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@ is is a petition for  ëë ë to set aside t e resolution, dated Marc 18, 1993, of t e

Sandiganbayan, granting t e motion of t e Special Prosecution Officer to suspend t e accused
from office    and t e resolution, dated Marc 29, 1993, denying reconsideration of t e
first resolution.

Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was filed
against im and two ot ers for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of
t e Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). @ e Information alleged:

@ at on or about June 24, 1986, in t e Municipality of Catbalogan, Samar,

P ilippines, and wit in t e jurisdiction of t is Honorable Court, t e above-named
accused AN@ONIO M. BOLAS@IG, PEDRO ASON and PRUDENCIO
MACABEN@A, all public officers, duly appointed and qualified as suc , being t e
OIC Governor, Provincial @reasurer and Property Officer respectively, all of t e
Province of Samar, and being members of Bids and Awards Committee responsible
for t e purc ase of office supplies for t e Provincial Government of Samar and
w ile in t e performance of t eir respective positions, confederating and mutually
elping one anot er and t roug manifest partiality and evident bad fait , did t en
and t ere wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purc ase contract wit REYNALDO
ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for t e purc ase of certain office supplies,
namely: one undred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit price of
Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five @ ousand Pesos
(P55,000.00), w ic contract was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to t e
government as t e prevailing unit price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pesos
(P55.00) or a total price of Five @ ousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00), t ereby
causing undue injury to t e government in t e total amount of Forty-Nine @ ousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00).

CON@RARY @O LAW.
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, w ereupon e entered a plea of "not guilty."

On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for petitioner's
suspension, citing sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 w ic provides in part:

Sec. 13. Ô
 
  

  
. ² Any incumbent public officer against
w om any criminal prosecution under a valid information under t is Act or under
@itle 7, Book II of t e Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property, w et er as a simple or as a complex
offense and in w atever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, s all be suspended from office.

Petitioner opposed t e motion, arguing  ë  t at:

2. Upon a bare invocation of t e foregoing provision, t e prosecution would ave

t is Honorable Court issue an Order suspending t e accused, as if suspension of a
public officer is a mindless and meaningless exercise, and is imposed wit out
regard to t e spirit and intent of t e law upon w ic it is based.

3. Indeed, it cannot be simply assumed t at laws are enacted and followed  
  ë  ë  ë
   
ë , especially w en a mec anical application s all
injure not only t e public official concerned, but t e entire electorate as well.

@ e Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's argument and ordered t e suspension of petitioner from

office for a period of 90 days. It eld t at preventive suspension is mandatory under sec. 13, of
Rep. Act No. 3019, pursuant to w ic all t at is required is for t e court to make a finding t at t e
accused stands c arged under a valid information "for any of t e above-described crimes for t e
purpose of granting or denying t e soug t for suspension."

Implementation of t e resolution was eld in abeyance to allow petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration, w ic t e Sandiganbayan, owever, eventually denied on Marc 29, 1993.

Hence, t is petition. It is contended t at t e Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its

discretion in issuing its resolution

(a) despite t e failure of t e prosecution to s ow any public interest to be served, or

injury to be prevented, or any ot er compelling factual circumstance w ic justifies
t e preventive suspension of petitioner; and

(b) despite t e injury not only upon petitioner but also upon t e people of Samar
w ose political rig ts are trenc ed upon by t e suspension for no valid reason of
t eir duly elected Governor.

@o t e Solicitor General's contention t at upon t e filing of a valid information suspension

    is mandatory as eld in several decisions of t is Court,petitioner replies t at, w ile
t e Sandiganbayan as t e power to order preventive suspension, t ere is a "need [for t e
Sandiganbayan] to go furt er, beyond t e filing of t e information, to a determination of t e
necessity of t e preventive suspension in accordance wit t e spirit and intent of t e Anti-Graft
Law." Petitioner explains:
 In ot er words, w en t e Anti-Graft Law gave t e courts t e aut ority to order t e
preventive suspension of t e accused, it never intended to impose a mindless and
meaningless exercise. @ e exercise of suc aut ority must always be wit in t e
confines of t e legislative intent, for to go beyond it would be to exceed t e bounds
of t e law. Preventive suspension s ould t erefore be ordered only w en t e
legislative purpose is ac ieved, t at is, w en "t e suspension order . . . prevent(s)
t e accused from using is office to influence potential witnesses or tamper wit
records w ic may be vital in t e prosecution of t e case against im." Corollarily,
w en t e legislative purpose is not ac ieved, preventive suspension is improper
and s ould not be decreed."

@ e petitioner's contention as no merit. It is now settled t at sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019
makes it mandatory for t e Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against w om a valid
information c arging violation of t at law, Book II, @itle 7 of t e Revised Penal Code, or any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed.  @ e court trying a
case as neit er discretion nor duty to determine w et er preventive suspension is required to
prevent t e accused from using is office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate is prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office. @ e presumption is t at unless t e accused is
suspended e may frustrate is prosecution or commit furt er acts of malfeasance or do bot , in
t e same way t at upon a finding t at t ere is probable cause to believe t at a crime as been
committed and t at t e accused is probably guilty t ereof, t e law requires t e judge to issue a
warrant for t e arrest of t e accused. @ e law does not require t e court to determine w et er t e
accused is likely to escape or evade t e jurisdiction of t e court.

It is indeed true t at in some of our decisionst e expression "t e maximum period of ninety (90)
days" is used. But t at is only for t e purpose of emp asizing t at t e preventive suspension
t erein involved, w ic were for more t an ninety (90) days, were excessive and unreasonable. It
is to be noted t at t e ninety-day period of preventive suspension is not found in sec. 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019 but was adopted from sec. 42 of t e Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807),
w ic is now sec. 52 of t e Administrative Code of 1987. @ is latter provision states:

Sec. 52. 
 ë   Ô
 
  
 
ë   

. ²
W en t e administrative case against t e officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by t e disciplining aut ority wit in t e period of
ninety (90) days after t e date of suspension of t e respondent w o is not a
presidential appointee, t e respondent s all be automatically reinstated in t e
service: ë , @ at w en t e delay in t e disposition of t e case is due to t e
fault, negligence or petition of t e respondent, t e period of delay s all not be
counted in computing t e period of suspension erein provided.

@ e duration of preventive suspension is t us coeval wit t e period prescribed for deciding

administrative disciplinary cases. If t e case is decided before ninety days, t en t e suspension
will last less t an ninety days, but if t e case is not decided wit in ninety days, t en t e preventive
suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly, as applied to criminal prosecutions under
Republic Act No. 3019, preventive suspension will last for less t an ninety days only if t e case is
decided wit in t at period; ot erwise, it will continue for ninety days.

@ e duration of preventive suspension will, t erefore, vary to t e extent t at it is contingent on t e

time it takes t e court to decide t e case but not on account of any discretion lodged in t e court,
taking into account t e probability t at t e accused may use is office to amper is prosecution.
Indeed, were t e Sandiganbayan given t e discretion to impose a s orter period of suspension,
say, 80, 70 or 60 days, as petitioner asserts, it would lie in its power not to suspend t e accused at
all. @ at, of course, would be contrary to t e command of sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.

Our olding t at, upon t e filing of a valid information c arging violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Book II, @itle 7 of t e Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government or public property, it is t e
duty of t e court to place t e accused under preventive suspension disposes of petitioner's ot er
contention t at since t e trial in t e Sandiganbayan is now over wit respect to t e presentation of
evidence for t e prosecution t ere is no longer any danger t at petitioner would intimidate
prosecution's witnesses. @ e fact is t at t e possibility t at t e accused would intimidate witnesses
or ot erwise amper is prosecution is just one of t e grounds for preventive suspension. @ e
ot er one is, as already stated, to prevent t e accused from committing furt er acts of
malfeasance w ile in office.

Finally, t e fact t at petitioner's preventive suspension may deprive t e people of Samar of t e

services of an official elected by t em, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing
w at is ot erwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. @ e vice governor, w o as likewise been
elected by t em, will act as governor.Indeed, even t e Constitution aut orizes t e suspension for
not more t an sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly be avior,  t us
rejecting t e view expressed in one case  t at members of t e legislature could not be
suspended because in t e case of suspension, unlike in t e case of removal, t e seat remains
filled but t e constituents are deprived of representation.

For t e foregoing reasons, we old t at in ordering t e preventive suspension of petitioner, t e

Sandiganbayan acted according to law.

WHEREFORE, t e Petition for 2 ëë ëis DISMISSED.