Political Law:

A. Arrest

1. Tabujara III vs. People, GR No. 175162, 29 October 2008

TABUJARA III VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 175162, October 29, 2008

CHICONAZARIO, J.

Petitioners: Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III & Christine S. Dayrit Respondents: People of the
Philippines & Daisy Afable

ISSUE/S: whether the Court of Appeals properly denied the petition for review filed by the
petitioners under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. - NO

FACTS:

· Respondent Afable filed two criminal complaints against petitioners for Grave Coercion
and Trespass to Dwelling.

· Petitioners denied the allegations against them arguing that they went to the house of
Afable to thresh out matters regarding some missing pieces of jewelry. (Afable is being charged
with estafa for having allegedly embezzled several pieces of jewelry from the Miladay Jewels
Inc.)

· [MTC] dismissed case for lack of probable cause holding that complaints are merely
leverage to the estafa case already filed against Afable by the Miladay Jewels Inc. wherein
respondent Atty. Tabujara III is its legal counsel; while respondent Dayrit is an officer.

· On MR, Judge Adriatico issued an Order reversing his earlier findings of lack of probable
cause through the sworn allegation of witness Mauro V. De Lara, that was apparently overlooked
by said Judge, sufficient to establish a prima facie evidence or probable cause against the
accused.

· Petitioners filed MR insisting that the alleged affidavit of De Lara on which the court a
quo based its findings of probable cause was hearsay because it was not sworn before Judge
Adriatico; that De Lara did not personally appear before the investigating judge during
preliminary investigation. MR Denied.
· [RTC] Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction seeking to annul orders of the court a quo. RTC granted TRO and
enjoined the MTC from proceeding with the prosecution. Case was raffled where RTC denied
petition for annulment, finding probable cause.

· [CA] Petitioners filed a Petition for Review asserting that the court a quo acted with grave
abuse of discretion; that the Order was void because it was issued by MTC while the TRO issued
by RTC was in force. CA denied petition on the ground that petitioners resorted to the wrong
mode of appeal; i.e., instead of an ordinary appeal, petitioners filed a petition for review.

· In denying the petition for review under Section 1 Rule 42 of 1997 Rules of Court filed by
petitioners, CA stressed that they availed of the wrong mode of review in bringing the case to it
since the petitioners filed an original action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the RTC, the
remedy availed of should have been an appeal under Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.

· MR denied hence instant petition. Petitioners insist that the Orders of the court a quo
should be annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion because the finding of
probable cause was based solely on the unsworn statement of De Lara who never appeared
during the preliminary examination; that since De Lara never appeared before the investigating
judge, his statement was hearsay and cannot be used as basis for finding probable cause for the
issuance of warrant of arrest or to hold petitioners liable for trial.

HELD: CA erred in dismissing petitioners’ petition for review. While it is true that rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, it nevertheless must
not be met at the expense of substantial justice. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to
proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. The principle that rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and that strict and rigid application of
rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice must always be avoided. In those rare cases to which we did not stringently apply the
procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave
injustice.

Rules must not be applied so rigidly as to override substantial justice. The CA should have
looked beyond the alleged technicalities to open the way for the resolution of the substantive
issues in the instance case. By dismissing the said Petition, the CA absolutely foreclosed the
resolution of all the substantive issues petitioners were repeatedly attempting to raise before the
Court of Appeals.
Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in issuing the Orders finding probable cause to
hold petitioners liable for trial and to issue warrants of arrest because it was based solely on the
statement of witness without conducting a personal examination on said witness or propounding
searching questions, and still found De Lara’s allegations sufficient to establish probable cause.
This falls short of the requirements imposed by the Constitution (Sec 2., Art. III 1987
Constitution) and in violation of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Executive Judge
Manalastas of RTC issued a TRO enjoining the court a quo from conducting further proceedings
but in contravention of said TRO, the court a quo issued its Order on even date ordering the
issuance of warrants of arrest. Considering that the said Order was issued during the effectivity
of the TRO, the same is considered of no effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. CA’s decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. MTC
is DIRECTED to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 9929037 and 9929038 for lack of probable cause
and to quash the warrants of arrest against petitioners for having been irregularly and
precipitously issued.

PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]

Facts:

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against thefollowing: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP)aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for
being members/leaders of the NPA,inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by AggravatingCircumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft,
and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congressusurped the powers of the judge 2.)
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPPwithout any forms of safeguard
of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt bybeing members of the
CPP regardless of voluntariness.The Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It
is an act to outlaw the CPP andsimilar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other
purposes. It defined the CommunistParty being although a political party is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government,not only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversion and other illegal means. It declares that theCPP is a clear and present danger to the
security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliationwith full knowledge of the illegal
acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation bya designated prosecutor
by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court.Section 6 provides for
penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in opencourt for acts
penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership tothe CCP
through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its
validexercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. For penalizing membership
of CPP(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held:

The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.A bill of attainder is solely
a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is thesubstitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt.

In order for a statute bemeasured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present:

1.) The statute specifiespersons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct. (A bill of attainderrelatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for
theoverthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not onlyto the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors.

The Act’s focus

2. People vs. Gabo, GR No. 161083, 3 August 2010

People of the Philippines vs Hon. Gabo

GR No. 161083

Facts:

• A fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware Plastic Products Manufacturing Corporation
• Investigations were conducted and the CIDG and IATF accused the following of Destructive
Arson:

a] Samson Cua Ting

b] Wilson Cua Ting

c] Edward Yao

d] Willy Tan

e] Carol Ortega

f] John Doe

g] Peter Doe

All of whom are employees of Sanyoware.

• Petitioner submitted Sworn Statements, which were denied by the respondents in their Counter-
Affidavit

• After preliminary investigation, the State Prosecutor issued a resolution recommending that an
information for Destructive Arson be filed

• Prior to arraignment and before warrant of arrest could be issued, respondents filed:

a] Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and

b] Hold in Abeyance the issuance of Warrant of Arrest Pending Determination of

Probable Cause

• RTC - dismissed the case observing that the sworn statements submitted by the petitioner and
respondents contained contradictory positions

• Petitioner filed a MFR, which was denied

• Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which it denied; as well as the MFR was
denied

• Respondents raised that certiorari does not lie considering that such special civil action is not
and cannot be a substitute for an appeal or for a lapsed appeal

• Petitioner's main argument hinges on the propriety of the RTC's use of the equipoise rule in
dismissing the case which was affirmed by the CA; contending that the equipoise rule cannot be
used by the RTC merely after the filing of the information

Equipoise Rule - shall properly come into play when the parties have already
concluded the presentation of their respective evidence → not at any prior time nor merely after
the filing of information

Issue:

Whether or not Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is applicable in this case

Held: NO

• A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when, "there is
no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," and certiorari
cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of
that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lost

3. Soliven vs. Makasiar, GR No. 82585, 14 November 1988

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with
libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him
and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would
defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president
cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be
placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back.
Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to
be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.

HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.
Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.

4. Webb vs. De Leon, GR No. 121234, 23 August 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234, August 23,
1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON

G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of
Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde,
her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at
Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her
April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the
DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of
their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended
their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide

2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them

3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during
their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to
charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:

1. NO.

2. NO.

3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to
be heard.

4. NO.

REASONS:

1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable
cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.

2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases,
there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the
Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination
of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the
panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.

4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom
to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department
of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A.
No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes
that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were
deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness
and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing.

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6. Pestilos et al. vs. Generoso and People, GR No. 182601, 10 November 2014
7.

Veridiano vs. People, GR No. 200370, 7 June 2017

October 12, 1984

G.R. No. L-62243PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Vs

.HON. REGINO VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales
and Olongapo City, Branch I, and BENITO GO BIO, JR., respondents.

RELOVA, J.

: FACTS:

Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in the then Court of
First Instance of Zambales. Before he could be arraigned respondent Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion
to Quash the information on the ground that the information did not charge an offense, pointing
out that at the alleged commission of the offense, which was about the second week of May
1979, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has not yet taken effect.

The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of
the check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense; and that
assuming that the effectivity of the law – Batas Pambansa Bilang 22– is on June 29,
1979,considering that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979, the said law is
applicable.

Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of
the Official Gazette. Fifteen (15) days therefrom would be April 24, 1979, or several days before
respondent Go Bio, Jr. issued the questioned check around the second week of May 1979; and
that respondent judge should not have taken into account the date of release of the Gazette for
circulation because Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that for the purpose
of ascertaining the date of effectivity of a law that needed publication, “the Gazette is
conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as the date of issue.”
 Go Bio, Jr. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the Official
Gazetteissue of April 9, 1979, nevertheless, the same was released only on June 14, 1979 and,
considering that the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he
could not have violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for circulation
at the time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has already taken effect when Go Bio, Jr.
committed the act complained of, and, consequently, whether Go Bio, Jr. committed any
violation thereof.

RULING:

No. It is certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979 and not
on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of publication of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal
provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents and/or its
penalties.

For, if a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was
no such law to be violated and, consequently, the accused could not have committed the alleged
crime.

The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that “This Act shall take
effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette.” The term “publication” in such
clause should

be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to make known to the people in general. If the
Batasang Pambansa had intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of
reference in determining the effectivity of the statute in question, then it could have so stated in
the special effectivity provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

When private respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the Information as
criminal, in May 1979, there was then no law penalizing such act. Following the special
provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979. As a matter
of fact, in May 1979, there was no law to be violated and, consequently, respondent Go Bio, Jr.
did not commit any violation thereof
8. Miguel vs. People, GR No. 227038, 31 July 2017

G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017

JEFFREY MIGUEL Y REMEGIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 21, 2015 and
the Resolution3 dated September 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
35318, which affirmed the Decision4 dated October 1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 64 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 10-912 convicting petitioner Jeffrey Miguel
y Remegio (petitioner) of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Facts

On May 27, 2010, an Information5 was filed before the RTC charging petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165,6otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,"
the accusatory portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On the 24th day of May 2010, in the city of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control, and
custody a total of one point ten (1.10) grams of dried Marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan
operative of Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo)
was doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a man showing off his private
parts at Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony Velasquez
(BB Velasquez) then went to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which they
later identified as herein petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in
front of a gate enclosing an empty lot. BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez approached petitioner and
asked him where he lived, and the latter answered Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo then said that he
also lived in the same street but petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an
identification card, but petitioner failed to produce one. BB Velasquez then repeated the request
for an identification card, but instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of
cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried
marijuana leaves, among others. This prompted BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez to seize the
foregoing items, take petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as well as the seized items,
over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo (SPO3 Castillo). SPO3 Castillo then inventoried, marked, and
photographed the seized items, all in the presence of BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, and
thereafter, prepared an inventory report and a request for qualitative examination of the seized
two (2) pieces of rolled paper and for petitioner to undergo drug testing. After examination, it
was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that petitioner was
positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites, both dangerous
drugs.8

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different version of the
facts. According to him, he was just urinating in front of his workplace when two (2) Bantay
Bayan operatives, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, approached and asked him where he
lived. Upon responding that he lived in Kaong Street, BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez then
frisked him, took away his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and brought him to the
barangay hall. He was then detained for about an hour before being taken to the Ospital ng
Makati and to another office where a bald police officer questioned him. Thereafter, he was
taken back to the barangay hall where they showed him two (2) sticks of marijuana joints
allegedly recovered from him.9

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision10 dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.11

The RTC found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as
petitioner was scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the
resultant search incidental to such arrest which yielded the seized marijuana in petitioner's
possession was also lawful. In this regard, since the prosecution has adequately shown that
petitioner freely and consciously possessed such marijuana without authority by law, then he
must be convicted for violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.12
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed13 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision14 dated October 21, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.15 It held that
the search made on petitioner which yielded the seized marijuana was validly made as it was
done incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on public. As such, the said seized
marijuana is admissible in evidence and, thus, sufficient to convict him for the crime charged.16
The CA likewise held that the rule on chain of custody was duly complied with and, thus, the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were not compromised.17

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,18 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution19 dated September 5, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's
conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial
court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law."20

Proceeding from the foregoing, and as will be explained hereunder, petitioner's conviction must
be set aside.
One of the arguments presented in the instant petition is that the search and arrest made on
petitioner were illegal and, thus, the marijuana purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in
evidence.21 In this relation, it is worth noting that his arresting officers, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB
Velasquez, are mere Bantay Bayan operatives of Makati City. Strictly speaking, they are not
government agents like the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of
Investigation in charge of law enforcement; but rather, they are civilian volunteers who act as
"force multipliers" to assist the aforesaid law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and
security within their designated areas.22 Particularly, jurisprudence described the nature of
Bantay Bayan as "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[, which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."23 In the
case of Dela Cruz v. People24 involving civilian port personnel conducting security checks, the
Court thoroughly discussed that while the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987
Constitution generally cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals, the same may
nevertheless be applicable if such individuals act under the color of a state-related function,
viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from
that imposed on state agents or authorized government authorities.

