Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137, GR 103125

(1993)

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province

of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops
and a housing project for provincial government employees
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor,
filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and
Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy
of the price offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion
to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally
fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer
in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to
admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order
dated February 26, 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that
Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that
the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the
motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated
February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss,
be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court
from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor
General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.
337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the
exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain.
However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of
Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing
project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province
of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order
denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private
respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue: WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San
Joaquins.

HELD: To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government
units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the
use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these
projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then
be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is
for a public purpose or public use.

Ratio: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of

the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private
respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the
order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR

FACTS:

Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened
and took over legislative power from the President. This Congress passed
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.
The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15,
1988. Before the law’s effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to
the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed
under compulsory acquisition by … DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August
6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its President, sent a letter to theSecretary of
…DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway.The Sangguniang Bayan of
Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural As a result, petitioner informed
respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential
Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF
NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas
from agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP
1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to
non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to
the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which
was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R.
No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on
the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994
3 which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial,
or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance
from the DAR.
ISSUES:
Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-
Nasugbu tourism zone to non-agricultural useto exempt Roxas & Co.’s
three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage;
RULING:
PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN
THE THREE MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDINGNASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL
LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as
each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all landstherein to tourism and,
therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural purposes.The perambulatory
clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the
[three Municipalities that] havepotential tourism value" and mandated the
conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic
areas" toachieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourismareas are. If all the lands
in those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use, there
would have been noneed for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those
"specific geographic areas" are.In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, 9 the
Court made it clear that the "power to determine whether Haciendas
Palico,Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the
coverage of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies withthe [Department
of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court." The DAR, an administrative body of
special competence, denied, byOrder, the application for CARP exemption of
Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands
in theaffected municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had
not yet, at that time, identified the "specific geographic areas" for tourism
development and had no pending tourism development projects in the areas.
Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation
(CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other
crops.11Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series
of 2004,12came up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed thatB.
Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities,
barangays, islands or peninsulas astourist zones that merely:(1) recognize certain
still unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities, barangays,
islands, or peninsulasto be with potential tourism value and charge the
Philippine Tourism Authority with the task to identify/delineate
specificgeographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and
to coordinate said areas’ development; or (2) recognize the potential value of
identified spots located within the general area declared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x
x)and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate said areas’
development;could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of
the entirety of the land area declared as tourist zone. This is sobecause
"reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation into some specific use and
"providing for the manner of their utilizationand disposition (Sec. 20, Local
Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan." A proclamation that merelyrecognizes the
potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as
tourist zone clearly does not allocate,reserve, or intend the entirety of the land
area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation
direct thatotherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already be used for
purposes other than agricultural.Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation
as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces,
municipalities,barangays, islands, or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it
amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in thename of
tourism development. The same would also undermine the land use
reclassification powers vested in local governmentunits in conjunction with
pertinent agencies of government.C. There being no reclassification, it is clear
that said proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect before June 15,
1988,could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands
embraced therein from CARP coverageD. The DAR’s reading into these general
proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost consideration, more especially
in thepresent petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate,
PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within
the general area declared as tourism zones

. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.A mere reclassification of

an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use
since there is still that process of conversion before one is permitted to use it
for other purposes
Just compensation in agrarian cases: what
law applies; how computed.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Vs. MAGIN FERRER, ANTONIO V. FERRER, and
RAMON V. FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, ATTY. RAFAEL VILLAROSA, GR
No. 172230, Feb. 2, 2011; with companion case - DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
represented by Secretary NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN vs. ANTONIO V. FERRER and
RAMON V. FERRER, GR No. 179421, Feb. 2, 2011.

X x x.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that RA 6657, rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O.
No. 228, is the law that should apply in the determination of just compensation for the subject
agricultural land.

Positions of the Parties

The LBP and the DAR basically argue that P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O. No. 228, should be
applied in determining the just compensation for the subject property. They contend that P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228 prescribe the formula in determining the just compensation of rice and corn
lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted and devoted to rice
production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at the prevailing rate at that time, when the
emancipation of the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil was declared in P.D. No. 27.

As to R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and the DAR insist that it applies only to ricelands and
cornlands not tenanted as of October 21, 1972. R.A. No. 6657 does not cover ricelands and
cornlands acquired under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. The government’s OLT program on
tenanted privately-owned rice and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 continues separately and
distinctly from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) acquisition and distribution
program under R.A. No. 6657 because 1) R.A. No. 6657 operates prospectively; and 2) Congress
intended that lands subject to or governed by existing government programs such as the OLT
and homestead under P.D. No. 27 are to be treated distinctly.

With respect to the appointment of commissioners, the LBP and the DAR argue that there was no
legal basis therefor because 1) there were no long accounts or difficult questions of fact that
required the expertise and know-how of the commissioners; and 2) the formula for just
compensation was already provided under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.

On the other hand, the Ferrers adopted the common ruling of the CA stating that it did not err in
applying the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 in fixing the just compensation for the subject property.

The Court’s Ruling

The issue as to which agrarian law between P. D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 and R.A. No. 6657 should
apply in the determination of just compensation has been laid to rest in a number of cases. In the
case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Eli G. C. Natividad, 497 Phil 738 (2005). it was ruled
that:
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as
the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the
passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA
6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably
with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.
Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the
determination of just compensation, reads as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided
by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA
6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation
should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the
equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. [Emphases supplied]

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manuel O Gallego, Jr., G.R. No. 173226, January 20, 2009,
576 SCRA 680, the Court handed down the same ruling. Thus:
The Court has already ruled on the applicability of agrarian laws, namely, P.D. No. 27/E.O. No.
228 in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, in prior cases concerning just compensation.
In Paris v. Alfeche, 416 Phil 473 (2001), the Court held that the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 are
also applicable to the agrarian reform process of lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No.
27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been completed upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. Citing Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1248 (1999), the Court in Paris held that
P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 have suppletory effect to R.A. No. 6657, to wit:
We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA [No.] 6657 should not apply to rice and corn lands under PD
[No.] 27. Section 75 of RA [No.] 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD [No.] 27 and EO
[No.] 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act also provides –

Sec. 7. Priorities.—The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the
acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of (10) years from the
effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:

Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private lands
voluntarily offered by the owners of agrarian reform; x x x and all other lands owned by the
government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and distributed
immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be completed within a
period of not more than four (4) years (emphasis supplied).

This eloquently demonstrates that RA [No.] 6657 includes PD [No.] 27 lands among the
properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless. And to facilitate the
acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to. In
Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, this Court
applied the provisions (of) RA 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld the constitutionality of
the payment of just compensation for PD [No.] 27 lands through the different modes stated in
Sec. 18. [Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 256 Phil. 777 (1989)].
Particularly, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 497 Phil. 738 (2005), where the agrarian
reform process in said case “is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private
respondents has yet to be settled,” the Court held therein that just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under R.A. No. 6657.
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 6657 is not only statutory but is also founded on equitable
considerations. In Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170220, November 20, 2006,
507 SCRA 415, the Court declared that it would be highly inequitable on the part of the
landowners therein to compute just compensation using the values at the time of taking in 1972,
and not at the time of payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries
have already benefited from the land although ownership thereof has not yet been transferred in
their names. The same equitable consideration is applicable to the factual milieu of the instant
case. The records show that respondents’ property had been placed under the agrarian reform
program in 1972 and had already been distributed to the beneficiaries but respondents have yet
to receive just compensation due them. [Emphases supplied]

The above rulings were reiterated in the recent cases of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rizalina
Gustilo Barrido and Heirs of Romeo Barrido, G.R. No. 183688, April 18, 2010, and Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Enrique Livioc, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010.

The CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that the agrarian reform process in this particular case
was still incomplete because the just compensation due to the Ferrers had yet to be settled.
Since R.A. No. 6657 was already in effectivity before the completion of the process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under this law.

With respect to the appointment of the commissioners, it is an issue not properly brought and
ventilated in the trial courts below and only raised for the first time on appeal. At any rate, the
appointment was proper because the applicable law is R.A. No. 6657.

X x x.
G.R. No. 170220 November 20, 2006

JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY

TAÑEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioners, 
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee2 of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of
agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285
hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the
land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)4 and Executive Order No.
228 (1987).5 The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54
which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
Nenita Suntay-Tañedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of
agricultural land consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2
containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under
the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the
same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination
of just compensation.

ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the
expropriated properties at the time of payment.

HELD: Yes.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which,
under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners.27 The
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the
compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet
received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the
failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or
E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real,
substantial, full and ample.
 [G.R. No. 118712. July 5, 1996]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER ,

VS .
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS .
I. FACTS

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied
in its resolution. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private
respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to
transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation
and payment of compensation for their land, they sought to compel the DAR to expedite the
pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their
properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow
them to withdraw the same.
DAR and Land Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.
II. ISSUES

Whether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term
"deposit.”
III. HELD

The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an
expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within
the coverage of term "deposit.” Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-settled rule
that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of constituting
trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding
immediate payment to them is further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the
offered compensation thereby making it necessary that the amount remains in the
custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the
landowners. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property
under the CARP puts the landowner, and not the government, in a situation where
the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no recourse but to allow
it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to
be paid for the expropriated property. Unduly burdening the property owners from
the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have
been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable.