy."8
From the allegations of respondents’ complaint, it readily appears that there is no
longer any dispute with respect to respondents’ accountability to the SSS.
Respondents had, in fact, admitted their delinquency and offered to settle them by
way of dacion en pago subsequently approved by the SSS in Resolution No. 270-s.
2001. SSS stated in said resolution that "the dacion en pago proposal of AG&P
Co. of Manila and Semirara Coals Corporation to pay their liabilities in the total
amount of P30,652,710.71 as of 31 March 2001 by offering their 5.8 ha. property
located in San Pascual, Batangas, be, as it is hereby, approved.."9 This statement
unequivocally evinces its consent to the dacion en pago. In Vda. de Jayme v. Court
of Appeals,10 the Court ruled significantly as follows:
Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing
by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance
of the obligation. It is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers
another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an
outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of the
nature of sale, that is the creditor is really buying the thing or property of
the debtor, payment for which is to be charged against the debtor’s debt.
As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely, consent,
object certain, and cause or consideration must be present. In its modern
concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an objective
novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object
of the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price.
In any case, common consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale or
novation, to have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or
obligation.11
The controversy, instead, lies in the non-implementation of the approved and
agreed dacion en pago on the part of the SSS. As such, respondents filed a suit to
obtain its enforcement which is, doubtless, a suit for specific performance and one
incapable of pecuniary estimation beyond the competence of the
Commission.12 Pertinently, the Court ruled in Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,13 as
follows:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of
first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).14
In fine, the Court finds the decision of the Court of Appeals in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 31 August 2006 of
the Court of Appeals Eleventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 83775 AFFIRMED.
Let the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing,Chairperson Carpio-Morales, Chico-Nazaio, Velasco*, Jr.,

JJ., concur.