In People v. Marti, the private forwarding and shipping company, following standard operating
procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland
and detected a peculiar odor from the packages. The representative from the company found
dried marijuana leaves in the packages. He reported the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation and brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory
examination. Agents from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the
illegal drugs. Andre Marti was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The evidence obtained against
the accused was not procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized
government agencies. The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it
cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals:

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured
if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers,
is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

xxxx

The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons
and vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police
officers in this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both
should be considered agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of
port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.

In People v. Malngan, barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were deemed as law
enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution. In People v. Lauga,
this court held that a "bantav bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]"

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and
deemed agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. x x x.25 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In this light, the Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan or any barangay-based or
other volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace
and order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should
be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under
Article III of the 1987 Constitution to them.26

Having established that the Bill of Rights may be applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives who
arrested and subsequently searched petitioner, the Court shall now determine whether such arrest
and search were validly made.

Section 2,27 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3 (2),28 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.29

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.30

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should as a
general rule be complied with:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that
said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during
the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.31

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b),
Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
had committed it.32

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer
himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed.33

In this case, the prosecution claims that the BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez simply responded to a
purported report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street which led to petitioner's
arrest. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that he was just urinating in front of his workplace
when the Bantay Bayan operatives suddenly approached and questioned him, and thereafter,
frisked and arrested him. BB Bahoyo's testimony on direct and cross-examinations is
enlightening on this matter, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe that at around past 12
o'clock in the early morning of May 24, 2010, petitioner went out to the street to urinate when
the Bantay Bayanoperatives chanced upon him. The latter then approached and questioned
petitioner, and thereafter, went on to search his person, which purportedly yielded the marijuana
seized from him. Verily, the prosecution's claim that petitioner was showing off his private parts
was belied by the aforesaid testimonies. Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct
of an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was no overt act constituting a crime
committed by petitioner in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Neither do
these circumstances necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest as the arresting Bantay Bayan
operatives do not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed an
offense.

More importantly, the Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's claim that a valid
warrantless arrest was made on petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his private
parts because if it was indeed the case, then the proper charge should have been filed against
him. However, records are bereft of any showing that such charge was filed aside from the
instant criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view
that no prior arrest was made on petitioner which led to a search incidental thereto. As stressed
earlier, there must first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such process
cannot be reversed.

All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner.
Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of such search is rendered
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated marijuana is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, petitioner must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.38

WHEREFORE, the petitiOn is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21, 2015 and the
Resolution dated September 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35318 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio is
ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs defined and penalized under
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

9. People vs. Racho, GR No. 186529, 3 August 2010

G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,vs. Appellant.

JACK RACHO y RAQUERO,

A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora. Having alighted from the bus, appellant was
about to board a tricycle when the team of police authorities approached him and invited him to
the police station. As he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.

Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165,
for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs.

ISSUE: (1) WON the warrant of arrest was violated.

(2) WON the evidence was admissible in evidence.

RULING: (1) No. “Reliable information” alone is not sufficient probable cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest. The SC required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal
design

(2) No. This is an instance of seizure of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” Hence, the confiscated
item is inadmissible in evidence.

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of
exceptions namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in “plain view;”

3. Search of evidence of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances

10. People vs. Mengote, GR No. 87059, 22 June 1992

Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were
three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo,
Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They
approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run
but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions
in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were
turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the
RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the
weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the
revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was
licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of
his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it
had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of
the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in
fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person
arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen,
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their
presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy
street on unexplained suspicion.

Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

11. People vs. Amminudin, GR No. 74869, 6 July 1988

Facts:

The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was
identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him as
he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

Issue:

Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is
violated

Ruling:

The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of
court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be
committed or had just been committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.

In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
was identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the information they have received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance
of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine on his own authority that a
search warrant was not necessary.

The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law
enforcement agents.

12. People vs. Agojo, GR No. 181318, 16 April 2009

Facts

PEOPLE v. AGOJOGR. NO. 181318 APRIL 16, 2009 TINGA, J;FACTS:AGOJO was arrested
via a buy-bust operation, who was subsequently convicted by the trial court and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death. On the other hand, AGOJO assails his arrest by giving his own
version of the story,which was eventually rendered as "self-serving" version of the story

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ARREST of AGOJO is proper even though the ARREST was made
WITHOUT A WARRANT?HELD:

Ruling:

YES. In this case, appellant points to the arrest not being in flagrante delicto, the existence of
discrepancies in the serial numbers of the buy-bust money and a prior attempt to frame him up as
proofs of the frame-up. However, the fact that the arrest was not inflagranti delicto is of no
consequence. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, which states:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant,arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense hasin fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by
paragraph(b) cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can
be effected : (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. A review
of the records shows that both requirements were met in this case

13. People vs. Martinez GR No. 191366, 13 December 2010

Facts: On September 2, 2006 at around 12:45 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on duty at the
Police Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan city when a concerned citizen reported
that a pot session was underway in the House of accused Rafael Gonzalez in Trinidad
Subdivsion,Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz and members of Special
Weapons and Tactics SWAT proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from the people in the
area, the house of Gonzalez was located. As the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria
was arrested while coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon,
Rezin MArtinez. Seized fromt he accused were open plastic sachets , pieces of rolled used
aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and brought to the police station, seized items were
sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Crime Laboratory. All accused except for Doria were found
positive for methylam.

Issue: Were the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling:No, the court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt because 1. Evidence against the accused are inadmissible and 2. Even if the
evidence were admissible, the chain of custody was not duly established.

14. People vs. Cabanada, GR No. 221424, 19 July 2017

Facts: Appellant Cabanada was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft, the Information
alleges that the accused, being then employed as housemaid of complainant Catherine Victoria,
with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of the trust reposed upon her with intent to
gain, feloniously take, steal and carry away some valuable items and money in cash in the
aggregate amount of ₱154,000.00 belonging to the complainant, without her knowledge and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.

The defense narrated that at around 9:00 a.m. on April 12, 2009, Cabanada went to Catherine's
house to work as a stay-out housemaid, and left around 9:00 p.m. upon arrival of the Victoria
family. On the same date, the plantsadora came around 9:00 a.m. and left at 3:00 p.m. On the
next day, Cabanada returned to the house to resume her work. She was washing clothes when
Catherine called her and asked about the missing items. She denied any knowledge of the same.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime of qualified theft.

Ruling: Yes. The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as
follows: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3. That the
said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owner's consent; 5. That it
be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

The following circumstances are established during the trial: Cabanada worked as Victoria's
housemaid for several years and has unrestricted access to all parts of the house; on April 12,
2009, she was left alone at the house; the plantsadora, who only reported for work every Sunday,
had no access to the house and the car; Cabanada was alone from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. after
the plantsadora left at 3:00 p.m.; Cabanada admitted to the police in the presence of Catherine at
the latter’s residence that she stole the money and led them to her room where they recovered the
₱l6,0000.00 cash.

Ratio Decidendi: When accused admitted the crime while at the residence of her employer, she
was not yet taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom.

Gist: Before Us for review is the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC,
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft.

15. People vs. Jalosjos, GR No. 132875-76, 3 February 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of

House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of
a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.

B. Custodial Investigation

1. People vs. Pepino, GR No. 174471, 12 January 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and

PRECIOSA GOMEZ y CAMPOS, Accused-Appellants.

FACTS:

Two men and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat,
Paranaque City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive them, one of
the men, eventually identified as Pepino pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward
told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier's box. Pepino and the other man looted the
"'cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go with them. The abductors then
confined Edward in an apartment in Quezon City where they insisted on asking ransom from
Edward’s father.

The exchange was performed eventually with the abductors and Edward’s wife Jocelyn wherein
after the exchange of money and Edward being released, the victim reported the kidnapping to
Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader.
After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed Edward that they had
apprehended some suspects and invited him to identify them from a lineup consisting of seven
persons: five males and two females.

Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo.9 Jocelyn likewise identified
Pepino. Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead presented Zeny
Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino who alleged that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest
leading to a violation of their rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illegal arrest of an accused is sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

RULING:

No. The Court pointed out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the
legality of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her person. Thus,
Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless arrest.

It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a
court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

Appellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to
move for the quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity
attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial.
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

2. Ho Wai Pang vs. People, GR No. 176229, 19 October 2011

HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

FACTS:

When Gilda Cinco search the bag of Ho Wai Pang in the Baggage Declaration at the arrival area,
she found boxes of chocolate which when she saw inside had white substance. They were then
brought to the PNP after the procedures in the airport.

The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA while affirming
the RTC decision took note that their right to counsel during custodial investigation was violated.

ISSUE:

Whether the violation of the petitioner's right to counsel made the evidence taken from the
petitioner inadmissible.

RULING:

The SC held in the negative. The SC reiterated that infractions to the accused during the
custodial investigation render only extrajudicial confession or admissions of the suspect
inadmissible as evidence.

Also, the guilt of Pang was based on the testimony of Cinco when she caught Pang in flagrante
delicto transporting shabu
3. Aquino vs. Paiste, GR No. 147782, 25 June 2008

JUANITA A. AQUINO, PETITIONER, TERESITA B. PAISTE, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Respondent alleged that petitioner along with 3 others sold fake gold bars to her.

Respondent brought the petitioner to the NBI in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where
the parties entered into an amicable settlement.

→ in the amicable settlement, the accused waived her right to counsel despite the recital of her
constitutional rights made by NBI agent Ely Tolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy.

Respondent filed a criminal complaint against Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the crime
of estafa.

The prosecution presented as documentary evidence three (3) documents, one of which is the
amicable settlement signed in the NBI, while the defense relied solely on its testimonial
evidence.

The trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of the crime charged.

CA affirmed said conviction.

Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due weight and consideration to the amicable
settlement with waiver of right to counsel that she signed in the NBI during the custodial
investigation.
→She claims she executed the agreement under threat and not freely and voluntarily, in violation
of Sec. 12(1) [9] of the Constitution which guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s right to counsel was violated

HELD: NO

When petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on March 27, 1991 to be
investigated, she was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for
her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was
provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.

→ However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that
the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did
not push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the
amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties
affixing their signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.

Petitioner's contention that her constitutional rights were breached, and she signed the document
under duress falls flat for the following reasons:

1) It is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy.

2) The petitioner could have asserted its right "to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses,"[13] for which she could have compelled Atty. Uy to testify but she did
not.

