G.R. No. 152894. August 17, 2007.*
—Republic Act
CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C. PALAD,
respondents.
Labor Law; Apprenticeship; One of the
objectives of Title II (Training and Employment
of Special Workers) of the Labor Code is to
establish apprenticeship standards for the
protection of apprentices; an apprenticeship
program should first be approved by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
before an apprentice may be hired, otherwise
the person hired will be considered a regular
employee; An apprenticeship program should
first be approved by the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) before an apprentice
may be hired, otherwise the person hired will be
considered a regular employee.—The Labor Code
defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by
a written apprenticeship agreement with an
employer. One of the objectives of Title II (Training
and Employment of Special Workers) of the Labor
Code is to establish apprenticeship standards for
the protection of apprentices. In line with this
objective, Articles 60 and 61 of the Labor Code
provide: ART. 60. Employment of apprentices.—
Only employers in the highly technical industries
may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable
occupations approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. (Emphasis supplied) ART. 61.
Contents of apprenticeship agree-ments.—
Apprenticeship agreements, including the wage
rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules
issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six
months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for
wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in
no case shall start below 75 percent of the
applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only
in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly
approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
The Ministry shall develop standard model
programs of apprenticeship. (Emphasis supplied) In
Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 248 SCRA 654 (1995), the Court cited
Article 61 of the Labor Code and held that an
apprenticeship program should first be approved by
the DOLE before an apprentice may be hired,
otherwise the person hired will be considered a
regular employee.
Same; Same; Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA); Republic Act
No. 7796 (RA 7796), which created the
Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA), has transferred the
authority over apprenticeship programs from
the Bureau of Local Employment of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to
the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA).
No. 7796 (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has
transferred the authority over apprenticeship
programs from the Bureau of Local Employment of
the DOLE to the TESDA. RA 7796 emphasizes
TESDA’s approval of the apprenticeship program as
a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices. Such
intent is clear under Section 4 of RA 7796: SEC. 4.
Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act: x x x j)
“Apprenticeship” training within employment with
compulsory related theoretical instructions
involving a contract between an apprentice and an
employer on an approved apprenticeable
occupation;k)“Apprentice” is a person undergoing
training for an approved apprenticeable occupation
during an established period assured by an
apprenticeship agreement; l) “Apprentice
Agreement” is a contract wherein a prospective
employer binds himself to train the apprentice who
in turn accepts the terms of training for a recognized
apprentice-able occupation emphasizing the rights,
duties and responsibilities of each party; m)
“Apprenticeable Occupation” is an occupation
officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved
for apprenticeship by the Authority [TESDA];
(Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; An apprenticeship
agreement which lacks prior approval from the
Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) is void; Prior approval from
the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA) is necessary to
ensure that only employers in the highly
technical industries may employ apprentices
and only in apprenticeable occupations.—In this
case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered
into between the parties before petitioner filed its
apprenticeship program with the TESDA for
approval. Petitioner and Palad executed the
apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein
it was stated that the training would start on 17 July
1997 and would end approximately in December
1997. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for
approval its apprenticeship program, which the
TESDA subsequently approved on 26 September
1997. Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced even before the TESDA approved
petitioner’s apprenticeship program. Thus, the
apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked
prior approval from the TESDA. The TESDA’s
approval of the employer’s apprenticeship program
is required before the employer is allowed to hire
apprentices. Prior approval from the TESDA is
necessary to ensure that only employers in the
highly technical industries may employ apprentices
and only in apprentice-able occupations. Thus,
under RA 7796, employers can only hire apprentices
for apprenticeable occupations which must be
officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved
for apprenticeship by the TESDA. This is to ensure
the protection of apprentices and to obviate possible
abuses by prospective employers who may want to
take advantage of the lower wage rates for KHIM V. COSTALES, ALVIN V. ALMOITE, and
apprentices and circumvent the right of the JOSEPH S. SAGUN, respondents.
employees to be secure in their employment.

