G.R. No.

L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.

LAUREL, J.:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case
has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider
the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no
sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez
que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado
se termine la obra;

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por
haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u
obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus
osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a
readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable
de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un
determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations
for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles
in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National
Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and
the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture
of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth
Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin
where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a
new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to
pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the
motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in
the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial
Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought
before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial
Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired
during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing
counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and
expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but
its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and
in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or
farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of
Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing
and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the
sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such
hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and
study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and
fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners.
(Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may
employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and
capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions,
which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September
13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by
the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated
by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of
Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty
and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such
right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust
it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity,
a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the
more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and
a limitation upon power.
 (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence
must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations
Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power
v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that
the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194
U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville
and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v.
Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis
in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59
S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission
vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty
actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any
matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as
the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect
the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States
the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our
case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national
way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc.,
from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the
petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against
the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the
interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction
that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 130230 April 15, 2005

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's
licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.

The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a
traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara
Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR:

You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic Operations Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours
from date of apprehension for disposition/appropriate action thereon. Criminal case shall be filed for
failure to redeem license after 30 days.

Valid as temporary DRIVER'S license for seven days from date of apprehension. 1

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter 2 to then MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for
his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint 3 with application for preliminary injunction
in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, on 12 September 1995, contending that,
in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the
MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the
Constitution. The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and
continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his license and that,
absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license
have no legal basis.

For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers
granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines
and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary
retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not preclude "admixture" of the three powers of government in administrative
agencies.4

The MMDA also refuted Garin's allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the governing board and policy
making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No.
7924 and directed the court's attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April
1995. Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-
001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.

Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26 September 1995, extending the
validity of the TVR as a temporary driver's license for twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory
injunction was granted on 23 October 1995, and the MMDA was directed to return the respondent's
driver's license.

On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision5 in favor of the herein respondent and
held that:

a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council held on March
23, 1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of driver's
licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.

b. The summary confiscation of a driver's license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be
heard; depriving him of a property right (driver's license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court
the complaint of supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence
unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent; th(e) MMDA is
directed to return to plaintiff his driver's license; th(e) MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from
confiscating driver's license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding.

In filing this petition,6 the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and contends
that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject
to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The
petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking
without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.

To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the judiciary retains the power
to determine the validity of the confiscation, suspension or revocation of the license, the petitioner points
out that under the terms of the confiscation, the licensee has three options:

1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,

2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA Adjudication Committee, or

3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutor's Office.

The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly passed in the presence
of a quorum, and that the lower court's finding that it had not was based on a "misapprehension of facts,"
which the petitioner would have us review. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for
the issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924
itself, and that such power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any implementing
regulation or circular.

Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan
Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid
at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of
course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the
date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates.7

It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from
confiscating drivers' licenses is concerned, recent events have overtaken the Court's need to decide this
case, which has been rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No.
04, Series of 2004.

The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or
any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating drivers' licenses. For the proper
implementation, therefore, of the petitioner's future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the
following observations:

1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise
of its police power.

The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a
privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its
police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process
requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal8 on the license to
operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry9 and Oposa v. Factoran10 on timber licensing agreements,
and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao11 on a legislative franchise to operate an electric
plant.

Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such as State ex. Rel. Sullivan,12 which
states in part that, "the legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the
state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the
safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their
registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first
appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a
privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and
welfare. The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon
noncompliance with prescribed conditions."

Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Funk,13 to the effect
that: "Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of
danger to persons and property upon the highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is still a
dangerous instrumentality, but, when operated by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine
of destruction. The Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may,
but must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways. One of the
primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is
to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed to
the promotion of public safety and is well within the police power."

The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in the exercise of police
power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be
operated on the state highways.

2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.

In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,14 we categorically stated that
Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its
functions are administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed that it had the authority to open a
subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. to public traffic because it is an agent of
the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this premise,
the MMDA argued that there was no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune
Street to the public.

Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is
not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its
predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street
was invalid.

We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power
to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local
government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs."16Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,
which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of
Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed
under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:

. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the
charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery
of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and
these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- -x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government
units concerning purely local matters."
….

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given
to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. 17 (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner
to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any
other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.

3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development
Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single
ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and
regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers'
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 413618 and
P.D. No. 160519 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce
all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or
members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."

Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to
whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not
precluded – and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the
exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs.20

This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact,
ordinances.