Basic is the principle that consultation and information between counsel and client is privileged
communication and the counsel may not divulge these without the consent of the client.
3) The petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uy's appointment during the
time she was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement. She is deemed
to have engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and thereafter signed the amicable
settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his presence.

We do not see how the answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the
petitioner's counsel in the NBI,could be evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact that
an independent counsel, Atty. Uy was provided petitioner.

4) When petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly executed the amicable
settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is
intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.

The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth."[Thus, the presence of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner's rights even if the custodial
investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or
intimidation.

5) Even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the
document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her constitutional rights were
violated.

4. People vs. Ulit, GR No. 131799-801, 23 February 2004

C. Bail
1. Paderanga vs. CA, GRS No. 115407, 28 August 1995

FACTS:

· Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information for the crime of multiple
murder as the mastermind.

· Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail before a Warrant of
Arrest could be issued by the lower court.

· Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed medical
attention. His counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their
client to the local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes
of said hearing, he considered being in the custody of the law.

· The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on his right to bail

Bail defined

Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions
hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash
deposit, or recognizance.

ISSUE:

· W/N it is proper to admit bail even though petitioner is not yet in custody of law

HELD/RATIO:

NO.

· Right to bail is only extended only to those persons who have been arrested, detained, or
otherwise deprived of their freedom

· A person is considered to be in the custody of the law:

§ when he is arrested either by virtue of warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest

§ when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to
the proper authorities

· In the foregoing facts, petitioner can be considered as being constructively and legally
under custody

§ Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person:
o firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court

o secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts;

o thirdly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court.

§ for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his
person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court

· an arrest is made either by:

- 1. actual restraint of the arrestee or 2. merely by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or,
in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp
area.

2. People vs. Escobar, GR No. 214300, 26 July 2017

acts:

This Rule 45 Petition assails the Court of Appeals Decision to grant the accused's second petition
for bail.

Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition), which was
denied by the Regional Trial Court in the Order[4] dated October 6, 2008 and by the Court of
Appeals in the Decision[5] dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in the accused's
case[6] compelled him to file a second petition for bail (Second Bail Petition). On April 26,
2012, the Regional Trial Court denied[7] this on the ground of res judicata. In the Decision[8]
dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals overturned the Regional Trial Court Order and
granted the Second Bail Petition.

Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagas
(Mary Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2)
other victims.[9] Robert was the owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines,[10] a manufacturing
company of foams and mattresses.

On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B. Torres (Torres), and her
driver Dionisio F. Burca (Burca) were passing by the front of Malcolm Hall, University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City when a vehicle blocked their way.[12] Another group of
suspects helped as lookouts.
Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men forced Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres inside the
vehicle.[14] The incident happened in broad daylight.

Alleged group leader Rolando Villaver (Villaver) and some of the suspects then travelled and
detained Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres in an undisclosed location in Batangas.[15] Afterwards,
the group headed to Club Solvento, a resort[16] in Calamba, Laguna owned by Escobar,[17] who
personally served them food.[18]

Some of the accused[19] stayed in Club Solvento to rest or sleep while the others, namely,
Villaver, Cesar Olimpiada, a certain Cholo, and Biboy Lugnasin, left to negotiate the price for
the victims' release.[20] Cheng paid the ransom of P15,000,000.00.[

At 7:00 p.m. on the same day, Villaver's group returned to Club Solvento,[22] followed by co-
accused brothers Rolando and Harold Fajardo (the Fajardo brothers), who were alleged advisers
of Villaver.[23] The group then locked themselves in a room where Villaver partitioned the
ransom money.[24] Cancio Cubillas (Cubillas), the group's driver,[25] confessed to have
received a total of P1,250,000.00 for the kidnapping operation.

At 10:30 p.m. on the same day, Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were finally released.[27] They
were freed somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna, more than 12 hours since they were abducted.

Cubillas became a state witness.[29] On June 3, 2002, he executed an extrajudicial confession

and implicated respondent Escobar as an adviser for Villaver.[30] Cubillas believed that Escobar
was involved after he saw Escobar talk to Villaver while they were in Club Solvento.[31] In his
extrajudicial confession, Cubillas also claimed that Escobar received a portion of the ransom
money from Villaver.[

On February 17, 2004, an Amended Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court
charging Escobar as a co-conspirator[33] in the kidnapping for ransom.[34] The charging portion
stated:That on or about June 18, 2001 at around 7:40 in the morning, at Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together,
with others not present during the actual kidnapping but performing some other peculiarly
contributory roles, did, then and there, by force and intimidation, with the use of long firearms
and clad in police uniform, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and thereafter
detain at some undisclosed place, after having blocked their car in front of Malcolm Hall,
Osmena Avenue, UP Campus, Diliman, Quezon City, MARY GRACE CHENG-ROSAGAS, her
driver DIONISIO F. BURCA and her bodyguard VALENTIN B. TORRES, against their will
and consent thereby depriving them of their liberty for more than twelve (12) hours for the
purpose of extorting ransom for their release in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), and which amount was in fact paid by Mary Grace's father, Mr. Robert Cheng,
owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, and have the same delivered at E. Rodriguez Compound,
Calamba, Laguna thereby resulting to the release of the kidnap victims somewhere in Alaminos,
Laguna at about 10:30 p.m. of the same day all to the damage and prejudice of the three (3)
victims and their families in such amount as may be awarded to them and their families under the
provisions of the Civil Code.CONTRARY TO LAW.

Escobar was arrested on February 14, 2008.

On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional Trial Court.[37]
During the hearing on Escobar's bail application, Cubillas testified that Escobar and the Fajardo
brothers were Villaver's advisers.[

In the Order dated October 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied[39] Escobar's First Bail
Petition.

The dispositive portion read:The Petition for Bail filed by accused Manny Escobar is denied for
lack of merit considering that state witness Cancio Cubillas positively identified said accused as
the owner of Club Solvento located in Calamba, Laguna; that he was the one who served food to
the group... that it was also in said Club Solvento where Cancio Cubillas, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning
Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez, Mike and Alan Celebre rested and slept after Rolando Villaver,
Cholo, Biboy Lugnasin and Cesar Olimpiada left to negotiate for the ransom of kidnap victim
Mary Grace Cheng Rosagas, and that on the night of June 18, 2001, Cubillas saw accused
Rolando Villaver gave part of the ransom money to him.

Escobar appealed before the Court of Appeals.[41] On March 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals
affirmed[42] the denial of the First Bail Petition. It recognized that Cubillas' extrajudicial
confession was generally incompetent evidence against his co-accused and was admissible
against himself only[43] for being hearsay and for violating the res inter alios acta rule.[44]
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals invoked an exception to this rule and held that the Regional
Trial Court "did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of Cubillas"; rather, the trial court
also relied on Cubillas' testimony during the bail hearing.

Escobar moved to reconsider the Court of Appeals March 8, 2011 Decision.

on October 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied Escobar's motion for reconsideration.

By January 2012, only Escobar was left in detention pending the final judgment on the merits of
the case as all the other accused who had active participation in the kidnapping had been granted
bail.[57] Escobar saw Rolando's release on bail as a new "development which warrant[ed] a
different view" on his own bail application.

Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second Bail Petition) before
the Regional Trial Court.[59] He noted that Cubillas could not explain how either Rolando or
Escobar advised Villaver and that both Rolando and Escobar were absent before, during, and
after the kidnapping.[60] Hence, if Rolando's petition for bail was granted based on the
unreliability of Cubillas' testimony, Escobar reasoned that the trial court should likewise grant
him provisional release.

RELEVANT

On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied[62] Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the
ground of res judicata,[63] reasoning thus: "[i]n deference to the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which has already attained finality, accused's Petition for Bail which is actually a second
petition for bail[,] must be necessarily denied.

Escobar moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Regional Trial Court.[65] On
January 14, 2013, he appealed before the Court of Appeals via Rule 65, arguing that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Second Bail Petition

In the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted[67] the petition for
certiorari and ordered the Regional Trial Court to determine the appropriate bail for Escobar's
provisional liberty. The dispositive portion read:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
April 26, 2012, September 14, 2012, September 17, 2012 and November 6, 2012 Orders, are
SET ASIDE. The trial court is directed to determine the appropriate bail for the provisional
liberty of the petitioner, Manuel Escobar, with dispatch.SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration.[69] According to the
Court of Appeals, Escobar's Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata, which applies
only if the former judgment is a final order or judgment and not an interlocutory order.[70] An
order denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.

On April 4, 2014, the Regional Trial Court fixed[72] Escobar's bail at P300,000.00. The
dispositive portion read:In view of the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on 24 March
2014, the bail for the provisional liberty of accused Manuel Escobar is hereby fixed at Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00).SO ORDERED.

In the Resolution dated September 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied[74] the prosecution's
Motion for Reconsideration.
On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Petition for Review[75] via Rule 45 before this Court. In its Petition, the prosecution does not
pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals Decision;[76]
rather, in assailing the grant of Escobar's Second Bail Petition, the prosecution avers that the
doctrine of res judicata must be respected.

On October 19, 2015, Escobar filed his Comment,[78] arguing that res judicata did not apply
here,[79] that there was no strong evidence of his guilt,[80] and that the Court of Appeals could
rectify errors of judgment in the greater interest of justice.[81] According to Escobar:13. Due to
this sudden development of the grant of bail to his co-accused, [Rolando], and considering that
both [Rolando] and [Escobar]'s alleged participation in the crime are based on the same court-
declared unreliable "speculations" of the state witness Cubillas, who even admitted he was lying
when questioned during [Escobar]'s own bail hearings, it was in the interest of justice and
fairness to re-open the matter of bail with respect to [Escobar] and thereby grant the same. And
the Honorable Court of Appeals agreed.

Issues:

First, whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res judicata; andFinally,
whether respondent should be granted bail.

imprisonment

Ruling:

Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in
criminal proceedings.

Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between the
parties or their successors-in-interest.[108] Trinidad v. Marcelo[109] declares that res judicata, as
found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing
on criminal proceedings."

Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal
cases,[111] Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule
124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Trinidad:[112]Petitioner's arguments — that res
judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no sufficient basis to indict him
in similar cases earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot be a supervening event
or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of facts and circumstances — do
not lie.

An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does
not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of the
prosecution in this case to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same
will still not apply.[114] Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or
acquitted or that the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.[115] Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has
not been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar's Second
Bail Petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.

A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter[124]—whether accused is
entitled to provisional liberty—and is not a final judgment on accused's guilt or innocence.
Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail is summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s]
unnecessary thoroughness" and does not try the merits of the case.

Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying bail is an
interlocutory order."[127] The merits of the case for kidnapping must still be threshed out in a
full-blown proceeding.

Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision denying Escobar's
First Bail Petition did not have the effect of res judicata.

In light of the circumstances after the denial of Escobar's First Bail Petition, his Second Bail
Petition should have been given due course. It should not be denied on the technical ground of
res judicata.

Escobar may be provisionally released if he indeed has paid the surety bond that must be
contained in a public document and approved by the Regional Trial Court judge. Otherwise, he is
directed to post bail.

Principles:

Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case,[1] not in an interlocutory order in a
criminal case.[2] An order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory.[3] This order does not
attain finality when a new matter warrants a second look on the application for bail.
3. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 213847, 18 August 2015

Doctrines:

Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.”