Same; Same; Same; Where a worker is not

Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; When they were
considered an apprentice because the
dismissed without just or authorized cause,
apprenticeship agreement was enforced before
without notice, and without the opportunity to
the TESDA’s approval of the apprenticeship
be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the
program, the worker is deemed a regular
law.—This reality is highlighted by the CA finding
employee.—Since Palad is not considered an
that the respondents occupied positions such as
apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement
machine operator, scaleman and extruder
was enforced before the TESDA’s approval of
operator—tasks that are usually necessary and
petitioner’s apprenticeship program, Palad is
desirable in Atlanta’s usual business or trade as
deemed a regular employee performing the job of a
manufacturer of plastic building materials. These
“fish cleaner.” Clearly, the job of a “fish cleaner” is
tasks and their nature characterized the four as
necessary in petitioner’s business as a tuna and
regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor
sardines factory. Under Article 280 of the Labor
Code. Thus, when they were dismissed without just
Code, an employment is deemed regular where the
or authorized cause, without notice, and without the
employee has been engaged to perform activities
opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal
which are usually necessary or desirable in the
under the law.
usual business or trade of the employer.
Same; Regular Employees; With the expiration
Same; Same; Dismissals; Absenteeism and
of the first agreement and the retention of the
Inefficiency; Habitual absenteeism and poor
employees, Atlanta recognized the completion
efficiency of performance are among the valid
of their training and their acquisition of a
causes for which the employer may terminate
regular employee status.—Even if we recognize
the apprenticeship agreement after the
the company’s need to train its employees through
probationary period.—In this case, the Labor
apprenticeship, we can only consider the first
Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for
apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the
habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of
expiration of the first agreement and the retention
performance. Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book II of
of the employees, Atlanta had, to all intents and
the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, habitual
purposes, recognized the completion of their
absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance are
training and their acquisition of a regular employee
among the valid causes for which the employer may
status. To foist upon them the second
terminate the apprenticeship agreement after the
apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which
probationary period.
was not even mentioned in the agreement itself, is a
Same; Same; Same; When the alleged valid violation of the Labor Code’s implementing rules
cause for the termination of employment is not and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees, to
clearly proven, as in this case, the law say the least.
considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal.—Under Article 227 of the Labor Code,
the employer has the burden of proving that the
G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999.*
termination was for a valid or authorized cause.
Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that Palad MARITES BERNARDO, Et. Al., petitioners, vs.
was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the NLRC NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
found that petitioner failed to prove the authenticity and FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
of the performance evaluation which petitioner respondents.
claims to have conducted on Palad, where Palad
received a performance rating of only 27.75%.
Petitioner merely relies on the performance Labor Law; Labor Code; The facts, viewed in
evaluation to prove Palad’s inefficiency. It was light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for
likewise not shown that petitioner ever apprised Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the
Palad of the performance standards set by the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be
company. When the alleged valid cause for the deemed regular employees.—At the outset, let it
termination of employment is not clearly proven, as be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of
in this case, the law considers the matter a case of private respondent’s effort to provide employment to
illegal dismissal. physically impaired individuals and to make them
more productive members of society. However, we
cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of
G.R. No. 187320. January 26, 2011.* that effort, simply because it now deems their
employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of
ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled
CHAN, petitioners, vs. APRILITO R. SEBOLINO,
Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners,
except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular
employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights
that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold,
not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence
of law and justice.
Same; Same; Since the Magna Carta accords
them the rights of qualified able-bodied
persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of
the Labor Code.—The fact that the employees were
qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80.
Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of
qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered
by Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Same; Same; The test of whether an employee is
regular was laid down in De Leon vs. National
Labor Relations Commission.—The test of
whether an employee is regular was laid down in De
Leon v. NLRC, in which this Court held: “The
primary standard, therefore, of determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer. The connection can be
determined by considering the nature of the work
performed and its relation to the scheme of the
particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if
the employee has been performing the job for at
least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems
repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business.
Hence, the employment is considered regular, but
only with respect to such activity, and while such
activity exists.”
Same; Same; When the bank renewed the
contract after the lapse of the six-month
probationary period, the employees thereby
became regular employees.—As held by the
Court, “Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put
an end to the pernicious practice of making
permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the
simple expedient of extending to them probationary
appointments, ad infinitum.” The contract signed by
petitioners is akin to a probationary employment,
during which the bank determined the employees’
fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the
contract after the lapse of the six-month
probationary period, the employees thereby became
regular employees. No employer is allowed to
determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
Same; Same; As regular employees, the twenty-
seven petitioners are entitled to security of
tenure; that is, their services may be terminated
only for a just or authorized cause.—As regular
employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled
to security of tenure; that is, their services may be
terminated only for a just or authorized cause.
Because respondent failed to show such cause,
these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed illegally
dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges. Considering the allegation of
respondent that the job of money sorting is no
longer available because it has been assigned back
to the tellers to whom it originally belonged,
petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement.
Same; Same; An employee is regular because of
the nature of work and the length of service, not
because of the mode or even the reason for
hiring them.—Respondent argues that petitioners
were merely “accommodated” employees. This fact
does not change the nature of their employment. As
earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the
nature of work and the length of service, not
because of the mode or even the reason for hiring
them.
Same; Same; The determination of whether
employment is casual or regular does not
depend on the will or word of the employer, and
the procedure of hiring x x x but on the nature
of the activities performed by the employee, and
to some extent, the length of performance and
its continued existence.—Equally unavailing are
private respondent’s arguments that it did not go
out of its way to recruit petitioners, and that its
plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T.
Datu v. NLRC, the Court held that “the
determination of whether employment is casual or
regular does not depend on the will or word of the
employer, and the procedure of hiring x x x but on
the nature of the activities performed by the
employee, and to some extent, the length of
performance and its continued existence.”
Same; Same; The well-settled rule is that the
character of employment is determined not by
stipulations in the contract, but by the nature
of the work performed.—Private respondent
argues that the petitioners were informed from the
start that they could not become regular employees.
In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the
stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still,
we are not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that
the character of employment is determined not by
stipulations in the contract, but by the nature of the
work performed. Otherwise, no employee can
become regular by the simple expedient of
incorporating this condition in the contract of
employment.
Same; Same; The noble objectives of Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely
on charity or accommodation, but on justice
and the equal treatment of qualified persons,
disabled or not.—In rendering this decision, the
Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias
in favor of the working class, but also the concern
of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble
objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are
not based merely on charity or accommodation, but
on justice and the equal treatment of qualified
persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the
handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a
hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this
statement is the repeated renewal of their
employment contracts. Why then should they be
dismissed, simply because they are physically
impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing
their fitness for the work assigned to them, they
should be treated and granted the same rights like
any other regular employees.
G.R. No. 164774. April 12, 2006.*
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE
ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA, petitioners, vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA &
LORNA E. ESTRELLA, respondents.
Labor Law; Management Prerogatives; Employer
Policies; Nepotism; It is true that the policy of
the petitioners prohibiting close relatives from
working in the same company takes the nature
of an anti-nepotism employment policy.—It is
true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close
relatives from working in the same company takes
the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy.
Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring
of unqualified persons based on their status as a
relative, rather than upon their ability. These
policies focus upon the potential employment
problems arising from the perception of favoritism
exhibited towards relatives. With more women
entering the workforce, employers are also enacting
employment policies specifically prohibiting
spouses from working for the same company. We
note that two types of employment policies involve
spouses: policies banning only spouses from
working in the same company (no-spouse
employment policies), and those banning all
immediate family members, including spouses, from
working in the same company (anti-nepotism
employment policies).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Two Theories of
Employment Discrimination—Disparate
Treatment and Disparate Impact; Words and
Phrases; Under the disparate treatment
analysis, the employer must prove that an
employment policy is discriminatory on its face;
To establish disparate impact, the
complainants must prove that a facially neutral
policy has a disproportionate effect on a
particular class.—Unlike in our jurisdiction where
there is no express prohibition on marital
discrimination, there are twenty state statutes in
the United States prohibiting marital
discrimination. Some state courts have been
confronted with the issue of whether no-spouse
policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital
status and sex discrimination. In challenging the
anti-nepotism employment policies in the United
States, complainants utilize two theories of
employment discrimination: the disparate
treatment and the disparate impact. Under the
disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must
prove that an employment policy is discriminatory
on its face. No-spouse employment policies
requiring an employee of a particular sex to either
quit, transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory.
For example, an employment policy prohibiting the
employer from hiring wives of male employees, but
not husbands of female employees, is
discriminatory on its face. On the other hand, to
establish disparate impact, the complainants must
prove that a facially neutral policy has a
disproportionate effect on a particular class. For
example, although most employment policies do not
expressly indicate which spouse will be required to
transfer or leave the company, the policy often
disproportionately affects one sex.
