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Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines

Dimensionality in Congress

John Aldrich
Jacob Montgomery
David Sparks

Duke University, Department of Political Science

September 1, 2010

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 1 / 29
The Main Event

Q: Do low-dimensional estimates of ideology from congressional roll-call


data necessarily imply a truly low-dimensional ideological world?

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 2 / 29
The Main Event

Q: Do low-dimensional estimates of ideology from congressional roll-call


data necessarily imply a truly low-dimensional ideological world?

A: No.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 2 / 29
Expanded Research Question

Estimates generated from roll-call scaling typically characterize policy


conflict as taking place in “one-and-a-half” dimensions.
Results from many formal theories (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks
1988, Krehbiel 1991) take as an assumption that the ideological space
of Congress is, in fact, one-dimensional.
But do these low-dimensional estimates necessarily imply a truly
low-dimensional ideological world?

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Simulation

We simulate Congressional roll-call data under a range of assumptions


about congressional voting behavior.
Pure ideological voting.
Pure ideological voting with bi-modal distributions of preferences.
Distributive voting (with and without party bias).
Mixed motives.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 4 / 29
Estimation

After generating roll-call matrices, we scale the simulated voters’


ideology using principal components analysis.
We adopt the “eigenvalues-greater-than-one” heuristic (Kaiser 1960)
in our sweep of 132, 480 parameter settings.
We compare the number of recovered dimensions to the number of
“true” dimensions.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 5 / 29
Estimation

After generating roll-call matrices, we scale the simulated voters’


ideology using principal components analysis.
We adopt the “eigenvalues-greater-than-one” heuristic (Kaiser 1960)
in our sweep of 132, 480 parameter settings.
We compare the number of recovered dimensions to the number of
“true” dimensions.
We find that there are many parameter settings under which we
recover a low-dimensional space even when the actual simulated
dimensionality is high.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 5 / 29
Estimation

After generating roll-call matrices, we scale the simulated voters’


ideology using principal components analysis.
We adopt the “eigenvalues-greater-than-one” heuristic (Kaiser 1960)
in our sweep of 132, 480 parameter settings.
We compare the number of recovered dimensions to the number of
“true” dimensions.
We find that there are many parameter settings under which we
recover a low-dimensional space even when the actual simulated
dimensionality is high.
Methodological issues:
Why eigenvalues?
Why principal components analysis?

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 5 / 29
More Dimensions, Better Fit

Uni−dimensional voting with error Perfect two−dimensional voting

Y Y
YYY Y
P
Cutpoint

Dimension 2
P SQ
YY NN YYYYY N Y N Y NNNN Cut−line N
Y Y N N
Y N
N
SQ
N
NN

Single Policy Dimension Dimension 1

It is always possible to add dimensions to better predict the data.

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Poole and Rosenthal’s WNOMINATE method always results in lower dimensionality
than does PCA.
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Some Simple Examples



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Some Simple Examples



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Some Simple Examples



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Some Simple Examples



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Some Simple Examples



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Some Simple Examples



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Some Simple Examples



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Some Simple Examples



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Some Simple Examples



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Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 17 / 29
Basic Spatial Voting

Members’ voting calculus:


2
0 if kxi − aj k2 − kxi − bj k < 0
yij = 2 (1)
1 if kxi − aj k2 − kxi − bj k > 0

Determining status quo from proposal and cut-point:



cjp − |cjp − bjp | if bjp > cjp
ajp = (2)
cjp + |cjp − bjp | if bjp < cjp

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 18 / 29
Real versus recovered dimensions under basic spatial voting

Gray line represents “perfect” recovery of dimensionality.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 19 / 29
Visualizing an increase in the distance between party distribution means.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 20 / 29
Basic spatial voting model with party separation

Increased polarization tends to collapse estimates of dimensionality.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 21 / 29
Spatial voting, varying dimensions of party separation

Increasing the number of dimensions along which parties are separated tends to reduce
estimates of dimensionality.
Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 22 / 29
Basic distributive politics
Priority for inclusion in distributive coalition:

rij ∼ N (0, 1). (3)


1 if rij > rankα (rj )
Bij = (4)
0 if rij < rankα (rj )
Voting decision; yea iff in coalition:

1 if Bij = 1
yij = (5)
0 if Bij = 0

Party bias in the determination of the coalition:



N (ρ, 1) if τk = τi
rij = (6)
N (−ρ, 1) if τk 6= τi

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 23 / 29
Real versus recovered dimensions under distributive politics

Random versus party-biased coalition formation.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 24 / 29
Conclusions

Truly low-dimensional voting is correctly estimated.


Wide separation of parties generates low-dimensional estimates, at all
levels of true dimensionality.
Distributive motivations generate low-dimensional estimates, at all
levels of true dimensionality, regardless of partisan bias.
⇒ Low-dimensional estimates do not imply a truly low-dimensional
world.
⇒ Formal models that rely on unidimensionality may not be valid.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 25 / 29
Mixing distributive and spatial motivations

Re-scale distributive component with CDF of standard normal distribution,


and γ-weight relative import of distributive and spacial considerations.

if (1 − γ) × Φ kxi − aj k2 − kxi − bj k2  + γ × Bij < .5


 
0
yij =
1 if (1 − γ) × Φ kxi − aj k2 − kxi − bj k2 + γ × Bij > .5
(7)

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 26 / 29
Mixing distributive and spatial motivations.

Increasing weight on distributive concerns tends to collapse estimates of dimensionality.

Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 27 / 29
Distributive and spatial motivations, with party bias.

Distributive voting with no party bias is essentially random, party bias does not effect
spatially-motivated voting.
Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 28 / 29
Distributive and spatial motivations, with party separation.

Low-dimensional spatial voting: about one-and-a-half dimensions; high party separation


and/or distributive motivations: about one-and-a-half dimensions.
Aldrich, Montgomery, Sparks (Duke) Drawing (Inferences) Outside the Lines September 1, 2010 29 / 29

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