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FIRST EXAMINATION

CASES

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EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS.
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
TAÑADA vs. TUVERA (1986)
Facts: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding
the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by law.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause, publication
may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it.
The Courts note at this point the conclusive presumption that
even person knows the law, which presupposes that the law has
been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification
at all.

The government argue that while publication was a necessary as
a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.
In the decision of this case in 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring
in the dispositive portion, as follows:
It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights recognizes “the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern”.
The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. xxx

"WHEREFORE the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall vires (beyond one's legal power or authority) act of the
have no binding force and effect.’'
legislature.
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even
Issues: The petitioners are now before the Court again, this time,
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. They ask
the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
the following questions:
Laws that need publication: /APACC/
1. What is meant by law of public nature or general
1. all statutes, including those of local application and private
applicability?
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
applicability and laws which are not?
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
3. What is meant by publication?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
2. presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
5. When is the publication to be made?
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
Solicitor General: The Solicitor General commented that the
present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the CC meant
that the publication required therein was not always imperative,
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say,
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
those naming a public place after a favored individual or
Official Gazette.
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements,

He also said in a rejoinder that issuances intended only for the

3. administrative rules and regulations must also be
internal administration of a government agency or for particular
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
persons did not have to be published, the publication when
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette.
4. even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding
Ruling: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to
that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
5. circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
previous publication.
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed
to enforce.
Publication is indispensable in every case but the legislature
may, in its discretion, provide that the usual 15-day period
shall be shortened or extended.

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Laws that do not need publication
1. interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published.
2. letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
3. no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say,
the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made
in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of
a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
4. municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
Executive orders, administrative orders, implementing rules
and regulations and even circulars must be published if they are
punitive in character, meaning that they provide sanctions,
penalties, or fines. Ordinances are governed by the Local
Government Code.
Decisions of the SC are not laws. So even if they are punitive in
character because it would impose the burden on the lawyer who
did not comply with the court pursuant to its new decision, it will
still now be considered as law because judicial decisions, while
interpreting or applying the law, and although forming part of the
legal system of the PHL, are still not laws.
Publication must be in full or it is not publication at all since
its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of laws.
The mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the
title of such decree, its whereabout, the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement.
Since E.O. 200 was still not effective during this time, the Court ruled
that the publication of laws must have been made in the Official
Gazette.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.
DE ROY vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1988)
Facts: The firewall of a burned out building owned by the
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied
by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the
former failed to do so.
TC: Found petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding
damages to private respondents.
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CA: Affirmed RTC decision.
On September 9, 1987, the last day of the 15-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by theCA
in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September
24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.
Ruling: This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit
a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration.
It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises,
Inc. v. Japzon, that the 15-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate
Appellate Court reiterated the rule and went further to restate and
clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court stressed the prospective
application of said rule.
IN THIS CASE: Petitioners’ motion for extension of time was filed
on September 9,1987, more than a year after the expiration of the
grace period on June 30,1986. Hence, it is no longer within the
coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace
period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals
on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the
ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to
file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners’ contention: Petitioners contend that the rule
enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply
to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision
of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Ruling: Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective.
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice
to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly
where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Disposition: The petition was denied.
PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS.
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Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
ATIENZA vs. BRILLANTES, JR. (1995)
Article 40 of the FC is a rule of procedure so if one may desire to enter into
a contract of marriage under the FC, and there was a prior, subsisting, and
void marriage, the first void marriage must be declared void by the courts.
The first marriage was contracted under the NCC, whereas the second one
was contracted under the FC. Therefore, he has to obtain a decree of nullity
of the previous void marriage before he can contract a valid and
subsequent marriage.
Facts: Complainant Lupo Atienza alleges that he has 2 children
with Yolanda de Castro who are living together in Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which
he purchased.
In December 1991, he saw respondent Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr. sleeping on his bed. He was told by his houseboy
that respondent had been cohabiting with Yolanda. He left the
house.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent denies being
married to Zenaida, although he admits having 5 children with her.
He alleges that he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony, however, the same was not married for lack of a
marriage license. Upon the request of Ongkiko, there went
through another marriage but still, neither applied for a marriage
license. Ongkiko abandoned him and their children.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in
Los Angeles, California, he believed in all good faith that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the FC, there must be a judicial declaration of nullity of
a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a
second marriage.
Respondent argues that Article 40 of the FC does not apply to
him as his first marriage took place in 1965, and was governed
by the NCC, while the second marriage took place in 1991, and
was thus governed by the FC (E.O. 209, August 3, 1988).
Ruling:
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the FC on August 3, 1988, regardless of the date
of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws”.
This is particularly true with Article 40 which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any violated right that was
impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
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The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative
of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
The case was dismissed.
CHENG vs. SY (2009)
Facts: Petitioner Anita Cheng filed 2 estafa cases before the RTC
against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to
her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762
and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of
which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn
against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner filed against
respondents 2 cases for violation of Batas Pampas Bilang 29
before the MeTC.
TC: Dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to
prove the elements of the crime.
MeTC: Dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order
on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused
respondents in open court.
Petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC a complaint
for collection of sum of money with damages based on the same
loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the 2 checks.
TC: Dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating
that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with
damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22
case in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration which the court
denied. Hence this petition raising one sole legal issue.
Issue given in the case: Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Supreme Court
Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing
and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are
applicable to the present case where the nature of the order
dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the respondents
was based on the failure of the prosecution to identify both the
accused and respondents herein.
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were
filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply,
as it must be given only prospective application.
Issue: Whether or not the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply,
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since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, as the
Rules must be given only prospective application.
Ruling: Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP
Blg. 22 complaints in 1999.
It is now settled that the rules of procedure apply even to
cases already pending at the time of their promulgation.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigant’s rights does not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions.
It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws
does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL (2008)
This is an exception to the rule that procedural laws are given retroactive
application. This refers to the rules on the declaration of nullity of the
marriage or rules on annulment of marriage.
The SC was very explicit when it said that these rules (declaration of nullity
and annulment) shall be given prospective application and will not apply
to petitions filed before the effectivity of the rule even if the marriage was
celebrated after the FC, but will only apply on the petitions filed when the
rule of procedure regarding the procedure of annulment/declaration of
nullity of marriage of marriage have taken effect.
The new rule became effective on March 15, 2003, prospective in
application; FC: August 3, 1988; NCC: August 30, 1950. Petitioner
commenced the marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.
Marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law
would govern would depend upon when the marriage took place. The
marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the FC, the
applicable law is the NCC which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.
Only a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for
marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code,
except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity of the
marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
Facts: Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate.
They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo
Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate
to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and
registered in the name of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered in
the name of petitioner.
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On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
Upon Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the
RTC in Muntinlupa City and in said case, parties submitted and
caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under
the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares
in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of
land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos, 2,331 square
meters of the Parcel No. 2 were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs
Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later
divided between petitioner and respondents.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in
August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as
Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo
with the following causes of action:
a. declaration of nullity of marriage;
b. status of a child;
c. recovery of property;
d. reconveyance; and
e. sum of money and damages.
Petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother
Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the
absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained
that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he
entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject
real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued
that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including
the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the
requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad’s marriage
to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the
illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another
woman.
Before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents
moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the
affidavit of the justice of peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondent also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
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respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos
and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
Petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the
ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In
the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for
summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from
the Local Civil Registrar of Calumet, Bulacan, certifying that there
is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary
judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case,
Carlos vs. Gorospe, wherein Felicidad narrated that co-respondent
Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.
TC: It declared the marriage between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May
14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate, null and void ab
initio for lack of the requisite marriage license.
It also declared the defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II not the
natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late
Teofilo E. Carlos.
CA: It reversed and set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the
case back to the trial court.
Issue: Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through
a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without
the benefit of a trial.
Ruling: No. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings
or summary judgment is allowed. So is the confession of
judgment disallowed.
The Court ruled that the CA was correct in reversing the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment
on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases
of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in
annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Section 17 (2). known
as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity as laid down in said Rule which took effect
on March 15, 2003:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
By issuing the said summary judgment, the TC has divested the
State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case.
A petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of a void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife, except:
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1. Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code.
Under the (new) Rule, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the
husband or wife to file a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of a void marriage.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the FC and
those solemnized under the CC. The rule extends to marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the FC which took effect
on August 3, 1988.
It is emphasized that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage
involved is within the coverage of the FC.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the FC, the applicable law is the CC which was the law in
effect at the time of the celebration.
But the CC is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. However, does this mean that any person may
bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
The Court responded in the negative. The absence of a provision
in the Civil Code cannot be construed as license for any person to
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Else wise
stated, plaintiff must be the real-party-in-interest. For it is
basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real-party-in-interest.
The Court ruled that the case must be remanded to determine
whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
CAROLINO vs. SENGA (2015)
Carolino retired under R.A. 340 and his pension was stopped when the
P.D. 1638 took effect because according to the AFP Pension Management
Center, he swore allegiance to a foreign country and thus he lost his
citizenship and by virtue of that, the Pension Mgt. Center decided to stop
his pension.
SC said that there is nothing in PD 1638 giving it retroactive application.
Moreover, Carolino retired under R.A. 340 and not under P.D. 1638
therefore, the provisions of 1638 will only apply to the members of the
AFP who will be retiring under that law but not those that have already
retired before it.
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which accrued from March 5, 2005 up to the time his name is

For 1, the pensions being received by Carolino — he has already acquired reinstated.
a vested right over them and thus if you stop that without giving him due
process, that would be violative of the Constitution so there is no basis for
TC: The RTC found that the issue for resolution is the applicability
the stoppage of the pension of Mr. Carolino.
of R.A. No. 340 and P.D. No. 1638 upon Jeremias’ retirement
benefits.
Facts: On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner’s
husband, retired from the AFP with the rank of Colonel under
It found that he retired as a commissioned officer of the AFP in
General Order No. 1208 dated November 29, 1976, pursuant to
1976, thus R.A. No. 340 is the law applicable in determining his
the provisions of Sections 1(A) and 10 of R.A. No. 340, as
entitlement to his retirement benefits, and not P.D. 1638 which
amended.
was issued only in 1979.
He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in the amount of
Article 4 of the CC provides that “laws shall have no retroactive
P18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same was withheld by
effect unless the contrary is provided.”
respondents in March 2005.

P.D. No. 1638 does not provide for such retroactive

On June 3, 2005, Jeremias wrote a letter addressed to the AFP
application. Also, it could not have been the intention of P.D. No.
Chief of Staff asking for the reasons of the withholding of his
1638 to deprive its loyal soldiers of a monthly pension during their
retirement pay.
old age especially where, as here, the right had been bested to
them through time.
In a letter reply, Myrna F. Villaruz, LTC (FS) PA, Pension and
Gratuity Officer of the AFP Finance Center, informed Jeremias that
R.A. No. 340 does not provide that the loss of Filipino citizenship
his loss of Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his name
would terminate one’s retirement benefits and that P.D. 1638 does
in the alpha list of the AFP Pensioners’ Payroll effective March
not reduce whatever benefits that any person has already been
5, 2005; and that he could avail of re-entitlement to his retirement
receiving under existing law.
benefits and the restoration of his name in the AFP Pensioners’
Masterlist Payroll by complying with the requirements prescribed
Respondents sought reconsideration but the same was denied
under R.A. No. 9225 or the Dual Citizenship Act.
and so they elevated the case to the CA. Jeremias died and was
substituted by his wife.
It appeared that the termination of Jeremias’ pension was done
pursuant to a disposition form dated October 29, 2004, which was
CA: The CA granted the respondents’ appeal. It found that while
approved by the Chief of Staff and made effective in January 2005.
it is true that Jeremias retired in 1976, under the provisions of R.A.
No. 340, as amended, which does not contain any provision anent
In the said disposition form, the AFP Judge Advocate General
cessation or loss of retirement benefits upon acquiring another
opined that under the provisions of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A.
citizenship, P.D. No. 1638, which provides that the name of the
No. 340, retired military personnel are disqualified from
retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the
receiving pension benefits once incapable of rendering
retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss,
military service as a result of his having sworn allegiance to a
was correctly made applicable to Jeremias’ retirement benefits.
foreign country.

Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner contends that her husband’s

It was also mentioned that termination of retirement benefits of
retirement from the active service in 1976 was pursuant to the
the AFP could be done pursuant to the provisions of P.D. 1638
provisions of R.A. No. 340 as P.D. No. 1638 was not yet in
which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
existence then, and there was nothing in R.A. No. 340 that
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
disqualifies a retired military personnel from receiving retirement
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. It being in
benefits after acquiring foreign citizenship.
consonance with the police consideration that all retirement laws
inconsistent with the provisions of P.D. No. 1638 are repealed and
The concept of retirement benefits is such that one is entitled to
modified accordingly.
them for services already rendered and not for those to be made
at a future time.
Jeremias filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
a Petition for Mandamus against Gen. Generoso Senga, as Chief
Retirement benefits due petitioner’s husband under R.A. No. 340,
of Staff of the AFP, Brig. Gen. Fernando Zabat, as Chief of the AFP
is an acquired right which cannot be taken away by a subsequent
Finance Center, Comm. Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the AFP-GHQ
law. P.D. No. 1638 does not expressly provide for its retroactive
Management and Fiscal Office, and Comm. Emilio Marayag,
application. Respondents, being officers of the AFP tasked to
Pension and Gratuity Management Officer, Pension and Gratuity
implement the provisions of R.A. No. 340 have neglected their
Management Center, AFP Finance Center, seeking reinstatement
function thereunder by delisting petitioner’s husband as a retiree,
of his name in the list of the AFP retired officers, resumption
thus, mandamus is proper.
of payment of his retirement benefits under R.A. No. 340, and
the reimbursement of all his retirement pay and benefits
Solicitor General’s Comment: P.D. No. 1638 applies to all
military personnel in the service of the AFP whether active or

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retired; hence, it applies retroactively to petitioner’s husband. Even
when a retiree is no longer in the active service, his being a Filipino
still makes him a part of the Citizen Armed Forces; that whether a
military personnel retires under the provisions of R.A. No. 340 or
under P.D. No. 1638, he is still in the service of the military and/or
the State only that he is retired, thus, they should not be treated
differently upon the loss of Filipino citizenship. He argues when
there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two laws of different
vintages, i.e., RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638, the latter enactment
prevails.
Ruling: The court found merit in the petition.
FIRSTLY, petitioner’s husband retired in 1976 under R.A. No. 340.
He was already receiving his monthly retirement benefit in the
amount of P18,315.00 since December 1976 until it was
terminated in March 2005.
Section 5, R.A. No. 340 provides:
Officers and enlisted men placed in the retired list shall be subject
to the rules and articles of war and to trial by court-martial for any
breach thereof. At any time said officers and enlisted men may be
called to active service by the President. Refusal on the part of any
officer or enlisted man to perform such services shall terminate
his right to further participation in the benefits of this Act
provided he resides in the Philippines and is physically fit for
service. Such fitness for service shall be determined by applicable
regulations.
The aforequoted provision clearly shows how a retiree’s
retirement benefits may be terminated, i.e., when the retiree
refuses to perform active service when called to do so provided that:
1. the retiree resides in the Philippines and
2. is physically fit for service.
There is no other requirement found in the law which would
be the reason for the termination of a retiree’s retirement
benefits. Petitioner’s husband was never called to perform active
service and refused to do so, however, his retirement benefit was
terminated. The reason for such termination was his loss of Filipino
citizenship based on Section 27 of P.D. No. 1638, to wit:
Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall
be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss.
The Court found that the CA erred in applying P.D. No. 1638 to
the retirement benefits of petitioner’s husband.
P.D. No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on
September 10, 1979.
Under Article 4 of the CC, it is provided that laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is said that the
law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless
the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions; that all statutes are to be construed as having only
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared
8
or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that every
case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect. These
principles also apply to the amendment of statutes.
P.D. No. 1638 does not contain ay provision regarding its
retroactive application, nor the same may be implied from its
language. In fact, Section 36 of P.D. No. 1638 clearly provides
that the decree shall take effect upon its approval.
As held in Parred v. COA, there is no question that P.D. No. 1638,
as amended, applies prospectively. Since P.D. No. 1638, as
amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation
from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who
were in the service at the time of its approval.
Conversely, P.D. No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired
before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act
is amended, the original act continues to be in force with
regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment.
Moreover, Section 27 of P.D. No. 1638 specifically provides for
the retirees to whom the law shall be applied, to wit:
Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall
be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss.
Notably, petitioner’s husband did not retire under those above
enumerated Sections of P.D. No. 1638 as he retired under R..A No.
340.
SECONDLY, before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests
in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of
eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and
length of service. Undeniably, petitioner’s husband had complied
with the conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits as he was
then receiving his retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it
was terminated. Where the employee retires and meets the
eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to the
benefits that is protected by the due process clause. It is only
upon retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits.
Vested right — a right is vested when the right to enjoyment has
become the property of some particular person or persons as a
present interest. It is the privilege to enjoy property legally vested,
to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred
by the existing law. It is some right or interest in property which
has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt
or controversy.
Petitioner’s husband acquired vested right to the payment of
his retirement benefits which must be respected and cannot
be affected by the subsequent enactment of P.D. No. 1638
which provides the loss of Filipino citizenship terminates
retirement benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations after the right has vested.
8

Furthermore, Section 33 of P.D. No. 1638 is clear that the law has
no intention to reduce or to revoke whatever retirement benefits
are being enjoyed by a retiree at the time of its passage.
The petition was granted.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS.
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
FAMANILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2006)
In the case of Famanila v. CA, SC said that there was a valid waiver, the
petitioner cited his physical incapacity and financial constraints as grounds
to nullify the waiver that he had signed earlier. However, SC said that these
are only grounds for annul the waiver but Article 1391 (2) of the NCC on
Obligations and Contracts provides for the following grounds for annulling
contracts:
1. Incapacity
2. Vitiation of consent
Physical disabilities and financial constraints are not grounds of vitiation
of consent, as envisioned by Article 1391 (2). Moreover, when he signed
that waiver, there was the presence of his spouse who acted as one of the
witnesses, and another relative of his. So, the waiver as signed by the
petitioner is valid.
Facts: In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents,
Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto G. Famanila as
Messman for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its
principal and co-respondent, Barbership Management Limited.
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of
Eureka, California, and while petitioner was assisting in the
loading operations, the latter complained of a headache.
Petitioner experienced dizziness and he subsequently collapsed.
Upon examination, it was determined that he had a sudden attack
of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm.
Petitioner underwent a brain operation and he was confined
at the Emmanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. and on
July 29, 1990, he underwent a second brain operation.
Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was
repatriated to the Philippines. On August 21, 1990, he was
examined at the America Hospital in Intramural, Manila, where the
examining physician, Dr. Patricia Abesamis, declared that “he
cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for 120 days, he
is being declared permanently, totally disabled.”
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents
convinced him to settle his claim amicably by accepting the
amount of US$13,200.00. Petitioner accepted the offer as
evidenced by his signature in the Receipt and Release dated
February 28, 1991.
His wife, Gloria Famanila, and one Richard Famanila, acted as
witnesses in the signing of the release.
9
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC
praying for an award of disability benefits, share in the insurance
proceeds, moral damages, and attorney’s fees.
On September 29, 1997, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A.
Balitaan dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
NLRC: It found the appeal to be without merit and ordered its
dismissal.
CA: The CA also dismissed the petition for lack of merit, hence,
the present petition.
Petitioner’s claim: He claims that he did not sign the Receipt and
Release voluntarily or freely because he was permanently
disabled and in financial constraints. These factors allegedly
vitiated his consent which makes the Receipt and Release void and
unenforceable.
Ruling: The petition lacks merit.
A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and
unenforceable. It only gives rise to a voidable agreement.
Under the CC, the vices of consent are mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. If consent is given through
any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the contract is
voidable.
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated
his consent to the Receipt and Release thereby rendering it void
and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the
factors that may vitiate consent. Besides, save for petitioner’s
self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record that his
consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the
absence of such proof of vitiated consent, the validity of the
Receipt and Release must be upheld. The Court agrees with the
findings of the CA that:
“In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that
petitioner’s consent was vitiated when he signed the agreement.
Granting that petitioner has not fully recovered his health at
the time he signed the subject document, the same cannot
still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntarily accept
the agreement, for his wife and another relative witnessed his
signing.
Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which was
attached by petitioner in his appeal does not show on its face any
violation of law or public policy. In fact, petitioner did not present
any proof to show that the consideration for the same is not
reasonable and acceptable. Absent any evidence to support the
same, the Court cannot, on its own accord, decide against the
unreasonableness of the consideration.”
It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon
and are considered as ineffective in barring recovery for the full
measure of the worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits
therefrom does not amount to estoppel. The reason is plain.
Employer and employee, obviously do not stand on the same
footing.
9

