Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 (1930)
L-29333, 27 February 1969
FACTS:
In the general elections held on December 14, 1937, respondent Agripino Ga. Del Fierro and
petitioner Ireneo Moya were contending candidates for the office of the mayor of the
Municipality of Paracale, Camarines Noret. After canvass of the returns, the Board of
canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the elected mayor with a majority of 102 votes.
However, respondent filed a motion of protest and judgment was rendered in favor of
respondent, declaring him as the candidate-elect with a majority of 3 votes over his rival.
Petitioner now seeks said judgment for review alleging the ff:
a. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently
or contrary to the controlling decisions of this Honorable Court
b. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del
Fierro."
c. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del
Firro."
d. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del
Fierro."
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s contentions are tenable
HELD: NO
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government,
necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the
ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and whenever
called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This,
fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not
with utmost, with reasonable, liberality.
It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that whatever might have been said in
cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the
intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system. Rationally,
also, this must be the justification for the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation
of ballots which are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth
Act No. 357).
Badelles v. Cabili, G.R. No.
FACTS:
Protestant Badelles and protestee Cabili were the duly registered candidates for the Office of
the City Mayor of Iligan City. Badelles impugns the election of Cabili on the ground that there
were “flagrant violatiOn of mandatory provisions of law relating to or governing elections…”.
What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to do
so, numbering 8,300 or more and that an approximately equal number, who were duly
registered with the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to the
above circumstances. The proclamation then could not have reflected the true will of the
electorate as to who was the mayor elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili over the
protestant consisted of only 2,344 votes.
The election protests against the duly proclaimer Mayor (Cabili) were dismissed by the CFI of
Lanao del Norte. In such order of dismissal, it was admitted that while irregularities as well as
misconduct on the part of election officers were alleged in the election protests filed, there
was however an absence of an allegation that they would change the result of the election in
favor of the protestants and against the protestees, that such irregularities would destroy the
secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the protestees knew of or participated in the
commission thereof. For the lower court then, the lack of a cause of action was rather
evident.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court in ordering the dismissal of the election protests
HELD: YES
The seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the elections conducted freely and
honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who
were the duly elected officials. Such allegations, it is to be stressed, would have to be
accepted at their face value for the purpose of determining whether there is a cause of
action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus pleased.
Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial
abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding
allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such character.
NOTE:
That if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and the flagrant violations of
the election law, the proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.
Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148334, 21 January 2004
FACTS:
Following the appointment of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as VP of the Phils., the Senate passed
Resolution No. 84 calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. The resolution further provides
that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona.
Petitioners now seek the nullification of the special election and the declaration of the 13 th
elected senator (Honasan) for (1) having failed to notify the electorate of the position to be
filled in as required under Sec. 2 of RA 6645; (2) having failed to require senatorial candidates
to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or
regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3)
having failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election
under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4,
paragraph 4 of RA 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Special Election should be nullified for failure to give notice by
the body empowered
HELD: NO
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the
special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election.—The calling of an
election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by
the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the
election’s validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the
election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election. In a special
election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to
fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special
election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election
held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law
with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold
the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some
authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the
election. Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special
election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a
condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory,
and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give
notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a
sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special election. If the lack of
official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no
special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void. The
required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two
matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term
Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second,
that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest
number of votes in the special election
NOTES:
The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of
the members of the Senate. (Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution)
Section 2 of R.A. 6645 provides for the procedure in calling a special election.—In case a
vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date
of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety
(90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to
give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
DISSENTING OPINION- JUSTICE PUNO
An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitution is the expansion of the democratic space
giving the people greater power to exercise their sovereignty
Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, the people can directly exercise their sovereign authority
through the following modes, namely: (1) elections; (2) plebiscite; (3) initiative; (4) recall; and
(5) referendum.
The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege
granted by the State to such persons as are most likely to exercise it for the public good.” The
existence of the right of suffrage is a threshold for the preservation and enjoyment of all
other rights that it ought to be considered as one of the most sacred parts of the constitution
The purpose of election laws is to safeguard the will of the people, the purity of elections
being one of the most important and fundamental requisites of popular government
As worded in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to information is self-executory
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic
thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues
thereon is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution.
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the
people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within
the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the
inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of
those to whom the power had been delegated . . . x x x x x x x x x .
Notice to the electors that a vacancy exists and that an election is to be held to fill it for the
unexpired term, is essential to give validity to the meeting of an electoral body to
discharge that particular duty, and is also an essential and characteristic element of a
popular election. Public policy requires that it should be given in such form as to reach the
body of the electorate. Here there had been no nominations to fill the vacancy, either by
the holding of a special primary election, or by nomination by county political conventions
or party committees. The designation of the office to be filled was not upon the official
ballot. As before noted, except for the vacancy, it would have no place there, as the term
of office of the incumbent, if living, would not expire until January 1, 1947.
Purisima v. Salanga, 15 SCRA 704 (1965)
FACTS:
In the election of November 12, 1963, Amante Purisima and Gregorio Cordero were among
the candidates for any of the three offices of Provincial Board Member of Ilocos Sur. Purisima
noted that during the canvass, the returns of 41 precincts showed on their faced that the
words and figures for Cordero’s votes had been “obviously and manifestly erased” and
superimposed with other words and figures. Purisima requested for suspension of the
canvass however, the Board of Canvassers denied said request. The BOC continued and
finished the canvass and consequently, proclaimed Cordero the winner. Purisima filed a
petition for recount under Sec. 163 of the Revised Election Code. The petition for recount
was dismissed. In dismissing the petition for recount, respondent Judge stated that some of
the requisites were not present, namely: first, that it appears to the provincial board of
canvassers that a discrepancy exists; second, that said discrepancy is between the copy
submitted to the board and another authentic copy thereof; third, that said authentic copy
must also be submitted to the board
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Purisima may file the petition for recount by himself
2) Whether or not the BOC has the duty to suspend canvass in light of the events
HELD: 1) YES
A candidate affected can file a petition for recount alone, without the concurrence of the
provincial board of canvassers (Cawa vs. Del Rosario, L-16837-40 May 30, 1960). From the
fact, therefore, that the provincial board of canvassers has not petitioned for a recount it
cannot be inferred that they were not convinced a discrepancy existed
Where a candidate was prevented from securing the Commission on Elections' copies of the
returns to establish a discrepancy between them and the Provincial Treasurer's copies, the
failure to submit the said copies to the board should not prejudice his right to petition for
recount before the court
2) YES
Where, as in the case at bar, there were patent erasures and superimpositions in words and
figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the board of canvassers, it was
imperative for said board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for verification of authentic
copies and recourse to the courts (Javier vs. Commission on Elections, L22248, January 30,
1965). A canvass or proclamation made notwithstanding such patent defects, without
awaiting proper remedies, is null and void (Ibid.).
Patent erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated in the election
returns strike at the reliability of said returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A
comparison with the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only way to
remove grave doubts as to the correctness of said returns as well as of ascertaining that they
reflect the will of the people.
Cauton v. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 911
FACTS:
Petitioner Lucas Cauton and respondent Pablo Sanidad were 2 of the candidates for the
Office of Representative in the 2nd congressional district of Ilcos Sure. During the canvass by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sure, respondent Sanidad brought to the
attention of the Board the fact that the entries of votes for the candidates for Representative
in those copies of the election returns that came from the envelopes presented by the
provincial treasurer differed from the entries appearing in the copies of the returns from the
same election precincts that were in the possession of the Liberal Party. He then filed a
petition with the COMELEC praying for the opening of the ballot boxes in all the precincts of
Candon, Santiago, and Sta. Cruz. Respondent COMELEC then issued an order directing the
opening of the ballot boxes of said municipalities. Petitioner, however, contends that
COMELEC is without jurisdiction to issue the resolution in question and the same is null and
void and should not be given legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC resolution is void.
HELD: NO
The Commission has the power to decide all administrative questions affecting elections,
except the question involving the right to vote. The Commission on Elections has the power
to investigate and act on the propriety or legality of the canvass of election returns made by
the board of canvassers. The power of the Commission in this respect is simply
administrative and supervisory. It is intended to secure the proclamation of the winning
candidate based on the true count of the votes cast.
Once the Commission on Elections is convinced that the election returns in the hands of the
board of canvassers do not constitute the proper basis in ascertaining the true result of the
elections. it is duty bound to take the necessary steps in order that the proper basis for the
canvass is made available. It would be absurd to say the Commission has a legal duty to
perform and at the same time it is denied the necessary means to perform that duty.
Where the three copies of the election returns outside the ballot box do not constitute a
reliable basis for a canvass, then the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power to
administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections, may order the opening
of the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside each ballot box, corresponding to
each precinct, is also tampered like the three copies outside the ballot box. The Commission
may do this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the proper party. That order does not
affect the right to vote or the validity of the votes cast.
NOTE: The ballot boxes may be opened in case there is an election contest. They may also be
opened, even if there is no election contest, when their contents have to be used as evidence
in the prosecution of election frauds. Moreover, they may be opened when they are the
subject of any official investigation which may be ordered by a competent court or other
competent authority. The competent authority must include the Commission on Elections
which is charged with the administration and enforcement of the laws relative to the conduct
of elections.
Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, 10 September 2009
The Court, in its September 10, 2009 Decision, dismissed the petition and the petition-in-
intervention on the following main grounds:
(1) RA 8436, as amended, does not require that the AES procured or, to be used for the 2010
nationwide fully automated elections must, as a condition sine qua non, have been pilot-
tested in the 2007 Philippine election, it being sufficient that the capability of the chosen AES
has been demonstrated in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction;
(2) Comelec has adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism to ensure compliance of the
PCOS with the minimum capabilities standards prescribed by RA 8436, as amended, and its
determination in this regard must be respected absent grave abuse of discretion;
(3) Comelec retains under the automation arrangement its supervision, oversight, and
control mandate to ensure a free, orderly, and honest electoral exercise; it did not, by
entering into the assailed automation project contract, abdicate its duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections and decide, at the first instance, all
questions affecting elections; and
(4) in accordance with contract documents, continuity and back-up plans are in place to be
activated in case the PCOS machines falter during the actual election exercise.
The bottom line is that the required 2007 automation, be it viewed in the concept of a pilot
test or not, is not a mandatory requirement for the choice of system in, or a prerequisite for,
the full automation of the May 2010 elections.
PUNO (C.J.), Separate Concurring Opinion:
A touchstone of our Constitution is that critical public policy judgments belong to the
legislative branch, and the Court must not unduly intrude into this exclusive domain. In
enacting RA 8436 (Election Modernization Act) on December 22, 1997, the legislature has
clearly chosen the policy that an AES shall be used by the COMELEC for the process of voting,
counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local elections.
It decided to put an end to the manual conduct of our elections that has frustrated the
honest casting of votes by our sovereign people. In the pursuit of its objective, the legislature
defined what it considered an AES and provided the standards for its implementation. It
further determined the minimum functional capabilities of the system and delegated to the
COMELEC the development and adoption of a system of evaluation to ascertain that the
minimum system capabilities would be met.
10 February 2010 (Motion for Reconsideration)- DENIED
By Decision dated September 10, 2009, the Court denied the petition of H. Harry L. Roque,
Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010
Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management
Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic).
Theories, issues, and arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot be brought out
on review. Basic considerations of fair play impel this rule. The imperatives of orderly, if not
speedy, justice frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence and on the practice of parties
of going to trial haphazardly
Arroyo v. DOJ and Comelec, G.R. No. 199082, 18 September 2012
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with
the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud
and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial
report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were
indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that
information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the
charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and
of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid
HELD: YES
The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to
prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms
of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on
any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint
with the office of the fiscal [public prosecutor], or with the Ministry [Department] of Justice
for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. Under the above provision of law, the
power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter,
however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance
of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 34 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants are given continuing
authority as deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under election laws and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly
with them or may be indorsed to them by the petitioner or its duly authorized
representatives.
The grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses to the
Comelec was not by virtue of the Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code which was
eventually amended by Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts preliminary
investigation of election offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere
deputies. If the prosecutors had been allowed to conduct preliminary investigation and file
the necessary information by virtue only of a delegated authority, they now have better
grounds to perform such function by virtue of the statutory grant of authority. If deputation
was justified because of lack of funds and legal officers to ensure prompt and fair
investigation and prosecution of election offenses, the same justification should be cited to
justify the grant to the other prosecuting arms of the government of such concurrent
jurisdiction.
Arroyo v. DOJ and Comelec 23 July 2013
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when
deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction
2) Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional
independence of the Comelec.
HELD:
1) NO
In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v.
Commission on Elections, 595 SCRA 477 (2009), the constitutionality of Section 43 of RA 9369
had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While recognizing
the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that
can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the
Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
2) NO
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless
included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint
Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the
Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. With more reason, therefore,
that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the
Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
Ongsioko Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013
FACTS:
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to
Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the
petitioner, on the ground that it contained material representations. On March 27, 2013, the
COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8,
2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR. However, on May 18, 2013, she
was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared
the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same day, petitioner took her oath
of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet
to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013.According
to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed20Â
because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELLEC has jurisdiction over petitioner
HELD: YES
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the HRET does not have jurisdiction
over a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit: As to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites:(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office.
The petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office; The term of office of a Member of the House of
Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.” Thus, until such time, the Commission on Elections retains jurisdiction.
Ongsioko Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, 22 October 2013
In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Banc shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); That the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional
provision.
The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy was a summary proceeding or one “heard summarily.”
The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or
its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally
proclaimed.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the
proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET
proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding
Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are
unconstitutional. Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants
or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in
Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the
Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution
that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners
only by Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise,
amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall
promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional
2) Whether or not Section 18.5 is unconstitutional
3) Whether or not Section 25 is unconstitutional
HELD:
1) NO
The execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act; The affidavit is
not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression
that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.
Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to “resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her
registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship
in another country.
Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as
promised stands to lose his right of suffrage

2) YES
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to
canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for
the said positions.” The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land
should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
3) YES
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC.
People v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945 (1936)
FACTS:
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934. He
was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal disqualification
under Section 2462 in connection with Section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which reads:
The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of
imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.
(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the United States.
(c) Insane of feeble-minded persons.
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.
(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding section who, after failing
to make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of inspectors at any of its two
meetings for registration and revision, that they are incapacitated for preparing their ballots
due to permanent physical disability, present themselves at the hour of voting as
incapacitated, irrespective of whether such incapacity be real or feigned.
Appellant was sentenced by final judgment to suffer 8 years and 1 days of presidio mayor
and no evidence was presented to show that prior to said elections, he had been granted a
plenary pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State has the right to deprive appellant the right of suffrage by
reason of conviction of a crime
HELD: YES
The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. It is a right
created by law, not a natural right.
Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such person or classes as are most likely to
exercise it for the public good. For reasons of public policy, certain classes of persons are
excluded from the franchise. Among the generally excluded classes are minors, idiots,
paupers, and convicts.
The right of the State to deprive persons of the right of suffrage by reason of their having
been convicted of crime, is beyond question. The manifest purpose of such restriction is to
preserve the purity of elections. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony is unfit to exercise
the privilege of suffrage or to hold a public office. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
The exclusion from the exercise of suffrage must be adjudged a mere disqualification
imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the
denial of a personal right. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)