PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO

vs
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be
declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art
3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec
28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section
3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

HELD:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is
a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory,
the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-
AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is
more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section
3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.
The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom
of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro
homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of
the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably,
the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
 Merlin Magallona
Vs
Secretary Eduardo Ermita

FACTS:
 In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the
terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the
Philippines in February 1984.
 Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others,
that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional.
Some of their particular arguments are as follows:

a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also
resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;

b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as “archipelagic” waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent
passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions;

c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de
masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or
lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or
diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area
that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of
the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image
below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in
this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal
waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS
itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others
of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid
innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands
did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of
islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the
baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that,
then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that
the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective
occupation.

NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-
based rights:

a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone

Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the
UNCLOS.
 Miriam Defensor Santiago et al
Vs
COMELEC

FACTS:
 On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC
 a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative”
The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over
the country,
 b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and
 c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations.
 On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin
Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet
been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation.
 The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no
provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the
matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed out
by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and
if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD:
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
“Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously not
self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although
this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in
the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.”

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if
Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled
that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution
which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given
when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to
amend the Constitution thru a people’s initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.
 Lambino vs COMELEC

FACTS:
 On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
 The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting
at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
 The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by
adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
 On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
 The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should
be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
“before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present.

First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October
2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.

There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

Principles:
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the... entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative... upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to
it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one
of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen... the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of
the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the
full text of the proposed... amendments... two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change... is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions.

qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution.
The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."... alteration in the structure of government is a
proper subject of inquiry"a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.
A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the
traditional form of government and the system of check and balances

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

vs
HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, et al.

FACTS:
 University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent
Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the buildings in
the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third
billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA).
Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.
 On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on
January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The
denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal
Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS
inDiliman, Quezon City.
 Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to
the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern
Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
 On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final
and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their
previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already
issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003
(although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the
sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release
of the funds.
 Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?
II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed out of time?

HELD:
1. UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public
funds; suability vs. liability of the State)

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a
legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the
States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act
No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the
purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going
into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any
banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned
with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the
UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of
real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated
in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability
and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and
the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable;
on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated
the claim against the UP.

2. The period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon counsel of
record. (The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period
rule; computation of time)

At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished
from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness
of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002.

It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the highest court of
the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted
several exceptions, among them:

(a) the correction of clerical errors;

(b) the so called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party;
(c) void judgments; and
(d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its execution unjust and
inequitable.

We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional power to disregard
the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the UPs right to due
process.

Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal
Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. Verily,
the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS
in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made
upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court,
which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon
his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one
counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by
the opposite side."

Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the
remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be
correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of
appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the
UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the
period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to
the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court
first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration." The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that
aims "to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is
impervious to any serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial,
the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period
rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next
working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22,
Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working
day.

GRANTED
 KHOSROW MINUCHER
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO
(G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003)

Facts:
 Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later
acquitted by the court.
 Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo.
 Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely
an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.
 Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to
DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note
is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

HELD:
YES. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

 The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United
States Embassy.
 Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation”
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo.
 These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and,
after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the
arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can
be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon

doctrine of sovereign immunity

Facts:
 This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic of
Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction
of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
waived their immunity from suit.
 Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and
Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was
to take effect in a period of four years.
 When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he
allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the
standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement.
 The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a
complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in
their private capacities.

Discussions:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In
the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as
expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another.] A contrary attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations”.

The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The increasing need of
sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their
governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive
theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii (public acts of the government of a state), but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis (the commercial activities of a state.)

HELD:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity
to suit.

The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the
ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the
inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state
may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the
embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a
contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia
in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from
suit.

2. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy
immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil
and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:

a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State,
unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,

administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;

an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in
the receiving State outside his official functions.

The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision
clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial
activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.

Bai Sandra Sema

vs
Commission on Elections

FACTS:
 The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao
but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in
1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato
City and 8 other municipalities.
  A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly
created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
 For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only
made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be
called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from
Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
 Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with
Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her
rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains
legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is
being deprived of a representative in the HOR.COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is
still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected
and so is its representation.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.

HELD:
1. YES. RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must
comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed
in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

2. No. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.

However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power
to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a
province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR.

Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said
district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable.

On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is
vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.