However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against
public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into
and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of
change of mind.
It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled
from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in
to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that
the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for
the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those
giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them.
The Court has reviewed the terms and conditions contained in
the Receipt and Release and it finds the same to be clear and
unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by petitioner’s
wife, Gloria T. Famanila and one Richard T. Famanila.
GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2006)
But not in the case of Guy v. CA because it was without any clarity as to
the purpose of why Remedios signed the document of release. It merely
said that she was to receive P300,000 + educational plan for minor children
so one of the requisites had not been applied. Moreover, according to the
Court, assuming that there was a valid waiver, while it may be true that the
parents or guardians of minor children are allowed or authorized to
receive the children’s legitim, but if it is one renunciation, the same myst
be with judicial authorization. In the case at bar, there was no judicial
authorization so it cannot be considered a valid waiver.
[See 3(a) on waiver for case of Guy v. CA]
Facts: On June 13, 1997, private respondent minors Jaren
Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother,
Remedies Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration
before the RTC and the case was entitled Intestate of Sima Wei
a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City
on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00
consisting of real and personal properties.
His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children
Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George, and Michael, all surnamed Guy.
Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They
likewise prayed that, in the mean time, petitioner Michael C. Guy,
son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the
estate.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition and asserted
that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be
settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that
10
private respondents should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to
Article 175 of the FC.
Petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents’
claim has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished by reason of Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and
Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and
educational assistance received from the petitioner, Remedios and
her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any
and all liabilities.
TC: The TC denied the motion to dismiss. It ruled that while the
Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not
been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of
her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occured.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
CA: Affirmed the orders of the RTC and denied the petition for
lack of merit. It had respondent judge resolve the controversy over
the illegitimate filiation of the private respondent minors who are
claiming successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased
Sima Wei.
Petitioner’s argument: Petitioner argues that the Release and
Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged
the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or
liabilities, and that private respondents do not have the legal
personality to institute the petition for letters of administration as
they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei
in accordance with Article 175 of the FC.
Issues:
1. Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes
private respondents from claiming their successional
rights.
2. Whether private respondents are barred by prescription from
proving their filiation.
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. Remedios’ Release and Waiver
of Claim the same does not bar private respondents from
claiming successional rights.
To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention
of a party to give up aright or benefit which legally pertains
to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms
do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.
IN THIS CASE: The Court found that there was no waiver of
hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not
state with clarity the purpose of its execution.
It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial
assistance and in full settlement of any or all claims whatsoever of
any kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.
Considering that the documents did not specifically mention
10

private respondents’ hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it
cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedies truly waived the
hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar
the latter’s claim. Article 1044 of the CC, provides:
Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may
be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or
guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards
only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to
the persons designated by the testator to determine the
beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to
those mentioned in Article 1030.
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is
because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which
must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to protect the interest of
the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release
and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the
deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of
it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver
cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have
possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet
to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of
the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that
private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent
to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner
claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner’s
invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
The petition was denied.
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS vs. REPUBLIC (2016)
Facts: Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias and retired Colonel
Francisco B. Otamias were married on June 16, 1978 and had 5
children. On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias
separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained
with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel
Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of the AFP. Edna
demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of Colonel
Otamias’ retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed an
affidavit stating:
11
That sometime in August or September 2002, I was summoned at
the Office of the Provost Marshal, Philippine Army, in connection
with a complaint-affidavit submitted to said Office by my wife Mrs.
Edna M. Otamias signifying her intention 75% of my retirement
benefits from the AFP;
That at this point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement
benefits to be prorated among my wife and five (5) children;
That in order to implement this compromise, I am willing to
enter into Agreement with my wife covering the same;
That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the
foregoing facts and whatever legal purpose it may serve.
On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of
Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension
benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of
Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise
agreement.
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003. The agreement was
honored until January 6, 2006. Edna alleged that the AFP
suddenly decided not to honor the agreement between
Colonel Otamias and his legitimate family.
In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the AFP Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court
order was required for the AFP PGMC to recognize the Deed of
Assignment.
In another letter the AFP PGMC reiterated that it could not act on
Edna’s request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias’ pension
unless ordered by the appropriate court.
Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren and Jemwel, filed before the
RYC an action for support.
TC: It ruled in favor of Edna, et al. and ordered the automatic
deduction of the amount of support from the monthly pension of
Colonel Otamias.
Edna, et. al., through counsel, filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution dated February 22, 2008. The TC granted the Motion
and a writ of execution was issued by the TC on April 10, 2008.
The AFO Finance Center filed a Motion to Quash the writ of
execution and argued that the AFP Finance Center’s duty to
disburse benefits is ministerial. It releases benefits only upon the
AFP PGMC’s approval.
The TC denied the Motion to Quash and ruled that:
Under the law and existing jurisprudence, the “right to support” is
practically equivalent to the “right to life.” The “right to life” always
takes precedence over “property rights.” The “right to
support/life” is also a substantive right which always takes
precedence over technicalities/procedural rules. It being so,
technical rules must yield to substantive justice. Besides, this
Court’s Decision dated February 27, 2007 has long acquired
finality, and as such, is ripe for enforcement/execution.
11

CA: The CA granted the petition of the AFP PGMC and partially
nullified the TC’s Decision insofar as it directed the automatic
deduction of support from the pension benefits of Colonel
Otamias.
The Court of Appeals discussed that Section 31 of Presidential
Decree No. 1638, otherwise known as the AFP Military Personnel
Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, “provides for the
exemption of the monthly pension of retired military personnel
from execution and attachment.”
Edna’s MfR was denied.
Edna, et. al. argue that the Deed of Assignment Colonel Otamias
executed is valid and legal. Furthermore, they claim that Section
31 of P.D. No. 1638 “does not include support,” hence, the
retirement benefits of Colonel Otamias can be executed upon.
Edna, et. al., also argue that the CA erred in granting respondent’s
Petition because it effectively rendered the Deed of Assignment
of no force and effect. On the other hand, the TC’s Decision
implements the Deed of Assignment and Edna, et. al.’s right to
support.
Furthermore, the AFP PGMC had already recognized the validity
of the agreement and had made payments to them until it
suddenly stopped the payment. After Edna, et. al, obtained a court
order, the AFP PGMC still refused to honor the Deed of
Assignment.
Solicitor General: The AFP, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argues that it was not a party to the case filed by Edna,
et al. Thus, “it cannot be compelled to release part of the monthly
pension benefits of retired Colonel Otamias in favor of Edna, et al.
The Office of the Solicitor General avers that the AFP PGMC never
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. It was not a
party to the case as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
the AFP PGMC.
The Office of the Solicitor General also argues that Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 and Rule 39, Section 13(1) of the
Rules of Court support the Court of Appeals’ Decision that
Colonel Otamias’ pension benefits are exempt from execution.
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 “does not deprive
the survivor/s of a retired or separated officer or enlisted man of
their right to support.” Rather, “what is prohibited is for
respondent AFP PGMC to segregate a portion of the pension
benefit in favor of the retiree’s family while still in the hands of the
AFP.”
Thus, the AFP PGMC “cannot be compelled to directly give or issue
a check in favor of Edna, et al. out of the pension gratuity of Col.
Otamias.”
Issue: Whether Colonel Otamias’ pension benefits can be
executed upon for the financial support of his legitimate family.
Article 6 of the NCC, cited.
12
The concept of a waiver has been defined by the Court as:
a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege,
which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a
right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall
be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or
such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of
such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with
claiming it.
In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, the Court
is guided by the following pronouncement:
The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers every
conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive
any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right
or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him
or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided
such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended
for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others,
and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and
the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and
agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it
can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any
public right, and without detriment to the community at large.
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he
effectively waived his right to claim that his retirement
benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive
retirement benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to
waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not infringe on the
right of third persons, but even protects the rights of his family to
receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the
law between the parties, and its provisions should be respected in
the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or
defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the
law between parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and
conditions that are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.
The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not
contrary to law; it was in accordance with the provisions on
support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the
AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.
DUTY OF COURTS OR JUDGES TO RENDER JUDGMENT.
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
Where the law governing a particular matter is silent on a question
at issue, the provision of another law governing another mater
may be applied where the underlying principle or reason is the
same. Abi cadet ratio ibi edam disposito.
12

Aside from customs and general principles of law affecting the
case, the judge may use as his guides — decisions of foreign
courts, opinions of unknown authors and professors, applicable
rules of statutory construction, and principles formulated in
analogous cases.
Article 9 is applicable only to civil cases
An offense is not a crime unless prohibited and punished by the
law (U.S. v. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599; People v. Sindiong, 44 O.G. 1471)
applying the rule “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege” (there is
no crime and there is no penalty in the absence of law),
nevertheless, if somebody is accused of a non-existent crime, the
judge must DISMISS the case. This, in reality, is equivalent to a
judicial acquittal.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC (2007)
This only applies to civil cases, not to criminal cases because there is no
crime when there is no law punishing it. While it may be true that in the
case of Silverio v. Republic, is one that is civil in nature but this is also a
criminal case because the prayer is for the change or correction in the
entries of his birth certificate.
The Supreme Court said that there is no law on the matter. The Supreme
Court may adapt a protocol but not to decide. Otherwise, they will be
deciding on such a situation or such an issue that will be tantamount to
legislation. Again, it is for the legislature to enact laws on persons who
have changed their sex or gender through sexual reassignment not for the
court to decide.
Facts: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the RTC of Manila. The petition impeded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of
Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his certificate of live birth and his sex
was registered as male.
He further alleged that he is a male transexual — anatomically
male but feels, thinks, and acts as a female and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood.
He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment,
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself into
a woman culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact,
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex
from male to female.
TC: The TC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. It ruled
that:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
13
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
relief asked for.
The court rules in the affirmative.
1. The court is of the opinion that granting the petition would
be more in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses
the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be
trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him.
2. Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice
will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring
the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner
and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
3. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or
ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and
publication thereof. Even the State, through the OSG has
not seen fit to interpose any opposition.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a petition
before the CA alleging that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
CA: The CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sec in the birth certificate
on the ground of sexual reassignment through surgery. Petitioner
moved of consideration but was denied.
Petitioner’s claim: He essentially claims that the change of his
name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
to 413 of the CC, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court, and R.A.
No. 9048.
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. A person’s first name cannot
be changed the ground of sex reassignment. Petitioner believes
that having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. The Court disagrees.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for the purposes of identification. A change of name is a
privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of names are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the CC
provides that “no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.”
The CC provision was amended by R.A. 9048 (Clerical Error Law),
which now governs the change of first name. It vests the power
and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the
city for municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Jurisdiction over applications for the change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name rom the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and
13

(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form, and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
Moreover, Section 4 provides for the grounds for which change
of first name may be allowed:
Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. — The petition
for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of
the following cases:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce.
2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been public
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
3. The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was
his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s
legal capacity or civil status.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name
for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
There is also no law that allows the change of entry in the
birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sexual
reassignment. The determination of a persons’ sex appearing in
his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.
Under R.A. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. The acts, events or factual errors
contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that
it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute.”
The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex,
were all correct. No correction is necessary.
14
Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or
sec be changed on the ground of equity. The TC opined that its
grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would
cause no harm, injury, or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-
ranging legal and public policy consequences.
1. The trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s
first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions,
is a special contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman.
One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant
the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual).
2. There are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule
131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which
could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition
were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the CC mandates that “no judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts
to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sexual reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case
where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change
of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed.
If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone
sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying
down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol
on when a person may be recognized as having successfully
changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court
14

cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that “the unfortunates are also entitled to a life
of happiness, contentment and the realization of their dreams.”
No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into
the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy
to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
The petition is denied.
OBLIGATORY EFFECT OF PENAL LAWS.
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principles of public international law and
to treaty stipulations.
DEL SOCORRO vs. VAN WILSEM (2014)
Facts: Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with
a son named Rodrigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the
filing of the instant petition was 16 years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage had ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue
of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
At that time, their son was 18 months old. Thereafter, petitioner
and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of 250 Guilder (which
is equivalent to P17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival
of petitioner and son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangray Tajo,
Pinamungahan, Cebu. To date, all parties, including their son, are
presently living in Cebu.
Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding support
from respondent but respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a
complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor for the violation
of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The
Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending the filing
of an information for the crime charged against herein
respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu, states that:
15
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or
less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his
son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14)-year-old
minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
abuse to the victim.
Respondent was arrested and subsequently, posted bail.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, and prescription of the
crime charged.
TC: The TC dismissed the instant criminal case against respondent
on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an
alien.
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration reiterating
respondent’s obligation to support the child under Article 195 of
the FC, thus failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262
which equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are
obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s
nationality.
The TC denied the MfR reiterating its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national, he is not subject to our national law (The
Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to
give support to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged
of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his
child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to
a foreigner who fails to give support to his child, notwithstanding
that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent
to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that
no prima facie case exists against the accused herein, hence, the
case should be dismissed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support
his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.
It cannot be negated, that the instant petition highlights a novel
question of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who
allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special
criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties.
The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case,
therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will
eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Ruling: The Court finds the petition to be meritorious.
Nonetheless, the Court does not fully agree with the petitioner’s
contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support
exists.
15

Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides
the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends
that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in
relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not excused
from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (As amended by E.O. No. 227).
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient
and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her
minor son, are entitled to financial support. Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated
to petitioner for any financial support.
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot
rely on Article 195 of the NCC in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the NCC
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of
the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such
that they are governed by their national law with respect to family
rights and duties. *(Note: This issue will be delved into in the
discussion on Article 15)
However, the Court found that respondent may be made
liable under under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for
unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son.
Under the aforementioned special law, the deprivation or denial
of financial support to the child is considered as an act of violence
against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in
the Philippines, the Court finds strength in petitioner’s claim
that the Territoriality Principle in Criminal Law, in relation to
Article 14 of the NCC, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: “penal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations.”
On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts
of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner
is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein
are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts
have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
The Court remanded the case to the RTC of Cebu given that the
issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s
child calls for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being
admitted.
16
NATIONALITY THEORY.
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO (1985)
Facts: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen
of the United States.
They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines and they
begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively.
The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States in 1982 and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent’s suit
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the RTC, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, the Galleon Shop, is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.
Petitioner’s motion to dismiss
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11,1982.
TC: The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. Hence the present petition.
Issues:
1. The effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the divorce is valid and binding in this
jurisdiction. [Yes]
Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner contends that respondent is
estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community of
property and that the Galleon Shop was not established through
conjugal funds and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
Respondent’s averment: He avers that the Divorce Decree issued
by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of
the Philippines and its declared national policy and that the acts
and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
16

contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
The Nevada divorce of the parties
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No.
381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys
in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt, Ltd., to agree to the divorce on
the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there
were neither community property nor community obligations.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as
her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
The nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
IN THIS CASE: The divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond
of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private
17
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Disposition: The petition is granted, and respondent Judge is
hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No.
1075-P of his Court.
PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA (1989)
Facts: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay
Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany.
The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between
them.
Divorce proceeding
After about 3 ½ years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there
was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart
since April, 1982.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983
where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.
Decree of divorce
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce
on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show
that under German law said court was locally and internationally
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of
said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
Private respondent’s 2 complaints for adultery against
petitioner
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of
the divorce decree, private respondent filed 2 complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.
17

The case entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
William Chia,” docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was
assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while
the other case, “People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
James Chua”, docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the
sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.
SOJ: On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the
Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice,
through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both
petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice “if the accused have already been arraigned
and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings”
and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for
review.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer
her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. As
a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge
merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the
suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435
until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending
before the Secretary of Justice.
A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied by the respondent
judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also
directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is,
petitioner and William Chia.
Petitioner’s special civil action
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower
court denying her motion to quash.
Petitioner’s contention: The petition is anchored on the main
ground that the court is without jurisdiction “to try and decide the
charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to
his filing the criminal complaint.”
Issue: Whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the
time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter. [Yes]
Ruling: The Court finds this petition meritorious. The writs
prayed for shall accordingly issue.
18
The crime of adultery can only be prosecuted upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse, and nobody
else
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse.
It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency,
that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a
formal, requirement.
While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the
offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a
sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it
is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the
ease.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for
adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called
exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action.
This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of
legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of
criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and
rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of
the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called “private crimes”, or
those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present
prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to
commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved
party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
go through the scandal of a public trial.
Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
18

relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of
the criminal action for adultery.
This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended
party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case.
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such
status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action.
It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed
prior to but ceased before or was acquired subsequent to but did
not exist at the time of, the institution of the case.
Statement of the issue
We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party
bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity
to do so. To repeat, there does not appear to be any local
precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must
exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status.
Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of
a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the
time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.
RULE:
After a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse
shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that
jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that
after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution
for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion. In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that —
“No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the
complaint of the husband or wife’ Section 4932, Code. Though
Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to
have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the
prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was
not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending
spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
19
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced.”
HELD: The Court sees no reason why the same doctrinal rule
should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering
our statutory law and jural policy on the matter.
RULE:
The Court is convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of
the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as
of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who
initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at
the time of the filing of the complaint.
IN THIS CASE: The fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status
of persons.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., cited.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., after
a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van
Dorn, a Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil
case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was
conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage
the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated
the error of such stance, thus:
“There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union, xxx.
“It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. xxx
“Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets, x x x”
IN THIS CASE: Under the same considerations and rationale,
private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
19

Even if there was no knowledge of such infidelity before the
decree of divorce was issued, it is of no legal significance
Private respondent’s contention: He alleges that he could not
have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge.
HELD: Even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in
this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that 1) there would no longer be a family nor
marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage
is decreed.
2) Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious
heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for
the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of.
The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be
successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article
433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of
the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery “although the
marriage be afterwards declared void”, the Court merely stated
that:
“the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of
a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be
made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage
contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect”.
Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
equivalent to stating that it never existed.
There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint
for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no
longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case
is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed
before the termination of the marriage by a judicial
declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite
would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage
was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent’s invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Va-
menta, hereinbefore cited, must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to
the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein.
Disposition: The questioned order denying petitioner’s motion to
quash is set aside and another one entered dismissing the
20
complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction.
The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21,
1987 is hereby made permanent.
GARCIA vs. RECIO (2001)
Facts:
Respondent’s first marriage to Australian Editha
Respondent Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Austrian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a “Certificate of Australian Citizenship” issued by the
Australian government.
Respondent’s second marriage to Filipina Grace
Petitioner Grace Garcia—a Filipina—and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.
Petitioner’s complaint for declaration of nullity on the ground
of bigamy
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy.
Petitioner’s contention: Respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12,
1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent’s marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
Respondent’s contention: Respondent averred that, as far back
as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to
many petitioner in 1994.
Divorce decree obtained by respondent for his marriage with
petitioner
On July 7, 1998—or about five years after the couple’s wedding
and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending—
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had
irretrievably broken down.”
TC: The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but
not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the
20

marriage; that is, respondent’s alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree
obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson
was proven. [No]
2. Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner. [No]
Ruling: The petition is partly meritorious.
ISSUE #1
Proving the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner assails the TC’s recognition of
the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, petitioner argues that the
divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given
recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of:
1. the foreign law allowing absolute divorce, and
2. the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
the law of the place where they were celebrated (lex loci
celebrationis).
In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law
to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the
legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it.
A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26
of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.”
A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws.
21
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading
and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.”
Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a question of fact
Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner insists that before a divorce
decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code. These articles read as follows:
“Article 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“(5) If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx xxx x x x”
“Article 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse
or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage, x x x.
“Article 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity
of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their
persons.”
Respondent’s argument: He argues that the Australian divorce
decree is a public document—a written official act of an Australian
family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
HELD: Respondent is getting ahead of himself.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed, the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act
of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
21

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either:
1. an official publication, or
2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be:
a. accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
b. authenticated by the seal of his office.
Appearance is not sufficient and compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated
IN THIS CASE: The divorce decree between respondent and
Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s
qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the
Family Code is not necessary as respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing
him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of proving Australian law
Respondent’s contention: He contends that the burden to prove
Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the
party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment.
He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the
divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact, which is respondent in this case
22
HELD: The Court is not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with
“the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
IN THIS CASE: Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.
ISSUE #2:
Respondent’s legal capacity to remarry
Petitioner’s contention: She contends that, in view of the
insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their
marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent’s contention: He avers that the Australian divorce
decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
HELD: Respondent’s contention is untenable.
Divorce and its types
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.
But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are:
1. absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimony, – terminates the
marriage
2. limited divorce or a mensa et thoro – suspends the marriage
and leaves the bond in full force.
IN THIS CASE: There is no showing in the case at bar which type
of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree—a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce.
It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on
22

the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again.
The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters the Court’s contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
his national law.
HELD: Hence, the Court finds no basis for the ruling of the TC,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto
restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
The Court also rejects the claim of respondent that the divorce
decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence
as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian
laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner’s contention: She argues that the certificate of legal
capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage license.
According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have
legal capacity to remarry.
HELD: The Court clarifies. To repeat, the legal capacity to
contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned.
The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of
legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license.
IN THIS CASE: As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence
that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner.
A review of the records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
1. for petitioner:
a. Exhibit “A”—Complaint;
b. Exhibit “B”—Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J.
Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan
City, Nueva Ecija;
c. Exhibit “C”—Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson
23
(Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;
d. Exhibit “D”—Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Redo and Editha D.
Samson was in its records;54 and
e. Exhibit “E”—Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recio;
2. for respondent:
a. Exhibit “1”— Amended Answer;
b. Exhibit “2”—Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia;
c. Exhibit “3”—Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recio;
d. Exhibit “4”—Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; and
e. Exhibit “5”—Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.
Based on the above records, the Court cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994.
It agrees with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with
the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
Neither can it grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree.
Hence, the Court believes that the most judicious course is to
remand the case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which
show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in
evidence 2 existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
Disposition: In the interest of orderly procedure and substantial
justice, we remand the case to the court a quo for the purpose of
receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent’s legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the
parties’ marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed.
QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1998)
23

Facts: Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They were not
blessed with children.
Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe
sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated July
19, 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from
each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties.
On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. 3
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will.
On August 31, 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
RTC of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina
Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan,
and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all
surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of
Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was
resolved in favor of the latter.
Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later
replaced by Higino Castillon. On April 30, 1973 the oppositors
(Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the July 19, 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto
T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On October 7, 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate
declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his
estate.
TC: The TC invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño which held that “a
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the present Civil Code (R.A. 386) was not entitled
to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,” disregarded the
divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it
consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties
due to lack of judicial approval.
On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo,
much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had
been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her.
As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo.
24
On November 27, 1987, only petitioner and Ruperto were
declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of
the two intestate heirs.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children
were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the
children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis
who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in
their respective records of birth.
RTC MFR: Thus on February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was
granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of
Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. Private
respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in
the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were
married on April 22, 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it
was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner.
CA: Respondent appellate court found Blandina and her children’s
ground that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation
of Section 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, was sufficient to sustain
the appeal, hence, on September 11, 1995 it declared null and void
the decision and order of the TC and directed the remand of the
case to the TC for further proceedings.
Issue: Whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A.
and in fact had twice remarried. [Yes]
Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner replied that Arturo was a
Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the
divorce they obtained.
Ruling: Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
from Arturo.
This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is
to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of
documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments
of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by
merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent’s motion to set aside and/or
reconsider the lower court’s decision she stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the
case be set for hearing.
Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address
the issue on her citizenship. The TC did not grant private
respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her
24

motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were
“Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines.”
It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction.
The Court deduces that the finding on their citizenship pertained
solely to the time of their marriage as the TC was not supplied with
a basis to determine petitioner’s citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino
citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect.
Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner’s
citizenship; it did not merit enlightenment however from
petitioner.
In the present proceeding, petitioner’s citizenship is brought anew
to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court
with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on May 5, 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a
certain transfer certificate of title as well as the issuance of new
owner’s duplicate copy thereof before another trial court.
Petitioner was an American citizen since 1954 but the decree
of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained on the same
year
When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner
answered that she was since 1954. Significantly, the decree of
divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same
year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the
time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be
conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate
court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.
The Court emphasizes, however, that the question to be
determined by the TC should be limited only to the right of
petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse.
Private respondent cannot inherit from Arturo as their
marriage was a bigamous one
Private respondent’s claim to heirship was already resolved by
the trial court. She and Arturo were married on April 22, 1947
while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from
the beginning under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
Disposition: The petition is denied. The decision of respondent
CA ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
25
holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as
intestate heirs is affined.
The order of the CA modifying its previous decision by granting
½ of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely,
Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the
exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo’s
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise affirmed. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court
should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2006)
Facts: Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily
Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The first marriage
ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M.
Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila while the second took place at the
Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The marriage
produced 4 children.
Divorce from the Dominican Republic
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that
they decided to separate from each other. Upon advice of a
mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the
Dominican Republic.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power
of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San
Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws.
Joint petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint
petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati.
On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican Republic
ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily.
Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of
properties between Tristan and Lily.
Marriage of Tristan to petitioner Elmar
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in
the State of Virginia in the United States and both lived as
husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one
offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce
decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which
“dissolved” the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was
deemed void under Philippine law.
When she confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her that
he would legalize their union after he obtains an annulment of his
marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he
25

would adopt their son so that he would be entitled to an equal
share in his estate as that of each of his children with Lily.
Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of his
marriage with Lily
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lily.
Petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File
Intervention claiming that she has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation because she knows certain information which
might aid the trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of
the annulment case, which the trial court granted. Petitioner’s
complaint-in-intervention was also ordered admitted.
Tristan filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul
the order dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court
of Appeals granted the petition and declared as null and void the
September 30, 2002 Order of the trial court granting the motion
for leave to file intervention and admitting the complaint-in-
intervention.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner’s contention: She contends that the CA gravely
abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the
annulment case between Tristan and Lily.
Ruling: The petition lacks merit.
Parameters before a person, who is not a party to a case, can
intervene
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a person, not
a party to a case can intervene, thus:
“Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties,
and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.”
Requirements for intervention
The requirements for intervention are:
1. legal interest in the matter in litigation; and
2. consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication
of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or
whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a
separate proceeding or not.
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in
the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment. Such interest must
26
be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant.
Petitioner does not have legal interest as she was never the
wife of Tristan
Petitioner’s contention: She claims that her status as the wife
and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the requisite
legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules
of Court.
HELD: Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner
was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her claim of legal
interest has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was
still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and
Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved
the marriage bond between them.
It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she
will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her
family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal
capacity.
A decree of divorce initiated and obtained abroad (by a
Filipino married to a Filipino) will not be recognized in the
Philippines
Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married
here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute
divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting
an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such
absolute divorce.
IN THIS CASE: When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968,
their marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v.
Escaño we held:
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (R.A.
No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country.
Thus, petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if
their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus,
petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which
her motion for intervention is based.
Disposition: The petition is dismissed.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS (2007)
Facts: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna.
26

During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages.
First marriage with Virginia Sulit
His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out
of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Second marriage with Merry Lee Corwin and their divorce
obtained by Merry Lee
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October
15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America, which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973.
Third marriage with Felicidad
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to
his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
Respondent’s petition for letter of administration
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Respondent’s contentions: Respondent alleged:
• that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
• that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila;
• that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage;
• that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less;
• that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
Petitioner’s motion to dismiss
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action.
Petitioner’s contentions: Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
his death.
27
He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since
the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined
her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition.
TC: On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying
the two motions to dismiss.
Respondent’s opposition; presented evidence
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed
on March 5, 1994 her opposition thereto. She submitted:
• documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
• the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry
her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order
denying their motions to dismiss.
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 25 of the Family Code.
TC: On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition
for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file
the petition for letters of administration because her marriage
with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino
citizen.
It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights
of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
CA: It reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed decision.
It held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by
virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
27

It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.
Petitioners’ contention: They contend that respondent’s
marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry
Lee.
They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered
the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity
to file the petition for letters of administration.
Issues:
1. Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad
may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. [Yes]
2. Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration. [No]
Ruling: The petition lacks merit.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file
the petition for letters of administration, the Court must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized
on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988.
In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing
the Court to rule in the affirmative.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., cited.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between
a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien
spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, cited.
The effect of a foreign divorce obtained by the foreigner
spouse on the Filipino wife – if the foreigner obtains a valid
28
foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longer be considered married to the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
“To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article
109, et seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.”
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The
Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect
of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”
Quita vs. Court of Appeals, cited.
Likewise, in Quita vs. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that where
a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling
in Van Dorn applies. Although decided on December 22, 1998, the
divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied.
The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that “if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
In Garcia vs. Recio, the Court likewise cited the aforementioned
case in relation to Article 26.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already
established through judicial precedent.
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable.
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
28

other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino
spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners contention: They cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil
Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
as Filipinos are concerned.
HELD: However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
IN THIS CASE: Applying the above doctrine in the instant case,
the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence
to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as
well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and
that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented.
Garcia vs. Recio, cited.
In Garcia vs. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient
and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either:
1. an official publication or
2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be:
a. accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
b. authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law
Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage
was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved.
29
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the TC for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, the Court finds that the latter
has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Interested person
An “interested person” has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
IN THIS CASE: Respondent would qualify as an interested person
who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of
their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity
to remarry but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be
Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property
relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry.
Conclusion: In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife
of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code
or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Disposition: The petition is denied.
LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA (2014)
Facts: Atty. Juan Luces Luna, a practicing lawyer, was at first a
name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna,
Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices.
First marriage with Eugenia
At that time, he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-
appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna whom he initially married in a
civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of
Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in
a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan
on September 12, 1948.
In Atty. Luna’s marriage to Eugenia, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L.
Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina
Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.
29

After almost two (2) decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and Eugenia
eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February
1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement entitled “AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT” dated November
12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
Divorce decree obtained by Atty. Luna of his marriage with
Eugenia
On January 12, 1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of
his marriage with Eugenia from the Civil and Commercial
Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance
of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic.
Second marriage with Soledad
Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, Atty.
Luna contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad.
Thereafter, Atty. Luna and Soledad returned to the Philippines and
lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm named:
Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where Atty.
Luna was the managing partner.
Condominium unit
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through Atty. Luna purchased
from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of
Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project (condominium unit) at
Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for
P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36 months
starting on April 15, 1978.
Said condominium unit was to be used as law office of LUPSICON.
After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No.
4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing
the following names:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100);
GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x”
Subsequently, 8/100 share of Atty. Luna and 17/100 share of Atty.
Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty.
Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on
February 7, 1992 in the following names:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100);
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
x x x”
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same
was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties
stipulated that the interest of Atty. Luna over the condominium
unit would be 25/100 share.
30
Atty. Luna thereafter established and headed another law firm
with Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz and used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the
death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
After the death of Atty. Luna, his share in the condominium
unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment
found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, Atty.
Luna’s son of the first marriage.
Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la
Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz
& Associates.
Complaint filed by Soledad against the Heirs of Luna
The 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium
unit as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment
became the subject of the complaint filed by Soledad against the
heirs of Atty. Luna with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on
September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644.
The complaint alleged:
• that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad
through their joint efforts;
• that since they had no children, Soledad became co-owner of
the said properties upon the death of Atty. Luna to the extent
of 3/4 pro indiviso share consisting of her 1/2 share in the
said properties plus her 1/2 share in the net estate of Atty.
Luna which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and
testament; and
• that the heirs of Atty. Luna through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded
Soledad from her share in the subject properties.
The complaint prayed:
• that Soledad be declared the owner of the 3/4 portion of the
subject properties;
• that the same be partitioned;
• that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit
pertaining to the share of Soledad be conducted;
• that a receiver be appointed to preserve and administer the
subject properties; and
• that the heirs of Atty. Luna be ordered to pay attorney’s fees
and costs of the suit to Soledad.
TC: x x x (b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna
should be changed from “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad
L. Luna” to “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna”; x x x
CA: Eugenia, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of Atty. Luna
until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce
decree obtained by Atty. Luna in the Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with Eugenia because foreign
30

divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our
jurisdiction. x x x
Issues:
Decisive question: Who among the contending parties should be
entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit;
and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to
ascertain the law that should determine:
1. Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna had validly dissolved the first marriage. [No]
2. Whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty.
Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in
property. [No]
Ruling: The Court modified the decision of the CA.
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the
time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos,
was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947.
The Nationality Rule
The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish
Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code
continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.
IN THIS CASE: Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July
12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between
Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines.
The nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of
the spouses are residing abroad.
Two types of defective marital unions
Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under
our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As
such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been
limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.
The divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.
31
Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even
if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time
of his death on July 12, 1997.
This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution, and regards it as a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.
The nonrecognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union
especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon
the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided
by law.
For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos
exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them
can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in
this jurisdiction.
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was
void for lack of court approval.
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was
void; properties acquired during their marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
NOVERAS vs. NOVERAS (2014)
Facts: Petitioner David A. Noveras and Respondent Leticia T.
Noveras were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines. They resided in California, United States of
Americawhere they eventually acquired American citizenship.
They then begot 2 children, namely: Jerome T. Noveras, who was
born on 4 November 1990 and Jena T. Noveras, born on 2 May
1993. David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia
worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the properties in the
Philippines and in the USA.
They have a Sampaloc property which used to be owned by
David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and
mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be
foreclosed, the couple paid a total of P1.5 Million for the
redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to
the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a
Special Power of Attorney authorizing David to sell the
Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million.
According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David
abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in
Aurora province.
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Leticia claimed that David agreed to and executed a Joint
Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty.
Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that:
1. the P1.1 Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia;
2. that David shall return and pay to Leticia P750,000.00, which is
equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the
Sampaloc property; and
3. that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest
in the conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines.
David was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the
Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
Petition for divorce filed by Leticia
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed
a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the
divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29
June 2005.
The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two
children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.
Petition for judicial separation of conjugal property filed by
Leticia
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation
of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s
failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed
for:
1. the power to administer all conjugal properties in the
Philippines;
2. David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the
subject conjugal properties;
3. the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor
of her children;
4. David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from
the sale of the Sampaloc property; and
the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses.
Petitioner’s contention: David stated that a judgment for the
dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo.
He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also
include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged
against the conjugal partnership.
TC: It dissolved the community property of the spouses. The trial
court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws
that cover their legal and personal status are those of the USA.
With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue
of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24 June
2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been
dissolved.
32
Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one
for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with
the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the
children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal
property.
CA: On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s
Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses.
Petitioner’s contention: David argues that allowing Leticia to
share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was
already granted all US properties by the California court.
Ruling: At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the
divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the
parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and
its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules
of Evidence.
Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of
a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by:
1. an official publication thereof or
2. a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof.
Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the
attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may
be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular
officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be, and must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer.
32

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
IN THIS CASE: Based on the records, only the divorce decree
was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove
its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on
divorce were not presented.
RULE: It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, the Court
relaxed the requirement on certification where the Court held that
“petitioner therein was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.”
IN THIS CASE: However, it appears that there is no seal from the
office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if the Court applies the doctrine of processual presumption
as the lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the
parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows
that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The
TC thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court will not remand the case
to the trial court. Instead, it shall adopt the modifications made by
the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to
liquidation.
The Court agrees with the CA that the Philippine courts did
not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David
and Leticia.
Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited
to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their
children’s presumptive legitims.
Disposition: The petition is denied.
ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SUZUKI (2014)
Facts: In August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese
national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja, to inquire about a
condominium unit and a parking lot at Cityland Pioneer,
33
Mandaluyong City, allegedly owner by Yung Sam Kang, a Korean
national and a Special Resident Retiree’s Visa holder.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 and
Parking Slot no. 42 were for sale for P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise
assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were
clean. The parties then reduced the price to P2,800,000.00 after a
brief negotiation.
Suzuki issued Kang a BPI check for P100,00.00 as reservation fee.
Then he issued Kang another check for P2,700,000.00
representing the balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang
then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the condominium
unit and the parking slot.
Soon after, Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and
parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the
condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to
deliver the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in
possession of Alexander Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer, for
safekeeping.
Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the
documents and Suzuki thereafter learned that Kang had left the
country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties
with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the
Parking Slot No. 42 contained annotations although it remained
under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding,
Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D.
Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of the
condominium unit and the parking slot.
The CCT representing the title to the condominium unit had no
existing encumbrance, although it contained an Entry
representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a P1,000,000.00
loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled on June 16,
2000. However, despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion,
the titles to the properties remained under the possession of
Perez.
Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles after executing an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Registry of Deeds of
Mandaluyong. Orion, through Perez, however, refused to
surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal
counsel and its reason.
Orion stated that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of
P1,800,000.00 and when Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion
en pago in favor of Orion covering the said unit. Orion, however,
did not register the dacion, until October 2003.
Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against Kang and Orion.
TC: It ruled in favor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the
CCTs to Suzuki. Orion appealed the decision to the CA.
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CA: It partially granted Oripn’s appeal and sustained the RTC
decision insofar as it upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties.
Orion’s MfR was also denied.
Petitioner’s arguments: Orion’s petition is based on the
following grounds/arguments:
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null
and void. Under Korean law, any converyance of a conjugal
property should be made with the consent of both spouses;
xxx
Ruling: The Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
ARTICLE 16.
Philippine law governs the transfer of real property.
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is
exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is
located.
The reason is found in the very nature of the immovable property
— its immobility. Immovables are party of the country and so
closely connect to it that all rights over them have their natural
center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real
property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae,
which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from
one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be
gained or lost. This principle includes all rules governing the
descent, alienation, and transfer of immovable property and the
validity, effect, and construction of wills and other conveyances.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a
deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature
may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title
to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci
rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the
law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his
capacity is undoubted.
ARTICLE 15.
Property relations between spouses are governed principally
by the national law of the spouses.
The party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden
of proving the foreign law as it is a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law.
How to prove a foreign law
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
34
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary
of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. —
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having
a seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of
real property shall be governed by Philippine Law while issues
pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be
governed by South Korean Law, provided it is proven as a fact.
IN THIS CASE: Orion, unfortunately to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached
a “Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea” to prove
the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as
sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is
no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of
his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where
a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase “Yung Sam Kang ‘married to’
Hyun Sook Jung” is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is
that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in
his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
DEL SOCORRO vs. VAN WILSEM (2014)
supra.
Ruling: Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Respondent’s contention: He contends that there is no sufficient
and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her
minor son, are entitled to financial support. Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to
petitioner for any financial support.
34

HELD: On this point, the Court agrees with respondent that
petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen,
since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality.
In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by
their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
It cannot be gainsaid, that the respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.
IN THIS CASE: Respondent hastily concludes that being a national
of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded
the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he
is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before,
during or after the issuance of a divorce decree).
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern.
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law
is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation
to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law,
which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the noncompliance therewith.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, cited.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court held that a
divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle
on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant
presented by respondent does not completely show that he is
not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree
was issued.
Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the
second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation
to support his child is specifically stated, which was not disputed
by respondent.
35
Even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child
to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
San Luis vs. San Luis, cited.
The Court emphasizes, however, that as to petitioner herself,
respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis vs. San Luis, to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longer be considered married to the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
LAW GOVERNING REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Article 16. Real property, as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
FORMS AND SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS.
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy, and
good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
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PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS.
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ARDIENTE vs. PASTORFIDE, ET. AL. (2013)
In Ardiente v. Javier, while there was this right of Mr. Ardiente to
complain on the non-compliance of Pastorfide of their agreement on the
memorandum of agreement to transfer all utility bills from his name to
that of Pastorfide, the buyer of the house, but was not complied with by
Pastorfide, when Ardiente was informed by the CDO Water District that
the account has already become delinquent, it ordered the COWD to cut
off the water connection. So according to the Court, it could have first
informed Pastorfide of the intention to cut off the water connection of the
water utility instead of immediately [cutting it off].
Facts: Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente
are owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City with a lot area of 153 sq. m. and covered by TCT No.
69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement selling, transferring and conveying in favor of
respondent Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests
in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of P70,000.00.
The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:
“4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be
for the account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide)
effective June 1, 1994.”
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide’s assumption of the payment of
the mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National
Home Mortgage.
For 4 years, Ma. Theresa’s use of the water connection in the name
of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed until on
March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection of Ma.
Theresa was cut off.
Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District
(COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa
that she was delinquent for 3 months corresponding to the
months of December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999.
Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March
18, 1999 yet Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance
of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off.
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills. On the
same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the
COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the water line.
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager,
respondent Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated
March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of
Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off.
36
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide and her
husband filed a complaint for damages against petitioner,
COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez.
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide’s water line was only
restored and reconnected when the TC issued a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
TC: In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties,
defendants did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and
observe honesty and good faith.
Before disconnecting the water supply, defendants COWD
and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection
notice to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-
charge of the Commercial Department of defendant COWD.
There was 1 though, but only 3 days after the actual
disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date for payment
was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither
did they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V.
Ardiente. They should have investigated first as to the present
ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente told
them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have
requested before the cutting off of the water supply, plaintiffs to
pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the
patience of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had
been using the water 4 years ago and not hers. She should have
been very careful.
Judgment was rendered ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs
damages. Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the
CA.
CA: The CA merely modified the decision of the RTC reducing the
amount of the damages.
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a “legal duty
to honor the possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement” and
“that when petitioner applied for its disconnection, she acted
in bad faith causing prejudice and injury to Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide.”
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they “failed to give
a notice of disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the
water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the
respondent spouses Pastorfide.”
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective MfRs, but
these were denied by the CA.
Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner insists that she should not be
held liable for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water
supply, because she had no participation in the actual
disconnection. However, she admitted in the present petition
that it was she who requested COWD to disconnect the
Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply. This was confirmed by
COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner.
36

Ruling: While it was COWD which actually discontinued
respondent spouses’ water supply, it cannot be denied that it
was through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses
Pastorfide’s water supply was disconnected in the first place.
It is true that it is within petitioner’s right to ask and even require
the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former’s
account with COWD to the latter’s name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce
such right is not to cause the disconnection of the respondent
spouses’ water supply.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part
of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of
respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or
informing the latter of such request.
Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based on
the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to
compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement
that petitioner’s account with COWD be transferred in respondent
spouses’ name.
If such was petitioner’s only intention, then she should have
advised respondent spouses before or immediately after
submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that
her request was simply to force them to comply with their
obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she
did not.
What made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the
disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to
reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment
of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part
of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the
Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
To recapitulate, petitioner’s acts which violated the
abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of
having the respondent spouses’ water supply disconnected,
coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent
spouses of such intention.
On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give
prior notice of the impending disconnection and their
subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent spouses’ water
supply despite the latter’s settlement of their delinquent
account.
37
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason
to depart from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that
petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
COCA COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. BERNARDO
(2016)
Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
large-scale manufacture, sale, and distribution of beverages
around the country. On the other hand, respondent spouses Jose
and Lilibeth Bernardo, doing business under the name “Jolly
Beverage Enterprises,” are wholesalers of soft drinks in Quezon
City, particularly in the vicinities of Bulacan Street, V. Luna Road,
Katipunan Avenue, and Timog Avenue.
Business relationship between the parties
The business relationship between the parties commenced in
1987 when petitioner designated respondents as its distributor.
On 22 March 1994, the parties formally entered into an
exclusive dealership contract for three years.9 Under the
Agreement, petitioner would extend developmental assistance
to respondents in the form of cash assistance and trade
discount incentives.
For their part, respondents undertook to sell petitioner’s
products exclusively, meet the sales quota of 7,000 cases per
month, and assist petitioner in its marketing efforts.
On 1 March 1997, the parties executed a similar agreement for
another 2 years, or until 28 February 1999. This time, petitioner
gave respondents complimentary cases of its products instead of
cash assistance and increased the latter’s sales quota to 8,000
cases per month.
For 13 years, the parties enjoyed a good and harmonious
business partnership. While the contracts contained a clause for
breach, it was never enforced.
Petitioner asked for a list of respondents’ customers
Sometime in late 1998 or early 1999, before the contract expired,
petitioner required respondents to submit a list of their
customers on the pretext that it would formulate a policy
defining its territorial dealership in Quezon City. It assured
respondents that their contract would be renewed for a longer
period, provided that they would submit the list. However, despite
their compliance, the promise did not materialize.
Respondents discovered that in February 1999, petitioner started
to reach out to the persons whose names were on the list.
Respondents also received reports that their delivery trucks
were being trailed by petitioner’s agents; and that as soon as
the trucks left, the latter would approach the former’s
customers.
Petitioner employed a different pricing scheme where the
prices given to distributors were higher than that given to
supermarkets
Further, respondents found out that petitioner had employed a
different pricing scheme, such that the price given to distributors
37

was significantly higher than that given to supermarkets. It also
enticed direct buyers and sari-sari store owners in the area
with its “Coke Alok” promo, in which it gave away one free
bottle for every case purchased.
Petitioner engaged a store adjacent to the respondents’ store
to sell at a lower price compared to respondents
It further engaged a store adjacent to respondents’ warehouse to
sell the former’s products at a substantially lower price.
Respondents claimed that because of these schemes, they lost
not only their major customers — such as Peach Blossoms, May
Flower Restaurant, Saisaki Restaurant, and Kim Hong Restaurant
— but also small stores, such as the canteen in the hospital where
respondent Jose Bernardo worked. They admitted that they
were unable to pay deliveries worth P449,154.24.
Respondents’ complaint for damages
Respondents filed a Complaint for damages, alleging that the
acts of petitioner constituted dishonesty, bad faith, gross
negligence, fraud, and unfair competition in commercial
enterprise.
The Complaint was later amended to implead petitioner’s officers
and personnel, include additional factual allegations, and increase
the amount of damages prayed for.
Petitioner’s contentions:
• Petitioner denied the allegations.
• It maintained that it had obtained a list of clients through
surveys, and that promotional activities or developmental
strategies were implemented only after the expiration of
the Agreements.
• It opined that the filing of the complaint was a mere ploy
resorted to by respondents to evade the payment of the
deliveries.
RTC: The RTC held petitioner liable for damages for abuse of
rights in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code
and for unfair competition under Article 28.
It found that petitioner’s agents solicited the list of clients in order
to penetrate the market and directly supply customers with its
products. Moreover, the trial court found that petitioner had
recklessly ignored the rights of respondents to have a fair chance
to en gage in business or earn a living when it deliberately used
oppressive methods to deprive them of their business. Its officers
were, however, absolved of liability, as there was no showing that
they had acted in their individual and personal capacities.
The RTC stated that petitioner should pay respondents P500,000
as temperate damages, and that it was only just and fair that the
latter offset this amount against their outstanding obligation to
petitioner in the amount of P449,154.34. In the fallo, the trial court
awarded P50,000 as moral damages, P20,000 as exemplary
damages, and P100,000 as attorney’s fees. It denied petitioner’s
counterclaim for damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
38
CA: Petitioner then elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed
the RTC Decision in toto. According to the appellate court’s ruling,
petitioner had used its sizable resources to railroad the
business of respondents:
[Petitioner] infiltrated certain areas in Quezon City at the
expense of and later, in derogation of its wholesalers,
particularly [respondents]. As admitted by Allan Mercado, the
Integrated Selling and Marketing Manager of appellant, it was
previously dependent on wholesalers to circulate its products
around the country. x x x
xxxx
[T]owards the end of the partnership, appellant employed a
different marketing scheme purportedly to obviate the
poor dealership management from wholesalers in major
areas. But as may be shown by the incidents leading to the filing
of this case, this method was designed strategically to
overrun [respondents’] business and take over the
customers of its wholesalers.
One such method was “different pricing schemes” wherein the
prices given to supermarkets and grocery stores were
considerably lower than those imposed on wholesalers. No
prior advice thereof was given to [respondents] or any of
the wholesalers. In fact, they only knew of it when their
customers began complaining about the variation in prices of
soft drinks sold in supermarkets and those that were sold by
them. When in fact [respondent] Bernardo personally inspected
the products in grocery stores, he discovered that a box of
Coke-in-can is sold at P40.00, lower than those offered by them
as wholesalers.
About the same time, [petitioner] also implemented the
“Area Market Cooperatives” (AMC) and the “Coke-Alok”
promo. Under the AMC, customers of wholesalers can purchase
[petitioner’s] products from prominent stores in heavily
crowded areas for P76.00 per case, as opposed to [respondent’s]
offering of P112.00. In “Coke-Alok,” [petitioner] directly sold
Coke products to wholesale customers with incentives as free
bottle of Coke for every case of soft drinks purchased. Being of
limited resources, [respondents had no] means to equal the
lucrative incentives given by [petitioner] to their customers.
xxx
Apart from direct selling and other promotions, [petitioner]
also employed high-handed means that further shrunk
[respondents’] market coverage. In one instance,
[petitioner’s sales representative] advised [respondents]
and other wholesalers to keep away from major
thoroughfares. Apparently, [petitioner] was going to supply
their products to these stores themselves. x x x
xxxx
x x x Furthermore, one of [petitioner’s] representatives, Nelson
Pabulayan, admitted that he sold products at the canteen in V.
Luna Hospital [which was then being serviced by respondents].
As if that was not enough, petitioner engaged other stores,
such as Freezel’s Bakeshop that was located adjacent to
[respondent’s] warehouse, to sell Coke products at a price
substantially lower than [that offered by respondents].
38

Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to award
temperate damages that were not prayed for in the
Complaint.
2. Whether or not petitioner violated Articles 19, 20, 21 or 28;
hence, the award of damages and attorney’s fees was proper.
Ruling: The CA did not err in affirming the finding that petitioner
was liable for temperate, moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney’s fees, for abuse of rights and unfair competition.
The petition raises questions of fact
Petitioner ignores the nature of a petition for review as a remedy
against errors of law. Instead, it raises factual matters that have
already been passed upon by the RTC and the CA.
Petitioner contends that since it did not assign any exclusive
territory to respondents, the latter had no exclusive right to any
customer.
It supposedly decided to rely on its own sales personnel to push
the sale of its products, because the distributors had violated the
terms of their agreements by selling competing products, failing
to meet the required sales volume, or failing to pay on time.
Petitioner, however, did not allege that respondents
committed any of these actions during the existence of the
agreement.
We have repeatedly held that factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are given great
weight, even finality, by this Court.
Petitioner is liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair
competition under the Civil Code
Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had employed
oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the
market coverage and diminish the investment returns of
respondents.
The CA summarized its findings as follows:
This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in
order to take over the market: directly sell its products to or deal
them off to competing stores at a price substantially lower than
those imposed on its wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers
suffered losses, and in [respondents’] case, laid off a number of
employees and alienated the patronage of its major customers
including small-scale stores.
It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a beverage
giant, but also the manufacturer of the products; hence, it sets
the price.
In addition, it took advantage of the information provided by
respondents to facilitate its takeover of the latter’s usual
business area. Distributors like respondents, who had assisted
petitioner in its marketing efforts, suddenly found themselves with
fewer customers. Other distributors were left with no choice but
to fold.
39
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock
for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever another person commits an act in violation of some
legal provision; or an act which, though not constituting a
transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain
rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held
that under any of the above provisions of law, an act that
causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of
damages. As explained by this Court in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of
others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which
gives it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It
cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he
unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good
customs. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law
are the supreme norms of justice which the law develops and
which are expressed in three principles: honeste vivere,
alterum non laedere and jus suum quique tribuere; and he
who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not
permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
Article 28 of the Civil Code
Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed
business methods resulting in unfair competition also gives a
right of action to the injured party. Article 28 of the Civil Code
provides:
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive
or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage.
Petitioner cites Tolentino, who in turn cited Colin and Capitant.
According to the latter, the act of “a merchant [who] puts up a
store near the store of another and in this way attracts some
of the latter’s patrons” is not an abuse of a right.
IN THIS CASE: The scenario in the present case is vastly different:
the merchant was also the producer who, with the use of a list
provided by its distributor, knocked on the doors of the
latter’s customers and offered the products at a substantially
lower price. Unsatisfied, the merchant even sold its products at
a preferential rate to another store within the vicinity.
Jurisprudence holds that when a person starts an opposing
place of business, not for the sake of profit, but regardless of
loss and for the sole purpose of driving a competitor out of
business, in order to take advantage of the effects of a
malevolent purpose, that person is guilty of a wanton wrong.
Temperate, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees, were properly awarded
Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner argues that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction to grant an award of temperate damages,
because respondents did not specifically pray for it in their
Amended Complaint.
39

HELD: Petitioner’s argument is flimsy and unsupported even by
the cases it has cited.
The CA correctly ruled that the award of temperate damages
was justified, even if it was not specifically prayed for, because:
1. respondents did pray for the grant of “other reliefs,” and
2. the award was clearly warranted under the circumstances.
Indeed, the law permits judges to award a different kind of
damages as an alternative to actual damages:
Article 2224, Civil Code. Temperate or moderate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
Compensatory damages may be awarded in the concept of
temperate damages for injury to business reputation or
business standing, loss of goodwill, and loss of customers who
shifted their patronage to competitors.
It is not extraordinary for courts to award temperate damages in
lieu of actual damages. In Canada v. All Commodities Marketing
Corporation, this Court awarded temperate damages in
recognition of the pecuniary loss suffered, after finding that
actual damages could not be awarded for lack of proof.
In Public Estates Authority v. Chu, this Court held that temperate
damages should have been awarded by the trial court considering
that the plaintiff therein had suffered some pecuniary loss.
IN THIS CASE: Both the RTC and the CA found that respondents
had similarly suffered pecuniary loss by reason of petitioner’s
high-handed machinations to eliminate competition in the
market.
The Court sees no grave error on the part of the RTC when it ruled
that the unpaid obligation of respondents shall be offset against
the temperate damages due them from petitioner.
However, the trial court was not accurate in considering the
P500,000 temperate damages as adequate to completely
extinguish the obligation of respondents to petitioner.
The Court notes that while the principal was P449,154, this amount
earned legal interest from the time of demand. Nonetheless, in
view of the established fact that respondents incurred the losses
after their business was systematically crippled by petitioner, it is
only proper and just that the obligation, as well as the legal
interest that has accrued, be deemed totally compensated by the
temperate damages.
Therefore, respondents do not need to tender the amount of
P449,154 plus legal interest to petitioner, while the latter does not
have to tender any amount as temperate damages to the former.
40
With regard to moral damages, petitioner argues that
respondents failed to provide satisfactory proof that the latter had
undergone any suffering or injury.
This is a factual question that has been resolved by the trial court
in a Decision affirmed by the CA. The award finds legal basis under
Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code, which states that moral
damages may be recovered in acts and actions referred to in
Articles 21 and 28.
Petitioner likewise questions the award of exemplary damages
without “competent proof.”
It cites Spouses Villafuerte v. CA as basis for arguing that the CA
should have based its Decision regarding the fact and the amount
of exemplary damages upon competent proof that respondents
have suffered injury and upon evidence of the actual amount
thereof.
The Court enjoins petitioner’s counsel to fully and carefully read
the text of our decisions before citing them as authority. The
excerpt lifted pertains to compensatory damages, not exemplary
damages. The Court reminds counsel that exemplary damages are
awarded under Article 2229 of the Civil Code by way of example
or correction for the public good. The determination of the
amount is left to the discretion of the judge; its proof is not
incumbent upon the claimant.
There being no meritorious argument raised by petitioner, the
award of exemplary damages must be sustained to caution
powerful business owners against the use of oppressive and high-
handed commercial strategies to target and trample on the rights
of small business owners, who are striving to make a decent living.
Exemplary damages having been awarded, the grant of attorney’s
fees was therefore warranted.
Petitioner’s counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, were
properly denied
The counterclaim for the payment of P449,154 plus legal interest
was effectively granted when the trial court offset the temperate
damages awarded to respondents against the outstanding
obligation of the latter to petitioner.
The counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, had no basis and were
properly denied. The fact that petitioner was compelled to engage
the services of counsel in order to defend itself against the suit of
respondents did not entitle it to attorney’s fees.
According to petitioner, it is entitled to moral damages, because
“respondents clearly acted in a vexatious manner when they
instituted this suit.” The Court sees nothing in the record to sustain
this argument. With respect to the prayer for exemplary damages,
neither does the Court find any act of respondents that has to be
deterred.
Disposition: The petition is denied.
40
 41

refusal without just cause to perform the duty is what you call as?
SESBREÑO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2014) — Nonfeasance. Failure to do a duty without just cause and the
duty is purely ministerial.
But there are no damages in the case of Sesbreño v. CA, VECO on the part
of the volt inspectors. According to the Court, the entering of the house This was true in the case of Campugan v. Tolentino, Jr. So the
of Mr. Sesbreño is merely a continuity of the earlier inspection made on act of the register of deeds in cancelling the annotation of the title
that electric meter that was not working, the rotating disk also not rotating,
by reason of the compromise agreement arrived at by the parties
and thus there is a need to determine the actual electrical consumption
and this can only be determined by inspecting the electrical appliances
is purely ministerial, not discretionary on the part of the register
and the fixtures inside the house. Likewise, there was permission that was of deeds, thus he cannot be held liable for damages.
granted to the inspectors to conduct that inspection inside Mr. Sesbreño’s
house. Also, that argument raised by Mr. Sesbreño that they should be Facts:
armed with a search warrant —> requirement only true if the search is Civil action to annul the transfer of TCT No. N-290546
conducted by an agent of the state but not a private individual nor a Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel
private establishment. Mr. Balicha is a member of the Philippine
of the complainants Jessie Campugan and Robert Torres in a
Constabulary, did not participate in the inspection because he was there
civil action they brought to seek the annulment of Transfer
merely to assist and escort the volt inspectors.
Certificate of Title No. N-290546 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Court in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598).
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
They impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort,
for the same.
Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They
caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of
ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS.
adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis pendens.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs,
Respondent Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
Sworn complaint for disbarment
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
docketed as A.C. No. 8261), the complainants narrated:
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
• that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and
ground, shall return the same to him.
Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their
parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano
ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING A CRIMINAL OFFENSE BUT
Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under
SHALL PRODUCE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-64333(35652) of the
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
Register of Deeds of Quezon City;
privacy, and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
• that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT-
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
prevention, and other relief: (PMIV)
City under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort; and
• that, accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of
1. Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
2. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations
of another;
Amicable settlement
3. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement
4. Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
end their dispute, whereby the complainants agreed to sell the
other personal condition.
property and the proceeds thereof would be equally divided
between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would
LIABILITY OF A PUBLIC SERVANT OR EMPLOYEE.
be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs)
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because
and the defendants.
a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
Pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio,
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated February 26,
any disciplinary action that may be taken.
2008, which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16, 2008 upon
noting the defendants’ lack of objection thereto and the
CAMPUGAN vs. TOLENTINO (2015)
defendants’ willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim.

What is that particular act that was not complied with by the Complainants’ allegations: The complainants alleged:
public official or employee? — Purely ministerial. And that

41

• that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order
dated May 16, 2008, they could no longer locate or contact
Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and
visits to his office;
• that they found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City that new annotations were made on TCT
No. N-290546, specifically:
1. the annotation of the letter-request appearing to be filed by
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT
No. N-290546; and
2. the annotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon
City, granting the complainants’ Motion to Withdraw Complaint;
and
3. that a copy of the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 addressed
to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed
that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the
letter.
Appeal with the LRA
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an
appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation
of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens
under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively.
However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707
was already resolved, or remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio,
Jr. despite their having paid him for his professional services, the
complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case.
They submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse
claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order
specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the
connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and
Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their
positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents
Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting
Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they
claimed to be thereby prejudiced.
Respondents’ contentions: Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his
Comment dated August 17, 2009:
• that complainant Robert Torres had been actively involved
in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which
included the mediation process;
• that the complainants, after having aggressively participated
in the drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now
claim that they had been deceived into entering the
agreement in the same way that they could not feign
ignorance of the conditions contained therein;
• that he did not commit any abandonment as alleged, but had
performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the
complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598;
• that he should not be held responsible for their
representation in other proceedings, such as that before the
LRA, which required a separate engagement; and
42
• that the only payment he had received from the complainants
were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for every
hearing in the RTC.
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing:
• that he was not acquainted with the other respondents,
except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during the hearings
in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598;
• that although he had notarized the letter-request dated June
30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had
no knowledge about how said letter-request had been
disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and
• that the present complaint was the second disbarment case
filed by the complainants against him with no other motive
except to harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 2009:
• that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of Deeds,
who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that
resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim
and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546;
• that the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in
the regular course of official duty and in the exercise of the
ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds;
• that no irregularity occurred or was performed in the
cancellation of the annotations; and
• that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-
07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any
involvement in the proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
As the result of Atty. Quilala’s allegation in his Comment in A.C.
No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.’s signature that
appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed
another sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010
alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of Atty.
Cunanan.
This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and
was later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because the
complaints involved the same parties and rested on similar
allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the
allegation of forgery and to reiterate the arguments he had made
in A.C. No. 8261. On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he
adopted Atty. Quilala’s Comment.
Ruling: The Court dismisses the complaints for disbarment for
being bereft of merit.
Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may
be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional
or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the Court.
42

Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the
Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional
Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as
provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court – disbarment
or suspension.
The complainants’ allegations of the respondents’ acts and
omissions are insufficient to establish any censurable conduct
against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree) enumerates the general duties of the Register of Deeds.
Purely ministerial act or duty
The duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.
Discretionary act or duty
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor the exercise of judgment.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no abuse of authority
or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and
Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice
of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on
TCT No. N-290546.
Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-
request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or
invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty
to examine documents presented for registration was limited
only to what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon
their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order, they
found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in conformity with
existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to perform
their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents’ performance of
duty, the complainants were not bereft of any remedy because
they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the
matter by way of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section
117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
There was no conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr.
Complainant’s contentions: The complainants charge Atty.
Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each
other to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598
would enter into the amicable settlement, and then to cause the
43
cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546.
The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having
abandoned their cause since the issuance of the RTC of its order
dated May 16, 2008.
HELD: The complainants’ charges are devoid of substance.
RULE: Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement
in order to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be
inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an
act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established
by clear and convincing evidence.
IN THIS CASE: The complainants failed in this regard. Outside of
their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
had conspired with each other in order to cause the dismissal of
the complaint and then discharge of the annotations, they
presented no evidence to support their allegation of
conspiracy.
On the contrary, the records indicated their own active
participation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not
now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had
themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
initiated and participated in the settlement of the case, there was
nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as
lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement
of the complainants and the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598 subsisted.
There was no abandonment on the aprt og Atty. Victorio, Jr.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of
Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel.
With Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s assistance, the complainants obtained a
fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the
sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds
accruing to counsel as his legal fees.
The complainants did not competently and persuasively show
any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as
their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty.
Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention
to any other matters subsequent to the termination of Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated
between them at any time during the engagement, the
complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s
legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his
representation of them in the LRA.
43

RULE: The Law Profession did not burden its members with the
responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the
rendition of professional services depends on the agreement
between the attorney and the client.
HELD: Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s alleged failure to respond to the
complainants’ calls or visits, or to provide them with his
whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the
termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did
not equate to abandonment without the credible showing
that he continued to come under the professional obligation
towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598.
Disposition: The court dimisses the baseless complaints for
disbarment.
LEDESMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2008)
This was not true in the case of Ledesma v. CA and Delmo, the
order of Mr. Ledesma not to grant Delmo honors was
subsequently reversed by the Director of the Bureau of Public
Schools, but despite the order, several orders given, in fact, one
came in the form of a telegram, Mr. Ledesma still refused to award
Delmo honors when she graduated even after her death. So, that
would give rise to the payment of damages under Article 27 of the
NCC.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
(ARTICLES 29 TO 35).
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand
civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to
prove the act complained of.
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the latter.
FRIAS vs. SAN DIEGO-SISON (2007)
44
Facts: Petitioner Bobie Rose V. Frias is the owner of a house and
lot located at No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, which she acquired from Island Masters Realty and
Development Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a Deed of Sale
dated November 16, 1990.
The property is covered by TCT No. 168173 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati in the name of IMRDC.
On December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST PARTY, and
respondent Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison, as the SECOND PARTY,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement over the property with
the following terms:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of THREE
MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00) receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY,
the parties have agreed as follows:
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of Six (6) months from
the date of the execution of this contract within which to
notify the FIRST PARTY of her intention to purchase the
aforementioned parcel of land together within (sic) the
improvements thereon at the price of SIX MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P6,400,000.00). Upon notice to
the FIRST PARTY of the SECOND PARTY’s intention to purchase
the same, the latter has a period of another six months within
which to pay the remaining balance of P3.4 million.
2. That prior to the six months period given to the SECOND PARTY
within which to decide whether or not to purchase the above-
mentioned property, the FIRST PARTY may still offer the said
property to other persons who may be interested to buy the
same provided that the amount of P3,000,000.00 given to the
FIRST PARTY BY THE SECOND PARTY shall be paid to the latter
including interest based on prevailing compounded bank
interest plus the amount of the sale in excess of P7,000,000.00
should the property be sold at a price more than P7 million.
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the first
six months from the execution of this contract, no interest shall
be charged by the SECOND PARTY on the P3 million however, in
the event that on the sixth month the SECOND PARTY would
decide not to purchase the aforementioned property, the
FIRST PARTY has a period of another six months within
which to pay the sum of P3 million pesos provided that the
said amount shall earn compounded bank interest for the last six
months only. Under this circumstance, the amount of P3 million
given by the SECOND PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan and
the property shall be considered as the security for the
mortgage which can be enforced in accordance with law.
xxx
Petitioner received from respondent 2 million pesos in cash and
1 million pesos in a post-dated check dated February 28, 1990,
instead of 1991, which rendered said check stale.
Petitioner then gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name of
IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property between
petitioner and IMRDC.
Respondent decided not to purchase the property and
notified petitioner through a letter dated March 20, 1991,
44

which petitioner received only on June 11, 1991, reminding
petitioner of their agreement that the amount of 2 million pesos
which petitioner received from respondent should be
considered as a loan payable within 6 months.
Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent the amount of 2
million pesos.
On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, a complaint for sum of money with preliminary
attachment against petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 93-65367 and raffled to Branch 30.
Respondent’s additional averments: Respondent alleged the
foregoing facts and in addition thereto averred that:
• petitioner tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by
making a false report of the loss of her owner’s copy of TCT No.
168173 to the Tagig Police Station on June 3, 1991, executing
an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition for the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate copy of said title with the RTC of Makati,
Branch 142;
• the petition was granted in an Order dated August 31, 1991;
• said Order was subsequently set aside in an Order dated April
10, 1992 where the RTC Makati granted respondent’s petition
for relief from judgment due to the fact that respondent is in
possession of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 and
ordered the provincial public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation of petitioner for perjury and false testimony.
Respondent prayed for the ex parte issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment and payment of two million pesos with
interest at 36% per annum from December 7, 1991, P100,000.00
moral, corrective and exemplary damages and P200,000.00 for
attorney’s fees.
TC: It ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC issued a decision:
In an Order dated April 6, 1993, the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Manila issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon the filing of
a bond in the amount of 2 million pesos.
Petitioner’s answer: Petitioner filed an Amended Answer alleging
that:
• the Memorandum of Agreement was conceived and arranged
by her lawyer, Atty. Carmelita Lozada, who is also
respondent’s lawyer;
• she was asked to sign the agreement without being given the
chance to read the same;
• the title to the property and the Deed of Sale between her and
the IMRDC were entrusted to Atty. Lozada for safekeeping
and were never turned over to respondent as there was no
It found that petitioner was under obligation to pay respondent
consummated sale yet;
the amount of 2 million pesos with compounded interest pursuant
to their Memorandum of Agreement.
45
• out of the 2 million pesos cash paid, Atty. Lozada took the 1
million pesos which has not been returned, thus petitioner
had filed a civil case against her;
• she was never informed of respondent’s decision not to
purchase the property within the six month period fixed in the
agreement;
• when she demanded the return of TCT No. 168173 and the
Deed of Sale between her and the IMRDC from Atty. Lozada,
the latter gave her these documents in a brown envelope on
May 5, 1991 which her secretary placed in her attache case;
• the envelope together with her other personal things were
lost when her car was forcibly opened the following day;
• she sought the help of Atty. Lozada who advised her to secure
a police report, to execute an affidavit of loss and to get the
services of another lawyer to file a petition for the issuance of
an owner’s duplicate copy;
• the petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy
was filed on her behalf without her knowledge and neither did
she sign the petition nor testify in court as falsely claimed for
she was abroad;
• she was a victim of the manipulations of Atty. Lozada and
respondent as shown by the filing of criminal charges for
perjury and false testimony against her;
• no interest could be due as there was no valid mortgage over
the property as the principal obligation is vitiated with fraud
and deception.
• She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, counter-claim
for damages and attorney’s fees.
• ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2 Million plus
interest thereon at the rate of thirty two (32%) per cent per
annum beginning December 7, 1991 until fully paid, and
• ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P70,000.00
representing premiums paid by plaintiff on the attachment
bond with legal interest thereon counted from the date of this
decision until fully paid.
• ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 by
way of moral, corrective and exemplary damages.
• ordering defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees of
P100,000.00 plus cost of litigation.
45

Furthermore, it found that the fraudulent scheme employed by
petitioner to deprive respondent of her only security to her loaned
money when petitioner executed an affidavit of loss and instituted
a petition for the issuance of an owner’s duplicate title knowing
the same was in respondent’s possession. Thus, it entitled
respondent to moral damages.
Further, it found that petitioner’s bare denial cannot be accorded
credence because her testimony and that of her witness did not
appear to be credible.
The RTC further found that petitioner admitted that she received
from respondent the 2 million pesos in cash but the fact that
petitioner gave the 1 million pesos to Atty. Lozada was without
respondent’s knowledge thus it is not binding on respondent.
Respondent had also proven that in 1993, she initially paid the
sum of P30,000.00 as premium for the issuance of the attachment
bond, P20,000.00 for its renewal in 1994, and P20,000.00 for the
renewal in 1995, thus plaintiff should be reimbursed considering
that she was compelled to go to court and ask for a writ of
preliminary attachment to protect her rights under the agreement.
Petitioner filed her appeal with the CA.
CA: The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification, reducing
the rate of interest from 32% to 25% per annum, effective June 7,
1991 until fully paid. It found that:
• petitioner gave the 1 million pesos to Atty. Lozada partly as
her commission and partly as a loan;
• respondent did not replace the mistakenly dated check of one
million pesos because she had decided not to buy the
property and petitioner knew of her decision as early as April
1991;
• the award of moral damages was warranted since even
granting petitioner had no hand in the filing of the petition
for the issuance of an owner’s copy, she executed an affidavit
of loss of TCT No. 168173 when she knew all along that said
title was in respondent’s possession;
• petitioner’s claim that she thought the title was lost when the
brown envelope given to her by Atty. Lozada was stolen from
her car was hollow;
• that such deceitful conduct caused respondent serious
anxiety and emotional distress.
Petitioner’s claim: Petitioner claims that moral damages were
awarded on the erroneous finding that she used a fraudulent
scheme to deprive respondent of her security for the loan.
She argues that such finding is baseless since petitioner was
acquitted in the case for perjury and false testimony filed by
respondent against her.
Ruling: The Court is not persuaded.
46
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and
perjury cases filed by respondent against her, those actions
are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with
damages filed by respondent against petitioner.
The Court agrees with the findings of the trial court and the CA
that petitioner’s act of trying to deprive respondent of the
security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the
title and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent
to moral damages.
Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or breach
of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence;
it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of fraud.
The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in the event that
respondent opts not to buy the property, the money given by
respondent to petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the
property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage.
It was testified to by respondent that after they executed the
agreement on December 7, 1990, petitioner gave her the owner’s
copy of the title to the property, the Deed of Sale between
petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate of occupancy, and the
certificate of the Secretary of the IMRDC who signed the Deed of
Sale.
However, notwithstanding that all those documents were in
respondent’s possession, petitioner executed an affidavit of
loss that the owner’s copy of the title and the Deed of Sale
were lost.
Petitioner’s testimony: Although petitioner testified that her
execution of the affidavit of loss was due to the fact that she was
of the belief that since she had demanded from Atty. Lozada the
return of the title, she thought that the brown envelope with
markings which Atty. Lozada gave her on May 5, 1991 already
contained the title and the Deed of Sale as those documents were
in the same brown envelope which she gave to Atty. Lozada prior
to the transaction with respondent.
Such statement remained a bare statement. It was not proven at
all since Atty. Lozada had not taken the stand to corroborate
her claim.
In fact, even petitioner’s own witness, Benilda Ynfante, was not
able to establish petitioner’s claim that the title was returned by
Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante’s testimony that after the brown
envelope was given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and
46

she placed it in petitioner’s attaché case and did not bother to look
at the envelope.
It is clear therefrom that petitioner’s execution of the affidavit
of loss became the basis of the filing of the petition with the
RTC for the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
No. 168173.
Petitioner’s actuation would have deprived respondent of the
security for her loan were it not for respondent’s timely filing of a
petition for relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous order
granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral
damages is in order.
The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the
award of exemplary damages is proper.
Exemplary damages may be imposed upon petitioner by way of
example or correction for the public good.
The RTC awarded the amount of P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages. While the award of moral and exemplary
damages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way of
awarding said damages, no error has been committed by CA.
There is no question that respondent is entitled to moral and
exemplary damages.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates,
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
1. freedom of religion;
2. freedom of speech;
3. freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
4. freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
5. freedom of suffrage;
6. the right against deprivation of property without due process
of law;
7. the right to a just compensation when private property is
taken for public use;
8. the right to equal protection of the laws;
9. the right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
10. the liberty of abode and of changing the same;
11. the right of privacy of communication and correspondence;
12. the right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
13. the right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
14. the right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
15. the right of the accused against excessive bail;
16. the right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
47
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
17. freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession except when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;
18. freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
19. freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code
or other penal statute.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force
refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case
of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal
offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent
civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the
justice of peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a
crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney
refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the
alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant’s motion, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action an information should be
presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
47

DY vs. PEOPLE (2016)
Jardeleza, J.
Facts: Petitioner Gloria S. Dy was the former General Manager
of MCCI. In the course of her employment, petitioner assisted
MCCI in its business involving several properties.
One such business pertained to the construction of warehouses
over a property (Numancia Property) that MCCI leased from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB).
Sometime in May 1996, in pursuit of MCCI’s business, petitioner
proposed to William Mandy, President of MCCI, the purchase of
a property owned by Pantranco.
As the transaction involved a large amount of money, Mandy
agreed to obtain a loan from the International China Bank of
Commerce (ICBC).
Petitioner represented that she could facilitate the approval of the
loan. True enough, ICBC granted a loan to MCCI in the amount of
P20,000,000.00, evidenced by a promissory note. As security, MCCI
also executed a chattel mortgage over the warehouses in the
Numancia Property. Mandy entrusted petitioner with the
obligation to manage the payment of the loan.
In February 1999, MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the
mortgaged property due to its default in paying the loan
obligation. In order to prevent the foreclosure, Mandy instructed
petitioner to facilitate the payment of the loan.
MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank checks and 12 Asia
Trust Bank checks in varying amounts and in different dates
covering the period from May 18, 1999 to April 4, 2000.
The total amount of the checks, which were all payable to cash,
was P21,706,281.00. Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner.
Mandy claims that he delivered the checks with the
instruction that petitioner use the checks to pay the loan.
Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that she encashed the
checks and returned the money to Mandy. ICBC eventually
foreclosed the mortgaged property as MCCI continued to default
in its obligation to pay. Mandy claims that it was only at this
point in time that he discovered that not a check was paid to
ICBC.
Criminal complaint: Thus, on October 7, 2002, MCCI, represented
by Mandy, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila. On March 3, 2004, an Information
was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court Manila.
TC: The RTC Manila rendered a decision acquitting petitioner.
The RTC Manila found that while petitioner admitted that she
received the checks, the prosecution failed to establish that she
was under any obligation to deliver them to ICBC in payment of
MCCI’s loan.
48
The trial court made this finding on the strength of Mandy’s
admission that he gave the checks to petitioner with the
agreement that she would encash them.
Petitioner would then pay ICBC using her own checks.
The trial court further made a finding that Mandy and petitioner
entered into a contract of loan.
Thus, it held that the prosecution failed to establish an
important element of the crime of estafa — misappropriation
or conversion.
However, while the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner, it
ordered her to pay the amount of the checks.
Petitioner filed an appeal of the civil aspect of the RTC Decision
with the CA.
CA: The CA found the appeal without merit. It held that the
acquittal of petitioner does not necessarily absolve her of civil
liability.
The CA said that it is settled that when an accused is acquitted on
the basis of reasonable doubt, courts may still find him or her
civilly liable if the evidence so warrant.
The CA explained that the evidence on record adequately prove
that petitioner received the checks as a loan from MCCI. Thus,
preventing the latter from recovering the amount of the checks
would constitute unjust enrichment.
Hence, the assailed decision ruled that the criminal case which
found Gloria Dy civilly liable to William Mandy is affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner’s argument: Petitioner argues that since she was
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements
of the crime charged, there was therefore no crime committed.
As there was no crime, any civil liability ex delicto cannot be
awarded.
Issue: The central issue is the propriety of making a finding of civil
liability in a criminal case for estafa when the accused is acquitted
for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime
charged.
Ruling: The Court grants the petition.
Criminal liabilities vs. Civil liabilities
Our laws recognize a bright line distinction between criminal and
civil liabilities.
Criminal liabilities Civil liabilities
48
 49

A crime is a liability against Civil liabilities take a less A criminal action requires A civil action requires a lesser
the state. It is prosecuted by public and more private proof of guilt beyond quantum of proof, that of
and for the state. nature. reasonable doubt. preponderance of evidence.

Acts considered criminal are Civil liabilities are claimed

penalized by law as a means
to protect the society from
dangerous transgressions.
As criminal liability involves a
penalty affecting a person’s
liberty, acts are only treated
criminal when the law clearly
says so.
through civil actions as a
means to enforce or protect a
right or prevent or redress a
wrong.
They do not carry with them
the imposition of
imprisonment as a penalty. I
Instead, civil liabilities are
compensated in the form of
damages.
This distinction also agrees with the essential principle in our legal
system that while a criminal liability carries with it a
corresponding civil liability, they are nevertheless separate
and distinct.
In other words, these two liabilities may coexist but their
existence is not dependent on each other.
The Civil Code states that when an accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be filed.

Civil liability arising from crime
Nevertheless, our jurisdiction recognizes that a crime has a
private civil component. Thus, while an act considered criminal
is a breach of law against the State, our legal system allows for
the recovery of civil damages where there is a private person
injured by a criminal act.
It is in recognition of this dual nature of a criminal act that our
Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable
is also civilly liable (Article 100). This is the concept of civil
liability ex delicto.
This is echoed by the New Civil Code when it recognizes acts or
omissions punished by law as a separate source of obligation.
In the latter case, only preponderance of evidence is required. This
is supported by the Rules of Court which provides that the
extinction of the criminal action does not result in the
extinction of the corresponding civil action.
The corresponding civil action may only be extinguished when
there is a “finding in a final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.”
Consistent with this, the Rules of Court requires that in judgments
of acquittal the court must state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused
or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

This is reinforced by Article 30 of the same code which refers to
the filing of a separate civil action to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense.
The Revised Penal Code fleshes out this civil liability in Article 104
which states that it includes restitution, reparation of damage
caused and indemnification for consequential damages.
Rules of procedure for criminal and civil actions involving the
same act or omission
The law and the rules of procedure provide for a precise
mechanism in instituting a civil action pertaining to an act or
omission which is also subject of a criminal case.
Our Rules of Court prescribes a kind of fusion such that, subject
to certain defined qualifications, when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense is deemed instituted as well.
However, there is an important difference between civil and
criminal proceedings that require a fine distinction as to how these
twin actions shall proceed. These two proceedings involve 2
different standards of proof.
Criminal proceedings Civil proceedings
In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
Thus, whether an exoneration from the criminal action should
affect the corresponding civil action depends on the varying
kinds of acquittal.
Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing civil
liability ex delicto, even if mandatorily instituted with the
corresponding criminal action, survives an acquittal when it is
based on the presence of reasonable doubt.
In these instances, while the evidence presented does not
establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action
still prevails for as long as the greater weight of evidence tilts
in favor of a finding of liability.
This means that while the mind of the court cannot rest easy in
penalizing the accused for the commission of a crime, it
nevertheless finds that he or she committed or omitted to perform
acts which serve as a separate source of obligation.
There is no sufficient proof that the act or omission is criminal
beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a preponderance of

49

evidence to show that the act or omission caused injury which
demands compensation.
Civil liability ex delicto in Estafa cases
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of
pecuniary estimation through Estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. In general, the elements of estafa are:
1. That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person.
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or
deceit in order to cause damage. As this Court previously held,
“the element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable.”
Our law abhors the act of defrauding another person by abusing
his trust or deceiving him, such that, it criminalizes this kind of
fraud.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the
circumstances which constitute estafa. Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
states that estafa is committed by abuse of confidence —
Article 315. Swindling (estafa).—x x x (b) By misappropriating or
converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal
is the act of misappropriation or conversion.
When the element of misappropriation or conversion is
missing, there can be no estafa.
In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability
ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or
omission from which any civil liability may be sourced.
However, when an accused is acquitted because a reasonable
doubt exists as to the existence of misappropriation or conversion,
then civil liability may still be awarded.
This means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such
evidence does not suffice to convince the court to the point of
moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts to estafa.
As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof
justifying the imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability
exists.
IN THIS CASE: The RTC Manila acquitted petitioner because the
prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence the element
of misappropriation or conversion.
50
There was no adequate evidence to prove that Mandy gave the
checks to petitioner with the instruction that she will use them to
pay the ICBC loan.
Citing Mandy’s own testimony in open court, the RTC Manila
held that when Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner,
their agreement was that it was a “sort of loan.”
In the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision, the RTC Manila
ruled that the prosecution “failed to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.” It then proceeded to order
petitioner to pay the amount of the loan.
The ruling of the RTC Manila was affirmed by the CA. It said that
“[t]he acquittal of Gloria Dy is anchored on the ground that her
guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt — not because she
is not the author of the act or omission complained of. x x x
The trial court found no trickery nor deceit in obtaining
money from the private complainant; instead, it concluded
that the money obtained was undoubtedly a loan.”
Jurisprudence over the years on civil liability ex delicto in
Estafa cases
Our jurisprudence on this matter diverges.
Pantig & Singson
Acquittal of the accused without prejudice to the filing of a
separate civil case
Earlier cases ordered the dismissal of the civil action for recovery
of civil liability ex delicto whenever there is a finding that there
was no estafa but rather an obligation to pay under a contract.
In People v. Pantig, this Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court
acquitting Pantig, but revoked the portion sentencing him to pay
the offended party the amount of money alleged to have been
obtained through false and fraudulent representations, thus —
The trial court found as a fact that the sum of P1,200, ordered to
be paid in the judgment of acquittal, was received by the
defendant-appellant as loan. This finding is inconsistent with the
existence of the criminal act charged in the information. The
liability of the defendant for the return of the amount so
received arises from a civil contract, not from a criminal act,
and may not be enforced in the criminal case.
The portion of the judgment appealed from, which orders the
defendant-appellant to pay the sum of P1,200 to the offended
party, is hereby revoked, without prejudice to the filing of a civil
action for the recovery of the said amount.
This was also the import of the ruling in People v. Singson. In that
case, this Court found that “the evidence [was] not sufficient to
establish the existence of fraud or deceit on the part of the
accused. x x x And when there is no proven deceit or fraud, there
is no crime of estafa.”
While the Court also said that the established facts may prove
Singson’s civil liability (obligation to pay under a contract of sale),
the Court nevertheless made no finding of civil liability because
50

their “mind cannot rest easy on the certainty of guilt” considering
the above finding.
The dispositive portion stated that Singson is acquitted “without
prejudice to any civil liability which may be established in a civil
case against her.”
However, our jurisprudence on the matter appears to have
changed in later years.
Others
Acquittal and payment of civil liability
In Eusebio-Calderon v. People, this Court affirmed the finding of
the CA that Calderon “did not employ trickery or deceit in
obtaining money from the private complainants, instead, it
concluded that the money obtained was undoubtedly loans for
which [Calderon] paid interest.”
Thus, this Court upheld Calderon’s acquittal of estafa, but found
her civilly liable for the principal amount borrowed from the
private complainants.
The ruling was similar in People v. Cuyugan. In that case, the Court
acquitted Cuyugan of estafa for failure of the prosecution to prove
fraud. We held that the transaction between Cuyugan and private
complainants was a loan to be used by Cuyugan in her business.
Thus, this Court ruled that Cuyugan has the obligation, which is
civil in character, to pay the amount borrowed.
The Court holds that the better rule in ascertaining civil
liability in Estafa cases is that pronounced in Pantig and
Singson.
The rulings in these cases are more in accord with the relevant
provisions of the Civil Code, and the Rules of Court. They are also
logically consistent with this Court’s pronouncement in Manantan.
Under Pantig and Singson, whenever the elements of estafa are
not established, and that the delivery of any personal property was
made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the
estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case.
This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil
liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission
constituting the crime.
Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in
a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as in this case, is
civil liability ex contractu where the civil liability arises from
an entirely different source of obligation. Therefore, it is not the
type of civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case, and
consequently must be filed separately.
This is necessarily so because whenever the court makes a finding
that the elements of estafa do not exist, it effectively says that
there is no crime. There is no act or omission that constitutes
criminal fraud. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it
cannot be sourced from something that does not exist.
51
When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a
contract, as in a contract of loan, it takes a position completely
inconsistent with the presence of estafa.
Estafa Contract
a person parts with his a person willingly binds
money because of abuse of himself or herself to give
confidence or deceit something or to render some
service
the accused’s failure to
a party’s failure to comply
account for the property
with his obligation is only a
received amounts to criminal
contractual breach
fraud
Thus, any finding that the source of obligation is a contract
negates estafa. The finding, in turn, means that there is no civil
liability ex delicto.
Thus, the rulings in the foregoing cases are consistent with the
concept of fused civil and criminal actions, and the different
sources of obligations under our laws.
IN THIS CASE: The Court applies this doctrine to the facts of this
case.
Petitioner was acquitted by the RTC Manila because of the
absence of the element of misappropriation or conversion.
The RTC Manila, as affirmed by the CA, found that Mandy
delivered the checks to petitioner pursuant to a loan agreement.
Clearly, there is no crime of estafa. There is no proof of the
presence of any act or omission constituting criminal fraud.
Thus, civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded because there is
no act or omission punished by law which can serve as the source
of obligation.
Any civil liability arising from the loan takes the nature of a
civil liability ex contractu. It does not pertain to the civil
action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
In Manantan, this Court explained the effects of this result on the
civil liability deemed instituted with the criminal case. At the risk
of repetition, Manantan held that when there is no delict, “civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of.”
IN THIS CASE: In Dy’s case, the civil liability arises out of contract
— a different source of obligation apart from an act or omission
punished by law —and must be claimed in a separate civil action.
Conclusion
The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay
her civil obligation arising from a contract of loan in the same
criminal case where she was acquitted on the ground that
there was no crime.
51

Any contractual obligation she may have must be litigated in
a separate civil action involving the contract of loan. The Court
clarifies that in cases where the accused is acquitted on the
ground that there is no crime, the civil action deemed instituted
with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely because there is
no delict from which any civil obligation may be sourced.
The peculiarity of this case is the finding that petitioner, in fact,
has an obligation arising from a contract. This civil action arising
from the contract is not necessarily extinguished. It can be
instituted in the proper court through the proper civil action.
The court notes that there is no written contract of loan, only
an oral one, which must be brought within 6 years; action has
not yet prescribed.
We note that while there is no written contract of loan in this case,
there is an oral contract of loan which must be brought within six
years.
Under the facts of the case, it appears that any breach in the
obligation to pay the loan may have happened between 1996
and 1999, or more than six years since this case has been
instituted. This notwithstanding, the Court find that the civil action
arising from the contract of loan has not yet prescribed.
Article 1150 of the Civil Code states —
Article 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions,
when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall
be counted from the day they may be brought.
The Court has held in numerous cases that it is the legal
possibility of bringing the action that determines the starting
point for the computation of the period of prescription.
The Court highlight the unique circumstances surrounding this
case. As discussed in this decision, there has been diverse
jurisprudence as to the propriety of ordering an accused to pay an
obligation arising from a contract in the criminal case where the
accused was acquitted on the ground that there is no crime.
Litigants, such as MCCI, cannot be blamed for relying on prior
rulings where the recovery on a contract of loan in a criminal case
for estafa was allowed.
The Court has found the opportunity to clarify this matter through
this decision. As it is only now that we delineate the rules
governing the fusion of criminal and civil actions pertaining to
estafa, it is only upon the promulgation of this judgment that
litigants have a clear understanding of the proper recourse in
similar cases.
The Court therefore rules that insofar as MCCI is concerned, the
filing of an action, if any (that may be sourced from the contract
of loan), becomes a legal possibility only upon the finality of
this decision which definitively ruled upon the principles on
fused actions.
52
The Court adds, however, that upon finality of this decision,
prospective litigants should become more circumspect in
ascertaining their course of action in similar cases.
Whenever a litigant erroneously pursues an estafa case, and the
accused is subsequently acquitted because the obligation arose
out of a contract, the prescriptive period will still be counted from
the time the cause of action arose.
In this eventuality, it is probable that the action has already
prescribed by the time the criminal case shall have been
completed. This possibility demands that prospective litigants do
not haphazardly pursue the filing of an estafa case in order to
force an obligor to pay his or her obligation with the threat of
criminal conviction.
It compels litigants to be honest and fair in their judgment as to
the proper action to be filed. This ruling should deter litigants from
turning to criminal courts as their collection agents, and should
provide a disincentive to the practice of filing of criminal cases
based on unfounded grounds in order to provide a litigant a
bargaining chip in enforcing contracts.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. DUQUE
(2017)
Peralta, J.
Facts: The instant petition arose from an Information for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City against herein respondents Carlos and
Teresa Duque. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of November 2001, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused being then
the authorized signatories of FITNESS CONSULTANTS, INC.
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out,
draw and issue to PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP., to
apply on account or for value the check described.
Said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said
accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of
such check upon its presentment which check when presented
for payment within reasonable time from date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
“ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said payee the face
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within 5 banking days after receiving notice.
It appears from the records at hand that herein petitioner
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a lessee of a
building known as Shell House at 156 Valero Street, Salcedo
Village, Makati City.
On August 23, 2000, PSPC subleased a 500-meter portion of the
2nd Floor of the Shell Building to the The Fitness Center (TFC).
Thereafter, TFC encountered problems in its business operations.
Thus, with the conformity of PSPC, TFC assigned to Fitness
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Consultants, Inc., (FCI) all its rights and obligations under the
contract of sublease executed by PSPC in its favor.
Respondent Carlos Duque is the proprietor, while respondent
Teresa Duque is the corporate secretary of FCI.
Subsequently, FCI failed to pay its rentals to PSPC. FCI
subsequently issued a check, with respondents as signatories,
which would supposedly cover FCI’s obligations to PSPC. However,
the check was dishonored, thus, leading to the filing of a criminal
complaint against respondents for their alleged violation of BP
Blg. 22.
MeTC: The parties then went to trial, which subsequently resulted
in a verdict finding herein respondents guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the Decision of the MeTC, reads thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having
proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
Court renders judgment finding accused Carlo Duque and Teresa
Duque GUILTY of the offense of Violation of BP 22 and hereby
sentences them to pay a FINE of P105,516.55 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Both accused are further ordered to civilly indemnify the private
complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) the
amount of P105,516.55 with interest of 12% per annum from the
time the complaint was filed on October 4, 2002 until the amount
is fully paid, attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Respondents appealed the above MeTC Decision with the RTC of
Makati.
TC: The RTC of Makati City, rendered judgment acquitting
respondents and disposing the case as follows:
The Court hereby renders judgment ACQUITTING the accused
CARLO DUQUE and TERESA DUQUE of violation of BP Blg. 22.
However, the Court maintains the court a the amount of One
Hundred Five Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen Pesos and
Fifty-Five Centavos (P105,516.55) as civil indemnity with
interest of 12% per annum from the time the complaint was filed
on 04 October 2002 until the amount is fully paid, attorney’s fees
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay the costs.
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the RTC
Decision contending that they could not be held civilly liable
because their acquittal was due to the failure of the prosecution
to establish the elements of the offense charged.
In addition, they assert that they, being corporate officers, may not
be held personally and civilly liable for the debts of the
corporation they represent, considering that they had been
acquitted of criminal liability.
RTC on respondents’ MfR: In an Order dated September 2, 2011,
the RTC found merit in respondents’ Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
The RTC ruled, in essence, that respondents may not be held
civilly liable for the value of the subject check because they
have not been convicted of the offense with which they had
been charged.
53
In addition, the RTC found that the check was drawn against the
current account of FCI and the obligations sought to be paid were
corporate debts and, as such, FCI, not respondents, should be held
civilly liable.
The RTC likewise held that the veil of corporate fiction was not
used as cloak for fraud as there was no evidence that respondents
agreed to be personally liable for the corporation’s obligations.
PSPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration citing the rule that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action and alleging that the RTC erred in
ruling that respondents may not be held liable for the
obligations of FCI on the ground that there was no basis to
pierce the corporate veil.
RTC on petitioner’s MfR: The RTC issued an Order granting
PSPC’s motion for reconsideration, thus, reviving the RTC Decision
of March 16, 2011.
The RTC ruled that respondents’ acquittal, the same having been
based on the prosecution’s failure to prove all the elements of the
offense charged, did not include the extinguishment of their
civil liability.
Citing Section 1 of BP 22, the RTC held that the person who
actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable,
without any condition, qualification or limitation. The RTC also
found that the records show that FCI, through respondents, was
civilly liable to PSPC.
Aggrieved by the March 23, 2012 Order of the RTC, respondents
filed a petition for review with the CA contending that the RTC
erred in holding them liable for the civil liability of FCI even if they
were acquitted of the crime of violating BP 22.
CA: In its assailed Decision, the CA ruled in favor of respondents
and it reversed and set aside the RTC decision and had the Order
dated September 2, 2011 is reinstated.
The CA basically held that, upon acquittal, the civil liability of a
corporate officer in a BP 22 case is extinguished with the
criminal liability, without prejudice to an independent civil
action which may be pursued against the corporation.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it.
Issue: Whether or not respondents, as corporate officers, may still
be held civilly liable despite their acquittal from the criminal
charge of violation of BP 22. [NO]
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court rules in the negative, as this matter has already been
settled by jurisprudence.
The civil liability of the corporate officer for the issuance of a
bouncing corporate check attaches only if he is convicted.
53

In the case of Gosiaco v. Ching, this Court enunciated the rule that
a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can
only be held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the said case,
the Court ruled that:
When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate
name he may be held personally liable for violating a penal
statute. The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who
with intent to defraud another of money or property, draws or
issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no
sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on presentment.
Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is
predicated on the principle that he cannot shield himself from
liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a corporate
act and not his personal act.
The Court, citing the case of Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders,
Incorporated, et al., nonetheless categorically held that the civil
liability of a corporate officer in a BP 22 case is extinguished
with the criminal liability.
The above rule is reiterated in the recent case of Navarra v. People,
et al., where the petitioner, the Chief Finance Officer of a
corporation, who was the signatory of the dishonored corporate
checks, was convicted of the offense of violation of BP 22 and was
ordered to pay the private complainant civil indemnity in an
amount equivalent to the value of the checks which bounced. The
Court held thus:
The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a
bouncing corporate check can be held civilly liable when he is
convicted. The criminal liability of the person who issued the
bouncing checks in behalf of a corporation stands independent of
the civil liability of the corporation itself, such civil liability arising
from the Civil Code. But BP 22 itself fused this criminal liability
with the corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by
allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability, not from
the corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its
behalf.
As held above, it is clear that the civil liability of the corporate
officer for the issuance of a bouncing corporate check attaches
only if he is convicted.
Conversely, therefore, it will follow that once acquitted of the
offense of violating BP 22, a corporate officer is discharged
from any civil liability arising from the issuance of the
worthless check in the name of the corporation he represents.
This is without regard as to whether his acquittal was based
on reasonable doubt or that there was a pronouncement by
the trial court that the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.
Moreover, in the present case, nothing in the records at hand
would show that respondents made themselves personally nor
solidarily liable for the corporate obligations either as
accommodation parties or sureties.
On the contrary, there is no dispute that respondents signed the
subject check in their capacity as corporate officers and that
54
the check was drawn in the name of FCI as payment for the
obligation of the corporation and not for the personal
indebtedness of respondents.
Neither is there allegation nor proof that the veil of corporate
fiction is being used by respondents for fraudulent purposes.
The rule is that juridical entities have personalities separate
and distinct from its officers and the persons composing it.
Generally, the stockholders and officers are not personally liable
for the obligations of the corporation except only when the veil of
corporate fiction is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud or
illegality, or to work injustice, which is not the case here.
Hence, respondents cannot be held liable for the value of the
checks issued in payment for FCI’s obligation.
The cases of Mitra v. People, et al. and Llamado v. Court of Appeals,
et al., which were cited by petitioner, may not be made as bases
to rule against respondents because the accused in the said cases
were found guilty of violating BP 22.
Thus, the general rule that a corporate officer who issues a
bouncing corporate check can be held civilly liable when
convicted, applies to them.
IN THIS CASE: Respondents were acquitted of the offense
charged. As such, consistent with the rule established in Bautista
and Gosiaco, respondents’ civil liability was extinguished with
their criminal liability.
In the same manner, the Court agrees with the CA that the case of
Alferez v. People, et al. is neither applicable to the present case on
the ground that, while Alferez was acquitted from the charge of
violation of BP 22, the checks which bounced were issued by
Alferez in his personal capacity and in payment of his personal
obligations. Hence, the petition is denied.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS.
Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme
Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the
provisions of this Code.
DREAMWORK vs. JANIOLA (2009)
In order that there shall be a prejudicial question, there are 2
elements that must be complied with under Rule 111, Section 5 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and these were amended
by the SC in the case of Dreamwork Construction vs. Janiola.
The 2001 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (effective December
1, 2000) provides for the essential elements of a prejudicial
question as well as the forum and the time when it should be
invoked.
Section 7. The elements of a prejudicial question are:
54

a. The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and
b. the resolution of such an issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Facts:
Criminal case: Petitioner, through its President, Roberto S.
Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing,
Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October
5, 2004 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22)
against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S.
No. 04-2526-33.
Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for
violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on
February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
Civil case: Private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a
civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated
August 2006 for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case
was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and docketed
as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated
July 24, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil
and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately
related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the
civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s
Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question on
the grounds that:
(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of
the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a
separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private
respondent violated BP 22; and
(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the
elements of a prejudicial question is that “the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”;
thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case
having preceded the civil case.
MTC: It granted the motion to suspend the proceedings.
TC: It denied the petitioner’s petition.
Ruling:
The civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action
for a prejudicial question to exist.
55
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by
Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988,
the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111,
Section 5, which states:
Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question.—The two (2)
essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
however, became effective and the above provision was amended
by Section 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law
as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires
a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected. The civil
action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal
action.
IN THIS CASE: The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan
ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State
with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question
exists.
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of
the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent
allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth
noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half
(2 ½) years from the time that private respondent allegedly
stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid
reason.
More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the
construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more
than three (3) years from the execution of the construction
agreement.
Evidently, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases
involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere
afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for
delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus,
private respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.
The resolution of the civil case is not determinative of the
prosecution of the criminal action.
Even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal
action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would
justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial
question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent
55

in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present
controversy.
Private respondent, claims that if the construction agreement
between the parties is declared null and void for want of
consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract
would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a
criminal prosecution.
The Court finds for petitioner.
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the
construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of
consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private
respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that
private respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that
is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the
existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue
in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action
may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case
before us.
Okay. Those were the two elements wherein a pre-judicial
question shall arise and these were reiterated in fact, in the case
of Pimentel v. Pimentel.
PHILIPPINE AGUILA SATELLITE, INC. vs. LICHAUCO (2006)
Facts: On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private
telecommunications carriers and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) represented by
then Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. relative to the launching,
ownership, operation and management of a Philippine satellite
by a Filipino-owned or controlled private consortium or
corporation.
Creation of PASI
Pursuant to Article IV of the MOU, the consortium of private
telecommunications carriers formed a corporation and
adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc.
(PASI), herein petitioner.
By letter dated June 28, 1996, PASI president Rodrigo A. Silverio
requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for
official government confirmation of the assignment of
Philippine orbital slots 161 E and 153 E to PASI for its AGILA
satellites.
Secretary Lagdameo’s confirmation of the assignment of
orbital slots
In response to Silverio’s letter, Secretary Lagdameo, by letter
dated July 3, 1996, confirmed the government’s assignment of
Philippine orbital slots 161 E and 153 E to PASI for its AGILA
satellites.
56
Preparations undertaken by PASI
PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the launching,
operation and management of its satellites by, among other
things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital, conducting
negotiations with its business partners, and making an initial
payment of US$ 3.5 million to Aerospatiale, a French satellite
manufacturer.
Michael de Guzman, PASI President and Chief Executive Officer,
later informed Jesli Lapuz, President and CEO of the Landbank of
the Philippines, by letter of December 3, 1996, of the
government’s assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161 E and 153 E
and requested the bank’s confirmation of its participation in
a club loan in the amount of US$ 11 million, the proceeds of
which would be applied to PASI’s interim satellite.
Secretary Lichauco’s letter to Lapuz
It appears that Lapuz sent a copy of De Guzman’s letter to then
DOTC Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco, who, by letter of
December 5, 1996, wrote Lapuz as follows:
1. Kindly be informed that there is simply no basis for Michael
de Guzman to allege that the DOTC has assigned 2 slots to
PASI. He conveniently neglected to attach as another annex, in
addition to Sec. Lagdameo’s letter of 3 July 1996 (Annex “A”) the
letter of 28 June (Annex “B”) in response to which the July 3rd
letter had been sent to PASI.
Annex “B” precisely provides that one slot (153 E, to which the
interim satellite was supposed to migrate) was to be used for
the migration of the Russian satellite in time for the APEC
Leaders’ Summit. This particular endeavor was not successful.
The interim satellite “Gorizont” never moved from its orbital
location of 130 E Longitude. Annex “C” is a letter from an official
of the Subic Bay Satellite Systems Inc., with its attachments,
addressed to me stating that as of the 13th of November, no
such voyage to 153 E orbital slot had been commenced. In fact
DHI hid this fact from me, and in fact stated that Gorizont had
already moved and was on its way to 153 E.
Since this timely migration did not happen in time for the APEC
Leaders Meeting on 24 November, this 153ºE Longitude slot
can no longer be assigned to PASI.
The other slot 161 E Longitude is the one that can be made
available for PASI’s eventual launch, in 1998 most likely, in
exchange for one free satellite transponder unit utilization, for
all requirements of Government. These have yet to be embodied
in a contract between PASI and the DOTC.
2. I understand from my meeting with DHI/PASI this morning, and
from the de Guzman letter you sent to me, that the latter are
still interested in pursuing their “interim satellite project” and
are applying for a loan with your bank. Of course, they can
always pursue this as a business venture of DHI/PASI which is
their own corporate business decision. The DOTC supports this
venture but they will be getting only one orbital slot for both
the Interim Satellite Project and for the Launch Project. I
understand from today’s meeting with them that this is
technically feasible.
3. As regards the use of the name “Agila,” Mr. de Guzman’s
allegation that DHI/PASI has registered “Agila” as a “corporate
alias/trademark” is FALSE. There is no such thing as registration
of a “corporate alias.” Nor for that matter can the trade name of
56

a satellite be registered for just any satellite, where it was the
President who chose the name for the first Philippine satellite in
orbit. No one else coined that name but he. He has therefore
given the name “Agila I” to the Mabuhay satellite now in orbit
at 144 E, being the first Philippine satellite in orbit. He made this
announcement in the presence of all the APEC Heads of State
just before the presentation to him of the Manila Action Plan for
APEC.
Secretary Lichauco’s Notice of Offer
Lichauco subsequently issued, in December 1997, a Notice of
Offer for several orbital slots including 153 E.
PASI, claimed that the offer was without its knowledge and that it
subsequently came to learn that another company whose
identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won
the award for orbital slot 153 E.
Complaint filed with the RTC
PASI filed on January 23, 1998 a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City against Lichauco and the
“Unknown Awardee,” for injunction to enjoin the award of
orbital slot 153 E, declare its nullity, and for damages.
Complaint filed with the Ombudsman
PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Secretary Josefina Trinidad
Lichauco.
In his affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco with gross
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
complaint was docketed as OMB Case No. 0-98-0416.
Alleged existence of a prejudicial question
EPIB: The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB)
of the Office of the Ombudsman, by Evaluation Report8 dated
April 15, 1998, found the existence of a prejudicial question after
considering that:
“the case filed with the RTC involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based and
that the guilt or the innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined in the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
case.”
It thus concluded that the filing of the complaint before the
Ombudsman “is premature since the issues involved herein are
now subject of litigation in the case filed with the RTC,” and
accordingly recommended its dismissal.
Ombudsman: Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved on
April 24, 1998 the recommendation of the EPIB.
PASI moved to reconsider the dismissal of the complaint, but was
denied.
RTC: In the meantime, a motion to dismiss the civil case against
respondent was denied by the trial court.
57
CA: On elevation of the order of denial to the Court of Appeals,
said court, by ordered the dismissal of the case.
SC: This Court, by Decision dated May 3, 2006, ordered the
reinstatement of the case, however.
PASI’s contention: PASI is now before this Court via petition for
review on certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman erred in
dismissing the complaint.
Issues:
1. Whether there exists a prejudicial question [Yes]
and, if in the affirmative,
2. Whether the dismissal of the complaint on that account is in
order. [No]
Elements of a prejudicial question (old)
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a
prejudicial question are:
a. the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and
b. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Rationale of the principle of prejudicial question
The rationale for the principle of prejudicial question is that
although it does not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused, it tests the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint or information in order to sustain
the further prosecution of the criminal case. Hence, the need
for its prior resolution before further proceedings in the criminal
action may be had.
Petitioner’s contention: PASI concedes that the issues in the civil
case are similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal case. It contends, however, that the resolution of the
issues in the civil case is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of Lichauco, it arguing that even if she is adjudged
liable for damages, it does not necessarily follow that she would
be convicted of the crime charged.
Determining the existence of a prejudicial question in the case
before the Ombudsman
To determine the existence of a prejudicial question in the case
before the Ombudsman, it is necessary to examine the elements
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for which Lichauco was charged and
the causes of action in the civil case.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which was earlier quoted has the
following elements:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or
official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them;
57

2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the
performance of his official duty or in relation to his public
position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private
party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to such parties.
The civil case against Lichauco, on the other hand, involves
three causes of action
1. For injunction – seeks to enjoin the award of orbital
slot 153 E, the DOTC having previously assigned the
same to PASI;
2. For declaration of nullity of award – seeks to nullify the
award given to the undisclosed bidder for being
beyond Lichauco’s authority; and
3. For damages – arising from Lichauco’s questioned
acts.
The finding by the Ombudsman of the existence of a
prejudicial question is well-taken
If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153 E is, in
the civil case, declared valid for being within Lichauco’s scope of
authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would
be no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for
undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. The
finding by the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial
question is thus well-taken.
When, in the course of the actions taken by those to whom the
complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial question is
found to be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
should be applied in a suppletory character.
Petitioner’s contention: Respecting the propriety of the
dismissal by the Ombudsman of the complaint due to the
pendency of a prejudicial question, PASI argues that since the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is silent on
the matter, the Rules of Court, specifically Section 6, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, applies in a suppletory character. It reads:
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon
the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may
be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting
the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.
Ombudsman’s contention: The Ombudsman, on the other hand,
argues that the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court
applies to cases which are at the preliminary or trial stage and
not to those, like the case subject of the present petition, at
the evaluation stage.
58
The Ombudsman goes on to proffer that at the evaluation stage,
the investigating officer may recommend any of several causes of
action including dismissal of the complaint for want of palpable
merit or subjecting the complaint to preliminary investigation, and
the evaluation of the complaint involves the discretion of the
investigating officer which this Court cannot interfere with.
While the evaluation of a complaint involves the discretion of the
investigating officer, its exercise should not be abused or wanting
in legal basis.
Rule II, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman reads:
Section 2. Evaluation. — Upon evaluating the complaint, the
investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:
a. dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b. referred to respondent for comment;
c. indorsed to the proper government office or agency which
has jurisdiction over the case;
d. forwarded to the appropriate office or official for
factfinding investigation;
e. referred for administrative adjudication; or
f. subjected to a preliminary investigation.
From the above-quoted provision, a complaint at the evaluation
stage may be dismissed outright only for want of palpable
merit.
Want of palpable merit obviously means that there is no basis
for the charge or charges. If the complaint has prima facie merit,
however, the investigating officer shall recommend the adoption
of any of the actions enumerated above from (b) to (f).
When, in the course of the actions taken by those to whom the
complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial question is
found to be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
should be applied in a suppletory character.
As laid down in Yap vs. Paras, said rule directs that the
proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that
it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of
the judge alone or as in this case, the investigating officer.
To give imprimatur to the Ombudsman’s dismissal of petitioner’s
criminal complaint due to prejudicial question would not only run
counter to the provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. It would sanction the extinguishment of criminal liability, if
there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis-à-vis
Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
Disposition: The Order dated July 17, 1998 of respondent
Ombudsman dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416 against
respondent then Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco is set aside.
The Ombudsman is ordered to reinstate to its docket for further
proceedings, in line with the foregoing ratiocination, OMB Case
No. 0-98-0416.
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PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL (2010)
In the case of Pimentel v. Pimentel, the criminal case was filed
ahead by the wife. Subsequent thereto, the husband filed a civil
case for the declaration of nullity of marriage. Now, in order that
the criminal case shall be suspended, there must be a petition or
motion that should be filed generally by the accused because if it
is his right, Constitutional right, to speedy trial, that would be
violated if the criminal case shall be held in abeyance. So, the
general rule is that it is given to the accused although the people
or the offended party may also seek a motion for the suspension
of the criminal proceedings, on the ground that there exists a
prejudicial question.
Facts:
Criminal case for frustrated parricide
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel
(petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to
Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
Civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC
Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome
of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal
case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
TC: It held that pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is
not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it.
CA: It ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated
parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the
marriage is still subsisting.
Ruling:
RULE: The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first
before the filing of the criminal action.
IN THIS CASE: The Information for Frustrated Parricide was
dated 30 August 2004. Petitioner was served summons in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. Respondent’s petition in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed
on 5 November 2004.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was
59
not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of
the criminal action.
The annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for parricide.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial
question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who
shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse”.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted,
will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
Disposition: The petition is denied.
CONSING, JR. vs. PEOPLE (2013)
Facts:
Loan obtained by petitioner from Unicapital, Inc.
Petitioner Rafael Consing, Jr. negotiated with and obtained for
himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz various loans totaling
P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc.
The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on
a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite
registered under the name of de la Cruz.
Unicapital, Inc. and Plus Builders’ purchase of said property
In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged
property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the
property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment
was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital
under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the
amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount
of P3,145,946.50.
The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders,
Inc., a joint venture partner of Unicapital.
Title to the property appeared to be spurious
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property,
they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No.
114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the
parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired
by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be
spurious.
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On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total
amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been
paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter
ignored the demands.
Pasig civil case filed by Consing for injunctive relief
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig
City Regional Trial Court (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief,
thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against
him for the collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground
that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
Unicapital’s Estafa case
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for
estafa through falsification of public document against
Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office.
Makati civil case or Unicapital’s suit for sum of money and
damages against Consing
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati
City for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for
estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in
Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was assigned to
Branch 60 (Makati criminal case).
Alleged existence of a prejudicial question
Petitioner’s contention: On February 15, 2001, Consing moved
to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the
ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the
pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases.
On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion for
deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19,
2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.
RTC PASIG AND MAKATI CASE: On November 26, 2001, the RTC
issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the
Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.
The State thus assailed in the CA the last 2 orders of the RTC in
the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari.
CA PASIG AND MAKATI CASE: On May 20, 2003, the CA
promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252, dismissing
the petition for certiorari and upholding the RTC’s questioned
orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite
and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case,
i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held liable in
the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or
60
innocence of private respondent Consing in both the Cavite and
Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati
criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal case show
that:
1. the parties are identical;
2. the transactions in controversy are identical;
3. the Transfer Certificate of Titles involved are identical;
4. the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical;
5. the dates in question are identical; and
6. the issue of private respondent’s culpability for the
questioned transactions is identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig
civil case identical to or intimately related to the criminal
cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the
parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/Mortgage
involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the
arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in view of
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party thereto,
did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial notice
of an official act of another judicial authority. It was also a better
legal tack to prevent multiplicity of action, to which our legal
system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private respondent’s
arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding
the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely, in
the Cavite criminal case.
Manila civil case or Plus Builder’s suit for damages against
Consing
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced
its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil Case No. 99-
95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).
Cavite criminal case or information for estafa against Consing
and de la Cruz
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through
falsification of public document was filed against Consing and
De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal case).
Petitioner’s contention: Consing filed a motion to defer the
arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases.
RTC CAVITE CASE: On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC
handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s motion. Later
on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
63712), seeking to enjoin his arraignment and trial in the Cavite
criminal case.
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CA CAVITE CASE: The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001,
and later promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001, granting
Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside the January 27,
2000 order of the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from
proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and
Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court
(G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of the May 31, 2001
decision of the CA.
SC: On January 16, 2003, the Court granted the petition for review
in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001
decision of the CA.
The Court ruled that Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such,
it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar.
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for
the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA:
• citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect
thatthe Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a
prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the
proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and
• claiming that under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig
and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question
that would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal
case.
Petitioner’s contention: Consing contended that the ruling in
G.R. No. 148193 was not binding because G.R. No. 148193
involved Plus Builders, which was different from Unicapital,
the complainant in the Makati criminal case.
He added:
• that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final
and executory, and could still be reversed at any time, and
thus should not control as a precedent to be relied upon; and
• that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his
mother and should not be held personally liable under a
contract that had involved property belonging to his mother
as his principal.
CA: On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing
itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193.
Petitioner’s additional contention: He posits that in arriving at
its amended decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of
the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a
prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil
action would include the issue of whether he had falsified a
certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the
resolution of either of which would determine his guilt or
innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
61
OSG: The OSG counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil
case as an independent civil action intended to exact civil
liability separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner
fully authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court.
It argues:
• that the CA correctly took cognizance of the ruling in G.R.
No. 148193, holding in its challenged amended decision that
the Makati civil case, just like the Manila civil case, was an
independent civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of
the Civil Code;
• that the Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question
that justified the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and
• that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case
did not also raise any prejudicial question, because the sole
issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his
mother, had any obligation or liability toward Unicapital.
Petitioner’s reply: Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that
he filed and Unicapital’s Makati civil case were not intended to
delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt
such resolution; and that such civil cases could be validly
considered determinative of whether a prejudicial question
existed to warrant the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Issue: Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension
of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling: The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely
meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding
in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the
Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig
civil case raised no prejudicial question.
That was wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully
applied to him due to the similarity between his case with Plus
Builders and his case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case
reveals that the action was predicated on fraud.
This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its
complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in
a “wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in
offering as security and later object of sale, a property which they
do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title.”
As such, the action was one that could proceed independently
of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code, which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
61
 62

An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue
physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the
Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.
Disposition: The Court affirms the amended decision
This was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
promulgated on August 18, 2003.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and
the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
CATERPILLAR, INC. vs. SAMSON (2016)
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Bersamin, J.
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the Facts: Before the Court are the consolidated cases of G.R. No.
independent civil action may be brought by the offended 205972 and G.R. No. 164352.
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no Caterpillar is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice and distribution of footwear, clothing and related items, among
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
others.
xxxx
Its products are known for six core trademarks, namely,
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and “CATERPILLAR,” “CAT,” “CATERPILLAR & DESIGN,” “CAT AND
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by DESIGN,” “WALKING MACHINES” and “TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR &
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is DESIGN (Core Marks)” all of which are alleged as internationally
an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. known.
As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
On the other hand, Samson, doing business under the names and
styles of Itti Shoes Corporation, Kolm’s Manufacturing
The Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the
Corporation and Caterpillar Boutique and General
resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed
Merchandise, is the proprietor of various retail outlets in the
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to
Philippines selling footwear, bags, clothing, and related items
apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital,
under the trademark “CATERPILLAR,” registered in 1997 under
for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different
Trademark Registration No. 64705 issued by the Intellectual
complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions
Property Office (IPO).
Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against
him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based
G.R. No. 164352
on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code.
On July 26, 2000, upon application of the National Bureau of
Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending
Investigation (NBI), the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, in
the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
Makati City issued Search Warrants Nos. 00-022 to 00-032,
inclusive, all for unfair competition, to search the establishments
Pasig civil case
owned, controlled and operated by Samson.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s
being a mere agent of his mother who should not be criminally
The implementation of the search warrants on July 27, 2000 led to
liable for having so acted due to the property involved having
the seizure of various products bearing Caterpillar’s Core Marks.
belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled in G.R.
No. 148193, to wit:
Caterpillar filed against Samson several criminal complaints for
unfair competition in the Department of Justice (DOJ), docketed
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would
justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
as I.S. Nos. 2000-1354 to 2000-1364, inclusive.
case (the Cavite criminal case).
Additionally, on July 31, 2000, Caterpillar commenced a civil
The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for action against Samson and his business entities, with the IPO
Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely as a nominal party — for Unfair Competition, Damages and
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Cancellation of Trademark with Application for Temporary
Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction —
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 of the RTC in Quezon
are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI
for the purchase of the disputed lot.
City.

Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his RTC in Civil Case: In said civil action, the RTC denied Caterpillar’s
mother in the transaction involving the sale of the application for the issuance of the TRO on August 17, 2000.
questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability.

62

DOJ: The DOJ, through Senior State Prosecutor Jude R. Romano,
issued a joint resolution dated November 15, 2001 recommending
that Samson be criminally charged with unfair competition under
Section 168.3(a), in relation to Section 123.1(e), Section 131.114 and
Section 170, all of Republic Act No. 8293, or the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines (IP Code).
However, because Samson and his affiliate companies allegedly
continued to sell and distribute products clothed with the general
appearance of its own products, Caterpillar again applied for
another set of search warrants against Samson and his businesses.
The RTC, Branch 172, in Valenzuela City issued Search Warrants
Nos. 12-V-00,16 13-V-00,17 20-V-0018 and 29-V-0019 upon
application of the NBI, by virtue of the implementation of which
several goods were seized and confiscated by the NBI agents.
As a consequence, Caterpillar filed 26 criminal complaints for
unfair competition on January 31, 2001, docketed as I.S. Nos.
2001-42 to 2001-67, against Samson and/or the occupants of his
affiliate entities before the DOJ.
In due course, the DOJ, through State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim,
issued a joint resolution dated September 28, 2001
recommending the filing of criminal complaints for unfair
competition under Section 168.3(a), in relation to Section 123.1,
Section 131.1 and Section 170 of the IP Code.
Accordingly, six criminal complaints were filed in the RTC,
Branch 256, in Muntinlupa City, presided by Judge Alberto L.
Lerma, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243.
On January 17 and 22, 2002, Samson filed petitions for review with
the Office of the Secretary of Justice to appeal the joint resolutions
in I.S. Nos. 2000-1354 to 2000-136422 and I.S. Nos. 2001-042
to 2001-067.
On May 30, 2002, Samson filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment
in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 243,24 citing the following as
grounds:
A. THERE EXISTS PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS PENDING
LITIGATION BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 90, IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-00-
41446 ENTITLED: “CATERPILLAR, INC., ET AL. V. ITTI
SHOES CORPORATION, ET AL.,” THE FINAL RESOLUTIONS
OF WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF THE
INSTANT CRIMINAL CASES.
B. ACCUSED HAS FILED PETITIONS FOR REVIEW WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ASSAILING THE RESOLUTIONS
OF THE CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR WHO CAUSED THE
FILING OF THE INSTANT CASES AND ARE STILL PENDING
THEREIN UP TO THE PRESENT.
DOJ on Samson’s petition for review: In the meanwhile, on July
10, 2002, the DOJ, through Secretary Hernando B. Perez, issued a
resolution denying Samson’s petition for review in I.S. Nos. 2000-
1354 to 2000-1364. Samson’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
63
RTC on Samson’s petition to suspend arraignment: On
September 23, 2002, Presiding Judge Lerma of the RTC granted
Samson’s Motion to Suspend Arraignment, and suspended the
arraignment and all other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-
240 to 02-243 until Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 was finally
resolved, holding:
After a careful scrutiny of the case, this Court finds that
private complainant, in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, seeks
for the cancellation of the trademark “CATERPILLAR”
which is registered in the name of the accused and to
prevent the latter from using the said trademark
(“CATERPILLAR”), while the issue in the instant case is the
alleged unlawful use by the accused of the trademark
“CATERPILLAR” which is claimed to be owned by the
private complainant.
From the foregoing, this Court believes that there exists a
prejudicial question since the determination of who is
really the lawful or registered user of the trademark
“CATERPILLAR” will ultimately determine whether or not
the instant criminal action shall proceed.
Clearly, the issues raised in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 is
similar or intimately related to the issue in the case at bar
for if the civil case will be resolved sustaining the
trademark registration of the accused for the trademark
CATERPILLAR, then the latter would have all the authority
to continue the use of the said trademark as a
consequence of a valid registration, and by reason of
which there may be no more basis to proceed with the
instant criminal action.
After the RTC denied its motion for reconsideration, Caterpillar
elevated the matter to the CA docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
75526 entitled Caterpillar, Inc. v. Hon. Alberto L. Lerma, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of the Regional Trial
Court, Muntinlupa City, and Manalo P. Samson, alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the RTC in suspending the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243 on the
ground of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question in Civil
Case No. Q-00-41446 then pending in the RTC in Quezon City
whose resolution would determine the outcome of the criminal
cases.
DOJ: Meanwhile, on January 13, 2003, Acting Justice Secretary Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez reversed and set aside the resolution
issued by State Prosecutor Lim in I.S. No. 2001-042 to 2001-067,
and directed the Chief State Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal
of the criminal informations filed against Samson in court,
disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed joint resolution is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Chief State Prosecutor is directed to
forthwith cause the withdrawal of the informations filed in
court against respondent Manolo P. Samson and to report
action taken hereon within ten (10) days from receipts hereof.
63

Acting Justice Secretary Gutierrez based her resolution on the
order dated June 26, 2001, whereby the RTC of Valenzuela City,
Branch 172, had quashed the 26 search warrants upon motion of
Samson.
Consequently, the goods seized and confiscated by virtue of the
quashed search warrants could no longer be admitted in evidence.
TC: Correspondingly, Presiding Judge Lerma of the RTC ordered
the withdrawal of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-240 to 02-243 on
February 4, 2003.
Aggrieved, Caterpillar assailed the order of Judge Lerma for the
withdrawal of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-240 to 02-243 by petition
for certiorari in the CA on October 16, 2003, docketed as CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 79937.
CA: The CA ultimately granted the petition for certiorari, setting
aside the assailed January 13, 2003 resolution of the Acting
Justice Secretary and directing the refiling of the withdrawn
informations against Samson.
The Court ultimately affirmed the CA’s decision through the
resolution promulgated on October 17, 2005 in G.R. No. 169199,
and ruling that probable cause existed for the refiling of the
criminal charges for unfair competition under the IP Code.
In the assailed January 21, 2004 decision, the CA dismissed
Caterpillar’s petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 75526.
Caterpillar sought the reconsideration of the dismissal, but the CA
denied the motion.
Hence, Caterpillar appealed the CA’s decision in C.A. G.R. S.P. No.
75526 (G.R. No. 164352).
G.R. No. 205972
In the meanwhile, in August 2002, upon receiving the information
that Samson and his affiliate entities continuously sold and
distributed products bearing Caterpillar’s Core Marks without
Caterpillar’s consent, the latter requested the assistance of the
Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division of the National
Capital Region Public Police (RIID-NCRPO) for the conduct of an
investigation.
Subsequently, after the investigation, the RIID-NCRPO applied for
and was granted 16 search warrants against various outlets owned
or operated by Samson in Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Manila,
Caloocan, Makati, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Pampanga and Cavite.
The warrants were served on August 27, 2002, and as the result
products bearing Caterpillar’s Core Marks were seized and
confiscated.
Consequently, on the basis of the search warrants issued by the
various courts, Caterpillar again instituted criminal complaints in
the DOJ for violation of Section 168.3(a), in relation to Sections
131.3, 123.1(e) and 170 of the IP Code against Samson, docketed
as I.S. Nos. 2002-995 to 2002-997; 2002-999 to 2002-1010;
and 2002-1036.
64
DOJ: After the conduct of the preliminary investigation, the DOJ,
through State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad, issued a joint resolution
dated August 21, 2003 dismissing the complaint upon finding that
there was no probable cause to charge Samson with unfair
competition.
Caterpillar moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal, but
State Prosecutor Abad denied the motion.
The Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
through the resolution issued on September 19, 2005, and denied
Caterpillar’s motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, Caterpillar appealed to the CA through a petition for
review under Rule 43, Rules of Court (C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 102316).
On May 8, 2012, however, the CA denied due course to
Caterpillar’s petition for review, and hence, dismissed it.
Caterpillar filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied
the motion for its lack of merit.
Hence, Caterpillar commenced G.R. No. 205972.
G.R. No. 164352
Petitioner’s contentions: Caterpillar posits that:
• the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-
238 to 02-243 was contrary to Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
Article 33 of the Civil Code on independent civil actions,
and Section 170 of the IP Code, which specifically provides that
the criminal penalties for unfair competition were
independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed
by law;
• the determination of the lawful owner of the
“CATERPILLAR” trademark in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446
would not be decisive of the guilt of Samson for unfair
competition in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243
because registration was not an element of the crime of
unfair competition;
• the civil case sought to enforce Samson’s civil liability arising
from the IP Code while the criminal cases would enforce
Samson’s liability arising from the crime of unfair competition;
and
• the Court already ruled in Samson v. Daway that Civil Case
No. Q-00-41446 was an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code and, as such, could proceed
independently of the criminal actions.
Respondent’s comment: Samson counters that the issues of the
lawful and registered owner of the trademark, the true owner of
the goodwill, and whether “CATERPILLAR” was an internationally
well-known mark are intimately related to the issue of guilt in the
criminal actions, the resolution of which should determine
whether or not the criminal actions for unfair competition could
proceed.
G.R. No. 205972
64

Caterpillar seeks the liberal interpretation of procedural rules in
order to serve the higher interest of substantial justice following
the denial by the CA of its petition for being an incorrect remedy;
and insists that it presented substantial evidence to warrant a
finding of probable cause for unfair competition against Samson.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in ruling
that the trial court a quo did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in suspending the criminal proceedings on account
of a prejudicial question;
2. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in
upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice finding that
there was no probable cause to charge Samson with unfair
competition.
Ruling:
G.R. No. 164352
The appeal in G.R. No. 164352 is meritorious.
The Court notes, to begin with, that Civil Case No. Q-00-41446,
the civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City, was for
unfair competition, damages and cancellation of trademark,
while Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 were the criminal
prosecution of Samson for unfair competition.
A common element of all such cases for unfair competition —
civil and criminal — was fraud.
Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the
injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution.
In view of its being an independent civil action, Civil Case No.
Q-00-41446 did not operate as a prejudicial question that
justified the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-02-108043-44 as there is no prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
In fact, this issue has already been raised in relation to the
suspension of the arraignment of Samson in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-02-108043-44 in Samson v. Daway, and the Court resolved it
against Samson and in favor of Caterpillar thusly:
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his
claim that there was a prejudicial question. In his petition, he
prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which
sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and
other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44.
For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support
of said prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he
attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor
quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a
prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently
65
of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence.
IN THIS CASE: The common element in the acts constituting
unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud.
Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party.
Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted by private
respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent
civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of
the criminal cases at bar.
A civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot
be considered a prejudicial question by which to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair competition.
A prejudicial question is that which arises in a civil case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issues to be
determined in the criminal case. It must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action
will necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
As stated in Librodo v. Judge Coscolluela, Jr.:
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that
it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play
generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7
of Rule 111, Rules of Court, to wit:
a. a previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar to
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and
b. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
In the suit for the cancellation of trademark, the issue of
lawful registration should necessarily be determined, but
65

registration was not a consideration necessary in unfair
competition.
An examination of the nature of the two kinds of cases involved is
necessary to determine whether a prejudicial question existed.
An action for the cancellation of trademark like Civil Case No.
Q-00-41446 is a remedy available to a person who believes that
he is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark.
On the other hand, the criminal actions for unfair competition
(Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44) involved the
determination of whether or not Samson had given his goods
the general appearance of the goods of Caterpillar, with the
intent to deceive the public or defraud Caterpillar as his
competitor.
Indeed, unfair competition is committed if the effect of the act is
“to pass off to the public the goods of one man as the goods of
another”; it is independent of registration. As fittingly put in R.F.
& Alexander & Co. v. Ang, “one may be declared unfair competitor
even if his competing trademark is registered.”
Clearly, the determination of the lawful ownership of the
trademark in the civil action was not determinative of whether or
not the criminal actions for unfair competition shall proceed
against Samson.
JURIDICAL CAPACITY AND CAPACITY TO ACT.
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY TO ACT (ARTICLES 38 TO
39).
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a
deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements.
Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or
limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being
a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage,
absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules
of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on
account of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified
for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law.
BIRTH, PRESUMPTIVE OR PRESUMED PERSONALITY OF
AN UNBORN CHILD.
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article.
66
QUIMIGUING vs. ICAO (1970)
Facts: Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents,
sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was averred:
• that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close
and confidential relations;
• that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having
carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and
intimidation, and without her consent;
• that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and
drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop
studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and
attorney’s fees.
Defendant’s contention: Duly summoned, defendant Icao
moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint
did not allege that the child had been born.
TC: After hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant’s
motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege
that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's
objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the
plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
Ruling: The Court finds the appealed orders of the court below to
be untenable.
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable
to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its
progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only “en ventre de sa mere;” just
as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations
as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being
ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of
a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir,
even if such child should be born after the death of the testator
(Article 854, Civil Code).
“Article 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn
children may be accepted by those persons who would legally
represent them if they were already born.”
“Article 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
66

“If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator,
the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right
of representation.”
It is thus clear that the lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the
Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children, “does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn,” violates Article 40, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it” adds
further “provided it be born later with the conditions, specified in
the following article” (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it
is completely delivered from the mother’s womb).
This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right
of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40
would become entirely useless and ineffective.
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for
a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
(as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a
clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines:
“Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same
Code:
“Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28
................................................................ .”
Thus, independently of the right to support of the child she was
carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages
under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it
for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
Disposition: Orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let
the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao.
WHEN CHILD IS CONSIDERED BORN.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it
is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life
of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within
twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the
maternal womb.
67
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs.
MONTAÑO (2009)
Facts: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation and a member of respondent
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and
the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
“x x x x
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to
grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of
death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse,
children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan—7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila—11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The
Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the
employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employee’s legitimate
dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the
employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents,
brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be
presented (e.g. death certificate).”
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child.
Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature
delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy.
According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006,
the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary
to uteroplacental insufficiency.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for
paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave
and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance.
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of
Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the
Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA.
67

Arbitration by the NCMB
Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to
settle their dispute, prompting the Union to file a Notice to
Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
National Capital Region (NCR). In a Submission Agreement dated
9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for
voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was
entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3
of the CBA.
The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA.
The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII,
Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the
dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death
could be covered by the CBA death benefits.
The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel
Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation
(Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under
similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan
(Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also
prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the
delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement
leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his
union and Mayer Steel.
Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before
labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38
weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
Continental Steel’s sister companies
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer
Steel are located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and
the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the
CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA
with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which
provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts
shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for
the laborer.
Petitioner’s contention: On the other hand, Continental Steel
posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without
legal personality.
68
It claimed that there are 2 elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely:
1. death and
2. status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in
Hortillano’s case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil
Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die.
Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired
juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the
moment of delivery was not a person at all.
Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that
never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered
dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed
any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was
clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the
terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof
were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure
of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of
dependent, as used in the CBA—the death of whom would have
qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other
death benefits—bound the Union to the legally accepted
definition of the latter term.
It averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister
companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union,
were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and
distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union
sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other
death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn
child constituted “company practice.”
Arbitrator’s resolution
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano
was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death
benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said
benefits, thus:
“This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of
bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as
provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present:
1. there is “death”;
2. such death must be of employee’s “dependent”; and
3. such dependent must be “legitimate.”
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and
accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4,
paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements
must be present:
1. there is “death”;
2. such death must be of employee’s “dependent”;
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3. such dependent must be “legitimate”; and
4. proper legal document to be presented.”
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of
an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the
right to be supported by the parents from the very moment
he/she was conceived.
The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not
have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid
of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.
Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she
died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that
Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their
dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner’s claim: Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño
erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with
pay and other death benefits because no death of an
employee’s dependent had occurred.
The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was
excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was
contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and
not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical
personality.
Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered
by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase
legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could
only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such
appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for
Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA were lacking.
CA: It affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November
2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
“[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal
sense in which the term “death” is used in the CBA fails to
impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the
purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death
benefits thereunder, is intended to serve.
While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned
on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such
event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a “death” as to be covered by the CBA
provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to
the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in
a legitimate relation.
[Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical
significance to the term “death of a legitimate dependent” as
condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits
under the CBA. Following Continental Steel’s theory, there
can be no experience of “death” to speak of.
69
The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus
simply cannot be equated with anything less than “loss of
human life”, especially for the expectant parents.
In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to
assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend
to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal
status or personality upon the unborn child. Continental Steel’s
insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical
purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.”
In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of Continental Steel. Hence, this petition, in which
Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death
should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and
a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
Ruling: The Court is not persuaded.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of
Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and
unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying
Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the
terms “death” and “dependent” as used in the CBA.
If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous,
then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same.
Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither
management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms
for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the
negotiation of the CBA.
Articles 40, 41, 42
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article
40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when
it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death.
The issue of civil personality is not relevant
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles
40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be
applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first
of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
“Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and
is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power
to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.”
The Court need not establish civil personality of the unborn
child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act
as a person are not in issue.
It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired
any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that
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were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights
to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant
case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon
the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide
at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly
state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could
die.
Death, defined.
Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent
under the CBA.
As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies
on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself
without the power or aid of someone else.”
Under said general definition, even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have
reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending
upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance.
Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the
dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been born or must
have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers.
Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in
its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the
mother’s womb.
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the aforecited
jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches
upon his/her conception.
IN THIS CASE: It was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife
were validly married and that their child was conceived during said
marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to
comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and
accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the
death certificate of his unborn child.
70
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave
and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims
for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
The Court emphasizes that bereavement leave and other death
benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible,
lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered
the loss of a loved one.
It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising
from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less
than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on
bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof.
Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in
case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision
affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the
same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in
favor of labor.
Disposition: The petition is denied. The decision dated 27
February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated
20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan
S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano
bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the
amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos
(P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn
child, are affirmed.
DEATH EXTINGUISHES CIVIL PERSONALITY.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
who are juridical persons.
Article 44. The following are juridical persons:
1. The State and its political subdivisions;
2. Other corporations, institutions, and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins
as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
3. Corporations, partnerships, and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner, or member.
MAYOR vs. TIU & MARTY (2016)
Mendoza, J.
Facts: On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan, the
widow of the late Primo Villasin, passed away and left a
holographic Last Will and Testament, wherein she named her
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sister, Remedios Tiu, and her niece, Manuela Azucena Mayor,
as executors.
Probate proceedings by Remedios and Manuela
Immediately thereafter, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition
for the probate of Rosario’s holographic will with prayer for the
issuance of letters testamentary. The petition was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City and docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 2008-05-30. They averred that Rosario left properties
valued at approximately P2.5 million.
Petition for letters of administration by Marty
On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito Marty claiming
to be the adopted daughter of Rosario, filed a petition for letters
of administration before the RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban City,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-32, but it was not given due
course because of the probate proceedings. Per records, this
dismissal is subject of a separate proceeding filed by Marty with
the CA Cebu City, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 04003.
RTC found probate petition to be sufficient
On June 12, 2008, in its Order, the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition for
probate of will filed by Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in form
and substance and set the case for hearing.
Marty’s motion
Marty’s contentions: Consequently, Marty filed her Verified
Urgent Manifestation and Motion, dated June 23, 2008, stating
that Remedios kept the decedent Rosario a virtual hostage for
the past ten years and her family was financially dependent
on her which led to the wastage and disposal of the properties
owned by her and her husband, Primo.
Marty averred that until the alleged will of the decedent could be
probated and admitted, Remedios and her 10 children had no
standing to either possess or control the properties comprising
the estate of the Villasins.
She prayed for the probate court to:
1. order an immediate inventory of all the properties
subject of the proceedings;
2. direct the tenants of the estate, namely, Mercury Drug
and Chowking, located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit
their rentals with the court;
3. direct Metrobank, P. Burgos Branch, to freeze the
accounts in the name of Rosario, Primrose
Development Corporation or Remedios; and
4. lock up the Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the
property until final disposition by the court.
Remedios and Manuela’s comment: On July 8, 2008, Remedios
and Manuela filed their Comment/Opposition averring that:
1. Marty was not an adopted child of the Villasins based on
a certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court
of Tacloban City, attesting that no record of any adoption
proceedings involving Marty existed in their records.
2. the probate court had no jurisdiction over the
properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of
Rosario’s estate because these properties were
71
actually owned by, and titled in the name of,
Primrose.
3. anent the prayer to direct the tenants to deposit the
rentals to the probate court, the probate court had no
jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons,
particularly by Primrose, the latter having a separate
and distinct personality from the decedent’s estate.
Marty’s reply: Marty cited an order of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte in S.P. No. 1239, claiming that as early as March 3, 1981,
the veil of corporate entity of Primrose was pierced on the
ground that it was a closed family corporation controlled by
Rosario after Primo’s death.
Thus, Marty alleged that “piercing” was proper in the case of
Rosario’s estate because the incorporation of Primrose was
founded on a fraudulent consideration, having been done in
contemplation of Primo’s death.
Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the Petition for the
Approval of the Will of the Late Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan,
Marty impugned the authenticity of her holographic will.
Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu, a son of Remedios, also filed his
Opposition, dated June 13, 2008.
After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties submitted
their respective memoranda.
January 14, 2009 Order
RTC Branch 9: The RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion of Marty and
appointed the OIC Clerk of Court as special administrator of the
Estate.
The Probate Court also ordered Mercury Drug and Chowking
to deposit the rental income to the court and Metrobank to
freeze the bank accounts mentioned in the motion of Marty.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was applied in the
case considering that Rosario had no other properties that
comprised her estate other than Primrose.
According to the probate court, for the best interest of whoever
would be adjudged as the legal heirs of the Estate, it was best to
preserve the properties from dissipation.
Remedios and Manuela’s motion for inhibition and motion for
reconsideration
On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion
for Inhibition on the ground of their loss of trust and confidence
in RTC-Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio C. Sescon to dispense justice.
Later, they also filed their Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam,
dated February 3, 2009, arguing that Rosario’s estate consisted
only of shares of stock in Primrose and not the corporation
itself. Thus, the probate court could not order the lessees of the
corporation to remit the rentals to the Estate’s administrator.
With regard to the appointment of a special administrator,
Remedios and Manuela insisted that it be recalled. They claimed
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that if ever there was a need to appoint one, it should be the two
of them because it was the desire of the decedent in the will
subject of the probation proceedings.
March 27, 2009 Order
RTC Branch 9 MFR: The RTC-Br. 9 denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed its January 14, 2009
Order. The presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also granted the
motion for inhibition and ordered that the records of the case be
referred to the RTC Executive Judge for re-raffling. The case was
later re-raffled to RTC-Br. 6, Judge Alphinor C. Serrano, presiding
judge.
Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration,
Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
in Cebu City, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 04254, assailing the
January 14, 2009 and March 27, 2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9.
CA: In its October 16, 2009 Decision, the CA reversed the assailed
orders of the RTC-Br. 9, except as to the appointment of a special
administrator insofar as this relates to properties specifically
belonging to the “Estate.”
It held that Primrose had a personality separate and distinct
from the estate of the decedent and that the probate court had
no jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders of the probate
court was it stated that its determination of the title of the
questioned properties was only for the purpose of determining
whether such properties ought to be included in the inventory.
When the probate court applied the doctrine of “piercing,” in
effect, it adjudicated with finality the ownership of the properties
in favor of the Estate.
The CA stated that RTC-Br. 9 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
ownership of a property claimed by another based on adverse
title; and that questions like this must be submitted to a court of
general jurisdiction and not to a probate court.
The CA added that assuming that the probate court’s
determination on the issue of ownership was merely intended to
be provisional, Marty’s contentions still had no merit.
The properties, which she claimed to be part of the estate of
Rosario and over which she claimed co-ownership, comprised of
real properties registered under the Torrens system.
As such, Primrose was considered the owner until the titles to
those properties were nullified in an appropriate ordinary
action.
The CA further stated that the RTC erroneously relied on the order
issued by the CFI Leyte in 1981, in the probate proceedings
involving the estate of Primo. Whatever determination the CFI
made at the time regarding the title of the properties was
merely provisional, hence, not conclusive as to the ownership.
Remedios and Manuela’s motion
72
By reason of the favorable decision by the CA, Remedios and
Manuela filed their Motion to Partially Revoke the Writ of
Execution Enforcing the January 14, 2009 Order of the Honorable
Court and Manifestation in Compliance with the October 21, 2009
Order (Ad Cautelam), dated October 27, 2009.
RTC Branch 6: In its Order, dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-
Br. 6 partially granted the motion as it revoked the power of the
special administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of
Primrose.
It also revoked the order with respect to Mercury Drug and
Chowking, reasoning out that the said establishments dealt
with Primrose, which had a personality distinct and separate
from the estate of the decedent.
In the said order, Atty. Blanche A. Salino nominated by
oppositors Marty and Edwin, was appointed special
administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of the estate.
The same order also upheld the January 14, 2009 Order, as to the
conduct and inventory of all the properties comprising the estate.
This order was not questioned or appealed by the parties.
Omnibus motion
On September 24, 2010, or almost ten months after the November
17, 2009 Order of the probate court was issued, Marty, together
with her new counsel, filed her Omnibus Motion, praying for the
probate court to:
1. order Remedios and Manuela to render an accounting of
all the properties and assets comprising the estate of the
decedent;
2. deposit or consign all rental payments or other passive
income derived from the properties comprising the
estate; and
3. prohibit the disbursement of funds comprising the estate
of the decedent without formal motion and approval by
the probate court.
RTC Branch 6: In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6
granted Marty’s Omnibus Motion. Although it agreed with the
October 16, 2009 CA Decision reversing the January 14, 2009
Order of the RTC-Br. 9, nonetheless, it acknowledged the urgency
and necessity of appointing a special administrator.
According to the probate court, considering that there was clear
evidence of a significant decrease of Rosario’s shares in the
outstanding capital stock of Primrose, prudence dictated that an
inquiry into the validity of the transfers should be made.
A final determination of this matter would be outside the limited
jurisdiction of the probate court, but it was likewise settled that
the power to institute an action for the recovery of a property
claimed to be part of the estate was normally lodged with the
executor or administrator. Thus, the probate court disposed that,
for the reasons aforestated, and so as not to render moot any
action that the special administrator, or the regular administrator
upon the latter’s qualification and appointment, may deem
appropriate to take on the matter (i.e., Whether or not to institute
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in the name of the estate the appropriate action for the recovery
of the shares of stock), the court hereby grants Oppositor Marty’s
Omnibus Motion, dated September 24, 2010, and thus hereby:
1. DIRECTS petitioners, either individually or jointly, to:
a. RENDER AN ACCOUNTING of all the properties and
assets comprising the estate of the decedent that may
have come into their possession; and (b) DEPOSIT OR
CONSIGN all the rentals payments or such other
passive incomes from the properties and as sets
registered in the name of Primrose Development
Corporation, including all income derived from
the Primrose Hotel and the lease contracts with
Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, both
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order;
2. DIRECTS the Special Administrator to take possession and
charge of the properties comprising the decedent’s estate,
specially those pertaining to the sharesholding of the decedent
in Primrose Development Corporation, to determine whether or
not action for the recovery of the shares of stock supposedly
transferred from the decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu,
Manuela Azucena Mayor should be instituted in the name of the
estate against the said transferees and to submit a Report on
the foregoing matters to this Court, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Order; and
3. ORDERS that no funds comprising the estate of the decedent
shall be disbursed without formal Motion therefor, with the
conformity of the Special Administrator, duly approved by this
Court.
The partial motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by
Remedios and Manuela was denied in the other assailed order of
the RTC--Br. 6, dated June 10, 2011.
Remedios and Manuela’s action for certiorari
Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65, and filed a petition before the
CA.
CA: In its October 5, 2011 Resolution, dismissed the same based
on the following infirmities:
1. there was no proper proof of service of a copy of the
petition on the respondents which was sent by registered
mail;
2. petitioners failed to indicate on the petition the material
date when the motion for reconsideration was filed;
3. the copy of the assailed order was not certified true and
correct by the officer having custody of the original copy;
and
4. the serial number of the commission of the notary public,
the province-city where he was commissioned, the office
address of the notary public and the roll of attorney’s
number were not properly indicated on the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping.
CA MFR: Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of
the assailed CA resolution, but to no avail, as the appellate court
denied the motion in its September 24, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by Manuela as
Remedios had also passed away.
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In his Manifestation, dated May 29, 2013, Edwin affirmed that he
and Manuela decided to patch up their differences and agreed to
settle amicably. Accordingly, he manifested that he was
withdrawing from the case pursuant to their agreement.
On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction on the ground that a flurry of orders had been issued
by the RTC-Br. 6 in the implementation of the assailed January 20,
2011 Order, such as the Order, dated May 27, 2013, wherein the
probate court vaguely ordered “the inventory of the exact extent of
the ‘decedent’s estate.’”
Then another order was issued appointing an auditing firm to
conduct an inventory/audit of the Estate including the rentals
and earnings derived from the lease of Mercury Drug and
Chowking Restaurant, as tenants of Primrose.
Petitioner’s assertion: According to petitioner Manuela,
although an inventory of the assets of the decedent was proper,
the probate court ordered an inventory of the assets of
Primrose, a separate and distinct entity. Manuela asserts that it
was clearly in error.
In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, dated June
17, 2013, Manuela informed the Court that the inventory and
accounting of Primrose would already commence on June 19,
2013.
Marty’s opposition: She stated that the petition of Manuela had
been rendered moot and academic as the probate court had
declared her as the sole heir of Rosario and appointed her
administrator of the estate.
She argued that an injunctive relief would work injustice to the
estate because of the total assimilation by petitioner of the
shareholdings of the decedent in Primrose and her share in the
corporation’s income corresponding to her shareholdings.
TRO in favor of Manuela
Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief were
present, the Court issued the TRO in favor of Manuela on October
14, 2013.
At the outset, the Court was convinced that the rights of Primrose
sought to be protected by the grant of injunctive relief were
material and substantial and the TRO was issued in order to
prevent any irreparable damage to a corporate entity that could
arise from the conduct of an accounting by the court-appointed
inventory.
Ruling: The Court now resolves the subject case by the issuance
of a permanent injunction, as prayed for by petitioner Manuela.
This position is supported by law and jurisprudence, as follows:
FIRST.
Who or what are artificial persons
Artificial persons include:
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1. a collection or succession of natural persons forming a
corporation; and
2. a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties.
This class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent
in our law. Example is the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical person separate
and distinct from the person of the decedent and any other
corporation
From this pronouncement, it can be gleaned that the estate of the
deceased person is a juridical person separate and distinct from
the person of the decedent and any other corporation.
This status of an estate comes about by operation of law. This is
in consonance with the basic tenet under corporation law that a
corporation has a separate personality distinct from its
stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be
connected.
SECOND.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no relevant
application in this case.
Under the said doctrine, the court looks at the corporation as a
mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of persons
undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate
juridical personality of the corporation unifying the group.
Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two business
enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same
parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the
rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two
corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or as
one and the same.
Purpose of piercing behind the corporate veil
The purpose behind piercing a corporation’s identity is to remove
the barrier between the corporation and the persons comprising
it to thwart the fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use
the corporate personality as a shield for undertaking certain
proscribed activities.
IN THIS CASE: Instead of holding the decedent’s interest in the
corporation separately as a stockholder, the situation was
reversed. Instead, the probate court ordered the lessees of the
corporation to remit rentals to the estate’s administrator without
taking note of the fact that the decedent was not the absolute
owner of Primrose but only an owner of shares thereof.
Ownership of a single stockholder of a corporation is not a
reason to disregard the separateness of the two personalities
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation
of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of
itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities. Moreover, to disregard the separate
juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing cannot be
presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly established.
THIRD.
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A probate court is not without limits in the determination of
the scope of property covered in probate proceedings.
In a litany of cases, the Court had defined the parameters by which
a probate court may extend its probing arms in the determination
of the question of title in probate proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, the Court explained that, as a rule, the question
of ownership was an extraneous matter which the probate court
could not resolve with finality.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should, or should not, be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
RULE:
A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be part of the estate but are also claimed
to belong to outside parties as it can only determine whether
they should, or should not, be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be overseen by the administrator
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate but
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties.
It can only determine whether they should, or should not, be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen by
the administrator.
If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort
to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Respondent’s contention: Respondent Marty argues that the
subject properties and the parcel of land on which these were
erected should be included in the inventory of Rosario’s estate.
More so, the arrears from the rental of these properties were later
on ordered to be remitted to the administrator of the estate
grounded on the allegation that Rosario had no other properties
other than her interests in Primrose.
HELD:
The subject land is registered under the Torrens system in the
name of Primrose, a third person
To the Court’s mind, this holding of the probate court was in utter
disregard of the undisputed fact the subject land is registered
under the Torrens system in the name of Primrose, a third person
who may be prejudiced by the orders of the probate court.
In Valera v. Inserto, the Court stated:
x x x, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but
limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless
the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the
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property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of
the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the
interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the
reason for the exception being that the question of whether or
not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as
a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality
not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving
a mode of practice which may be waived.
x x x These considerations assume greater cogency where,
as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the
decedent’s names but in others, a situation on which this
Court has already had occasion to rule.
The probate court should have recognized the incontestability
accorded to the Torrens title of Primrose over Marty’s
arguments of possible dissipation of properties.
In fact, in the given setting, even evidence purporting to support
a claim of ownership has to yield to the incontestability of a
Torrens title, until after the same has been set aside in the manner
indicated in the law itself.
In other words, the existence of a Torrens title may not be
discounted as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Put clearly, if a
property covered by Torrens title is involved:
“the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given
due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence
to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as
in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title.”
Additionally, Presidential Decree No. 1529 proscribes a collateral
attack on a Torrens title:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
In Cuizon v. Ramolete, the property subject of the controversy was
duly registered under the Torrens system. To this, Court
categorically stated:
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question
was in the possession of third parties and more important,
covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of
such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the
property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their
possession and ownership of the property. x x x
IN THIS CASE: There was no compelling evidence presented to
substantiate the position of Marty that Rosario and Primrose
were one and the same, justifying the inclusion of the latter’s
properties in the inventory of the decedent’s properties.
A perusal of the records of this case would show that no
compelling evidence was ever presented to substantiate the
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position of Marty that Rosario and Primrose were one and the
same, justifying the inclusion of the latter’s properties in the
inventory of the decedent’s properties.
This has remained a vacant assertion. At most, what Rosario
owned were shares of stock in Primrose. In turn, this boldly
underscores the fact that Primrose is a separate and distinct
personality from the estate of the decedent.
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the
estate of Rosario are in the possession of, and are registered in
the name of, Primrose, Marty’s claims are bereft of any logical
reason and conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.
FOURTH.
The probate court in this case has not acquired jurisdiction
over Primrose and its properties and thus, Primrose may not
be the subject of the court’s process of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction.
RULE: Before the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil may
be applied, it is imperative that the court must first have
jurisdiction over the corporation.
Piercing the veil of corporate entity applies to determination of
liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine
established liability. It is not available to confer on the court a
jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not
impleaded in a case.
This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction comes to play only during the trial of the case after the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over the corporation.
Hence, before this doctrine can be even applied, based on the
evidence presented, it is imperative that the court must first have
jurisdiction over the corporation.
Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject
to the court’s process of piercing the veil of its corporate
fiction. Resultantly, any proceedings taken against the
corporation and its properties would infringe on its right to due
process.
IN THIS CASE: The probate court applied the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil ratiocinating that Rosario had no other
properties that comprise her estate other than her shares in
Primrose.
Although the probate court’s intention to protect the decedent’s
shares of stock in Primrose from dissipation is laudable, it is still
an error to order the corporation’s tenants to remit their
rental payments to the estate of Rosario.
Permanent and final injunction is in order
Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds that a
permanent and final injunction is in order in accordance with
Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides that “if after
the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to
have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the
court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party
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or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act

or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.”

Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to suffer an irreparable injury from

the subject order of the probate court.

Disposition: The petition is granted. The Temporary Restraining

Order, dated June 14, 2013, is hereby made permanent, effective
immediately. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, is
enjoined from enforcing and implementing its January 20, 2011
and June 10, 2011 Orders, insofar as the corporate properties of
Primrose Development Corporation are concerned, to avert
irreparable damage to a corporate entity, separate and distinct
from the Estate of Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan.

FIN.

NOTE AND DISCLAIMER

Note: THIS SET OF DIGESTS IS INCOMPLETE.

The text in gray are taken from my transcription of the review given by
Ma’am G last year, so those are practically Ma’am’s words.

Please do not give this set of digests to other people without my

permission… kasi medyo nahihiya ako. HAHAHA. Pero baka matulungan ka nito. Pero if hindi,
okay lang. At least I tried to help. Charot. XD

Disclaimer: Dili ko bright… but I tried my best (???) this time ☹

These “digests” are not really “digests”, because as you can see, they are
not short, at all. They are almost a copy of the full text of the cases only
that they are arranged in a way, which, I find, makes it easier for me to read
and comprehend such cases.

Pero these digests, are in no way, perfect, nor a replacement of the full text
because reading the full text would always be the best and the most ideal
thing to do.

Thank you for reading this portion. 😊

Fall down seven times, stand up eight.

Good luck to us!!!

♥,

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