This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be read in a
manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it,21 and is supported by the criteria in cases of
this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.22

A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local
political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with
regard to transport and traffic management,23 and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to
untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited
by the MMDA's enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts
in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate
source.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

GAYCANCO vs. Q.C

SERENO, J.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] promulgated on 18 July 2006 and the Resolution[2] dated 10 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648.
The Facts

In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746
Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA),[3] Quezon City with an area of 375 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT114558.

On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled An Ordinance
Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated
as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof. [4]

An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk
beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. [5]

Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of
4.50 meters and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side of Santolan Road to one lot
after Liberty Avenue, and from one lot before Central Boulevard to the Botocan transmission line.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city
council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the
construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular
ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground
floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not
allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under
the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for
pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.

The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties located at the Quezon
City-San Juan boundary were exempted by Ordinance No. 60-4477 from the construction of arcades.
This ordinance was further amended by Ordinance No. 60-4513, extending the exemption to commercial
buildings from Balete Street to Seattle Street. Ordinance No. 6603 dated 1 March 1966 meanwhile
reduced the width of the arcades to three meters for buildings along V. Luna Road, Central
District, Quezon City.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965,
Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from
the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.

On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and issued
Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall,
within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so
demands.[6]

Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro
Manila Councils (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002.[7] The resolution authorized the MMDA and
local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public
places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. [8]
 On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a
portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines(Building Code)[9] in relation to
Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the
building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.[10]

Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the
MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the wing walls, of the ground
floor structure. The records of the present case are not entirely clear on the extent of the demolition;
nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of
the building was being used as a restaurant.

On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition[11] with prayer for a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed
as Civil Case No. Q03-49693, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City
from demolishing his property. In his Petition,[12] he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of
private property without due process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an
arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that
the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of
the buildings located in the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle
Streets to construct arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No.
2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation should
the court hold the ordinance valid.

The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police
power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco
was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an
ordinance that he had already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe
passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement
established by Ordinance No. 2904.[13]

The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco.[14] It held
that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice
Gancaycos 375 square meters of property were being taken without compensation for the publics benefit,
the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners right to
equal protection of laws. The dispositive portion thus states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby declares
Quezon City Ordinance No. 2094,[15] Series of 1956 to be unconstitutional, invalid and
void ab initio. The respondents are hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing and
implementing the said ordinance, and the respondent MMDA is hereby directed to
immediately restore the portion of the party wall or wing wall of the building of the
petitioner it destroyed to its original condition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On 18 July 2006, the Court of
Appeals (CA) partly granted the appeal.[16] The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted
the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of
its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid
classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties
depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the
owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property, to wit:

Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his
commercial lot, appellee still retains the beneficial ownership of the said property. Thus,
there is no taking for public use which must be subject to just compensation. While the
arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good, for providing safety and comfort to
passersby, the ultimate benefit from the same still redounds to appellee, his commercial
establishment being at the forefront of a busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded
sidewalks, by their nature, assure clients of the commercial establishments thereat some
kind of protection from accidents and other hazards. Without doubt, this sense of
protection can be a boon to the business activity therein engaged. [17]

Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the
subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues,
alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private
property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or
abate nuisances. Thus, the dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, the appeals are PARTLY GRANTED.

The Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
224, Quezon City, is MODIFIED, as follows:
1) The validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094, [18] Series of 1956, issued by
the City Council of Quezon City, is UPHELD; and
2) The injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said Ordinance
is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

This ruling prompted the MMDA and Justice Gancayco to file their respective Motions for Partial
Reconsideration.[19]

On 10 May 2007, the CA denied the motions stating that the parties did not present new issues
nor offer grounds that would merit the reconsideration of the Court.[20]

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Justice Gancayco and the MMDA filed their respective
Petitions for Review before this Court. The issues raised by the parties are summarized as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING

THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
II. WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A
PUBLIC NUISANCE.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF
JUSTICE GANCAYCO.

The Courts Ruling

Estoppel

The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that Justice Gancayco was estopped
from challenging the ordinance, because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the application of the
ordinance. According to them, Justice Gancayco thereby recognized the power of the city government to
regulate the construction of buildings.
 To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two grounds: (1)
whether the ordinance takes private property without due process of law and just compensation; and (2)
whether the ordinance violates the equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its
application.

On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the
ordinance to determine whether or not the ordinance constitutes a taking of private property without due
process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property
when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was granted an exemption in 1966,
there was no taking yet to speak of.

Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[21] we held:

It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact
that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject
business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra
vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts
which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null and void and cannot
be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act
which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)

Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,[22] we likewise held:

We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking
to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid,
petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act. Indeed, petitioner
cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to comply with, and subjecting itself to the
operation of Section 145(C), and only later on filing the subject case praying for the
declaration of its unconstitutionality when the circumstances change and the law results
in what it perceives to be unlawful discrimination. The mere fact that a law has been
relied upon in the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional
is not a ground for considering petitioner estopped from assailing its validity. For
courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it
in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been
raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the
ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice
Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was
eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as
there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with
regard to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not
the proper person to do so.

Zoning and the regulation of the

construction of buildings are valid
exercises of police power .

In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,[23] we discussed the nature of police powers exercised by
local government units, to wit:

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the

power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
 penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is
plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public
health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.
It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers
as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine whether
there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can determine whether the City Government of
Quezon City acted within the limits of the delegation.

It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police
power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon
City,[24] which states:

To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act
and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City
Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.

Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the
Charter also expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings
and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them. [25]

With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue zoning ordinances, we
apply Social Justice Society v. Atienza.[26] In that case, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila City enacted an ordinance on 28 November 2001 reclassifying certain areas of the
city from industrial to commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in those
areas were no longer allowed. Though the oil companies contended that they stood to lose billions of
pesos, this Court upheld the power of the city government to pass the assailed ordinance, stating:

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to

restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to
forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals,
safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning
ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to
commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation
which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a
result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in
their present location will no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for
industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself
and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
 locality.Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those
affected cannot be said to be unjust... (Emphasis supplied)

In Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[27] we also held:

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings
and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of
evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity
which every law has in its favor. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it
issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the
city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along
the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so
because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone
along EDSA.

Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code,[28] which was passed after the Quezon City Ordinance,
supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance No. 2904. The Building Code states:

Section 102. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this
Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design quality of materials,
construction, occupancy, and maintenance.

Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing or zoning
ordinances require it. Apparently, the law allows the local government units to determine whether arcades
are necessary within their respective jurisdictions.

Justice Gancayco argues that there is a three-meter sidewalk in front of his property line, and the
arcade should be constructed above that sidewalk rather than within his property line. We do not need to
address this argument inasmuch as it raises the issue of the wisdom of the city ordinance, a matter we
will not and need not delve into.

To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code
enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city
council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.

The wing walls of the building are not

nuisances per se.

The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per se.

We disagree.
 The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an
arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do
not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an
ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2)
annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or
impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined
law of necessity.[29]

Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or
the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of
persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the
structure.

Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have
the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties
Corp.,[30] we held:

We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is
empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of
nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the
power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not
a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such.
Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a
thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be
determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.)

MMDA illegally demolished

the property of Justice Gancayco.

MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to
demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and
the local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public
places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the
property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.

However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be
demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official. The
pertinent provisions of the Building Code provide:

SECTION 205. Building Officials. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building
Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as well
as the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto.

Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public
Works District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers act as Building
Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction.
 The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until regular
positions of Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated for causes
provided by law or decree.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the
Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this
Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefor. He is the
official charged with the duties of issuing building permits.

In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises
at all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the requirements of this
Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the building permit as issued.

When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the
Building Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or
conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building Official
is authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building
or structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to the
provisions of this Code.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. When any building or structure

is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order
its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life,
health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken
under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc. [31] is applicable to
the case at bar. In that case, MMDA, invoking its charter and the Building Code, summarily dismantled
the advertising media installed on the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3. This Court held:
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling
of Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no
power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other
advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's
powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power.

Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:

...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It

is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
 Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in
the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of
local government units concerning purely local matters.

The Court also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009
and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards,
signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and
display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas,
but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the
Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition
applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks'
billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically
cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the
center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have
included MRT3 in its prohibition.

MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096
(Building Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The power
to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the law's following
provision, thus:

Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. -

The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the
imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in the
Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, hereinafter
referred to as the "Secretary."

There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by

DPWH to implement the Building Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition
of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine
of not more than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days, or by
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court, Provided, that if the violation is
committed by a corporation, partnership, or any juridical entity, the Manager, managing partner, or any
person charged with the management thereof shall be held responsible therefor. The ordinance itself also
clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the
ordinance.

As pointed out in Trackworks, the MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it
cannot supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No.
02-28.

Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be considered to have
approved the demolition of the structure, simply because then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R.
Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No. 02-28. In effect, the city government delegated these powers to
the MMDA. The powers referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent and abate a
nuisance[32] and to further impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the building or structure by the
owner or by the city at the expense of the owner.[33]
 MMDAs argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA.
Contrary to the claim of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of
the former. In its Answer,[34] the city government stated that the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA
only, without the participation and/or consent of Quezon City. Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and
should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice Gancaycos building.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
84648 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.