By: Dennie Vieve Idea

New Era University College of Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW I

CASE TITLE FACTS ISSUE DOCTRINE/RULING
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
In general; RA 6735
GARCIA v. COMELEC Petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Whether or not a “resolution” Yes, a resolution is a proper subject of initiative.
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang cannot be a subject of an
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes initiative? The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but
the Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative (as
Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA embodied in section 32, Article 6)
No. 7227.
Also, in sec. 3 (a.3) of RA 6735, “resolution” was mentioned
The Sanggunian did not take action hence the amongst those covered by initiative.
petitioners moved for initiative. The COMELEC
denied the petition for local initiative because its
subject is “merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.”
PIRMA v. COMELEC Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, President Whether or not 1. No, what has been delegated cannot be re-delegated. It is
of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization the Congress who has the authority to take cognizance of such
and Actions (PIRMA), filed with the COMELEC 1. The COMELEC can take petition
a petition to amend the Constitution to lift the cognizance of the petition for
term limits of elective officials thru people’s initiative on amendment of the 2. Revision, as it would affect other provisions of the
initiative, basing it on Section 2 of Article XVII. Constitution? Constitution such as synchronization of elections, equal access
to opportunities and prohibiting political dynasties.
Several intervenors opposed the Delfin petition 2. the lifting or terms would
on the ground that it is cognizable by the constitute a revision or Revisions cannot be done thru initiative.
COMELEC. amendment?

On the contrary, Delfin filed the present petition

under Rule 65 invoking that People’s Initiative
can only be implemented by Congress and is
limited to amendments and not revisions.
Difference between amendment and revision
LAMBINO v. COMELEC Lambino was able to gather the signatures of Whether or not the Lambino By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition to proposal is an amendment or a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,
amend the 1987 Constitution. revision? involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a
The proposed amendment to the constitution revision, not a mere amendment.
seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4
 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled
“Transitory Provisions”. These proposed changes
will shift the president bicameral-presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
The COMELEC denied the petition.
Steps in amendatory process
Proposals; By congress as a Constitutional Assembly
ALMARIO v. ALBA On January 1984, a plebiscite was to be held to Whether or not the proposal is
allow the voters to either approve or reject valid?
amendments to the Constitution proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments
are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be
answered by simple YES or NO answers.
Alex Almario and some other concerned groups
seek to enjoin the submission in the said
plebiscite of Questions No. 3 (“grant” as an
additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to
the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the
government of a land reform program and a
social reform program) to the people for
ratification or rejection on the ground that there
has been no fair and proper submission.
Amendment vs. Revision
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle
in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that
adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed
amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate.
Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban
land reform" are unwise or improvident or whether or not the
proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only
the people can decide. The questions are presented for their
determination.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 643 directs the COMELEC to publish
the amendments. The respondents assure us that publication in
all provinces and cities, except a few where there are no local
newspapers, has been affected and that Barangays all over the
country have been enjoined to hold community gatherings for
this purpose. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines and various
civic organizations have taken a strong stand for or against the
last two proposed questions. Television and radio programs
regularly broadcast the amendments. The petitioners have
failed to explain why, inspite of all the above, there is still fair
and proper submission.
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MABANAG v. LOPEZ The case involved a petition for prohibition to
VITO prevent the enforcement of a congressional
resolution (re amendment of the Constitution).
It was alleged that 3 Senators and 8
representatives were not allowed to sit in office
due to some irregularities, hence, they did not
take part in the passage of the resolution, nor their
membership reckoned within the computation of
necessary 3/4s vote required in amending the
Constitution.
OCCENA v. COMELEC Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gonzales instituted a prohibiting proceedings
against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
resolutions:
1. Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited
area of land for residential purposes was
approved by the vote of 122 to 5;
2. Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1
abstention; and,
3. Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the
Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote
of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.)
Whether or not the court take
cognizance of the petition?
Whether or not the three
resolutions are unconstitutional?
The case is a political question beyond the scope of powers of
the Court.
Citing Miller v. Colemen – final determination by Congress
that ratification by 3/4s of the States has taken place “is
conclusive upon the Courts”. However, this calls for the
decisions of a “political department”, hence, “political”.
NO.
1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its
amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained.
The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the
Interim National Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote
of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with
the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular
national assembly. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by
virtue of such impotence.
2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in
character as to amount to a revision rather than amendments.
To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to
the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution
and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology
foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the
same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once
ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about
the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is
no argument against the validity of the law because
'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the
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GONZALES v. In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed.
COMELES This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the
Constitution. It was provided in the said law that
the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that
the general national elections shall be held
(November 14, 1967). This was questioned by
Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as
they argued that this was unlawful as there would
be no proper submission of the proposals to the
people who would be more interested in the
issues involved in the general election rather than
in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the
procedure adopted by Congress when they came
up with their proposals to amend the Constitution
(RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and
other respondents interposed the defense that said
act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts
because it is a political question.
By Constitutional Convention
TAN v. MACAPAGAL
Whether or not the act of
Congress in proposing
amendments is a political
question?
Whether the petitioners had the
requisite standing to seek a
declaration of the alleged nullity
of a resolution of the
Constitutional Convention?
entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is
merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would
become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people."
The act of Congress in proposing amendments is not a political
question. It must be noted that the power to amend, as well as
the power to propose amendments is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress.
On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as
repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being,
when Congress makes amendments or proposes, it is not
actually doing so as Congress but rather, it is sitting as a
Constitutional Assembly.
Although generally, one who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, the
rule has been relaxed.
As long as the proposed amendment is still unacted on by it,
there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight.
The Court has no jurisdiction since at the time the case was
filed, the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that
would radically alter the 1935 Constitution, therefore, not yet
ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-
Con has actually done something already.
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 By People’s Initiative
LAMBINO v. COMELEC The Lambino Group commenced gathering Whether or not the initiative Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on
signatures for an initiative petition to change the petition is sufficient compliance direct proposal by people
1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with with the constitutional
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification requirement on direct proposal Sec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a
under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. by the people? people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
The proposed changes under the petition will While this provision does not expressly state that the petition
shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the
a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show
government. COMELEC did not give it due that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant American
course for lack of an enabling law governing jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments
pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling. before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text.

