Scunak Corporation and Alfonso Enriquez v. Roberto and c.
c. WON there was bad on faith on the part of Scunak (YES
Caesar Sylianteng (2014)
FACTS:
(1) Petitioners and respondents are both claiming
ownership of two parcels of land (1250sqm and 990sqm)
located along Wilson Street, San Juan City.
a. Scunak et al – claim that the lands were sold to them
by the sole heir (Ramon Pultaje) who inherited from the
original developer
b. Syliantengs – claim that the original developer
executed deeds of sale in favor of their mother who later
transferred it to them.
(2) RTC ruled in favor of Scunak et al. CA reversed and
ruled for Sylianteng.
(3) SC took cognizance of the case despite dealing with
questions of fact because of the conflicting decisions of the
lower courts.
ISSUE:
(1) Evidence: Petitioners claim that the duplicate/carbon
copy of the Deed of Sale in favor of Sylianteng violated the
best evidence rule R130.3. They also question its
authenticity in general. (SC – best evidence rule doesn’t
apply)
(2) Side issues:
a. WON the entry in the registrar of deeds was falsified
(NO)
b. WON civil code provision on double sale applies (NO)
– they were aware of the prior DOAs)
SC: Best evidence rule doesn’t apply | Notarization proof of
due execution and authenticity
(1) Best evidence rule only applies when the content of a
document is the subject of inquiry, NOT where the issue was
due execution, authenticity, or existence of the document.
In the latter situations, testimonial evidence may be
admissible even without the original.
(2) Notarization is evidence of authenticity and due
execution. A notarized instrument is admissible even
without further proof of its due execution since notarization
is:
a. Conclusive as the truthfulness of its contents
b. Enjoys the presumption of regularity.
(3) CAB:
a. Petitioners failed to present convincing evidence of
any irregularity in the notarization that would strip the DOAs
of their public character.
b. Petitioners likewise did not dispute the fact that the
carbon copies were duplicates of the original. – “It is settled
that a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document
executed at the same time as the original is known as a
duplicate original and may be introduced into evidence
without accounting for the non-production of the original”.
(See R130.4(b)).
G.R. No. 183034 March 12, 2014
SPS FERNANDO and MA. ELENA SANTOS, Petitioners, vs.
LOLITA ALCAZAR, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
DELFIN CHUA, Respondent.
DOCTRINE
• The rule that the genuineness and due execution of
the instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless the
adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies
only to parties to such instrument.
• While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original
copy prevails over a mere photocopy, there is no harm if in a
case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are
authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by
the party proponent.
• The effect of the admission is such that "a prima facie
case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the
necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a
judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of new
matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant."
FACTS
• Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC)
filed a Complaint for sum of money against the petitioners,
Sps Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect the value of
paint and construction materials worth P1,456,000.00,
which remained unpaid despite written demand.
• The cause of action is based on a document entitled
"Acknowledgment" apparently executed by hand by
Fernando stating that: This is to certify that I acknowledge
my obligation in the amount of P1,456,000 with LCC.
• Petitioners sought the dismissal of the Complaint,
alleging among others that –
Paragraph 6 of the complaint is specifically denied as the
same does not reflect the correct amount. The defendants[’]
computation is that the amount of P600,000.00 is the only
amount due and the instrument used as the actionable
document does not reflect the correct substance of the
transaction and indicates a reformation of the actionable
document;
• Petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which
respondent opposed. Petitioners argued that the
Acknowledgment was not an original copy and thus
inadmissible; petitioners’ receipt of the written demand was
not proved; the alleged deliveries of paint and construction
materials were not covered by delivery receipts; and
respondent’s testimony was merely hearsay and
uncorroborated.
• Trial court denied petitioners’ demurrer for lack of
merit.
RTC
• The trial court essentially held that petitioners
admitted that they entered into transactions with the
respondent for the delivery of paint and construction
materials, which remained unpaid; that from the
Acknowledgment, Exhibit "A," signed by Fernando and duly
presented, authenticated, and identified by respondent
during trial, petitioners admitted that their unpaid obligation
– including interest – amounted to P1,456,000.00; and that
petitioners’ plea for reformation has no basis.
CA
• CA held that petitioners failed to deny specifically
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
Acknowledgment; consequently,
o 1) its genuineness and due execution are deemed
admitted
o 2) there was thus no need to present the original
thereof, and
o 3) petitioners’ liability was sufficiently established.
• CA held that in their Answer, petitioners admitted that
they owed respondent, albeit to the extent ofP600,000.00;
this judicial admission of liability required no further proof.
And with this admission of liability, the Acknowledgment
which was duly authenticated and formally offered in
evidence was sufficient to establish their liability, and no
further proof in the form of receipts and statements of
account was required.
• Fernando’s categorical admission of liability as
contained in the Acknowledgment as well as petitioners’
admissions in their Answer sufficed. It held further that
respondent was competent to testify on the
Acknowledgment as she was a signatory therein.
• Since they failed to oppose the Acknowledgment in
the court below as a result of their having waived their right
to present evidence, petitioners cannot now belatedly
question the document.
• Moreover, their claim of a lesser liability in the amount
of P600,000.00 remained to be plain unsubstantiated
allegations as a result of their failure to refute respondent’s
evidence and present their own.
Petitioners’ Arguments
• Petitioners assert that only a photocopy of the
Acknowledgment was presented and identified by
respondent even as the original was not lost, the same
having been made part of the record of the case when
respondent’s evidence was first presented ex parte.
• They argue that the photocopy presented and offered
in evidence is inadmissible and could not be the basis for
arriving at a finding of liability on their part, pursuant to the
best evidence rule.
• Petitioners point out inconsistencies and erroneous
assumptions made by the CA which formed the basis of its
decision, such as Ma. Elena’s undue inclusion in the
judgment of liability, when it is evident from the
Acknowledgment that it was executed and signed by
Fernando alone.
Respondent’s Arguments
• Petitioners may no longer raise any issue pertaining to
the Acknowledgment, the genuineness and due execution of
which they are considered to have admitted; and that with
the resolution by the CA of the issues revived in the Petition,
petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.
SC
WON THE FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT THE
ORIGINAL COPY OF THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT RENDERED IT
INADMISSIBLE. NO.
• Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of
the Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for
the second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy
thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the
outcome of the case.
• It was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have
been cured and did not affect petitioners’ cause in any
manner. As conceded by them, the original exists and was
made part of the records of the case when respondent’s
evidence was first taken.
• Though respondent now claims that she had lost the
original, the CA proclaimed that the document resides in the
record. This would explain then why respondent cannot
find it in her possession; it is with the court as an exhibit.
Besides, it evidently appears that there is no question raised
on the authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was
presented and identified in court; petitioners merely insist
that the photocopy is inadmissible as a result of respondent’s
failure to present the original, which they nevertheless admit
to exist and is found and included in the record of the case.
• While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original
copy prevails over a mere photocopy, there is no harm if in
a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are
authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence
by the party proponent.
WON THE FAILURE OF PETITIONERS TO DENY SPECIFICALLY
UNDER OATH THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF
THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN THEIR ANSWER RESULTED AS
AN ADMISSION. YES.
• The effect of this is that the genuineness and due
execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted.
• "There is no need for proof of execution and
authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness and
due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party."
• The Court believes that judgment may be had solely
on the document, and there is no need to present receipts
and other documents to prove the claimed indebtedness.
The Acknowledgment is "valid and binding between the
parties who executed it, as a document evidencing the loan
agreement they had entered into."
• The absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by
petitioners’ waiver of their right to present evidence renders
the Acknowledgment as the best evidence of the
transactions between the parties and the consequential
indebtedness incurred.
• The effect of the admission is such that "a prima facie
case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the
necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a
judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of new
matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant."
WON MA ELENA SHOULD BE BOUND BY THE
‘ACKNOWLEDGMENT’. NO.
• However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only
Fernando may be held liable for the judgment amount of
P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the
Acknowledgment. She may be held liable only to the extent
of P600,000.00, as admitted by her and Fernando in
paragraph 5 of their Answer; no case against her may be
proved over and beyond such amount, in the absence of her
signature and an acknowledgment of liability in the
Acknowledgment. The rule that the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted,
unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath,
applies only to parties to the document.
• The admission of liability resulting from petitioners’
admission of indebtedness in their Answer and other
pleadings, their failure to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment, as
well as their waiver of their right to present evidence – all
these did away with the necessity of producing receipts and
statements of account which would otherwise be required
under normal circumstances.
HEIRS OF PRODON vs HEIRS OF ALVAREZ – Buenaventura
Doctrine: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the
terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry.
In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of
a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast
a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best
Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not
precluded from presenting evidence other than the original
document.
FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina
Clave claimed that they could not locate the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797 pertaining to the land they
inherited from their parents, that the entry of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase on the original TCT did not
exist, and that the entry had been maliciously done by
Prodon.
Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase on
September 9, 1975; and this had been registered with the
Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title. She had
then become the absolute owner of the property due to its
non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.
The custodian of the records of the property attested that
the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could
not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Prodon.
It opined that the contents of the deed of sale could be
proved by secondary evidence in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or
existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without
bad faith when defendant Prodon swore that she purchased
the land and her testimony has been confirmed by the
Notarial Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon and by the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
CA reversed. It said: “a party must first satisfactorily explain
the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort
to secondary evidence. Xxx The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the
court in its discretion may change this order if necessary."
The CA found circumstances that put doubt on the existence
of the alleged deed of sale. Evidence on record showed that
Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between August 23, 1975
to September 3, 1975 and suffered from paralysis of half of
his body and blindness due to cataract. Maximo Alvarez was
again later hospitalized and died on October of 1975 without
having left the hospital.
ISSUE:
WON the Best Evidence Rule applies in an action for quieting
of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right
to repurchase. - NO
HELD: NO
SC: The CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence
Rule to this case.
This action does not involve the terms or contents of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue was
whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase,
duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really
existed.
The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms
of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the
issue . The lower court should have simply addressed and
determined whether or not the "existence" and "execution"
of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by
preponderance of evidence.
The presentation of evidence other than the original
document, like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon,
the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary
Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed
even without first proving the loss or unavailability of the
original of the deed.
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still
required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the
original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed.
This was because the deed, although a collateral document,
was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting
of title. Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise
to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution
by other means that could only be secondary under the rules
on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required
to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same
strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or
unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary
evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce
proof sufficient to show the loss or explain the unavailability
of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary
evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he
had given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao,
but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original
because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his
heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability
to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao’s
belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or
representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate
original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon,
but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that
direction.
In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the
improbability of the existence of the deed. Camilon claimed
that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his
residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on September 5,
1975, to negotiate the sale of the property in question, and
the second on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of
sale with right to repurchase.
------------------
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: greater than in the case of attempts at describing other
situations generally. The rule further acts as an insurance
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the against fraud. Xx Lastly, the rule protects against misleading
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a