FACTS:

On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan
on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan
denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence
of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty
would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his
age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.

a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will
be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:

1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of
bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher
than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
— No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of
the court.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community
arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality
of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused
during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and
advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsical and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
4. People vs. Villanueva, GR No. 210798, 14 September 2016

Facts:

wlibrayOn 25 April 2007, AAA ran away from home after finding out that she was adopted and
after being scolded by her mother, who became the private complainant in this case. The friends
of AAA informed private complainant that AAA was staying at the On Tap Videoke Bar,
working as a Guest Relations Officer. Private complainant sought assistance from the Channel 2
TV program "XXX" to regain custody over AAA. Private complainant, accompanied by the TV
crew, lodged a preliminary complaint with the Southern Police District (SPD) Headquarters of
Taguig City against On Tap Videoke Bar and a task force was created for the rescue of AAA.
Police Officer 1 Ariel Sullano (PO1 Sullano), accompanied by private complainant was tasked to
go inside the videoke bar to talk to AAA. PO2 Thaddeus Abas (PO2 Abas) and the other police
officers were stationed outside the bar, awaiting the predetermined signal. After the operation,
AAA was taken to the SPD headquarters, together with accused-appellant and five (5) other
videoke bar employees who were without the necessary Mayor's and Health Permits. Private
complainant executed a complaint-affidavit against On Tap Videoke Bar and AAA was endorsed
to the Social Development Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD)-Las Pinas. Accused-appellant and the five (5) apprehended employees were booked,
investigated and underwent medical examinations.

On 17 May 2007, accused-appellant and the five (5) employees were referred to the inquest
prosecutor with charges for violation of R.A. No. 76107 and working without Mayor's/ Health
Permit, respectively. The Office of the City Prosecutor charged accused-appellant with human
trafficking under R.A. 9208, instead of violation of R.A. 7610 for the reason that accused-
appellant "recruited and exploited AAA, a 13-year old minor, to work as a GRO in her bar by
taking advantage of her vulnerability as a child."8chanrobleslaw

On 24 May 2007, a Petition for Bail was filed by accused-appellant, alleging that the evidence of
guilt was not strong. The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO2 Abas and the private
complainant to prove otherwise.

Meanwhile, on 31 May 2007, an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by private complainant,

which formed part of the exhibits. The Affidavit of Desistance was executed after the private
complainant had the opportunity to talk to AAA after the rescue operation and after AAA
revealed that she was merely allowed to stay at the videoke bar after she ran away from
home.10chanrobleslaw

PO2 Abas testified as to the filing of the complaint and the entrapment and rescue operation
conducted. He narrated that during the operation, he was stationed a couple of blocks from the
videoke bar;11 and that upon the execution of the pre-arranged signal, he and his companion
officers rushed to the bar to take custody of AAA and other girls working without permits.12 On
cross-examination, PO2 Abas admitted that he was only acting based on the preliminary
complaint filed by private complainant;13 and that he was not aware of why AAA was in the
videoke bar or who had custody over AAA.14 When asked about the other details of the
investigation and the operation, he failed to give coherent answers and insisted that his only
designation was to secure the GROs and the other persons in the videoke bar.15chanrobleslaw

The prosecution then presented private complainant as the second� witness. She recounted the
details of the rescue operation and the subsequent filing of the complaint against accused-
appellant. On cross-examination, she clarified that she had never been to the videoke bar before
the rescue operation;16 and that when she saw her daughter in the videoke bar, she was neither
drinking, singing, nor smoking.17 When asked about the conversation she had with her daughter
after the rescue, private complainant revealed that AAA claimed that she was neither hired nor
recruited as a GRO at the videoke bar.18 Private complainant further narrated that she signified
her lack of intention to pursue her complaint against accused-appellant after hearing the side of
her daughter.19 Unfortunately, while the trial was ongoing, AAA absconded from DSWD
custody, resulting in the prosecution's failure to obtain her testimony.

The Petition for Bail was granted by the court and accused-appellant was allowed to post bail. To
supplement the testimonies of the witnesses presented during the bail hearing, the prosecution
offered the testimony of P/Chief Insp. Jerome Balbontin (PCI Balbontin). He narrated that on
May 16, 2007, the private complainant, accompanied by the TV crew, reported that her missing
13-year old daughter was seen working as a GRO at the On Tap Videoke Bar.20 According to
the witness, he was not present during the operation21 but he sent SPO1 Camaliga, PO2
Andador, PO1 Sullano, PO2 Abas, PO2 Espinosa, among others, to conduct the surveillance and
rescue.22 He further narrated that after the rescue operation, the TV crew interviewed the child
at the police station;23� and that unfortunately, the footage of said interview and the rescue
operation could not be obtained.24chanrobleslaw
The defense presented Wilfred Aquino (Aquino), the videoke bar waiter, as first witness. He
testified as to the events which transpired during the rescue operation. He narrated that two male
individuals asked him to call AAA; that AAA approached their table to speak with them; and
that after five minutes, the policemen announced the rescue operation.25cralawred The witness
insisted that accused-appellant was not aware of AAA's stay in the videoke bar because it was
her father, Rosito Villanueva, Sr., who allowed AAA to stay in the videoke bar.26 Wilfred also
insisted that AAA has been staying in the videoke bar for two weeks before the rescue operation;
and that during such stay; she was always in the kitchen helping them wash glasses.27 On cross-
examination, he testified that his immediate superior was Rosito Villanueva, Jr., (Villanueva, Jr.)
accused-appellant's brother, who was the one managing the videoke bar.28chanrobleslaw

Villanueva, Jr. was the second witness for the defense. He testified as to the circumstances
surrounding AAA's stay in the videoke bar. He claimed that while he was on vacation, his father
took over the management of the videoke bar and allowed the temporary stay of AAA, upon the
request of their employee.29 Like Aquino, Villanueva, Jr. claimed that accused-appellant was
unaware of AAA's stay in the videoke' bar because accused-appellant had no hand in the daily
operations and management. On cross-examination, he testified that the videoke bar was merely
registered under his sister's name; and that all earnings belonged to him because the videoke bar
was put up by his sister for him.30chanrobleslaw

Accused-appellant maintained that at the time the raid was conducted, she was at her sister's
house. Her brother called her to apprise her of the situation, prompting her to rush to the bar to
handle the situation. She went with the authorities to the SPD Headquarters and presented herself
as the registered owner of the videoke bar. Accused-appellant vehemently denied hiring and/or
recruiting AAA as a GRO, insisting that she was not involved in the day-to-day operations.
Asserting that she was unaware that AAA was staying at the bar, accused-appellant explained
that she merely provided capital for the business and that her brother, Villanueva, Jr., was the
one managing the same. Both accused-appellant and her brother aver that it was their father who
allowed AAA to stay at the videoke bar upon the request of one of the waiters.

Issue:

Ruling:
Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that the Constitution presumes a
person is innocent until he is proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Countless times,
this Court has elucidated that the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and
not rely on the weakness of the defense. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense's evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt
of the accused. In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to
pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant accused-appellant's conviction. From the
foregoing, we rule that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 May
2013 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05027 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y
MANALILI @ BEBANG is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9208 or Qualified Trafficking. Her immediate RELEASE from detention is
hereby ORDERED, unless she is being held for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Correctional Institution for Women,
Mandaluyong City, by personal service, for immediate implementation. The Director shall
submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of the copy of the Decision, the action
taken thereon.

5. People vs. Brita, GR No. 191260, 24 November 2014

Facts:

On October 24, 2002, two separate Informations were filed against appellant before the RTC of
Pasig City. One was for selling 0.19 gram of shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165, as amended, and the other for illegal possession of 1.56 grams of shabu, in violation of
Section 11, Article II the same law. The cases were raffled to Branch 165 of the said RTC (RTC-
Pasig, Branch 165).

Immediately after his arraignment on February 11, 2003 wherein he pleaded not guilty to both
charges, appellant filed a Petition for Bail. During the bail hearing, the prosecution presented
PO2 Archibald Tejero (PO2 Tejero) and PO3 Edgar Orias (PO3 Orias). Their testimonies[5]
revealed that in the afternoon of October 23, 2002, upon being told by a confidential informant
that a certain "Boboy" (later identified as the appellant) was engaged in rampant selling of illegal
drugs in Western Bicutan, Taguig, Police Inspector Eduardo Paningbatan (P/Insp. Paningbatan),
Chief of the Taguig Police Station, Drug Enforcement Unit, set up a buy-bust team. PO2 Tejero
was designated as the poseur-buyer and was given P500.00 as buy-bust money marked with
"AT."

At about 4:30 p.m. of the same day, the buy-bust team went to the house of appellant. The
informant, together with PO2 Tejero, called appellant who thereupon came out of his house and
approached them. After having been introduced by the informant to the appellant as a potential
buyer of shabu worth P500.00, PO2 Tejero gave appellant the marked money. In return,
appellant took from his right pocket a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and
handed the same to PO2 Tejero. PO2 Tejero then executed the pre-arranged signal by lighting a
cigarette. Thereupon, PO3 Orias and the rest of the team rushed to the scene. Alarmed, appellant
went inside his house but was caught by the police officers. After he was placed under arrest,
PO2 Tejero recovered from appellant the buy-bust money. Anent the white crystalline substance
he bought from appellant, PO2 Tejero marked the plastic sachet thereof with "MDB-1."

Meanwhile, PO3 Orias frisked appellant and found in his possession two plastic sachets
containing suspected shabu. PO3 Orias marked the recovered plastic sachets with "MDB-2" and
"MDB-3."

Thereafter, the team brought appellant and the confiscated items to the Taguig Police Station.
The seized items were turned over to P/Insp. Paningbatan, who in turn gave the same to the
investigator/evidence custodian. After preparing the request for laboratory examination of the
specimen, PO2 Tejero and the investigator brought the specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Per Physical Science Report No. D-1542-02,the substance tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

In support of his Petition for Bail, appellant offered the testimonies of Maygene Fernandez
(Fernandez), the daughter-in-law of appellant's wife, and Olivia Duhaylongsod (Duhaylongsod),
a neighbor. Their testimonies aimed to establish that when appellant was arrested, no buy-bust
operation was actually conducted and that no shabu was recovered from him.
Fernandez testified that at the time of the alleged buy-bust operation, appellant was actually
sleeping in a room at the second floor of their house. Suddenly, police officers entered their
house. When appellant emerged from the room and saw them, he asked for a search warrant. The
police officers, however, did not respond and instead immediately handcuffed appellant.
Fernandez further testified that appellant was not frisked and that she did not see any sachet of
drugs at the time of the incident.

For her part, Duhaylongsod testified that she saw two men enter an opening in the back portion
of appellant's house. She did not see appellant or his common-law wife when the men made their
entry.

Issue:

W/N

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the CA that the testimonies of PO2 Tejero and PO3 Orias established
beyond reasonable doubt appellant's culpability. Their narrations of what really transpired in the
afternoon of October 23, 2002, from the moment the confidential information disclosed to their
chief the illegal activities of appellant up to the time of his arrest, deserve great respect and
credence as the same emanated from the direct account of law enforcement officers who enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. Hence, the Court finds no error
on the part of the courts below in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.