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people

through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present.

2 elements of initiative
1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The
full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on
the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must stated the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that everyone of the several millions of signatories to
the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before – not after – signing.

Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of

signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed” and

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failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the
initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single

word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the
text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature
sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does
not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before
they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without

first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a
gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitution
requires that an initiative must be “directly proposed by the
people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign
on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s
fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general
or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of

amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress
upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through
a people’s initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second

modes, applies to “any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring
to the third mode, applies only to “amendments to this

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SANTIAGO V. Private respondent filed with public respondent
COMELEC Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
“Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s
Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked
the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering all over the
country; (2) Causing the necessary publications
of said Order and the attached “Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and
(3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in
all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing
stations at the time and on the dates designated
for the purpose.
Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the
conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid
exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend
that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law
because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
Whether or not (1) the absence of
subtitle for such initiative is not
fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is
adequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendment to the
Constitution, and (3)
COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is valid?
Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as shown by the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A people’s
initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In
contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose
both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous
silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act
is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A.
No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation.
R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition
are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through
its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3)
to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of
signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used
in the immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A.
No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition does
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 not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300,
for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a
mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by
the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December
1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file
their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

By president during emergency

SANIDAD v. COMELEC On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 Whether or not Marcos can Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct propose amendments to the amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National
1976 for the Citizens Assemblies Constitution? Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
(“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
its replacement, the powers of such amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular
replacement, the period of its existence, the National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
length of the period for the exercise by the Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather
President of his present powers. than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself
into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook
the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose

amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present
those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President
at that time also sits as the legislature.

Submission of Proposals
Doctrine of Proper submission
TOLENTINO v. Whether or not it is within the
COMELEC power of the Convention to call
for a plebiscite for ratification by
In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to
the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter
not only the sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent

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PLANAS v. COMELEC
UNIDO v. COMELEC UNIDO sent letters to COMELEC requesting
equal opportunity to the same time and number
of TV and radio stations all over the country
which were utilized by the President to lead the
campaign for “YES” votes on the proposed
constitutional amendments. COMELEC denied
said request.
JAVELLANA v. On January 20, 1973, just two days before the
EXECUTIVE Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite
SECRETARY cases, Javellana filed this suit against the
respondents to restrain them from implementing
any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935
Constitution.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground that the President as
the people of the constitutional
amendments?
Whether the proclamation of
Martial Law affected the proper
submission of the proposed
Constitution to a plebiscite?
Whether or not UNIDO was
denied equal protection by virtue
of the COMELEC’s denial of
their request.
Ratification
1. Whether or not the
constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention
has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory
provisions?
2. Whether or not the proposed
Constitution has been
appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its
relation to the other parts of the Constitution.
In this case, there was no “proper submission”.
Amendments cannot be submitted to the people in a piecemeal
fashion wherein the other amendments are to follow. The
people should have a frame of reference from which to read the
amendments being proposed.
No. Martial Law per se does not preclude the factual possibility
of adequate freedom
NO.
Section 5, Article XII-C CLAUSE “FREE ORDERLY AND
HONEST ELECTIONS”
The Court views this also applies to plebiscites, particularly one
relative to constitutional amendments. Be borne in my mind
that one of the most steadfast ruling of the Court is that it is
indispensable for plebiscite that it be properly characterized to
be fair submission – which means that the voters must of
necessity have had adequate opportunity to cast their votes with
sufficient understanding of what they are voting on.
-
Ruling:
1. The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6)
members of the court.
The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to
vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of
suffrage.
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Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies;
without power to approve proposed constitution;
without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and
the election held to ratify the proposed
constitution was not a free election, hence null
and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the
nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any
order, decree, and proclamation which have the
same import and objective.
acquiesced in (with or without
valid ratification) by the people.?
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the
proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held
in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in
that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid
votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or
segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings
in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term
“votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising
hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but
natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American
regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its
major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared
and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting,
with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial
inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election
returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted
under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that,
such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without
the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with
the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly
followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking
the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted
said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of
the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure
the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s will.
For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is
null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified
the revised Constitution
2. No majority vote has been reached by the Court.
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Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
GAMBOA v. TEVES Gamboa involves a petition to nullify the sale of Section 11, Article XII of the
shares of stock of the government-sequestered Constitution Section 11, Article
Philippine Telecommunications Investment XII of the Constitution is a self-
Corporation (PTIC) to Metro Pacific Assets executing provision?
Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First
Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific) First
Pacific is a Hong Kong-based investment
management and holding company and, like
PTIC, is a shareholder of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already
accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the
people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their
acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under
Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded
that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect
that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new
Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be
accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view
of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of
ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the
freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge
and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal
and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement
that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of
opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have
no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether
the people have accepted the Constitution.”
YES. To treat Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution as not
self-executing would mean that since the 1935 Constitution, or
over the last 75 years, not one of the constitutional provisions
expressly reserving specific areas of investments to
corporations, at least 60 percent of... the "capital" of which is
owned by Filipinos, was enforceable.
Principles:
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
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GENERAL PROVISIONS
Name of the country, national anthem, and national seal
MARTINEZ v. LIM This involves 2 interrelated administrative Whether or not Respondent’s NO.
charges against respondent, Sheriff III of RTC- letter constitute misconduct?
Romblon.
Rooted from Respondent’s letter against
petitioners on the latters’ non-attendance to flag
ceremony.
Petitioners assert that Respondent’s letter made
them look “unpatriotic” and embarrassed them
and it was a misconduct for the latter to do such.
different departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes... certain fixed principles on which the government
is founded. But while some constitutional provisions are self-
executing, others are not.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if it fixes the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed such
that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to... the legislature for action. On the other hand, if
the provision needs a supplementary or enabling legislation, it
is merely a declaration of policy and principle which is not self-
executing.
The Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give... the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall
be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will
of the law-making body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
The Court held that flag ceremonies inspire patriotism and
evoke the finest sentiments of love of country and people.
RA 8491, section 18 provides that all government offices and
educational institutions shall observe the flag-raising ceremony
and flag-lowering ceremony.
As OIC of Hall of Justice, respondent was duty bound to remind
the employees to attend the flag ceremony. Further, the letter
was courteously written and neither used offensive language,
hence, no misconduct.
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 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAGDALO v. As part of its application for candidacy to be a Whether or not the composition It must be underscored that the membership of MAGDALO
COMELEC party-list organization, MAGDALO also filed a of MAGDALO is violative of cannot include military officers and/or enlisted personnel in
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party- the Constitution? active service as this would run counter to the express provision
List System of Representation in the 10 May of the Constitution under section 5 (1)(3)(4), Article 16.
2010 Elections, in which it stated that its
membership includes former members of the
AFP, Anti-Corruption Advocates, Reform-
minded citizens.
POLICE FORCE
KULAYAN v. TAN Whether or not Tan has the No.
power to declare state of
emergency and exercise powers Only the President can exercise emergency powers. The
like search and seizure? President is still a civilian and civilian authority is at all times
supreme over the military. In addition to being a Commander-
in-chief, the President also acts as the leader of the police force
(section 17, Article 7).