written document the original of the document must be produced in
court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing
to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves:
(a) the existence or due execution of the original;
(b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for
its non-production in court; and
(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the
exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, considering
that
(a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words
of the writing is of more than average importance,
particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments,
such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation
in words may mean a great difference in rights;
(b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human
process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and
(c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from
memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error,
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HOMER T.
SAQUILAYAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
 Maliksi & Saquilayan - mayoralty candidates for the
Municipality of Imus
 Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed
Saquilayan as the duly elected municipal mayor
 Maliksi filed an election protest before the RTC
RTC – declared Maliksi as the duly elected
 Saquilayan filed an appeal before the COMELEC
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division
 NULLIFY the pronouncement of the lower court
 In favor of saqui
 En Banc – affirmed
 8,387 cases of double-shading were purposely
machinated.
The COMELEC En Banc ruled that the decryption, printing,
and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards are not
without basis since a Division, through its Presiding
Commissioner, may take such measures as he may deem
proper to resolve cases pending before it. The COMELEC En
Banc ruled that Maliksi was not denied due process because
he never questioned the Order of decryption by the
COMELEC First Division nor did he raise any objection in any
of his pleadings. Further, the ballot images are not mere
secondary images, as Maliksi claimed. The digital images of
the physical ballots, which are instantaneously written in
the CF cards by the PCOS11 machines the moment the
ballots are read and counted, are equivalent to the original
for the purpose of the best evidence rule. The COMELEC En
Banc accorded higher evidentiary value to the ballot images
because their integrity are more secure for the following
reasons:
(1) the digital images are encrypted to prevent unauthorized
alteration or access;
(2) the ballot images cannot be decrypted or in anyway
accessed without the necessary decryption key;
(3) the ballot images may only be decrypted using a special
system designed by the COMELEC and not by any ordinary
operating system or computer;
(4) the CF cards storing the digital images of all the ballots
used in the 10 May 2010 elections are kept in a secured
facility within the Commission to prevent unauthorized
access.12
ISSUES
(1) whether Maliksi was deprived of due process when the
COMELEC First Division ordered on appeal the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF
cards;
(2) whether the ballot images in the CF cards are mere
secondary evidence that should only be used when the
physical ballots are not available;
SC: dismiss petition
1. did not gravely abuse its discretion in using the ballot
images in the CF cards.
 Maliksi was aware of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images
Evidentiary Value of the Digital Ballot Images
MALIKSI: “best and most conclusive evidence are the
physical ballots themselves,”
SC: NO; We have already ruled that the ballot images
in the CF cards, as well as the printouts of such images,
are the functional equivalent of the official physical
ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an
election protest.
produced by the same impression as the original, or from the
same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic recording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques
which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or
duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
 ballot images are the counterparts produced by
electronic recording which accurately reproduce the
original, and thus are the equivalent of the original.
 Maliksi did not raise any allegation that the use of the
ballot images falls under any of the exceptions under
Section 2, Rule 4 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC that would
make their use inadmissible as original ballots.

2. Rule 4 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC36 is clear on this issue. It

states:

SECTION 1. Original of an Electronic Document. - An

electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of
an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown
to reflect the data accurately.

