SPECPRO DIGESTS
filed by petitioner and respondent Silverio Jr., father and son, respectively, who are
A. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
1. G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner, vs. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR.,
CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC., Respondents.
FACTS:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will, survived by her legal heirs,
namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S.
Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and
Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO, but by
virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of
BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by
EDGARDO was approved by the intestate court and in his stead, SILVERIO SR.
was appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings
to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued between SILVERIO SR. and
SILVERIO JR.
The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as administrator of the
estate petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr. In an order in 2005,
SILVERIO SR. was removed as administrator and in his stead, SILVERIO, JR. was
designated as the new administrator. By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO,
JR. on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of CITRINE
HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on 06
September 2010 as evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo
(notarized on September 16, 2010) for the lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle,
Forbes Park, Makati City. On 23 December 2010, TCT No. 006-2011000050 was
issued toMonica P. Ocampo. The latter subsequently sold said property to ZEE2
Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was issued on 11 February
2011 under its name.
SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the Issuance
of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among others,
that a TRO be issued restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA
OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-in-interest from
committing any act that would affect the titles to the three properties.
An Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate court acting upon pending motions
the central figures in the now decade-old controversy over the Intestate Estate of the
late Beatriz Silverio.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To
Declare as Null and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b)
To cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate
the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr.
and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court rendered
the now assailed orders granting the preliminary injunction against Silverio Jr., and
declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and void.
The Court of Appeals rendered decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificate of Title and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and
Intsia property valid. Silverio Sr., contends that CA committed a
reversible error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and Cambridge
properties on theground that the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a
limited jurisdiction only and which does not include resolving issues of ownership.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the Intestate Estate by the administrator valid.
RULING:
An administrator can validly sell the intestate estate under his administration only by
leave of court. While it is true that Silverio Sr. was eventually reinstated as
administrator pursuant to the 2008 decision, the permanent injunction issued by the
CA, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the 2006
Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and
taking of an oath of administration by Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would
have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing
the sale of the subject properties.
Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this
Court denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.’s motion for reconsideration of the
February 11, 2009 Resolution denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No.
185619).1âwphi1
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate
court annulling the sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the injunction
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should
not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate
court, having relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval
of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which
remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
2. Edgar San Luis Vs.Felicidad San Luis (G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007)
Rodolfo San Luis Vs. Felicidad Sagalongos Alias Felicidad San Luis (G.R. No. 134029
February 6, 2007)
Facts:
Felicisimo T. San Luis (decedent), the former governor of Laguna, contracted three marriages.
First with Virginia Sulit (died) with 6 children Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel, second with Merry Lee Corwin (American, divorced taken from Hawaii) with a son
Tobias, and lastly with Felicidad San Luis, where he had no child but lived with her till his
death for 18 years.
Felicidad sought for dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate and filed for letters of administration (LOA), alleging, among others, that
the decedent was residing at Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue and lack of cause of action of Felicidad,
claiming that LOA should be file in Laguna because it was Felicisimo’s place of residence
prior to his death and claiming that Felicidad was only a mistress since Felicisimo was still
validly married to Merry Lee.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the case was filed in the proper venue.
2. Whether or not Felicidad has cause of action and legal capacity to be the
administratix.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate. The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. The term "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between
"residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions.
Yes, but not as wife but as a co-owner. Since the Divorce Decree obtained by Merry Lee from
Hawaii was not presented and recognized in the Philippines, Felicisimo was still considered as
married to the former during his marriage to Felicidad, making their marriage invalid for being
bigamous. However, since Felicisimo lived with Felicidad for 18 years and acquired properties
therein, they are recognized as co-owners of the properties in accordance with the rules on
property relations of common law partners. Therefore, Felicidad may become the
Administratix of Felicisimo’s properties for being the latter’s co-owner.
3. Agtarap vs Agtarap (June 8, 2011)
FACTS:
Decedent Joaquin left (2) parcels of land with improvements. He contracted (2)
marriages.
with Lucia (W1), who died 1924; three children, Jesus (+), Milagros (+), Jose (+)
Then with Caridad (W2), with three children, Eduardo, Sebastian, Mercedes
Son Eduardo (W2) filed petition for settlement of Joaquin’s intestate estate. RTC
issued resolution appointing Eduardo as administrator.
The RTC issued an Order of Partition on Oct 23, 2000 which ruled that “bulk of
estate property
were acquired during the existence of 2nd marriage, TCTs showing Joaquin married
to Caridad.
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph & Teresa (Jose children) filed their
respective motions for reconsiderations. The RTC
o Denied Eduardo & Sebastian MRs
o Granted MR of Joseph & Teresa
o Declared “real properties belonged to conjugal partnership of Joaquin &
Lucia” and directed Oct Partition to reflect correct sharing of heirs
Eduardo & Sebastian both appealed to CA before RTC could issue new order of
partition. The CA dismissed the appeals and affirmed the RTC resolution. The CA
also directed the partition of Joaquin’s
properties. Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed separate MRs which were
denied. They filed separate petitions for review which were eventually consolidated.
Sebastian contended that
o Joseph & Teresa failed to establish that they are legitimate heirs of Jose,
and thus of their grandfather Joaquin
 o Certificates of title of subject property indicate “Joaquin married to
Caridad” which is conclusive proof of ownership, and thus not subject to
collateral attack
Eduardo alleged
o CA erroneously settled Joaquin’s estate together with the estates of Lucia,
Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria and Milagros in one proceeding
o Estate of Milagros cannot be distributed, since a proceeding was already
conducted in another
court for the probate of Milagros’ will, thus violating the rule on precedence
of testate over
intestate proceedings.
o RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction has no
jurisdiction to determine questions of ownership which belongs to another
court with general jursdiction
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC as intestate court has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of
real properties? (Yes)
-CA settlement of Joaquin estate together with the estates of the other heirs
-Legitimacy of Joseph & Teresa
RULING:
Eduardo’s petition granted. Sebastian’s petition denied. CA affirmed with
modification that the share awarded in favor of Milagros shall not be distributed until
the final determination of the probate of the will.
Sebastian to be represented by wife and children, given that Sebastian died on
January 15, 2010.
Case remanded to RTC for further settlement of Joaquin’s estate.
HELD:
RTC has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of the real properties.
Gen Rule: Jurisdiction of trial court, either as probate or intestate court, relates only
to matters having to do with probate of will and or settlement of estate of deceased
persons and does not extend to determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings.
Exceptions, as justified by expediency and convenience:
Probate court may provisionally pass upon in intestate or testate proceeding
the question of inclusion or exclusion, from inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to final determination in a separate action.
If interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or
advancement of the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
court and the rights of third persons are not impaired.
Estate is settled and distributed among heirs only after payment of debts of the estate,
funeral charges, administrative expense, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax.
Records show these were not complied with in1965.
Sebastian did not present evidence to support avermrnts to exclude Joseph and
Teresa as heirs.
CA disposition related only to the estate of Joaquin.
Sec 1 Rule 90: RTC granted jurisdiction to determine lawful heirs of
Joaquin as well as their respective shares in the payment of obligations.
The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Mercedes and Gloria was merely a necessary
consequence of the settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his legal heirs.
4.Suntay III vs. Cojuanco-Suntay
(G. R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012, Perez J.)
Facts:
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina
was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren:
three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two
illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico and
Cristina only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. After
Cristina’s death, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Federico, opposed the petition, and filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabela’s petition for
letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to
the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of
her parent’s marriage being declared null and void.
Undaunted, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his
behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio
III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped
than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court
rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent’s intestate
estate. On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme Court in an earlier case reversed and set
aside the ruling of the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether Emilio III is better qualified to act as administrator of the estate than Isabel
Held:
No. Isabel is better qualified to act as administrator of the estate than Emilio III. The
general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid
down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters
of administration granted, If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person
as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling,
or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is not such creditor
competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the
appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks
out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an
administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence. The paramount consideration in
the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6,
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment
of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will
reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in
the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement,
have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.
In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the
estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate. The collected teaching
is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto
entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling
among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as
co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left
entirely to the sound discretion of the Courts and depends on the facts and the
attendant circumstances of the case. Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant
facts and circumstances of this case even as we reiterate Isabel and her siblings
apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina. These considerations do not warrant
the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
The evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator
of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s appointment as
administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
5. LEE V. RTC of QC
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the company’s
incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed
capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado
Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five
illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina
Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all
surnamed Ortañez).2
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez.
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition
to the petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed
that the intestate court appoint a special administrator.
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez
submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other
properties, 2,0293 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance
Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the company’s
outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez,claiming that she
owned 1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate,
sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino
Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, herein petitioner
Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the
stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in
its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal
capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,0115 Philinterlife shares of
stocks as his inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to
repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG, represented by its president,
herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its
name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortañez failed to
repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the
intestate proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85),
Juliana Ortañez and her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose
Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the
estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was
the basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortañez on April
15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortañez on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares)
in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her
siblings (hereafter referred to as private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for
appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was
opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents
Enderes et al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the
Philinterlife shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion
to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982.
On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the partial nullity of the
extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate. These motions were opposed by
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to
declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which
move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a property of
the estate without an Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. Since the sales in question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortañez and
Jose S. Ortañez in their personal capacity without prior approval of the Court, the
same is not binding upon the Estate.
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting the motion of
Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the March 4, 1982
memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate. The court reasoned
that:
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose Ortañez filed, on
December 22, 1997, a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court denied his petition, however, ruling that there was no legal justification
whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose Ortañez, his brother
Rafael Ortañez and mother Juliana Ortañez during the pendency of the settlement of
the estate of Dr. Ortañez, without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it
was clear that there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby.
Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez to
FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without
approval of the intestate court, was void.8
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of
Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise the following errors for our consideration:
The Court of Appeals committed grave reversible ERROR:
xxx
D. In failing to declare null and void the orders of the intestate court which
nullified the sale of shares of stock between the legitimate heir Jose S. Ortañez
and petitioner FLAG because of settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that an heir
has the right to dispose of the decedent’s property even if the same is under
administration pursuant to Civil Code provision that possession of hereditary
property is transmitted to the heir the moment of death of the decedent
(Acedebo vs. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 194);
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the shares of stocks was invalid.
HELD: YES.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor because this was already settled a long time
ago by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No.
46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in our resolution dated October 9,
1998 in G.R. No. 135177 dismissing the petition for review on a technicality and
thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on the ground
that there was no compelling reason to reconsider said denial.18 Our decision
became final on February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in the book of entry
of judgments.
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose,
Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of
agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite
their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final
settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate
properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio
Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third
party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
moment of death of the decedent.20 However, an heir can only alienate such
portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by
the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors
shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their
shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the
estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and
Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in
Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending
the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue
prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the
present case.
6. THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor,
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division),
MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE
ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996]
FACTS:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son,
Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes,
and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his
heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor
of his estate.
Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the
decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take
any action for the probate of his father’s holographic will.
Four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will
was executed under undue influence.
Petitioner thereafter leased a property bequeathed to one of the private respondent to
third persons. The probate court then ordered petitioner to deposit the rental deposit
and payments with the Clerk of Court. Petitioner the moved for the release of certain
amounts for the payment of real estate taxes which the court granted. Petitioner again
moved for the release of funds but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover
the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three
granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.
The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes
and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of firast
publication of the notice to creditors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before
payment of the estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an
allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testators grandchildren;
(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs.
RULING:
1. It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should
not be limited to the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article
188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the
time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the deceased’s legitimate spouse and children,
regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the
fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education,
subsist even beyond the age of majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children
and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate courts
order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of
his estate.
2. Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of first
publication of notice to creditors. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment
of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only
be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said
obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the
court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of
six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The
questioned order speaks of notice to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations.
Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations
that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires
that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the
time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried
and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles
six months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as
to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions
of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has
been authenticated.
7. Unionbank vs Santibañez G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
Facts:
On 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount
was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one unit Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC. On December 13, 1980,
the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of
another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of Rotamoto., Again, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreementfor the
loan.
In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings
commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Edmund was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence executed a Joint
Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of
the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was
executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the
FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines
(UBP) to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union
Bank filed filed a Complaintfor sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were
issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in
the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his
return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.Considering that the
joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under
the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence)as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code;
and that unconditional signing of the joint agreement stopped Florence, and that she
cannot deny her liability under the said document,
In her comment to petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to
recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim; thus the claim should have been
filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the
joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that
even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it
should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the
estate, the heirs or third parties.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate
court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim was pending.
2. Whether or not the agreement between Edmund and Florence which was in effect,
a partition of the estate was vpid considering that it had not been approved by the
probate court.
3. Whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid;
Whether or not there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is
probated.
Held:
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine
all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.[20] The said court
is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the
estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a
holographic will which contained the provision which read as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later
after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately
preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the
properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he
was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein
are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid since specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money
claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate
court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of
the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence
presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement,
were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund.
As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may
only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes
and continuing guaranty.
8. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON vs MA. LOURDES BELEN
FACTS
Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife
Ma. Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother,
Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas
City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its
value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s
estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed
an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition to their
claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise
upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the
Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived
together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s
estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of
the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court,
so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that
for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of
Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during
his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in
the said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.Having a vested right
in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
9.ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES namely
ESTELA, ERIBERTO and VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA,
ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA
SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA vs. HEIRS OF
MAXIMINO BRIONES namely: SILVERIO BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES,
BINIFACIO CABAHUG JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA,
CRESENCIA BRIONES, FUGURACION MEDALLE and MERCEDES
LAGBAS
G.R. NO. 150175 FEBRUARY 5, 2007
DOCTRINE: The settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding
in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and
of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a
notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on
the date and time indicated in the publication.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Petitioners were the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones while
respondents were the heirs of the late Maximino Briones. Maximino married Donata
but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died in 1952, Donata
instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband's estate in CFI Cebu City. The
court issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of
Maximino's properties. Subsequently, CFI also issued an order awarding ownership
of real estate properties to Donata which she filed at the Registry of Deeds. Thus,
new TCT's were issued covering the real estate properties in her name.
When Donata died on 1977, Erlinda, one of her nieces, instituted with the
RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and
her husband was appointed as administrators of Donata's intestate estate.
On 1985, Silverio Briones, nephew of Maximino, filed a petition with the
RTC for letters of Administration for the Intestate estate of Maximino which was
later on granted by the RTC. RTC likewise allowed Silverio to collect rentals from
Maximino's properties. Gregorio (Erlinda's Husband) filed a motion to set aside
order claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wife's
administration as part of the intestate estate of Donate. For this reason, the Letter of
Administration issued to Silverio was set aside by the RTC.
On 1987, the Heirs of Maximino filed a complaint with the RTC against the
heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment and recovery of possession of real
property. The Complaint was later on amended alleging that Donata, as
administratrix, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust and without
the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering the properties under her
name.
RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Maximino and ordered Erlinda to
reconvey the real estate properties to the heirs of Maximino. The heirs of Donata
appealed the case to the CA but the Appellate Court affirmed the ruling made by the
RTC. SC reversed the decision rendered by the CA and the RTC. Thus, Respondents
moved for the reconsideration of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court.
The main contention of respondents was that since the CFI Order was based
on Donata's fraudulent misrepresentation that she was Maximino's sole heir, it being
void, such order does not produce any legal effect.
ISSUE OF THE CASE
WON the CFI order declaring Donata to be the sole heir of Maximino was
valid despite Donata's alleged misrepresentation. YES
RULING OF THE CASE
The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the
intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no
implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in
her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October
1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed
to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive
heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of
Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other
heirs of her deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of
Maximinoin Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had
surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given
personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the
settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the
publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for
the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole
world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time
indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers
is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the
deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who
were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such
omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the
intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court
pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge conducted the
proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such
presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A
review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also
failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate
proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can
this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximinos siblings could have
missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
Moreover, even if Donata's allegation that she was Maximinos sole heir
does constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated
15 January 1960, considering the nature of intestate proceedings as being in rem and
the disputable presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful
exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
10. SABIDONG V. SOLAS
Facts: Trinidad Sabidong, complainantâs mother, is one of the longtime occupants
of a parcel of land, designated as Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N.
Hodges and situated at Jaro, Iloilo City.
The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Hodges
Estate, as the other half-portion was occupied by Priscila Saplagio. In 1983 ejectment
suit, however Saplagio was ordered to vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her. In
1984, respondent who was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City
Offered to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the Hodges
Estate rejected respondent’s because the actual occupant of Lot 12 manifested their
intention to buy it. He was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to
purchase Lot 11 "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them which
the respondent immediately made. The probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late Charles
Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"), approved the offer upon the
court’s observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their
desire to purchase the lots they are occupying up to this date and considering time
restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x x x offerors are most
beneficial to the estate x x x". Consequently the title of the lot was transferred to the
respondent. Later on a writ of demolition was issued by the probate court in favor of
respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot 11. In 1999, a complaint was
initiated against the respondent in the Supreme Court alleging the prohibition for
court personnel to buy properties in litigation. The complaint likewise alleged that
the respondent committed deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of
authority. It was alleged that complainant and his family were made to believe by the
respondent that he is the representative of the Estate. The complainant relied on the
representations of the respondent that he was authorized to facilitate the sale, with
more reason that respondent represented himself as the City Sheriff.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is prohibited to purchase the property subject
of probate.
Held: NO. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must
take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the
property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. In the case at bar, when respondent
purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it
can not be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering
that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc.
No. 1672). A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or
litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the
judicial action of the judge.
A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be
subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to show
that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and
terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated
November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the
operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. This notwithstanding, we hold that
the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to
purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another court
(RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
11. G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v.TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON
V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V.
MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L.
MERCADO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate, survived by his second wife, Teresita V.
Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V.
Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M.
Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L.
Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian,
Cebu to Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate. The RTC granted
the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in
favor of Teresita As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate
of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and
to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of
January 8, 1993.
Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, supporting her
inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir
Realty shares of stock; the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10,
1991 involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange
for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; and
the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory,
and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to
or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the
order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot
No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that
the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the
possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty. Thelma opposed the
motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that there
was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants agreement as
heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or
excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction
to pass upon the issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of
certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been
either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the
decedent during his lifetime
RULING:
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its
conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders
of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may
be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent
and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the
inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant
to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz: Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be
returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order
one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real
and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is
qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which
signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the
decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception,
for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the
estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining
the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of
the estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is
vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in
the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in
order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included
or excluded from the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for
in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to
replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive
abuse of discretion.” As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its
judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is
special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of
the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still
revised.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the
RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with
circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all
properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator
to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end
to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse
of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its
judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi–
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi–judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
12. G.R. No. 187524, August 05, 2015
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG AND FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA, SUBSTITUTED
BY DR. RUEL B. VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, v. MA. GRACIA RI�OZA PLAZO
AND MA. FE RI�OZA ALARAS, Respondents.
DECISION
Facts:
Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including
his children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and
Ma. Fe Alaras, his second wife Benita Tenorio and other children, as
well as several properties including a resort covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an
area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on which it
stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in
Nasugbu, Batangas.
Respondents Plazo filed an action for Judicial Partition with
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession dated September 15,
1993, on the ground their co-heirs, Pedro's second wife, Benita
Tenorio and other children, had sold Pedro’s resort and family home to
petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are
now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria,
without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about the sale,
Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she
believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however,
did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by
Pedro and Benita from a bank.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a
notice of an extra- judicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the
annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before
the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying,
among others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the
subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued
pursuant thereto.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents due to the irregularities
irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as
well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same.
Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary
public who was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was
executed. The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the
acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the typewritten name
"Pedro Riñoza, Husband" on the left side of the document was not
signed.
The CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Before the SC, petitioners contended that the RTC had no
jurisdiction. According to them, the allegations in the complaint filed
by the respondents show that the cause of action is actually one for
settlement of estate of decedent Pedro.
Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding
cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction, while judicial
partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are
ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the respondent’s
complaint.
Issue:
WON the RTC had no jurisdiction on the ground that the
complaint filed is for the settlement of the estate of Pedro and not of
Partition.
Held:
Yes. The RTC had jurisdiction. Petitioner is mistaken. It is true
that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties
left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and
extent of their interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement
of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily
show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and
the reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition
with annulment of title and recovery of possession. Section 1, Rule 69
of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.— A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
Here, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2)
that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with
the exception of one who is represented by a judicial representative
duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the
only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description
of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no known
indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the
decedent's estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with
the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations
of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the
complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not
perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
B. ESCHEATS
1. CASTORIO ALVARICO, petitioner, vs. AMELITA L. SOLA
Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of respondent Amelita Sola while
FerminaLopez is petitioner's aunt, and also Amelita's adoptive mother.
On June 17, 1982, the Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous
Sales Application (MSA) of Fermina (aunt/adoptive mother) over Lot 5.
On May 28, 1983, Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of
Rights over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the obligations,
duties, and conditions imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application:
xxx the Transferee Mrs. Amelita L. Sola, agrees to assume, all the obligations, duties
and conditions imposed upon the Awardee in relation to
the MSA Application xxx.
[I] hereby declare that I accept this Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer
of Rights and further agree to all conditions provided therein.
Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands. She paid a total amount
of P282,900.
On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of
rights and granting the amendment of the application from Fermina to Amelita. On
May 2, 1989, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3439 was issued in favor of
Amelita.
On June 24, 1993, herein petitioner (natural father) filed Civil Case for reconveyance
against Amelita. He claimed that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to
him and immediately thereafter, he took possession of the same. He averred that the
donation to him had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita.
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because
Fermina was no longer the owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to
petitioner, the property having been transferred earlier to her. She added that the
donation was void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that
she had validly acquired the land as Fermina's rightful heir. She also denied that she
is a trustee of the land for petitioner.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals REVERSED the RTC. Case Dismissed. MR
denied.
 Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari seasonably filed on the following grounds:
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
IN APPLYING ON THE
CASE AT BAR THE PRINCIPLE IN LAW THAT IT IS REGISTRATION OF
THE SALES PATENT THAT
CONSTITUTE THE OPERATIVE ACT THAT WOULD CONVEY OWNERSHIP
OF THE LAND TO THE
APPLICANT BECAUSE THE LEGAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
DOES NOT INVOLVE CONFLICTING CLAIMS ON SALES PATENT
APPLICATIONS;
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR IN MAKING A FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ACQUIRED
THE LAND IN QUESTION,
IN GOOD FAITH, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO BASIS NOR NEED TO MAKE
SUCH A FINDING; and
The crucial issue to be resolved in an action for reconveyance is: Who between
petitioner and respondent has a better claim to the land?
Given the circumstances in this case and the contentions of the parties, we find that
no reversible error was committed by the appellate court in holding that herein
petitioner's complaint against respondent should be dismissed. The evidence on
record and the applicable law indubitably favor respondent.
Petitioner principally relies on Articles 744 and 1544 of the New Civil Code, which
provide:
Art. 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees shall be
governed by the provisions concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more
different persons.
Art. 1544.xxx ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she registered the land in her
name and, based on the abovementioned rules, he has a better right over the property
because he was first in material possession in good faith. However, this allegation of
bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary
support. For one, the execution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of
Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence
is required to assail and controvert them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439
was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioner's bare
allegation to defeat the Original Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity of issuance. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as
notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can plead
ignorance of its registration.
in bad faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the
Public Land Act. Thus:
Sec. 101.-All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain
or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any
action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will
again form part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting
in his stead may do so. Since Amelita Sola's title originated from a grant by the
government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly
then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita's title. It
follows that he cannot "recover" the property because, to begin with, he has not
shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.
2.G.R. No. 172720, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015
ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS, petitioners, v. HEIRS OF
EUSEBIO BORROMEO, respondents
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.
FACTS
On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued Free Patent No. 586681 over a
piece of agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-9053. On June 15, 1983, well within the five-year
prohibitory period, Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos. Eusebio
Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he
allegedly told his wife, Norberta Borromeo,3 and his children to nullify the sale
made to Eliseo Maltos and have the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5477
cancelled because the sale was within the five-year prohibitory period. On June 23,
1993, Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for
Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and
the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
946. Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing
that the sale was made in good faith and that in purchasing the property, they relied
on Eusebio Borromeo's title. Further, the parties were in pari delicto. Since the sale
was made during the five-year prohibitory period, the land would revert to the public
domain and the proper party to institute reversion proceedings was the Office of the
Solicitor General. The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer,
arguing that the deed of sale was presented for Registration after the five-year
prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on its part to register the deed. The heirs
of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a valid defense because the
prohibitory period appeared on the face of the title of the property.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the late Eusebio
Borromeo.
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed property within the prohibitory period is
valid or binding.
HELD
1.
The five-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained under homestead or free
patent is provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which states:
SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation
from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance1 of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified
persons, associations, or corporations.
The main purpose in the grant of a freq patent of homestead is to preserve and keep
in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given
to him so he may have a place to live with his family and become a happy citizen and
a useful member of the society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the conservation
of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to
foster, families as the foundation of society, and thus promote general welfare. . . .
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public policy. Its violation gives
rise to the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land and its
improvements to the government at the instance of the latter. The provision that "nor
shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to that
expiration of the five-year period" is mandatory and any sale made in violation of
such provision is void and produces no effect whatsoever, just like what transpired in
this case. Clearly, it is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what
public policy by law seeks to preserve.
In this case, Section 10187 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title already
vested in Eusebio Borromeo's name. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that the sale was made within the five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is
sufficient cause to revert the property in favor of the state. However, this court
cannot declare reversion of the property in favor of the state in view of the limitation
imposed by Section 101 that an action for reversion must first be filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General.
2.
The doctrine of in pari delicto non orituractio is inapplicable when public policy will
be violated. The in pari delicto rule is provided under Articles 1411 and 1412 of the
Civil Code. Article 1411 pertains to acts that constitute criminal offenses, while
Article 1412 pertains to acts that do not These provisions state:
ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the
contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari
delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or
instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent
one may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his
promise.
ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover
what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's
undertaking;cralawlawlibrary
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he
has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfilment of what has been
promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has
given without any obligation to comply with his promise.
The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here
appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law.
Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-
in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but
because the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires
that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to
her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead
law is predicated. This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of
any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve." We are,
therefore, constrained to hold that appellee can maintain the present action it being in
furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead law.
As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the question now arises as to who
between the parties have a better right to possess the subject parcel of land. This
issue was addressed in Santos:
What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the
possession of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to
the homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the
purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no
more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the
appellants. Their right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of
appellee and, therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of
appellee during and until the government takes steps toward its reversion to the State.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that while there is yet no action for
reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the property should be
conveyed by petitioners to respondents.
