682 Rezensionen

Konrad Ott

NIETZSCHE’S ANIMAL PHILOSOPHY

Vanessa Lemm, Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy. Culture, Politics, and the Ani-
mality of the Human Being, New York (Fordham University Press) 2009, 244
S., ISBN 978-0-8232-3028-0.

Vanessa Lemm’s book is not a book about the role animals as eagle or snake may play
in Nietzsche’s philosophy.1 It is an outline of a truly postmodern Nietzschean philosophy.
From a rhetorical perspective, the book is eloquently written in a gesture of overcom-
ing old and presenting new and promising modes of philosophical thought. To Lemm,
Nietzsche is not one philosopher among many, but the philosopher who has opened the
horizon under which such new modes of thought can blossom. Throughout the book,
Lemm attempts to make Nietzsche politically correct according to contemporary moral
standards but I will remain silent on this strategy and only focus on philosophical points.
To Lemm, Nietzschean philosophy is “bio-centric”. “Biocentrism” does not, as in en-
vironmental ethics, mean that inherent moral worth is attributed to all living beings. It
rather means that all philosophically interesting issues are to be judged and assessed
“from the perspective of life”. Lemm’s notion of life is clearly an axiological one. Life is
a phenomenon being worth to be endorsed as such and in (all?) its manifestations. Life is
said to be innocent, overflowing, generous, creative, and the like. Any increase, improve-
ment, and enhancement of life is prima facie good while deprivation of life is bad. This
axiological perspective is maintained throughout the book even if life is later said to be an

1 Cf. Christa Davis Acampora / Ralph R. Acampora (Eds.), A Nietzschean Bestiary. Becoming
Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal, Lanham / Boulder / New York / Toronto / Oxford 2004 (cf.
Christian Niemeyer, Nietzsches Also sprach Zarathustra – zwei neue Studien, in: Nietzsche-Stu-
dien 35 (2006), S. 338 – 342). In addition to this bestiary, another book deserves some attention:
Stephan Braun, Nietzsche und die Tiere oder: vom Wesen des Animalischen, Würzburg (König-
shausen & Neumann) 2009, 157 S., ISBN 978-3-8260-4216-4. Braun wishes to augment Acam-
pora’s bestiary by some animal figures, as beaver and bear, which are not addressed. Moreover,
he presents some new sources on Nietzsche’s animal figurations that stem from letters, notes
and type-writing texts. Braun emphasizes Nietzsche’s dionysian passion for transfiguration and
metaphors which resembles both his lifestyle and his mode of thought. Braun claims that
Nietzsche opens himself to the essence of animality via the artificial media of writing. Nietzsche
is seen as “Schreibe-Thier” (p. 151). Nietzsche is always writing, but he writes in different moods
which can be expressed by animal figures. The different animals express Nietzsche’s underlying
will for artistic transfigurations which mirrors life and, ultimately, is philosophy. Braun’s book is
written at the edge of philosophy, biography, psychoanalysis, and literary criticism. It is beyond
my competence to compare Acampora’s and Braun’s interpretation of the different animal fig-
ures critically.
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“inherently violent and cruel force, interested only in its own enhancement” (p. 9). The
moral tensions within an affirmation of life are downplayed. Lemm does not adopt
Nietzsche’s distinction between ascending and descending life, although this distinction
seems to be somehow present in the distinction between culture and civilization.
From this biocentric perspective, Lemm takes the animality of human beings into ac-
count. She prudently argues that the denial and suppression of animality in its different
facets (body, senses, sexual desire, digestion, pleasure and pain) creates resentment, fear,
aggression and mental disorders among humans. It is also likely that moral doctrines that
support or preach such suppression of animality are secretly breeding attitudes in humans
which are opposed to the supreme moral principles of these doctrines. This might be true
for all ascetic variants of Christianity. I also agree with Lemm that we encounter the di-
mension of animality especially in dreams. Thus, we should neither be forgetful about
animality nor about dreams. But didn’t we know this since Sigmund Freud, Erich Fromm
and other psychologists? Didn’t critical theory always say so?
These points to which most philosophers can agree are not the key messages of
Lemm’s book. Key message is the overcoming of modern concepts of philosophy and
their replacement by “bio-centric” concepts. Starting from the dialectical opposition be-
tween culture and civilization, Lemm proposes the following replacements:
In political philosophy, the concept of a legitimate basic (constitutional) structure (John
Rawls) is replaced by the lively struggle between strong institutions and sovereign rebels.