SECTION 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. - When a

document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart
REPUBLIC V. MARCOS-MANOTOC
Republic of The Philippines vs. Ma. Imelda Imee R. Marcos-
Manotoc, Ferdinand Bongbong R. Marcos, Jr., Gregorio Ma.
Araneta III, Irene R. Marcos-Araneta, Yeung Chun Fan, Yeung
Chun Ho, Yeung Chun Kam, and Pantranco Employees
Association (PEA)-PTGWO G. R. No. 171701 | February 8,
2012 | 2nd Div. | Sereno, J.
FACTS:
This case involves P200 billion of the Marcoses alleged
accumulated ill-gotten wealth. It also includes the alleged
use of the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9 for the
Marcos familys personal benefit; the alleged use of De Soleil
Apparel for dollar salting; and the alleged illegal acquisition
and operation of the bus company Pantranco North Express,
Inc. (Pantranco).
One of the civil cases filed by PCGG before the
Sandiganbayan to recover the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten
wealth was Civil Case No. 0002. During the course of the
trial, the petitioner presented and formally offered its
evidence against the respondents. However, the latter
objected to the offer primarily on the ground that the
documents violated the best evidence rule of the Rules of
Court, as these documents were unauthenticated;
moreover, petitioner had not provided any reason for its
failure to present the originals. Nonetheless, the
Sandiganbayan admitted the pieces of evidence while
expressing some reservations regarding its evidentiary value.
Subsequently, respondents filed their respective Demurrers
to Evidence. The Sandiganbayan granted all of them except
the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos (due to her admission that
she and her husband owned properties enumerated in the
Complaint), primarily because the originals of the evidence
were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated by
the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court
pointed out that petitioner failed to provide any valid reason
why it did not present the originals in court. Republic filed its
Motion for Partial Reconsideration which is also denied by
the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
WON the Republic observed the best evidence rule? (NO)
HELD:
No. Petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are
the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative,
therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove
petitioners allegations. Thus, the photocopied documents
are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates
that the evidence must be the original document itself. The
origin of the best evidence rule can be found and traced to
as early as the 18th century in Omychund v. Barker, wherein
the Court of Chancery said, “The judges and sages of the law
have laid it down that there is but one general rule of
evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit. The
rule is, that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to
them, they must be proved by those witnesses. The first
ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules,
is an absolute strict necessity. Secondly, a presumed
necessity. In the case of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if
all are dead, the proof of one of their hands is sufficient to
establish the deed: where an original is lost, a copy may be
admitted; if no copy, then a proof by witnesses who have
heard the deed, and yet it is a thing the law abhors to admit
the memory of man for evidence.”
In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the
documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule 130 in relation to Secs.
19 and 20 of Rule 132.
1. The fact that these documents were collected by the
PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them
per se public records. Petitioner presented as witness its
records officer Magno, who testified that these public and
private documents had been gathered by and taken into the
custody of the PCGG in the course of the Commissions
investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, witnesses can testify only to those facts
which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived
from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify
as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but
not as to the contents of the documents themselves.
generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who
uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's
statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally
rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves
are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
3. As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before
the PCGG, while it may be considered as a public document
since it was taken in the course of the PCGGs exercise of its
mandate, it was not attested to by the legal custodian to be
a correct copy of the original. This omission falls short of the
requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of
Court.

2. Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the

affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the
court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be
considered as public documents if they are acknowledged
before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not
EBREO vs. EBREO
When original document is not available
Facts:
• Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926 leaving behind as
heirs his 5 children (Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, and Felipa.)
• Defendants-spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn Beraa
are the son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of defendant
Felino, one of the five children of Felipe Ebreo.
• Felipe Ebreo left to his children an untitled parcel of
land situated in Batangas and was subdivided into six lots
identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F.
• As agreed upon by these heirs, Lot No. 9046-F, shall
remain under the co-ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino,
Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa Ebreo. However, plaintiffs
were surprised to discover that Lot 9046-F was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of defendant Antonio Ebreo.
• Plaintiffs said that they alleged that they never sold,
ceded, conveyed or transferred their rights, share and co-
ownership over Lot 9046- F.
• Answering the complaint, the defendants countered
that after the execution of the Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng
Lupa, by and among the heirs of the late Felipe Ebreo, Lot
9046-F was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of
this sale, the corresponding Real Property Tax Declaration
was transferred in the name of Santiago Puyo as owner.
However, the deed of sale evidencing this transaction was
never presented.
Issue: Does an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged
Deed of Sale sufficiently prove conveyance of title to a
property?
Held:
• The defendant-appellants rely on the Deed of Sale
supposedly executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in favor of
Santiago Puyo. However, defendant-appellants failed to
produce the alleged Deed of Sale in violation of the Best
Evidence Rule.
• The best evidence rule, applied to documentary
evidence, operates as a rule of exclusion, that is, secondary
(or substitutionary) evidence cannot inceptively be
introduced as the original writing itself must be produced
in court. Defendant-appellants miserably failed to prove
that their case is included among the exceptions to the
Rule.
To buttress the claim of sale by the heirs to Santiago Puyo:
1. Petitioners presented the testimony of Antonio
Pajilan of the City Assessors Office of Batangas City who
testified on the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221 but
ended up as inconclusive as he was not yet employed when
the tax declaration was given to their office.
2. Petitioners also presented the testimony of Felino
Ebreo, father of petitioner Antonio Ebreo, who testified that
the heirs of Felipe Ebreo sold Lot 9046 F to Santiago Puyo.
When queried on the whereabouts of the document of sale,
Felino alleged that it was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria
Cueto who is the daughter of one of the heirs, Felipa Ebreo.
According to Felino, Eleuteria refused to return the
document and even got angry when he tried to demand its
return. From Felinos account, there are three copies of the
missing deed of sale. Lamentably, petitioners failed to
present any one of them.
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

3. Finally, petitioners presented Asuncion Aguado, step- (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
daughter of Santiago Puyo, who testified that her stepfather
Santiago Puyo bought the subject lot from the Ebreo heirs.
• Under this rule, it is axiomatic that before a party is
Similar to Pajilans testimony, Aguados testimony cannot be
allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents
given much weight in view of the fact that save for her bare
of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove
allegations that Lot 9046-F was purchased by her stepfather
with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or
Santiago Puyo, she was not likewise present when the deed
destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original
was executed. In her testimony she merely stated that her
of the said deed or document.
stepfather paid taxes for his real estate properties but could
not state with specificity if the payment was made for Lot
• In sum, considering that the annotation of the
9056-F.
disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient
• To summarize, the testimonies of the 3 are at most
proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject
secondary evidence; hence, they are inadmissible
of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the
considering that the petitioners, as offerors of the Deed of
petitioners to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of
Sale, thereof failed to prove any of the exceptions provided
the deed consistent with Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to establish
Court. In the absence of the said document, the exhortations
conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted,
of petitioners regarding the existence of said deed of sale
they have no probative value.
must fail.
Rule 130 - SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
Estrada vs Desierto; Estrada vs Arroyo (April 3, 2001)
(topic is in issue #)
Puno, J.
Facts:
This is an MR of the court’s resolution in Estrada vs Desierto
(March 2, 2001) which dismissed the petitions of Joseph
Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the
Republic.
Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the
alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is
urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state
of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation
violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence
Issue 1: W/N the use of the Angara Diary violates the rule
against admission of hearsay evidence. NO.
Petitioner: The Angara diaries were published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and as such constitutes statements
made outside the court.
SC:
First: The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at
bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy
of the Angara Diary. Petitioner even cited in his Second
Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second and
third parts of the diary. Thus, petitioner had all the
opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately
failed to do so.
Second: Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was
an out of court statement, still its use is not covered by the
hearsay rule. Not at all hearsay evidence is inadmissible as
evidence. An examination of our rules of exclusion will show
that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara
Diary belongs to this class.
Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him. It has long been settled that these
admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay.
Admissions are not covered by the hearsay rule. The Angara
Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be
categorized as admissions of a party.
• his proposal for a snap presidential election where he
would not be a candidate;
• his statement that he only wanted the five-day period
promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes;
• his statements that he would leave by Monday if the
second envelope would be opened by Monday and
• Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga.
Third: The ban on hearsay evidence does not cover
independently relevant statements. These are statements
which are relevant independently of whether they are true
or not. They belong to two (2) classes:
(1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and
(2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of
the facts in issue.
The second class includes the following:
a) Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that
is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will
and other emotions;
b) Statements of a person from which an inference may
be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the
knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the
latter;
Where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as
motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless
direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as
conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof
available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of
such person.
The Angara Diary is a testimony of another which contains
statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind
and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also
contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can
reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are
admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay.
Issue 2: W/N the Angara Diary can be used against Estrada it
not being his own diary. YES.
Petitioner: The Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner,
hence, non-binding on him.
SC: The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive
admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a
statement or action by another person when it is reasonable
to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something
stated or implied by the other person.
In the Angara Diary, the options of Estrada started to dwindle
when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as
President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive
Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to
advise Estrada to consider the option of dignified exit or
resignation. Estrada did not object to the suggested option
but simply said he could never leave the country. Estrada’s
silence (to be treated as his reaction) on this and other
related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him [of
his intent to resign.]
Issue 3 (TOPIC): W/N the use of the Angara diary against him
violated the rule on res inter alios acta.
Petitioner: The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another. This is embodied in Sec 28 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
SC: Section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, says: “The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.”
The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of
them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to
admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Section 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the
scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such
party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to
the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the
petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was
authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical
hours and days before he abandoned Malacanang Palace.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent
(Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner).
What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him,
as through a mere instrument.
Example of Secretary’s Angara’s acts on behalf of President
Estrada: According to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told
Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed,
ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa
rin. This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner
after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the
first negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask
Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after
taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00
p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to
Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? Secretary
Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that
Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met
with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the
peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his
relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diary
shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary
Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary
Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial
days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and
declarations of Secretary Angara.
4. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR
BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE:
HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS
AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;
Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of
private writings and best evidence were violated in our
Decision, viz:
“The use of the Angara diary palpably breached
several hornbook rules of evidence, such as the rule on
authentication of private writings”
xxx
A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated
The rule governing private documents as evidence was
violated. The law provides that before any private
writing offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a) by anyone who saw the document executed or
written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
xxx
B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed
Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best
evidence of the Angara diary. It is secondary evidence,
 of dubious authenticity. It was however used by this
Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of
the original or duplicate original of the diary. The Best
Evidence Rule should have been applied since the
contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.
The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances,
[w]hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself.[23]
Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the
Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court provides in sections 2
to 4 of Rule 1301:
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only
copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did
not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his
book on evidence, states that:
1 Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing
letters, words, numbers, figures or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the
trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the
document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.[24]
xxx
Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be
received in evidence if no objection is made to its
reception.[26]
In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules
of Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz:
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject
of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents,
all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that
which it is claimed to be.
On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco
states that:
A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of
documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity
of the document must be reasonably established as a pre-
requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294
S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263, and others) However, a party who
does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument
may not object that it was not properly identified before it
was admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa
1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835).[27]
blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government
but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the
instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to
object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed
his Memorandum dated February 20, 2001, Reply
Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental
Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second
Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He
was therefore not denied due process. In the words of
Wigmore, supra, petitioner had been given an opportunity
to inspect the Angara Diary but did not object to its
admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his
objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has
been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the
basis thereof.

Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[28]

which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper
accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the
service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing
eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
There is a significant difference, however, between the Muro
case and the cases at bar. In the Muro case, Judge Muro
dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a
newspaper account without affording the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a
written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a

Vidallon-Magtolis vs. Salud
Facts:
Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on
inefficiency and incompetence of official duty; conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
directly and indirectly having financial and material interest
in an official transaction considering his undue interest in the
service of the order of release and actual release of Melchor
Lagua.
Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained
at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa
City. Lagua’s petition for bond was approved in a Resolution
where the appellate court directed the issuance of an order
of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was brought to
the office of Atty. Madarang, Division Clerk of Court, for
promulgation.
Respondent served the resolution and order of release of
Lagua at the National Penitentiary, where Lagua was
detained for homicide.
Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain
Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative,
asking how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s
provisional liberty, and that they sought the help of a certain
Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig, but was told that they still had
a balance. When Atty. Madarang was able to get the mobile
number of respondent, he represented himself as Lagua’s
relative and exchanged text messages with said respondent
for a possible pay-off for the Lagua’s provisional liberty. Atty.
Madarang later discovered that the respondent did not
properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of
Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel. but
gave them to a certain Art Baluran, allegedly Lagua’s relative.
Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office.
When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or
receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case. He,
however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and
order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art
Baluran. Complainant then lodged the complaint against the
respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence
constitutes a violation of right to privacy of the accused?
Held:
No. The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text
messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of
his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been
classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and
“shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any
question as to the admissibility of such messages is now
moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his
counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first
three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of
Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in
finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the
complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a
favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court
had the occasion to state:

… The text messages were properly admitted by the

Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k),
Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone

conversations, text messages … and other electronic forms
of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained.”
Aznar v Citibank (supra case, Pretz)
FACTS:
Aznar went to Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. When he used his
credit card at Indonesia, the same was not honored because it was
“DECL OVERLIMIT”. He sued Citibank because according to him,
Citibank “blacklisted” his card without valid cause. (ACTION FOR
DAMAGES).
Aznar’s evidence consisted of:
1) Exh G.: a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to
him by Ingtan Agency at Indonesia with the signature of one Victrina
Elnado Nubi (Nubi)
ISSUE: WON the electronic document was properly authenticated
HELD: NO
RATIO: As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such
exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due
execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision
is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that
whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by
(a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually
see the document executed or written, neither was he able to provide
evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi,
who handed to him said computer print-out.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took
effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this
case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking
to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding
has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private
electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the
person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security
procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of
electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability
to the satisfaction of the judge.
Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it
constitutes the "other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh.
"G" to the satisfaction of the judge."
SC: is not convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan
Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he
thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as
sufficient to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly
pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G"
does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar
merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out
from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific business
address of the source of the computer print-out because while the
name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address
was not reflected in the print-out.

Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on

the print-out was generated and how the said information could be
relied upon as true.

ATTY. NERI: Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the
"hot" list was confirmed to be authentic"

Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred Citibank

Mastercard was authentic?
Aznar: Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at the
Merchant’s store, I do not know, they called up somebody for
verification then later they told me that "your card is being denied".
So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do not know whom they
called up; where they verified. So, when it is denied that’s presumed
to be blacklisted.
Torres v PAGCOR
DOCTRINE: A facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic
evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation,
We determined the question of whether the original facsimile
transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic
documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and
We said:
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and
"electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a
facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It
is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible aselectronic evidence.
Facts:
1. Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor of
PAGCOR.
2. On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the
Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt
Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot
machine and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and
in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's
Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation
to verify the veracity of such report.
3. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was
committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a
slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR.
4. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot
machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February
and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who
were responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein
petitioner.
5. On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum
of Charges for dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and violation of
office rules and regulations which were considered grave offenses
where the penalty imposable is dismissal.
6. On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2,
2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human
Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from the
service.
7. On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a
Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal
dismissal,
8. Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged,
among others, that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the
period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service Law.
9. CSC: treating petitioner's complaint as an appeal from the
PAGCOR's decision dismissing petitioner from the service, issued
Resolution No. 081204 denying petitioner's appeal.
a. In so ruling, the CSC found that the issue for resolution was
whether petitioner's appeal had already prescribed which the former
answered in the positive.
b. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he sent a
facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period
prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.
c. It found PAGCOR's denial of having received petitioner's letter
more credible as it was supported by certifications issued by its
employees.
d. It found that a verification of one of the telephone numbers
where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration disclosed
that such number did not belong to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board
of Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned about the
alleged facsimile transmission at the first instance when he filed his
complaint and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of
prescription in its Comment.
10. Petitioner's motion for a reconsideration was denied
11. CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
a. Petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that
he had filed a motion for reconsideration.
b. It found insufficient to merit consideration petitioner's claim
that he had sent through a facsimile transmission a
letter/reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to PAGCOR's
Chairman, members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems
Protection Board; that assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration
was indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile
transmission is inadmissible as electronic evidence under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000; and that a review of the CSC assailed
resolution revealed that the telephone numbers where petitioner
claimed to be the recipient of the faxed document sent was not that of
PAGCOR's Office of Board of Directors. The CA found baseless and
conjectural petitioner's claim that PAGCOR can easily deny having
received the letter by giving orders to their employees to execute an
affidavit of denial under pain and threat of administrative sanction or
termination from service.
Issue: W/N the P’s period for which to appeal expired. YEP
Under the uniform rules on Admin Cases in the Civil Service:
- A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or
personal delivery.
- When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same
shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the
envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case.
- On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is
deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And
the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to
file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August
4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been
submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August
19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his
motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt
of petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by
certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter
reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile
transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to
appeal. The MODE USED BY PETITIONER IN FILING HIS
RECONSIDERATION IS NOT SANCTIONED BY THE UNIFORM RULES ON
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE. As we stated earlier,
the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by
mail or personal delivery.
Garvida v Sales:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission
and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original
copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone
of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is
transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave
relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the
elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The
receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a
printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best,
an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the
original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the
facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed
by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x
See doctrine.
DENY PETITION
G.R. No. 206162, December 10, 2014 - ALEX M. VALENCERINA,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
1. The Sandiganbayan found Valencerina, a high-ranking officer of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), guilty of giving
unwarranted benefits to Ecobel Land Incorporated (Ecobel) on account
of his participation in the unjustified issuance of GSIS Surety Bond GIF
No. 029132 (subject bond) covering the amount of Ten Million US
Dollars (US$10,000,000.00).
2. Valencerina upon the instructions of accused Mallari, who was
then the Senior Vice-President of the GSIS General Insurance Group
prepared a memo which also included Mallari’s strong
recommendation through a marginal note with the words “Strong
reco. Based on info & collateral herein stated.” In short, Valencerina
helped approve the issuance of a surety bond for Ecobel.
3. On March 30, 1998, Valencerina certified that the subject bond
could be redeemed if Ecobel would default in paying the loan.
4. In a letter, dated March 7, 2000, URSA Minor Limited, the
assignee of BSIL (Bear Stearns), demanded payment from Ecobel. A
notice of failure was sent by Banker’s Trust, informing GSIS of Ecobel’s
failure to pay the obligation which became due on March 9, 2001.
5. On April 5, 2000, Aon Financial Products, Inc., also a subsequent
assignee of BSIL, sent a Notice of Demand to the then Secretary of
Finance, Pardo de Tavera, calling on the guarantee of the Republic of
the Philippines under the subject bond.
6. Thus, for having participated in, or contributed to the release
or issuance of the subject surety bond, an Information was filed before
the Sandiganbayan, against Valencerina, along with Campaña, Mallari,
Leticia G. Bernardo, Josephine Edralin Boright, and Estela J. Edralin for
7. After the trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed
decision, finding Valencerina and Mallari guilty beyond reasonable
doubt because of Valencerina’s declaration that the bond was fully
secured by collaterals was taken by the Sandiganbayan against him as
he already knew that the said collaterals were defective.
8. With respect to Mallari, his conviction was premised on the
findings by the Sandiganbayan that he strongly recommended the
Ecobel bond application for evaluation notwithstanding its infirmities;
that he approved and subsequently signed the subject bond on behalf
of GSIS; and that he knew beforehand that PVB was not the obligee of
the loan as manifested in the correspondence he had with accused
Boright, thus, highlighting his active participation in the negotiation
with Bear and Stearns International, Ltd. on the subject bond.
9. did he participate in the giving of undue benefits to Ecobel with
evident bad faith, or manifest partiality, as punishable under Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, when the bond was issued and used by Ecobel to
secure a foreign denominated loan?
10. In finding Valencerina guilty of giving undue advantage or
preference to Ecobel, in violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that the
elements of the crime were duly established. These elements, as
enumerated by the Court in Bautista v. Sandiganbayan,16 are as
follows:
 the offender is a public officer;
 the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official,
administrative or judicial functions;
 the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or gross inexcusable negligence; and
 the public officer caused any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference.
Issue: WON petitioner is guilty under the anti graft and corrupt
practices act given his defense that the corpus delicti of the crime—
that a loan has actually been extended to Ecobel by BSIL was not
presented as evidence?
Held: YES
The Sandiganbayan correctly relied on the testimonies of the
witnesses, which were based primarily on the January 27, 1998
Memorandum, and the Certifications, dated March 30, 1998 and
January 14, 1999, issued by Valencerina himself.
These documents purportedly showed his resignation to favor Ecobel
in the issuance of the subject bond as well as his alleged participation
in the negotiation of the loan sought to be guaranteed under the bond,
thus, making him guilty of the offense charged.
In this case, Valencerina clearly extended, with evident bad faith,
undue advantage to Ecobel in the process of issuing and negotiating
the subject bond. His act of endorsing Ecobel’s application to the PGM
despite his knowledge that the obligee of the loan was not PVB but a
foreign lender, clearly shows his disregard for the policy of GSIS
requiring the existence of governmental interest in the transaction. In
the observation of the GSIS audit team, as it appeared in a report
before the Sandiganbayan, PVB was merely used to show that GSIS has
an insurable interest in the loan. The truth, however, is that BSIL was
the funder and obligee of the credit sought to be guaranteed by the
bond.
Valencerina’s defense that the memorandum was prepared and issued
pursuant to the instructions of Mallari, who was higher in rank, cannot
exculpate him from liability. As Vice-President, his duties were not
mere perfunctory in the greater scheme of the process.
He knew that GSIS could only issue a guarantee payment bond if it had
an interest in the transaction, and that the bond must be secured by
adequate collaterals. Yet, he still endorsed the Ecobel application
which he could have denied at sight. He could have at least made some
remarks as to the propriety of the application in light of his information
that a foreign funder was the obligee of the loan which would violate
GSIS policies in the issuance of a high-risk bond, but he did not.
The Court, moreover, notes the finding of the Sandiganbayan that
Valencerina also participated in the negotiations of the loan using the
guarantees available under the bond. It appears from the records that
BSIL required Ecobel to verify the authenticity of the signatures in the
subject bond. Boright then requested Mallari to issue certifications
containing declarations that he was authorized to sign the subject
bond, including a certification that he was authorized to sign certain
letters that were requested apparently referring to the certifications
that Valencerina himself issued on January 14, 1999, together with the
first one he issued on March 30, 1998, both directed to an unnamed
addressee. The certifications read as follows:
The Court finds no value either to Valencerina’s submission that no
crime was proven to have been committed because no evidence had
been presented showing that BSIL actually granted a loan of US $10
