Soliman, et al vs. PASUDECO (GR No.

169589)
FACTS:

The property subject of this case is situated in Pampanga, with an area of ten (10) hectares, more or less,
previously coveredby Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and formerly owned by one Dalmacio Sicat
(Dalmacio). Dalmacio offered to sell the subjectproperty to respondent Pampanga Sugar Development
Company (PASUDECO), a domestic corporation engaged in sugar milling,to be used as a housing
complex for PASUDECO's laborers and employees. The land was offered for sale at the price of P8.00
per square meter. On January 26, 1970, Dalmacio reduced the price to P5.00 per square meter. In a
meeting held on April 15, 1970,the Board of Directors of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution No. 057
authorizing the purchase of the subject property at P4.00per square meter. Dalmacio and his tenants
jointly filed a Petition with the then Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) seeking approval of the voluntary
surrender of the subject property with payment of disturbance compensation. On the same date, the
CAR rendered a Decision, approving the voluntary surrender of the subject property by the tenants to
Dalmacio, thus, terminating their tenancy relationship effective May 21, 1970, the date when the parties
entered into the agreement. On May 22, 1970, a Deed of Sale with Mortgage was executed
between Dalmacio and PASUDECO. Thereafter, the documents needed for the conversion of
the land to residential purposes were prepared, However, due to financial setbacks suffered
after the imposition of Martial Law in 1972, PASUDECO deferred the construction of the housing project.
PASUDECO averred that no person was authorized to occupy and/or cultivate the subject property. On
the other hand, the petitioners have a totally different version. Petitioners claimed that, sometime in
November 1970, they started working on the subject property with a corresponding area of tillage. A
Certification was also issued by the Samahang Nayon in favor of petitioner Joaquin Soliman
with respect to the remaining area of 1.5 hectares. Likewise, the Barangay Chairperson of Macabacle,
Bacolor, Pampanga, certified that the eight (8)petitioners had been the actual tenant-tillers of the subject
property from 1970 up to the present, and that petitioner Baldomero Almario (Baldomero) was
issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT).
The Ocular Inspection and the Investigation Report issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) on March 13,1990 showed that since 1970, petitioners cultivated the subject property, allegedly
managed by the late respondent Gerry Rodriguez(Gerry), manager of PASUDECO from 1970-1991.
Petitioners alleged that in 1970, Gerry made one Ciriaco Almario (Ciriaco) hisoverseer/caretaker, tasked
to collect lease rentals from petitioners. In turn, Ciriaco remitted the rentals to Gerry. On May 14,
1990,C i r i a c o c e r t i f i e d t h a t p e t i t i o n e r s w e r e t h e a c t u a l t e n a n t -
t i l l e r s o f t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y . M o r e o v e r , petitioners deposited their alleged
rentals with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as land amortizations, in varying amounts,from 1989
to 1993, as shown by the official receipts issued by LBP. Thus, petitioners averred that from 1970 up to
1990 or for aperiod of almost twenty (20) years, they had been in actual and peaceful possession and
cultivation of the subject property. The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the
development of the property into a housing project for itsemployees. Petitioners filed a Complaint for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with a Prayer for the issuance of a PreliminaryInjunction against
Gerry before the PARAD to restrain him from harassing and molesting petitioners in their respective
landholdings.Petitioners alleged that Gerry, together with armed men, entered the property and destroyed
some of their crops. Traversing thecomplaint, Gerry raised as one of his defenses the fact that
PASUDECO was the owner of the subject property. Thus, on November 26, 1990, petitioners filed
their Amended Complaint impleading PASUDECO as a party-
defendant. Meanwhile, PASUDECOasserted that petitioners were not tenants but merely interlopers,
usurpers and/or intruders into the subject property. Trial on the merits ensued. In the process, the PARAD
conducted an ocular inspection and found that the subject property was planted with palay . There were
also several dikes or pilapil dividing the subject property. The PARAD also observed that there wasa big
sign installed therein, reading “Future Site of PASUDECO Employees Housing
Project.”The PARAD dismissed petitioners' complaint and denied their application for the writ
of preliminary injunction. ThePARAD held that petitioners had not shown direct and convincing proof
that they were tenants of the subject property. Petitionerscould not show any receipt proving payment of
lease rentals either to PASUDECO or Gerry. In addition to the absence of sharing,the PARAD ruled
that there was no consent given by PASUDECO in order to create a tenancy relationship in
favor of thepetitioners. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the DARAB. DARAB
rendered its Decision in favor of the petitioners,reversing the findings and conclusions of the
PARAD. The DARAB held that, without the approval of the conversion application
filedby PASUDECO, it could not be substantiated that the subject property
was indeed residential property intended for housingpurposes. Because of this, and the fact that
petitioners tilled the subject property for almost twenty (20) years, the same remainedagricultural in
character. Moreover, the DARAB held that, contrary to the findings of the PARAD, the
elements of consent andsharing were present in this case. The DARAB, citing Section 5 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3844, ratiocinated that petitioners enteredthe subject property in 1970 upon the request of
Ciriaco who, with the consent of Gerry as manager of PASUDECO, was authorizedto look for people to
cultivate the subject property. Petitioners cultivated the same and shared their harvests with
PASUDECO,received by Gerry through Ciriaco. Later on, when Gerry refused to accept their lease
rentals, petitioners deposited the money withLBP. The DARAB opined that these pieces of evidence
established the fact of consent and sharing. While express consent was notgiven, the fact that Gerry
accepted the lease rentals for a considerable number of years signified an implied consent which, in
turn,bound PASUDECO.CA reversed the DARAB's ruling and reinstated the PARAD's decision. The CA
held that, while the subject property wasagricultural, there was no tenancy relationship between the
parties, express or implied. The CA concurred in the findings of thePARAD and found no
credible evidence to support the contention that petitioners were de jure tenants inasmuch as the
elements of consent and sharing were absent. CA reiterated that tenancy is not merely a factual
relationship but also a legal relationship; hence,the fact that PASUDECO, being the owner of the subject
property, was uninvolved in and oblivious to petitioners' cultivation thereof,tenancy relations did not
exist. Thus, the CA concluded that in the absence of any tenancy relationship between the parties,
thecase was outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA in its Resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are de jure tenants of the subject property.

RULING:
Tenants are defined as persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate
farm households— cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for
purposes of production, sharing the producewith the landholder under the share tenancy system, or
paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under
the leasehold tenancy system. Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in jurisprudence
are the following essential elements of tenancy: 1)the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3)there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5)there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest
is shared between landowner andtenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must be
proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person hasestablished his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant
do notautomatically give rise to security of tenure.The pronouncement of the DARAB that there is, in this
case, tenancy by operation of law under Section 5 of R.A. No. 3844 isnot correct. In
Reyes v. Reyes SC held: Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an
agricultural leasehold relation:(1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by
oral or written agreement, either express or implied. By operation of law simply means the abolition of
the agricultural share tenancy system andthe conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold
relations.
The other method is the agriculturalleasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing. Rather,
consistent with the parties' assertions, what we have here is an alleged case of tenancy
by implied consent. As such,crucial for the creation of tenancy relations would be the existence of two
of the essential elements, namely, consent and sharingand/or payment of lease rentals.
After a meticulous review of the records, we find that the elements of consent and sharing and/or payment
of leaserentals are absent in this case.

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either
the owner, lessee,usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and not through the acts of
the supposed landholder who has no right to the property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise
would allow collusion among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder . As duly
found by the PARAD and the CA, Gerry was not authorized to enter into a tenancy relationship with
thepetitioners. In fact, there is no proof that he, indeed, entered into one. Other than their
bare assertions, petitioners rely on thecertification of Ciriaco who, likewise, failed to substantiate his
claim that Gerry authorized him to select individuals and install themas tenants of the subject property.
Absent substantial evidence showing Ciriaco's authority from PASUDECO, or even from Gerry, togive
consent to the creation of a tenancy relationship, his actions could not give rise to an implied tenancy.
[49]
Likewise, the alleged sharing and/or payment of lease rentals was not substantiated other than by the
deposit-payments withthe LBP, which petitioners characterized as amortizations. We cannot close our eyes
to the absence of any proof of payment prior tothe deposit-payments with LBP. Not a single receipt was
ever issued by Gerry, duly acknowledging payment of these rentals fromCiriaco who, allegedly, personally
collected the same from the petitioners. Notably, the fact of working on another's landholding,standing
alone, does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence
necessary to establishthe fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must
be concrete evidence on record adequate to provethe element of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, becauseself-serving statements are
inadequate.
[50]
The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given
locality, the certificationissued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or an authorized representative, like
the MARO or the BARC, concerning the presenceor the absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, is considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence,such certification does not bind
the judiciary. The onus
rests on the petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which they failed to discharge with
substantial evidence. Simply put, he who makes an affirmative allegation of an issue has the burden of
proving the same, and in the case of the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The same
rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant,upon whom rests the burden of proving his
cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases hisclaim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.
[52]
 Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject property without
opposition, does not mean thatPASUDECO impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold
relation. Occupancy and continued possession of the land willnot ipso facto make one a de jure
tenant, because the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. This much
we said in
VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, where we held that: Indeed, a tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation.The principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not
a purelyfactual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship .As we ruled in Chico v. Court of Appeals
[347 SCRA 35 (2000)]:"Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de jure
leasehold or tenancyrelationship between the parties. This de jure relationship, in turn, is the terra firma for
a security of tenurebetween the landlord and the tenant. The leasehold relationship is not brought about
by a mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that
relationship should be primordial." Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding when the
farmer is installed, and their writtenagreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary
to law, are even more important.
WHEREFORE , the instant Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 192026. October 1, 2014.]

AUTOMAT REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, LITO CECILIA AND LEONOR LIM,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES MARCIANO DELA CRUZ, SR. AND OFELIA DELA CRUZ, respondents.

Theme: agricultural tenancy relationship, jurisdiction of DARAB

Facts:
Petitioner Automat Realty and Development Corporation (Automat) is the registered owner of two parcels
of land located in Barangay Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, covered by TCT Nos. T-210027 and T-209077.
Petitioner Leonor Lim (petitioner Lim) was the real estate broker behind Automat's purchase of the property.
Respondent spouses dela Cruz sometimes referred to petitioner Lim some Sta. Rosa real estate properties available
for sale. They received a share in the broker's fees either from the seller or buyer.
The land was not occupied in 1990 when it was purchased by Automat. Respondent Ofelia dela Cruz
volunteered her services to petitioner Lim as caretaker to prevent informal settlers from entering the property.
Automat agreed, through its authorized administrator, petitioner Lim, on the condition that the caretaker would
voluntarily vacate the premises upon Automat's demand.
Respondent spouses' family stayed in the property as rent-paying tenants. They cultivated and improved the
land. They shared the produced palsy with Automat through its authorized agent, petitioner Lito Cecilia (petitioner
Cecilia). He also remitted the rentals paid by respondent Ofelia Dela Cruz to petitioner Lim in Makati and to Automat's
office in Quezon City.
Sometime in August 2000, Automat asked respondent spouses to vacate the premises as it was preparing the
groundwork for developing the property. Respondent spouses refused to vacate unless they were paid compensation.
They claimed "they were agricultural tenants [who] enjoyed security of tenure under the law."
On October 19, 2000, respondent spouses filed a petition for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order against Automat before the PARAD for
Laguna.
On August 28, 2001, the PARAD dismissed the complaint. It declared, among other things, that "no
agricultural tenancy can be established between [the parties] under the attending factual circumstances."
On February 8, 2005, the DARAB reversed and set aside the PARAD's decision. It declared respondent
spouses as de jure tenants of the landholding, thus, protected by security of tenure. It ordered Automat "to maintain
[the spouses] in peaceful possession and cultivation of the landholding."
Automat, petitioner Lim, and petitioner Cecilia appealed with the Court of Appeals, arguing that (a) the
DARAB had no jurisdiction since the property is not agricultural land, (b) the board's finding that respondent spouses
are de jure tenants was not supported by evidence, and (c) the essential requisites for a valid agricultural tenancy
relationship are not present.
 On August 19, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB without prejudice to petitioners' right to seek
recourse from the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary on the other issues.
Meanwhile, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region IV-A CALABARZON issued two orders,
both dated March 30, 2010, exempting the property from coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).
On April 16, 2010, petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.
Two days earlier or on April 14, 2010, the Court of Appeals had denied reconsideration. On May 4, 2010, it
noted without action the supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioners Automat, Leonor Lim, and Lito
Cecilia appealed before this court.
Issues:
I. Whether an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between Automat and respondent spouses.
II. Whether the DAR exemption orders have an effect on the DARAB's earlier exercise of jurisdiction.

Held:
1. No, there is absence of an agricultural tenancy relationship between Automat and respondent spouses.

The elements to constitute a tenancy relationship are the following:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee."
There must be substantial evidence on the presence of all these requisites; otherwise, there is no de jure tenant.
Only those who have established de jure tenant status are entitled to security of tenure and coverage under tenancy
laws. Respondent spouses were the ones claiming they had a tenancy relationship with Automat. Thus, they had the
burden of proof to show that such relationship existed.
On the first requisite: Actual Tillers
Respondents Petitioners Supreme Court
Respondent spouses contend that Petitioners counter with MARO Officer A MARO certification
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Candanido's March 23, 2001 amended "concerning the presence or
Office (MARO) Officer Job A. certification. This later certification states the absence of a tenancy
Candanido issued a certification on that there are "No Records of Tenancy or relationship between the
October 18, 2000 that respondent written Agricultural Leasehold Contract to contending parties, is
spouses are the actual tillers of the any farmer/tiller" in relation to the considered merely
land. Three farmers of adjacent property. preliminary or provisional,
lands 44 testified on the same fact — hence, such certification does
that respondent spouses are the not bind the judiciary."
actual tillers. 45 Irrigation
Superintendent Cesar Amador also MARO certifications are
issued a certification that respondent limited to factual
spouses paid the irrigation service determinations such as the
fees. presence of actual tillers. It
cannot make legal
conclusions on the existence
of a tenancy agreement.

Second requisite: property must be agricultural land

Respondents Petitioners Supreme Court
Respondent spouses argue that a Petitioners submit that the two The land in this case cannot be
subsequent reclassification does parcels of land were classified as considered as agricultural land.
not automatically remove the land industrial prior to the effectivity of
from CARP coverage. "A valid CARL on June 15, 1988. This was First, it is undisputed that the DAR
certificate of exemption [or] done through the Municipal Zoning Region IV-A CALABARZON had
exclusion, or a duly approved Ordinance of Sta. Rosa Laguna No. already issued two orders, both
conversion order, must first be XVIII, series of 1981, approved on dated March 30, 2010, exempting
 secured. . . ." December 2, 1981 by the then
Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission, now HLURB.
This classification was reiterated in
the town plan or Zoning Ordinance
No. 20-91 of Sta. Rosa, Laguna,
approving the town plan classifying
the lands situated in Barangay
Malitlit as industrial land.
Third requisite: Consent; nature of relationship
Respondents Petitioners
Respondent spouses argue that Petitioners contend that there is no
petitioners' inaction or failure to prior tenancy relationship to speak
refute their occupation and of between respondent spouses and
cultivation of the land for the past Automat.
10 years, coupled with the
acceptance of payments for use of Petitioner Cecilia executed an
the land, is "indicative of consent, if affidavit submitted to the DARAB
not acquiescence to . . . tenancy categorically denying respondent
relations." spouses' allegations that he
instituted them as agricultural
They contend that a "[t]enancy tenants. Petitioner Lim executed a
relationship may be deemed similar affidavit "debunking
established by implied agreement [respondent spouses'] claim that
[when a] landowner allows another they were instituted as agricultural
[to] cultivate his land in the concept tenants."
of a tenant for a period of ten (10)
years." Petitioners, thus, emphasize that
petitioners Cecilia and Lim's
authority to establish a real right
over the land has been properly
questioned, and no special power
of attorney has been presented by
respondent spouses on such
authority
(Other requisites were no longer discussed by SC)
Respondent spouses were allowed to stay in the property as caretakers and, in turn, they paid petitioners rent
for their use of the property. Petitioners' acceptance of rental payments may be considered as ratification of an
unwritten lease agreement whose period depends on their agreed frequency of rental payments. However, this court is
not a trier of facts and can only entertain questions of law. The causes of action of respondent spouses, if these can be
supported by the facts and evidence, may be pursued in the proper case either under builder, planter, or sower
provisions, or civil lease provisions before the proper court.
the property from CARP
coverage. These orders were
submitted before the Court of
Appeals and raised again before this
court. The order provides in part:
Further, said lands reclassified to
non-agricultural prior to June 15,
1988 ceased to be considered as
"agricultural lands" and removed
from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program
Supreme Court
"[t]enancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land
[but] is also a legal relationship."
Tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed. The allegation of its
existence must be proven by
evidence, and working on another's
landholding raises no presumption
of an agricultural tenancy.
Consequently, the landowner's
consent to an agricultural tenancy
relationship must be shown. While
this court agrees with the conclusion
that no agricultural tenancy
relationship can exist in this case, we
find that the element of consent in
establishing a relationship, not
necessarily of agricultural tenancy,
is present.
This court finds that Automat
consented to a relationship with
respondent spouses when (a)
through petitioner Lim, it
constituted respondent Ofelia dela
Cruz as caretaker of the property
with the understanding that she
would vacate when asked by
Automat, and (b) it accepted rental
payments from respondent spouses.
 2. The DAR exemption orders have determined with certainty that the lands were reclassified as non-
agricultural prior to June 15, 1988. Consequently, the petition filed by respondent spouses in 2000
before the PARAD did not involve "lands devoted to agriculture" and, necessarily, it could not have
involved any controversy relating to such land. Absent an "agrarian dispute," the instant case cannot
fall under the limited jurisdiction of the DARAB as a quasi-judicial body.

The DARAB has "primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the [CARP] . . . and other agrarian laws and their implementing
rules and regulations1.
"Agrarian dispute" has been defined under Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6657 as referring to "any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture. . . ." This court has held that "jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial office or government
agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein
and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant entitled to any or all
such reliefs."
The petition filed by respondent spouses before the PARAD alleged that "AUTOMAT REALTY AND DEV'T.
CORP. . . . is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land. . .", respondent spouses were "instituted as
tenant-tillers of the two (2) parcels of rice landholdings by . . . AUTOMAT through its authorized administrator LITO
CECILIA", and that "shares of the harvests of . . . AUTOMAT were paid and delivered in the form of checks payable
in cash in the name of . . . AUTOMAT. . . ." However, jurisdiction is conferred by law, and "an order or decision
rendered by a tribunal or agency without jurisdiction is a total nullity."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The PARAD's decision dated August 28, 2001 and DARAB's decision
dated February 8, 2005 are declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to the filing of a civil
case with the proper court.

1
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:

a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP
and other agrarian laws; b) The valuation of land, and the preliminary determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); c) The annulment or
cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments involving lands under the administration and disposition of the DAR or LBP; d) Those cases arising
from, or connected with membership or representation in compact farms, farmers' cooperatives and other registered farmers' associations or organizations, related
to lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws; e) Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, preemption and redemption of agricultural lands
under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws; f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)
and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority; g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of Presidential No. 946, except sub-paragraph (q) thereof and Presidential Decree No. 815. It is understood
that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987. Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation
of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall
be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the
Secretary of the DAR.

SECTION 2. Jurisdiction of the Regional and Provincial Adjudicators. — The RARAD and the PARAD shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board to hear,
determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied)