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Metaphysics

C. A. Tomy
Professor of Philosophy
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
IIT Delhi

(Note: This write-up is based on the writings of Moriz Laserowitz. It is meant only for
personal study)

Metaphysics has been traditionally held to be the most important part of philosophy. It
asks the question, what is real and attempts to answer it. It is considered as the systematic
study of the fundamental nature and structure of reality. The Greek philosopher Aristotle
conceived metaphysics as the study of being per se or as the investigation of being qua
being. Metaphysicians think of it as the most basic of all sciences. According to
Descartes, metaphysics is the root of the tree of knowledge with physics as its trunk and
special sciences as the branches. The special sciences like biology, chemistry psychology,
etc., divide the being or the real into various compartments and try to comprehend the
being piecemeal: each of the basic sciences studies or concentrates on some specific
aspects or properties of reality whereas metaphysics studies the real as such. It aims to
provide a coherent conception of reality as a comprehensive, unbiased, and objective
whole. Without such a general conception provided by metaphysics, various theories and
empirical findings of special sciences would become meaningless. It is the general
framework of metaphysics that helps us interpret the findings of the various special
sciences and integrate the knowledge provided by them into a coherent and unified
whole.

Metaphysics and other sciences

No rational being can totally avoid metaphysical thinking. Every rational being at
some point of his/her life must have thought about reality, its fundamental nature and
structure. It assumed that metaphysics as a way enquiry can arrive at truth the about
reality without the aid of sensory experience, and for that reason without taking recourse
to the methods of empirical sciences. This however, is not to say that metaphysics has no
connection whatsoever with empirical sciences. Every empirical science requires a
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comprehensive and coherent framework within which its empirical findings can be
interpreted and understood. It is metaphysics that provides it. It is perhaps not possible to
arrive at conclusions about the nature and structure of reality without heeding attention to
what the various sciences have to say about what is there in the universe and how various
elements in the universe are related to one another. The aim of science is to tell us what
actually exist. What actually exists is something what possibly could exist. If it is
impossible for something to exist, then we cannot say that it actually exists. Therefore, it
is the function of metaphysics is to say what possibly could not exist, and what could not
exist and what if there is anything that necessarily exists. Metaphysics specifies what is
genuinely possible and what is impossible and what is really necessary. Sciences speak of
what exists and it can be done only in the light of a coherent conception of what could or
could not exist for what exists must be genuinely possible.

There cannot be progress in sciences if metaphysics is ignored. Metaphysics

should not be subservient to the prevailing scientific fashion. Each particular body of
science would have its own metaphysical outlook, though often it is tacit and
unarticulated. It would be a complete abdication of philosophical responsibility for a
philosopher to adopt uncritically the metaphysical outlook of a particular branch of
science.

Types of Metaphysics
We humans undergo various sensory experiences. It is undeniable that we have these
experiences, though it might be debated whether whatever we experience really exist as
we experience them or whether we can even grant their existence at all. Some
philosophers would argue that what we experience is ultimately illusory, and that that
there is nothing answering these experiences. There are others who reject that things exist
as we experience them. However, the latter group of thinkers is ready to grant that there
is something behind the experiences, which in a sense is responsible for the diverse
experiences that we have. They, thereby, grant a distinction between appearance and
reality. Whatever be the philosophical position one is given to, it cannot be denied that
we have these experiences. On the basis of how metaphysics would construe its relation
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to the given, metaphysics can be divided into two kinds: metaphysics of transcendence
and metaphysics of immanence.

Metaphysics of Transcendence
The metaphysics of transcendence regards the experience or the given as merely illusory.
The real transcends or goes beyond what is given by the sensory experience or
introspection. The external senses are said to provide us with the knowledge of the
existence and nature of physical things outside us while introspection provides us with
the knowledge of things within us. The transcendental metaphysicians think that either
external senses or the faculty of introspection cannot present the real and its properties to
us. The reality and its attributes transcend the horizons of the physical and the mental.

An example of the metaphysics of transcendence would be Plato’s ideas. Plato

distinguishes between the world of common sense and the world of the higher and
sublime reality. What is given to us in the world of experience is the world of common
sense. This world is given to us by the senses and it exists in space and time. One
characteristic feature of the reality as presented by the senses is that it is constantly
undergoing change. For Plato, the reality that undergoes change or is in constant flux
would be inferior to something that is permanent. What changes cannot be considered as
real. Moreover, it is not possible for us to know something that keeps on changing. The
spatio-temporal universe is in constant flux. Therefore, no knowledge of the spatio-
temporal universe is possible. The true knowledge is the knowledge of something
unchanging and permanent. If such a reality exists, then it is possible for us to have the
knowledge of it. According to Plato, such a reality exists and it is the world of intelligible
Forms or Ideas. Nothing but ideas or forms inhabit the world of ideas. These ideas never
undergo any change and are permanent and eternal. They are neither spatial nor temporal.
These ideas are universal in the sense that they have many instantiations across the
spatio-temporal universe. The world that the senses represent to us is the world of
changing particulars. Consider the case of a particular table that we encounter through the
senses. This table that came into existence at a particular point in time and would cease to
be at some point of time in future. It occupies a specific location in space. It constantly
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undergoes change. If the table, for example, is made of iron, it would rust if exposed to
moisture or it would be worn out as we use it. Consider, on the other hand, the form or
the idea of table existing in the world of Ideas. The tables that we see in the spatio-
temporal world are all instantiations of the table in the world of ideas. As it has many
instantiations and is available always and everywhere it is a universal. The idea would
never undergo any change. It is logically prior to the existence of any particular table. It
existed before any particular table came into existence and would continue to exist even
if all the tables that exist in the spatio-temporal universe are annihilated. Thus the idea of
table is eternal, permanent, changeless, and transcends space and time. Whereas we come
to know the particular table through sense perception, we get to know the idea of table
through pure understanding. The world of ideas that we come to know through reason
rather than through the world of sense is the real world. In comparison to it, the spatio-
temporal world of senses is a mere illusion or a world of shadows.

Plato brings out the distinction between the higher reality of ideas and the world of
common sense through the famous allegory of cave. The people who take the world of
senses to be real are like men who are chained in their cave with the their head facing the
walls of the cave. These are men who have been brought up in the cave from their birth.
There are people who live outside the cave, but the cave dwellers are unaware of them.
The people outside the cave are engaged in various activities in their daily life. They
carry various objects; take their horses to the cave, etc. The shadows of the people and
objects outside the cave fall on the walls of the cave. They see what happens outside the
cave as black and white pictures without realizing that it is shadows of the real people
and objects that they watch. The cave dwellers take the shadows to the real objects and
people and spend their entire life in this illusory world. If one of the cave dwellers were
to escape from the cave and come to the real world and see people and multi-colored
objects in the real sunlight, only then would he realize that he was wasting away his
entire life mistaking shadows for the real objects. Similarly, it is only when the
knowledge of the intelligible forms in the world of ideas dawn upon us, that we realize
that the world that senses present us to be a merely shadowy and illusory world. Thus, for
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Plato, the spatio-temporal world is just a changing shadowy world, a product of one’s
ignorance. Plato’s transcendental metaphysics rejects both space and time as unreal.

Metaphysics of immanence
Quite unlike the metaphysics of transcendence, the metaphysics of immanence does not
reject the world of everyday experience as either illusory or shadowy. It is concerned
with the empirical world. The empirical world as encountered by the sense experience is
real though it may not be there as we experience it. The immanent metaphysicians accept
the distinction between appearance and reality. However, appearance is not rejected as
illusory and unreal. Appearance itself has its anchoring in reality. According to
Metaphysicians of immanence, how the empirical world appears the way it does requires
explanation and they are engaged in the job of developing comprehensive and systematic
theories that would do the job. They accomplish this task by positing certain basic
entities, which are considered to be the principles out of which everything in the
empirical world comes into being. The real as it appears is said to be empirical when it is
shown in accordance with certain laws specified by the metaphysical theory. For the
immanent metaphysician, the real is not the object of metaphysical contemplation, but the
way some objects are studied by the empirical sciences. The function of metaphysical
theories is to give a description of the real at the fundamental level. In other words,
metaphysical theories and everyday descriptions in terms of the ordinary language are
descriptions of one and the same reality but at two different levels. It should, however, be
noted that, for the immanent metaphysicians, both the descriptions are not at the same
level. Metaphysical description, the description at a more fundamental level, has priority
over description at the ordinary level. Thus it could not be said that though immanent
metaphysicians do speak of a reality that appears is different from the reality that
transcends space and time, there is a sense in which the reality for them in transcendent,
i.e., sense-transcendent. The things as they are in themselves are not accessible to senses.

A classic example of immanent metaphysics is Leibniz’s monadology. Monads

are the simple, indivisible substances that are of the nature of the mind. The world as we
perceive today is the result of the various concatenation of monads. Another example of
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immanent metaphysics is the atomism propounded by the modern science. On the basis
of their outlook about the real, the metaphysical systems are classified as monistic,
dualistic, and pluralistic. Monists believe that in spite of the appearance of the real as
many and changing, the ultimate reality is just one and that the division of the real into
many is the work of the intellect and is born out of ignorance. Systems of philosophy
developed by Parmenides, Spinoza, and Bradley are examples of monistic philosophy.
Dualists believe that real consists of two different kinds of substances, both of them are
radically different and opposing natures. Metaphysics as expounded by Descartes is the
paradigm of dualism. Pluralists believe that the basic entities or substances that make up
the world are many in number. Philosophies of Leibniz and Hobbes are examples of
pluralistic systems.

It could further be asked what the nature of the real is. Depending on the answer
given to this question, the metaphysical systems are classified as idealism and
materialism. Idealists believe that the ultimate reality is of the nature of the mind or
consciousness and would not grant existence to matter. They would try either to explain
away the matter or would try to delineate how matter arises from consciousness.
Materialist, on the other hand, think there exists only matter in this universe. The mental
phenomena, including consciousness could be explained in terms of or can be reduced to
matter. Thus, whereas the idealists grant primacy to mind over matter, matter is the basic
and fundamental reality for the materialists.

If we take the metaphysicians’ outlook on the real as well as the nature they
ascribe to the real as our basis for the classification, we can divide metaphysical systems
into four kinds: materialistic monism, idealistic monism, materialistic pluralism and
idealistic pluralism. Materialistic monism is the view that the real is one and is of the
nature of matter whereas idealistic monism says that the real is one and is of the nature of
consciousness. Materialistic pluralism views real as many in number but of the nature of
matter. For the idealistic pluralists, the real is many and of the nature of consciousness.
The dualistic metaphysics cuts the real into two exclusive and exhaustive categories of
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substance, namely, matter and mind. So dualism may be characterized as half-

materialism and half-idealism.

Metaphysics and the Rationalist Tradition

Metaphysics originated and flourished within the tradition of rationalism. Though many
rationalists acknowledge the role of experience in the acquisition of knowledge of the
real, they are unanimous in holding that it is in principle to have knowledge unassisted by
experience. Reason has the power to know the real without any inputs from the senses.
Whereas senses may deceive us, reason is the reliable, the only reliable, instrument of
knowledge provided it is employed properly. That is, the real nature of the real can be
comprehended only through the reason.

We see various formulations of the thesis that the nature and existence of the real
can be arrived at by pure and a priori thinking. The earliest formulation of the above
thesis can be found in Parmenides. According to him, what can be thought is identical
with what is. That is, if we can conceive of a certain thing, then it is certain that the thing
as we conceive exists. Spinoza justified the claim that the real is knowable through
thought alone by stipulating that the order of the real conforms to the order of the
thought.

We do not know of any reason that Parmenides cites in support of the thesis that
what is thinkable exists in reality. G. E. Moore tries to clarify the thesis by appealing to
the object of thought. According to him, whenever we think, our act of thought has some
object or other. For example, when we think of Taj Mahal, the object of our thought is
Taj Mahal itself. When we conceive of unicorn, the mythical figure of a horse with one
horn, the object of our conception is unicorn. It is not possible for us to think without
some object. But how does the reality of a thing follow from the fact that we can think of
it? The reality of the object of our thought follows from the fact if we think of something
and maintain at the same time that the object of our thought does not exist, then our
thought leads to a contradiction. So we can conclude that an object that can be thought of
exists with the property of being thought of. We would not be able to ascribe the property
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of being thought of if the object we thought of does not exist. Take, for example, the case
of unicorns. We can think of unicorns. Therefore, the unicorn exists with the property of
being thought of.

When one thinks of unicorns one is not thinking of nothing. This can be clarified
as follows. Just as we can think of unicorns, it is possible for us to think of griffins. The
thought of unicorns and the thought of griffins are two different thoughts with distinct
thought contents. If the thought of unicorns and the thought of griffins were thought
about nothing, one would not be able to distinguish between thought about unicorns and
thought about griffins. But we are able to distinguish between these two thoughts. What
differentiate these thoughts are indeed the difference in their objects. In one case, the
thoughts are about unicorns and in another case it is the griffins. If we think of unicorns
or griffins, and if it is possible for us to distinguish between unicorns and griffins, then
the unicorns and griffins at least must exist as objects of our thoughts.

The view that such fictitious entities like unicorns and griffins exist seems to go
contrary to the common sense because it seems that we can think of unicorns and griffins
even if they do not exist. That is, we can conceive of unicorns and griffins even if the
terms ‘unicorns’ and ‘griffins’ do not refer. Thus we have seemingly conflicting
intuitions about the truth of the thesis that what is thinkable is. If we can think of unicorns
and griffins and if `unicorns’ and `griffins’ do not refer, then what is thinkable is not. On
the other hand we can think of unicorns and griffins only if they exist, then what is
thinkable is. Is there a way out of this conflict? Some have suggested a way out.
According to them, the words ‘being’ and ‘existence’ should not be equated. ‘Being’ is
much more general than ‘existence.’ It could be said that there are two modes of being:
existence and subsistence. Anything that we can think of possesses being only in the
sense of subsistence. If we think of griffins, unicorns, trees, lions etc., the objects of our
thoughts can be said to subsist. Of these, only some like trees, lions, etc. can be said to
exist. Thus existence would entail subsistence because whatever exists can be thought of,
but subsistence does not entail existence because what can be thought of need not
necessarily exist. Being is a general attribute whereas existence is a possession of some
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of the beings. Thus what is conceivable subsists is a more plausible interpretation of the
rationalist thesis, what is conceivable is than the interpretation what is conceivable exists.

We have been trying to explicate the rationalist thesis, what is conceivable is,
from the point of a thinking subject. The same can be made explicit from the perspective
of a language user provided we assume whatever we can think of, we can speak of. Thus
conceivability and speakability may be construed as equivalent. On this assumption, if
we can speak of i.e., mention or name something, then the thing we are mentioning or
naming is said to be or subsist. Russell makes this point clear as follows: let ‘A’ be any
term that is available to us for use. Suppose we use ‘A’ to name or speak of something.
Then we must say that A is. That is, A is something and has being. The linguistic
expression ‘A is not’ on this interpretation would be a contradiction and therefore always
false and meaningless. Accordingly, anything that we can think of or speak of necessarily
possesses being. If the objects of our thought or speech lack being, then it is not possible
for us to make propositions about them. In what follows we shall see how this rationalist
tenet, what is conceivable is, figures in various metaphysical systems.

Materialistic Monism of Parmenides

Materialistic monism expounded by the Greek philosopher Parmenides is unique in the

history of philosophy. His argument for materialistic monism is based on his distinction
between the phenomenal and the real. Anything that is given introspectively or
perceptually is part of the phenomenal. But he does not accord the status of real to the
phenomenal. The phenomenal has no anchoring in the real and therefore the phenomenal
should be explained away as illusory. The external senses and introspection present the
real as many and as constantly changing. This picture of the reality as presented by the
senses is false. Neither perception nor introspection is in a position to give us undistorted
picture of the real. It is only reason or the intellect that is able to provide us with the true
nature of the real, which according to Parmenides, is one, unchanging and material in its
nature. In establishing this thesis, Parmenides appeals to the rationalist thesis, what is
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thinkable is. In fact, for Parmenides, what is thinkable and what is are identical. His
argument for the identity is as follows:
1. What is, is thinkable
2. What is thinkable is
3. Therefore, what is thinkable is the same as what is.
Premise 1 is almost uncontroversial. If something exists or subsists, it is possible for a
rational being to conceive of it, though some particular individual x, y, or z may not be
able to do it. In other words, we do not have any argument to show that whatever having
being cannot, in principle, be conceived of.

The above argument does not say, that that there exists something. It merely
identifies being with thinkable. But Parmenides does not stop with this identity. He has
argument to show that something exists, which runs as follows:
1.Either something exists or nothing exists
2.Nothing is inconceivable
3. Therefore, something exists
The first premise of the argument cannot be challenged, as it is an instantiation of the law
of excluded middle, (P V ~P). The second premise states that nothing inconceivable. If
the premises were to entail the conclusion, the second premise must be equivalent to or at
least entail the negation of the second disjunct of the first premise, nothing exists. On the
rationalist tenet, we have been considering so far, that which is inconceivable cannot
exist. Nothing is inconceivable; therefore, `nothing’ cannot exist. The impossibility of
nothing entails the non-existence of nothing. That is, if it is impossible for nothing to
exist, then nothing does not exist. Thus, clearly, the second premise implies that nothing
does not exist. Once this implication is available, the argument can be stated as follows:
1.Either something exists or nothing exists
2. Nothing does not exists
3. Therefore, something exists
The argument is of the form of the disjunctive syllogism, `P V ~P, ~~P, therefore, P’. The
argument is clearly valid as its form is a valid form. The only way to challenge the
argument is to question the second premise. For this, we must say that nothing is
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conceivable. If nothing is the object of a thought and can be conceived, then nothing
ceases to be nothing and turns out to be something. Further, it is not true that nothing is
conceivable as we conceive things like unicorns, mathematical truths, Homeric Gods,
relations etc.

We can clarify the logical status of the Parmenidean thesis, nothing is inconceivable, and
what it implies with the help of square of opposition. Square of opposition is a figure that
depicts logical relations among certain types of propositions. Categorical propositions
can divided on the basis of their quantity as well on the basis of their quality. They are
are divided into two kinds on the basis of their quantity: universal propositions and
existential propositions. A universal proposition speaks for an entire class of objects
whereas an existential proposition speaks only of some members of the class. Example:
`All men are mortal’, is a universal proposition whereas `Some men are not cloned’ is an
existential proposition. Depending upon their quality, i.e., with regard to the question
whether they affirm or deny, propositions are divided into affirmative and negative
propositions. Thus if we are going to classify proposition, taking into account both its
quality and quantity, we have four kinds of propositions:
1. Universal affirmative proposition; e.g., everything is red.
2. Universal negative proposition; e.g., nothing is red.
3. Existential affirmative proposition; e.g., something is red
4. Existential negative proposition; e.g., something is not red
The relation that holds between universal affirmative and existential negatives are said to
be contradiction. Similarly, the universal affirmatives and existential negatives are also
contradictories. The contradictory propositions cannot be true together. If one is true, the
other is false. According to Modern Square of opposition, the only logical relation that
obtains among the four types of categorical propositions is the relation of
contradictoriness. On the other hand, the traditional square of opposition grants in
addition three other logical relations, the relations of contrary, sub-contrary and subaltern.
The logical relations that hold universal affirmatives and universal negatives are called
contraries. They cannot be true together, but they can be false together. Existential
negatives and existential affirmatives are called sub-contraries. They can be true together,
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but cannot be false together. The relation that holds between universal affirmative and
particular affirmative and that between universal negative and particular negatives are
called subalterns. In both the cases truth of universal propositions entails the truth of the
existential ones. Modern square of opposition does not grant latter three kinds of
relations.

The square of opposition helps us identify the logical status of the Parmenidean
thesis, nothing is inconceivable and what it implies. Consider the following propositions:
1. Everything is conceivable
2. Nothing is conceivable
3. Something is conceivable
4. Something is not conceivable
“Nothing is inconceivable” is a negation of ‘nothing is conceivable.’ Negation of
‘nothing is conceivable’ is ‘something is conceivable.’ So nothing is inconceivable is
equivalent to something is conceivable. Noting is conceivable and something is
conceivable are contradictories. Similarly `everything is conceivable’ and `something is
not conceivable’ are contradictories. According to Parmenides, something is conceivable
and therefore, something exists. He calls something being.

Properties of Being
Having established the existence of being, Parmenides enumerates the properties of
being. Being according to him, is one, eternal, permanent and finite. These properties are
not arbitrarily attributed to being. Parmenides justifies the attribution of each of these
properties by highly ingenious and powerful arguments. The arguments he advances for
the establishing properties of being are more or less similar; each one of them is based on
his main claim that nothing is conceivable. Each argument is a reductio ad absurdum
argument in which the negation of the thesis to be established is taken as a premise and
derives consequences that are absurd or contradictory. Since, the absurdities arise from
the negation of the thesis to be established, it is concluded that the negated thesis is
rejected and that the un-negated thesis stands established. Let us rehearse the arguments
that establish properties of being.
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1. Being is one:
We have already noted that Parmenides is a materialist monist and therefore would not
grant more than one reality. But what is his reason to say that the real is one and not
many. Let us assume that more than one thing exists. If there were, say, two beings, there
would be empty space in between them. And empty space is the space where nothing
exists. Since, nothing is inconceivable, the space where nothing exists is inconceivable.
Hence empty space cannot exist. If there is no empty space to separate between the two
beings, then there are no more two but one.

2. Being is continuous
The continuity of being follows from the oneness of being. However, Parmenides has an
independent argument for this, which runs as follows. Suppose that being is not
continuous. Discontinuity in being would imply that being has parts. Being can be
conceived as having parts only if we can conceive empty space that would separate and
give particular identity to these parts. But empty space is inconceivable. So there cannot
be empty space that would separate parts within being, and give particular identity them.
Thus if empty space is impossible, then being cannot have parts. The absence of parts
within being implies that being is continuous. Thus, Parmenides does not allow any sort
of discontinuities in being. Since, Being, for him, is material in nature, his conception of
being is such that the entire matter in the universe is pressed together with no
discontinuities in between them, hence having no parts.

3. Being is eternal:
While considering the oneness and continuity of being, we were primarily concerned
with the spatial aspects of Being. The central thesis around which the argument revolved
was that empty space is inconceivable. Thus, Parmenides’ problem is not with granting
space, but with granting empty space. When Parmenides speaks of the eternality of being,
he is concerned with the temporal dimensions of being. Anything that has a beginning in
time or an end in time cannot be said to be eternal. Eternality implies both
beginninglessness and endlessness. That being is eternal implies two things:
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a. Being cannot have a beginning in time,

b. Being cannot have an end in time.
Parmenides makes a case for each of these two theses. His main argument is that just as
we cannot conceive of an empty space, it is also not possible for us to conceive of an
empty time. Just as space cannot be conceived independently of the things that exists in
space or constitutes space, time cannot be conceived independently of the events that
occur in time. In other words, there cannot be empty time. That there cannot be empty
time would mean that being is eternal i.e., it cannot have a beginning or an end in time.

Suppose Being has a beginning in time. This would imply there was a time being
did not come into existence, a time when nothing existed. Since nothing is inconceivable,
we cannot think of a time when nothing existed. Similarly being cannot come to an end in
time. Suppose being comes to an end at some point of time. Then there is a time after
being comes to an end when nothing exists. But time when nothing exists is
inconceivable, so there cannot be a time when nothing exists. If such a time is not
allowed, then being cannot end in time. If being cannot have either a beginning in time or
an end in time, then being must be eternal. For the same reason, being must be uncreated
and indestructible. Moreover, if being is one, continuous and eternal, then there cannot be
a creator or a destroyer of being.

4. Being is permanent:
One of the important properties of being is that it does not undergo any change. Change
could be of two types: locomotion and qualitative. If an object located at x moves on to
another place y, it is case of locomotion. Parmenides argues that being cannot be
subjected to locomotion because locomotion implies unoccupied space. Since unoccupied
space is inconceivable, and cannot exist for that reason, being is motionless. Parmenides
says: “Abiding the same in the same place, it [Being] rests by itself and so abides firm
where it is….” Similarly, being cannot undergo any sort of qualitative change. If being
undergoes qualitative change, there is a time when being does not posses the said quality
and another time when being does posses it. If qualitative changes are allowed, then there
is a time when being did not possess some quality or property. Absence of qualities are
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inconceivable, therefore whatever qualities being possesses, it possesses eternally. Hence

being cannot undergo any qualitative change. Thus, Parmenidian universe is a ‘frozen
universe’ where there is no locomotion or qualitative change. Being is all there is and it
fills the whole space there is.

Being is finite and like a well-rounded sphere

According to Parmenides, what exists must be finite; for “it is not lawful that what is
should be unlimited.” Being is such that it cannot be in need: in other words, it cannot
have any lack or privation. If it has lacks and privations, they can be satiated or fulfilled
only by all. But Parmenides does not allow the concept of all, for the concept of all
involves the concept of infinity as well as contradictions (nothings). Contradictions and
infinities cannot be conceived. What is conceivable is always finite. Therefore, what is is
finite.

The being that is finite in nature is like a well-rounded (perfect) sphere. Being, we
have seen, is not unlimited because there is a `farthest limit’. If there is a farthest limit,
then it bounded on every side. It is equally balanced in every direction from the center.
So being is like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere. If it has needs, its needs must be the
same everywhere; we cannot speak of more or less of being. Talk about more or less of
being makes sense only if we grant what is not which stops being from meeting its like.
In Permenides’s own words, “….being equal to itself on every side, it rests uniformly
within its limits.”

With a little bit of hindsight about the rationalist tradition in general, we can
speculate as to why Parmenides thought that being is like the ‘bulk of a well-rounded
sphere.’ A principle of rationality acceptable to all system builders is to achieve
maximum with minimum resources or efforts. The principle known as the principle of
economy has various formulations in the history of philosophy. The principle as applied
to Parmenidean being would demand that there be maximum being with minimum space.
The sphere, we know, is the only figure that allows for maximum amount of mass with
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minimum surface area. So Parmenides’ purpose is to pack maximum of being/matter in

minimum surface area. This is possible only if being is like a sphere.

Parmenides, we have already mentioned, is a materialistic monist. But why should

the being be material in nature? We do not find any argument to this effect in
Parmenides. This seems to be an assumption of the Parmenidian system since being for
him is extended as is evident from his view that being is like a sphere. For Parmenides,
like Descartes, the defining characteristic of matter is extension: since Parmenides thinks
of being with its spatial dimensions, it is clear that for him it is materialistic.

Now that Parmenides does not give an argument to the effect that being is
material/extended, can we think of an argument on the Parmenidian line? A putative
argument would be that it is not possible for us to conceive anything that is unextended.
But in this form the argument would not be acceptable because it is not clear why we are
able to conceive only what is extended. One could argue that it is possible to conceive of
mathematical truths, ethical dictums etc. and extension is not involved in understanding
any of these. So it could rightly be said that conceivability need not necessarily involve
extension. This means that, from the rationalist thesis, what is conceivable is, it does not
follow that the being is extended and hence material.

However, that being is extended would follow from the thesis that what is
conceivable is, if conceivability is construed as imaginability. Thus if we reformulate the
rationalist tenet as ‘what is imaginable is’, then we can see that this reformulated version
of the thesis would entail that the real has to be something extended because imagination
as we know is the activity of forming mental images and it is an essential feature of
images that they are extended. But the question, whether imaginability is the same as
conceivability, is debatable. If the two are identical, it is necessary to answer how they
are identical and what the grounds for such identifications are.
 17

Zeno of Elea

Zeno of Elea is a disciple of Parmenides and wanted to defend his master’s thesis that
reality is one. This thesis became a laughing stock among the ancient Greeks. Zeno
wanted to argue that the thesis of many which his contemporaries had propounded
against Parmenides’s thesis of one was even more ridiculous. Parmenides affirms the
positive thesis of the oneness of the real. Zeno on the other hand, denies plurality. The
thesis that reality is one is equivalent to the thesis that the real is non-plural.

Both Parmenides and Zeno of Elea used reductio ad absurdum argument to

establish their theses. However, there is a major difference between the two thinkers.
Parmenides’s argument is centered on the concept of being or non-being. Since non-
being is inconceivable, any thesis that purports to speak of the existence of non-being is
self-contradictory and false. Zeno, on the other hand, lays emphasis on the concept of
infinity. According to him, a thesis implying the infinity of things is not tenable because
infinity of things is inconceivable. It is not possible to say that there exist ‘a
consummated infinite whole.’

The truth of monism implies the two theses:

1. Real is at least one; and
2. Real is at most one.
The thesis of one would be false if there are more than one being or if there is no being at
all. So there cannot be less than one thing, for the possibility of less than one implies the
possibility of non-being. It makes no sense to say, or it is non-contradictory to say that
non-being exists or non-being is conceivable. So there must be at least one being. But can
there be more than one being? Zeno rejects the thesis that the real is more than one or that
the real is many in number. According to him, the thesis of many would lead to infinity
and infinity is inconceivable because it leads to contradictions. The hypothesis that there
is more than one being leads to contradiction. Therefore, there cannot be many beings.
Thus Zeno refutes the possibility of there being more than one being. Since both non-
being and plurality of being is impossible, there must be one and only one being.
 18

Zeno agrees with Parmenides that the real is finite. According to him, the number
of things in the actual assemblage must be finite. But this number must be one because
more than one would lead to granting of infinity leading to various contradictions. What
must have been the reason for Zeno to think that that infinite totality is a contradiction
and therefore existing things cannot be infinite or that there is no actual infinite totality?
Zeno only says that infinity leads to contradictions and therefore, it is an impossible
number. He does not seem to give any justification for this claim. However, his position
can be clarified with the help of certain examples from mathematics discussed by Galileo.
Galileo asks us to consider the set K of natural numbers, i.e. K. = {1,2,3,………}. Each
of the counting numbers that is an element of the set has a square. The set, K1 of the
squares of every element of K is a subset of K. Every number in the set K has a square
and each square in set K1 is a square of a number. So, there must be a one to one
correspondence between the set of numbers and the set of squares for two reasons: (1)
there cannot be more numbers than there are squares. Otherwise, there would be some
numbers that do not have squares. (2) There cannot be more squares than there are
numbers. Otherwise, there will be some squares that are not squares of numbers. Thus
there is a one to one correspondence between K = {1,2,3,4,5, ………} and K1 = {12, 22,
32,42,……} Though K2 is a subset of K, K1 is not fewer than K. This, according to
Galileo, shows that the attributes such as ‘greater’ ‘equal’, ‘less’ etc. that are applicable
to finite numbers are not applicable to infinity. Galileo’s example does not clearly show
that the concept of infinity leads to a contradiction. However, Leibniz goes a step further
and argues that infinity (number of all numbers) leads to contradiction. Consider, K, the
set of natural numbers. Given any number of the set, we can find a corresponding number
equal to its double. The set of numbers we would get by doubling each element of the set
of natural numbers is the set of even numbers. Now, we can find that the number of all
numbers is not greater than the number of even numbers. So we get a contradiction that
the whole is not greater than the parts. If infinity can lead to contradiction as Leibniz has
shown, then according to Zeno of Elea infinity is an impossible number.

Zeno of Elea’s argument against the plurality of being has two steps:
1. The number of things in an actual assemblage is finite
 19

2. The thesis of many leads to infinity.

In a sense, we have been discussing Zeno’s argument in support of step 1. Actual
multiplicity of things cannot be many, for if there were many, they would have been
infinite and being infinite they would not have come into existence. This is argument we
have been discussing so far. There is, however, another argument to show that a
multiplicity of actual things is finite: suppose many things exist. Then there are exactly as
many things as there are; neither more nor less. If there are so many things as there are,
they are finite in number, i.e., if we are able to count the things, their number would
belong to some number or other from the series, 1, 2, 3, ….

The above argument in support of finiteness of actually existing multiplicity

appears to be circular as it presupposes that actually existing plurality of things is finite.
If one were to say, “there are only as many things as there are”, it is as good as saying
that there are only finite number of existing things. One of the universally accepted
assumptions of the materialists is that the matter existing in the universe is finite.
Moreover, it may be that the term ‘many’ here is interpreted as an existential quantifier
and not as a universal quantifier that does not carry any existential commitments. This is
the reason why ‘many’ cannot be understood as implying infinity. The quantifier ‘all’
may imply infinity and therefore it would be blatantly false to say that “all things exist’
for if all things exist, then it must be true that square circles exist. But it is false.
Therefore, it is not true that all things exist.

Let us now move on to argument for the second step. The thesis that there exists a
multiplicity of things implies infinity. Argument in support of this step is of paramount
importance for Zeno because it is this step that actually proves Parmenides’s position that
the real is one. The argument is basically a reductio ad absurdum that essentially says
that if you grant plurality of existing things, then you will have to grant infinity of
existing things, which is absurd. Therefore, plurality cannot be accepted. A reason is
required in order to make a cogent argument in support of the thesis that if things are
many, then they will be infinite in number. The supporting reason is given as follows:
 20

Suppose there exists many things. Then, there will be other things between them and still
others in between those other things and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, if things are
many, then they will be infinite in number.

A further explanation in support of the second step is in order. A plurality of

things must be finite in number. When we consider the number of existing things, we
consider the total number of existing things or the whole of existing things. But an
infinite totality is logically impossible. The geometrical series, ½, ¼, ⅛, … cannot exist
as a whole. We cannot speak of the sum of the series, as it cannot, in principle be added
together. It would be logically impossible to add them together. Not even divinity can do
it.

The real, according to Zeno, must be finite in number; yet it cannot be a finite
multiplicity, as finite multiplicity would lead to infinity. Since the real cannot be a finite
multiplicity, the real must be one. Based on his thesis that infinity is inconceivable and
cannot come into existence for that reason, he attacks two important common sense
beliefs:
1. Motion exists
2. Space exists.

Arguments against Motion

If Zeno can show that motion is not logically possible, then he can defend Parmenides’
thesis that being is static. This is what he sets out to do in his argument against motion.
They are three in number:
1. Dichotomy Argument
2. Achilles and Tortoise Argument
3. Moving Arrow Argument

Dichotomy Argument
Suppose you want to reach the end of a racecourse. You will not be able to make
this feat because you will have to travel infinite number of decreasing sub-distances. It is
 21

not possible for you to finish this trip unless you travel the first half of the racecourse.
This would not be possible unless you finish the first quarter of the racecourse and so on.
That is, in order to finish the trip, the geometrical series ½, ¼, ⅛ , must be brought to an
end, which is impossible. Zeno goes a step further and argues that a moving body cannot
even leave its place. To leave its position, a body has to arrive at a new position. This can
be done only if an infinite number of steps of traversing sub-distances are completed.
Since this is not possible, whatever exists must remain stationary and immediate.

Achilles and Tortoise:

Achilles, the fastest runner in Greece and the slow, lethargic tortoise once decides
to go for a friendly race, say a100 meters’. Achilles, being very sure of his abilities and
quite knowledgeable about the slow pace of the tortoise gives the tortoise a head start.
Achilles starts only when the tortoise has already covered the first 50 meters. Zeno argues
that if Achilles gives a head start to tortoise as mentioned above, Achilles will never be
able to overtake the tortoise because by the time Achilles reaches the place from where
the tortoise started the race, the tortoise would have moved further away. And again by
the time, Achilles catches up with tortoise, it would have moved further away. This
process would continue ad infinitum and therefore Achilles would never be able to
overtake the tortoise. To overtake the tortoise, Achilles will have to perform unending
tasks of traversing sub-distances which is impossible.

The moving arrow does not move

In the third argument, Zeno attempts to show that a moving arrow does not really
move. An arrow in flight is at a place at any given time during its flight. Therefore, at any
moment it would be at rest. This would be true of each of the moment of time during its
flight. Hence it is always at rest.

The above arguments of Zeno are known as paradoxes of motion. A paradox is an

argument that consists of two lines or braches and the conclusion arrived from one branch
seems to contradict the conclusion from the other. The two lines of the argument are not
apparent in Zeno’s paradoxes of motion. Yet they are considered as paradoxes because
 22

they go against the common sense belief that motion is possible. The experiences of the
phenomenal world present us with the belief that motion is real and the rational argument
of Zeno tells us just the opposite. Hence they are paradoxes.

Objections to Zeno’s paradoxes

A number of objections are raised against Zeno’s paradox. An objection that
concerns the first two paradoxes is that it is based on the wrong assumption about the
nature of space and motion. According to this objection, Zeno assumes that space
consists of points and motion consists of passing through these points. The objection is
made on the assumption that space or distance does not consist of points and motion does
not involve passing through these points. According to Moriz Laserowitz, this objection
does not hold against Zeno because for his argument he uses only the idea that distance or
space is divisible. A finite length can be divided into infinite sub-lengths. Therefore, to
travel a finite length, an infinite sublengths has to be traversed.

The second objection also identifies a purportedly wrong assumption implicit in Zeno’s
argument, the assumption that traversing a finite distance requires an infinite amount of
time. But this assumption is wrong because we know that as distances decreases the time
intervals also decrease. So the sum of the time intervals required for traversing a finite
distance will always be a finite sum. Therefore, Zeno’s argument that granting of motion
implies completion of unending tasks is not correct. According to Laserowitz, this
objection does not hold against time. Zeno’s argument does not presuppose that
traversing a finite distance requires infinite amount of time. In fact, Zeno’s argument
does not have to appeal to the concept of time to drive home his point. His point is that
motion requires infinite number of acts of traversing distances. Performance of such an
act is logically impossible. So the argument is not concerned with time.

The third objection

The third objection is raised against the argument ,which purports to prove that a
moving arrow does not move. The gist of the argument is that motion does not exist.
According to critics, the argument assumes that motion is a ‘succession of static states of
 23

rest’. For example, Russell maintains that there is no state of motion. What we call
motion is the occupation of different points at different times. Therefore, in motion there
is no transition from one point to another.

Laserowitz argues that Russell’s view that motion is not a succession of ‘static
states of rest’ but occupation of different places at different times is hardly an objection
against the denial of reality of motion. Rather, it is a subtle way of denying the reality of
motion. If something moves from one place to another, this movement can be seen as a
series of thing’s being at series of places without being in transition from one to another.
We can speak of a state of motion only if a thing moves from one place to another at
given moment of time. If the notion of a state of motion is given up, it makes no sense to
speak of the possibility of motion. If something is in motion, then it is in transition. But it
is not possible for something to be in transition. Therefore, it is not possible for
something to be in motion. It is not possible to build motion out of a series of
immobilities.

Zeno’s argument against space

Zeno did not grant existence to space. According to him, existence entails being
finite. If it is granted that the real is many in number, this multiplicity must be a finite
multiplicity. If space exists, then the existence of space violates the principle that actually
existing multiplicity must be a finite multiplicity. Existence of space entails the existence
of an infinite number of spaces. So space cannot be finite and cannot exist. There are two
theses concerning space that conflict with the finitude of space
1. A space is embedded in a more inclusive space
2. A space encloses a number of smaller spaces.
Zeno gives argument in support of both the theses and shows that either of the theses
leads to infinity of spaces,

Argument 1
Anything that exists exists in space. If space S1 is granted existence, then space S1
becomes something and exists in a space S1* which accommodates S1. If space S1*
 24

exists, this again would be something and would exist in a larger space S1** and so on ad
infinitum. Thus existence of one space leads to infinite series of bigger and more
inclusive spaces. Such infinite series is inconceivable. Accordingly, there is no such thing
as space.

Zeno conceives being as materialistic in nature. For him, any being or anything
that exists occupies space and therefore is extended. If space were considered as an
existent, it too would occupy space, leading to infinity of spaces. Zeno rejects the
absolutist conception of space because it leads to absurdities. As no other conception of
space is available to him, he rejects the very existence of space.

Argument 2
We have noted that Zeno of Elea equates being spatial with being extended. One
of the properties of anything extended is that it is divisible. But the notion of divisibility
of space would mean that any stretch of space is infinitely divisible. Zeno’s second
argument is construed on the divisibility of any given stretch of space. The argument runs
as follows.

Suppose space exists. The space that exists will be the whole space there is
(because anything that exists must be infinite, according to Zeno. Let us call this whole
space S. Given the whole space there is, every actual space we consider will be identical
with S. But S cannot be the whole space there is, because we can conceive of S1 which is
a part of S and we can conceive of S2 which is a part of S1 and so on. Thus every space
encloses infinity of smaller spaces. This is inconceivable. Thus according to Zeno, space
exists as a whole implies a contradiction because if space exists, it cannot be the whole
space there is for two reasons. Any space would be a part of a more inclusive space and
any space would accommodate smaller spaces.

Zeno’s Arguments Boomerang

Zeno wanted to support Parmenidean materialistic monism according to which the
real is one and extended. Since the real is conceived as spherically extended, we may say
 25

that the real possesses spatial magnitude and hence is a body. One of the defining
characteristics of body is the occupation of space. Accordingly, the One of Parmenides is
extended, and it exists in space. It may further be noted that though Parmenides rejected
motion and change, he did not reject the notion of space. He was critical of the notion of
empty space, which according to him, is inconceivable and cannot exist. But this of
course is not to reject space altogether. For him, being is of spatial magnitude and
therefore space exists. The whole space there is full of what there is. Hence no empty
space at all.

Though Zeno wanted to defend the Parmenidean conception of being, his

arguments against the conception of space undermined the Parmenidean thesis that being
is of corporeal magnitude. If the notion of space is incoherent and leads to a contradiction
as Zeno maintains, then being cannot be of a spatial magnitude as Parmenides clearly
maintained. Thus Zeno’s critique of space effected a remarkable transition in the
conception of the real, namely that the real cannot be of a spatial magnitude. (Zeno’s
arguments against motion was based on the divisibility of spatial magnitude)

Melissas, another disciple of Parmenides argued that being can not be one and of
spatial dimension at the same time. If being has a spherical body as Paremenides
maintains, then it is possible to conceive it as being divisible as anything extended is
divisible. If being is divisible, then being has parts and no more indivisible and possesses
the kind of unity required for its oneness. In other words, being cannot be of the nature of
matter and possess the property of indivisibility. We know of two kinds of reality:
material and mental. If being cannot be of the nature of matter as shown by Zeno of Elea
and Melissos, then the only alternative available to us is that the real must be of the
nature of the mind.