Appellant asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his claim that the evidence of the prosecution is
not strong enough to prove his guilt. The Court is not convinced. "[A] grant of bail does not
prevent [the trial court, as] the trier of facts, x x x from making a final assessment of the
evidence after full trial on the merits." As the Court ruled in People v. Baldoz, "such appreciation
[of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from making a final
assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence that an
accused person granted bail is convicted in due course."
Finally, appellant makes much of the fact that the police operatives failed to comply with the
requirements of the law with regard the handling of evidence, specifically the absence of the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Section 21,
par. 1, Article II of RA 9165 as implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations. However, it must be pointed out that it was only during appeal that
appellant raised these alleged breaches in the custody and handling of the seized evidence.
During trial, the item object of the sale was duly marked, subjected to rigid examination, and
eventually offered as evidence. Yet, at no instance did appellant manifest or even hint that there
were lapses in its safekeeping which affected its admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value.
Indeed, such failure to raise this issue during trial is fatal to the case of the defense as held by
this Court in People v. Sta. Maria[26] and in subsequent cases.] Besides, mere lapses in
procedures need not invalidate a seizure if the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
can be shown to have been preserved. In this regard, the Court quotes with favor the CA's
disquisition on chain of custody, viz:

Appellant sold one (1) sachet of shabu to PO2 Archibald Tejero in the buy-bust operation. PO2
Tejero, after the arrest of appellant, marked the sachet "MDB-1" before turning it over to Police
Inspector Eduardo Paningbatan. Back at the station, Police Inspector Paningbatan prepared the
necessary documents for the transmittal of the sachet, particularly the letter-request for
laboratory examination. He then handed the request and the sachet to PO1 Saez who, together
with PO2 Archibald Tejero, delivered them to the PNP Crime Laboratory. At the laboratory, the
sachet was received by Police Inspector Lourdeliza Gural, who found the sachet positive for
point nineteen (.19) [gram] of Methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The same sachet was
identified in open court by PO2 Tejero.[29]

Hence, like the courts below, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to adequately show
the unbroken chain of custody/possession of the seized item from the moment the sale was
consummated, until it was tested in the crime laboratory, and up to the time it was offered in
evidence. Clearly, its integrity and evidentiary value have not been compromised at any stage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.聽 The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 18, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03561 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED
6. Leviste vs. CA, GR No. 189122, 17 March 2010

Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for
the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an
application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course
of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a
sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility.

On this matter, Leviste questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the conditions
justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That
when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and
the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of
Leviste.

Ruling:

No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if
the penalty imposed is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
circumstances:
that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or that
there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. That
bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA
committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the
grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.

7. San Miguel vs. Maceda, AM No. RTJ-03-1749, 4 April 2007

Facts:
Complainant was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation, distribution and delivery of .50 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, punishable by prision correccional. He jumped bail. On May
10, 2001, then Judge Florentino Alumbres issued a bench warrant and canceled his bail bond in
the amount of P60,000.00 and fixed a new bail bond in the amount of P120,000.00. Complainant
was arrested on September 8, 2001. On September 12, 2001, the state prosecutor filed a Motion
to Cancel Recommended Bail on the ground of reasonable belief and indications pointing to the
probability that accused is seriously considering flight from prosecution. The Motion was set for
hearing on September 19, 2001. On September 17, 2001, complainant filed an Opposition to the
Motion. On the same day, or two (2) days before the scheduled hearing, respondent issued an
Order granting the Motion. During the hearing of September 19, 2001, respondent opted to
consider complainant’s Opposition as a motion for reconsideration and merely ordered the
prosecutor to file a reply thereto.
On November 21, 2001, respondent issued an Order clarifying his Order of September 17,
2001.Complainant comes to this Court alleging that his right to procedural due process was
gravely violated when respondent issued the September 17, 2001 Order without giving him the
opportunity to comment on the same. The issuance of the September 17, 2001 Order shows
respondent's gross ignorance of the law as the offense charged is neither a capital offense nor
punishable by reclusion perpetua. His right to bail is not a mere privilege but a constitutionally
guaranteed right that cannot be defeated by any order.
Clearly, the intendment of the September 17, 2001 Order was to deny him of his constitutional
right to bail. The issuance of the November 21, 2001 Order that only the bail recommended by
the prosecutor was considered withdrawn did not relieve the respondent of any liability.In his
Comment dated March 8, 2002, respondent explained that the motion to cancel the prosecutor's
recommended bail in Crim. Case No. 00-0736 did not need any hearing because the court could
act upon it without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party.
When he canceled the bail, the cancellation referred to the P60,000.00 and not the P120,000.00
bail fixed by Judge Alumbres. The September 17, 2001 Order canceling the bail does not speak
of the cancellation of the P120,000.00 bail and the same was reaffirmed in a subsequent Order on
November 21, 2001.
The right of complainant to be heard in the motion to withdraw bail was never violated nor his
right to bail impaired. Complainant could have posted the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge
Alumbres or could have seasonably moved for the lifting of the warrant, but he did not. The
Order of cancellation is dated September 17, 2001 while the Information for murder was filed
against complainant on September 14, 2001 or three days earlier. Thus, the cancellation was in
due course because complainant was already detained for the non-bailable offense of murder
three days before the cancellation was ordered.

Issue:
Whether or not the increased bail of P120,000.00 fixed by Hon. Florentino M. Alumbres, in the
Warrant of Arrest he issued on May 10, 2001 was also withdrawn by the Order dated September
17, 2001 granting the prosecution's withdrawal of its recommended bail.

Ruling:
The answer is in the negative.
On September 19, 2001 Atty. Sebrio manifested that the bail fixed by Judge Alumbres was not
affected by the withdrawal of the prosecution's recommended bail. That is correct. Any of the
accused, therefore, could have applied for bail thereunder. They could have even moved for the
lifting of the warrant dated May 10. But, they did not. It is clear from the [September] 17 Order
that only the bail recommended by the prosecutor was "considered withdrawn". Such Order does
not speak of cancellation of the P120,000.00 bail fixed by the former Presiding Judge.
Respondent's issuance of the September 17, 2001 Order two days prior to the scheduled hearing
without considering complainant's Opposition to the Motion, effectively deprived the latter of his
constitutional right to due process. As above stated, during the September 19, 2001 hearing,
respondent considered the Opposition to the Motion as a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Order, albeit, the prosecutor was merely ordered to file its reply thereto without
adducing evidence to prove the high probability that complainant will jump bail.
Respondent's issuance of the assailed Order before the scheduled hearing is premature and is
tantamount to misconduct. Thus, we find respondent guilty of simple misconduct. Misconduct is
defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of
justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally
means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. Respondent may not be held guilty of gross misconduct because the term
"gross" connotes something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant;
shameful." In this case, complainant was not able to post bail because there is no other way for a
lay man to interpret the assailed Order except that it effectively canceled the bail bond fixed by
Judge Alumbres, thereby depriving him of his right to temporary liberty as a result of
respondent's erroneous Order. WHEREFORE, Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC, Branch 275,
Las Piñas City is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and FINED in the amount of P5,000.00
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

D. Rights of the Accused

1. People vs. Paloma, GR No. 178544, 23 February 2011

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor charged the accused Manuel Paloma (Paloma) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-03-116898 with violation of Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

At the trial, PO2 Bernard Amigo testified that at about 1:00 p.m. on April 23, 2003 the Batasan
Police Station got a tip from an informant that accused Paloma was selling illegal drugs at
Pacomara Street in Commonwealth, Quezon City. The station chief directed PO2 Amigo and
PO1 Arnold Peñalosa to conduct a buy-bust operation involving Paloma. The police officers
went to Pacomara Street with the informant and brought with them a ₱100.00 bill marked with
the initials "AP."

When the buy-bust team arrived at Pacomara Street at around 3:15 p.m., they saw Paloma
standing beside a man and a woman. PO1 Peñalosa and the informant approached them; PO2
Amigo, the witness, stood as back-up some 15 meters away. From where he stood, he saw PO1
Peñalosa talking to Paloma. Momentarily, PO1 Peñalosa waved his hand, signifying that he had
made the purchase. On seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Amigo approached and arrested
Paloma; PO1 Peñalosa for his part arrested Paloma’s companions, later on identified as Noriel
Bamba (Bamba) and Angie Grotel (Grotel). PO2 Amigo recovered from Paloma’s pants pocket a
plastic sachet with a white crystalline substance and the marked ₱100.00 bill.

After the police officers informed Paloma, Bamba, and Grotel of their rights during custodial
investigation, they brought them to the police station and turned them over to the desk officer.
The arresting officers also turned over the three sachets of suspected shabu that they seized.
According to PO2 Amigo, two of these sachets were those that PO1 Peñalosa bought from
Paloma. The police eventually let Bamba and Grotel go for the reason that the police officers
found no illegal drugs in their possession.
In his defense, Paloma denied that such a buy-bust operation took place. He claimed that at the
time of the alleged buy-bust, he was with his 80-year-old mother at their house on Pacomara
Street, taking a nap. Suddenly, five armed men in civilian clothes barged into the house and
woke him up. Two of them held him by the arms while the others searched the house. Although
the men found nothing, they handcuffed him and brought him to the police station.

On June 10, 2005 the RTC found Paloma guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Q-
03-116898 of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00. On February 13, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. HC
CR 01289 affirmed the RTC’s ruling in toto.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the prosecution
succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that Paloma sold prohibited drugs to PO1
Peñalosa.

Ruling

No. To prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the
prosecution is required to prove (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller as well as the object
and consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment given for the
same. Further, the prosecution must present in court evidence of corpus delicti.1

Here, the proof of the sale of illegal drugs is wanting.

Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People v. Doria, the prosecution must clearly and
adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely, the initial contact between the poseur-
buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, and,
finally, the accused’s delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer, whether the latter be the informant
alone or the police officer. This proof is essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not
unlawfully induced to commit the offense.

Here, PO2 Amigo’s testimony miserably failed to establish the required details of the supposed
illegal drug sale.
2. 2. Macayan Jr. vs. People, GR No. 175842, 18 March 2015

3. Franco vs. People, GR No. 191185, 1 February 2016

Facts:

On November 3, 2004 at around 11:00 a.m., Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto (Nakamoto) went to
work out at the Body Shape Gym located at Malong Street, Tondo, Manila. After he finished
working out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth PI8,500.00 on the altar where gym users
usually... put their valuables and proceeded to the comfort room to change his clothes. After ten
minutes, he returned to get his cell phone, but it was already missing. Arnie Rosario (Rosario),
who was also working out, informed him that he saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from
the... altar. Nakamoto requested everyone not to leave the gym, but upon verification from the
logbook, he found out that Franco had left within the time that he was in the shower.

Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement was arrived thereat; hence,
a criminal complaint for theft was filed against Franco before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Manila

In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost his cell phone
at around 1:00 p.m., he and his witnesses could have confronted him as at that time, he was still
at the gym, having left only at around 2:45 p.m.[11] He also... admitted to have taken a cap and
cell phone from the altar but claimed these to be his.

In its Decision dated February 27, 2008, the RTC convicted Franco of theft

In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found the elements of theft to have been duly established.

Issues:

whether the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable... doubt to establish the corpus
delicti of the crime.

Ruling:

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides that the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance to convict; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved;...
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads one to a fair and... reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.[... it was only
Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. His lone testimony, however,
cannot be considered a positive identification of Franco as the perpetrator.

Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive identification.
While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it does not
establish with certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming that he did, was

Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell phone."

The testimony of Ramos shows that the logbook, indeed, was not identified and authenticated
during the course of Ramos' testimony.

The logbook or the particular page referred to by Ramos was neither identified nor confirmed by
him as the same logbook which he used to log the ins and outs of the gym users, or that the
writing and notations on said logbook was... his.

The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of moral
certainty necessary to warrant Franco's conviction.

Principles:

criminal law

In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond reasonable
doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements
of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the... perpetrator of the crime.

criminal law

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are: (1) the
taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done
with intent to gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the... owner; and (5) the
taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force upon
things.

evidence

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal... case as the perpetrator
of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes
direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have
actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be... able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or
one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of
the crime. This is the second, type of positive... identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all... others.

evidence

Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.[49] Section 20 of the same Rule, in turn, provides that before any...
private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

4. People vs. Maraorao, GR No. 174369, 20 June 2012

FACTS:

Before us is an appeal from the March 1, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 35, convicting
appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

Appellant was charged under an Information dated January 4, 2001 filed before the RTC of
Manila as follows:

That on or about November 30, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
without being authorized by law to possess or use regulated drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1)
transparent plastic sachet containing ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT
ZERO EIGHT ONE (1,280.081) grams of white crystalline substance known as shabu containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription thereof.