Same; Same; Same; Marital Status
Discrimination; The courts narrowly
interpreting marital status to refer only to a
person’s status as married, single, divorced, or
widowed reason that if the legislature intended
a broader definition it would have either chosen
different language or specified its intent.—The
courts narrowly interpreting marital status to refer
only to a person’s status as married, single,
divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature
intended a broader definition it would have either
chosen different language or specified its intent.
They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is
married rather than to whom one is married. They
construe marital status discrimination to include
only whether a person is single, married, divorced,
or widowed and not the “identity, occupation, and
place of employment of one’s spouse.” These courts
have upheld the questioned policies and ruled that
they did not violate the marital status
discrimination provision of their respective state
statutes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;
The courts that have broadly construed the
term “marital status” rule that it encompassed
the identity, occupation and employment of
one’s spouse, and strike down the no-spouse
employment policies based on the broad
legislative intent of the state statute, and
further hold that the absence of a bona fide
occupational qualification invalidates a rule
denying employment to one spouse due to the
current employment of the other spouse in the
same office; This is known as the bona fide
occupational qualification exception.—The
courts that have broadly construed the term
“marital status” rule that it encompassed the
identity, occupation and employment of one’s
spouse. They strike down the no-spouse
employment policies based on the broad legislative
intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-
spouse employment policy violate the marital status
provision because it arbitrarily discriminates
against all spouses of present employees without
regard to the actual effect on the individual’s
qualifications or work performance. These courts
also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid
for failure of the employer to present any evidence
of business necessity other than the general
perception that spouses in the same workplace
might adversely affect the business.They hold that
the absence of such a bona fide occupational
qualification invalidates a rule denying employment
to one spouse due to the current employment of the
other spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that
unless the employer can prove that the reasonable
demands of the business require a distinction based
on marital status and there is no better available or
acceptable policy which would better accomplish
the business purpose, an employer may not
discriminate against an employee based on the
identity of the employee’s spouse. This is known as
the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Occupational
Qualifications; To justify a bona fide
occupational qualification, the employer must
prove two factors: (1) that the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and, (2)
that there is a factual basis for believing that
all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job.—We note that since
the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification
justifies an employer’s no-spouse rule, the exception
is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state
courts. There must be a compelling business
necessity for which no alternative exists other than
the discriminatory practice. To justify a bona fide
occupational qualification, the employer must prove
two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the
job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job. The concept
of a bona fide occupational qualification is not
foreign in our jurisdiction. We employ the standard
of reasonableness of the company policy which is
parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification
requirement. In the recent case of Duncan
Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson
v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., we passed on
the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical
company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The cases of
Duncan Association of Detailment-PTGWO v.
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R. No.
162994, 17 September 2004, 438 SCRA 343,
and Philippine Telegraphy and Telephone
Company v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 118978, 23 May 1997,
272 SCRA 596, instruct that the requirement of
reasonableness must be clearly established to
uphold a questioned employment policy.—The
cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the
requirement of reasonableness must be clearly
established to uphold the questioned employment
policy. The employer has the burden to prove the
existence of a reasonable business necessity. The
burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but
not in PT&T.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That the
“company did not just want to have two (2) or
more of its employees related between the third
degree by affinity and/or consanguinity” is
lame—the policy is premised on the mere fear
that employees married to each other will be
less efficient; If the court were to uphold the
questioned rule without valid justification, the
employer can create policies based on an
unproven presumption of a perceived danger at
the expense of an employee’s right to security of
tenure.—Petitioners’ sole contention that “the
company did not just want to have two (2) or more
of its employees related between the third degree by
affinity and/or consanguinity” is lame. That the
second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the
first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently
not the valid reasonable business necessity required
by the law. It is significant to note that in the case
at bar, respondents were hired after they were found
fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show
how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting
Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an
employee of the Repacking Section, could be
detrimental to its business operations. Neither did
petitioners explain how this detriment will happen
in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production
Helper in the Selecting Department, who married
Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine.
The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less
efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without
valid justification, the employer can create policies
based on an unproven presumption of a perceived
danger at the expense of an employee’s right to
security of tenure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The failure to
prove a legitimate business concern in imposing
an employer policy cannot prejudice the
employee’s right to be free from arbitrary
discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one
company.—Petitioners contend that their policy
will apply only when one employee marries a co-
employee, but they are free to marry persons other
than co-employees. The questioned policy may not
facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
creates a disproportionate effect and under the
disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass
judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable
despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate,
effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate
business concern in imposing the questioned policy
cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one company.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The protection given
to labor in this jurisdiction is vast and extensive
that the Supreme Court cannot prudently draw
inferences from the legislature’s silence that
married persons are not protected under the
Constitution and declare valid a policy based on
a prejudice or stereotype.—The absence of a
statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination
in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners.
The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is
vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw
inferences from the legislature’s silence that
married persons are not protected under our
Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a
prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of
petitioners to present undisputed proof of a
reasonable business necessity, we rule that the
questioned policy is an invalid exercise of
management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to
whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned
voluntarily has become moot and academic.
Same; Illegal Dismissals; Voluntary
Resignation; In voluntary resignation, an
employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to
disassociate himself from employment—it is
done with the intention of relinquishing an
office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment.—The contention of petitioners that
Estrella was pressured to resign because she got
impregnated by a married man and she could not
stand being looked upon or talked about as immoral
is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid
embarrassment and humiliation, she would not
have gone back to work at all. Nor would she have
filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for
reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary
resignation, the employee is compelled by personal
reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It
is done with the intention of relinquishing an office,
accompanied by the act of abandonment. Thus, it is
illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of
sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the
resignation was voluntary, Estrella’s dismissal is
declared illegal.
G.R. No. 162994. September 17, 2004.*
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO
and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners, vs. GLAXO
WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
Labor Law; Dismissals; Glaxo’s policy
prohibiting an employee from having a
relationship with an employee of a competitior
company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.—No reversible error can be ascribed to
the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s
policy prohibiting an employee from having a
relationship with an employee of a competitor
company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade
secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it
and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry.
Same; Same; While our laws endeavor to give
life to the constitutional policy on social justice
and the protection of labor, it does not mean
that every labor dispute will be decided in favor
of the workers; The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled
to respect and enforcement in the interest of
fair play.—That Glaxo possesses the right to
protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the right of
enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to
protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed,
while our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor
dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The
law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement
in the interest of fair play.
Same; Same; The challenged company policy
does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.—The challenged company policy
does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It
is a settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or
those acting under color of its authority. Corollary,
it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that the equal protection clause
erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only
exception occurs when the state in any of its
manifestations or actions has been found to have
become entwined or involved in the wrongful private
conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is not
present in this case.
Same; Same; Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor companies;
What the company merely seeks to avoid is a
conflict of interest between the employee and
the company that may arise out of such
relationships.—From the wordings of the
contractual provision and the policy in its employee
handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an
absolute prohibition against relationships between
its employees and those of competitor companies.
Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with
and marry persons of their own choosing. What the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of
interest between the employee and the company
that may arise out of such relationships.
Same; Same; Constructive Dismissal; Definition
of Constructive Dismissal.—The Court finds no
merit in petitioners’ contention that Tecson was
constructively dismissed when he was transferred
from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area
to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur
sales area, and when he was excluded from
attending the company’s seminar on new products
which were directly competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is
defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation
resorted to when continued employment becomes
impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is
a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a
clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
None of these conditions are present in the instant
case. The record does not show that Tecson was
demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of
such transfer.
G.R. Nos. 169295-96. November 20, 2006.*
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA
CASTAÑEDA, respondent.
Labor Law; Procedural Rules and
Technicalities; The application of technical
rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the
demands of substantial justice, particularly in
labor cases.—It is well settled that the application
of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to
serve the demands of substantial justice,
particularly in labor cases. Labor cases must be
decided according to justice and equity and the
substantial merits of the controversy. Rules of
procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice;
Verification; The requirement of verification is
formal, and not jurisdictional—verification is
simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith.—This Court has consistently
held that the requirement of verification is formal,
and not jurisdictional. Such requirement is merely
a condition affecting the form of the pleading,
noncompliance with which does not necessarily
render it fatally defective. Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations
in the pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith. The court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act on the
pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with
the rules may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may thereby be served.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; While it is an
established rule that the perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal
has the effect of rendering the judgment final
and executory, it is equally settled that the
National Labor Relations Commission may
disregard the procedural lapse where there is
an acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the
taking of the appeal.—Under Article 223 of the
Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC shall be final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from the
receipt thereof by the parties. While it is an
established rule that the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law
is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure
to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory, it is equally settled
that the NLRC may disregard the procedural lapse
where there is an acceptable reason to excuse
tardiness in the taking of the appeal. Among the
acceptable reasons recognized by this Court are (a)
counsel’s reliance on the footnote of the notice of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter that “the aggrieved
party may appeal. . . within ten (10) working days”;
(b) fundamental consideration of substantial
justice; (c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of
unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is
from a decision granting separation pay which was
already granted in an earlier final decision; and (d)
special circumstances of the case combined with its
legal merits or the amount and the issue involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Technicality should
not be permitted to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights
and obligations of the parties for the ends of
justice are reached not only through the speedy
disposal of cases but, more importantly,
through a meticulous and comprehensive
evaluation of the merits of a case.—We hold that
the particular circumstances in the case at bar, in
accordance with substantial justice, call for a
liberalization of the application of this rule. Notably,
respondent’s last day for filing her motion for
reconsideration fell on December 16, 2000, which
was a Saturday. In a number of cases, we have ruled
that if the tenth day for perfecting an appeal fell on
a Saturday, the appeal shall be made on the next
working day. The reason for this ruling is that on
Saturdays, the office of the NLRC and certain post
offices are closed. With all the more reason should
this doctrine apply to respondent’s filing of the
motion for reconsideration of her cause, which the
NLRC itself found to be impressed with merit.
Indeed, technicality should not be permitted to
stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving the rights and obligations of the parties for
the ends of justice are reached not only through the
speedy disposal of cases but, more importantly,
through a meticulous and comprehensive
evaluation of the merits of a case.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; The mere
pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
in connection with a pending case in a lower
court, does not interrupt the course of the latter
if there is no writ of injunction.—As to
petitioner’s argument that the NLRC had already
lost its jurisdiction to decide the case when it filed
its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
suffice it to state that under Section 7 of Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding with the case.
Thus, the mere pendency of a special civil action for
certiorari, in connection with a pending case in a
lower court, does not interrupt the course of the
latter if there is no writ of injunction. Clearly, there
was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in issuing its second decision which modified
the first, especially since it failed to consider the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration when it
issued its first decision.
Same; Employer-Employee Relationship; That a
person works within company premises, and
that she does not cater exclusively to the
personal comfort of a company officer and his
family, is reflective of the existence of the
company’s right of control over her functions,
which is the primary indicator of the existence
of an employeremployee relationship.—In the
case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position
paper that respondent worked at the company
premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its
employees’ lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs,
as well as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook,
who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his
family but also to that of the petitioner’s employees,
makes her fall squarely within the definition of a
regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in
the Apex Mining case. That she works within
company premises, and that she does not cater
exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and
his family, is reflective of the existence of the
petitioner’s right of control over her functions,
which is the primary indicator of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.
Same; Same; The determination of the existence
of an employeremployee relationship is defined
by law according to the facts of each case,
regardless of the nature of the activities
involved.—It is wrong to say that if the work is not
directly related to the employer’s business, then the
person performing such work could not be
considered an employee of the latter. The
determination of the existence of an employer-
employee relationship is defined by law according to
the facts of each case, regardless of the nature of the
activities involved. Indeed, it would be the height of
injustice if we were to hold that despite the fact that
respondent was made to cook lunch and merienda
for the petitioner’s employees, which work
ultimately redounded to the benefit of the petitioner
corporation, she was merely a domestic worker of
the family of Mr. Tan.
Same; Abandonment; Words and Phrases;
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his
employment—it is a form of neglect of duty;
hence, a just cause for termination of
employment by the employer.—Abandonment is
the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee
to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of
duty; hence, a just cause for termination of
employment by the employer under Article 282 of
the Labor Code, which enumerates the just causes
for termination by the employer. For a valid finding
of abandonment, these two factors should be
present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear
intention to sever employer-employee relationship,
with the second as the more determinative factor
which is manifested by overt acts from which it may
be deduced that the employee has no more intention
to work. The intent to discontinue the employment
must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate
and unjustified. This, the petitioner failed to do in
the case at bar. Alongside the petitioner’s contention
that it was the respondent who quit her employment
and refused to return to work, greater stock may be
taken of the respondent’s immediate filing of her
complaint with the NLRC. Indeed, an employee who
loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any
reasoning be said to have abandoned her work, for
it is well-settled that the filing of an employee of a
complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for
reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return
to work, thus, negating the employer’s charge of
abandonment.