With respect to Appellees' claim for the reimbursement of the improvements on the
land in question, they are hereby declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the
necessary improvements that they made thereon in the same manner that Appellants
should lose the value of the products gathered by the Appellees from the said land.
We are constrained to hold that the heirs of the homesteader should be declared to
have lost and forfeited the value of the products gathered from the land, and so
should the defendants lose the value of the necessary improvements that they have
made thereon.
Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of Commonwealth of the
Philippines.
The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently awarded and
disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. The
general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic, and the Office of
the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for reversion. The objective
of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation of the certificate of title
an|l the resulting reversion of the land covered by the title to the State| This is why an
action for reversion is oftentimes designated asj an annulment suit or a cancellation
suit. Since an action for reversion presupposes that the property in dispute is owned
by the state, it is proper that the action be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
being the real party-in-interest.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not automatic. Section 29
of the Public Land Act provides:
SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun, the purchaser, with the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may convey or encumber
his rights to any person, corporation, or association legally qualified under this Act
to purchase agricultural public lands, provided such conveyance or encumbrance
does not affect any right or interest of the Government in the land: And provided,
further, That the transferee is not delinquent in the payment of any installment due
and payable. Any sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and shall produce the
effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights to the
State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government
shall be forfeited. After the sale has been approved, the vendor shall not lose his
right to acquire agricultural public lands under the provisions of this Act, provided
he has the necessary qualifications.
In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to Eusebio
Borromeo. This shows that he already had title to the property when he sold it to
petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Thus, Section 101 of the Public Land Act applies.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
C. GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP
1. PILAR Y. GOYENA v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO.
[G. R. No. 147148. January 13, 2003]
PILAR Y. GOYENA, petitioner, vs. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent.
Facts:
On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP over the person and properties of her sister Julieta,
the pertinent allegations of which read:
During the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the Makati
Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age, general debility,
and a mini-stroke which she suffered in the United States in early 1995;
Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without outside
assistance, and she has to be moved by wheel chair. She owns real estate and
personal properties in Metro Manila and in Western Visayas, with an aggregate
estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million Pesos. However, she is not in a
position to care for herself, and that she needs the assistance of a guardian to manage
her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises;
That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely,
petitioner Amparo Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the
Religious of the Assumption, and Loreto Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given
their consent to the filing of this petition as shown by their signatures at the bottom
of this petition
Pilar Goyena, Julieta’s long time close friend filed an Opposition to the petition for
letters of guardianship alleging that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and there
is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property. She
also contents that Julieta and her sister Amparo are antagonistic with each othr.
xxx
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Amparo Gustilo is unsuitable for appointment as
guardian of the person and properties of Julieta.
Ruling:
She is a suitable guardian for Julieta.
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals
directly with the parties. As this Court said:
As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting
the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his
action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed
unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.[14]
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
Based from the evidence presented, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case
at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent as
guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she was
disliked by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for
appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner concealed the deteriorating state of mind
of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good faith.
2. CANIZA VS. CA
February 24, 1997
FACTS:
Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College
of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared
incompetent by judgment of the RTC QC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by
her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age
and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia.
Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
Plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT
No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that
Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and
failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the
Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so;
and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of
the house in question, they ** (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for
the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be
rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year
from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
Guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the (MetroTC) of Quezon City to
eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint was
later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal
guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living
in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they
had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a
holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas
the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MeTC in favor of Caiza but it was reversed on appeal
by the RTC.
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October 21, 1992,
but failed in that attempt.
Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively --
were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said
action; and assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not
Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
RULING:
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of
both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of
Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the "guardian over
the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA with full authority to
take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in
which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management
of her properties **
By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to
attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to
custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. ] It also became her right
and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real
and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or
control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's
estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone
who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal.
The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Caiza's death
automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as
her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the
present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule
affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza,
is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew,
Ramon C. Nevado.
SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear
within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment
of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court,
and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of
the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed
by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not
extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not
being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and
now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
3. NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-
CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D.
ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALAvs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY.
Facts:
Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first
marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5)
from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia,
Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and
Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555
square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his
personal capacity and as natural guardian of minors Rosa and Douglas, with
Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
with Absolute Deed of Sale on July 7, 1979, adjudicating the properties among
themselves ten conveying them to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy) for ₱ 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale
against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs) before the RTC assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint
was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria as additional plaintiffs for having
been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her
first marriage.
The heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory
period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of
Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the
subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the annulment of the
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sales because Eutropia
and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial
authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. RTC rejected
the defenses of laches and prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed
possession of the subject properties for 17 years, holding that co-ownership rights are
imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision. It
held that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial
settlement and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound by it, the
CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale considering spouses
Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and that Eutropia and Victoria belatedly filed
their action in 1997, or more than two years from knowledge of their exclusion as
heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded
heirs from recovering their legitimes from their co-heirs.
CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent sale as valid
and binding with respect to Enrique and his children, holding that as co-owners, they
have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they consider necessary or fit.
Rosa and Douglas were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to question
it upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in because of
their inaction for a long period of time.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Extra-Judicial Settlement is valid.
2. Whether or not the Absolute Deed of Sale is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. All the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion
from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and
consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979
and 980 of the Civil Code which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her
children (1/16 of the estate each) and Enrique (1/2 plus 1/16) acquired their
respective inheritances.
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have
participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and
that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the
settlement was not valid and binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. –
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. The effect of excluding the heirs in the
settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura, thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which
was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the
nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the
rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and
did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their
right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution…
2. Yes. The subsequent sale of the subject properties made by Enrique and his
children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents is valid but
only with respect to their proportionate shares. These heirs have acquired their
respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death and
that, as owners, they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate. With
respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the
settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in
the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique
was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to
dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution
of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos,
the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to
the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the
necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the
child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be
considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of
guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof.
For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of
fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or
alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the
limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the
minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the
property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the
ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in
accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor
children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching
the age of majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and
1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by
the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it
is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been
executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction
to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would
not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts
to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized
act of the party so making the ratification. Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such
as when the person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from
all its defects from the moment it was constituted, as it has a retroactive effect.
Records show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with
absolute deed of sale on Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation before the RTC dated
July 11, 1997 and in their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit. The same, however, is not
true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action
has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in
Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the
extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate.
Besides, an "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from
the time the cause of action accrues, which is from the time of actual notice in case
of unregistered deed. In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have
knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father,
Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in
1997 was well within the prescriptive period of 10 years.
4. Oropesa v Oropesa
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision
rendered by the CA affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings which
dismissed Nilo Oropesa’s, peitioner, petition for guardianship over the properties of contained finding that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed
his father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa. competent.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms.
Oropesa vs Oropesa
Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, respondent,
Cirilo Oropesa. Facts:
• P Nilo – filed a petition for him and Ms. Louie – to be appointed as guardians over
In said petition, petitioner alleged that respondent has been afflicted with several the property of his father [R Cirilo] [SP 04-0016]
maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke, that - alleged:
1] R – afflicted with several maladies
his judgment and memory were impaired and such has been evident after his 2] sickly for over 10 years, suffered a stroke
hospitalization. That due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside 3] judgment and memory were impaired [evidence: hospitalization]
4] R had lapses in memory and judgment; failure to manage his
aid, manage his property wisely, and has become easy prey for deceit and properties properly [even before stroke]
exploitation by people around him, particularly his girlfriend, Ms. Luisa Agamata. 5] due to his age and medical condition – he cannot manage his
property wisely
Respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his (ever [t] become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation,
caring and loving) son. particularly by Ms. Ma. Luisa, his GF
• R – filed his opposition to the petition for guardianship
During trial, petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his, his sister, and • R – presented his evidence – testimonies of:
respondent’s former nurse’s testimony. 1] his sister
2] former nurse
After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his written • P – failed to file his evidence, [t] R – filed an Omnibus Motion & Demurrer to
formal offer of evidence. Evidence

Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner has • TC – granted the latter
waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they were not • CA – dismissed P’s appeal

formally offered; To expunge the documents of the petitioner from records; and to Issue:
W/N R IS AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SEC. 2, R.92,
grant leave to the Oppositor to file Demurrer to Evid. A subsequent Demurrer was
ROC WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP - NO
filed and was granted.
• © Francisco vs CA
MR was filed by petitioner and appealed the case to CA; failed, now to the SC.
√ Guardianship
- a trust relation of the most sacred character,
in which one person called a “guardian” acts for another called the
Issue: Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who should be “ward” whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs
placed under guardianship? - designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian
- intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any
assistance that the ward may personally require
Decision: No.The only medical document on record is the Report of
√ Custody – immediate care and control
Neuropsychological Screening. Said report, was ambivalent at best, although had √ Guardianship – plus one in loco parentis as well
negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also √ Guardianship proceeding
 - court may appoint a qualified guardian [if] prospective ward – proven to
be a minor or incompetent
√ Sec. 2, R.92
- incompetents – persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of [age,
disease, weak body or other similar causes] are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid
√ Anchored on – “clear, positive and definite evidence”
• P’s proof of testimonies – insufficient to convince P’s cause of action
• Set aside P’s procedural lapse [fail to offer formal evidence], his documentary
proof do not relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself
• “Report on Neuropsychological Screening” [attached to the petition]
- although it had negative findings regarding memory lapses, it also
contained findings that supported R’s view that he was average and indeed
competent
√ © “Where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary;
observations of the TC coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of
mental sanity will suffice”
• Court - noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that
Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to
manage his own affairs.
• Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states
that Gen. Oropesa
(1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested;
(2) is capable of mental calculations; and
(3) can provide solutions to problem situations
• The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning,
except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation
• It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.
6. EDUARDO T. ABAD vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO
G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012
Facts:
Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of
Maura B. Abad with the RTC. In support thereof, Abad alleged that he maintains
residence at Quezon City and that he is Maura’s nephew. He averred that Maura,
who is single, more than 90 years old and a resident of Pangasinan, is in dire need of
a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her advanced age,
Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself and her
properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation.
Leonardo Biason opposed to the Petition and submitted his Opposition to the
Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties of Maura B.
Abad. Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was
not notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the latter’s
guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian as
he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while
Maura maintains her abode in Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as
Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of
attorney to manage her properties.
RTC denied Abad’s petition and appointed Biason as Maura’s guardian. Abad filed a
MR but the RTC denied the same.Abad filed an appeal to the CA. He argued that the
RTC erred in disqualifying him from being appointed as Maura’s guardian despite
the fact that he has all the qualifications stated under the Rules. That he was not a
resident of Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a ground for his disqualification as
he had actively and efficiently managed the affairs and properties of his aunt even if
he is residing in Metro Manila. Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura to be
her guardian.
Abad further averred that no hearing was conducted to determine the qualifications
of Biason prior to his appointment as guardian. He claimed that the RTC also
overlooked Maura’s express objection to Biason’s appointment.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Abad filed a MR but the CA denied.
Abad also bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of his residence.
He emphasizes that it is not a requirement for a guardian to be a resident of the same
locality as the ward, or to be living with the latter under the same roof in order to
qualify for the appointment. The more significant considerations are that the person
to be appointed must be of good moral character and must have the capability and
sound judgment in order that he may be able to take care of the ward and prudently
manage his assets.
Issue:
WON the CA gravely erred when it denied the petitioner’s appeal and erroneously
upheld respondent Biason’s appointment as guardian based on sole ground of
residence, and failed to consider the requirements and qualifications prescribed by
the SC for the appointment of guardian.
Ruling:
Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. Maura
averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and academic the issues raised in the
petition. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship be
terminated. Abad expressed his acquiescence to Maura’s motion to dismiss the
petition. He also supported Maura’s prayer for the termination of the guardianship by
asseverating that her act of filing of a petition-in-intervention is indicative of the fact
that she is of sound mind and that she can competently manage her business affairs.
We find Maura’s motion meritorious.
Basically, Abad was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which
the RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it
has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the
petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The
supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of
Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been
dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone
else for that matter, any substantial relief.
D. TRUSTEES
1. LBP V. PEREZ
Doctrines of the case
1. Under the Trust Receipts Law, intent todefraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee
fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by the trust receipt to the
entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to return the goods under trust, if they are
not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts.
2. In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in
the alternative—the return of the proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the
goods, whether raw or processed.
3. In order that the respondents “may be validly prosecuted for estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with Section 13 of the
Trust Receipts Law, the following elements must be established:
(a) they received the subject goods in trust or under the obligation to sell the same
and to remit the proceeds thereof to [the trustor], or to return the goods if not sold;
(b) they misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale;
(c) they performed such acts with abuse of confidence to the damage and prejudice
of Metrobank; and
(d) demand was made on them by [the trustor] for the remittance of the proceeds or
the return of the unsold goods.”
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government financial
institution and the official depository of the Philippines. Respondents are the officers
and representatives of Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC), a
corporation incorporated under Philippine law and engaged in the construction
business.
2. LBP extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the execution of an
Omnibus Credit Line Agreement (Agreement) between LBP and ACDC on October
29, 1996.
3. In various instances, ACDC used the Letters of Credit/Trust Receipts Facility of
the Agreement to buy construction materials. The respondents, as officers and
representatives of ACDC, executed trust receipts in connection with the construction
materials, with a total principal amount of P52,344,096.32. The trust receipts
matured, but ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects
or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts. LBP sent ACDC a demand
letter, dated May 4, 1999, for the payment of its debts, including those under the
Trust Receipts Facility in the amount of P66,425,924.39. When ACDC failed to
comply with the demand letter, LBP filed the affidavit-complaint for estafa or
violation of Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
P.D. 115
4. Perez alleged that they signed the trust receipt documents on or about the same
time LBP and ACDC executed the loan documents; their signatures were required by
LBP for the release of the loans. The trust receipts in this case do not contain (1) a
description of the goods placed in trust, (2) their invoice values, and (3) their
maturity dates, in violation of Section 5(a) of P.D. 115.
5. They alleged that ACDC acted as a subcontractor for government projects such as
the Metro Rail Transit, the Clark Centennial Exposition and the Quezon Power Plant
in Mauban, Quezon. Its clients for the construction projects, which were the general
contractors of these projects, have not yet paid them; thus, ACDC had yet to receive
the proceeds of the materials that were the subject of the trust receipts and were
allegedly used for these constructions. As there were no proceeds received from
these clients, no misappropriation thereof could have taken place.
The CA ruled in favor of Perez ratiocinating in this wise
1.The case did not involve a trust receipt transaction, but a mere loan. It emphasized
that construction materials, the subject of the trust receipt transaction, were delivered
to ACDC even before the trust receipts were executed.
2. LBP did not offer proof that the goods were received by ACDC, and that the trust
receipts did not contain a description of the goods, their invoice value, the amount of
the draft to be paid, and their maturity dates. It also adopted ACDC’s argument
that since no payment for the construction projects had been received by ACDC, its
officers could not have been guilty of misappropriating any payment.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the case is merely a loan agreement and
not a trust receipt transaction?
Supreme court Decision
Yes. The transaction is a mere loan agreement and not a trust receipt
transaction.
1. The disputed transactions are not trust receipts.
Section 4 of P.D. 115 defines a trust receipt transaction in this manner:
“Section 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction.—A trust receipt transaction,
within the meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by and between a person
referred to in this
Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in this Decree as entrustee,
whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or security interests over
certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the
possession of the entrustee upon the latter’s execution and delivery to the entruster of
a signed document called a “trust receipt” wherein the entrustee binds himself to
hold the designated goods,
documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of
the goods, documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster
the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears
in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or instruments themselves if they are
unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions
specified in the trust
receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent to any of the following: In the
case of goods or documents,
(a) to sell the goods or procure their sale; or
(b) to manufacture or process the goods with the purpose of ultimate sale:
Provided, That, in the case of goods delivered under trust receipt for the purpose of
manufacturing or processing before its ultimate sale, the entruster shall retain its title
over the goods whether in its original or processed form until the entrustee has
complied fully with his obligation under the trust receipt; or (c) to load, unload, ship
or tranship or otherwise deal with them in a manner preliminary or necessary to their
sale[.]”
2. Two obligations in a trust receipt transaction.
a. By the provision that refers to money under the obligation to deliver it
(entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold.
b. By the provision referring to merchandise received under the obligation to return it
(devolvera) to the owner.
Thus, under the Trust Receipts Law, intent to defraud is presumed when:
(1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods vcovered by the
trust receipt to the entruster; or
(2) when the entrustee fails to return the goods under trust, if they are not disposed of
in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts.
In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in the
alternative—the return of the proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the
goods, whether raw or processed. When both parties enter into an agreement
knowing that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even
without any fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction
penalized under Section 13 of P.D. 115; The only obligation actually agreed upon by
the parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This
transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the
amount spent for the purchase of the goods.
3. In the case at bar,
a. At the onset of these transactions, LBP knew that ACDC was in the construction
business and that the materials that it sought to buy under the letters of credit were to
be used for construction projects. LBP had in fact authorized the delivery of the
materials on the construction sites for these projects, as seen in the letters of credit it
attached to its complaint. Clearly, they were aware of the fact that there was no way
they could recover the buildings or constructions for which the materials subject of
the alleged trust receipts had been used. Notably, despite the allegations in the
affidavit-complaint wherein LBP sought the return of the construction materials, its
demand letter dated May 4, 1999 sought the payment of the balance but failed to ask,
as an alternative, for the return of the construction materials or the buildings where
these materials had been used. The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the
delivery of construction materials to a construction site of two government projects,
as well as unspecified construction sites, repudiates the idea that LBP intended to be
the owner of those construction materials.
As a government financial institution, LBP should have been aware that the materials
were to be used for the construction of an immovable property, as well as a property
of the public domain. As an immovable property, the ownership of whatever was
constructed with those materials would presumably belong to the owner of the land.
In contrast with the present situation, it is fundamental in a trust receipt transaction
that the person who advanced payment for the merchandise becomes the absolute
owner of said merchandise and continues as owner until he or she is paid in full, or if
the goods had already been sold, the proceeds should be turned over to him or to her.
b. Based on these premises, the agreements between the parties in this case are not
trust receipt transactions because
(1) from the start, the parties were aware that ACDC could not possibly be obligated
to reconvey to LBP the materials or the end product for which they were used; and
(2) from the moment the materials were used for the government.
E. ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS
1. HERBERT CANG, petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses
RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27,
1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on
January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husbands
alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Upon
learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Cebuwhich rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the
Cang spouses providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and
board.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie
before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued
the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna
Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.
Private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively
the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-
CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying
consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging
that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting
the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he could not in
conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved
children.
The RTC issued a decree of adoption and concluded that petitioner has abandoned his
children. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires
the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the
consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that
Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent
of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
RULING:
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by
the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for
the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that
the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
"any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their
children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children.
The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular
communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send
them packages catered to their whims.
2. TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO
PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur,
and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong,"
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Petitioner: Tomasa Vda. de Jacob
Private Respondent: Pedro Pilapil
What: The loss of the best evidence of marriage, specifically the marriage contract,
and how to prove the validity of marriage using a reconstructed marriage certificate
and other evidences.
Summary: Tomasa is the surviving spouse of the deceased Alfredo e. Jacob and
claims the right over the latter's estate. However Pedro, the legally adopted son of the
late Alfredo, claims for his share of the estate as the sole surviving heir. Pedro
further questions the validity of the marriage between Tomasa and his late adoptive
father.
Nature of the Case:
The instant case is a petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The CA ruled in favor of Pedro Pilapil and
against Tomasa Vda. de Jacob on grounds including the declaration that the
reconstructed marriage certificate as spurious and non-existent. Hence, the present
petition.
What are the facts of the case?
1. Petitioner Tomasa narrated that her marriage with the late Alfredo was
solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana in Intramuros, Manila sometime in
1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage
Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly
gave it to one Mr. Jose Centenera for registration.
In lieu of the lost marriage certificate, petitioner presented a reconstructed marriage
contract issued three years after the said marriage.
However, several irregularities of the reconstructed marriage contract was observed
by the court:
a. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar;
b. A mere thumbmark was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo on the alleged
reconstructed marriage contract instead of his customary signature as affixed in their
sworn affidavit;
c. Inconsistencies in the affidavit of Msgr. Yllana on the circumstances surrounding
the loss of the marriage contract and the testimonies of appellant Tomasa; and
d. Appellant admitted that there was no record entered into the San Agustin Church
where the alleged marriage was solemnized.
What are the issues of the case?
1. Whether the alleged reconstructed marriage contract is valid and is a
sufficient proof of marriage in lieu of the lost Marriage Contract.
2. Whether the questioned marriage was void ab initio due to lack of marriage
license and a marriage ceremony as alleged by the legally adopted son, Pedro.
3. Whether the absence of said marriage on the record book of the local civil
register affects the validity of such.
What is the ruling of the court?
1. Yes. Even though the marriage contract is the best evidence that a marriage
indeed took place between two contracting parties, absence or lost thereof does not
render the marriage void. The marriage license is not a formal requisite of marriage;
it is merely a written manifestation or the reiteration of the exchange of vows done
during the marriage ceremony. As provided by Section 3 in relation to Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the contents of such document may be proven by
competent evidences other than the document itself.
In the case at bar, appellant Tomasa had provided competent evidences to prove that
a valid marriage had been solemnized between her and the late Alfredo. Such
evidences were supplied by the sworn testimonies of Msgr. Yllana who was the
solemnizing officer; witness Adela Pilapil, and Tomasa herself both in open court
and in writing.
2. No. The contention Pedro that there was no marriage license issued prior to
the solemnization of the marriage between the two was misplaced due to the fact that
the said spouses had been cohabiting with each other for more than five years as
stated in a sworn affidavit made by the late Alfedo and the appellant. This is an
exceptional character under the Article 76 of the Civil Code which provided that the
questioned marriage is exempted from the requisite of a valid marriage license. The
accusations of Pedro Pilapil which were formerly favored by the Court of Appeals
were then reversed and set aside.
3. No. Absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office
(NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is of the solemnizing officer's duty to
send a copy of marriage certificate to these offices in order to be duly recorded (Art.
23, FC).
In the absence of other competent evidences to the contrary, a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a legal
contract of marriage. The fact that the appellant and the deceased had lived together
as husband and wife and the same was affirmed by the evidences, the presumption of
marriage was not likewise rebutted.
Held:
The marriage between petitioner Tomasa and the late Alfredo was proven to be valid
in virtue of the reconstructed marriage contract sworn by the solemnizing officer
himself and a witness to the marriage ceremony.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa
Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared
VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED
NONEXISTENT.
Significant Provisions to the Case at Bar
Section 3, Rule 130, ROC. Original document must be produced; exceptions. —
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5, Rule 130, ROC. When the original document is unavailable. — When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.
Art. 76, CC. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oath. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Other issues:
ADOPTION.
Whether Pedro Pilapil is a legally adopted son of the late Alfredo Jacob.
No. The court ruled that the burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
person claiming such relationship. However, Pedro Pilapil failed to do such.
Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was
no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.
Semper Presumitur Pro Matrimonio: Always Presume Marriage
The Supreme Court, holding the sanctity of marriage with the highest regards and
respect, rule that marriage shall always be presumed between a man and a woman of
legal age, who had voluntarily cohabitated with each other, and had no legal
impediment to marry. Marriage is always favored in the absence of proofs to the
contrary. If ever there will be an ambiguity in the question of the validity of the
marriage, the question shall be resolved in light of the presumption of marriage.
The court held that "Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married."
The constant pressure of the presumption of marriage made it necessary that the
evidence presented in order to repel such must be strong, distinct, and satisfactory
(Sta. Maria, 2010).
The Duty of the Solemnizing Officer
Article 23 of the Family Code provides that it is the primary duty of the solemnizing
officer to submit the copies of the Marriage Contract, specifically the duplicate and
the triplicate copies, to the Local Civil Registrar where the marriage was validly
solemnized. It is mandatory that the copies shall be sent to the Local Civil Registrar
not later than 15 days after the marriage ceremony. Such as in the case of Beso v.
Judge Daguman (323 SCRA 566), the solemnizing officer will be held
administratively liable for the non-registration of the marriage or a significant delay
thereof.
Such non-registration is a mere irregularity in the procedure of marriage and does not
render the marriage void or annullable for it is not the contracting parties’ duty to do
such.
3. REPUBLIC v. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina
Munson y Andrade, filed a petition[2] to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the
first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of
the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. Petitioner reiterated
its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of
name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and
pursued as two separate proceedings. The trial court ruled in favor of herein private
respondents. Petitioner challenges said order of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given
name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption b granted.
RULING:
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption even if not prayed
for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered
in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon
the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond
the purview of a decree of adoption.
 On the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby
MODIFIED. The court uphold the propriety of the portion of the order of the court
below granting the petition for adoption. The legally adopted child of private
respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade.
4. Republic vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996
MENDOZA, J.
Facts:
On September 2, 1988, Spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed a
petition for adoption of minor Midael C. Mazon, before the Regional Trial Court in
Cavite City Branch XVI.
In their petition, Spouses Carato alleged that Midael C. Mazon had been living with
them since he was seven years old. They further alleged that when they got married
on January 19, 1986, Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody.
In the petition, they prayed that after hearing, a judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the Michael C. Mazon their child for all intents and purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that
the first name which was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be corrected to
MICHAEL.
The case was set for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by
publication and by service of the Order upon the DSWD and Office of the Solicitor
General.
The OSG opposed the petition insofar as the correction of name of Midael was
concerned. According to the OSG, although the change in the name sought was
clerical, the petition was basically for adoption and not for correction of entry under
Rule 108.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption and prayer of Spouses Caranto to change
the name of the child from Midael to Michael. The RTC ruled that Rule 108,
contrary to the claim of the OSG, was only applicable to concerns related to civil
status of persons.
Issue:
Whether or not change of name falls under Rule 108 (Correction of Entry).
Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to the findings of the RTC, change of name falls under Rule 108.
Section 2 (o) of the said rule states:
"Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – xxx (o) changes of name."
Clearly, Rule 108 does not only concern civil status of persons but also concern
changes of name.
This also means that the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for
the correction of entry, was void. This is so because the Local Civil Registrar, an
indespensable party in proceedings falling under Rule 108, was not notified. Section
3 of the said Rule states:
“3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.”
Furthermore, the decision of the RTC was void also on the ground that the supposed
Petition for Correction of Entry (change of name) was not published. Meaning, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
5. REYES V. MAURICIO
Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos,
Bulacan by Respondents (Librada Mauricio, and her alleged daughter Leonida) for
annulment of contract between Librada and Eugenio parties.
Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue,
Bulacan. Subject land herein.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio,
who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-
interest to the subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful
means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document to eject Respondents from the
subject property, and had the same notarized in Pasig; that Librada never appeared
before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the said
contract (Kasunduan) were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue
advantages of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps
of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent.
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, DARAB ruled in favor of
Respondents. On appeal with the CA, Petitioner assailed the status of Leonida as a
legal heir and her capacity to substitute Librada who died during the pendency of the
case. Petitioner averred that Leonida is merely a ward of Librada.
Issue: Whether Leonida’s filiation may be attacked collaterally?
Decision: No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.
Citing Dr. Tolentino’s book, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, Dr. Tolentino explained thus:
“The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent
action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican
code (article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the
husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court;
any contest made in any other way is void. This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to the
action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or
his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.”
THE SAME RULE IS APPLIED TO ADOPTION
Filiation; cannot be collaterally attacked. It is settled law that
filiation cannot be collaterally a t t a c k e d . W e l l - k n o w n c i v i l i s t a D r .
A r t u r o M . T o l e n t i n o , i n h i s b o o k “ C i v i l C o d e o f t h e Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence,” noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of
an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: “The contest of the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint
before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.”
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code
confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This
action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in
the present articles. Eugenio R. Reyes, joined by Timothy Joseph M. Reyes, et al. vs.
Librada F. Maurico and Leonida F. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24,
2010The legitimacy and filiation of a child cannot be contested by way of defense or
as collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. They can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonally filed by the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack. This is confirmed by Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code
which refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.”
The same rule is applied to adoption. It cannot also be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f a d e c e d e n t ’ s e s t a t e . T h e l e g a l i t y
of adoption by a testatrix can be
assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and
c a n n o t b e s u b j e c t t o collateral attack. (Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. 175080,
November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 79)
6. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA, HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
GR No. 148311 March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petitionto adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption.
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name.
On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
The Court held that there is no law expressly prohibiting the child to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name and what is not prohibited by law, is
allowed. It is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. While not set out in law this custom has been
recogniсed during the lawmaking process. In fact, the Family Law Committees had
agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
The Court also said that it is necessary to preserve and maintain the child’s
relationship with her natural mother because under the law, she remains an intestate
heir of the mother. The underlying intent of adoption law is in favour of the child and
the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes under the law. Being a legitimate child by virtue
of her adoption by the petitioner, it follows that the child is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
Adoption law should be interpreted and construed liberally to carry out the beneficial
purposes of adoption with the interests and welfare of the adopted child being the
primary and paramount consideration.
Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights instruments:
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to
consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention
of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying
intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known
as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,” secures these rights and privileges for the
adopted.
7. PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF LIM
FACTS:
1. Petitioner MONINA P. Lim is an optometrist by profession.
2. On 23 June 1974, she married PRIMO Lim. They were childless.
3. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a
certain Lucia AYUBAN.
4. Being so eager to have a child of their own, the spouses Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents.
5. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
6. Unfortunately, Lim died. Monina married Angel Olario (Olario), an
American citizen.
7. Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
8. Monina filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle (25 yrs old) and
Michael (18 yrs and 7 mo old).
9. Michelle and her husband, Michael and Olario (new husband) gave their
consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.
10. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions.
a. since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband.
b. joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory
11. MR was denied on the ground that did not fall under any of the exceptions
under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
a. Petitioner: mere consent of her husband would suffice
i. TC: under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party
in this case, must comply.
b. Petitioner: adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely
for the joint exercise of parental authority,
i. TC: joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and
assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
ISSUE: WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
HELD: No. Petition denied. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit under Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
xxx
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
xxx
1. The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly.
2. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
must jointly adopt.
3. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7.
a. The children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of
her husband Olario.
b. The children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner.
c. Petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
4. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario
must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 but none of these qualifications were shown and proved during
the trial.
a. he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines;
b. he must have been living in the Philippines for at least 3 continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
c. he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
d. he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
e. the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted
child.
5. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children
or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of
petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
6. It is true that emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption.
7. Adoption has, thus, the following effects:
a. sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
b. deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
c. give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
i. the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
ii. the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of
each other.
8. Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child
such as:
a. to bear the surname of the father and the mother;
b. to receive support from their parents; and
c. to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
9. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child,
enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.
10. Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show
that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for
dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in Los Angeles.
a. SC: The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner
and Olario is of no moment. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists.
11. Since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was
married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty.
Glicerio A. Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite
receiving his legal fees and for making Nery believe that the petition was already
filed.
The Facts
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010, [1] Nery alleged that in June 2008, she
engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her
adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and
Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she
had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana
then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her
adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a)
P10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c)
P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts since she
trusted Sampana.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already
filed the petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana further
informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently,
Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of
Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court,
Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was
only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the
status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed
in the court.[2] Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met Sampana and sought
the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that
he would deduct the filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee
should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter,
Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 from Sampana,
but the demands were left unheeded.
In an Order dated 25 February 2011,[3] the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C.
Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file his answer
to the complaint and to appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties
were directed to submit their position papers.

In her position paper,[4] Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.

8. MELODY R. NERY VS. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA
On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011,[5] Sampana argued
The Case that Nery's allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana
admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of
marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed
adoption because of the old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but
Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the [alien] adopter
would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien]
could be possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents, including
the marriage contracts and the certification of the alien's qualification to adopt from
the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract,
but not the certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption
but did not file it because he was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption.
Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment
case with the petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have
overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the
amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
Issue
w/n Sampana misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption
Ruling
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both
cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to
file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to
his client. Sampana's proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing
the petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he
suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the
intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision,
which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt is waived. [11]
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed
Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case
overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter
entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code's
mandate to deliver the client's funds upon demand. A lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of
the public confidence in the legal profession.[12]
9. Castro vs Gregorio
GR No.188801 15 October 2014
Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA
which denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The
petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that
granted Rs’ decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately,
they separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual
tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death
after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta
Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana
Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro
alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio
(Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that
Jose had been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36
year; that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while
Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to
the extent of adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne
knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his
fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was often
declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children that’s
why he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document
purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and
Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose,
while another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged
that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate
children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied
the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, it ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and
legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.”
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets
of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated
therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of
judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
required in an action for annulment of judgment. technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Issues: Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case? proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the
adopter is required?

Decision: 10. BARTOLOME V. SSS

The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained
through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the
fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to
contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial
court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that
because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.
FACTS:
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program
(ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of
his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John’s biologicalmother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer
considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio
Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not
petitioner.

RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.
obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
(Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552) ISSUES:

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, 1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, 2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse.
HELD:
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since
her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552). taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and
that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not
 The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if
the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike
the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee,
who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their
rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While
the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of
the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession
at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way
that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the
event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as
a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since
the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s
sole remaining beneficiary.
F. HABEAS CORPUS
1. ILUSORIO VS.BILDNER
FACTS:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano
Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President
of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for
30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant),
Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972.
Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner
lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5
months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time
their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In
February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in
Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have
the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see
and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
RULING:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or
by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him
to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and
cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court
or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." [
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of
which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is
issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising
legal custody over another person. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint
of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter
was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental
capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the
right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to
compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by the sheriffs or by any other process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority
and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of
habeas corpus is denied.
2. SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Nature: 2 Petitions for Certiorari filed by Petitioner Serapio assailing the resolutions
of Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, Motion for reinvestigation and
motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case
No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former
President Estrada, J “Jinggoy” and several others.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, , a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in
February 2000 for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor
and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to
research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its
behalf a P200M donation from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson through
the latter’s assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. turned over the said amount to the
Foundation’s treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundation’s account with the
Equitable PCI Bank.
Public accusation of Singson against Pres. Estrada and others for engaging in several
illegal activities (including jueteng) triggered the filing with the Office of the
Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Pres. Estrada, Jinggoy and
petitioner, together with other persons. Ombudsman conducted a preliminary
investigation of the complaints issued a joint resolution recommending that they be
charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
- Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations against former
President Estrada and petitioner with plunder
- No bail was recommended for the provisional release of all the accused,
including petitioner.
Before the Ombudsman – filed Urgent Omnibus Motion to To Hold in Abeyance the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings – DENIED
Before the Sandiganbayan - issued a Resolution finding probable cause to justify the
issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused - VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED
been detained at Camp Crame
SB set arraignment – petitioner filed Urget Petition for Bail – due to pending
incidents yet to be resolved, said petition was reset
However, even before the SB could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the
prosecution, petitioner filed with SC - Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari
praying that the Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of
the SB on his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process
prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus that he be granted provisional
liberty on bail after due proceedings
ISSUE Propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner
Petitioner’s contention:
i. State, through the prosecution’s refusal to present evidence and by the
Sandiganbayan’s refusal to grant a bail hearing has failed to discharge its burden of
proving that as against him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is
strong
ii. prosecution launched “a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive and
dilatory moves” to prevent the conduct of bail hearings
iii. prosecution moved for petitioner’s arraignment before the commencement
of bail hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada and
Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was only petitioner who asked for a bail
hearing; manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the
evidence in chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the
prosecution presented its entire case upon the accused
iv. petitioner’s motion to quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and
therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these two remedies
v. Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and resolutions postponing
the bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law
vi. issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail hearings
which it had earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition for issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of
petitioner’s right to bail
vii. the fact that he was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does
not by itself negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus citing Moncupa vs.
Enrile - where the Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances where the
detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary
Prosecution’s contention:
i. habeas corpus is not proper because petitioner was arrested pursuant to the
amended information which was earlier filed in court, the warrant of arrest issuant
pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
General Rule: writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court
which jurisdiction to do so.
Exception: habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person
concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this
writ of liberty is recognized as “the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action” due to “its ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes.
1. issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under
the law, had later become invalid and
2. even though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely
deprived of their liberty.
HELD Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of
petitioner.
General Rule on Habeas Corpus Applies
The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25,
2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder
against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered
himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued.
Ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile Does Not Apply because the hearing on petitioner’s
application for bail has yet to commence. the delay in the hearing of petitioner’s
petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution
for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed. A Petition For Habeas
Corpus Is Not The Appropriate Remedy For Asserting One’s Right To Bail It
cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on
the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to
grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion.
Proper Recourse - file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case
is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also
preempt the Sandiganbayan’s resolution of the pending application for bail of
petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his
application for bail.
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan
conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even
then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong
before he may be granted bail.
3. Lacson vs. Perez
G.R. No. 147780, G.R. No. 147781, G.R. No. 147799, G.R. No. 147810
FACTS
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal--‐Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
o She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and
the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital
Region.
o Warrantless arrests of several leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were
effected.
On May 6, 2001, President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state of
rebellion” in Metro Manila. On May 10, 2001, four petitions were filed before the
Court:
o G.R. No. 147780 (by Lacson, Aquino, and Mancao): prohibition, injunction,
mandamus, and habeas corpus
o G.R. No. 147781 (by Defensor--‐Santiago): mandamus and/or review of the
factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order
o G.R. No. 147799 (by Lumbao): prohibition and injunction with prayer for a
writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
o G.R. No. 147810 (by Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino): certiorari and
prohibition
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitions should be dismissed for being rendered moot and
academic.
HOLDING
Petitions are DISMISSED for being MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President
Gloria Macapagal--‐ Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue
thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. The lifting of the said declaration
in Metro Manila has rendered the petitions moot and academic.
DOCTRINE
When an issue or case no longer presents a justiciable controversyor when the matter
in dispute has already been resolved, it becomes “moot”. In such case, a
determination of the issue would have no practical use, and there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition.
As a rule, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. The Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.
4. Sangca vs City Prosecutor of Cebu City GR No 175864 08 June 2007
Facts: Anisah Impal Sangca (petitioner) filed the instant case praying for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam who was
detained in Cebu City for alleged violation of the Drugs law (R.A. 9165).
Lovely Impal Adam was arrested due to an entrapment operation. A case was filed
against her but the prosecutors found that there was no probable cause or enough
evidence to try her (the alleged buy-bust operation was not proven by the police
officers). The inquest prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case but was
disapproved by the City Prosecutor. On petition for review before the DOJ, it found
no probable cause to hold Adam liable for the offense charged.
The Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to withdraw the
information.PDEA filed a MR but was denied by the Justice Secretary.
Issue:WON the City Prosecutor should withdraw the information.
Decision: Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged, Judge
Ingles issued an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering
the release of the accused, unless otherwise held for another valid ground. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
Accordingly, the "Motion to Withdraw Information" is hereby GRANTED and the
accused is ordered immediately released unless another valid ground exists for her
continued detention.
The prosecution and/or PDEA are/is ordered to turn over to this court within three
(3) days from receipt hereof the dangerous drug described in the information which
shall in turn be confiscated in favor of the state for proper disposition unless the
prosecution intends to refile or file another case against the accused which it deems
appropriate as double jeopardy has not attached.
SO ORDERED.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such
restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect
and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.
5. MANGILA V. PANGILINAN
Facts: Anita Mangila, petitioner, was charged with seven of syndicated estafa. The
complaint against her arose from recruiting and promising employment to private
complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada without lawful
authority from POEA.
By reason of the charged against petitioner, a warrant of arrest was issued against
her. She was arrested. She then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA
alleging that she is deprived of the remedy of a motion to quash or a motion to recall
the warrant of arrest because Judge Pangilinan (Judge who issued the warrant) had
already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no
authority to lift or recall the warrant. CA denied the petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s restraint in this case is unlawful.
Decision: NO. Habeas corpus is a speedy and effective remedy devised to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. Petitioner’s restraint in this case is NOT unlawful.
She had been arrested and detained by virtue of the valid warrant issued for her
arrest.
The objective of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the
detainee. Equally well-settled, however, is that the writ will not issue where the
person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record.
Her proper remedy was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of
the (preliminary investigation) and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the
attention of the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.
6. MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR
CRISELDA M. CADA, Petitioner, vs. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA,
Respondent.
FACTS:
Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the R TC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ
of habeas corpus directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before
the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to
return to her the custody over the child.
RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child
to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however,
the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas
corpus petition and of the writ.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the
RTC Quezon City. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for
guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia, among others. Thereafter, or on June 3,
2011, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping before the Office of the City
Prosecutor – Quezon City against petitioner and her counsel.
Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the
RTC-Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court on August 8, 2011. On even
date, the court directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ upon petitioner at the Office
of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 10, 2011. In compliance,
the Sheriff served petitioner the August 8, 2011 Order as well as the Alias Writ
during the preliminary investigation of the kidnapping case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition
filed by respondent and, assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it validly
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda.
RULING:
The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of the habeas corpus petition.
Subsequently, it acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was served with
a copy of the writ in Quezon City.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court. As provided: Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified
petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with
the Family Court. The writ shall beenforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the
presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall
refer the case tothe Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where
there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the
judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
with any of its members and, if so granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular
court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found
for hearing and decision on the merits.
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be
filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement
thereof is sought.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan
City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region,
the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the
above rule.
7. DATUKAN V WARDEN
Facts:
Salibois suspected to be Butukan S. Malang.
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly
participating in Maguindanao Massacre. Salibo presented himself before the police
officer... to clear his name. explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he
could not have participated in Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi
Arabia at that... time.
Police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that
evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia
They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days
transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato
City, where he was detained for another 10 days.
Alibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is
currently detained.
Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus...
questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.
Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the
Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of
Justice).
The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a
Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of
Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.[21]... he trial court
found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"[29]... under any resolution,
information, or amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended
Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused.
He was... also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias
Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was
not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.
Trial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate
release from detention.
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision... dismissed Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias
Warrant... of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must
be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may
be invoked[.]"
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,... As for respondent Warden, he maintains
that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the
Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should
have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
Issues:
Whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court... on petitioner Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals... whether petitioner Salibo's
proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Ruling:
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in
court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias
Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a
Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.
Respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.
His court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for
Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal basis
The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas
Corpus,... "acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the case[.]"
Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on Medina's
Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable
to the Regional Trial Court,... The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his
Return and decided the Petition on the merits. We rule that the trial court "acquired
the power and authority to determine the merits"... of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The
decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial...
court, not of the Court of Appeals.
Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of
trial courts,... respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.
When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer
Police Station, he was... neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense.
The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo
without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of
law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest.
Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not
have been cured by mere... amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack
of preliminary investigation in this case.
Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His
Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
H. CHANGE OF NAME V. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES
1. ELEOSIDA VS LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the RTC of The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on RA 9048,
Quezon City dismissing motu propio the petition for Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct which allows first name and nickname in the birth certificates without judicial order.
some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The Municipal officer approved the change. The Solicitor General objected to the
Petitioner seeks to correct in the birth cert. of her son the following: correction on the ground that the correction is not merely clerical but requires an
1. The surname “Borbon” should be changed to Eleosida (since the parents adversarial proceeding. The Court of Appeals favored with Kho.
were never married; the child is illegitimate and, therefore, should follow
the mother’s surname; ISSUE:
Whether or not Kho’s request for change in the details of their birth certificate
2. The date of the wedding should be blank; requires an adversarial proceeding.
3. Petitioner’s name should be Ma. Lourdes Eleosida (instead of Borbon). RULING:
It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of
No opposition was made to this petition.
Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the “married” status
RTC, however, dismissed it on the basis that only clerical errors (CLERICAL
of Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’ respective birth certificates, as well as
ERRORS) of a harmless and innocuous nature like misspelled name, occupation of
change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just
the parents, etc. may be subject of judicial order authorizing changes or corrections
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail
and not as may affect the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the person
substantial and controversial amendments.
(substantial/material change/error) involved.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth
Hence this petition.
certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the
Issue: Whether changes or corrections which are substantial may be subject of a
citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.
judicial proceeding.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his sibllings’ parents were
Decision: Yes, Court find merit in the petition.
“married” alters their filiation from “legitimate” to “illegitimate”. with significant
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
implications on their successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either
only be granted in an adversary proceeding.
be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil
The enactment in March 2001 of RA 9048 known as “An Act Authorizing the City
register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial,
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the
and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. (Note: CLERICAL -SUMMARY;
Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order.” has been considered to lend
SUBSTANTIAL- ADVERSARIAL)
legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the
If all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 (Notice and publication
civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing
[especially]) (Note: Adversarial) have been followed, it was therefore error for the
of a petition under Rule 108.
trial court to dismiss the petition motu propio without allowing the petitioner to
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
present evidence to support her petition (and all the other persons who have an
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the
interest over the matter to oppose the same).
entries of the civil register is satisfied.

2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO I. KHO, ET. AL

G.R No. 170340, JUNE 29,2007
3. PETITION ON CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIM
CARPIO MORALES, J.
This is a Petition seeking to drop the petitioner’s middle name and have his
FACTS:
registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
Carlito Kho and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth
certificate. Carlito petitioned for 1) change of citizenship of his mother from
FACTS: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to
“Chinese” to “Filipino”; 2) delete “John” from his name; 3) delete the word
parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each
“married” opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was
other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they
ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael,
Mercy, Nona and Heddy Moira.
executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei
Jasmine who was born in Singapore…. Since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current
registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be
asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have
the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
RTC: rendered a decision denying the petition. It found that the reason given for the
change of name sought in the petition—that is, that petitioner Julian may be
discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle name—did
not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. It added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of
majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his
middle name.
Petitioner: filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied. She
then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) arguing that the
trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the
Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary
to Article 174
of the Family Code.
COURT: required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
petition.
OSG: filed itsCommentpositing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for
change of name. argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right
cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. There is also no
showing that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best interest of
petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of
name and/or cancellation of entry. the petitioner has not shown any compelling
reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that
matter.
ISSUE: Whether the change of name / dropping of the middle name of the petitioner
should be granted
HELD: NO. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have
been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence,
as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
IN GRANTING/DENYING:
The question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the
best evidence available.
What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request,
but a JUDICIOUS evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its
grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in
the courts.
DROPPING OF THE MIDDLE NAME FROM HIS REGISTERED NAME? – No
law supports such.
MIDDLE NAME PURPOSE
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname
as he has.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make
his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change
of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of
majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value
of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.
4. BRAZA V CIVIL REGISTRAR
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died
in a vehicular accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son,
Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son,
respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained
Patrick’s birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which
stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having acknowledged by the father on
January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent
marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo
and Lucille were married in 1998.
Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before
the RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of
Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been
legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because
said marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her
(Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioner prayed for the: 1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with
respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment and the
use of the last name “BRAZA”; 2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all
surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA
testing to determine his paternity and filiation; 3. The declaration of nullity of the
legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the
declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for
correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family
Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test,
and that the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar?
RULING:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical
error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of
the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed
only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.
The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and
Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy,
which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively;
hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the
court a quo.
5.
5. REPUBLIC V. SILVERIO
Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex
reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru
the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.
Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error
Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all
other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely
by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.
6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from
Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It
appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition
where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer
Cagandahan grew up with secondarymale characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificateevidencing that she is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female
but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her
favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court
invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding
the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court
including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the
statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him
as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the
Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The
Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion,
to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
7. Republic of the Philippines vs. Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
Ponente: Diosdado M. Peralta (Associate Justice)
Facts:
Dr, Norma Lugsanay Uy filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of
Live Birth. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate
daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that
her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and
friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and
not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
Dr. Uy sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those
pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She also sought the correction
allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood,
including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records.
RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and
setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis
Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of
respondent.
CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondent’s failure to
implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order
setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar,
the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition on the sole ground that the petition is
dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties. It assailed that the changes
are obviously not mere clerical as they affects her rights and obligations in this
country and these changes are clearly substantial.
Issue:
Whether or not failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be
cured by the publication of the notice of hearing?
Ruling:
No. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. Section 3 of
Rule 108 states that “when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding”.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of
the proceedings taken. Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the
courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due
process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.
The subject matter of the petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted
in a proceeding summary in nature. Supreme Court adheres to the principle that
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other
mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far
reaching.
8. MINORU FUJIKI V. MARINAY
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008
in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”
RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied upon consideration
that Fujiki as a "third person” in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be
judicially recognized.
The OSG agreed with the petitioner that the RTC’s decision be set aside.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
ISSUES & RULING:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can
file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Yes. “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact.”
 Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage.
It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot
decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize
the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
9.
G.R. No. 189538 : February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MERLINDA L.
OLAYBAR, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She denied having contracted
said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; She, thus, filed
a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries
in the wife portion thereof.
During trial, She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but
she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met
them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed
that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency,
whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. A
document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract
was forged.
The RTC held in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision
on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the
wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void
ab initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required.
Considering that respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void
marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
RUING:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or
adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary.
If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties
aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion.
However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in
Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition;
it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar
and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although
the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the
court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as
long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the
civil register.Lee v. CA 419 Phil. 392
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the
civil registry. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of
the National Statistics Office G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where
all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had
already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification
of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of
such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
10. ONDE VS CR OF LAS PINAS
“Correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in
Bicol to “not married” is a substantial correction requiring
adversarial proceedings”
“The remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial; The law removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or
typographical errors.”
FACTS:Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live
birth before the RTC and named Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas
City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his
parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde He prayed that the following entries on
hisbirth certificate be corrected as follows:
ENTRY FROM TO
Date and place of December 23, 1983-Bicol Not married
marriage of his parents
First name of his mother Tely Matilde
His first name Franc Ler Francler
RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground that it is
insufficient in form and substance. It was further held that the correction in the first
name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal
Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in
an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without
Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, as it found no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on
December 23, 1983. However petitioner argues that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
allows a substantial correction of entries in the civil registry He likewise adds that
proof that his parents were not married will be presented during the trial, not during
the filing of the petition for correction of entries. The OSG in its comment ,it points
out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru
administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on
petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in
Bicol to “not married” is a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it
must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are
impleaded.
Issue/s:Whether the RTC erred when it points out that the first names of
petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative proceedings
under R.A. No. 9048,and in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to “not
married” is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings;
HELD:On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and
his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048 under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or
typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first
name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial
order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry
on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983
in Bicol to “not married” is a substantial correction requiring adversarial
proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert
him from a legitimate child to an ille gitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,8 we held that
corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy
of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations.
Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceedings. We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without
prejudice. He can also file a new petition before the RTC to correct the alleged
erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were married on December
23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner
are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect
the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the
legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Petition seeking a substantial correction of
an entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the
local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of
entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In
Republic v. Uy, we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of
Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his
father and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also
affect them it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue as petitioner will have
his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married on December 23,
1983 when he files the new petition for the purpose.
I.A. WRIT OF AMPARO
1. DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ V HON. JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO
FACTS:
1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint
for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the petitioners and other John Does numbering about
120.
2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered
owners of the disputed land; (2) they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when
the petitioners – armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with
unidentified persons – entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without
the private respondents’ permission and against the objections of the private
respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially
claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on
the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for
the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents’
favor, finding prior possession through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.
5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.
6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ –
authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision – was actually
issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the private respondents had complied
with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the
writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ MR and to Defer
Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent
Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented
fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily
demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual
possession of the land.
9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory
Injunction and Order of Demolition in CA.
10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.
ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper
HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally
defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition
for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on
the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of
willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of
forum shopping. In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited
formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been
filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats
to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported
by justifying allegations of fact.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions
of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues
relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent
that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the
other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from
the presence of “armed men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the
threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is
continuing.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no
concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related
to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much
less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities
other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous
efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the “fishing expedition”
that this Court – in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data – had in mind in
defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright
denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
PETITION DENIED.
2. ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA vs
NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N., I â XIII, INC., ET AL G.R. No. 182795
June 5, 2008
Summary:
The petitioners claim that the writ of amparo is proper in cases of fraudulent
issuances of land titles which led to the demolition of future demolition of their
dwelling places. Court dismissed their petition on the ground that this was not within
the enumeration of rights under the provisions of the said writ. This new remedy of
writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of
the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and
security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious
time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
Facts:
 Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been
demolished or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
 The petition seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the following
premise:
o Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to
shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as the result of
these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public
Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable
Supreme Court is the only solution to this problem via this newly
advocated principles incorporated in the Rules â the "RULE ON
THE WRIT OF AMPARO."
 Ultimately, the petition seeks the reversal of this Courtâs dismissal of
petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038.
Issue: WON the writ of amparo can be issued. NO
Ratio:
 The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the
court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R.
Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the
enumeration of rights as stated in Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ
of amparo is made available.
 The factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is
not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these
rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four
cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be
protected.
 Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the
filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
o Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this
case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed
outright.
3. CASTILLO V. CRUZ
Facts:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G.
Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos
(the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor
Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for
local projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The
pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of
Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the
RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition was already implemented before
the TRO issuance.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al.,
who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by
Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the
possession of the property,” entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting
that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing
it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment
for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue:
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.
Held:
On the 1st issue:
Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the
coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security,
and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances.” Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: “What it is not is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a
property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any
considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’
right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of
petitioners’ entry into the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation,
imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of
petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo.
No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able
to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
On the 2nd issue:
Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have
been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were
arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted
thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a
petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.
4. RAZON VS. TAGITIS
GR No. 182498 December 3, 2009
FACTS:
Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo,
Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived
in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis
asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer
around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in
the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis
and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know
of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP
professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB,
reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007,
Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances
surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for
the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe
P. Arcilla. The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding
General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police
(PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as
petitioners].
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ
of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners
to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of
Tagitis was an “enforced disappearance” under the United Nations (UN) Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of amparo is proper in this case
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every
detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any
other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts
constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
uniqueAmparosituation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine
whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s
rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition
should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component
parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State
or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or
security – are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the
circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in
normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate
him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15
and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators
of the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and
security were violated when he was “forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle
by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,” and then
taken “into custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives since October
30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will
in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different
terrorist groups.”
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s
knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in
this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient
information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to
liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause
of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting
affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary
nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition,
the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the
annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement,
however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal
of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has
substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition
sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that
an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the
required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs.
Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and
February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even
on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not comply
with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule (that a prior investigation
must have been made), as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and
his companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police authorities
in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain that he indeed had
disappeared. The police, however, gave them the “ready answer” that Tagitis could
have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups. The
respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a
“complaint” with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of
“an intriguing tale” by the police that her husband was having “a good time with
another woman.” The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to no
less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent’s personal
inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her petition.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the Writ
of Amparo is sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had
every reason to proceed with its consideration of the case.
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the “writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.” We note that although the writ
specifically covers “enforced disappearances,” this concept is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction.
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts
undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless
to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate “rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts,”
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not
rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal
courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether
an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for
this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address
it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts
at disclosure andinvestigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from
this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations
require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is
preserved and his or her liberty and security restored.
Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced
disappearance” is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction
or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or
by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law.
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a
right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right is non-derogable.
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the
country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a
crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for
action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced
disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security
that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-
making powers.
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in
a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on
the country, given our own adherence to “generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.”
We characterized “generally accepted principles of international law” as norms of
general or customary international law that are binding on all states. We held
further: [G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if
they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international
law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of]
two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on
enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not
formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital
shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the
international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle
of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and
which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the
international conventions that bind us.
5. ROXAS V. GMA
FACTS:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States,
enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a member.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions
rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her
companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered
the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was
informed that she is being detained for being a member of Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her
companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of
gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her
communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that those who
tortured her came from the “Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted
because her name is included in the “Order of Battle.”
On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a
sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas
continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out of
apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of
military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the
government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. The
Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However,
the court a quo absolved the respondents because it was not convinced that the
respondents were responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas.
Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an
amparo petition.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators is enough ground for the issuance of the privilege of the
writ of amparo.
3. Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.
ANSWERS:
1. No.
2. It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be preferred
over mere circumstantial evidence.
3. Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF
AMPARO
Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally
inaccurate – The use of the doctrine of command responsibility as justification in
impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by
this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an
amparo petition.
The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy – As held in the case of Rubrico v.
Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by
the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. It does not fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
administrative under the applicable substantive law. Since the application of
command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more
aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed
with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be
impleaded — not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the
ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS
In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence – In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to
parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of
directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of
identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based
on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as
to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
3. EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS
Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before the
privilege of the writ may be extended – An indispensable requirement before the
privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence,
of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or
threatened violation of such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents
were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any
inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s
right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the
meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, it
modified the directive of the Court of the
Appeals for further investigation, as follows:
Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall,
under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary
steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by
the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his
successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend
assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to
furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s
abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the
Constitution and existing laws.
Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the
reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are
already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
decision.
Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its
corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection
to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may
hereinafter be determined by this Court.
The Supreme Court likewise referred the case back to the Court of Appeals, for the
purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining
whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least,
accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its
own report with recommendation to the Supreme Court for its consideration. It was
declared that the Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in
order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.
6. Burgos vs Esperon
Doctrine:
The Court emphasize that the Court’s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely
to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is
responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance.
Facts:
 Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April
28, 2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men
and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant located in
Quezon City.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) submitted to the Court its Investigation
Report on the Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos. The CHR finds that the
enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos had transpired and that his constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully
determined. The CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal
prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. Regional Trial Court found probable cause for arbitrary
detention against Lt. Baliaga and ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’
disappearance.
Based on the finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of
Amparo. The respondents have not appealed to the court, as provided under Section
19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Hence, the petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s motion should be granted.
Ruling:
No.
After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and
considering all the developments of the case, including the Court of Appeal’s
decision that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the
present case, the Court resolve to deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela.
The Court note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the
beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As the
Court held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis the writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to
police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced
disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and
a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is
on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or
the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings
has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to
achieve. In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, the Court defined what the terms “responsibility”
and “accountability” signify in an Amparo case. The Court
said: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to
the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives
issued by the Court outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR
demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga.
The Court take judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court has already
found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his
arrest in connection with Jonas’ disappearance.
The Court emphasize that the Court’s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely
to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is
responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance.
As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in
the present case with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of
criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and
prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ
of Amparo proceeding now before us.
I.B. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
1. Infant JULIAN YUSA y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA.
CHRISTINA YUSA y CARAM vs. Atty. MARIJOY SIGUE, Atty. SALLY
ESCUTIN, VILMA CABRERA and CELIA YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652. 5 August 2014. Villarama, Jr., J.
Facts
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (herein referred to as Christina) had an
amorous relationship with Gicano Constantino III (herein referred to as Marcelino),
and eventually became pregnant without the benefit of marriage. Christina mislead
Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion; and to avoid placing her family in
a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son, she
intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun
and Moon, for brevity). After giving birth to Baby Julian, Christina surrendered him
by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. Not long after,
Marcelino suffered heart attack and died. During the wake, Christina disclosed to the
family of Marcelino the birth of Baby Julian and the fact that she gave him up for
adoption. The said family vowed to help Christina recover and raise the baby.
Christina wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s
adoption proceedings. However, DSWD had already issued a Certificate declaring
Baby Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption,” he was “matched” with spouses
Vergel and Filomina Medina; and thereafter, supervised trial custody commenced.
The Certificate abovementioned had attained finality and, in effect, Christina’s
parental authority was terminated and Baby Julian is effectively made a ward of the
State. DSWD, in response to the letter, informed petitioner that they were no longer
in the position to stop the adoption process, and Christina lost her right to reacquire
her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process since the
reglementary period for the said action had already lapsed under Sec. 7 of RA No.
9523.
Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo, seeking to obtain
custody of Baby Julian from respondents. Christina argues that the life, liberty and
security of Baby Julian is being violated or threatened by herein respondents; that the
latter "blackmail" her into surrendering custody of her child to the DSWD, and
utilized an invalid Certificate of Availability for Adoption to misrepresent that all
legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with. As such,
respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby depriving her
of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.
Initially, the trial court affirmed the remedy availed of by petitioner and issued a
Writ of Amparo, commanding respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at the
scheduled hearing, to which they refused to comply. However, the court, later on,
dismissed the petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo, on ground that the same it is
not the proper remedy to regain custody of the child. The court held that Christina
should have filed either (a) civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the
Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors; or (b) Petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors, in case there is extreme
urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegally detained by another,
either as a principal or ancillary remedy.
Issue
Whether a petition for a Writ of Amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child?
Ruling
No.The Court held that the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," as such, it is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
In relation thereto, "enforced disappearance" is characterized by an arrest, detention
or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private
individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside
the protection of law.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her
"enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an
"enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her
position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's
whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's Memorandum
explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses; she
even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent presented
Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no "enforced
disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child
and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she
is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is
involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child,
who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied
2. VIVARES ET AL V. ST. THERESE COLLEGE
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into
their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along
with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook
profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,
learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified
Julia and Julienne, among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal
Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include:
(a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and
(b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing
that showvirtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
 Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred
from joining the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the
following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may
view them, lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is,
the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a
right to informational privacy in online social network activities of its users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at
the latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right
to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact,
defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim (proven by at least substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression
or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be
availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and
of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data
about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family.
Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To
“engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information
about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the
element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a
personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial
and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.
Right to informational privacy
 Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information
about themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in this Social
Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations,
but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the
underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in
OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng
High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,”
but did so with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes
every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the
user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose
facts about themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’
right to privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’
Facebook friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were
visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that
the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-
serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that
her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using
their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be
able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,
and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook,
absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the
right to informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures
or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s
own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not
with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is
suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot
easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’
argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since
it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents
were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means
of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of
the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed
any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has
been screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result
may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the
particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s
friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
3. MERALCO VS. LIM
FACTS:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, an administrative clerk at
the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), learned of an anonymous letter that was
posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of
MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing
respondent. The letter reads:
“Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON
NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…”
By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human
Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang
Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” in light of the receipt of “… reports that
there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals
and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.”
Respondent questions the propriety of MERALCO’s action in a letter as “highly
suspicious…” and being “punitive”, but the latter never responded. Respondent filed
a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Additionally, respondent prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from
effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s
transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the writ outside the parameters expressly set forth in
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data?
RULING:
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial
complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s
right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is
to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
[W]rits of …habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague
or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due
process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the
real reasons for her transfer – a legitimate concern respecting the terms and
conditions of one’s employment – are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law
with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right
to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation
of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these
threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of
her letter as “highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.”
And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the real
intent of management]” and could be a “punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
4. LEE V. ILAGAN
FACTS: Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas
Data against Joy, her former common law partner. According to him, sometime in
July 2011, he visited Joy’s condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at
his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted
him about a purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing him
and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but
she refused. The had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against
a wall and then walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of
Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said
video.
The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the
other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of
habeas data.
After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ
and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well
as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from
receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera
and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases she filed against
Neri. Neri’s petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at
suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in
the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC
granted Neri’s petition and ordered the turn-over of the video to Neri and enjoined
Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded Joy’s defense that she is not engaged
in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of reproducing the
same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neri’s right to privacy
and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video and not
on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data was
proper
The Court’s ruling: NO.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule),
was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances[1]. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals[2], which is
defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of
data about oneself[3].”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the
petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists
a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other[4]. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported
by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim[5]. In this relation, it bears pointing
out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague and doubtful[6].
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the
supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While
Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears
would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence
on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data
cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data
petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the
records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving
testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by
the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee
actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude[7] that Lee was going to use the subject video in order
to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the
only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the
same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
Ilagan[8]. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring
absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
I.C. WRIT OF KALIKASAN
1. MARICRIS D. DOLOT v. RAMON PAJE, GR No. 199199, 2013-08-27
Facts:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the
parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa
Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages
and attorney's fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-
8338.
The petition contained the following pertinent allegations... iron ore mining
operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco,
located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail;
Matnog... need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality... susceptible to flooding and landslides... confronted with the
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground
subsidence and landslide hazard... after investigation... did not have the required...
permit to operate... issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they
did not have authority to issue... representatives DENR... did not do anything...
violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076
R.A. No. 7942
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53
being the designated environmental court.[8] In the Order[9] dated September 16,
2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration... the RTC[11] further ruled that: (1)
there was... no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of
continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein
failed to exhaust their... administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach
judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency, as required by the rules.
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues:
whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338.
The other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is
no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly... failed to
act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy
of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.
Ruling:
The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and
confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over
the action filed by the petitioners.
By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
is vested in... the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.
he petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take
further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to
compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law."[33] The petition
should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation... or
a right therein.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure
to attach judicial affidavits.
the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be
accompanied by a sworn certification of... non-forum shopping. There is nothing in
Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited
Principles:
"courts are not... enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of
the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties'
right to an opportunity to be... heard."
Dolot vs. Paje, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 199199, August 27,2013
Facts
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution3 dated October
18, 2011 issued by RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 on Continuing Mandamus,
Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Environment Protection Order (TEPO).
Petitioner Maricris Dolot, et al, filed the aforesaid petition with the RTC of
Sorsogon alleging that mining operations conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global
Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore puts the municipality of
Matnog in environmental dangers and despite this fact, Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee
and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit.
Similarly, it was alleged that representatives of PMS and DENR did nothing to
protect the interest of the people in same community, thus, respondents violated
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A.
No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.
Dolot, et al primarily prayed for the shutdown of said mining operations through
issuance of TEPO as well as the rehabilitation of the mining sites and the return of
the iron ore mined in the area.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. However, the case was
summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC averred that SC
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 limit the power
of such court to try and hear the case as its territorial jurisdiction was limited to
violations of environmental laws within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the
neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban.
Issue
Whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338.
Ruling
The SC held that such reasoning is plainly erroneous and that RTC cannot
solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself
within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed
by the petitioners. As reiterated by the SC, jurisdiction is the power and authority of
the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be over the
nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or
over the issues framed in the pleadings. BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 also states that jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC, hence, original jurisdiction shall be
exercised by the RTCs. Both the SC AO and AC merely provide for the venue where
an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on
any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress and
the same cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.
The high court further emphasized that venue relates only to the place of
trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought
and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court as it is aimed to accord
convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their
access to the courts. Therefore, RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction is incorrect. While it appears that the alleged actionable
neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition
should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin, it does not warrant the outright dismissal
of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived. Moreover, the action filed by the
petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction. With these, the SC granted the petition and directed the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon to transfer the case to the RTC of Irosin,
Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch.
2. HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE, in his capacity as DENR Secretary v. Hon.
Teodoro Casino, et al. G.R. No. 207257/February 3, 2015/J. Del Castillo
Facts: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an
Environmental Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at
Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary
on the ground that actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project
is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules
governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated
the ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in
invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the
validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a
Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.
Issues: Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan; and
Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
Ruling: Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal,
questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such
writ is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a
magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities,
but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the
defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be
dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the
perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.
3. ARIGO V. SWIFT
FACTS
 Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation
No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 11 August 1988.
 In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site.
It was recognized as one of the Philippines’ oldest ecosystems.
 On 6 April 2010, Congress passed R.A. No. 10067 (RA 10067), otherwise
known as the “Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009”, to
ensure protection and conservation of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity
for the enjoyment of present and future generations.
 Under the “no take” policy, entry into the waters of the TRNP is strictly
regulated and many human activities are prohibited, penalized or fined,
including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within
the TRNP.
 In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the USS Guardian (the ship) “to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.”
 On 6 January 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on
13 January 2013. Two days later, it departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia.
 On 17 January 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. No one was
injured in the incident and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
 On 20 January 2013, US 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift
expressed regret for the incident in a press statement.
 On 4 February 2013, US Ambassador to the Philippine Harry Thomas, Jr.
met with Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario
regarding the compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship.
 By 30 March 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing
the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
 On 17 April 2013, petitioners Arigo, et.al. on their behalf and in
representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including
minors or generations yet unborn filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases. Their contentions are:
- The grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the ship
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antiques, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboaga
del Norte, Basilan, Sulu and Taw-Tawi which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
- There should be a directive from the Supreme Court for the
institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in
connection with the grounding incident
- US respondents committed the following violations under RA
10067: unauthorized entry; non-payment of conservation fees;
obstruction of law enforcement officer; damages to the reef; and
destroying and disturbing resources
- The VFA provides for a waiver of immunity from suit
 The respondents consist of the following: Scott Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet; Mark Rice as the Commanding Officer of
the ship; President Benigno Aquino III as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; Hon. Albert del Rosario as the DFA
Secretary; Hon. Paquito Ochoa as the Executive Secretary; Hon. Ramon
Paje as the DENR Secretary; Vice Admiral Jose Luis Alano as the
Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command; Admiral Rodolfo Isorena as
Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, Commodore Enrico Efren
Evangelista as the Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, Major Gen. Virgilio
Domingo as Commandant of the AFP and Lt. Gen. Terry Robling as Co-
Director of the US Marine Corps. Forces. The Philippine respondents
contend that:
- The grounds relied upon by petitioners for the issuance of TEPO or
writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage
operations on the ship were already completed
- The petition is defective in form and in substance
- The petition improperly raises issues involving VFA between
Philippines and USA
- The determination of the extent of responsibility of the US
Government regarding the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests
exclusively with the executive branch
ISSUES
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents
2. WON the waiver of immunity provisions of the VFA applies
3. WON the petition has become moot
4. WON the Court can determine the extent of responsibility of the US
Government
RULING

1. None. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be
one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.
It is worthy to note that during the deliberations, Justice Antonio
Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its
warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).
While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of UNCLOS creates an exception to
this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of
the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and
the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter
of long-standing policy, the US considers itself bound by customary
international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in
UNCLOS.
The Court concurs with Justice Carpio’s view that non-
membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the
rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. The Court thus expects the US to bear “international
responsibility under Art. 31 of UNCLOS in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.
2. No. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:
“SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions. – The filing of a
petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not
preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or
administrative actions.”
A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The Court
found it unnecessary to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is
indeed absolute.
In the same vein, the Court cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. Section 15, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases enumerates the reliefs which
may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall
render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the
writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the
following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist
from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a
duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of
 the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied)
3. Yes, in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or
restrained had already been accomplished. However, insofar as the
directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef
structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident
are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the
completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.
The Court is mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine
governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. After all,
exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed
by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
4. No. The Court deferred to the Executive Branch the matter of compensation
and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of
these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of
common security interests under the VFA.
It is settled that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed
by the Constitution to the executive and legislative – “the political” departments of
the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision
4. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v.
Secretary Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Energy, et.al. (G.R. No. 180771 and 181527)
FACTS:
On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department
of Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
(GSEC102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX). The studies
included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic
data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon
Strait was conducted. On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-
102 to Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sqm.
offshore the Tañon Strait. From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys
in and around Tañon Strait, including a multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering
approximately 751 kms. to determine the area’s underwater composition. During the
2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well. Since
the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan
where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential
Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled “Establishing an Environmental Impact
Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures
and For Other Purposes.” On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management
Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted
the Initial Environmental Examination commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably
recommended the approval of the latter’s application for an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC). On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted
an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon
Strait. From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory
well with a depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town. On 17 December 2007,
two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that the implementation
of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which
inhibit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria
Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends
seeking their protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the
Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit,
non-governmental organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk
in Region VII and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities
of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Their contentions are: - A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a
drastic reduce in fish catch by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the “payao”
or the artificial reef. - The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there
is no public consultations and discussions prior to its issuance. - SC-46 is null and
void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, considering
that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions,
and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction -
FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer
radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the
1.5kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination
The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose
L. Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield
Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-
allegations are: - The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal
standing to file the petition. - SC-46 is constitutional. - The ECC was legally issued. -
The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June 2008.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the case is moot and academic; Whether or not Petitioners have a
legal standing: Whether or not SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING:
The Court makes clear that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magic
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the
termination of SC-46, the Court deems it necessary to resolve the consolidated
petitions as it falls within the exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is
violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised
undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and the respondents’ contested actions are
capable of repetition.
In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a
“citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations
under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an
order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs
prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the
case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected
baragngays copies of said order. Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A.
No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of
procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi
in environmental cases.
In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet
unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.” It is also worth noting that the
Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part: “The President may
enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall
notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.” (Emphases supplied) The disposition,
exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in
the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that
PD 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two
other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be
notified of such contract, renders it null and void. SC-46 appears to have been
entered into and signed by the DOE through its then Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr.
Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was
subsequently notified of the execution of such contract. Service contracts involving
the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of
paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were out
in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and
likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and agencies
by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service contracts
herself. Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board,
now the DOE, obtain the President’s approval for the execution of any contract under
said statute. The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent
laws to serve as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts. Under
Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having
been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of
its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after
undergoing an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of
such activity on its ecological system. Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only
started to secure an ECC prior to the 2nd sub-phase of SC-46, which required the
drilling of the exploration well. This means that no environmental impact evaluation
was done when the seismic surveys were conducted. Unless the seismic surveys are
part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation
of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586. While
PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law
specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy
resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
5. WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM V. PHIL IND. CORP
Facts:
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil Pipeline
(WOPL) System, which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the
Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene;
and (b) the Black Oil
Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel
from Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60%
of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of
Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the
residents of West Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the
condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium premises
led to the discovery of a fuel leak from... the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its
inability to control the flow, WestTower’s management reported the matter to the
Police Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire
Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day
affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the
City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage
system of Barangay Bangkal.
Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their
respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo’s power was shut down.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower
Corp.) interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on
behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding
communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati
City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several
people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups
who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the
environmental issues... involved.[1]
On November 19, 2010, the Cou... rt issued the Writ of Kalikasan[2] with a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC,
FGC, and the members o... f their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified
returns. The TEPO... enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating
the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the whole span of
the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and
avert any untoward incident that may result from any... leak of the pipeline; and (c)
make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors
and Officers filed a Joint Compliance[5] submitting the report required by the Writ
of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither own nor operate the
pipelines,... adding that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity
of the pipelines, much less to cease and desist from operating them as they have no
capability, power, control or responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that
the directives of the Writ of
Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.
On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page
“Report on Pipeline Integrity Check and Preventive Maintenance Program.”
Since after the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on
November 19, 2010, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL.
On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of the DOE, clarified and
confirmed that what is covered by the
Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can
resume operation of its BOPL System.
To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA). By this Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2011,[14]
the appellate court was required to conduct hearings and, thereafter, submit a report
and... recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the parties’ memoranda.
On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration[19] of
the CA’s Report praying that (a) instead of the DOE, the required certification should
be issued by the DOST-Metal Industry Research and Development Center; (b) a
trust... fund be created to answer for future contingencies; and (c) the directors and
officers of FPIC and FGC be held accountable.
On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the
CA in its Report and Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification
from the DOE Secretary before the WOPL may resume its operations.
Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014 Letter
from the DOE on the state of the WOPL, as well as the parties’ comments thereon,
the following issues defined by the parties during the March 21, 2012 preliminary
conference are now ripe for... adjudication
Issues:
Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other
petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower
and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the
respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect,
preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;
Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future
similar contingencies; and
Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be
held liable under the environmental protection order.
Ruling:
Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[39]
Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real...
parties-in-interest.[40] In other words, the action must be brought by the person who,
by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.[41] Alternatively, one
who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the... jurisdiction of the court as
party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected
all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to
evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the
condominium’s electrical power... was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and
residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus,
there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest
of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the
instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA
4726, otherwise known as The
Condominium Act,[43] it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members.
In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the management body of West
Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium
unit owners or... users.
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of
juridical personality
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of
the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. – San Juan
Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala
Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as
petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present
controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7[45] of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental...
disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the
submissions to the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of
the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the
pending motions. Suffice it to state in the outset that as regards the substantive issues
presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the other recommendations of the CA,
with a few... modifications.
II.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE
Certification of the WOPL’s Commercial Viability
To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010
TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec.
3,[46] Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. For its part,
respondent
FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place,
will sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.
With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following
systems: (a) regular cleaning scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline
integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as in-line inspections (ILI),
which is done every five years;
(c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted
that it also undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole
testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known as segment pressure test; (c)
pressure-controlled test; (d)... inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection
and reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement.[47] Furthermore,
in August 2010, with the oil leak hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle
East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI... inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL)
and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the pipeline and check it
for cracks.
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and
insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence,
considering the necessary caution and level of assurance required to ensure that the
WOPL system is free... from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA
recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is
already safe for commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA, was
to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of... the appropriate leak
detection systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace
portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the required
certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We
required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013
Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said certification from the DOE
considering that the core issue of this case... requires the specialized knowledge and
special expertise of the DOE and various other administrative agencies. On October
25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013
Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos
Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable
for the resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue between the
concerned government agencies and FPIC.
After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the
parties, the Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter
dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption
of the commercial operations of... the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed
with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter.
Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate reopening of the
WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the... operation of the
WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no
longer safe for continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or that it already
exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may be...
ordered.
It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s
compliance with pipeline structure standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a
question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence presented by the
parties on the WOPL’s... actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous
findings and recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the
WOPL’s present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent
propounds.
Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon
FPIC for the resumption of the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the
submission by the DOE of its proposed activities and timetable, is a clear and
unequivocal message coming from the
DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and continued commercial
operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive determination
by the DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical state through its proposed activities, and
not merely through a... short-form integrity audit,[56] that the factual issue on the
WOPL’s viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s structural
integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court’s
resolution.
Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification adverted to
equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under
Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is
limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals
that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.This
is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of
Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has
presumably already suffered. Hence,the Court affirms with concurrence the
observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for damages, which is
prohibited by the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view that
the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.
The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the
instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be
rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from the same
incident if the payment... of damages is found warranted.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and the
IV.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and
officers, the CA found FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the
outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City)
and criminal complaint
(Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Makati City) filed against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and
FGC are not liable in their individual capacities.
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual
directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of
kalikasan,the Court cannot... grant the award of damages to individual petitioners
under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly
noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against
respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and... determine the individual
liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the With regard to petitioners’ March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation about a
management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the dumping of recent possible leak in the pipeline, the CA appropriately found no additional leak.
petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, However, due to the devastating effect on the environs in Barangay Bangkal due to
Makati City. the 2010 leak, the Court finds it... fitting that the pipeline be closely and regularly
monitored to obviate another catastrophic event which will prejudice the health of
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and the affected people, and to preserve and protect the environment not only for the
FGC officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal present but also for the future generations to come.
cases now pending against them.
Petitioner’s January 10, 2013 Motion for Partial Recommendation of the CA’s
Principles: Report need not be discussed and given consideration. As the CA’s Report contains
Said proviso... pertinently provides: but the appellate court’s recommendation on how the issues should be resolved, and
not the adjudication by this
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. – If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff
proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the Court, there is nothing for the appellate court to reconsider.
environment and the payment of attorney’s fees, costs of suit and other litigation... As to petitioner’s October 2, 2013 Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or Clarification, the matters contained therein have been considered in the foregoing
restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to discussion of the primary issues of this case. With all these, We need not belabor the
contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the... court. other arguments raised by the... parties.
(emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Sec. 15(e), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
expressly prohibits the grant of damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance
of a writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the
privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of
the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
The CA’s resolution on petitioners’ September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current
Developments) with Omnibus Motion on the remediation plan in Barangay Bangkal
by directing the Inter-Agency Committee on Environmental Health to submit its
evaluation of the said plan prepared by
CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to strictly comply with the stipulations embodied
in the permits issued by the DENR, and to get a certification from the DENR of its
compliance thereto is well taken. DENR is the government agency tasked to
implement the state policy of
“maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of
the environment”[57] and to “promulgate rules and regulations for the control of
water, air, and land pollution.”[58] It is indubitable that the DENR... has jurisdiction
in overseeing and supervising the environmental remediation of Barangay Bangkal,
which is adversely affected by the leak in the WOPL in 2010.