Contrary to law.

On March 19, 2001, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged
against him. Trial on the merits ensued.
For the prosecution, PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November 29, 2000, they received
reliable information at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that an
undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the early
morning of the following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2
Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman Gamit went to the Islamic Center.
While walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men talking to each other. Upon
noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to
apprehend him.

Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on the pavement. He was about
to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The man was
later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the contents of
the bag and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance, which they
suspected to be shabu. At the police station, the investigator marked the plastic sachet ZM-1 in
the presence of the police officers.

The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory chemical
analysis. When examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan, the 1,280.081 grams
of white crystalline substance gave a positive result to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Her findings are contained in Chemistry Report No. D-1121-00.

In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he was going
to the place of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a letter from his mother. He
went there early because he had to report for work at the Port Area in Manila at 8:00 a.m. On his
way, an unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a house number which he did not
know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who placed his bag down and asked him again.
When they turned around, they saw four men in civilian attire walking briskly. He only found out
that they were police officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the man ran away,
the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because he was not aware of what
was inside the bag.

Appellant further narrated that the police arrested him and asked who the owner of the bag was.
He replied that it did not belong to him but to the man who ran away. They made him board a
bus-type vehicle and brought him to the police station in Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was
referred to a desk sergeant. The desk sergeant asked him whether the bag was recovered from
him, and he replied that he had no knowledge about that bag. He was not assisted by counsel
during the investigation. He was also incarcerated in a small cell for about ten days before he
was brought to Manila City Jail. At the Office of the City Prosecutor, he met his lawyer for the
first time.

On September 25, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused ZAFRA MARAORAO y
MACABALANG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of 1,280.081 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride without license or prescription, penalized under Section 16 in
relation to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing said accused to
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00, plus the costs.

In the service of his sentence, the full time during which the accused has been under preventive
imprisonment should be credited in his favor provided that he had agreed voluntarily in writing
to abide with the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoner. Otherwise, he should be
credited with four-fifths (4/5) only of the time he had been under preventive imprisonment.

Exhibit B, which consists of 1,280.081 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, is

confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government. Within ten (10) days following the
promulgation of this judgment, the Branch Clerk of this Court, is ordered to turn over, under
proper receipt, the regulated drug involved in this case to the Dangerous Drugs Custodian,
National Bureau of Investigation, as appointed by the Dangerous Drugs Board, for appropriate
disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. The entire records of the case were elevated to
this Court. Pursuant to our Decision in People v. Mateo, however, the case was transferred to the
CA for appropriate action and disposition.

At the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE FABRICATED

AND COACHED TESTIMONY OF THE STAR PROSECUTION WITNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED'S DEFENSE

OF DENIAL.

On March 1, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated 25 September 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35 in Crim. Case No.
01-188945 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED
ISSUE:

Whether the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied a fact or circumstance of

weight and substance which would have affected the case.

RULING:

Facts:

On November 3, 2004 at around 11:00 a.m., Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto (Nakamoto) went to
work out at the Body Shape Gym located at Malong Street, Tondo, Manila. After he finished
working out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth PI8,500.00 on the altar where gym users
usually... put their valuables and proceeded to the comfort room to change his clothes. After ten
minutes, he returned to get his cell phone, but it was already missing. Arnie Rosario (Rosario),
who was also working out, informed him that he saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from
the... altar. Nakamoto requested everyone not to leave the gym, but upon verification from the
logbook, he found out that Franco had left within the time that he was in the shower.

Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement was arrived thereat; hence,
a criminal complaint for theft was filed against Franco before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Manila

In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost his cell phone
at around 1:00 p.m., he and his witnesses could have confronted him as at that time, he was still
at the gym, having left only at around 2:45 p.m.[11] He also... admitted to have taken a cap and
cell phone from the altar but claimed these to be his.

In its Decision dated February 27, 2008, the RTC convicted Franco of theft

In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found the elements of theft to have been duly established.

Issues:

whether the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable... doubt to establish the corpus
delicti of the crime.

Ruling:

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides that the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance to convict; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved;...
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads one to a fair and... reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.[... it was only
Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. His lone testimony, however,
cannot be considered a positive identification of Franco as the perpetrator.

Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive identification.
While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it does not
establish with certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming that he did, was

Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell phone."

The testimony of Ramos shows that the logbook, indeed, was not identified and authenticated
during the course of Ramos' testimony.

The logbook or the particular page referred to by Ramos was neither identified nor confirmed by
him as the same logbook which he used to log the ins and outs of the gym users, or that the
writing and notations on said logbook was... his.

The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of moral
certainty necessary to warrant Franco's conviction.

Principles:

criminal law

In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond reasonable
doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements
of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the... perpetrator of the crime.

criminal law

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are: (1) the
taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done
with intent to gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the... owner; and (5) the
taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force upon
things.

evidence

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal... case as the perpetrator
of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes
direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have
actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be... able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or
one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of
the crime. This is the second, type of positive... identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all... others.

evidence

Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.[49] Section 20 of the same Rule, in turn, provides that before any...
private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

In his Supplemental Brief,[15] appellant stresses that PO3 Vigilla testified that when they first
saw appellant, he was talking with a certain person. It was appellants companion who scampered
away upon seeing the police. PO3 Vigilla further testified that appellant tried to flee but they
were able to arrest him before he could do so. Appellant argues that his alleged attempt to flee
does not constitute a crime that should have prompted the police to arrest him. Since his arrest
was illegal, he contends that the subsequent search made by the police was likewise illegal, and
the shabu supposedly recovered from him is inadmissible in evidence.

The appeal is meritorious.

We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a
hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the case.[16]

It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review. This Court is
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them
necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused
shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall
be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.[17]

Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, or the shabu in this
case, the prosecution evidence must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1)
the appellant was in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or
dangerous drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the appellant freely and
consciously possessed the drug.[18] In this case, the fact of possession by appellant of the bag
containing the shabu was not established in the first place.

A careful perusal of the testimony of PO3 Vigilla reveals a glaring discrepancy which both the
trial and the appellate courts overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit,[19] arresting officers PO3
Vigilla, PO2 Abella, PO1 dela Cruz and SPO1 Gamit stated that they spotted two unidentified
persons standing and seemingly conversing a few meters ahead of them. However, when one of
them noticed our presence, he hastily r[a]n away heading towards the Muslim Center leaving
behind the other person and a maroon colored bag with Adidas marking in the pavement. In
other words, the maroon bag was left behind by the man who ran away. But at the trial, PO3
Vigilla testified during direct examination that they spotted two persons talking to each other,
and upon noticing them, one of them scampered away and was chased by my companions while
the other one dropped a bag, sir.[20] Presumably, under his testimony, the bag was now held by
the one who did not run away. Later, in another part of his testimony, he again changed this
material fact. When he was asked by Prosecutor Senados as to who between the two persons they
saw talking to each other ran away, PO3 Vigilla categorically answered, [t]he one who is holding
a bag, sir.[21] Such material inconsistency leaves much to be desired about the credibility of the
prosecutions principal witness and casts reasonable doubt as to appellants guilt for it renders
questionable whether he in fact held the bag with intention to possess it and its contents.

In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused.[22] While a lone witness
testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony must be clear,
consistent, and crediblequalities we cannot ascribe to this case.Jurisprudence is consistent that
for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must both come from a credible witness and be
credible in itself tested by human experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted
conduct that has evolved through the years.[23] Clearly from the foregoing, the prosecution
failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was indeed in possession of
shabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same.

The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle,

fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an
accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto,
conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense.[24] In this case, the prosecutions evidence failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.

Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is reasonable
doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have been established.
The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that
the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.[25]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 1, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01600 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang is
hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged.

5. People vs. Geron, GR No. 113788, 17 October 1997

6. People vs. Santos Jr., GR No. 175593, 17 October 2007

7. People vs. Olivo, GR No. 177768, 27 July 2009

G.R. No. 177768

July 27, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
CHARMEN OLIVO y ALONG, NELSON DANDA y SAMBUTO, and JOEY ZAFRA y
REYES, Appellants.
FACTS: On November 21, 2000, around 6:30 o’clock in the evening, Maricel [Permejo] was
tending the store of the victim, Mariano Constantino in Bagong Silangan, Quezon City.
Suddenly, three (3) armed men entered the store and demanded money. When Maricel did not
accede to the demand, one of the armed men later identified as appellant Nelson Danda kicked
her in the leg while his other companion, appellant Joey Zafra got money from the cash register.
When the store owner, Mariano Constantino, went inside the store and shouted, the third
companion, appellant Charmen Olivo poked a gun at him. Mariano ran towards the back of the
house but appellant Olivo nevertheless chased him. Thereafter, Maricel heard successive shots
and saw appellants Danda and Zafra going out of the store while the bloodied body of Mariano
was lying at the stairway of the house. The victim was taken to the hospital where he died upon
arrival.
Two days after the incident SPO2 Joseph Dino received an information from the Batasan Police
Station that they have three (3) suspects for drug violations and illegal possession of firearms. He
borrowed the suspects for identification by Maricel. When presented to her, she identified them
as the men who staged a hold up and shot the deceased.5
On August 24, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of the crime of
robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
Accused-appellants Olivo and Danda appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated November 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE: WON an accused who has not perfected an appeal should be included in a decision of
acquittal on appeal by the other co-accused. (YES)
HELD: In view of the foregoing, acquittal of the accused-appellants is in order.
He One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other
appellants and who was likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have
perfected an appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The record does not show the reason
therefor.
Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.27 Our pronouncements here with respect to the
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are
definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. should not therefore be treated as the
odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused.
OTHERS: WON lower court has committed GAD in convicting accused. (yes- insufficiency off
evidence)
After review, we find that the accused-appellants should be acquitted.
The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are
accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing
evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of
substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the
outcome of the case.17
In this case, the material fact and circumstance that the lone alleged eyewitness, Maricel
Permejo, was not able to identify the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, varies
the outcome of this case.
Apparently, the accused-appellants were arrested without a warrant during a buy-bust operation
on November 24, 2000,24 transferred to Camp Karingal under dubious circumstances, and made
to stand in a police line-up and identified by an eyewitness who failed to identify them three
times. These circumstances were ignored by the trial court who gave too much credence on the
positive identification of the accused-appellants by the same eyewitness during direct
examination.
We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the
evidence relied upon by the trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove appellants’
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty,
whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00595 and the Decision dated August 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 81 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Charmen Olivo and
Nelson Danda are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Pursuant to Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, their co-accused Joey Zafra is declared entitled also
to ACQUITTAL. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa, Rizal, who is ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE them from confinement
unless held for some other legal cause, and to report to this Court any action taken by him within
ten days from notice.

8. Vicario vs. CA, GR No. 124491, 1 June 1999

FACTS:

ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ was charged with libel by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Catarman, Northern Samar, with Judge Proceso Sidro of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Mondragon-San Roque, Northern Samar, as complaining witness. According to the Information,
the crime was committed when Vicario allegedly distributed and circulated in the vicinity of the
Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman photocopies of page 7 of the 20 March 1992
issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer which contained the following article1 -

SAMAR JUDGE WHO POCKETED BOND CHARGED WITH GRAFT

OMBUDSMAN Conrado Vasquez yesterday filed with the Sandiganbayan graft charges against
a Northern Samar judge who pocketed the P1,000.00 cash bond posted by a respondent in one of
several cases pending in his sala.

Charged was Judge Proceso Sidro of the Northern Samar municipal circuit trial court in
Mondragon.
Investigation showed that Sidro failed to deposit the cash bond with his clerk-of-court, and
refused to return the money even after the accused who filed the bond was already acquitted in
the case.

Private complainant Sidro alleged that petitioner's act greatly prejudiced his reputation as a
member of the bench and caused him great distress. Petitioner Vicario on the other hand
disclaimed responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous article, at the same time
asserting that the libel suit against him was ill-motivated for he had filed a criminal charge for
graft and corruption against Judge Sidro before the Ombudsman and an administrative complaint
for dishonesty with the Supreme Court, both due to the latter's unjustified refusal and failure to
return petitioner's cash bond of P1,000.00.

After trial, the court a quo found petitioner Vicario guilty of libel and sentenced him to pay a fine
of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.2 The trial court justified its
decision by declaring that while no evidence was presented to show that Vicario distributed
copies of the news article to several persons, at least he gave one photocopy to prosecution
witness Amador Montes which amounted to publication, and that this act was tainted with malice
as it stemmed from Vicario's hatred, as evident from the manner his testimony was delivered,
towards complaining witness Sidro.3cräläwvirtualibräry

On 28 February 1996 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court.4 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari predicated on the following propositions5 -

First. The news item in question is a privileged matter and since it was published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, a nationally circulated newspaper, without any intervention of
petitioner, his act of giving a copy to a person named Amador Montes is not a libelous act;

Second. Respondent court gravely erred in concluding that Amador Montes saw petitioner
distributing copy of the aforesaid issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer;

Third. Respondent court gravely erred in considering the affidavit-complaint petitioner filed with
the Ombudsman which was completely immaterial and impertinent to the issue of whether or not
the act of petitioner in giving a copy of the Philippine Daily Inquirer to Amador Montes where
the news item was published, constitutes the crime of libel;

Fourth. Respondent court seriously erred in citing authorities which are not applicable in
deciding whether petitioner's act of giving a copy of the Philippine Daily Inquirer to Amador
Montes constituted the crime of libel;

Fifth. Respondent court gravely erred in adopting the conclusion of the trial court that petitioner's
act of giving a copy of the Philippine Daily Inquirer to Amador Montes was motivated by his
intense hatred against Judge Sidro, it being clear that such act was an insufficient and inadequate
evidence of the alleged intense hatred of petitioner; and,
Sixth. Respondent court gravely erred, in the final analysis, in not acquitting petitioner on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Two (2) main issues are laid before us: (a) whether the act of merely distributing a photocopy of
an article in a newspaper reporting that graft charges had been filed against a judge named
therein constitutes libel, and (b) whether Vicario's act was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause
the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.6Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to
another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence
of malice.7cräläwvirtualibräry

The evidence on record clearly shows that the elements above enumerated have not been
satisfactorily established as to conclude that libel was committed by petitioner. Thus, we rule in
his favor. For an incongruency exists between the evidence on one hand, and the findings of fact
and of law by the trial court and the appellate court on the other, which we must reconcile, if not
rectify.

As found by the trial court, there was no evidence at all to show that petitioner was the source of
the statements contained in the news item published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Indeed, for
not only was the news item by itself bereft of this information, the records also confirmed its
absence. This is why it was incorrect for the appellate court to find that "the news item was
patently culled from the Affidavit-Complaint of the appellant imputing a criminal act on Judge
Sidro filed with the Ombudsman (emphasis ours)" when no basis, factual or legal, exists for so
ruling. To be sure, the Affidavit-Complaint was merely a narration of the facts constituting the
cause of action of petitioner. Its contents never appeared in the news article which spoke only of
the filing by the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan of graft charges against Judge Sidro after
its investigation of a complaint that the judge refused to return the cash bond of an accused after
the latter's acquittal in a criminal case. There is no specific reference therein to petitioner nor to
his Affidavit-Complaint. Since it has not been established that he caused the publication of the
subject article nor was the source thereof, it would be inappropriate to conclude that through the
disputed news item he ascribed a criminal act to Judge Proceso Sidro. Parenthetically, it would
have been more accurate for the appellate court to state that the news article was culled from the
resolution of the Ombudsman directing the filing of a criminal charge based on the results of his
investigation of a complaint leveled against the named judge. But then, if it did, it would have
been left with no basis at all to hold, as in fact it did, that Vicario maliciously imputed a
discreditable act to respondent judge, and there would be no more justification for the finding
that the first element of libel was established.

The trial court also opined that no suit arising from the publication was filed against the
newspaper because what appears settled is that the item was merely a fair and true report, with
no comments or remarks, of official or judicial proceedings which are not classified as
confidential. Again, a perusal of the subject news item confirms this fact. Then the trial court
proceeded to state that the accused (petitioner) however publicized the newspaper item because
"shown by competent and relevant evidence was the giving (by Vicario) of a xerox copy of the
publicized item to Amador Montes." But was petitioner indeed guilty of republication of a
libelous article?

In his appeal, petitioner disputes the existence of the elements of publication and malice,8
arguing that inasmuch as he was not the author or originator of the subject article in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer he could not be liable for its publication. The Court of Appeals brushed
aside this proposition, declaring in the main that by having the news item machine copied and
furnishing prosectution witness Montes a copy thereof, accused-appellant thereby endorsed and
adopted the news item and hence was answerable therefor. We note the American citations relied
upon by the appellate court to support its conclusions. However, we deem these as not
authoritative, much less persuasive upon the Court, considering further that there are
dissimilarities in the facts between the cited cases and this case before us.

Contrary to the perception of the appellate court, there was no evidence at all offered to show
that petitioner himself photocopied the article. Nor was evidence sufficiently adduced to prove
that he himself distributed photocopies of the news item to so many people, prompting the trial
court to rule as hearsay the testimony on the matter by Judge Sidro and his protege Amador
Montes. This puts to doubt whether petitioner himself gave a copy of the publication to Montes.
Notably, Montes was not even named by the judge as one of the original witnesses listed in the
complaint he filed for preliminary investigation. The witness named therein was a certain
Hermito Pahimnayan who was never presented in court despite his having executed an affidavit
which was attached to Sidro's criminal complaint in the Municipal Trial Court. This affidavit
described not the incident of 22 May 1992 on which the charge for libel was based but one which
occurred sometime in 1991 or a year earlier during which Vicario was said to have shown
Pahimnayan a copy of his administrative complaint against Judge Sidro. Moreover, in the
affidavit executed by Judge Sidro which he also attached to his complaint, he declared that it was
Romeo Pinangay, his court messenger, who gave him a copy of Philippine Daily Inquirer and
informed him that Roque Vicario distributed clippings of the news item to everyone in the
premises of the hospital. Amador Montes was never mentioned in this affidavit; much less was
he made to execute any affidavit to support the criminal complaint of Judge Sidro. This much he
admitted on the witness stand.9 Other than the testimony of Montes himself, an acknowledged
subaltern of the judge, no one else was presented to establish the fact of distribution by petitioner
of copies of the alleged offensive news article. The prosecution could have offered other
witnesses with more objective dispositions than Montes, but it did not do so. With these doubts
subsisting, it was therefore reversible error of the courts below to conclude that petitioner was
liable for the republication of the news article alleged to be libelous.

A person's liability for libel need not, admittedly, stem from the fact that he was the original
publisher of the discreditable act. The maker of a libelous republication or repetition, although
not liable for the results of the primary publication, is liable for the consequence of a subsequent
publication which he makes or participates in making. It is no justification that the defamatory
matter is previously published by a third person,10 provided malice is present. Granting
arguendo the correctness of the finding by the lower courts that petitioner did at least distribute a
machine copy of the article to one Amador Montes, an acknowledged "batos"11 of Judge Sidro,
was there sufficient basis to ascribe malice in his act?

The trial court rationalized that "the accused has all the motivations to do so (i.e., distribute a
copy to Montes) because of his intense hatred against complainant, manifested even by the very
manner he gave testimony, who would not return to him an amount that he had to borrow from a
loan shark (there is nothing to show that the same was returned to the accused). x x x x Even so,
such actuation x x x in disseminating through Montes is removed from the protection accorded to
a privileged communication under the foregoing circumstances." This is flawed reasoning, a
veritable non sequitur. It is established doctrine that the malice that attends the dissemination of
the article alleged to be libelous must attend the distribution itself. It cannot be merely a
resentment against a person, manifested unconnectedly several months earlier or one displayed at
a much later date, as what happened in this case. A fine-tooth comb dissection of the testimony
of prosecution witness Amador Montes reveals none that would indicate, much less hint at, the
attitude and mental frame of Vicario at the time he allegedly handed over the photocopy of the
news item in question to Montes. If at all, as can be gathered from the testimonial narration,
Vicario's attitude could only be described as noncommittal.

In order to constitute malice, ill will must be personal. So if the ill will is engendered by one's
sense of justice or other legitimate or plausible motive, such feeling negatives actual malice.12
The anger observed by trial court to have been shown by the petitioner towards private
complainant at the time the former offered his testimony in defense of libel cannot be properly
considered as malice, either in fact or in law, that accompanied the dissemination of an alleged
libelous publication. For the anger discerned of petitioner on the witness stand could also mean
anger not only borne out of a sense of justice frustrated by the continued refusal of Judge Sidro
to return to him his cash bond, but also at being criminally sued in court for an act which he
stoutly believed was not imputable to him. This state of mind cannot be appropriately considered
malice and applied retroactively to the time of the distribution of the alleged libelous article
unless clear and convincing evidence shows otherwise; and, there is no such contrary evidence in
the case at bar. Since there is no indication about the cause of such display of "intense hatred" by
the petitioner for Judge Sidro, the Court will grant him the benefit of the doubt under the
"equipoise doctrine."13cräläwvirtualibräry
There was nothing defamatory in the news item. This much was found by the trial court itself,
noting that the published article was merely a factual report about the filing by the Ombudsman
of the charge of corruption against the judge with the Sandiganbayan. Of course, it does not
necessarily mean that if the news article complained of is not libelous because it is a privileged
matter, he who repeats the publication is likewise free from accountability for the re-utterance.
We recognize that a person's liability for libel does not necessarily proceed from the fact that he
was the original publisher of the discreditable act. The maker of a libelous republication or
repetition, although not liable for the results of the primary publication, is liable for the
consequences of a subsequent publication which he makes or participates in making so long as
the elements of libel are satisfied. But in every case malice must be present, something which has
not been shown in the case at bar.

The law presumes that malice is present in every defamatory imputation. However, on this score,
Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides an exemption -

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases x x x x 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions (emphasis supplied).

Paragraph 2 aforequoted refers to a qualifiedly privileged communication, the character of which

is a matter of defense that may be lost by positive proof of express malice on the part of the
accused. Once it is established that the article is of a privileged character, the onus of proving
actual malice rests on the plaintiff who must then convince the court that the offender was
prompted by malice or ill will. When this is accomplished the defense of privilege becomes
unavailing.14 Since the prosecution failed to establish express malice on the part of petitioner by
positive proof, its cause perforce must fail.

WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Catarman, Northern Samar, dated 11 March 1993 finding petitioner guilty of libel, and that of the
Court of Appeals dated 28 February 1996 affirming his conviction are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

9. People vs. Erguiza, GR No. 171348, 26 November 2008

Facts:
Larry Erguiza was charged with one count of rape. The victim’s father, testified that the family
of Erguiza went to their house after the case was filed, and initially offered P50,000 and later
P150,000. Albina, the mother of Erguiza admitted that she did talk with the parents of the victim,
but according to her, it was the spouses who asked for P1M, later reduced to P250,000, to settle
the case and that she made a counter-offer of P5,000.00.

Issue:

Can the offer of compromise given by the mother of the accused be used as evidence of his guilt?