In economics, the concept of maximizing social welfare is replaced by free expenditure. In
ethics, the problem of how to substantiate normative claims is replaced by praising gift-
giving as outstanding acts. In history, the concept of scientific inquiry is replaced by a con-
cept of counterhistory as artwork. In ontology and theory of truth, the concepts of refer-
ence, aletheic reasoning, theories of truth and philosophy are replaced by concepts of sin-
gular truth, intuited metaphors, and, ultimately, philosophy as an art that is motivated by
the drive to illusion. Due to these replacements, it seems fair to say that Lemm’s approach
is post-modern. To philosophers who wish to defend the achievements of modern
thought, these replacements are critical. Therefore, it seems also fair to take these re-
placements into account with scrutiny. Before doing so, I have to address the underlying
distinction of culture and civilization.
“The distinction between culture and civilization shows that there are two different,
antagonistic ways in which human animal life can be politicized” (p. 48). Culture and
civilization are seen as antagonistic projects. The distinction between culture and civili-
zation has had an ideological history in Germany which we should not forget. Once upon
a time before 1933, the distinction was adopted by Spengler, Klages, Scheler and many
others in order to denounce liberalism, enlightenment, democracy, and pacifism in the
name of “real” (German) culture. Moreover, it never had been clarified by the early pro-
ponents of this distinction by which criteria single phenomena of social life should be re-
garded as belonging (rather) to the spheres of culture or civilization. The German man-
darins did such assessment by intuition. Lemm is either not familiar with this history or
she prefers to be forgetful about it.
Although Lemm recognizes that culture and civilization are intertwined and stand in
need of each other, her sympathies clearly are with biocentric culture. To Lemm, civilization
is a project that domesticates humans, and breeds the herd (Nietzsche). It tames animal-
ity in humans by imposing rules and it secretly breeds resentment and violence. It is by no
means as peaceful as it presumes to be. Civilization might be needed to stabilize industrial
societies by means of science, technology, and law. Probably, civilization makes ordinary life
more comfortable and more secure. Even if so, to Lemm a deep discontent and distrust re-
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mains with civilization from a biocentric perspective. Civilization rests on the wrongful for-
getfulness of animality, thus sucking the blood of life and creating only a pale and tamed
shade of what human life could become culturally. In short, civilization is suppressive to
life. But ultimately, life can’t be mastered and tamed, as Nietzsche and the other “geniuses
of culture” (p. 29), for instance Goethe and Schopenhauer, have known. Civilization might
be a totalitarian project but it is never perfectly closed against the forces of life.
Lemm uses the distinction between culture and civilization as a scheme, by which
most or all modern approaches in political philosophy, economics, ethics, and history fall
into the realm of civilization while Lemm’s approach always stays close to the subversive,
anarchic, life-enhancing, life-affirming forces of culture. Her Nietzschean idea of biocen-
tric culture is subversive to civilization but indicates “that the human has again become
strong enough to confirm its animality, its creative and artistic powers of life”. Lemm
finds such vision in BGE 44. In this famous note (which is not quoted at full length)
Nietzsche favors a situation of danger and opposes “Sklaven des demokratischen Ge-
schmacks” (KSA 5.61). This note may give reasons for worrisome concerns how the sub-
versive powers of culture may look like.
In this opening chapter, Lemm also introduces the opposition between forgetfulness
and memory and the concepts of dream and imagination which are of relevance for her
overall approach. The concept of dreaming is used in an unusual way because, ultimately,
there remains no difference between dreaming and being awake. All living beings live “in
dreams of their own creation. Life is a dream that keeps on imagining and reimagining
and creating and recreating itself through dreaming” (p. 25). This concept of dreaming re-
turns in the chapter on truth (see below).
In the chapter on politics, Lemm argues that the institutions of political power “al-
ways contain an inevitable kernel of violence and injustice” (p. 33). Nietzsche is said not
to be against such kernels but against the hypocrisy of civilized politics that tries to “ob-
scure” the violence that is needed to stabilize social life. I wonder whether this is a good
point of departure for political philosophy since it models all political systems according
to the distinction between surface and kernel. The differences of despotic, authoritative,
and semi-authoritative systems, electorate and full liberal democracies which are analyzed
in political science then become mere surface phenomena. If so, modern schemes of
political analysis remain superficial, shallow, and even obscuring while postmodern politi-
cal philosophy directly touches the invariant kernel of politics. Is it “true” (in some sense
of this word) that modern states only obscure violence or do they indeed reduce violence
between individuals, between states (wars) and between states and citizens? The distinc-
tion between kernel and surface could be an essentialist scheme.
Lemm states that obscuring violence “degenerates into moral dogmatism, political
terror, and irresponsibility” (p. 33). By doing so, she shifts the blame for political terror
to modern states and, then, recommends “responsible use of violent means” (ibid.). The
concept of responsibility is shaped by her overall approach. Responsibility does not mean
that persons are made responsible for actions or omissions with reference to moral
rules, values, or laws (modern concept) but is an instinct of sovereign individuals (p. 38).
“Nietzsche identifies the instinct of responsibility with the sovereign individual’s con-
science” (ibid.). This is to say, that the responsible use of violence can be justified accord-
ing to this “promising” concept of responsibility as instinct. If instincts are intact in sov-
ereign individuals, violence seems to be sound. Fair to say, that Lemm defines sovereign
individuals as humans that have overcome the need for domination (p. 40). Neverthe-
less, the affirmation of a kernel of violence with this biocentric concept of responsibility
widely opens the door for any arbitrary use of political violence.
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From the perspective of life, the violence being performed by political authorities is
to be welcomed if it provokes rebellion and resistance as “counterforce”. Violence and
rebellion, power and counterforce constitute an “agonistic politics of responsibility”
under which sovereign individuals struggle. In struggling hard against each other they
honor each other as strong enemies in a Schmittian sense. “Freedom is anarchic. […] It is
always only what one fights for, what one conquers” (p. 41 f.). Given the definitions, it is
easy for Lemm to state that – according to Nietzsche – this agonistic struggle guarantees
freedom (fighting for something) and responsibility (instinct). This agonistic struggle is
“fruitful” (p. 42) and it liberates each party (p. 42). I hold that this political philosophy can
be adopted easily by all political forces that wish to combat against modern liberal states
and civilized modes of politics. Lemm recommends a political culture that always ba-
lances at the edge of riots and civil war. Under the definitions being given, Lemm’s cau-
tious disclaimers are not convincing. Lemm pleas for “universal respect” and “equality
based on the recognition of difference” but where should these principles stem from?
The end of this section ends up in hollow rhetoric (p. 43).
The chapter “Culture and Economy” sees civilization close to slavery. The notion of
slavery is defined broadly and is not restricted to slavery in the literal sense. Slavery de-
fines life in civilization (p. 50). The economy of civilization is enslaving and leaves hu-
mans incomplete. The economy of culture is not about savings, investments, efficiency,
profit, wages, accumulation of capital and the like. This all belongs to the economy of
civilizations whatever their details may be. Economy of culture is “free expenditure”. At
this point, Lemm refers to Bataille. Now, and contrary to the concept of freedom in the
previous chapter, freedom is freedom to lose (p. 56). (This reminds me of Janis Joplin
who sang that freedom is just another word for nothing left to lose.) Savings and invest-
ments being undertaken in the project of civilization create preconditions for such free
expenditure. This vision is attractive to all who see themselves on the side of culture and
would join and enjoy the great noble festivities of free expenditure after which civilized
business as usual must continue. Economists would worry about the concept of a “posi-
tive property of loss” (p. 56). This concept of free expenditure can’t serve as foundation
of a critique of modern economics and capitalism.
The chapter on ethics distinguishes Nietzschean forgetfulness and Christian forgive-
ness sharply. Nietzsche’s critique of forgiveness is taken for granted. Christian theology
can’t accept such treatment of forgiveness. In the Bible, the idea of forgiveness is directed
against the cycle of revenge. Forgiveness is a virtue by which guilt, hate, and revenge can
be removed from social relations. In this way we say in German: “Vergeben und ver-
gessen!” Lemm states that forgiveness can never forgive “since it fails to be giving”. If
one grants this critique of forgiveness as being repeated on p. 67, forgetfulness looks
more attractive as a conceptual alternative. This opposition is clear: If forgiveness can’t
forgive, forgetfulness is required as precondition for true/genuine forgiving. Forgetful-
ness is throughout the book a faculty of animality which stands on the side of biocentric
culture. With Derrida, Lemm builds a bridge between forgetfulness and gift-giving. It re-
mains unclear how the step from forgetfulness to gift-giving is being made conceptually.
Lemm states: “The event of the gift must happen in such a way that the forgetting forgets
itself.”
The phenomenon of gift has attracted postmodern philosophers because it is con-
ceptually asymmetrical and undetermined by rules. Ethically, gift-giving is clearly a virtue
(p. 75). To Lemm, this virtue is not one virtue among others, but outstanding: “The gift
giving virtue stands out and alone, over and above all measures” (p. 75). Since the gift-
giving virtue exceeds all measures, it can’t be judged. As uncommon, it can’t be named.
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It only signifies its own “incommunicability” (ibid.). This virtue is the expression of the
overflowing of life. Praising this virtue, Lemm strongly rests on Z. At the end of this sec-
tion, this virtue is said to be an “animal rather than a human virtue” (p. 80). This out-
standing virtue must be protected against the logic of civilization. In civilization, gifts are
ordinary in social interactions. From a sociological perspective, gift-giving is a complex
pattern of social interaction which has many cultural variants. The outstanding virtue
must be distinguished from civilized societal gift-giving. To Lemm, it must be hidden: “In
order that the gift not become part of the logic of power and domination, or of appro-
priation and exploitation, it is necessary for the gift giving virtue to pass unrecognized”
(p. 84). It remains unclear how Lemm’s rhetorical celebration of this unique virtue is re-
lated to ethics and to moral philosophy. The end of this chapter does not address this
question but mentions the “great Hazar” in Z. Despite some nice remarks about friend-
ship, the implications of the chapter for ethical theory remain open.
The chapter on history refers to Nietzsche’s untimely meditation which should be
contextualized within German historism after Ranke. I would not discard this untimely
meditation since it opened our eyes for the practical dimension of history. History is al-
ways of practical interest to humans in many respects. Personally, as an environmentalist,
I take an interest in the origins of nature conservation in Germany which emerged during
Nietzsche’s lifetime. Moreover, the lingual parallels between historical narratives and nar-
ratives of novels have attracted many scholars. Without doubt, history raises specific me-
thodological problems due to the matter of fact that the past is not present any more.
These problems have been addressed in the theory of history since Droysen. Lemm does
not address them but wants to address the problem of history by the concepts of forget-
fulness and memory. History as science clearly belongs to memory, but memory belongs
to civilization. The history of culture must, therefore, rest in the forgetfulness of the ani-
mal. Such forgetfulness is an “idyllic happiness” in an instant moment of time (p. 88). As
such, it is strictly without history. This is clearly a new reading of the untimely meditation,
but it is also a strange systematic outset, since it is hard to found history in forgetfulness.
History that rests on forgetfulness can’t be scientific any more. It must be artwork.
Lemm: “Nietzsche holds animal forgetfulness responsible for the artfulness of history
writing” (p. 87). History as artwork shall now emerge from such a-historical perspective
and it shall overcome the dualisms of forgetfulness and memory because history is con-
ceptually intrinsically linked to memory. What kinds of history are to be expected from
such approach? Lemm conceives a “counterhistory” that turns the dead past into a living
presence. “The past is not a given with which one has to come to terms, but something
that has to be formed and transformed, interpreted and reinterpreted until it fulfills the
terms determined for it” (p. 95). In German language, we say that someone “sich die
Geschichte zurechtbiegt” until it fits his objectives and ideology. Lemm’s concept of
counterhistory gives free permission to do so. It radically politicizes history. Counterhis-
tory is entitled to do injustice to the past in the name of life (p. 96). The past is like an or-
acle whose language is to be understood only by “architects of the future” (p. 100). The
role of the historian is to bring about a new age that promises “more life” (p. 101). Illu-
sion and imagination belong to history as artwork. Reading all this after one century of
highly politicized history, one can only wonder how one can find this outlook on counter-
history promising. I do not fear that professional historians will adopt this approach, but,
perhaps, some intellectuals of postmodern camps may do history of philosophy accord-
ing to this approach.
In the chapter on truth, Lemm distinguishes three discourses of truth in Nietzsche:
a) theoretical-ontological discourse, b) biopolitical discourse, c) practical discourse. The
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first discourse is committed toward a critique of all metaphysical and realistic concepts of
truth, the second discourse is critical against a (bio)political “will to truth” (Foucault),
and the third discourse “belongs to the genre of social criticism” (p. 113). In the first dis-
course, the common Nietzschean critique against metaphysical or absolute truth is re-
peated. But which contemporary philosophies of truth defend such metaphysical (Pla-
tonic) approach? Lemm ignores all philosophical approaches on truth since Tarski. Thus,
this section does not contribute to philosophical debates under which conditions the
term “true” can be attributed to propositions, claims, statements, and the like. Before
fighting against windmills and straw-men, Nietzscheans should take some lessons in
modern theories of truth.
The second discourse uses the term “truth” differently. Truth, as a normative con-
cept, refers to basic commitments of society, be it customs, habits, belief systems and
the like (p. 138). Conceptual language is the institution that stabilizes such commitments.
Control over life requires control over language, but “to overthrow a language is to over-
throw a rule”. Lemm adopts from Nietzsche the idea of a deep questioning of custom-
ary lingual commitments. As far as I understand, she wishes to connect this idea with the
third and practical sense of truth which, surprisingly, is conceived in terms of critical the-
ory. Truth in a practical sense refers to all communicative action among human beings
(p. 113). Practical truth is a requirement for critique. Lemm implicitly concedes that there
can be no critique without some normative presupposition. Her concession, however,
does not fit well in the overall biocentric approach. My point is that this practical concept
of truth can’t be reconciled with Lemm’s own theory of recognition.
Lemm interprets Nietzsche’s wondering about the animal’s silence as a claim that the
silence of the animal comes closer to “truth” than conceptual language. “The silent pre-
sent of the animal […] offers […] another paradigm of truth” (p. 115). This sounds
strange but becomes meaningful within Lemm’s philosophy. To Lemm, there is some im-
mediate contact with reality given by the senses. Lemm: “In the immediacy of intuition,
the human being recovers the silent truth of the animal” (p. 117). This immediate contact
results in some nerve stimuli which are immediately transformed into intuited metaphors
and pictures. This immediate access to the real is a transitory moment. Lemm: “In every
experience (of the outside world) something withdraws” (p. 125). This peculiar some-
thing (“it”) always remains silent and secret. Its brute immediacy is already lost in the pic-
tures and metaphors, to which it is transformed by the human brain, but the withdrawal
of immediacy becomes more radical in the sphere of conceptual language. Metaphors and
pictures are closer to the immediate experience of the real, while conceptual language and
abstract thinking “exercise restriction and control over the artistic expression of animal
life” (p. 119). If so, metaphors are to be regarded as first-order dissimulation (“Verstel-
lung”), while conceptual language is a second-order dissimulation. Thus, metaphors, pic-
tures, and dreamlike images remain closer to life and must be at the heart of biocentric
philosophies.
If so, philosophy has to move away from civilized conceptual language and should im-
merse in the pictures, metaphors, and dreamlike images, because this is the pathway back
to the moments of immediacy by which organic life encounters the real. Lemm’s longing
for immediacy can’t solve the problem that experiences (and dreams) as such are neither
true nor false but are being made by or happen to humans.
This approach stringently leads to a conception of philosophy as an artistic activity of
creating a counterlanguage in close connection with metaphors, pictures, and dreamlike
images which “overflow with life” (p. 119). Counterhistory and counterlanguage are com-
plementary. This approach allows Lemm to keep a concept of honesty and truthfulness
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while rejecting all concepts of truth that rest on schemes of representation. Since Lemm
does not this “intuited world of first impressions brought forth by pictorial thinking”
with “reality as illusion”, she can argue that honesty and truthfulness becomes means to
illusion and, as she does not hesitate to add, “deception” (p. 12).
Her prejudices against conceptual thinking expresses itself lively in a rhetoric that be-
comes repetitious (and slightly boring) at the end of the book. It is simply not true that
conceptual thinking implies that all concepts and their meanings are “univocal, absolute,
determined, and fixed” (p. 140). It is painful to read in the section about the “Philosophi-
cal Life” that Nietzsche directly participated in the French-German war of 1870/71 and
healed himself afterwards “from the injuries of war”. Nietzsche did military service in
1868, while working on metrics in 1870/71. I do not hope that this mistake is a first in-
stance of counterhistory.
The book ends with some brief remarks on biopolitics. Lemm distinguishes two pat-
terns of biopolitics and outlines what she qualifies as “affirmative” or “positive” bio-
politics. Not surprisingly, this kind of biopolitics as culture shall result in a culture of “in-
herently singular” forms of life and in increasing vitality. To my mind, the final remarks
appear poor compared with other studies on biopolitics.
What else could Lemm’s book presume to be than a philosophical manifesto directed
toward such new biocentric culture? In any case, her book should be read as a paradigm
example of postmodern Nietzscheanism. It can’t be refuted easily by reasons since Lemm
can interpret all criticism as stemming from the camp of civilized philosophers who have
so far removed themselves from life that they must be frightened (physiologically) by the
fresh air of wild philosophical thoughts founded in animality. Lemm affirms “dangerous
thinking” and is therefore immune against warnings of how dangerous her positions are
for societal life.
After this philosophical manifesto, Lemm’s next book should be about how such an
affirmative biocentric biopolitics could be specified in terms of social and environ-
mental politics, strategies of overcoming poverty, the treatment of non-human beings,
the further prospects for democratization, and the like. Meanwhile, proponents of critical
theory should hesitate in welcoming companionship of such postmodern Nietzscheans.