million to Ecobel, it being the corpus delicti of the second mode of
committing the offense under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The reason is
simple.
The corpus delicti of the crime is not dependent upon whether a loan
had been granted to Ecobel, but more on proving the fact of giving
unwarranted preference or benefit to another with evident bad faith,
manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence. It is sufficient that
such fact has been established, as the prosecution did in this case.
Besides, the Court gives credence to the report and findings of the
audit investigation team, affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, that Ecobel
failed to pay the loan from BSIL, which then gave rise to a notice making
known the decision of the assignee under the loan to collect on the
surety bond subject of this case. This by itself cemented the fact that,
indeed, Ecobel received benefit by reason of the unjustified actions
committed by no less than the high-ranking officers of GSIS.’
RELEVANT TOPIC:
In a last ditch attempt to save himself, Valencerina argues that the
documents, especially the above certifications from which the
testimonies of the witnesses and eventually his conviction were based,
could not be used as evidence against him for being incompetent and
hearsay as they were mere photocopies that were not properly
authenticated.
Indeed, these documents serve as the bedrock of the prosecution’s
position that he violated Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. It is true that these were mere photocopies and, as a
general rule, if the original copy cannot be produced, a photocopy, can
only be admitted in evidence if it is shown that the original is
unavailable21 by proving (1) the existence or due execution of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence
of bad faithto which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.22 The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents.23
Here, Valencerina claims that the prosecution failed to even attempt
to prove the authenticity and due execution of the memorandum and
the certifications it presented and, thus should be enough reason to
conclude that the Sandiganbayan based its conviction on mere
conjectures. The Court finds the argument untenable.
Valencerina cannot now say that the certifications were not properly
authenticated and their existence not properly proved because the
records would show that, during the trial, hehimself adopted their
contents and admitted that he indeed issued the same certifications.
For instance, he testified as follows:
Q The prosecution offered a document purportedly a Certification by
one Alex Valencerina dated March 30, 1998 which the prosecution
marked as Exhibit D-14 which I am now showing you. Could you please
go over this document and inform the Honorable Court if you are
aware of such a document?
A Yes, sir, I am aware of this document, sir.
Q Now, this is a certification prepared by one Alex Valencerina. Are you
the same Alex Valencerina who prepared this particular document?
A Yes, sir. It is me, sir.
Q Why did you prepare this document?
A This document was prepared upon the request of Senior Vice-
President Amalio Mallari to simply draft a statement of facts and
procedures in relation to the bond itself, Ecobel bond.
Q We noticed, Mr. Valencerina, that this document was addressed to
"To Whom It May Concern". Could you inform the Honorable Court
why you addressed it to"To whom it may concern"?
A It is actually a generic statement, simply a statement of facts and
procedures and it is basically a GSIS policy, for information only.
Q And what are the facts and procedures that you are referring to
which you mentioned in thisparticular memorandum?
A These are actually referring tothe drawing conditions which actually
refer to the event in which case there is a default in the bond. So are
the documents that must be presented by the obligee. Q Are you
referring to this bond which is mentioned in this memorandum, Bond
No. 092132, issued on March 11, 1998 and maturing on 11 March
2000?
A Yes, sir, I am referring to that particular transaction, sir.
Q The prosecution also marked Exhibit "D-17". It was testified to by a
witness and offered in evidence by the prosecution which is a
memorandum by one Alex M. Valencerina dated 14 January 1999.
Could you please go over this memorandum and inform the Honorable
Court if you are aware of that memorandum?
A Yes, sir, I am aware of this letter.
Q Why did you prepare this memorandum?
A Again, this letter or this memorandum actually is requested upon by
my Senior Vice-President Amalio Mallari, sir.
Q Again, this is addressed only "To whom it amy concern" and not to
anybody in particular. Why did you address it only to "To whom it may
concern"?
A Again, it is a statement of facts and procedures which practically
govern the policies of the GSIS, sir.24 (Emphases supplied)
By testifying as to the contents of the certifications he himself signed,
Valencerina, in effect, admitted that the said documents exist and
that the same were duly executed by him. He himself built upon the
said documents to draw his defense that the certifications were mere
statements of facts and procedures. He did not contradict their
existence but even went further to elaborate as to the reasons behind
their issuance. As such, the Court cannot give merit to his position that,
being mere photocopies, the certifications could not be relied on in
determining his culpability. Conversely, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, assuming they had no personal knowledge of
the contents and due execution of the said documents, would now be
a superfluity as he himself used the certifications to forward his
defense.
The Court finds no value either to Valencerina’s submission that no
crime was proven to have been committed because no evidence had
been presented showing that BSIL actually granted a loan of US $10
million to Ecobel, it being the corpus delicti of the second mode of
committing the offense under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The reason is
simple. The corpus delicti of the crime is not dependent upon whether
a loan had been granted to Ecobel, but more on proving the factof
giving unwarranted preference or benefit to another with evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence. It is sufficient
that such fact has been established, as the prosecution did in this case.
Besides, the Court gives credence tothe report and findings of the audit
investigation team, affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, that Ecobel failed
to pay the loan from BSIL, which then gave rise to a notice making
known the decision of the assignee under the loan to collect on the
surety bond subject of this case. This by itself cemented the fact that,
indeed, Ecobel received benefit by reason of the unjustified actions
committed by no less than the high-ranking officers of GSIS.
G.R. No. 191696 April 10, 2013
ROGELIO DANTIS, Petitioner, vs. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR.,
Respondent.
Rogelio alleged that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-125918, with an
area of 5,657 square meters, located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan;
that he acquired ownership of the property through a deed of
extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased father, Emilio
Dantis (Emilio), dated December 22, 1993; that he had been paying the
realty taxes on the said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied and built a
house on a portion of his property without any right at all; that
demands were made upon Julio, Jr. that he vacate the premises but the
same fell on deaf ears; and that the acts of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud
of doubt over his title and right of possession of his property
Evidence: Extrajudicial Partition of Estate of Emilio Dantis, executed
in December 1993 which land was titled later on under his name,
Rogelio Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal;
Maghinang claimed that he was the actual owner of the 352 square
meters (subject lot) of the land covered by TCT No. T-125918 where he
was living; that he had been in open and continuous possession of the
property for almost thirty (30) years; the subject lot was once tenanted
by his ancestral relatives until it was sold by Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to
his father, Julio Maghinang, Sr. (Julio, Sr.); that later, he succeeded to
the ownership of the subject lot after his father died on March 10,
1968; and that he was entitled to a separate registration of the subject
lot on the basis of the documentary evidence of sale and his open and
uninterrupted possession of the property
Evidence: He presented an affidavit executed on September 3, 1953 by
Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of Rogelio Dantis and the father of Emilio
Dantis. The latter was, in turn, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The
affidavit, according to affiant Ignacio Dantis, alleged that Emilio Dantis
agreed to sell 352 square meters of the lot to Julio Maghinang on
installment. Defendant was then 11 years old in 1952
RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the true owner of the
entire 5,657-square meter lot located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan,
as evidenced by his TCT over the same.
The RTC did not lend any probative value on the documentary evidence
of sale adduced by Julio, Jr. consisting of:
1) Exhibit 3: an affidavit allegedly executed by Ignacio
Dantis (Ignacio), Rogelio’s grandfather, whereby said affiant
attested, among others, to the sale of the subject lot made by
his son, Emilio, to Julio, Sr. and
2) Exhibit 4: an undated handwritten receipt of initial
downpayment in the amount of ₱100.00 supposedly issued by
Emilio to Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale of the subject lot
The RTC ruled that even if these documents were adjudged as
competent evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that the
purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been completely paid
and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the property to
Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by tolerance
CA reversed the RTC. It held that Exhibit "4" was an indubitable proof
of the sale of the 352-square meter lot between Emilio and Julio, Sr. It
also ruled that the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with
the delivery of the res, gave efficacy to the oral sale and brought it
outside the operation of the statute of frauds
ISSUE: The fundamental question for resolution is whether there is a
perfected contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr.
SC: Rogelio was able to establish a prima facie case in his favor
tending to show his exclusive ownership of the parcel of land. From
the records, it appears that TCT No. T-125918 is a derivative of TCT No.
T-256228, which covered a bigger area of land measuring 30,000
square meters registered in the name of Emilio Dantis; that Emilio died
intestate on November 13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs, including
Rogelio, executed an extra-judicial partition of estate on December 22,
1993 and divided among themselves specific portions of the property
covered by TCT No. T-256228, which were already set apart by metes
and bounds; that the land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the subdivision plan
Psd-031421-054315 with an area of 5,657 sq. m. went to Rogelio, the
property now covered by TCT No. T-125918; and that the property was
declared for realty tax purpose in the name of Rogelio for which a tax
declaration was issued in his name; and that the same had not been
transferred to anyone else since its issuance.
The affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be
accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay when its
probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced.
The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1)
absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and
3) absence of oath.
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence
where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The sworn
statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified and
its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit
"3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an
inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration
against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the
hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his
father (Ignacio).
Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being
a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the
contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best
evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must
be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document
are best proved by the production of the document itself to the
exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule
130, Section
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule
130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution
or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original
or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original
is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of
the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would
constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.
Guided by these norms, the Court holds that Julio, Jr. failed to prove
the due execution of the original of Exhibit "4" as well as its subsequent
loss.
A perusal of the receipt/ Exhibit 4 would readily show that it does not
specify a determinate subject matter. Nowhere does it provide a
description of the property subject of the sale, including its metes and
bounds, as well as its total area.