Also, in Section 6, Article 16, local chief executives control

GAMBOA v. CHAN Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National
Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations
against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group
(PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining
PAGs.
Whether or not the PNP erred in
providing Gamboa’s information
pursuant to AO 275?
over the police is only on day-to-day operations, otherwise, it
will spawn warlodrism, bossism and sanctuaries of vices and
abuses.
YES.
AO 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
The PNP, as a police force, is empowered by law to enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and
properties, maintain peace and order and investigate/prevent
crimes.

Contending that her right to privacy was violated

and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ

13 | P a g e
 of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISIDRO v. PVAO Isidro Animos is a World War II veteran, having
been a member of the USAFFE and the guerilla
forces thereafter. Originally, the case was a suit
for mandamus by the petitioners against PVAO,
for the payment of full pension benefits,
retroactive to 1947, under Republic Act No. 65,
as amended.
However, the petitioner’s claim was denied on
the basis that Animos’ disability was only
considered partial, rather than total, according to
the “Rules on Disability Ratings”, thus
precluding the maximum payment of his pension
benefits. The petitioner submits that the rating
system adopted by PVAO is null and void.
COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES
CHAVEZ v. GONZALES In 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
won in the presidential elections against her
nearest rival, Fernando Poe, Jr. Sometime in June
2005, dzMM radio station aired the Garci Tapes
where the parties to the conversation discussed
“rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to
favor President Arroyo. In a press conference in
Malacañang Palace, a recordings of alleged
conversations between President Arroyo and
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano was
identified. Then DoJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez
ordered the NBI to investigate media
organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for
possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or
the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The NTC, on one
hand, issued a press release warning radio and
television stations that those who will air the
Garci Tapes will face suspension or revocation of
their license.
Whether or not Isidro is entitled
to full benefits?
YES.
PVAO cannot overrule the mandate of a statute. In the case at
bar, there is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner had been
enjoying pension benefits, albeit partial, hence, the government
must pay him the maximum pension benefits.
Section 7 of Article 16 – the State sha;; provide immediate and
adequate care, benefits and other forms of assistance to war
veteran xxx
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
AZCUNA, J.:
I vote to GRANT the petition on the ground that the challenged
NTC and DOJ warnings violate Sec. 10, Art. XVI of the
Constitution which states:
Sec. 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for the
full development of Filipino capability and the emergency of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations
of the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of,
and across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects
the freedom of speech and of the press.
This provision was precisely crafted to meet the needs and
opportunities of the emerging new pathways of
communications, from radio and tv broadcast to the flow of
digital information via cables, satellites and the internet.
14 | P a g e
 The purpose of this new statement of directed State policy is to
hold the State responsible for a policy environment that
provides for (1) the full development of Filipino capability, (2)
the emergence of communication structures suitable to the
needs and aspirations of the nation and the balanced flow of
information, and (3) respect for the freedom of speech and of
the press.
The regulatory warnings involved in this case work against a
balanced flow of information in our communication structures
and do so without respecting freedom of speech by casting a
chilling effect on the media. This is definitely not the policy
environment contemplated by the Constitution.
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
MANILA PRINCE Pursuant to the privatization program of the Whether or not the subject A Constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
HOTEL v. GSIS government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the provision is a self-executing extent of the right conferred and liability imposed are fixed by
Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders provision? the Constitution itself xxx and there is no language indicating
participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Berhad. MPH’s bid was at P41.58/per share
while RB’s bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the
highest bidder hence it was logically considered
as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so.
Pending declaration, MPH matches RB’s bid and
invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under
par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a
TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of
the sale to RB.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH
arguing among others that:

1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution

needs an implementing law because it is merely a
statement of principle and policy (not self-
executing);

2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila

Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

15 | P a g e
FRANCISCO JR. v. The case involved the impeachment complaint
HREP against CJ Davide, Jr. wherein after the filing of
the first complaint, a second one was also filed.
Whether or not the filing of the
second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the
one year bar provided in the
Constitution?
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for
its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where
we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision
to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this
principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary in this
wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
16 | P a g e

CHAVEZ v. JBC In 1994, instead of having only seven members,
an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-
half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided
to allow the representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representatives one full vote each.
At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this
practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the
Whether or not the current
practice of the JBC to perform its
functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, runs
counter to the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution?
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.
xxx
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole.
In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that
no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all
the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of
the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should
be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the
two can be made to stand together.
Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of
the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the
JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be
a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral
body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate.
In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the
distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same
holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these
powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
17 | P a g e
 controversy is the phrase “a representative of
Congress.”
AGLIPAY v. RUIZ Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent
Church, filed a writ of prohibition against
respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining
the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic
Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The
petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling,
as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil.
Legislature, contemplates religious purpose - for
the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence,
this petition.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
MAGALLONA v. In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating
ERMITA the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of
9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties
over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was
amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in
PREAMBLE
Whether or not the issuing and
selling of commemorative
stamps is constitutional?
Petitioner now assails the
constitutionality of the law for
three main reasons:
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists
in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must
be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The
Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are
nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified.
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative
stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor upon
a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only 'to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist' and the
government just took advantage of an event considered of
international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on
its provision on the separation of the Church and State.
Moreover, the Court stressed that 'Religious freedom, as a
constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in
human affairs'. Emphasizing that, 'when the Filipino
people 'implored the aid of Divine Providence', they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men
and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.'
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of
territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of
States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark
out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international
community of the scope of our maritime space.
18 | P a g e
 R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to
be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one
baseline, to optimize the location of some
basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough
Shoal as 'regime of islands'.
PROVINCE OF On August 5, 2008, the Government of the
COTABATO v. GRP Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign
a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of
public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the
1. it reduces the Philippine
maritime territory under Article
1;
2. it opens the country's waters to
innocent and sea lanes passages
hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough
as 'regime of islands' would
weaken our claim over those
territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is
constitutional?
Whether or not the signing of the
MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself, among
others, to create and recognize
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by
law?
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can
enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic
waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the
absence of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to
both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis
continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary
international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to
forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints
mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.' total
maritime space. Moreover, the law itself commits the Phils.'
continuous claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): 'drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago'.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include
them, we'll breach the rules: that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an “associative”
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
19 | P a g e
 complete and official copies of the MA-AD and
to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and
the holding of public consultation thereon. They
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO
enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
CRUZ v. DENR Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a
suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Do the provisions of IPRA
contravene the Constitution?
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous
region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an
expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations
with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not
necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept
of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region.
But even assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous
region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-
AD would still be in conflict with it.
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted
20 | P a g e
 Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.
COLLADO v. CA Petitioner's application for the registration of a
parcel of land was opposed by the Republic for
such land is said to be a public land, hence, under
the Regalian doctrine, it belongs to the State,
however, petitioner contends that she has the
possession of the land in question since time
immemorial.
SEC. OF DENR v. YAP In May 2006, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares
of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and
six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided
for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the
centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-
of-way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Whether or not the lot in
question belongs to the State?
Whether Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose
any legal obstacle for Yap et al
and Sacay et al, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title
to their occupied lands in
Boracay Island?
by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants
of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time,
a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part
of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and
belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, 'all lands not otherwise appearing
to be within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.'
The petitioner must submit proof of application that:
1. The lot is alienable and disposable; and,
2. She has the lot since time immemorial.
Since the petitioner failed to comply with the first condition, it
is thus presumed to be of public domain. Moreover, since the
land in question is defined as a watershed for public utilization,
the land becomes inalienable, thus, public.
Also, the argument on prescription is immaterial because
prescription does not run against the State.
Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The
Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State
as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at
21 | P a g e
 bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject
of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence,
the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by
private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed.
SAAD-AGRO v. Rooted from the free patent awarded to Soccorro Whether or not the subject land No.
REPUBLIC Orcullo on 14 February 1971. Subsequently, the should be reverted in favour of
lot was sold to Petitioner, Saad-Agro Industries the government? Under the Regalian Doctrine, all land of the public domain
by one of Orcullo’s heirs. belong to the State xxx in instances where a parcel of land
considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is found
In 1995, the government filed cancellation of title under private ownership, the government is allowed to file an
and reversion of the lot to the mass of the public action for reversion, which is an action where the ultimate relief
domain, on the ground that the issuance was is to revert the land to the government pursuant to the doctrine.
irregular and erroneous as its part is a timberland
and forest reserve. However in this case, PD 705, section 13 which the Respondent
used as basis for the complaint was promulgated only in 1975
The RTC dismissed the complaint, however on or 4 years after the free patent and title were awarded to Orcullo
appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision. (the one who sold the land to petitioner). Hence, cannot be
reverted.
CITIZENSHIP
DEFINITION OF CITIZENSHIP
TECSON v. COMELEC Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known Whether or not FPJ is a natural- Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of born citizen of the Philippines.
candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
of President of the Republic of the Philippines in citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
the forthcoming national elections. In his write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the preceding such election.
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.,"
or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.

22 | P a g e
 Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a
petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his
certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents
were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou,
a Spanish subject.
ELEMENTS OF CITIZENSHIP
TAN CHONG v. SEC OF Tan Chong (petitioner) – born in San Pablo, W/N the petitioner and the
LABOR Laguna in July 1915 to a Chinese father and a applicant are citizens of the
Filipino mother who were lawfully married. He Philippine Islands.
left for China in 1925 and returned to the
Philippines on January 25, 1940.
Lam Swee Sang (applicant) – born in Jolo, Sulu
on May 8, 1900 to a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. It is not clear whether or not they were
legally married. He has been residing in the
Philippines from his birth to his filing of his
application for naturalization on November 16,
1938. He speaks the local dialect, Spanish and
English. He is married to a Filipina and has three
children by her.
Based on the evidence presented, there is no doubt that Allan
Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a
Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20,
1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution
considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or
not he is legitimate or illegitimate.
No. Citizenship of the petitioner and the applicant should be
determined from the law in force at the time of their birth and
circumstances of their birth. In Tan Chong’s case, upon his
birth he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father
(who was not a Spanish subject). In Lam Swee Sang’s case,
besides the fact that his father was a Chinese subject, there was
no law on Philippine citizenship at the time of his birth.
In both their cases, since their parents were not subjects of
Spain, they both did not acquire Philippine citizenship at birth
by virtue of sec 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The Court said that while birth is an important element of
citizenship, it alone does not make a person a citizen of the
country of his birth. Youth spent in the country; intimate and
endearing association with the citizens among whom he lives;
knowledge and pride of the country's past; belief in the
greatness and security of its institutions, in the loftiness of its
ideals, and in the ability of the country's government to protect
him, his children, and his earthly possessions against perils
from within and from without; and his readiness to defend the
country against such perils, are some of the important elements
that would make a person living in a country its citizen.
Citizenship is a political status. The citizen must be proud of
his citizenship.
He should treasure and cherish it. In the language of Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller, "the question of citizenship in a nation is of the
most vital importance. It is a precious heritage, as well as an
inestimable acquisition." (U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark, supra.)
23 | P a g e

