Title: Agner vs.

BPI Family Savings

Topic: V. Replevin – Optional Reading

Principle: Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is
nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the
possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.

Short Version

Question:

XY obtained a loan from C and executed a promissory note with chattel mortgage over XY car. C
assigned his rights and interests to A then the latter assigned likewise to B. XY failed to pay his
installments so B sent a demand letter to XY to pay obligation or surrender the car however such letter
was unheeded. As a result, B filed an action for replevin and damages against XY. XY argue that they
cannot be considered to have defaulted in payment for lack of competent proof that they received the
demand letter.

Is a prior demand necessary before filing an action for replevin?

Answer:

No.

Jurisprudence provides that prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin,
since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a
demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.

In the case at bar, there is really no need for a demand letter because XY legally waived the necessity of
notice or demand in the promissory note with chattel mortgaged in which XY signed in favor to C’s
predecessor-in-interest.

Therefore, prior demand is not necessary before an action for replevin can be filed in court.

LONG VERSION

Original Complaint Jurisdiction Parties

Action for Replevin and Damages RTC - Manila Petitioner:
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and
MARICON AGNER
Respondent:
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK,
INC.

FACTS:

Petitioners Spouses Agner obtained a loan from Citimotors, Inc and executed a promissory note with
chattel mortgage which was a Mitsubishi adventure super sport car. Citimotors assigned all its rights and
interests to ABN AMRO Savings Bank which likewise assigned the same to respondent BPI Family
Savings Bank.

Petitioners failed to pay successive installments by which respondent sent to the former a demand letter
declaring the entire obligation due and demandable or surrender the mortgaged vehicle immediately. The
demand was left unheeded prompting respondent to file an action for replevin and damages before the
RTC.

RTC:

A writ of replevin was issued however the subject vehicle was not seized. RTC ruled in favor of
respondent and ordered petitioners to pay the entire obligation.

CA:

Petitioners applealed but CA affirmed RTC decision.

SC:

Petitioners argue that they cannot be considered to have defaulted in payment for lack of competent proof
that they received the demand letter.

ISSUE:

Whether prior demand is necessary before filing an action for replevin.

HELD:

No.

The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or is in default from the time the obligor
demands the fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee. However, the law expressly provides that
demand is not necessary under certain circumstances, and one of these circumstances is when the
parties expressly waive demand.

Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido that prior demand is not a condition precedent to an
action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires
the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin
could be filed.

In this case, records bear that both verbal and written demands were in fact made by respondent prior to
the institution of the case against petitioners. Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that no demand letter
was sent by respondent, there is really no need for it because petitioners legally waived the necessity of
notice or demand in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, which they voluntarily and knowingly
signed in favor of respondent’s predecessor-in-interest. Said contract expressly stipulates:

In case of my/our failure to pay when due and payable, any sum which I/We are obliged to pay under this
note and/or any other obligation which I/We or any of us may now or in the future owe to the holder of this
note or to any other party whether as principal or guarantor x x x then the entire sum outstanding under
this note shall, without prior notice or demand, immediately become due and payable.

Therefore, prior demand is not necessary in filing an action for replevin.

Title: Calderon v. Roxas

Topic: VI.B Support Pendente Lite – Application

Principle: The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which may be
availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment
or final order.

Short Version

Question:

X filed a complaint for nullity of her marriage to Y with an application for support pendent lite for their
children. RTC granted the application for support. Later, Y filed a motion to reduce such support. On
March 07, 2005, RTC granted Y motion to reduce support and denied X petition for increase of the
children support others. On May 04, 2005, the MR filed by X was also denied. Subsequently, RTC
declared the marriage between X and Y null and void. X filed an appeal emphasizing that she is only
appealing the orders dated March 7 and May 4, 2005. CA dismissed the case on the ground that X failed
to avail the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order.

Is a support pendent lite an interlocutory order?

Answer:

Yes.

The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term
suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. Moreover, an interlocutory order is not subject to appeal but a
special civil action under Rule 65.

In the case at bar, having chosen the wrong remedy, CA was correct in dismissing the case.