Country Bankers Insurance Corp. v. Lagman
TOPIC: Secondary evidence – sec. 5 when original document not
available
Facts:
- Nelson Santos applied for a license with the NFA to engage in
the business of storing sacks of palay in his warehouse at Camiling,
Tarlac
- Under Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded Warehouse Act, the
approval for such license was conditioned upon posting of a cash bond,
a bond secured by real estate or a bond signed by a duly authorized
bonding company
- In 1989, Country Bankers issued 2 Warehouse Bonds through
its agent, Antonio Lagman, in favor of Santos who, together with
Lagman and several others, in turn executed Indemnity Agreements
- Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as
collateral
- Santos defaulted on those loans, and since the sacks of palay
covered by warehouse receipts were no longer in the bonded
warehouse, Country Bankers was compelled to pay Php 1.1M
- Country Bankers filed a collection suit before the RTC Manila
against the co-signors
- Santos and others were either could no longer be found or were
declared in default
- Lagman’s Answer:
o 1989 Warehouse bonds were valid only for 1 year from the date
of issuance
o Bonds were never renewed
o Although Country Bankers executed another bond in 1990, he
did not execute an indemnity agreement to cover for them (or at least,
he was not a party, if there was any)
o 1990 Bond superseded the 1989 bonds
- RTC: Lagman solidarily liable to pay Country Bankers
o Bonds remained in force unless cancelled by the NFA
Administrator
o Lagman cannot unilaterally cancel them
- CA: reversed RTC decision; case dismissed
o 1990 superseded the 1989 bonds
o Lagman was not a signatory in the alleged 1990 Indemnity
Agreement
Country Bankers argues:
o By express terms, the 1989 bonds shall remain in full force and
effect until cancelled by NFA Administrator
o Under Insurance Code (Sec. 177), bond may only be cancelled
by the obligee Republic, by the Insurance Comm’r or by a competent
court
o Spurious existence of the 1990 bond since Lagman failed to
produce the original; neither did Country Bankers process such nor the
NFA had in its possession the same
o Lagman failed to prove that NFA accepted the 1990 bond in
replacement of the 1989 bonds
Issue (1):
w/n 1989 bonds were valid for only 1 year
Holding and Ratio:
No. The official receipts which evidence the payment of premiums for
the 1989 bonds only serve as proof of payment of the premium for 1
year. They do not however automatically mean that the surety bonds
were only effective for 1 year.
Under Sec. 177 of the Insurance Code:
The surety is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the
contract of suretyship or bond is perfected and delivered to the
obligor. No contract of suretyship or bonding shall be valid and binding
unless and until the premium therefor has been paid, except where the
obligee has accepted the bond, in which case the bond becomes valid
and enforceable irrespective of whether or not the premium has been
paid by the obligor to the surety
The 1989 bonds have identical provisions that the bonds shall remain
in force until cancelled by the Administrator of the NFA. These bonds
were in the nature of continuing bonds, where there is no fixed
expiration date, and thus the cancellation may be made only by the
obligee, by the Insurance Comm’r or by the court.
Issue (2): TOPICAL
w/n the 1990 bond existed and novated the 1989 bonds
Holding and Ratio:
No. Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be
produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. (cf. ROC
130.3)
Lagman presented a mere photocopy of the 1990 bond, and such
photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless
it is shown that the original is unavailable. Under ROC 130.5:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the
following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
non-production in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which
the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss, and contents.
Here, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are
actually four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept
by the NFA, the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac,
the third is with Country Bankers and the fourth was in his possession.
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these
duplicate originals, Lagman merely presented a photocopy.
He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no
longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with Country
Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by itself
reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of the bond
considering that, as it appears from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is
a bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to secure the
original from any of the three other custodians he mentioned in his
testimony. While he apparently was able to find the original with the
NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its
photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce
the original.
Fueling further suspicion regarding the existence of the 1990 Bond is
the absence of an Indemnity Agreement. While Lagman argued that a
1990 Bond novates the 1989 Bonds, he raises the defense of non-
existence of an indemnity agreement which would conveniently
exempt him from liability.
Consequently, because the 1990 bond does not exist, there can be no
novation to speak of. Thus, under the Indemnity Agreements covering
the 1989 bonds which still subsist, Lagman is solidarily liable to
indemnify Country Bankers for any damage or loss sustained on
account of the execution of the bond. Moreover, the bonds contained
Incontestability Clauses which prohibit Lagman from questioning his
liability under them.
Xerxes Abadiano v. Spouses Martir
TOPIC: Secondary evidence – sec. 5 when original document not
available
Facts:
- Lot No. 1318, owned by Inocentes Baares and Felicidad
Villanueva, was partitioned among their heirs:
o A – Demetrio Baares
o B – Ramon and David Abadiano
o C – Amando Baares
- David who was absent during the execution of the Deed of
Partition, executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging and
ratifying the document of partition
- OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted, and in lieu
thereof OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued in the name of the
original owners
- Demetrio sold his share to his son, Leopoldo
- Leopoldo filed before CFI Negros Occidental a petition praying
for confirmation of the Deed of Partition and the issuance of a new
certificate of title over the property
- CFI ordered the cancellation of the reconstituted title, and the
issuance of a new TCT No. T-31862 in the names of Leopoldo, Amando,
Ramon and David
- Spouses Martir filed an action for quieting of title and/or
recovery of possession, claiming that:
o prior to the issuance of said TCT, Ramon and David sold Lot B to
a certain Victor Garde who in turn sold it to Jose Garde
o said Jose Garde sold the Lot B to them
o Roberto, the son of Ramon, allegedly entered the property and
cultivated the stalks of sugarcane that they planted; Roberto also
refused to vacate the property
o the following year, Roberto, together with several others, again
harvested sugarcane not only on Lot B, but also on Lot C, which by then
had been acquired by Lolita Martir from her adoptive father, Amando
Baares
Defendants Roberto et al
o Denied that Lot B was sold by Ramon and David
o Consequently, Roberto inherited the same from Ramon his
father
o Roberto had demanded that the spouses Martir pay him
reasonable rental for the land but they refused
o Sometime in 1981, Roberto and the spouses Martir came to an
agreement that the former will continue to cultivate the remaining
stalks of sugarcane left by the latter
- Xerxes Abadiano intervened as successor-in-interest of Ramon
who likewise disputed the supposed sale
RTC: in favor of spouses Martir
o Compra Y Venta in favor of spouses was not null and void for
failure of David to sign
o David’s Confirmation pertained only to the Deed of Partition
and not to the sale; therefore, he did not authorize Ramon to sell his
share
o As co-owner, Ramon could validly alienate his inchoate share in
Lot B, and as a consequence, only his share was transferred
o The fact that the Compa Y Venta was not annotated on the OCT
or the reconstituted OCT did not make the sale invalid; such annotation
is required only to bind third persons
o As to the Compra Y Venta containing the same notarial
inscription as the Deed of Partition, RTC said it was an error that did
not nullify the document; its effect would be only make the document
non-registrable
o Spouses and their predecessors-in-interest were in possession
of the property for more than 60 years; defendants are guilty of laches
- Defendants’ appeal was summarily dismissed for failure to pay
docket fees within the required period; thus, only Xerxes Abadiano’s
appeal was entertained
- CA: affirmed in toto RTC decision
- Xerxes argues:
o RTC and CA disregarded the primordial issue of whether or not
the Deed of Sale is a spurious document
o They were not guilty of laches
Issue (1):
w/n the deed of sale between Ramon and Victor Garde was spurious
Holding and Ratio:
Yes. Spouses Martir only attached a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta
to their complaint. According to Lolita, the original was in the office of
the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from said
office but were refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions,
however, was presented to prove that the original is indeed in the
custody of the Register of Deeds or that respondents due and diligent
search for the same was unsuccessful.
Under ROC 130.3:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Thus, when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
Here, the spouses failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the
document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed
under the abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the
document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on
such assumption.
Re: On the notarial inscription being the same on the Deed of Partition
and the Compra Y Venta:
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the
document presented contained the same notarial inscription as the
Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the Compra
Y Venta, though executed on different days, were notarized on the
same day, and both documents contained the signatures of the same
witnesses and the same notarial inscription.
While it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have
invalidated the sale if indeed it took place the same error would have
meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document
and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document
would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose
genuineness and due execution need not be proved.
Issue (2):
w/n the defendants were guilty of laches
Holding and Ratio:
No. Under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land
in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration
proceedings. Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement
of the title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and possession
once their title is registered under the protective mantle of the Torrens
system.
Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, his (the fathers) inheritance was in the possession of their uncle,
the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession Amando Baares who knew likewise that the property was theirs.
of his registered property by reason of laches. That petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of Amando
Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to assert a right, taken Baares to try and occupy the land is understandable. They had to be
in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing careful about the actions they took, lest they sow dissent within the
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a family. Furthermore, they knew that their parents revered Amando.
delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another
because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or OTHER FACTORS AGAINST LACHES:
relations of the property or parties. It is based on public policy which, - Lack of annotation of the deed of sale on the OCT or the
for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale reconstituted OCT
demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. - Even at the time of issuance of new TCT, not annotation of the
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the alleged 1922 sale to Victor Garde
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation - Neither the spouses nor their predecessors-in-interest
of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a participated in the proceedings involving the OCT, reconstituted OCT,
remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the or the TCT
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants - Compra Y Venta was only annotated on TCT in 1982
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.
The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the
neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition
which may have arisen during the period in which there has been
neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of the
parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without
doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be
destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers
in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect.
Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements
must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot
be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.
Xerxes had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still
in the name of his predecessor in interest, continued to be theirs,
especially considering that the annotation of the purported sale was
done only in 1982. According to petitioner, his father had told him that
Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort Inc. v. BF Corp.
When original document is in adverse party;s custody or control
FACTS:
• Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions for review
under Rule 45 to nullify certain issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA):
1. In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145842, petitioners Edsa
Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. (ESHRI), assail the Decision of CA
affirming the Decision (RTC), that ordered them to pay jointly and
severally respondent BF Corporation (BF) a sum of money with
interests and damages
2. In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145873, petitioner
Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo also assails the aforementioned CA Decision
it adjudged her jointly and severally liable with ESHRI, et al. to pay the
monetary award decreed in the RTC
• Both petitions stemmed from a construction contract
denominated as Agreement for the Execution of Builder's Work for the
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project that ESHRI and BF executed for the
construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991.
• Among other things, the contract stipulated for the payment of
the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described
in the monthly progress billings.
• Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress
billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work accomplished
and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month's progress
billing.
• ESHRI laid out the collection procedure BF was to follow, to wit:
(1) submission of the progress billing to ESHRI's Engineering
Department; (2) following-up of the preparation of the Progress
Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity Surveying
Department; and (3) following-up of the release of the payment with
one Evelyn San Pascual.
• BF adhered to the procedures agreed upon in all its billings for
the period from May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, submitting for the
purpose the required Builders Work Summary, the monthly progress
billings, including an evaluation of the work in accordance with the
Project Manager's Instructions (PMIs) and the detailed valuations
contained in the Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for final re-
measurement under the PMIs.
• BF said that the values of the WVOs were contained in the
progress billings under the section "Change Orders".
• From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19
progress billings following the procedure agreed upon. Based on
Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP86,501,834.05.
• According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to
19, did not re-measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress
Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive periods
covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working
continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about
the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.
• After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF
filed before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages.
• In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress
Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and, by way of counterclaim with damages, asked
that BF be ordered to refund the excess payments. ESHRI also charged
BF with incurring delay and turning up with inferior work
accomplishment.
The RTC found for BF
• RTC, on the main finding that BF, as plaintiff a quo, is entitled
to the payment of its claim covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19
and to the retention money corresponding to Progress Billing Nos. 1 to
11, with interest in both instances, rendered judgment for BF.
• ESHRI subsequently moved for reconsideration, but the motion
was denied by the RTC, prompting ESHRI to appeal to the CA.
• Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the following
events and/or incidents transpired:
(1)The trial court granted BF's motion for execution pending appeal.
The account was garnished- 35 million
(2) CA a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the trial court from
carrying out its Order upon ESHRI's posting of a PhP1 million bond. In
a supplemental resolution issued on the same day, the CA issued a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction directing the trial court judge
and/or his branch sheriff acting under him:
(a) to lift all the garnishments and levy made under the enjoined order
of execution pending appeal; (b) to immediately return the garnished
deposits to PNB instead of delivering the same to ESHRI; and (c) if the
garnished deposits have been delivered to BF, the latter shall return
the same to ESHRI's deposit account.
(3) By a Decision dated June 30, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187, the CA
set aside the trial court's January 21, 1997 Order. The CA would later
deny BF's motion for reconsideration.
(4) Aggrieved, BF filed before this Court a petition for review of the CA
Decision , the Court affirmed the assailed decision of the CA with the
modification that the recovery of ESHRI's garnished deposits shall be
against BF's bond.
We denied the motions for reconsideration of ESHRI and BF.
(5) Forthwith, ESHRI filed, and the CA by Resolution of August 13, 1999
granted, an application for restitution or damages against BF's bond.
Consequently, BF and Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., the bonding
company, filed separate motions for reconsideration.
On November 12, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the CA rendered a
Decision resolving (1) the aforesaid motions of BF and its surety and (2)
herein petitioners' appeal from the trial court's Decision dated
September 23, 1996. AFFIRMED RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding issues of law raised by petitioners in their appeal
[particularly in admitting in evidence photocopies of Progress Billing
Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs].
HELD: The petition has no merit.
Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and
WVOs
• Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the
matter of the admission in evidence of the photocopies of Progress
Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and the WVOs.
According to petitioners, BF, before being allowed to adduce in
evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the basis for
the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence,
conformably to the best evidence rule.
• Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with
the laying-the-basis requirement. Defending the action of the courts
below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the documents
aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present the original of
the documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI which
refused to hand them over to BF despite requests.
• We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term "best
evidence" denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing
must, as a general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence
of its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be
had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best
evidence rule:
RULE 130 - SEC. 3.Original document must be produced; exceptions. —
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
(a)When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; EaHcDS
(b)When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;(Emphasis added.)
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
SEC. 6.When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. (1) there is proof of the original document's execution or existence;
— If the document is in the custody or under control of the adverse (2) there is proof of the cause of the original document's unavailability;
party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and
and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the (3) the offeror is in good faith.
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily
• Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be
document refers to evidence other than the original instrument or admitted.
document itself. A party may present secondary evidence of the
contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed,
but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse
party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given
before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
• In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation
of the photocopied documents in question as secondary evidence. Any
suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals
has to be dismissed. The stenographic notes of the following exchanges
between Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF and ESHRI,
respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the requirements:
IDScTE
• Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above
exchanges, to wit:

(1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession
of;
(2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents;
(3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and
(4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.

Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the

exception under Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 130. In other words, the conditions
sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of
the original document as secondary evidence have been met.

These are: