Right to Information Case No.

: 7
LIMITATIONS Subtopic: Right of Association
a. Membership in subversive organizations
INVENTORY OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO ACCESS OF
INFORMATION People v. Ferrer
48 SCRA 382 (1972)
1. Information covered by executive privilege
2. Privileged information relating to national security, defense, Doctrine: Freedom of association is Xxx clearly and heavily
or international relations outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security
3. Information concerning law enforcement and protection of and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country.
public and personal safety
4. Information deemed confidential for the protection of the Facts: Two information on different instances were filed against
privacy and certain individuals such as minors, victims of crimes several individuals for violating the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957.
or the accused One was against Feliciano Co for being a leader of the
5. Information, documents, or records known by reason of Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by
official capacity and are deemed as confidential, including those circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
submitted or disclosed by entities to government agencies, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity.
tribunals and boards or officers, in relation to the performance The other was against NiloTayag and five other people for being
of their functions or to inquires or investigation conducted by members / leaders of the New Peoples Army (NPA) and for
them in the exercise of their administrative, regulatory or quasi- inciting and instigating people to unite and overthrow the
judicial powers. Philippine Government attended by aggravating circumstances
6. Prejudicial, premature disclosure of aid of armed men, craft, and fraud.
7. Records of proceedings or information from proceedings
which pursuant to law or relevant rules and regulations are The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 (Republic Act No. 1700) was
treated as confidential or privileged approved, among other purposes, to outlaw the CPP and similar
8. Matters considered confidential under banking and finance associations and membership therein. It defined the Communist
laws and their amendatory laws, and; Party as an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government,
9. Other exceptions to the right to information under laws, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
jurisprudence, and rules and regulations. other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present
danger to the security of the Philippines and further provided that
(PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT MEMORANDUM FOR THE ELABORATION affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is
OF EACH EXCEPTION WHICH IS AVAILABLE IN PDF) punishable.

Co and Tayag moved to quash the information against them and

questioned the validity of the
Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of
attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject
not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal
protection of the laws. Resolving the constitutional issues raised,
the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared
the
statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it
is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations against
the two accused. The government appealed by filing a special
civil action for certiorari to uphold the validity of R.A.1700.

Issue: Whether or not the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 outlawing

subversive associations is violative of Constitutional right of
association, hence, unconstitutional?

Ruling: No. The Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow

the Government by force, violence or other illegal means.
Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of
association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so
indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily
outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security
and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country.

1
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Act is similar in
many respects to the membership provision of the Anti-
Subversion Act. The former provides:
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society,
group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage
the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or
violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliated with, any
such society, group or assembly of persons, knowing the purpose
thereof.
which led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegal
means for the purpose of placing the country under the control
of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined the CPP; and (c)
that he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to the crime of
remaining a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines
or of any other subversive association; we leave this matter to
future determination.

"Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more

than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment
by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the
five years next following his conviction, . . ."

In sustaining the validity of this provision, the Court said in Scales

vs. United, States:

"It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we are here
concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and it was
further established that a combination to promote such advocacy,
albeit under the aegis of
what purports to be a political party, is not such association as is
protected by the first Amendment. We can discern no reason why
membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of complicity
in a group engaging in this same forbidden advocacy, should
receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of
that Amendment."

Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problems of

accommodating the exigencies of self-preservation and the
values of liberty are as complex and intricate as in the situation
described in the legislative findings stated in the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, the legislative
judgment as to how that threat may best be met consistently
with the safeguards of personal freedoms is not to be set aside
merely because the judgment of judges would, in the first
instance, have chosen other
methods. For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom
to hire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromise
between the claims of the social order and individual freedom,
and when the legislative compromise in either case is brought to
the judicial test the court stands one step removed from the
conflict
and its resolution through law."

The Government, in addition to proving such circumstances as

may affect liability, must establish the following elements of the
crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippines or any
other subversive association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the

Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the purpose of the
organization is to overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime
under the domination of a foreign power; (b) that the accused
joined such
organization; and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts; and(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, (a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectives
2
Case No: 8
Subtopic: Right of Association – Right to Join
Case Title: STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION vs. JUAN
DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 141961. January 23, 2002
Doctrine:Freedom of Association; The constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to
associate.—To support their contention that private
respondents are members of the association, petitioners cite the
SCHA’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws which provide that
all landowners of the Sta. Clara Subdivision are automatically
members of the SCHA. We are not persuaded. The
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the
freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one
will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that
partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees
the right to form an association. It does not include the right to
compel others to form or join one.
Same; Homeowners cannot be compelled to become
members of a homeowners’ association by the simple expedient
of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws
without their express or implied consent; Memberships in
homeowners’ associations may be acquired in various ways—
often through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms of
evidence of property ownership.—More to the point, private
respondents cannot be compelled to become members of the
SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of
Incorporation and Bylaws without their express or implied
consent. True, it may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners
in a subdivision to band themselves together to promote their
common welfare. But that is possible only if the owners
voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of
the association. True also, memberships in homeowners’
associations may be acquired in various ways—often through
deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms of evidence of
property ownership. In the present case, however, other than
the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no
showing that private respondents have agreed to be SCHA
members.
FACTS: On 1 April 1998, Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M.
Gaston, private respondents herein, filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction/preliminary mandatory
injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional
Trial Court in Negros Occidental at Bacolod City against
petitioners Santa Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA for
brevity) thru its Board of Directorsand Santa Clara Estate,
Incorporated.
"The complaint alleged that private respondents herein
[were] residents of San Jose Avenue, Sta. Clara
Subdivision, Mandalagan, Bacolod City. They purchased
their lots in the said subdivision sometime in 1974, and
at the time of purchase, there was no mention or
requirement of membership in any homeowners’
association. From that time on, they have remained
non-members of SCHA. They also stated that an
arrangement was made wherein homeowners who
[were] non-members of the association were issued
‘non-member’ gatepass stickers for their vehicles for
identification by the security guards manning the
subdivision’s entrances and exits. This arrangement
remained undisturbed until sometime in the middle of
March, 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board
resolution which decreed that only its members in good
standing were to be issued stickers for use in their
vehicles. Thereafter, on three separate incidents, Victor
M. Gaston, the son of the private respondents herein
who lives with them, was required by the guards on
duty employed by SCHA to show his driver’s license as a
prerequisite to his entrance to the subdivision and to
his residence therein despite their knowing him
personally and the exact location of his residence. On
29 March 1998, private respondent herein Victor Ma.
Gaston was himself prevented from entering the
subdivision and proceeding to his residential abode
when petitioner herein security guards Roger Capillo
and a ‘John Doe’ lowered the steel bar of the KAMETAL
gate of the subdivision and demanded from him his
driver’s license for identification. The complaint further
alleged that these acts of the petitioners herein done in
the presence of other subdivision owners had caused
private respondents to suffer moral damage.
On 8 April 1998, petitioners herein filed a motion to
dismiss arguing that the trial court ha[d] no jurisdiction
over the case as it involve[d] an intra-corporate dispute
between SCHA and its members pursuant to Republic
Act No. 580, as amended by Executive Order Nos. 535
and 90, much [less], to declare as null and void the
subject resolution of the board of directors of SCHA,
the proper forum being the Home Insurance (and
Guaranty) Corporation (HIGC). To support their claim of
intra-corporate controversy, petitioners stated that the
Articles of Incorporation of SCHA, which was duly
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on 4 October 1973, provides ‘that the association
shall be a non-stock corporation with all homeowners
of Sta. Clara constituting its membership’. Also, its by-
laws contains a provision that ‘all real estate owners in
Sta. Clara Subdivision automatically become members
of the association’. The private respondents, having
become lot owners of Sta. Clara Subdivision in 1974
after the approval by the SEC of SCHA’s articles of
incorporation and by-laws, became members
automatically in 1974 of SCHA argued the petitioners.
Moreover, the private respondents allegedly enjoyed
the privileges and benefits of membership in and
abided by the rules of the association, and even
attended the general special meeting of the association
members on 24 March 1998. Their non-payment of the
association yearly dues [did] not make them non-
members of SCHA continued the petitioners. And even
granting that the private respondents [were] not
members of the association, the petitioners opined that
the HIGC still ha[d] jurisdiction over the case pursuant
to Section 1 (a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
HIGC.
3
ISSUE: "Whether or not private respondents are members of
SCHA.
RULING: No, private respondents are not members of the SCHA.
The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
association18 includes the freedom not to associate.The right to
choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very
foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted
that the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It
does not include the right to compel others to form or join
one.21
More to the point, private respondents cannot be compelled to
become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of
including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws
without their express or implied consent. True, it may be to the
mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to band
themselves together to promote their common welfare. But that
is possible only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or
indirectly, to become members of the association. True also,
memberships in homeowners’ associations may be acquired in
various ways -- often through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates
or other forms of evidence of property ownership. In the
present case, however, other than the said Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that private
respondents have agreed to be SCHA members.
As correctly observed by the CA:
"x xx. The approval by the SEC of the said documents is not an
operative act which bestows membership on the private
respondents because the right to associate partakes of the
nature of freedom of contract which can be exercised by and
between the homeowners amongst themselves, the
homeowners’ association and a homeowner, and the subdivision
owner and a homeowner/lot buyer.
Subtopic: Right of Association (Right not to join)
Case Title: BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., plaintiff-
appellee, vs.VIRGILIO V. DIONISIO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-38354 June 30, 1989
Doctrine:
The approval of a contract by a Goverment Branch(Land
Registration Commission) does not make it a governmental act
subject to the constitutional restriction against infringement of
the right of association. The constitutional proscription that no
person can be compelled to be a member of an association
against his will applies only to government acts and not to
private transactions like the one in question.
The defendant cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to
be a member of the association against his will because the
limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does
not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question he
can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of
the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a
member of the plaintiff association. After all, it is not imposed
upon him personally but upon his ownership of the property.
The limitation and restriction is a limitation that follows the land
whoever is its owner. It does not inhere in the person of the
defendant.
FACTS:
That plaintiff was incorporated as corporation and the By-laws of
the association, provides for automatic membership in the
association for every owner and purchaser of lots located inside
the Bel Air Village, thereafter, without applying for membership
in the plaintiff association, defendant in this case, like the other
members, automatically became a member because he is the
registered owner of a lot located inside the Bel Air Village and in
accordance with the By-Laws of the plaintiff, the association is
run and managed by a Board of Governors who exercises,
among other things, the power to assess and collect against
every owner of the lot inside the Bel Air Village, certain amounts
for the operation and activities of the association.
On January 22, 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint against the
defendant in the municipal court of Makati, for the collection of
the amount of P 2,100 which represents the association dues
assessed on the lot owned by the defendant as member of the
plaintiff association plus penalty of 12% per annum and
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The defendant filed an
answer traversing all the material allegations of the complaint
and set up the following special defenses;
1) That there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant;
2) that the collection of alleged dues from its members is in
reality an unlawful exercise of the power of taxation which is
beyond the corporate power of the plaintiff,
3) that the amount sought to be collected is unreasonable and
oppressive,
4) that the assessment of the dues upon the defendant in so far
as he has not voluntarily affiliated with plaintiff is illegal,
immoral, contrary to law and public policy, and
4

**Related to the syllabus**
5) that the acts of plaintiff in compelling the defendant to be a
member is unconstitutional and outside the scope of its corporate
power
ISSUE
1. W/N the collection is illegal?
2. W/N there the acts of plaintiff in compelling the defendant to
be a member is unconstitutional?
RULING:
1. No, the collection is LEGAL.
When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of
land it was understood that he took the same free of all
encumbrances except notations at the back of the certificate of
title, among them, that he automatically becomes a member of
the respondent association.
The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the
dues are intended clearly indicate that the dues are not in the
concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are
shares in the common expenses for necessary services.
2. The contention that this lien collides with the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of association is not tenable. The
transaction between the defendants and the original seller
(defendant's immediate predecessor) of the land is a sale and
the conditions have been validly imposed by the said vendor/the
same not being contrary to law, morals and good customs and
public policy. The fact that it has been approved by the Land
Registration Commission did not make it a governmental act
subject to the constitutional restriction against infringement of
the right of association. The constitutional proscription that no
person can be compelled to be a member of an association
against his will applies only to government acts and not to
private transactions like the one in question.
The defendant cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to
be a member of the association against his will because the
limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does
not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question he
can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of
the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a
member of the plaintiff association. After all, it is not imposed
upon him personally but upon his ownership of the property.
The limitation and restriction is a limitation that follows the land
whoever is its owner. It does not inhere in the person of the
defendant.
Subtopic: Right not to join an association.
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
Doctrine: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for
the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as
he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 29, 1975,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976,
the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the
said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that
as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic,
he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP
By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court
to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that
the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the
IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an
official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of
the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now
appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court.
5
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 1 of Court Rule is unconstitutional (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro.
for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
(and not to associate). law and the integration of the Bar

RULING: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of
Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he
is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for
the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with

anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers.

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel

a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion
is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

We must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a

property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with
the lawyer's public responsibilities.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every

lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to
do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of
a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment
of the offending member

The most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality

and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by
Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxxxxx

6
Case No. 11
Subtopic: Non-impairment of contracts
a)When there is impairment
China Banking Coporation v. ASB Holdings,Inc.
G.R. No. 172192, December 23, 2008
Doctrine: The Court reiterates that the SEC’s approval of the
Rehabilitation Plan did not impair BPI’s right to contract. As
correctly contended by private respondents, the non-
impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power
and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The SEC, through the
hearing panel that heard the petition for approval of the
Rehabilitation Plan, was acting as a quasi-judicial body and, thus,
its order approving the plan cannot constitute an impairment of
the right and the freedom to contract.
Besides, the mere fact that the Rehabilitation Plan proposes
a dacion en pago approach does not render it defective on the
ground of impairment of the right to contract. Dacion en pago is
a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another
thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of
an outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in a sense
of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the
thing or property of the debtor, the payment for which is to be
charged against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential
elements of a contract of sale, namely; consent, object certain,
and cause or consideration must be present. Being a form of
contract, the dacion en pago agreement cannot be perfected
without the consent of the parties involved.
Facts:
In 1999, respondent ASB Development Corporation was granted
a credit line by petitioner China Bank in the amount
of P35,000,000.00. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage constituted over two contiguous lots with a combined
area of 1,332.5 square meters in Grace Park, Caloocan City.
In 2000, respondent ASB Realty Corporation, an affiliate of ASB
Development, obtained an omnibus credit line from petitioner
China Bank in the amount of P265,000,000.00. The loan was
secured by two real estate mortgages: (1) over two parcels of
land situated at Salcedo, Legaspi Village, Makati City, covered
by TCT Nos. 205136 and 206189; and (2) over a parcel of land
located at Constellation Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati City,
covered by TCT No. 201933.
Respondent corporations defaulted in the payment of the
agreed loan amortizations, interest, and other charges. Demands
to pay were left unheeded.
On May 2, 2000, ASB Development Corporation and its affiliates,
filed before the SEC a petition for rehabilitation with prayer for
suspension of actions and proceedings, pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 902-A, as amended (The Corporate Rehabilitation),
docketed as SEC Case No. 05-00-6609.
In filing the petition for rehabilitation, respondents contended
that while they have sufficient capitalization, the company will
be hard-pressed to service its obligations in favor of petitioner
bank and its other creditors due to a glut in the real estate
market, the depreciation of the currency and decreased investor
confidence in the Philippine economy. Respondents then prayed
that the SEC, after due hearing: (a) appoint an interim
receiver; (b) suspend all actions against the ASB Group for a
period of sixty days subject to extension; and (c) approve a
rehabilitation plan for the ASB Group and appoint a
rehabilitation receiver to monitor the implementation of the
said rehabilitation plan.
On August 18, 2000, respondent ASB Development Corporation
submitted the rehabilitation plan for approval of the SEC. The
plan, in part, provides:
x x x Based on the program, secured creditors claims amounting
to PhP5.192 billion will be paid in full including interest up
to April 30, 2000. Secured creditors have been asked to waive all
penalties and other charges. This dacion en pago program is
essential to eventually pay all creditors and rehabilitate the ASB
Group of Companies. If the dacion en pago herein contemplated
does not materialize for failure of the secured creditors to agree
thereto, this rehabilitation plan contemplates to settle the
obligations (without interest, penalties, and other related
charges accruing after the date of the initial suspension order) to
secured creditors with mortgaged properties at ASB selling
prices for the general interest of the employees, creditors, unit
buyers, government, general public, and the economy.
On April 26, 2001, the ASB rehabilitation plan was approved by
the SEC.
Aggrieved, petitioner bank appealed the plans approval to
the SEC En Banc. According to petitioner, the SEC order
compelling the bank to surrender its present collateral and
accept certain properties located
in Pasig City and Parañaque City as payment of the obligations
due it violates the constitutional proscription against impairment
of contracts. It was likewise argued that the value of the
properties being offered by ASB via dacion en pago is insufficient
to cover the amount of its outstanding loans; and that the
preference conferred by law to the bank as a secured creditor
has been rendered illusory.
The SEC En Banc denied with finality petitioner bank’s
appeal. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. CA dismissed
the bank’s petition, hence this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the ASB Rehabilitation Plan violates the
principles of mutuality of contracts, curtails a party’s freedom to
contract.
Rulings:
No. The approved Rehabilitation Plan did not constitute an
impairment of the right and the freedom to contract.
7
This is not the first time that the matter of the rehabilitation plan
of respondent ASB Development Corporation has reached the
Courts corridors.
In Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. ASB Holdings, Inc.,the
Court held then:
We are not convinced that the approval of the Rehabilitation
Plan impairs petitioner banks lien over the mortgaged
properties. Section 6[c] of P.D. No. 902-A provides that upon
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for
claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under
management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal,
board or body shall be suspended.
In a related case, Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Court En Banc would be more
emphatic in holding that:
The very same issues confronted the Court in the case of
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. ASB Holdings, et al. In
this case, Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (MBTC) refused
to enter into a dacion en pago arrangement contained
in ASB’s proposed Rehabilitation Plan. MBTC argued, among
others, that the forced transfer of properties and the diminution
of its right to enforce its lien on the mortgaged properties
violate its constitutional right against impairment of contracts
and right to due process. The Court ruled that there is no
impairment of contracts because the approval of the
Rehabilitation Plan and the appointment of a rehabilitation
receiver merely suspend the action for claims against the ASB
Group, and MBTC may still enforce its preference when the
assets of the ASB Group will be liquidated. But if the
rehabilitation is found to be no longer feasible, then the claims
against the distressed corporation would have to be settled
eventually and the secured creditors shall enjoy preference
over the unsecured ones. Moreover, the Court stated that there
is no compulsion to enter into a dacion en pago agreement, nor
to waive the interests, penalties and related charges, since these
are merely proposals to creditors such as MBTC, such that in the
event the secured creditors refuse the dacion, the Rehabilitation
Plan proposes to settle the obligations to secured creditors with
mortgaged properties at selling prices.
of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the
thing or property of the debtor, the payment for which is to be
charged against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential
elements of a contract of sale, namely; consent, object certain,
and cause or consideration must be present. Being a form of
contract, the dacion en pago agreement cannot be perfected
without the consent of the parties involved.
We find no element of compulsion in
the dacion en pago provision of the Rehabilitation Plan. It was
not the only solution presented by the ASB to pay its creditors.
In fact, it was stated in the Rehabilitation Plan that:
x x x If the dacion en pago herein contemplated does not
materialize for failure of the secured creditors to agree thereto,
the rehabilitation plan contemplates to settle the obligations
(without interest, penalties and other related charges accruing
after the date of the initial suspension order) to secured
creditors with mortgaged properties at ASB selling prices for the
general interest of the employees, creditors, unit buyers,
government, general public, and the economy.
Thus, if BPI does not find the dacion en pago modality
acceptable, the ASB Group can propose to settle its debts at
such amount as is equivalent to the selling price of the
mortgaged properties. If BPI still refuses this option, it can assert
its rights in the liquidation and distribution of the ASB Groups
assets. It will not lose its status as a secured creditor, retaining
its preference over unsecured creditors when the assets of the
corporation are finally liquidated.
We are inclined to rule in a similar fashion here.

The Court reiterates that the SEC’s approval of the Rehabilitation

Plan did not impair BPI’s right to contract. As correctly
contended by private respondents, the non-impairment clause is
a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial power. The SEC, through the hearing panel that
heard the petition for approval of the Rehabilitation Plan, was
acting as a quasi-judicial body and, thus, its order approving the
plan cannot constitute an impairment of the right and the
freedom to contract.

Besides, the mere fact that the Rehabilitation Plan proposes

a dacion en pago approach does not render it defective on the
ground of impairment of the right to contract. Dacion en pago is
a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another
thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of
an outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in a sense
8
Case No: 12
Subtopic: Exception to Non-Impairment of Contracts
Case Title: Ortigas vs. FEATI
G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979
Doctrine:While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled
with the legitimate exercise of police power.
FACTS:Ortigas and Co. is engaged in real estate business
developing and selling lots to the public. It sold to Augusto
Padilla and Natividad Angeles Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31 of the
Highway Hills Subdivision, Mandaluyong by sale on instalments.
The vendees then transferred their rights and interests over the
aforesaid lots in favour of one Emma Chavez. The agreements
of sale on instalment and the deeds of sale contained the
restriction that “The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale
shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes,
and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or
gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.”
Feati Bank and Trust Co. later bought said lots from Emma
Chavez in the name of Republic Flour Mills. Ortigas and Co.
claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general
building scheme designed for the beautification and
development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part
of its big landed estate. Feati Bank, on the other hand,
maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from
Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River has been declared a commercial
and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27 s-1960 of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. Later on, Feati Bank
commenced construction on the said lots for a building devoted
to banking purposes. It refused to comply with the demands of
Ortigas& Co. to stop the said construction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 can nullify or
supersede the contractual obligations assumed by the
defendant.
RULING: Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has
to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.
“ the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety of the general
welfare of the people.” This general welfare clause shall be
liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power
to local governments in promoting the economic conditions,
social welfare and material progress of the people in the
community. The only exceptions under Section 12 of the Local
Autonomy Act (R.A. 2264) are existing vested rights arising out
of a contract between a province, city or municipality on one
hand and a third party on the other hand. Said case is not
present in this petition.
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as
an industrial and commercial zone was passed in the exercise of
police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace,
good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs The Deputy Executive Secretary, et
al.
190 SCRA 673 / GR No. 79538, 18 October 1990, J. Cortes
Doctrine: (franchise, privilege, and license)
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence
a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause.
FACTS:
In 1986, at the start of President Corazon Aquino’s
administration, petitioner sent letters to the Office of the
President and to the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR)
seeking the reinstatement of its timber license agreement (TLA
No. 87), which was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine
other concessions, during the Marcos administration. It alleged
that after the its TLA was cancelled without being given the
opportunity to be heard, its logging area was re-awarded to
other logging concessionaires without a formal award or license,
as these entities were controlled or owned by relatives or
cronies of deposed President Marcos.
The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within
the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege
which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so
demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in
view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose
licenses were revoked in 1983. It also emphasized the fact that
there was currently a total log ban being imposed on the subject
areas.
After the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the
Office of the President, but the petition was denied on the
ground that the appeal was prematurely filed, the matter not
having been terminated in the MNR. Hence, petitioner filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Timber Licensing Agreement is a contract.
RULING:
The assailed orders of the MNR disclose public policy
consideration, which effectively forestall judicial interference.
Public respondents, upon whose shoulders rests the task of
implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's
natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and
permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. A
9
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under their special technical knowledge and
training.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence
a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause.
The Court expresses its concern regarding alleged irregularities
in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of
logging concessionaires. Should the appropriate case be
brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of
concerned officials with respect to the implementation of this
public policy, the Court will not hesitate to step in. However, in
this case, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and
to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.
Case No. 14
Topic: Free Access to Courts and Quasi-Judicial Bodies and
Adequate Legal Assistance
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM
LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION,
INC.
A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC; August 19, 2009
Doctrine: Only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an
indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical
person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess
property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or
criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of
their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be
accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to
indigent litigants.
FACTS: The administrator of Good Shepherd Foundation, Mr.
Prioreschi, wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice asking if
the Court could grant to their Foundation, an institution who
works mainly with indigent and underprivileged people, the
same option granted to indigent people, that is, an exemption to
the payment of legal fees.
ISSUE: Whether an institution for indigent and underprivileged
people, such as Good Shepherd Foundation, has the right to free
access to courts and quasi-judicial bodies
RULING: The Court answers in the negative. The Courts cannot
grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.
the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to
indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for
indigent and underprivileged people. The basis for the
exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause,
embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts and
quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be
denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the
Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the
equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give
constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor. In
implementation of the right of free access under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically,
Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of
Court. Only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an
indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical
person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess
property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or
criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of
their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be
accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to
indigent litigants.
10
Rights under Custodial Investigation: Police Line-Up
People vs Pepino
Facts: Two man and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan
at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Paranaque City, and
pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive
them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino pulled out
a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the
money was inside the cashier's box. Pepino and the other man
looted the "'cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him
to go with them.From the hallway, Jocelyn Tan Edward's wife,
saw Pepino take her husband.
Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla. The
woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front passenger
seat.The abductors then placed surgical tape over Edward's eyes
and made him wear sunglasses. After travelling for two and a
half hours, they arrived at an apartment in Quezon City. The
abductors approached Edward and asked for the phone number
of his father so that he could ask for ransom for his (Edward's)
liberty.
The kidnappers called Edward's father and demanded a P40
million ransom. Edward's father told the kidnappers that he did
not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn
who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers
told Jocelyn to drop these at a convenience store in front of
McDonald's at Mindanao Avenue.
After four days Antonio (the family driver) brought the agreed
amount to the 7-Eleven convenience store at Mindanao
Avenue.That evening, three men and Gomez blindfolded
Edward, made him board a car, and drove around for 30
minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward that he could remove
his blindfold after five minutes. When Edward removed his
blindfold, he found himself inside his own car parked at the UP
Diliman Campus. He drove home and reported his kidnapping to
TeresitaAng See, a known anti-crime crusader.
After five months, NBI informed Edward that they had
apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them
from a line-up consisting of seven persons: five males and two
females. Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one
Mario Galgo. Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino.
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense.
RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and sentenced them to suffer the death
penalty.
The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the
death penalty that the R TC imposed. We referred the case to
the CA for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in People
v. Mateo.
Ca affirmed RTC’s decision.
Petitioner’s contention: It was impossible for Edward to have
seen her in the front seat of the getaway car because he
(Edward) was blindfolded. Gomez further claimed that Edward's
identification of her during trial "may have been preconditioned
x xx by suggestive identification" made at the police lineup.
Issue: Whether or not the the identification in the police line-up
is admissible?
Ruling: There is no merit in Gomez's claim that Edward's
identification of her during trial might have been preconditioned
by the "suggestive identification" made during the police lineup.
The Court explained the procedure for out-of-court
identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such
identifications in this manner:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various
ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is
brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done
thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose x xx In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-
of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward's
out-of-court identification to be reliable and thus admissible. To
recall, when the three individuals entered Edward's office, they
initially pretended to be customers,and even asked about the
products that were for sale.The three had told Edward that they
were going to pay, but Pepino "pulled out a gun" instead. After
Pepino' s companion had taken the money from the cashier's
box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go
down to the parked car. From this sequence of events, there
was thus ample opportunity for Edward - before and after the
gun had been pointed at him - to view the faces of the three
persons who entered his office. In addition, Edward stated that
Pepino had talked to him "[a]t least once a day"during the four
days that he was detained.
We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward's
and Jocelyn's attention from the incident. Nothing in the records
shows the presence of any distraction that could have disrupted
the witnesses' attention at the time of the incident.
Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of
criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their
assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. It
is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is
to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator and to
observe the manner in which the offense is perpetrated. Most
often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof,
create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a
witness's memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of
the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes,
eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of criminals at any given time.
While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution,
there is no compelling circumstance in this case that would
warrant its non-application.
Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at
the NBI was not suggestive. We note that there were seven
11
people in the lineup; Edward was not compelled to focus his
attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have
been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup
instead of only two, or if there had been a separate lineup for
Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males
and two females in the lineup did not render the procedure
irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or
even suggested to Edward that the appellants were the
suspected perpetrators.
The lineup had not been attended by any suggestiveness on the
part of the police or the NBI agents; there was no evidence that
they had supplied or even suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn
that the appellants were the kidnappers.
We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has
acquitted an accused when the out-of-court identification is
fatally flawed. In these cases, however, it had been clearly
shown that the identification procedure was suggestive.
Case No. 16
Subtopic: Rights of Suspects Under Custodial
Investigation
a. When rights available
RODEL LUZ v. PEOPLE
G. R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
Doctrine: The roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should not be
considered custodial interrogation, such questioning does not
fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a
formal arrest.
Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended
due to a traffic violation.
FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was assigned at Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer, saw the accused, driving a
motorcycle without a helmet. This prompted him to flag down
the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires
all motorcycle drivers to wear helmets while driving said motor
vehicle. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in
front of the said sub-station. While he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on
getting something from his jacket. He was alerted and so, he told
the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged
and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which
was a nickel-like tin or metal container, among others. After the
accused opened the container, the accused spilled out the
contents of the container on the table which turned out to be
four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while
the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
Luz claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because
there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there
was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued
a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance.
Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had
never consented to the search conducted upon him.
The RTC convicted Luz of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had
been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected
to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two
plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. Upon review, the
CA affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizure were valid.
RULING:
No, there was no valid arrest, searches and seizure.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers
license of the latter.
12