LONG VERSION

Original Complaint Jurisdiction Parties

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage RTC – Paranaque City Petitioner:
MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON
Respondent:
JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS and
COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

RTC:
Petitioner Carminia Calderon and Jose Roxas were married with 4 children. Calderon filed a complaint for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Accordingly, RTC
granted petitioner’s application for support pendent lite in which Roxas is ordered to defray 42,292.50 per
month as support for the children and other expenses are to be shared by Calderon and Roxas.

Consequently, Roxas filed a Motion to Reduce Support because the amount fixed by the court for support
was even higher than his then P20,800 monthly salary as councilor.

On March 07, 2005, RTC granted Roxas motion to reduce support and denied Calderon motion for
spousal support, increase of the children support and support-in-arrears. On May 04, 2005, the partial
motion for reconsideration filed by Calderon was denied.

Subsequently, RTC declared null and void the marriage between Calderon and Roxas. The latter was
also ordered to give support to the children in the amount of 30k per month.

CA:

On appeal, petitioner emphasized that she is not appealing the decision of RTC in the main case but its
March 07, 2005 and May 04, 2005 decisions. Appeal was denied on the ground that the RTC decisions
had long become final and executory and it failed to avail of the proper remedy to question an
interlocutory order.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the assailed orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory orders.

HELD:

Yes.

The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term
suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a
final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other
incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.

Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be
resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and
for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they
constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary
because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. The subject
orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

Moreover, an appeal from interlocutory orders not allowed however the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate civil action under Rule 65.

In the case at bar, having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the
RTC, petitioner’s appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.
Title: Francisco v. Zandueta

Topic: VI.B Support Pendente Lite – Application

Principle: There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to
be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son.

Short Version

Question:

X, a minor, represent by his mother, filed an action for support. X alleged that he is the acknowledged son
of Y. Y denied the allegation however the trial court granted the support pendente lite in favor of X despite
denial of paternity by Y. Y argued that X has no right to monthly support until his status as a child is finally
determined and that the judge order was an excess of jurisdiction due to the fact the civil status of X was
placed in issue.

Was Y correct?

Answer:

Yes.

There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in
the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son.

In the the case at bar, the action for support is brought by a minor, X, through his guardian ad litem, who
alleges that he is the son of Y; therefore it is necessary for X to prove his civil status as such son. His
alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in
issue.

Therefore, Y was correct that X has no right to support pending the determination of which the right to
support arises and that the judge was in excess of jurisdiction granting the support pendente lite.

LONG VERSION

Original Complaint Jurisdiction Parties

Action for support CFI - Manila Petitioner:
LUIS FRANCISCO
Respondent:
FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, Judge
of First Instance of Manila, and
EUGENIO LEOPOLDO
FRANCISCO

FACTS:
Respondent Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, 2 year olds, represented by his mother, Rosario Gomez, filed
an action for support before CFI of Manila. The complaint alleged that respondent is the acknowledged
son of Luis Francisco, petitioner. The latter denied the allegation and he was present athe the baptism of
the respondent and that he was married at the time it is alleged that the respondent was born.

Despite the denial of paternity, the court of first instance issued an order for a monthly support of P30
pendente lite. On motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that order was issued in excess of
jurisdiction due to the fact that the civil status of the respondent was placed in issue; that it has no right to
monthly support until his status as a child is finally determined. Judge Zandueta denied the motion, hence
the institution of this special proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent is entitled to support pendente lite pending the determination of his civil status as a
son.

HELD:

No.

Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support each other:

(1) Husband and wife,

(2) legitimate ascendants and descendants,

(3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate descendants of the latter,

(4) parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of natural children and

(5) brothers and sisters.

In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support, the
civil status of marriage or that of relationship.

In the present case, the action for support is brought by a minor, through his guardian ad litem, who
alleges that he is the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as
such son. His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted
upon the point in issue.

There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in
the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the
legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing
but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an
established right recognized by a final judgment. The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil
status, from which the right to support is derived, being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given
to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.

Therefore, CFI order in granting the support pendente lite is declared null and void.
Title: Yangco v. Rohde

Topic: VI.B Support Pendente Lite – Application

Principle: The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such, and where the existence of the
status is put in issue by the pleading it cannot be presumed to exist for the purpose of granting alimony.

Short Version

Question:

X filed a complaint praying the she be granted divorce and allowance of alimony from her marriage to Y.
Y denied the marriage however Judge Z ruled that the marriage alleged in the complaint is valid and
ordered Y to give monthly allowance as alimony to X. Y then filed a writ of prohibition to declare Judge Z
acted in excess of jurisdiction in attempting to obliged Y in paying to X said allowance. Judge Z argued
that X by virtue of the marriage acquired the right to the allowance of alimony pendente lite.

Was Judge Z correct?

Answer:

No.

The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such, and where the existence of the status is
put in issue by the pleading it cannot be presumed to exist for the purpose of granting alimony.

In the case at bar, the action for the support or alimony is brought by a X who alleges that she is a wife;
therefore it is necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status of a spouse - that is, a marriage,
without which one has no right to the title to husband or wife.

Hence, Judge Z was incorrect.

LONG VERSION

Original Complaint Jurisdiction Parties

Nullity of Marriage and allowance CFI - Manila Petitioner:
of alimony LUIS R. YANGCO
Respondent:
WILLIAM J. ROHDE, judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila

FACTS:

Victorina Obin filed a complaint against Lius Yanco before CFI Manila praying that she declared lawful
wife of Yangco and she be granted divorce and allowance of alimony. Yangco denied the allegation and
filed a demurrer by which Judge Rohde overruled and decided the case in favor of Victoriana.

In his decision, he stated that in his opinion, the marriage alleged in the complaint is valid under the laws
in forc, although the question is not clear nor without doubt. He also granted the motion for monthly
allowance as alimony filed by Victorina while the case was pending. With this, Yangco filed a writ of
prohibition to render judgment declaring Judge Rohde acted in excess of jurisdiction in attempting to
oblige Yangco to pay Victorina said allowance.

Judge Rohde in his motion to dismiss the said petition says that Victorina Obin acquired a right to all
conjugal rights, and in particular to the allowance of alimony pendente lite. And upon this supposition he
cited articles of the Civil Code as to rights enjoyed by a married woman by virtue of the marriage, and
those which she may further exercise by reason of divorce pending litigation and those granted to her
finally in case of a favorable judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Rohde is correct that Victorina Obin is entitled to such support pendente lite.

HELD:

No.

The necessity of founding the action for support or alimony on a title, and a title supported by
documentary evidence, is a consequence of the precepts of article 143 of the Civil Code cited by the
respondent judge himself. In this article the right to support is granted (1) to spouses inter se; (2) to
legitimate descendants and ascendants inter se; (3) to parents and certain legitimated and acknowledged
natural children; (4) to other illegitimate children, and (5) to brothers and sisters. In all these cases in is a
civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support - the civil status of marriage or
that of relationship.

In the present case the action for the support or alimony is brought by a woman who alleges that she is a
wife; therefore it is necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status of a spouse - that is, a
marriage, without which one has no right to the title to husband or wife.

The civil status of marriage being denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived,
being issue, it is difficult to see how any effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative
declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.

Title: Coquia v. Baltazar

Topic: VI.B Support Pendente Lite – Application

Short Version

Question:

W, X,Y and Z filed an action for recovery of possession of parcels of land against A and B. W, X,Y and Z
(now deceased) alleged that they are the owners of the subject land which portion of which belongs to Z
and A as co-owners and they also added that they are the acknowledged children of the deceased Z. A
and B denied the allegations. While the case is pending, W, X and Y filed a petition for alimony pendente
lite in which Judge B granted based on the legal and equitable rights of W, X and Y in the subject land.

Was the Judge correct?

Answer:

No.

Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court, which authorizes the granting of alimony pendente lite" at the
commencement of the proper action, or at any time afterwards but prior to the final judgment.

In the case at bar, the action filed by W, X and Y was not for support but for recovery of real property.
Such action is not the proper action provided in the law. The mere fact that W, X and Y have legal and
equitable rights in the property they seek to recover does not authorize the court to compel the
defendants to support the plaintiffs pending the determination of the suit.

Hence, Judge Baltazar erred in granting support to W, X and Y.

LONG VERSION

Original Complaint Jurisdiction Parties

Recovery of Possession
CFI - Leyte Petitioner:
SILVESTRA COQUIA and LUIS
CARANDANG
Respondent:
RODOLFO BALTAZAR Judge of
the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, and GASPARA,
FRANCISCA, DIONISIO,
ALFREDO, and SALVADOR, all
surnamed COQUIA

FACTS:

Respondents Gaspara, Francisca, Dionisio, Alfredo and Salvador Coquia assisted by their mother Maria
Dalori filed an action for recovery of possession against Spouses Silvestra Coquia and Luis Carandang.
They alleged that they are the owners of the 4 parcels of land, 3 of which belong to Alfredo Coquia and
Silvestra Coquia as co-owners and that they are the acknowledged natural children of the deceased
Alfredo Coquia. In their answer, the petitioners denied such allegations.

Respondents filed a petition for alimony pendente lite in which Judge Piccio granted considering the legal
and equitable rights of said respondents. In petitioners MR, Judge Baltazar denied the such holding that
the order of the Judge Piccio was well founded.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Baltazar is correct in affirming the order of Judge Piccio granting the support pendente
lite.

HELD:

No.
Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court, which authorizes the granting of alimony pendente lite" at the
commencement of the proper action, or at any time afterwards but prior to the final judgment.

In the case herein, The action commenced before the respondent judge was not for support but for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of real property. Manifestly such an action is not "the proper
action" contemplated by said rule The mere fact that the plaintiffs have legal and equitable rights in the
property they seek to recover (Q. E. D. ) does not authorize the court to compel the defendants to support
the plaintiffs pending the determination of the suit.

Moreover, the petitioners, who are sister and brother-in law, respectively, of the deceased Alfredo
Coquia, are not bound to support the alleged natural children of the latter. Under the article 143 of the
Civil Code only the following are bound to support each other: (1) husband and wife: (2) legitimate
ascendants and descendants: and (3) parents and acknowledged natural children, and the legitimate
descendants of the latter.

The petition is granted and the orders complained of are hereby set aside.

Title: Villanueva v. Villanueva

Topic: VI.B Support Pendente Lite – Application

Principle: Repeated illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough. The law
is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose propensity
towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.

Short Version

Question:

X was married to Y with 3 children. X filed a separate sustenance on the ground of infidelity and cruelty of
Y. X alleged that Y was guilty of repeated infidelity with 4 different women and that she only stayed with
him for almost 10 years in the hope that Y will change. Eventually X left from their home and brought the
children with her.

Is X entitle to separate sustenance?

Answer:

Yes.

In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from her
husband, it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the marital domicile.
Repeated illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough. The law is not so
unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose propensity towards
other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.

In the case herein, Y repeated acts of conjugal infidelity against the sanctity of the marriage tie gives X an
undeniable right to relief.
LONG VERSION **guys short ra jud and case and its an old case year 1929

Original Complaint Jurisdiction Parties

Separate maintenance and CFI - Manila Petitioner:
custody AURELIA DADIVAS DE
VILLANUEVA
Respondent:
RAFAEL VILLANUEVA

FACTS:

Aurelia was married to Rafael Villanueva with three children. Aurelia filed a separate maintenance on the
ground of infidelity and cruelty of Rafael. She alleged that during the ten years of their marriage, Rafael
was guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with 4 different women and she only stayed with him in hope that
he will change his course. Eventually, with the nature of Rafael relations with other women, Aurelia
moved out from their abode and brought the children with her.

ISSUE:

Whether Aurelia is entitled to separate sustenance.

HELD:

Yes.

In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from her
husband, it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the marital domicile.
Repeated illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough. The law is not so
unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose propensity towards
other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.

In the case before us repeated acts of conjugal infidelity on the offender against the sanctity of the
marriage tie. This give the wife an undeniable right to relief.