IMPORTANCE OF CITIZENSHIP
JAPZON v. COMELEC Petitioner ran against Noble for municipal mayor Should “residence” and
of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 “domicile” be construed as
elections. Pundaodaya filed a petition for referring to “dwelling”?
disqualification against Noble alleging that the
latter lacks the residency qualification. Did Noble effectively change his
Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is a resident of domicile?
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Noble averred
that he is a registered voter and resident of
Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental. In a resolution, the Second Division of
the COMELEC ruled and disqualified Noble
from running as mayor. Noble filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution. In the
meantime, he garnered the highest number of
votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate.
Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to
Annul Proclamation. The COMELEC En Banc
reversed the decision of the Second Division and
declared Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty
position. Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for
certiorari
Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is
allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must
be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the
principle of jus soli to persons born in this country of alien
parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the
long run would be detrimental to both countries of which
such persons might claim to be citizens.
In this case, The Court found that Noble failed to convince that
he successfully effected a change of domicile. To establish a
new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not
only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and
probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of
abode.
In Japzon v. COMELEC, it was held that the term “residence”
is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring
to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal
residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain ( animus manendi).”
**more over, as cited by the Court of Appeals in this case, It
must be noted that absent any showing of irregularity that
overturns the prevailing status of a citizen, the presumption of
regularity remains. Citizenship is an important aspect of
every individuals constitutionally granted rights and
privileges. This is essential in determining whether one has
the right to exercise pre-determined political rights such as
the right to vote or the right to be elected to office and as
such rights spring from citizenship.
Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus presumed
that every person is a citizen of the country in which he
resides; that citizenship once granted is presumably
retained unless voluntarily relinquished; and that the
24 | P a g e
 burden rests upon who alleges a change in citizenship and
allegiance to establish the fact.
NATURAL BORN CITIZEN
LIMKAICHONG v. Two petitions were consolidated on the issue 1) Whether or not the citizenship 1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization
COMELEC about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong of Limkaichong's parents may be certificate of one person should be in accordance with Section
to run for, be elected to, and assume and questioned in an election case. 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it
discharge the position as Representative of the is the State, through the Solicitor General or the representative
1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of 2) Whether or not the HRET designated by statute, that may question in the appropriate
the parties who sought her disqualification is that should assume jurisdiction over denaturalization proceeding.
she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the disqualification case.
the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article 2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board
VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that 3) Whether or not the 10-day of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was
ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of prescriptive period under 1998 allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007.
Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. HRET Rules apply to Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and disqualification based on and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the
has since performed her duties and citizenship. jurisdiction over the disqualification case. Section 17, Article
responsibilities as Member of the House of VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC
Representatives. underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
The proponents against Limkaichong's
qualification stated that she is not a natural-born 3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET
citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship,
at the time of her birth. They went on to claim because qualifications for public office are continuing
that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
procedural and substantial defects. officer's entire tenure.
NATURALIZED CITIZENS
SOBEJANA-CONDON v. The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen W/N petitioner disqualified from R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
COMELEC having been born of Filipino parents on August running for elective office due to Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their
8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a failure to renounce her Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her Australian Citizenship in Republic.
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of
R.A 9225 Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia aforesaid oath.
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise
known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-

25 | P a g e
Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was
approved and the petitioner took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an
unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated
September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased
to be an Australian citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of
Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in
her bid. She again sought elective office during
the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. She took her oath of office on
May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V.
Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista,
(private respondents) all registered voters of
Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought
the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual
citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 9225.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores
one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and
obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions
imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought
elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the
same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer
oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian
citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before any public
officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon
void.

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to

be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006,
she no longer held dual citizenship and was only
a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of

26 | P a g e
 candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence,
the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does
not apply to her.
STATELESS PERSONS AND FOUNDLINGS
POE-LLAMANZARES v. In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 Whether or not Grace Poe-
COMELEC elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a Llamanzares is a natural- born
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that Filipino citizen?
her residence up to day before May 9, 2016
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from
May 24, 2005.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to
deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be
considered a natural born Filipino citizen since
she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical
parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The
Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT,
reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that
POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino
Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only
natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as
being shown in her physical features which are typical of
Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in
Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that
residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99%
chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said
probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under
Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class,
natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935
Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the
natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being
found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year
residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS
MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with
ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US)
in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May
24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225.
Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.
27 | P a g e
 DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL ALLEGIANCE
MERCADO v. MAZANO Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Whether or not a dual citizen is The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160
Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor disqualified to hold public Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as
of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. elective office in the Philippines. referring to dual allegiance.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano
garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the
pending petition for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano
is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered
himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states.
Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec.
5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence
of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and
of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes
an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or
government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether
28 | P a g e

IN RE BENJAMIN Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in
DACANAY March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical
attention for his ailments. He subsequently
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His
application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of
Whether petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay lost his membership in
the Philippine bar when he gave
up his Philippine citizenship?
such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions
of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the
law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic.
No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of
respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as
a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that
he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to
the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent
his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in
the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in
the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine
29 | P a g e
 allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines
and now intends to resume his law practice.
JACOT v. DAL Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution
dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-
361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007
of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying
him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007
National and Local Elections, on the ground that
he failed to make a personal renouncement of his
United States (US) citizenship.
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of
the US on 13 December 1989.
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the
administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine
Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,
California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19
June 2006 an Order of Approval, on the same
day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.
Whether petitioner is Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of
disqualified from running as a allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the
candidate in the 14 May 2007 Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not
local elections for his failure to substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and
make a personal and sworn sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are
renunciation of his US distinct requirements to be complied with for different
citizenship? purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens
of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their
Philippine citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino
swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein
on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation
might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino
has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his
Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The
afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the
one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must be
executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in
Philippine elections.
30 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines and eventually was
issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019
recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the
Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position
of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman,
Camiguin.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second
Division finally issued its Resolution
disqualifying the petitioner from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin,
for failure to make the requisite renunciation of
his US citizenship.
NATURAL BORN CITIZENS AND DUAL CITIZENS AND PUBLIC OFFICE
ARNADO v. COMELEC Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Whether or not Arnado should YES.
Later, however, he became an American citizen. be disqualified?
On July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship by executing an oath of allegiance to
the Philippines.
On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit
renouncing his American citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of
candidacy (COC) for mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections.
A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a
disqualification case against Arnado on the
ground that Arnado used his US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship in April 2009. It
was argued that such act of using a US passport
constitutes dual allegiance and that is a ground
for disqualification under the Local Government
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public
office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those
who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before
the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-
born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective
public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Arnado failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9225.
Although he did swear allegiance to the Philippines and
renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his COC in
November 2009, such acts were deemed recanted or withdrawn
when he again used his US passport.
In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that he used
his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010. As such, he
remained a US citizen and is therefore disqualified to run for
public office.
What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of running in
the 2013 elections, was to renounce again (for the third time)
his US citizenship. But he never did that hence he was rightfully
disqualified in the 2013 elections too.
Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his US passport
in January 2010 and March 2010, he is still disqualified.
31 | P a g e
 Code. In short, it was argued that Arnado
remained a US citizen.

In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified

to run for public office because he complied with
the requirements of Republic Act No. 9225.

He was eventually disqualified by the

COMELEC.
CHUA v. COMELEC

32 | P a g e