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, Luz could not be said to have been under arrest.
There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him,
deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the
issuance of the ticket, the period during which Luz was at the
police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
waiting there. There was no intention to take Luz into custody.
Citing Berkemer v. McCarty,the Court ruled that roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic
stop should not be considered custodial interrogation. The Court
held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue
of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the
motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is
conducted.
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist
therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the
scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed
under custody (such that he should have been apprised of
his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be
fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal
arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered under
arrest at the time that his traffic citation was being made. Even if
one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was
deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation
and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
The Court held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be
the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the
reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of
arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
they might make could be used against them.In this case, it may
be noted that these constitutional requirements were complied
with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that
the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person
apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to
ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into
confessing, to relieve the inherently compelling pressures
generated by the custodial setting itself, which work to
undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as possible
to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try
to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody
questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are
by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.
Case No: 17
Subtopic: Kinds of Involuntary or Coerced Confessions
People v. Obrero
332 SCRA 190, May 17, 2000
Doctrine:
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated
in this constitutional provision:
(1) those which are the product of third degree
methods such as torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of
Section 12, and (2) those which are given without the
benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of
paragraph 1 of the same Section 12.
Art. III, 12 of the Constitution provides in
pertinent parts:
(1)...Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
FACTS: Jimmy Obrero, accused-appelant,
is a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business
was selling chickens to customers. Obrero started working for
Angie in the latters business in Manila for three or four months
before the incident. Jimmy was asked to deliver chickens to
Emma Cabrera, a regular customer. In Jimmy’s extrajudicial
confession, he stated that the day before the robbery, Ronnie
Liwanag, his fellow employee, proposed that they rob Emma in
order to beable to go to La Union to visit his family. After
learning that only two helpers were then at the residence of
Emma Cabrera, accused-appellant and Ronnie decided to pull
the heist. Ronnie covered the mouth of one Berjuega to prevent
her from shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed
and killed her. Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-appellant
who stabbed the younger maid Hitta from which she died.
Thereafter, the two proceeded to Blumentritt Street and divided
the money Ronnie had taken from the house of Emma Cabrera.
Ronnie went to La Union, while accused-appellant proceeded to
Pangasinan. The extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed
by accused-appellant in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes.
Atty. De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the WPD Headquarters, U.N.
Avenue, Manila said that he happened to be at Station 7 of the
WPD, representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He
was asked by Lt. Javier to assist accused-executing an
extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los Reyes, he
apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional rights,
explaining to him that any statement made by him could be used
against him in court, but accused-appellant said he was willing to
give a statement as in fact he did, confessing to the commission
of the crime of robbery with homicide.[6]
13
Dr. Cenido, medico-legal officer, another witness, who
conducted autopsies on the victims, testified that the victim
sustained 16 stab wounds which affected her vital organs,
causing her death. Dr. Cenido likewise prepared a postmortem
report that Hitta suffered 12 stab wounds from which she died.
He prepared the certificates of death of the victims. He stated
that the weapon used on both victims could have been the same
and that both victims sustained multiple stab wounds.
The
trial court found Jimmy Obrero guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The court held that the accused consented to giving his
extrajudicial confession and that absentany showing that the
assisting lawyer, though a station commander but of another
police station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, the Court will
hold that the proceedings were regularly conducted.
Hence, this instant appeal. Accused-appellant assails the validity
of this extrajudicial confession which forms the basis of his
conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide. He claims
that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his
confession, was not the counsel of his own choice. That was the
reason, he said, he refused to sign the booking and information
sheet. He said he signed the extrajudicial confession five times
as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimmy Obrero’s extrajudicial confession
is inadmissible in evidence applying the Miranda doctrine
HELD: YES. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced
confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those
which are the product of third degree methods such as torture,
force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in
paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) those which are given
without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject
of paragraph 1 of the same Section 12.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the
absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant’s consent
in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be
sustained.
Moreover, the confession contains details that only the
perpetrator of the crime could have given. X xx. It has been held
that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being
replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the
accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be
said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied.
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such
that they could not have been concocted by one who did not
take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment
in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where
abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was
voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the
declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be
voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which
dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.
But what renders the confession of accused-appellant
inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given the
Miranda warnings effectively. Underthe Constitution, an
uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States
from which Article III, Section 12(1) was derived, is presumed to
be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliarenvironment
and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the
guiding hand of counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required
that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the
following warnings: (1) he must be informed of his right to
remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can
and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has
a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him…x xx
There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights
to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him
whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had
his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him.
This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court,
has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to
transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in
this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the
police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked
these questions considering that he only finished the fourth
grade of the elementary school. X xx
Moreover, Article III, Section 12(1) requires that counsel
assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and
independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De
los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be
considered an “independent counsel” as contemplated by the
law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD
at the time he assisted accused-appellant.
This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula (232 SCRA 566
[1994]), the independent counsel required by Article III, Section
12(1) cannot be special counsel, public or private prosecutor,
municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los
Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was
part of the police force who could not be expected to have
effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the
investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render
illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial
investigation.
14
Case No: 18a Moreover, the answer of the accused ("Nandiyannamanposi
Subtopic: Right to Counsel Fiscal kaya hindikonakailangan ng abogado") is a palpable
indication that she did not fully understand her in-custody rights,
People v. Viduya hence it cannot be said that she knowingly and intelligently
G.R. No. L-60025, September 11, 1990 waived those rights.

Doctrine:
An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter, cannot
exercise the function of defense counsel even during custodial
investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render
illusory the protection given to the accused during custodial
investigation. What the Constitution requires in Article III Section
12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel,
one who will effectively undertake his client's defense without
any intervening conflict of interest.
FACTS:

The accused wife of Atty. Viduya has been found by his

driver, named Cambel holding or clutching a knife, standing
behind the victim, Atty. Viduya. In her testimony the accused
wife narrated that there are 2 thieves entered into their room
and one of them did the criminal act to the victim. In his extra –
judicial confession administered by the investigator, she alleged
that she was the mastermind of the killing, however this
confession which she made, according to her, was a confession
made purposely because the investigator promised her she will
not go to jail. The trial court found her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide by

relying on her extra judicial confession.

HELD:No.

Article III, Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates that:

Any person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel

The confession was made without the presence of the counsel,

the reliance of the accused that a fiscal may act as her counsel is
a palpable mistake and a misunderstanding of her right to
counsel. It is also elementary that a Fiscal or Prosecutor cannot
be a lawyer for the accused at the same time.

An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter, cannot exercise the

function of defense counsel even during custodial investigation.
To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the
protection given to the accused during custodial investigation.
What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the
presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will
effectively undertake his client's defense without any
intervening conflict of interest.
15
Case No: 19
Subtopic: Admissibility – Confession given to media
Case Title: PEOPLE vs. EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY
GALGARIN alias TOTO
G.R. No. 13026 February 20, 2001
Doctrine: Apropos the court a quos admission of accused-
appellants videotaped confession, we find such admission
proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed
accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not
form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police
officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and
forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been
forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from
the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been
sympathetic with him.
elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he
had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily
sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would
have been sympathetic with him.
The Court also deemed it proper to discuss the danger
in the use of television as a medium for admitting ones guilt and
the recurrence of this phenomenon. The trial courts should take
extreme caution in admitting similar confessions. For in all
probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous
media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced
extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the
guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal
justice system.

FACTS:
Edward Endino and his uncle, Gerry Galgarin were
accused of stabbing and shooting Dennis Aquino in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. Aquino died while on the way to the hospital
while the two assailants allegedly fled in the direction of the
airport. A warrant of arrest was issued for their arrest but only
Galgarin was arrested and Endino remained at large. Galgarin
was arrested in Antipolo and will be taken to Palawan to be tried
accordingly. On their way to the airport, they were stopped by
reporters and Galgarin was interviewed. He was videotaped
admitting his guilt while pointing his nephew Endino as the
gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left
for Roxas, Palawan and then took the boat for Batangas, where
they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they
separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for
Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was
shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.

Galgarin disowned the confession which he made

over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of
the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped
confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under
the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the
Constitution. Despite this, the trial court still admitted the video
footages on the strength of the testimony of the police officers
that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant
and upon a finding that his confession was made before a group
of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of
hostility towards him. The court gave credence to the arresting
officers assertion that it was even accused-appellant who
pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on
national television for Edward to surrender.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession made by Galgarin in front

of the media is admissible?

RULING: Yes. The Court held that the admission of Galgarin’s

extrajudicial confession is proper. The interview was recorded
on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was
not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to
16
Case 20. Held:
Extrajudicial Confession to Mayor
YES. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational
People vs. Pablito Andan supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably
G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997 be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However,
Doctrine: Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through to any interrogation by the latter. It was appellant himself who
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. private meeting. When appellant talked with the mayor as a
Facts: confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled
confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus,
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape
it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial
with homicide. The offense was committed on February 19,
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra,
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing.
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and
committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the
prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
investigation team. On February 24, a police team led by Mayor
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest
Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. Initially, he
use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
police confronted him with evidence, appellant relented but
telling the truth. Hence, appellant's confession to the mayor was
implicated two of his neighbors, and that he was merely a
correctly admitted by the trial court. Appellant's confessions to
lookout. The following day a physical examination conducted on
the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions
the suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on
were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by
the neck, chest and back. By that time, people and media
the police or any other investigating officer. It was held that
representatives were already at the police headquarters
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters
awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad
on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
arrived. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and
admissible in evidence. The Court therefore held accused-
whispered that they talk privately. The mayor led him to the
appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special complex crime of
office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said
rape with homicide.
"Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one
who killed Marianne." Afterwards, in the presence of the mayor,
the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own
wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt.

On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not

guilty." He testified that on said date he was at his parent'shouse
for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went
home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the nextday.
Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police on
February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and
killedMarianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.

The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to

death. He was found guilty of the crime charged in the
Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized accordingly.
Hence, the automatic review.

Issue:

W/N the appellant’s confession not being assisted by a counsel is

in violation of the constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as
evidence against him.

17
Case No: 21 material to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
Subtopic: Giving urine samples under the Fruit of the Poisonous observation and not to unearth undisclosed facts.
Tree
An accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or
GUTANG v. PEOPLE measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to
335 SCRA 479 (2000) move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done
without going against the proscription against testimonial
Doctrine: The right to counsel begins from the time a person is compulsion.
taken into custody and placed under investigation for the
commission of crime. Such right is guaranteed by the
Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical

or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused,
but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation and not to unearth undisclosed facts.

An accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or

measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to
move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done
without going against the proscription against testimonial
compulsion.

FACTS: David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez

and Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was arrested by policemen in
connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his
residence at Greenhills, San Juan. Several drug paraphernalia,
which later tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine
hydrochloride, were seized along with a small quantity of
marijuana fruiting tops.

The four were brought to Camp Crame and were subjected to a

drug-dependency test and were asked to give a sample of their
urine to which they complied. Their urine samples all tested
positive for shabu.

De Venecia, Jr. voluntarily submitted himself for treatment,

rehabilitation and confinement. Gutang, Regala and Jimenez
pleaded not guilty. They were found guilty of possession and use
of prohibited drugs.

Gutang argued that the urine sample is inadmissible in evidence

because he had no counsel during the custodial investigation
when it was taken. In effect, it is an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession and a violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the urine samples taken were admissible

in evidence.

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that it was admissible. The right to
counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and
placed under investigation for the commission of crime. Such
right is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical

or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused,
but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be

18
Case No: 22 The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant
Subtopic: Admissibility of other evidence obtained to the issue are not otherwise excluded by law or rules, and are
not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
HO WAI PANG V. PEOPLE investigation.
G.R. No. 176229
In the case, petitioner did not make any confession or admission
Doctrine: Constitutional provision of right under custodial during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not
investigation only prohibits as evidence, confessions and present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as
admissions of the accused as against himself. The infractions of evidence of his guilt. Verily, in determining the guilt of the
the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they existence of the confiscated shabu. Any allegation of violation of
are relevant to the issue are not otherwise excluded by law or rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only
rules, and are not affected even if obtained or taken in the course to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession
of custodial investigation. extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction. Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in
FACTS: not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation
deserves scant consideration.
Ho Wai Pang is among the 13 tourist from Hong Kong who
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Customs
Examiner Gilda L. Cinco then examined the baggages of each of
the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first traveling
bag, Cinco saw few personal belongings such as used clothing,
shoes and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second
bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were
almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming
suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened
one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was
white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent
plastic. . Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive
Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate
boxes earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the
passenger manifest and further examined their bags. The
following day, the 13 tourists were brought to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The
confiscated stuff were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who
weighed and examined them. Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI
found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against
petitioner and his five co-accused. After pleading not guilty to
the crime charged, all the accused testified almost identically,
invoking denial as their defense.

Petitioner contended that his constitutional right to counsel

during the custodial investigation was violated upon the
questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI without his
counsel

ISSUE: The CA erred in excluding evidence obtained during

custodial investigation as it acknowledge the violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner under custodial
investigation

RULING: The Court denied the petition

Constitutional provision of right under custodial investigation

only prohibits as evidence, confessions and admissions of the
accused as against himself. The infractions of the so-called
Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during custodial investigation.
19
Case No. 23
Subtopic: right to bail
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial
Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO
Doctrine:The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule
that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence
in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the
right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
FACTS:
In accordance to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to
the Philippine Government Note Verbale an extradition request
of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon
receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign
affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ)
for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Jimenez then sought and was granted a TRO to prohibit the DOJ
from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition which was
later on assailed by the SOJ. The Court initially dismissed the
petition, but later on reverse its decision when it filed its Motion
for Reconsideration and held that private respondent was bereft
of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process.
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the United States of
America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC,
the appropriate Petition for Extradition. In order to prevent the
flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Respondent Jimenez then filed an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-
Parte Motion, praying for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set a date for
hearing. When the arrest warrant was issued, he was granted
bail for his temporary liberty in the amount of one million pesos
in cash.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent entitled to notice and hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Whether or not the respondent entitled to bail.
Whether or not there is a violation of due process of law.
HELD:
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their
arguments, to wit:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing,
Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition,
the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable,
summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on
the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for
the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any
where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge
that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the
answer, or should the accused after having received the
summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding
judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing
thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of
arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused
and the attorney having charge of the case.
1. No. On the basis of the Extradition Law, the word immediate
was used to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification
would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance
of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and
giving them time to prepare and present such facts and
arguments.
When it requires a speedy action on the petition, the trial court
is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret
out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of
the petition. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.
On the basis also of the Constitution, Section 2 Article III does
not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The Constitution only requires examination
under oath or affirmation of complaints and the witnesses they
may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. The judges
merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of
guilt of an accused.
2. No, he's not entitled to post bail. Extradition case is different
from ordinary criminal proceedings. Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Jimenez should
apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court.
3. There is no violation of his right to due process. Potential
extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to
fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a
prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is
20
sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during
the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to
be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible
with the summary nature of extradition.
To sum all up, extradition proceedings should be conducted with
all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose
Case No: 24
Subtopic: Right To Bail/What Is Bail/Extradition
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ,
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
Doctrine:
As a rule prospective extradites are entitled to notice and
hearing only when the case is filed in court and not during the
process of evaluation.
Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. (Rodriguez, et al.
vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila Branch 17, et al.,
supra.).
Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign
power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction,
and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to
the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is
not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations
between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt
or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown
civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its
object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted
of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he
fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
[W]hile extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the
machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
“immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused” if
such “will best serve the interest of justice.” We further note
that Section 20 allows the requesting state “in case of urgency”
to ask for the “provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt
of the request for extradition;” and that release from provisional
arrest “shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently.”
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
21
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding
state following the proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be
a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of
time of the detention should be reasonable.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason
why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in
the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail
to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him
or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under
the Constitution
In extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of
proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
FACTS:
Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hongkong Court
with three (3) counts of the offense of accepting an advantage
as agent in violation of Section 9 (1)(a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hongkong. He was also charged
with seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hongkong. Warrants of arrest
were issued against him. The DOJ received a request from the
Hongkong Department of Justice for the provisional arrest of
Muñoz. The NBI later on arrested him on the basis of a warrant
issued by the RTC, Manila. The order was declared void by the
CA, but its validity was sustained by the SC. In the meantime,
Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a
petition for his extradition. He applied for bail which was initially
denied but which was reconsidered later, granting the petition
for bail. There was a motion to vacate the order but it was
denied, hence, a special civil action for certiorari was filed
alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, Muñoz maintained that
the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prospective extraditee is entitled to bail
RULING:
Yes, in view of recent developments, in international law. The
following trends in international law cannot be ignored, such as:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to
human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding
duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of the Court to
balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law,
on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of
human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person
may properly be a subject of international law is now taking
root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international
law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards
the second half of the past century.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty
and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, Philippine authorities
are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted
to bail.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both
international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty, and
all the other fundamental rights of every person were
proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v.
22
Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) the Court, in granting bail
to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the
principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the
land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty,
and due process.
Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the security given for
the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished
by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions
hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of
corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or
recognizance.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right
to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that the Court
has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a
prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo, G.R. No.
148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, it was held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is “available only in criminal proceedings,” thus:
 Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal
or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
 Extradition is “sui generis”: It is sui generis, tracing its
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-
blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative
in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure
his return to the state from which he fled, for the
purpose of trial or punishment.

x xx. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction”,

the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings
because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail

shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the rule
that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.” (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. In cannot be
taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

NOTE(s)

 Section 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure

23
Case 25 RIGHT TO BAIL (Deportation)
GO VS RAMOS
G.R. No. 167569
September 4, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no
longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of
habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to
be released had been charged before any court. The term
"court" in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be
assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is
detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant
to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional
Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in
habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
FACTS:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for
deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration)
against Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO alleging that the
latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while
Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal
circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so.
The complaint for deportation against Jimmy was dismissed. The
Associate Commissioner affirmed the findings of the National
Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that
Jimmy’s father (Carlos Go) elected Filipino citizenship in
accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution.
The Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal,
holding that Carlos’ election of Philippine citizenship was made
out of time. The corresponding Charge Sheet was then filed
against Jimmy, charging him for violating Com. Act No. 613,
otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as
amended.
Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC. They
challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the
deportation proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision ordering the
apprehension and deportation of Jimmy.
In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed a
supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from
enforcing the Decision. Later, however, the trial court dissolved
the writ in a Decision as a consequence of the dismissal of the
petition. Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their
motion was likewise denied.
Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led
to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for
habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason
of his provisional release on bail.
Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision as well as the
Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. They imputed
grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their
citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition
was merely the nullification of the Resolution and the charge
sheet. However, The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, Carlos and
Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Immigration Commissioner issued
Warrant of Deportation. This resulted in the apprehension and
detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan
Detention Center, pending his deportation to China. On account
of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the RTC assailing his apprehension and detention
despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on
recognizance.
The trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy
of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of
release once a deportation order has already been issued by the
Bureau.
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the appellate court, and the
Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the
deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled
with finality by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus assailing Jimmy’s
apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal
and his release on recognizance was proper
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired
into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest,
the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason
24
of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing
of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no
longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of
habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to
be released had been charged before any court. The term
"court" in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be
assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is
detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant
to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional
Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in
habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and
in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this
Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the
petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This
being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other
arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same
subject.
CASE 26 Comendador vs. De Villa
Facts: . These four cases have been consolidated because they
involve practically the same parties and related issues arising
from the same incident. The petitioners are officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their
alleged participation in the failed coup d'etat that took place on
December 1 to 9, 1989.The charges against them are violation of
Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in
relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial
Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office
Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the
petitioners . The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena
individually addressed to the petitioners which they received.
During the first hearing petitioners challenged the proceedings
on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10
days within which to file their objections in writing. This was
done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal. The PTI Panel
denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice
to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of
their witnesses. The petitioners verbally moved for
reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave
them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing.
They filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus,questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial
Investigation (PTI) Panel constituted to investigate the charges
against them and the creation of the General Court Martial
(GCM) convened to try them. They alleged that the initial
hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no
prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their
affidavits. While the motion for summary dismissal was denied,
the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and
they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
While case still pending, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail but the
application was denied by GCM No. 14. He thereupon filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction.Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an
order granting provisional liberty to Ligot. Ligot filed an urgent
omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to
declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail
for disobeying the said order. He later also complained that
Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him
"pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
The respondent question the propriety of the petition for
certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpusand
argued that since the petitioners are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the courts
have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere
with the court-martial proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the right to bail is available to the military
officers charged in General Court Martial?
25
Ruling: NO. The court find that the right to bail invoked by
petitioners has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula,
where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist."
The justification for this exception was well explained by the
Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should
be enough reason to exempt military men
from the constitutional coverage on the
right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to
note that mutinous soldiers operate within
the framework of democratic system, are
allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their duties
and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All
other insurgent elements carry out their
activities outside of and against the existing
political system.
National security considerations should also
impress upon this Honorable Court that
release on bail of respondents constitutes a
damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of
say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of
the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July
25, 1990 Order were sustained, on
'provisional' bail. The sheer number alone is
already discomforting. But, the truly
disquieting thought is that they could freely
resume their heinous activity which could
very well result in the overthrow of duly
constituted authorities, including this
Honorable Court, and replace the same with
a system consonant with their own concept
of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail
would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This
guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things
similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the
treatment is substantially different from others. The accused
officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members
of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been
discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.
Case No: 1
Subtopic: When bail a matter of right – Sec. 4, Rule 114, Crim
Pro
Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION), Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015
Doctrine: 1.) The term "punishable" should refer to prescribed,
not imposable, penalty. 2.) Falsification, like an aggravating
circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For
purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that
the supposed crime committed is a complex crime since it is only
when the trial has terminated that falsification could be
appreciated as a means of committing malversation.
FACTS:
This special civil action for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) seeks to nullify and set aside the October 10, 2014
Resolution of public respondent Sandiganbayan Fifth Division.
The case stemmed from a post-audit of the disbursement
vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among the
subjects thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of
private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former
mayor of Bacolod City.
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that
issued the official receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips were
altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive
reimbursement from the Government the total amount of
P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate
overclaim of P274,306.75.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which
(SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-
0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
under Articles 217 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). All the cases were raffled before
public respondent.
Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-14-CRM-
0321, 0322, and 0324, Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the
filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to
Fix the Amount of Bail. She argued that the three cases are
bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating or modifying
circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken from the medium period that ranged
from 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying
Article 48 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is 20 years, which is
the maximum of the medium period.
Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is inapplicable as the
attending circumstances are immaterial because the charge
constituting the complex crime have the corresponding penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Since the offense is punishable by
26
reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary. Instead of a motion to
fix bail, a summary hearing to determine if the evidence of guilt
is strong is, therefore, necessary conformably with Section 13,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 of the
Rules.
On October 10, 2014, public respondent granted the motions of
Valdez. a new arrest order was issued, fixing the bail for each
offense charged in said cases in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Valdez, indicted for the complex crime
of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
entitled to bail as a matter of right?
RULING:
Yes, She is entitled to bail because evidence of guilt is not
strong.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetual when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody
shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetual or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (7a)
The term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not
imposable, penalty. People v. Temporada, which was even cited
by petitioner, perceptibly distinguished these two concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription
for the felonies defined therein which consists of a range of
period of time. This is what is referred to as the "prescribed
penalty." For instance, under Article 249 of the RPC, the
prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal which
ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment.
Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying
circumstances which when present in the commission of a felony
affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a
convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the
"imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed
with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable
penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a
straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually imposed" on a
convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.
Following Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00, the "prescribed
penalty" is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such
crime be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt,
the "imposable penalty" is reclusion perpetuain view of the RPC
mandate that the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal
maximum to reclusion perpetuashall be applied in its maximum.
The falsification, which is the means used to commit the crime
of malversation, is in the nature of a generic aggravating
circumstance that effectively directs the imposition of the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Finally, the "penalty
actually imposed" is still reclusion perpetua, considering that the
ISL finds no application as the penalty is indivisible.
At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found
guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00. Falsification, like an aggravating circumstance, must
be alleged and proved during the trial. For purposes of bail
proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the supposed
crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial
has terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a
means of committing malversation. Further, it is possible that
only the elements of one of the constituent offenses, i.e., either
malversation or falsification, or worse, none of them, would be
proven after-full-blowntrial.
It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to
bail and grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that
there is no complex crime committed.
For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents that involves an amount in excess of
P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right, a summary
hearing on bail application is, therefore, unnecessary.
Other Related Discussion:
1. Citing People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al., in relation to Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules, it was held that Manalac, Jr. is not entitled to bail as a
matter of right since he is charged with Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the
amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 a crime whose penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The court opined that the
Sandiganbayancorrectly imposed the penalty of reclusion
27
perpetuaand that the ISL is inapplicable since it is an indivisible
penalty.
For purposes of bail application, however, the ruling in Manalac,
Jr. should be revisited on the ground that Pantaleon, Jr. (as well
as Conwi, Jr., Enfermo, Pajaro, et al., and Zafra) was disposed in
the context of a judgment of conviction rendered by the lower
court and affirmed on appeal by this Court. (unlike the instant
case)
2. The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is spot
on had it not confused imposable penalty with prescribed
penalty. Nonetheless, reading through the text of the assailed
Resolution reveals that the anti-graft court actually meant
prescribed penalty whenever it referred to imposable penalty.
Therefore, in essence, the ruling is correct.
Case 2ENRILE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or
for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at
trial.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of
innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough
to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no
higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution
and repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of
age, and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on
the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed
his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his
Motion to Fix Bail.
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is
entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden
of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile
comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to
establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his
guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not
be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already
over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
28
In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to
bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that
to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his
guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not
seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service, and
history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted
bail.

ISSUE: Is Enrile entitled to bail as a matter of right? If YES, on

what ground(s)?

HELD: YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on

humanitarian grounds.

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and

during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear
and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure
that the accused appears at trial.

The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose

of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is
further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the
international community arising from the national commitment
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the

worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human

rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has
authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from
the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was
29
Case No: 3
14. Rights of an Accused During Trial
ii. Presumption of Innocence
1. Equipoise Rule
GENEROSO P. CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Doctrine: The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is
applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly
balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is
no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner
with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The
presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive
finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the
prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His
conviction must be affirmed.
FACTS: As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the petitioner was
designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this
capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds, and made
bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government
accounts.
His designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was subsequently
terminated, and a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected
between the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of
Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of P72, 823.08.
A letter of demand required the petitioner to produce the
missing amounts but he was only to make partial payments
through temporarily disallowing cash items and deductions from
his salary before his dismissal from the service.
A final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50, 596.07
was sent to the petitioner. The demand not having been met, an
Information for Malversation of the said amount was filed
against him with the Sandiganbayan.
The above facts were not denied by the petitioner, but he
insisted that he was not guilty of the charge because the
shortage imputed to him was malversed by other persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the
shortage represented the unliquidated withdrawal made by
Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four separate checks
issued and encashed while the petitioner was on official leave of
absence. He avers he was later made to post the amount in his
cash book by Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C.
Aluning and he had no choice but to comply although he had not
actually received the said amount.
Pineda, as witness for the prosecution, insisted he had liquidated
all four (4) checks after the amounts thereof were disbursed,
turning over to petitioner the corresponding withdrawal
vouchers, paid vouchers, and payrolls, adding that petitioner
was not really absent on the dates. Petitioner was the one who
prepared the said checks in the morning before attending to his
sick wife in the hospital, returning to the office in the afternoon.
The payroll payments were liquidated after the petitioner came
back from the hospital.
Said testimony was corroborated by Acting Provincial Treasurer
Martinez, stating that although one of the checks had already
been encashed, the same was not immediately recorded in the
petitioner’s logbook, “which was one way of temporarily hiding
the early detection of a shortage. The shortage was discovered
only a few months after, and when confronted with it, petitioner
had no explanation to offer.
Aluning denied he exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the
shortage in the cash book. As his superior, he required the
petitioner to make the proper entry in the cash book because
the amount withdrawn was already part of the latter’s
accountability.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged, sentenced petitioner to suffer
imprisonment, provide restitution to the government the
amount misappropriated, and the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed reversible error
in convicting petitioner.
RULING: No. The findings by the Sandiganbayan are mainly
factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no
reason to disturb them absent any of the exceptional
circumstances that will justify their review and reversal. On the
contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as established
point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the offense
charged.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's
observation that:
Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the
missing P50,000.00 is negated by the following factors:
First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in
March, 1981, he did not make any notation that said
amount, though entered, was not actually received.
Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over,
he did not make any certification that the amount of
P50,000.00 should not be charged against him.
Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez
misappropriated the money, he did not file any case,
whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both.
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a
fatal omission. That is not a preliminary requirement to the filing
of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie
guilt of the suspect has already been established. The failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use. And what
determines whether the crime of malversation has been
30
committed is the presence of the following requirements under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property
by reason of the duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or
property for which he was accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design"
to hold him responsible for a crime he has not committed is less
than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for
his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he
who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a
small fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos
regime is a mere emotional appeal that does not impress at all.
The suggestion that the supposed injustice on the petitioner
would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed
must be rejected.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only
where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which
case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the
scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here.
The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not
been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of
persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the
accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the
sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose
confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
Right of the accused during trail:Section 14, Article III, 1987
Constitution: (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have a
compulsory process to secure the attendance of the witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he had been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
PEOPLE VS PEPINO & GOMEZ; GR NO 174471
Doctrine: In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-
court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality
of circumstances test where they consider the following factors.
1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time for
the crime; 2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; 3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; 4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; 5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and 6) the suggestiveness if the identification
procedure.
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the
crime under investigation. As a rule, a police line-up is not part
of the custodial investigation; hence the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this
stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during
custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused
during identification in a police lineup.
FACTS: Evidence showed that in 1997, two men entered the
office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat,
Parañaque, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was
about to receive them, the respondent herein pulled out a gun.
Thinking it was a holdup, Edward told the respondent that the
money was in the cashier’s box. The respondent looted the
cashier’s box, handcuffed Edward and forced him to go with
them. Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla
where three other men were waiting. The woman (Gomez) sat in
front of the car
At around 4PM, the abductors called Edward’s’ father and
demanded for ransom. The abductors instructed that the
ransom be dropped at a convenience store in front of Mc
Donalds in Mindanao Avenue. That evening, the abductors
including Gomez blindfolded Edward, and had him boarded a
car, and drove for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward
that he could remove his blindfold after 5 minutes. When
Edward removed his blindfold, he found himself inside his own
car and drove his way back home.
After 5 months, the NBI informed Edward that some suspects
were apprehended and invited him to identify them from a
lineup consisting of 7 persons. Edward positively identified
Pepino, Gomez, and one Galgo.
31

The RTC convicted the respondent of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. RTC held that Edward positively identified the
respondent who forcibly abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton
Motors, and who consequently detained him somewhere in
Quezon City for 4 days.
On appeal, the decision of the lower court was affirmed and
further ruled that the respondents were estopped from assailing
the legality of their arrest after they have entered their pleas,
and that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to attain
common objective to kidnap Edward for ransom.
While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino
filed an urgent motion to withdraw his appeal, which the Court
granted. Only Gomez’s appeal is now at issue. In her
supplemental brief, she maintained that it was impossible for
Edward to have seen her in the front seat of the getaway car
because she was blindfolded.
Gomez insisted that the most irregular incident was when she
and other individuals were presented to the media as
kidnappers on December 8, 1997 at the Department of
Justice.On the following day, December 9, 1997, Edward
identified her as a suspect to the kidnapping. This made "the
identification ... at the NBI. . . highly suspect because at that
time, the appellant had already been presented to the public
and branded as kidnappers, and viewed by all and sundry before
national television networks, in violation of her constitutional
right to be presumed innocent[.]"For Gomez, there was high
probability that Edward already saw her in the media reports,
thus making it easier for him to identify her as an abductor.
Right to counsel: The right to counsel is a fundamental right and
Gomez further argued that her constitutional rights were
breached. Her right to be presumed innocent was violated when
she was presented to the media as a person responsible for the
kidnapping. Further, her right to due process was violated when
she was subjected to the line-up without counsel. Since she was
already presented before the media as a kidnapper and treated
by the police as a suspect, it was just proper that she should
have had a counsel during the line-up.
ISSUE[S]: WON the presumption of innocence has been
breached, and her right to counsel has been violated.
RULING: No.
Admissibility of identification: Out of court identification is
conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru
show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to
face with the witness for identification; thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect; thru line-ups where a witness
identified the suspect form a group of persons lined up
for the purpose. In resolving the admissibility of and
relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where
they consider the following factors. 1) the witness’
opportunity to view the criminal at the time for the
crime; 2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time;
3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; 5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and 6) the
suggestiveness if the identification procedure.
Applying the totality of circumstances test, the SC find
Edward’s out-of-court identification to be reliable and
thus admissible. When the three individuals entered
Edward’s office, they initially pretended to be
customers, and even asked about the products that
were for sale. The three had told Edward that they
were going to pay, but Pepino pulled out a gun instead.
After Pepino’s companion had taken the money from
the cashier’s box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward
and forced him to go down to the parked car. From this
sequence of events, there were thus ample opportunity
for Edward.- before and after the gun had been pointed
at him – to view the faces of the three persons who
entered his office.
Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the
getaway metallic green Toyota Corolla vehicle. In
addition, the abductors removed the tape from
Edward’s eyes when they arrive at the apartment, and
among those whom he saw there was Gomez.
Also, the lineup had not been attended by any
suggestiveness on the part of the police or NBI agents;
there was no evidence that they had supplied or even
suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn that the
appellants were the kidnappers.
is intended to preclude the slightest coercion that
would lead the accused admit to something false. The
right to counsel attaches upon the start of the
investigation (when the investigating officers starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confession
from the accused.
Custodial investigation commences when a person is
taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule,
a police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during
custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police lineup.
The guarantees of Section 12(1), Article III, of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up
is not a part of the custodial investigation, hence, the
32
 right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage.
Case No. 5
Subtopic – Right to be Informed
Enrile v. People
G.R. No. 213455 August 11, 2015
Doctrine:
xxx a person’s constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him signifies that an
accused should be given the necessary data on why he is the
subject of a criminal proceeding. xxx the act or conduct imputed
to a person must be described with sufficient particularity to
enable the accused to defend himself properly. xxx
xxx the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify
allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague, or are
conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and
prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which
he stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently
respond to the charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or
are unclear to him.
Facts:
The Ombudsman filed an information for plunder
against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald
John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
Enrile then filed an urgent omnibus motion (MTD and motion for
bail) and supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of
arrest and for dismissal of Information. However, the
Sandiganbayan denied such motions and ordered the issuance
of warrant of arrest against Enrile. Later on, Enrile filed a motion
for bill of particulars and motion for deferment of arraignment
since he would undergo medical examination in PGH. The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied his motion for bill of particulars
on the ground that: (1) the detail that Enrile desires are
substantial reiterations of the argument he raised in his
supplement opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and
for dismissal of information; (2) and the details sought are
evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial. Enrile
filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied because
there was no new substantial ground raised to warrant the grant
thereof.
Enrile, then, filed a petition for certiorari, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it
denied its motion for bill of particulars. Such denial was a
violation of his constitutional right of right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him since the
information did not sufficiently stated with particularity the
following: (1) who among the accused acquired the ill-gotten
wealth, (2) what particular overt acts constitute the crime of
plunder, (3) Which Napoles NGO was the recipient of Enrile’s
PDAF, (4) which project from 2004-2010 was ghost or spurious,
among others. Enrile maintained these are not evidentiary
matters but material facts which should be alleged in the
information in order of him to be informed of the charges
against and be prepared to meet the issues in the trial. On the
other hand, the respondent maintain that information contained
ultimate facts which were sufficient.
Issue:
Whether or not the Enrile is entitled for bill of
particulars on certain details which were not alleged with
sufficient particularity, as part of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
Ruling:
Before ruling on the matter, the Court explained the
concept of the right to be informed, and bill of particulars, its
origin, its difference with motion to quash and its importance to
the said right (this was reiterated all throughout the ruling).
Citing its previous rulings, the Court said that a person’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him signifies that an accused should be
given the necessary data on why he is the subject of a criminal
proceeding. The Court added that the act or conduct imputed to
a person must be described with sufficient particularity to
enable the accused to defend himself properly. The Court also
held the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in
the Information that are indefinite, vague, or are conclusions of
law to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for
trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he stands
accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the
charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are unclear to
him.
In this case, the Court ruled that the requested detail by
Enrile on who among the accused acquired the ill-gotten wealth
was not a proper subject in bill of particulars since the crime of
plunder in the information was alleged to be committed through
conspiracy and thus, it is unnecessary to identify who among
them acquired the ill-gotten wealth. On the detail which project
from 2004-2010 was ghost or spurious, among others, it was
held that these are evidentiary matters that do not need to be
reflected with particularity in the Information, and may be
passed upon at the full-blown trial on the merits of the case. The
Court also believed that the exact amounts of Enrile’s yearly
PDAF allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010 need not be pleaded
with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for his defense since Enrile may be in a better position
to know these details than the prosecution.
However, the Court also found that Enrile was entitled
for bill of particulars on certain details. One of which is what
particular overt acts constitute the crime of plunder. The Court
held that the heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. Hence, even if
the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50
million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder
if this resulted from a single criminal act. It is insufficient, too, to
merely allege that a set of acts had been repeatedly done
(although this may constitute a series if averred with sufficient
definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in the
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth as in this case.
The Information should reflect with particularities the predicate
acts that underlie the crime of plunder. A reading of the
Information filed against Enrile shows that the prosecution made
33
little or no effort to particularize the transactions that would
constitute the required series or combination of overt acts. In
addition, Enrile is also entitled for bill of particulars on the
approximate dates of commission and kickbacks, and as the
projects funded and the Napoles NGOs involved because he
should not be left guessing and speculating as to the periods,
project and NGO inlvoved.
The Court further added that the Sandiganbayan also
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it missed the legal
points on the issue of the reiteration of the grounds in Enrile’s
motion for bill of particulars and opposition on the warrant of
arrest. It was held that the question of whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against an accused, is
separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations
in the Information have been worded with sufficient definiteness
to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare his
defense. While the grounds cited for each may seemingly be the
same, they are submitted for different purposes and should be
appreciated from different perspectives, so that the insufficiency
of these grounds for one does not necessarily translate to
insufficiency for the other. Thus, the resolution of the issue of
probable cause should not bar Enrile from seeking a more
detailed averment of the allegations in the Information.
In the end, the Court partially granted the petition of
Enrile, setting aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
6a. RIGHT TO INFORMATION
QUIMVEL VS. PEOPLE
GR No. 214497 April 18, 2017
DOCTRINE: What determines the real nature and cause of the
accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated
in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or preamble
thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, being conclusions of law.
FACTS:
The AMMENDED INFORMATION reads:
The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby
accuses EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as
EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
committed as follows:
That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at
Palapas, Ligao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and
unchaste design, through force and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, insert his hand inside
the panty of [AAA],7 a minor of 7 years old and mash her
vagina, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner contends that, granting without admitting that he is
guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness, he should only be held liable for
the crime as penalized under the RPC and not under RA 7610.
According to him, to be held liable under the latter law, it is
necessary that the victim is involved in or subjected to
prostitution or other sexual abuse, and that the failure to allege
such element constituted a violation of his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation
against him.
ISSUE: WON for having been convicted under RA 7610 and not
under the RPC, was Quimvel denied of his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him.
RULING: No. He was properly informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. In criminal prosecutions, every
element constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information before an accused can be convicted of the crime
charged. This is to apprise the accused of the nature of
the accusation against him. The Information must allege clearly
and accurately the elements of the crime charged. An
investigating prosecutor is not required to be
absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal
name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of
the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts
stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption
or preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, being conclusions of
34
law. Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the
acts of lasciviousness on a child who is neither exploited in
prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse." In contrast,
under Section 5 of RA 7610, the accused performs the acts of
lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in prostitution
or subjected to "other sexual abuse." The very definition of
"child abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610 does not require that
the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse
aside from the act complained of. It refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec.
5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed
sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a
prior sexual affront.
Case No. 7a
Subtopic: Right of an Accused during Trial
vi. Right to meet the witnesses face to face (Confrontation
Clause)
Doctrine: Nothing in this section or any other provision of law,
except official in-court identification provisions, shall be
construed to require a child to look at the accused.
(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused,
whose presence or conduct causes fear to the child.
(a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an
order that the chair of the child or that a screen or other device
be placed in the courtroom in such a manner that the child
cannot see the accused while testifying. Before the guardian ad
litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult with
the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third
paragraphs of section 25(a) of this Rule. The court shall issue an
order stating the reasons and describing the approved courtroom
arrangement.
(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the
accused while testifying in the courtroom, the courtroom shall be
arranged to enable the accused to view the child.
(d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right to
counsel and to confront and cross-examine the child, shall not be
violated during the deposition.
A.M. NO. 004-07-SC November 21, 2000
RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - Unless otherwise provided,
this Rule shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are
victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It
shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal
proceedings involving child witnesses.
Section 2. Objectives. - The objectives of this Rule are to create
and maintain an environment that will allow children to give
reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children,
encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate
the ascertainment of truth.
Section 3. Construction of the Rule. - This Rule shall be liberally
construed to uphold the best interests of the child and to
promote maximum accommodation of child witnesses without
prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.
Section 4. Definitions. -
(a) A "child witness" is any person who at the time of giving
testimony is below the age of eighteen (18) years. In child abuse
cases, a child includes one over eighteen (18) years but is found
by the court as unable to fully take care of himself or protect
himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or
35
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.
(b) "Child abuse" means physical, psychological, or sexual abuse,
and criminal neglect as defined in Republic Act No. 7610 and
other related laws.
(c) "Facilitator" means a person appointed by the court to pose
questions to a child.
(d) "Record regarding a child" or "record" means any
photograph, videotape, audiotape, film, handwriting,
typewriting, printing, electronic recording, computer data or
printout, or other memorialization, including any court
document, pleading, or any copy or reproduction of any of the
foregoing, that contains the name, description, address, school,
or any other personal identifying information about a child or his
family and that is produced or maintained by a public agency,
private agency, or individual.
(e) A "guardian ad litem" is a person appointed by the court
where the case is pending for a child who is a victim of, accused
of, or a witness to a crime to protect the best interests of the
said child.
(f) A "support person" is a person chosen by the child to
accompany him to testify at or attend a judicial proceeding or
deposition to provide emotional support for him.
(b) The guardian ad litem:
(1) Shall attend all interviews, depositions, hearings,
and trial proceedings in which a child participates;
(2) Shall make recommendations to the court
concerning the welfare of the child;
(3) Shall have access to all reports, evaluations, and
records necessary to effectively advocate for the child,
except privileged communications;
(4) Shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of
resources and special services to the child;
(5) Shall explain, in language understandable to the
child, all legal proceedings, including police
investigations, in which the child is involved;
(6) Shall assist the child and his family in coping with
the emotional effects of crime and subsequent criminal
or non-criminal proceedings in which the child is
involved;
(7) May remain with the child while the child waits to
testify;
(8) May interview witnesses; and

(g) "Best interests of the child" means the totality of the

(9) May request additional examinations by medical or
circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the
mental health professionals if there is a compelling
survival, protection, and feelings of security of the child and
need therefor.
most encouraging to his physical, psychological, and emotional
development. It also means the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the (c) The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings but
shall not participate in the trial. However, he may file motions
child.
pursuant to sections 9, 10, 25, 26, 27 and 31(c). If the guardian
ad litem is a lawyer, he may object during trial that questions
(h) "Developmental level" refers to the specific growth phase in
asked of the child are not appropriate to his developmental
which most individuals are expected to behave and function in
level.
relation to the advancement of their physical, socio-emotional,
cognitive, and moral abilities.
(d) The guardian ad litem may communicate concerns regarding
the child to the court through an officer of the court designated
(i) "In-depth investigative interview" or "disclosure interview" is
for that purpose.
an inquiry or proceeding conducted by duly trained members of
a multidisciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement
or child protective services for the purpose of determining (e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding
concerning any information, statement, or opinion received
whether child abuse has been committed.
from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem,
unless the court finds it necessary to promote the best interests
Section 5. Guardian ad litem. -
of the child.

(a) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a
(f) The guardian ad litem shall be presumed to have acted in
victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to promote the
good faith in compliance with his duties described in sub-section
best interests of the child. In making the appointment, the court
(b).
shall consider the background of the guardian ad litem and his
familiarity with the judicial process, social service programs, and
child development, giving preference to the parents of the child, Section 6. Competency. - Every child is presumed qualified to be
a witness. However, the court shall conduct a competency
if qualified. The guardian ad litem may be a member of the
examination of a child, motuproprio or on motion of a party,
Philippine Bar. A person who is a witness in any proceeding
involving the child cannot be appointed as a guardian ad litem. when it finds that substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of

36
the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth
from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity. - A party seeking a competency
examination must present proof of necessity of competency
examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis
for a competency examination.
(b) Burden of proof. - To rebut the presumption of competence
enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging his competence.
(c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the
following are allowed to attend a competency examination:
(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;
(2) The counsel for the parties;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) One or more support persons for the child; and
(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that
competence can be fully evaluated in his absence.
(d) Conduct of examination. - Examination of a child as to his
competence shall be conducted only by the judge. Counsel for
the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he
may, in his discretion, ask the child.
(e) Developmentally appropriate questions. - The questions
asked at the competency examination shall be appropriate to
the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be related
to the issues at trial; and shall focus on the ability of the child to
remember, communicate, distinguish between truth and
falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.
(f) Continuing duty to assess competence. - The court has the
duty of continuously assessing the competence of the child
throughout his testimony.
Section 7. Oath or affirmation. - Before testifying, a child shall
take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.
Section 8. Examination of a child witness. - The examination of a
child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be
done in open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers
of the witness shall be given orally.
The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem
of such child witness may, however, move the court to allow him
to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 9. Interpreter for child. -
(a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino
language or is unable to communicate in said languages due to
his developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other similar
reason, an interpreter whom the child can understand and who
understands the child may be appointed by the court,
motuproprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child.
(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only
person who can serve as an interpreter for the child, he shall not
be disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of the child. The
interpreter, however, who is also a witness, shall testify ahead of
the child.
(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a
true and accurate interpretation.
Section 10. Facilitator to pose questions to child. -
(a) The court may, motuproprio or upon motion, appoint a
facilitator if it determines that the child is unable to understand
or respond to questions asked. The facilitator may be a child
psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor,
teacher, religious leader, parent, or relative.
(b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for
the parties shall pose questions to the child only through the
facilitator. The questions shall either be in the words used by
counsel or, if the child is not likely to understand the same, in
words that are comprehensible to the child and which convey
the meaning intended by counsel.
(c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose
questions to the child according to the meaning intended by
counsel.
Section 11. Support persons. -
(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a
deposition shall have the right to be accompanied by one or two
persons of his own choosing to provide him emotional support.
(1) Both support persons shall remain within the view
of the child during his testimony.
(2) One of the support persons may accompany the
child to the witness stand, provided the support person
does not completely obscure the child from the view of
the opposing party, judge, or hearing officer.
(3) The court may allow the support person to hold the
hand of the child or take other appropriate steps to
provide emotional support to the child in the course of
the proceedings.
(4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to
prompt, sway, or influence the child during his
testimony.
37
(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness,
the court may disapprove the choice if it is sufficiently
established that the attendance of the support person during
the testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk of
influencing or affecting the content of the testimony of the child.
(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the
court, his testimony shall be presented ahead of the testimony
of the child.
Section 12. Waiting area for child witnesses. - The courts are
encouraged to provide a waiting area for children that is
separate from waiting areas used by other persons. The waiting
area for children should be furnished so as to make a child
comfortable.
Section 13. Courtroom environment. - To create a more
comfortable environment for the child, the court may, in its
discretion, direct and supervise the location, movement and
deportment of all persons in the courtroom including the
parties, their counsel, child, witnesses, support persons,
guardian ad litem, facilitator, and court personnel. The child may
be allowed to testify from a place other than the witness chair.
The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies
may be turned to facilitate his testimony but the opposing party
and his counsel must have a frontal or profile view of the child
during the testimony of the child. The witness chair or other
place from which the child testifies may also be rearranged to
allow the child to see the opposing party and his counsel, if he
chooses to look at them, without turning his body or leaving the
witness stand. The judge need not wear his judicial robe.
Nothing in this section or any other provision of law, except
official in-court identification provisions, shall be construed to
require a child to look at the accused.
Accommodations for the child under this section need not be
supported by a finding of trauma to the child.
Section 14. Testimony during appropriate hours. - The court may
order that the testimony of the child should be taken during a
time of day when the child is well-rested.
Section 15. Recess during testimony. -
The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief while
undergoing direct, cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations as
often as necessary depending on his developmental level.
Section 16. Testimonial aids. - The court shall permit a child to
use dolls, anatomically-correct dolls, puppets, drawings,
mannequins, or any other appropriate demonstrative device to
assist him in his testimony.
Section 17. Emotional security item. - While testifying, a child
shall be allowed to have an item of his own choosing such as a
blanket, toy, or doll.
Section 18. Approaching the witness. - The court may prohibit a
counsel from approaching a child if it appears that the child is
fearful of or intimidated by the counsel.
Section 19. Mode of questioning. - The court shall exercise
control over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are stated
in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3)
protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and
(4) avoid waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative
form.
Section 20. Leading questions. - The court may allow leading
questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will
further the interests of justice.
Section 21. Objections to questions. - Objections to questions
should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse,
frighten, or intimidate the child.
Section 22. Corroboration. - Corroboration shall not be required
of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by itself, shall
be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment
subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-
criminal cases.
Section 23. Excluding the public. - When a child testifies, the
court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all
persons, including members of the press, who do not have a
direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made to
protect the right to privacy of the child or if the court
determines on the record that requiring the child to testify in
open court would cause psychological harm to him, hinder the
ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to effectively
communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity. In making
its order, the court shall consider the developmental level of the
child, the nature of the crime, the nature of his testimony
regarding the crime, his relationship to the accused and to
persons attending the trial, his desires, and the interests of his
parents or legal guardian. The court may, motuproprio, exclude
the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced
during trial is of such character as to be offensive to decency or
public morals. The court may also, on motion of the accused,
exclude the public from trial, except court personnel and the
counsel of the parties.
Section 24. Persons prohibited from entering and leaving
courtroom. - The court may order that persons attending the
trial shall not enter or leave the courtroom during the testimony
of the child.
Section 25. Live-link television testimony in criminal cases where
the child is a victim or a witness. -
(a) The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may apply
for an order that the testimony of the child be taken in a room
38
outside the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by
live-link television.
Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this
section, he shall consult the prosecutor or counsel and shall
defer to the judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding
the necessity of applying for an order. In case the guardian ad
ltiem is convinced that the decision of the prosecutor or counsel
not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma, he
himself may apply for the order.
The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5)
days before the trial date, unless the court finds on the record
that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable.
(b) The court may motuproprio hear and determine, with notice
to the parties, the need for taking the testimony of the child
through live-link television.
(c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some
comfortable place other than the courtroom, in the presence of
the support person, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and counsel
for the parties. The questions of the judge shall not be related to
the issues at trial but to the feelings of the child about testifying
in the courtroom.
(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused,
whose presence or conduct causes fear to the child.
(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use of
live-link television and stating the reasons therefor. It shall
consider the following factors:
(1) The age and level of development of the child;
(2) His physical and mental health, including any mental or
physical disability;
(3) Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced
by him;
(4) The nature of the alleged abuse;
(5) Any threats against the child;
(6) His relationship with the accused or adverse party;
(7) His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in
court or elsewhere;
(8) His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was
discussed with him by parents or professionals;
(9) Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days
prior to testifying;
(10) Testimony of expert or lay witnesses;
(11) The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of the
members of his family regarding the events about which he will
testify; and
(12) Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and
formalities of court procedure.
(f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken
by live-link television if there is a substantial likelihood that the
child would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the
accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. The
trauma must be of a kind which would impair the completeness
or truthfulness of the testimony of the child.
(g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link
television:
(1) The child shall testify in a room separate from the courtroom
in the presence of the guardian ad litem; one or both of his
support persons; the facilitator and interpreter, if any; a court
officer appointed by the court; persons necessary to operate the
closed-circuit television equipment; and other persons whose
presence are determined by the court to be necessary to the
welfare and well-being of the child;
(2) The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the parties
shall be in the courtroom. The testimony of the child shall be
transmitted by live-link television into the courtroom for viewing
and hearing by the judge, prosecutor, counsel for the parties,
accused, victim, and the public unless excluded.
(3) If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at trial,
the court may allow the child to enter the courtroom for the
limited purpose of identifying the accused, or the court may
allow the child to identify the accused by observing the image of
the latter on a television monitor.
(4) The court may set other conditions and limitations on the
taking of the testimony that it finds just and appropriate, taking
into consideration the best interests of the child.
(h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved on videotape,
digital disc, or other similar devices which shall be made part of
the court record and shall be subject to a protective order as
provided in section 31(b).
Section 26. Screens, one-way mirrors, and other devices to shield
child from accused. -
(a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an
order that the chair of the child or that a screen or other device
be placed in the courtroom in such a manner that the child
cannot see the accused while testifying. Before the guardian ad
litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult with
the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third
paragraphs of section 25(a) of this Rule. The court shall issue an
order stating the reasons and describing the approved courtroom
arrangement.
39
(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the
accused while testifying in the courtroom, the courtroom shall be
arranged to enable the accused to view the child.
Section 27. Videotaped deposition. -
(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply for
an order that a deposition be taken of the testimony of the child
and that it be recorded and preserved on videotape. Before the
guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he
shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the
second and third paragraphs of section 25(a).
(b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in
open court at trial, it shall issue an order that the deposition of
the child be taken and preserved by videotape.
(c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a
child. Objections to deposition testimony or evidence, or parts
thereof, and the grounds for the objection shall be stated and
shall be ruled upon at the time of the taking of the deposition.
The other persons who may be permitted to be present at the
proceeding are:
(1) The prosecutor;
(2) The defense counsel;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) The accused, subject to sub-section (e);
(5) Other persons whose presence is determined by the court to
be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child;
(6) One or both of his support persons, the facilitator and
interpreter, if any;
(7) The court stenographer; and
(8) Persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment.
(d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right to
counsel and to confront and cross-examine the child, shall not be
violated during the deposition.
(e) If the order of the court is based on evidence that the child is
unable to testify in the physical presence of the accused, the
court may direct the latter to be excluded from the room in
which the deposition is conducted. In case of exclusion of the
accused, the court shall order that the testimony of the child be
taken by live-link television in accordance with section 25 of this
Rule. If the accused is excluded from the deposition, it is not
necessary that the child be able to view an image of the accused.
(f) The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and
stenographically recorded. The videotape and the stenographic
notes shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court where the
case is pending for safekeeping and shall be made a part of the
record.
(g) The court may set other conditions on the taking of the
deposition that it finds just and appropriate, taking into
consideration the best interests of the child, the constitutional
rights of the accused, and other relevant factors.
(h) The videotaped deposition and stenographic notes shall be
subject to a protective order as provided in section 31(b).
(i) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unable
to testify for a reason stated in section 25(f) of this Rule, or is
unavailable for any reason described in section 4(c), Rule 23 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may admit into
evidence the videotaped deposition of the child in lieu of his
testimony at the trial. The court shall issue an order stating the
reasons therefor.
(j) After the original videotaping but before or during trial, any
party may file any motion for additional videotaping on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. The court may order an
additional videotaped deposition to receive the newly
discovered evidence.
Section 28. Hearsay exception in child abuse cases. - A statement
made by a child describing any act or attempted act of child
abuse, not otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, may be
admitted in evidence in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding
subject to the following rules:
(a) Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its
proponent shall make known to the adverse party the intention
to offer such statement and its particulars to provide him a fair
opportunity to object. If the child is available, the court shall,
upon motion of the adverse party, require the child to be
present at the presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-
examination by the adverse party. When the child is unavailable,
the fact of such circumstance must be proved by the proponent.
(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the
court shall consider the time, content and circumstances thereof
which provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall consider the
following factors:
(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;
(2) The general character of the declarant child;
(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;
(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between
the declarant child and witness;
(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of
the declarant child;
40
(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child is
remote; and
(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that
there is no reason to suppose the declarant child
misrepresented the involvement of the accused.
(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the
following situations:
(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of
memory, mental illness, or will be exposed to severe
psychological injury; or
(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his
statement has been unable to procure his attendance
by process or other reasonable means.
(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony
shall be admitted only if corroborated by other admissible
evidence.
Section 29. Admissibility of videotaped and audiotaped in-depth
investigative or disclosure interviews in child abuse cases. - The
court may admit videotape and audiotape in-depth investigative
or disclosure interviews as evidence, under the following
conditions:
(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds and
under conditions established under section 28 (c).
(b) The interview of the child was conducted by duly trained
members of a multidisciplinary team or representatives of law
enforcement or child protective services in situations where
child abuse is suspected so as to determine whether child abuse
occurred.
(c) The party offering the videotape or audiotape must prove
that:
(1) the videotape or audiotape discloses the identity of all
individuals present and at all times includes their images and
voices;
(2) the statement was not made in response to questioning
calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement or is
clearly shown to be the statement of the child and not the
product of improper suggestion;
(3) the videotape and audiotape machine or device was capable
of recording testimony;
(4) the person operating the device was competent to operate
it;
(5) the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct; and
(6) it has been duly preserved.
The individual conducting the interview of the child shall be
available at trial for examination by any party. Before the
videotape or audiotape is offered in evidence, all parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to view or listen to it and shall be
furnished a copy of a written transcript of the proceedings.
The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or
audiotaped as required by this section shall not by itself
constitute a basis to exclude from evidence out-of-court
statements or testimony of the child. It may, however, be
considered in determining the reliability of the statements of the
child describing abuse.
Section 30. Sexual abuse shield rule. -
(a) Inadmissible evidence. - The following evidence is not
admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged child
sexual abuse:
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the
alleged victim.
(b) Exception. - Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior
by the alleged victim to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical
evidence shall be admissible.
A party intending to offer such evidence must:
(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial,
specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for
which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires a
different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at
least three (3) days before the hearing of the motion.
Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a
hearing in chambers and afford the child, his guardian ad litem,
the parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The
motion and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain
under seal and protected by a protective order set forth in
section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the
hearing in chambers except with his consent.
Section 31. Protection of privacy and safety. -
(a) Confidentiality of records. - Any record regarding a child shall
be confidential and kept under seal. Except upon written request
and order of the court, a record shall only be released to the
following:
(1) Members of the court staff for administrative use;
(2) The prosecuting attorney;
41
(3) Defense counsel;
(4) The guardian ad litem;
(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement agencies; and
(6) Other persons as determined by the court.
(b) Protective order. - Any videotape or audiotape of a child that
is part of the court record shall be under a protective order that
provides as follows:
(1) Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel, their
expert witness, and the guardian ad litem.
(2) No tape, or any portion thereof, shall be divulged by any
person mentioned in sub-section (a) to any other person, except
as necessary for the trial.
(3) No person shall be granted access to the tape, its
transcription or any part thereof unless he signs a written
affirmation that he has received and read a copy of the
protective order; that he submits to the jurisdiction of the court
with respect to the protective order; and that in case of violation
thereof, he will be subject to the contempt power of the court.
(4) Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof made
available to the parties, their counsel, and respective agents
shall bear the following cautionary notice:
"This object or document and the contents thereof are subject
to a protective order issued by the court in (case title) , (case
number) . They shall not be examined, inspected, read, viewed,
or copied by any person, or disclosed to any person, except as
provided in the protective order. No additional copies of the
tape or any of its portion shall be made, given, sold, or shown to
any person without prior court order. Any person violating such
protective order is subject to the contempt power of the court
and other penalties prescribed by law."
(5) No tape shall be given, loaned, sold, or shown to any person
except as ordered by the court.
(6) Within thirty (30) days from receipt, all copies of the tape
and any transcripts thereof shall be returned to the clerk of
court for safekeeping unless the period is extended by the court
on motion of a party.
(7) This protective order shall remain in full force and effect until
further order of the court.
(c) Additional protective orders. - The court may, motuproprio or
on motion of any party, the child, his parents, legal guardian, or
the guardian ad litem, issue additional orders to protect the
privacy of the child.
(d) Publication of identity contemptuous. - Whoever publishes or
causes to be published in any format the name, address,
telephone number, school, or other identifying information of a
child who is or is alleged to be a victim or accused of a crime or a
witness thereof, or an immediate family of the child shall be
liable to the contempt power of the court.
(e) Physical safety of child; exclusion of evidence. - A child has a
right at any court proceeding not to testify regarding personal
identifying information, including his name, address, telephone
number, school, and other information that could endanger his
physical safety or his family. The court may, however, require
the child to testify regarding personal identifying information in
the interest of justice.
(f) Destruction of videotapes and audiotapes. - Any videotape or
audiotape of a child produced under the provisions of this Rule
or otherwise made part of the court record shall be destroyed
after five (5) years have elapsed from the date of entry of
judgment.
(g) Records of youthful offender. - Where a youthful offender has
been charged before any city or provincial prosecutor or before
any municipal judge and the charges have been ordered
dropped, all the records of the case shall be considered as
privileged and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to
anyone for any purpose whatsoever.
Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court
acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him to an
institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to Chapter 3
of P. D. No. 603, all the records of his case shall also be
considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone except to determine if a defendant may
have his sentence suspended under Article 192 of P. D. No. 603
or if he may be granted probation under the provisions of P. D.
No. 968 or to enforce his civil liability, if said liability has been
imposed in the criminal action. The youthful offender concerned
shall not be held under any provision of law to be guilty of
perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his
failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related
thereto in response to any inquiry made to him for any purpose.
"Records" within the meaning of this sub-section shall include
those which may be in the files of the National Bureau of
Investigation and with any police department or government
agency which may have been involved in the case. (Art. 200, P.
D. No. 603)
Section 32. Applicability of ordinary rules. - The provisions of the
Rules of Court on deposition, conditional examination of
witnesses, and evidence shall be applied in a suppletory
character.
Section 33. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on December
15, 2000 following its publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
42
Case No: Writ of Habeas Corpus even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law
Subtopic: authorizing it.

Case Title: GO vs. RAMOS

G.R. No. 167569. September 4, 2009
FACTS:These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for
Doctrine:Habeas Corpus; Certiorari; Appeals; Pleadings and deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of
Practice; The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may
be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration)
cor-rection of the error; The 48-hour appeal period in habeas against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
corpus proceedings demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy
in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents
will be re-evaluated.—We have held in a litany of cases that the himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and
extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition
other records indicate that he is not so. He also averred that in
and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth,
law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be
machination and scheming managed to cover up his true
taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the
correction of the error. The petitioners correctly argue that citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more
untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine
plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period
demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-
evaluated. On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Bail;
Words and Phrases; Once a person detained is duly charged in against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9)[19] in relation
court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition to Section 45(c)[20] of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The
for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus—his remedy would be to
quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued; Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
The term “court” in the context of habeas corpus proceedings
includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies
authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration; When an alien
is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation for certiorari and prohibition with application for injunctive
pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, reliefs before the RTC of Pasig City, seeking to annul and set
the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on
bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of
authorizing it.—A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings had
corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine therein. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board
whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, to continue with the deportation proceedings.
the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of
the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the In the interim, the Board issued a Decision dated April
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some 17, 2002, in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section
4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy.
application. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he
may no longer question his detention through a petition for
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218,
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to
quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the
The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for
sought to be released had been charged before any court. The
term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason
governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s of his provisional release on bail.
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be
assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is In view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143,
detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant Bureau of Immigration Commissioner issued Warrant of
to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the
Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail Deportation dated November 16, 2004 to carry out the April 17,
43
2002 Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted in the
apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of
Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation
to China.
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a
petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch
167, assailing his apprehension and detention despite the
pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of Jimmy for the petition of habeas
corpus is proper.
RULING: No, the petition for habeas corpus is improper.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot
be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for
the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events,
such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Once a
person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be
released had been charged before any court. The term court in
this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental
agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the
cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for
habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of
Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation
by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no
power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the
Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation,
coupled by this Courts pronouncement that the Board was not
ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation
proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot
and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on
the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the
same subject.
OTHER ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION (Bakalangmatanong)
Jimmys invocation of prescription also does not
persuade us. Section 37 (b) of Com. Act No. 613 states:
Section 37.(b) Deportation may be
effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
this section at any time after entry, but shall
not be effected under any other clause unless
the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
made within five years after the cause of
deportation arises.
As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for
violation of Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(e)
of Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing provision, his
deportation may be effected only if his arrest is made
within 5 years from the time the cause for deportation
arose. The court a quo is correct when it ruled that the
5-year period should be counted only from July 18,
2000, the time when Luis filed his complaint for
deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing the
action which determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of prescription. Additionally,
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled An Act
to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,
provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his
passport was issued because the government was
unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the
government been aware at such time that he was not a
Filipino citizen or there were certain anomalies attending
his application for such passport, it would have denied his
application.
44

In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that
due process was not observed in the deportation proceedings
must likewise fail.
Deportation proceedings are administrative
character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court
proceedings.[81] The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[82] As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the
demands of due process are sufficiently met.[83] Although Jimmy
was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and
Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found that he was
given ample opportunity to explain his side and present
controverting evidence.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
Citizenship; Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis—
once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it
necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon.—Carlos
and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has
prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship
are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into
question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided
upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257
SCRA 727 (1996), we said that decisions declaring the acquisition
or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status
with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of
the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Indeed, if the
issue of one’s citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the
courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is
more reason why the government should not be precluded from
questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so
when the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal.
Same; Deportation; Prescription; An alien’s deportation
may be effected only if his arrest is made within 5 years from the
time the cause for deportation arose; It is the legal possibility of
bringing the action which determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of prescription.—As shown in the
Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section
37(a)(9), in relation to Section 45(e) of Com. Act No. 613. From
the foregoing provision, his deportation may be effected only if
his arrest is made within 5 years from the time the cause for
deportation arose. The court a quo is correct when it ruled that
the 5-year period should be counted only from July 18, 2000, the
time when Luis filed his complaint for deportation. It is the legal
possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting
point for the computation of the period of prescription.
Additionally, Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled “An
Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized
by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Run,” provides: Sec. 2. Prescription
shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
in violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Same; Same; Parties; Indispensable Parties; To be indispensable,
a person must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.—As to the issue of
whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that an
indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined
either as plaintiff or defendant. To be indispensable, a person
must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Carlos clearly is not an
indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the
deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. Hence,
the principal issue that will be decided on is the propriety of his
deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino under
Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution because Carlos,
his father, is allegedly a citizen. Since his citizenship hinges on
that of his father’s, it becomes necessary to pass upon the
citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will be the findings
as to Carlos’ citizenship will in no way prejudice him.
Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; Citizenship proceedings
are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata
does not obtain as a matter of course; Requisites for Application
of Res Judicata in Citizenship Cases.—Citizenship proceedings, as
aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res
judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of
decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: 1. a
person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party; 2. the Solicitor General
or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by
this Court.
Same; Bureau of Immigration and Deportation; Administrative
Law; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; There can be no question
that the Board of Commissioners has the authority to hear and
determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the
process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him;
Judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts
themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting
the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable
grounds for the belief that the claim is correct; When the
evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship,
the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the
courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.—
There can be no question that the Board has the authority to
45
hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and
in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised
by him. However, this Court, following American jurisprudence,
laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by
the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation
Board, 96 SCRA 665 (1955), wherein we stressed that judicial
determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves
believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of
citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for
the belief that the claim is correct. Moreover, when the
evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be
recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings. While we are mindful that resort to the courts may
be had, the same should be allowed only in the sound discretion
of a competent court in proper proceedings. After all, the
Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of
citizenship. Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and
not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his
citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation
proceedings. The decision of the Board on the question is, of
course, not final but subject to review by the courts.
Same; Legal Research; The Supreme Court abandoned the
principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor,
79 Phil. 249 (1947), and, since then, said doctrine only benefited
those who were individually declared to be citizens of the
Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application
of jus soli.—One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim
to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine
or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus
soli was never extended to the Philippines. We agree. The
doctrine of jus soliwas for a time the prevailing rule in the
acquisition of one’s citizenship. However, the Supreme Court
abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v.
Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947). Since then, said doctrine
only benefited those who were individually declared to be
citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the
mistaken application of jus soli.
Same; Filiation; Paternity; It is a settled rule that only legitimate
children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate
children are under the parental authority of the mother and
follow her nationality.—It is a settled rule that only legitimate
children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate
children are under the parental authority of the mother and
follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer
upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the
Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.
However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence
proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the
aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
Same; Election of Philippine Citizenship; Words and
Phrases; The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.—The 1935 Constitution and
Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935
Charter only provides that the election should be made “upon
reaching the age of majority.” The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then
Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the
time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period
for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the election should be
made within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.
Same; Same; The 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship
may be extended as when the person has always regarded
himself as a Filipino; The exercise of the rights and privileges
granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship,
because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and
thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country; No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must
be resolved in favor of the state.—It is true that we said that the
3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended
as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be
that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single
circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of
the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of
suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief,
considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine
citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to
vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine
citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his
desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino
citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this
jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise
of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not
conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may
misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights
and privileges of citizens of this country. It is incumbent upon
one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction
of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and
any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
state.
Same; Deportation; Due Process; Deportation proceedings
are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not
be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary
court proceedings; The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.—Deportation proceedings are administrative in
character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court
proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity
to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met. Although Jimmy was not furnished
with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as
alleged by him, the trial court found that he was given ample
46
opportunity to explain his side and present controverting Case No: 9
evidence. Subtopic: Right Against Self Incrimination

RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, et al. vs. MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C.

CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND
REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND
151 SCRA 279
June 23, 1987

Doctrine: The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to

testimonial compulsion only.

Facts:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred
Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces
raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov.
Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms,
ammunition and other explosives. A shoot-out ensued after
petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a
number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were
arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing and
photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle,
grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the

items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the
provisions on the Bill of Rights (Sec.3 and Sec.4 (2))

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without

a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior
orders and that operation was necessary because of the
aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the
assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the
fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting
them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are
inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the
respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former
from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were
entitled to due process and should be protected from the
arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law.
Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was
urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals
or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree”
were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against
the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done
without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation
should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said
evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and

paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-
47
incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-
incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice
Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”
Topic: Right Against Self-Incrimination
Subtopic: Scope and Coverage
BATAAN SHIPYARD & ENGINEERING CO., INC. (BASECO) vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
G.R. No. 75885 May 27, 1987
Doctrine: It is elementary that the right against self-incrimination
has no application to juridical persons. While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless
protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a
corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may
refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such
privileges.
Corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional
protections which private individuals have. They are not at all
within the privilege against self-incrimination, although this court
more than once has said that the privilege runs very closely with
the 4th Amendment's Search and Seizure provisions. It is also
settled that an officer of the company cannot refuse to produce
its records in its possession upon the plea that they will either
incriminate him or may incriminate it.
FACTS: Challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition by a private corporation known as the Bataan
Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders
Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino
on February 28, 1986 and March 12, 1986, respectively, and (2)
the sequestration, takeover, and other orders issued, and acts
done, in accordance with said executive orders by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government and/or its
Commissioners and agents, affecting said corporation.
BASECO also contends that its right against self-incrimination
and unreasonable searches and seizures had been transgressed
by the Order of April 18, 1986 which required it "to produce
corporate records from 1973 to 1986 under pain of contempt of
the Commission if it fails to do so." The order was issued upon
the authority of Section 3 (e) of Executive Order No. 1, treating
of the PCGG's power to "issue subpoenas requiring * * the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records,
statements of accounts and other documents as may be
material to the investigation conducted by the Commission, "
and paragraph (3), Executive Order No. 2 dealing with its power
to "require all persons in the Philippines holding * * (alleged "ill-
gotten") assets or properties, whether located in the Philippines
or abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or trustees, to
make full disclosure of the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order to produce corporate records
from 1973 to 1986 infringed the corporation’s constitutional right
against self-incrimination, and unreasonable search and seizure.
RULING: No. There was No Violation of Right against Self-
Incrimination and Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.
It is elementary that the right against self-incrimination has no
application to juridical persons. While an individual may lawfully
48
refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an
immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested
with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its
hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.
Relevant jurisprudence is also cited by the Solicitor General:
* * corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional
protections which private individuals have. * * They are not
at all within the privilege against self-incrimination, although
this court more than once has said that the privilege runs
very closely with the 4th Amendment's Search and Seizure
provisions. It is also settled that an officer of the company
cannot refuse to produce its records in its possession upon
the plea that they will either incriminate him or may
incriminate it."
It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises,
could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these
franchises had been employed, and whether they had been
abused, and demand the production of the corporate books
and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this,
that an officer of the corporation which is charged with a
criminal violation of the statute may plead the criminality of
such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state
this proposition is to answer it. X XXXX
At any rate, Executive Order No. 14-A, amending Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 14 assures protection to individuals
required to produce evidence before the PCGG against any
possible violation of his right against self-incrimination. It gives
them immunity from prosecution on the basis of testimony or
information he is compelled to present. As amended, said
Section 4 now provides that —
The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under the order
(or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony, or other information) may be used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order.
Case No. 11a
Subtopic: Right against self-incrimination
a) Scope and Coverage
Beltran v. Samson and Jose
53 Phil 57
Doctrine: As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to
testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional
provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward
their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and
the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to
construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse
to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there
is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition
is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces
as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word
of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused
has a right to hold secret.
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition wherein petitioner
Beltran complains that the respondent Judge Samson ordered
him to appear before provincial fiscal Jose to take dictation in his
own handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose
of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining
whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed
to be falsified.
The respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to
the remedy applied for. The respondents contend that the order
is based upon Section 1687 of the Administrative Code which
provides that, the provincial fiscal, and the proper Judge, upon
motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the
investigation of any crime or misdemeanor.
The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded,
seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the
Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58 (Criminal
Procedure) which states: “Nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.”
Issue:
Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner
for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to
be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under
examination.
Ruling:
Yes, the act required constitutes violation of the Constitutional
prohibition that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself.
49
In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the
variations of wording in the constitutional clauses; this much is
conceded. It is therefore immaterial that the witness is
protected by one constitution from 'testifying', or by another
from 'furnishing evidence', or by another from 'giving evidence,'
or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various
phrasings have a common conception, in respect to the form of
the protected disclosure.
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to
testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional
provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward
their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and
the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to
construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse
to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there
is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition
is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces
as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word
of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused
has a right to hold secret.
Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his
own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his
own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write
in open court in order that the jury maybe able to compare his
handwriting with the one in question.
It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific
Reporter, 1013) inasmuch as the defendant, in offering himself
as witness in his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
Of like character is the case of Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va.,
374,378), where the judge asked the defendant to write his
name during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now
before us. We are not concerned here with the defendant, for it
does not appear that any information was filed against the
petitioner for the supposed falsification, and still less as it a
question of the defendant on trial testifying and under cross-
examination. This is only an investigation prior to the information
and with a view to filing it. And let it further be noted that in the
case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant performed the act
voluntarily.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more
than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not
a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means
that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious,
we believe the present case is similar to that of producing
documents or chattels in one's possession. And as to such
production of documents or chattels. which to our mind is not so
serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor
Wigmore, in his work cited, says:
. . . 2264. Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. —
1. It follows that the production of documents or chattels by a
person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response
to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other
form of process treating him as a witness ( i.e. as a person
appearing before a tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral
responsibility for truthtelling), may be refused under the
protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded.
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege,
there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of
his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to
obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted,
the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance
that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit
A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is
impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to
the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling
upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might
be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the
hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional
privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited
on behalf of the respondents, it should be remembered that in
the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear
that the defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the
fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they
must be understood to have waived their constitutional
privilege, as they could certainly do.
The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while
absolute when claimed, maybe waived by any one entitled to
invoke it.
The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng
(23 Phil., 145), were the defendant did not oppose the extraction
from his body of the substance later used as evidence against
him.
In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly
stated that the court preferred to rest its decision on the reason
of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said
reason of the case there consisted in that it was the case of the
examination of the body by physicians, which could be and
doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion
of the petitioner therein to furnish evidence by means
of testimonial act. In reality she was not compelled to execute
any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only
enjoined from something preventing the examination; all of
which is very different from what is required of the petitioner of
the present case, where it is sought to compel him to perform
a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his
handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Besides, in the case
of Villamor vs. Summers, it was sought to exhibit something
50
already in existence, while in the case at bar, the question deals
with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to
compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this
means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this
evidence which may seriously incriminate him.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is
ordered that the respondents and those under their orders
desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the
petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Case No: 12a
Subtopic: Right Against Self-incrimination: Statutory Immunity –
Two Types
Case Title: Mapa Jr. v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994
Doctrine:
There are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness.
They are the transactional immunity and the used-and-
derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the
scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be
prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or
transaction. 4 In contrast, by the grant of used-and-derivative-use
immunity,a witness is only assured that his or her particular
testimony andevidence derived from it will not be used against
him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
FACTS:
On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo
Vergara, together with Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, Fernando
Balatbat, Ramon Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando
Maramag, Jr., and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were charged with violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
for the sale of a major portion of the public utility assets of the
Pantranco Express, Inc., for a consideration of SEVEN HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE MILLION (P775,000,000.00) PESOS, giving accused
Gregorio Ma. Araneta III unwarranted benefits, advantages
and/or preferences and causing undue injury to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED
MILLION (P400,000,000.00) PESOS. Nonetheless, Herein
petitioners upon agreeing with PCGG to testify against Former
President Marcos and His wife Imelda in a case instituted in New
York USA for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to the United States and
concealing the investment of money through cronies and
offshore organizations. They were promised immunity by PCGG
which was denied by Sandiganbayan when the NY case got
dismissed. The latter court averred that the granting of
'Immunity' from criminal liability and/or prosecution is a matter
subject to the court's judicious determination and approval,
after applying the test of compliance and the standard of
reasonableness with the rigid requirements for such grant.
Hence this present petition.
ISSUE: WON herein petitioners may invoke the immunity
granted to them by PCGG against respondent Court.
RULING: Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the
failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the
Marcoses in New York can not nullify their immunity. They have
satisfied the requirements both of the law and the parties'
implementing agreements. Under section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as
amended, their duty was to give information to the prosecution,
and they did. Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they
promised to make themselves available as witnesses in the said
RICO cases, and they did. Petitioners were ready to testify but
they were not called to testify by the US prosecutors of the RICO
case. Their failure to testify was not of their own making. It was
51
brought about by the decision of the US prosecutors who may The days of inquisitions brought about the most despicable
have thought that their evidence was enough to convict the abuses against human rights. Not the least of these abuses is the
Marcoses. Since petitioners' failure to testify was not of their expert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even
own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian
and equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal of method, the right against self-incrimination was ensconced in
their immunity. Indeed, initially, the PCGG itself adopted the the fundamental laws of all civilized countries. Over the years,
posture that the immunity of petitioners stayed and should not however, came the need to assist government in its task of
be disturbed. It joined the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matrix of
in the respondent court. When the respondent court denied the public welfare. To accommodate
motion, PCGG stuck to its previous position as it again joined the the need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. It is only in this absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted
petition for review on certiorari that PCGG, after a change of which would allow government to compel a witness to testify
Chairman, flip-flopped in its position. despite his plea of the right against self-incrimination. To
insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a
We also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or
granted a section 5 immunity to petitioners while they were a use-derivative-use immunity, as heretofore discussed. Quite
already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No. 11960. Section 5 of clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from
E.O. 14, as amended, does not prohibit the PCGG from granting government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high
immunity to persons already charged in court and undergoing price for it — the surrender of their precious right to be silent.
trial. As long as the privilege of immunity so given will in the Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against self-
judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining its greater objectives, incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded
the PCGG is well within legal grounds to exercise this power at greater respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the
any stage of the proceedings. This section 5 immunity frees and force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a
releases one from liability, and as it inures to the benefit of an liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The government
accused, it can be invoked at any time after its acquisition and has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.
before his final conviction. Our regard for the rights of an
accused dictates this result. Thus, we have consistently held that
laws that decriminalize an act or a grant of amnesty may be
given retroactive effect. They constitute a bar against the further
prosecution of their beneficiaries' regardless of the appearance
of their guilt. To be sure, the guilt of the petitioners in Criminal
Case No. 11960 has yet to be established beyond doubt. The
PCGG itself does not appear certain and confident of the
strength of its evidence against the petitioners in said criminal
case. The records show that petitioners Mapa was granted
immunity not only because of the information he gave to the
prosecution but also ". . . in light of Republic's review of the
cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or intends to file
against . . ." him. Similarly, petitioner Vergara was granted
immunity ". . . in light of Republic's review of Vergara's
participation in Criminal Case No. 11960 . . . ." After reviewing its
evidence against the petitioners, PCGG appears to have sensed
the sterility of its efforts of continuing their prosecution. Its
former chairman, M.A.T. Caparas, learned that petitioners would
file a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 11960 after PCGG rest
its evidence, "for failure of the prosecution to prove its case." In
his May 16, 1990 letters to the petitioners, he assured them that
"we shall . . . offer no objection to its favorable consideration."
This is a patent admission that petitioners' Motion to Dismiss has
merit and that the PCGG cannot prove its case against the
petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960.

Finally, we reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of

section 5 immunity must be strictly construed against the
petitioners. It simplistically characterized the grant as special
privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In
taking this posture, it misread the raison d'etre and the long
pedigree of the right against self-incrimination vis-a-vis immunity
statutes.

52
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Doctrine: Double Jeopardy, (Same Offense)
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A
simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of
an additional fact or element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one
does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewhere,
where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines
two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the
other.
FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along
Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then
driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then
driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and
injuries to Ernesto Reyes and PaulinoGonzal.
As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against
petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and (b) an Information for
violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code
on Abandonment of one's victim.
On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding
the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's
victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275
of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said
Decision to the RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989,
petitioner was arraigned for violation of Article 365. He entered
a plea of not guilty.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
He is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal
Code. In People vs. Doriquez, the SC held that it is a cardinal rule
that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only
for the same offense or identical offenses. Where two different
laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for
separate offenses. The first, for reckless imprudence (Article
365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title
Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal
Code. The second, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art.
275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title
Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two
of the same Code.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of
culpa. Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.
Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of the offenses charged.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an identity is shown to exist between the
earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.

He filed a petition for review in the CA but which was denied. He

raised before the SC that that he cannot be penalized twice for
an “accident” and another for “recklessness.” He maintained
that since he is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence,
which offense carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under Article
275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing to render to the persons
whom he has accidentally injured.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment
under Article 275 of the same Code because it constitutes
double jeopardy.

RULING:
No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize different and
distinct offenses. The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner
has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed
for lack of merit.
53
Case No 14a
Topic: Double Jeopardy
Subtopic: Two Kinds—Same “act”
PEOPLE v. RELOVA
G.R. No. L-45129; March 6, 1987
Doctrine: That is, where the offenses charged are penalized
either by different sections of the same statute or by different
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the
earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the
other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the
identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed
and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so
long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first
offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a
statute.
FACTS: On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police
together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System,
equipped with a search warrant, searched and examined the
premises of the OpulenciaCarpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage
owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel
Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices
and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government, and "architecturally
concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by the private
respondent, and of which Opulencia admitted in his written
statement.
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of
Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance
No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. He filed a motion to dismiss
the information, on which the Batangas City Court granted the
motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing
that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two
months from the time of discovery thereof.
Again, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this
time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to
Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Before he
could be arraigned, Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash alleging
that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in
the second information and that the filing thereof was violative
of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The
petitioner countered that the unauthorized installation punished
by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of
electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second
offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information. The respondent
Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the
case dismissed. A Motion for Reconsideration of the Order filed
by the petitioner was denied by the respondent Judge. Hence,
the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed in
this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of
the People.
ISSUE: Whether double jeopardy is present in the case
RULING: The Court ruled in the positive and states that the basic
difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be
examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV
(22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV
(22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first
and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of
acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although the
prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as
the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts.
That is, where the offenses charged are penalized
either by different sections of the same statute or by different
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the
earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the
other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the
identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed
and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so
long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first
offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a
statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist
where two offenses under two different sections of the same
statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule
for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the
second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been
written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a
municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An
offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition,
different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses
would never constitute the same offense having been
promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though one
be subordinate to the other — and the plea of double jeopardy
would never lie.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within
the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975.
During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or
permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices in his
ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or
authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused
conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized
installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill.
This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that
54
such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical
effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of
electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the
corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other
words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with the
unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be
understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses
that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where
the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.
Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be
available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the second
offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an
accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements. Further, the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of
the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance
upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed,
amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime"
is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."
Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash
based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense.
Double Jeopardy: Requisites
Ivler vs. Modesto- San Pedro
Doctrine; The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article
365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this
Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365
charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula
under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the
more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-
offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under
Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner
Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first
delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for
the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the
two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought
from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case,
including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial
question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with
the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled
his bail and ordered his arrest.
55
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.
offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under
Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double

Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for
the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.

Ruling: The accused negative constitutional right not to be

"twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"
protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution
for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two

cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense
from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts,
were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or
simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a

single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this
Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as

constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365
charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula
under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the
more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-
56
Case No. 16a
Subtopic: Double-Jeopardy
b. Requisites
PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008
Doctrine: Judgment rendered with grave abuse of
discretion or without due process is void, does
not exist in legal contemplation and, thus,
cannot be the source of an acquittal. Hence,
no double jeopardy will attach.
FACTS:
During the May 1998 elections, private respondent Villapando
ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M.
Tiape, a relative of Villapando’s wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of
Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape
lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San
Vicente, Palawan. A Contract of Consultancy executed between
the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and Tiape whereby the
former employed the services of Tiape as Municipal
Administrative and Development Planning Consultant in the
Office of the Municipal Mayor.
Solomn B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando
and Tiape for violation of Article 244 (Unlawful Appointments) of
the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, for appointing Tiape. They based they
position on the one year prohibition on appointment imposed
on losing candidates as enunciated in the Constitution and the
local government code. Prosecution proceeded for ViIllando,
while the case against Tiape was dismissed pursuant to its
untimely death.
After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave
to file a demurrer to evidence. The Sandiganbayan denied his
motion but gave him five days within which to inform the court
in writing whether he will nonetheless submit his Demurrer to
Evidence for resolution without leave of court. Villapando then
filed a Manifestation of Intent to File Demurrer to Evidence, and
was given 15 days from receipt to file his Demurrer to Evidence.
Finding the Demurrer to Evidence meritorious, the same was
granted. The Sandiganbayan held that the qualifications for a
position are provided by law, and that it may well be that one
who possesses the required legal qualification for a position,
may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public
position by reason of the one-year prohibition imposed on losing
candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from temporary
disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee possesses
all the qualifications stated in the law.
Thus, the petition to Supreme Court by the Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
representing the People of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the granting of demurrer to evidence amounts
to acquittal.
RULING:
Yes, the granting of demurrer to evidence amounts to acquittal.
Once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order
amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy, hence such ruling shall not be disturbed in the absence
of a grave abuse of discretion.
Villapandos contention and the Sandiganbayan interpretation of
the term legal disqualification lack cogency. Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot be circumscribed lexically. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, in disregarding basic rules of
statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its
interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts
should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated.
Further, the Sandiganbayan, denied Villapandos Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence yet
accommodated Villapando by giving him five days within which
to inform it in writing whether he will submit his demurrer to
evidence for resolution without leave of court.
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or
without due process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation
and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.
PS: Jeopardy attaches only
(1) upon a valid indictment;
(2) before a competent court;
(3) after arraignment;
(4) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.
57
Case No: 17
Subtopic: Doctrine of Supervening Event/ Supervening Fact
Doctrine
People v. Buling
G.R. No. L-13315 April 27, 1960
Doctrine:
Two conflicting doctrines on double jeopardy have been
enunciated by this Court:
. . . Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where
after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said
to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new
offense. (85 Phil., 769-770).
FACTS: The accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of less serious physical
injuries for having inflicted wounds on complaining witness
Isidro Balaba, which according to the complaint would "require,
medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and will
incapacitate him from the performance of his customary labors
for the game period of time." The accused pleaded guilty to the
complaint and was found guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to pay
damages to the offended party in the sum of P20.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On the same day
he began to serve his sentence and has fully served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period
estimated, and so the Provincial Fiscal filed an information
against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
charging him of serious physical injuries. The information alleges
that the wounds inflicted by the accused on Isidro Balaba
require medical attendance and incapacitated him for a period
of from 1 ½ months to 2 ½ months. After trial the accused was
found guilty of serious physical injuries and sentenced in the
manner indicated in first paragraph hereof. This is the decision
now sough to be set aside and reversed in this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not a new fact supervened which
transformed the offense from less serious physical injuries to
serious physical injuries
HELD: NO. We are inclined to agree with the contention made
on behalf of appellant that no new supervening fact has existed
or occurred, which has transformed the offense from less
serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.
Two conflicting doctrines on double jeopardy have been
enunciated by this Court:
. . . Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where
after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said
to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new
offense. (85 Phil., 769-770).
We do not believe that a new fact supervened, or that a new
fact has come into existence. What happened is that the first
physician that examined the wounds of the offended party
certified on December 10, 1956 that the injury was as follows:
"wound, incised, wrist lateral, right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and
that the same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and
incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same period of time
from his usual work (Exh. 3). It was on the basis of this certificate
that on December 8, 1956, defendant-appellant was found guilty
of less serious physical injuries and sentenced to imprisonment
of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.
But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the
offended party, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the
offended party which had been wounded. The examination
discloses, according to the physician, the following injuries:
Old stab wound 4 inches long. With infection, distal end
arm, right. X-ray plate finding after one month and 12
days — Fracture old oblique, incomplete distal end,
radius right, with slight calus. (Exh. "E").
and the certification is to the effect that treatment will take from
1 ½ months to 2 ½ months barring complications.
Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened in
the case at bar, as a result of which another offense had been
ommitted. It is argued that the injury and the condition thereof
was the same when the first examination was made on
December 10, 1956, as when the examination was made on
January 18, 1957, and that if any new fact had been disclosed in
the latter examination failure of this new fact to be disclosed in
the previous examination may be attributed to the
incompetence on the part of the examining physician. We find
much reason in this argument. What happened is no X-ray
examination of the wounded hand was made during the first
examination, which was merely superficial. The physician who
made the first examination could not have seen the fracture at
the distal end of the right arm, and this could only be apparent
or visible by X-ray photography.
But the Solicitor General cites the case of People vs. Manolong,
supra, and argues that our ruling in said case should apply to the
case at bar, for the reason that in the said case the first crime
with which the accused was charged was less serious physical
injuries and the second one was serious physical injuries and yet
we held that there was no jeopardy.
If the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on
January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first
examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is,
therefore, no now or supervening fact that could be said to have
58
developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which Case No: 18b
would justify the application of the ruling enunciated by us in the Subtopic: MR’s and Appeal
cases of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, supra. We
attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently People v. Tria – Tirona
lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2005
superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10,
1956. Had an X-ray examination taken at the time, the fracture Doctrine:
would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the
delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first An acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or
examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that a remand
that no supervening fact had occurred which justifies the to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the
application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a
vs. Manolong, for which reason we are constrained to apply the finding of mistrial
general rule of double jeopardy.
FACTS:

Armed with two search warrants members of NBI

investigation division conducted a search on the house of
accused private respondent located at Banawe , Quezon City.
The group alleged that they found shabu in his house lead to the
filing of information charging the accused for violation of
possession of illegal drugs. However, after the trial, the accused
was acquitted. Unsatisfied, the government appealed via
certiorari before this court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court will consider the appeal

considering that the decision acquitting the accused is final.

HELD:No.
It is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the
merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed
on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where
double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of
mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
We find petitioner’s argument that, despite our ruling
in People v. Velasco, since we gave due course to the petition,
the issue on the sufficiency of the evidence may be reviewed, to
be untenable. The fact that the petition was given due course
does not necessarily mean we have to look into the sufficiency
of the evidence since the issue to be resolved is the appealability
of an acquittal. We have categorically ruled in People v.
Velasco20 that, except when there is a finding of mistrial, no
appeal will lie in case of an acquittal. There being no mistrial in
the case before us, we find no need to reexamine the evidence,
because if we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made
on an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of the
accused’s right against double jeopardy.

Case No: 19
Subtopic: MR and Appeals (Double Jeopardy)

59
Case Title: Lejano vs People
G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011
Doctrine: As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be
reconsidered because it places the accused under double
jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already
been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the
Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is
ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to
prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been
acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a
sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm
the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
FACTS:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case,
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and
Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack
of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an
immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider
its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process
of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably
regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and
erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted
in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its
treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."
Brief background about the Vizconde case:
Carmela, her mother and 7 year-old sister were killed in their
own home in Pitong Daan Subd. Carmela was raped before
killed. Webb et al were the accused for the crime. They were
pointed by Jessica Alfaro who claimed that she had witnessed
the crime. Webb et al were ACQUITTED. The Court held that the
testimony of Jessica Alfaro is not only incredible and inconsistent
at some, if not most points, but her reputation for being an NBI
asset whose job and living is to fraternize with criminals so she
could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. The Court ruled that
Webb’s testimony is stronger not only because of lack of
inconsistencies (unlike of Alfaro’s) but because of documentary
and object evidence presented for his alibi that he is in the US
when the crime happened. Hence, if Webb’s alibi should prevail,
Alfaro’s testimony would crumble and totally untrue because
Web is the anchor of her story. The Court found reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the 9 people accused in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgement by the Court can be
reconsidered and the Court should re-examine the case again.
RULING: NO. Because a reconsideration of a judgment of
acquittal places the accused under double jeopardy.
On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is
possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when
the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its
discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has
occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision
by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he
has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under
such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court "must
ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no
grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the
evidence." But he has not specified the violations of due process
or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court
supposedly committed. His claim that "the highly questionable
and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious
doubts the validity of the decision" is, without more, a mere
conclusion drawn from personal perception.
Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan as authority that the Court can set aside the
acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the government
proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due
process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was
"dictated, coerced and scripted." It was a sham trial. Here,
however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham
review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that
the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the
seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who
dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really
go through the process.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the
Court’s appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the
prosecution witnesses’ credibility. He ascribes grave error on the
Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails
the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense.
In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review
the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such
a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely
a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et al’s conviction. The
judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be
disturbed.
60
Case 20 a Case No: 21a
Subtopic: Bill of attainder

PEOPLE vs. FERRER

48 SCRA 382 (1972)

Doctrine: The Supreme Court held that the Anti-Subversion Act is

not a bill of attainder, because it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for
the purpose of punishment; what it does is simply declare the
Party to be an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government; and the term “Communist Party of the Philippines”
is used solely for definitional purposes.

FACTS: On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed against
Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance in Tarlac concerning
the Anti-Subversion Act. He was accused of being an officer or a
ranked leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
government of the Philippines by means of force, violence,
deceit, subversion or any other illegal means. Co claimed that
the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. On May 25, 1970,
NiloTayag and five others were also charged in the same court
with subversion. Tayag copied Co’s attack on the law. The court
ruled the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder
and that it is vague overbroad. Government appealed to the SC
as a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of

attainder.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that the Anti-Subversion

Act is not a bill of attainder, because it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for
the purpose of punishment; what it does is simply declare the
Party to be an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government; and the term “Communist Party of the Philippines”
is used solely for definitional purposes.

Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to

easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to
inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it
become a bill of attainder. (US v. Lovett 328 US 303 1946)

61