Held:

No. The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be used against
appellant as evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the
case. Moreover, appellant was not present when the offer to settle was allegedly made.

An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the

party himself. Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the
accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, we believe that the better rule is that
for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been
present or at least authorized the proposed compromise. Moreover, it has been held that where
the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such
offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. (People vs. Erguiza, G.R. No.
171348, November 26, 2008)

10. People vs. Lagarde, GR No. 182549, 20 January 2009

Facts:

This is an appeal seeking for the reverse of decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of conviction for rape by RTC Leyte.
Lagarde was charged with rape in an information stating that: On December 27, 2001 in Leyte,
deliberate and of use of force and intimidation rape an 11 year-old. Upon arraignment, Lagarde
pleaded not guilty.

During trial, prosecution presented testimony of the minor and her the doctor who examined her
after the incident. Defense presented Lagarde denial contending that he didn't left the house of
Lolita during the fiesta celebration, that he had a drinking spree with the other visitors.

The RTC found AAA’s testimony credible, noting that at her age, it is inconceivable for her to
concoct a tale of having been raped. Her accusation, according to the RTC, was supported by
medical findings that she was indeed sexually abused. The lower court dismissed accused-
appellant’s denial and alibi. Lolita’s testimony was likewise disbelieved not only because she
was related to accused-appellant but also because she herself was busy drinking tuba in another
part of the house. She could not categorically say, the RTC added, that accused-appellant did not
leave his seat and molest AAA.

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s findings of fact and judgment of conviction. With
regard to the penalty, however, the CA ruled that the trial court erred when it imposed the death
sentence on the basis of the following aggravating circumstances: minority, use of bladed
weapon, and uninhabited place. Aside from the abolition of the death penalty, the CA held that:

It is basic in criminal procedure that the purpose of the information is to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him or the charge against him so as to enable him
to prepare a suitable defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple
rape and convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant
circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment were not set forth in the
indictment on which he was arraigned. More importantly, they are not the circumstances that
would call for the application of death penalty.

Issues: (1) the court gravely erred in finding the guilt of the accused (2) the court gravely erred in
imposing upon the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Ruling: Appeal has no merit.

In rape cases, courts are governed by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime,
only the complainant can testify against the assailant. Accordingly, conviction for rape may be
solely based on the complainant’s testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

The trial court observed that AAA’s testimony was credible, straightforward, clear, and
convincing. She ably identified accused-appellant as her attacker and described in detail how she
was sexually assaulted. There is no reason a child would fabricate such a serious accusation such
as rape and risk public humiliation if not to seek justice. It is for this reason that testimonies of
child-victims are normally given full weight and credence, since when minors say they were
raped, they say in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.

The victim’s credibility is further bolstered by the immediate reporting of the incident to her
mother and subsequently to the authorities. Moreover, the medical findings of Drs. Oyzon and
Palencia-Jadloc established the fact that complainant had sexual intercourse.

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, could only offer denial and alibi as defenses. His alibi that
he spent the afternoon drinking with other visitors does not deserve merit since he was present in
the same house where the victim was.

It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellant’s basic right to due process if
he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying circumstances
which were not alleged in the information.

The appellate court correctly ruled that the use of a bladed weapon and uninhabited place are not
circumstances that would call for the imposition of the death penalty.
The victim’s minority does not also qualify the offense to merit the death penalty. To warrant a
death sentence, the victim must be under seven (7) years of age.

11. People vs. Noque, GR No. 175319, 15 January 2010

Facts: Accused Joselito Noque was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by SPO4 Norberto
Murillo on January 30, 2001. Two Informations were filed before the RTC of Manila docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459 charging of the crimes of illegal sale and
illegal possession of a regulated drug. The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. The
trial court held that while the Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride as the drug
seized from the appellant, the drug actually confiscated which was ephedrine, which by means of
chemical reaction could change into methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court ruled that the
appellant can be convicted of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved. The
CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA held that the designations and allegations in the
informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. Hence,
the accused appealed the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
was not violated.

Held: The appeal is bereft of merit.

As correctly observed by CA, the offenses designated in the Informations are for violations of
Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and
possession of regulated drugs. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized sale and
possession of “shabu” or methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the
qualifying phrase “which is a regulated drug”. Thus, it is clear that the designations and
allegations in the Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
regulated drugs. Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs
Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988.
The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be applied by
analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes
proved. Under these provisions, an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter. At any rate, a minor variance between the information and the evidence does not alter the
nature of the offense, nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a
discrepancy exists, this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In other words, his right to
be informed of the charges against him has not been violated because where an accused is
charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of
lesser crimes or offenses included therein.

12. Hilario vs. People, GR No. 161070, 14 April 2008

FACTS:

John Hilario was charged with 3 counts of murder which, without counsel, he pleaded
guilty.During the trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the PAO took over representing the client in view of
the death of the

latter’s counsel.

The RTC subsequently rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of homicide and sentenced him to 8 years 1 day of prison mayor and 14 years 8 months of
reclusion temporal.Unassisted by counsel, Hilario filed a Petition for Relief contending that he
was already confined at the promulgation of the judgement. The RTC dismissed the petition for
relief due to failure to perfect the appeal. Petitioner contends that he has no way to file the notice
of appeal except by his lawyer who he had instructed to do so. However, no notice of appeal was
filed by his lawyer in defiance of his clear instructions. The decision was likewise received by
his lawyer but the latter did not inform him of any action taken thereon. The CA also dismissed
his petition for certiorari.Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de officio cannot
be binding on him for the

latter’s defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship
between

counsel and client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case

due to the defiance of the petitioner’s

counsel de officio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence to

entitle the undersigned detention prisoner to pursue his appeal?

HELD:

Yes. We find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s
petition for relief from judgement. The RTC denied the petition as it found petitioner’s claim that
his counsel did

not heed his instruction to file the appeal to be unsubstantiated and self-serving; and that if there
was indeed such omission committed by the counsel, such negligence is binding on the
client.There was no basis for the RTC to dismiss the petition concluding that the claim of
petitioner that he instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as self-serving and unsubstantiated.
The RTC's dismissal of the petition for relief was done with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to an undue denial of the petitioner's right to appeal as it did not touch on the question whether
the PAO lawyer was indeed negligent in not filing the appeal as it merely stated that even if said
omission should be considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of counsel is
binding on the client.

13. People vs. Siongco, GR No. 186472, 5 July 2010 )

G.R. NO. 186472 JULY 5, 2010

Rule 115 Rights of the accused

FACTS: Appellants Siongco, Boton and Enriquez, induced 11-year old Nikko Satimbre, a
resident of Balanga, Bataan, to board a bus bound for Pilar

, Bataan and promised the latter a “Gameboy”. He was

then bought to Dinalupihan, Bataan where he was kept for the night. Two days after, Siongco
called

Elvira Satimbre, Nikko’s mother, and demanded P400,000.00, in exchange for the release of her
son.

Siongco further threatened that Nikko would be killed if Elvira failed to give the ransom money.
Nikko was moved to Taguig City and was cautioned not to tell anybody that he was kidnapped.
Appellants were finally arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by the PAOCTF four days
after Nikko was kidnapped. The RTC convicted appellants of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention, then punishable

by death, with the exception of Boton, on the ground of reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the
conviction byt modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.On review, the appellants claimed that
they were deprived of their right to an independent and competent counsel when the RTC
appointed Atty. Michael Moralde (Atty. Moralde) as their counsel de oficio during the pre-trial
conference, direct examination and cross-

examination of the prosecution’s principal witness, Nikko. This was so, despite Atty. Moralde’s
manifestation during Nikko’s cross

-examination that the defense of his actual client, accused Boton, conflicts with that of the other
accused.

ISSUE: Whether Appellants were deprived of their right to an independent and competent
counsel by the appointment of Atty.Moralde.

HELD:

NO, A scrutiny of the records shows that Atty. Moralde was appointed as appellants’ c

counsel de oficio in six (6) hearings, because their regular counsel de oficio, Atty. Antoniano
from the Public

Attorney’s Office (PAO), was inexplicably absent. There is no denial of the right to counsel
where a

counsel de oficio is appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte, or in this
case the regular counsel de oficio, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as
practicable under the continuous trial system. The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal
prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the
court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel, which it considers competent and
independent, to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance.
Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused, to the
detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.

14. Lumanog vs. People, GR No. 182555, 7 September 2010

15. Perez vs. People, GR No. 164763, 12 February 2008

16. People vs. Rapeza, GR No. 169431, 3 April 2007

17. People vs. Casimiro, GR No. 146277, 20 June 2002

Facts
The accused-appellant appeals from the decision of the RTC, Branch 5, Baguio City, guilty of
violating Republic Act No. 6425otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.The accused-
appellant, did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to posing buyer, SPO2
DOROTHEO SUPA of the14th Regional Field Office, Narcotics Unit, about nine hundred fifty
(950) grams of marijuana dried leaves in brick form, andknowing fully well that the article is a
prohibited drug, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.However, the witnesses testified
for the prosecution: PO2 Dorotheo Supa, Alma Margarita D. Villasenor, and PO2 Juan
Piggangay, Jr.admitted to have forgotten the affixing of their initials upon receipt of the
marijuana, thereby deviating from narcotics field teststandard operating procedure. PO2 Supa
testified that he no longer gave the marked money to accused-appellant because he placed
thelatter under arrest. He recited to him his rights but failed to include a crucial part of the
Miranda Rights, if accused-appellant could notafford counsel, one would be assigned to him. The
officers also admitted to have made the accused affix his signature on the receipt of property
seized without the assistance of a counsel, as well as whether or not he was waiving his rights to
remain silent at all.

Issue
Is deviation from standard operating procedures a violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused?

Held
First. With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the fact that there
was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the accused does not
affect the liability of the accused.
Second
. Nor is there other credible evidence against accused-appellant. As he points out, he could not
have been so careless as to callthe telephone number of the 14th Regional Narcotics Office and
offer marijuana to the policemen there. Neither would he blatantlysell illegal drugs to known
police officers nor would he transact these illegal sales over the telephone, because these acts are
usuallydone face to face.
Third
. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the
corpus delicti
of the offense, anessential requirement in a drug-related case. In this case, the prosecution failed
to prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody,they did not write their initials on the brick
of marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing it.According to PO3 Piggangay, the bag that he
saw was colored gray or blue, the same color as that of the bag sent to the PNP CrimeLaboratory
Service for laboratory examination. Whereas PO2 Supa stated, however, that the bag of
marijuana which he saw wascolored brown. The discrepancy in the testimony of these two police
officers casts additional doubt on the identity of the prohibiteddrug which constitutes the
corpus delicti
.Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard operating procedure for a buy-bust
operation. It is precisely when thegovernment’s purposes are beneficent that we should be most
on our guard to protect these rights. Our desire to stamp out criminalitycannot be achieved at the
expense of constitutional rights. For these reasons, we cannot uphold the conviction of accused-
appellant.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City is
REVERSED and accused-appellant AlbertCasimiro is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody, unless heis being
lawfully held for another crime.

18. People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, 15 March 2010

Extrajudicial confession before a bantay bayan taken without counsel is inadmissible in

evidence.

Facts:

Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of
the witnesses for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay.
Banting testified that after his assistance was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found
the latter wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga
obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because
he was unable to control himself. Lauga contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged
confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a
“bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a
lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

Issue:

Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a lawyer
admissible in evidence?

Held:

No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit
to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope
of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to
conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function
and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without counsel was
inadmissible in evidence.

19. Tan vs. People, GR No. 173673, 21 April 2009

Facts: Panel of Prosecutors filed before the RTC of Pasig. (Three (3) informations against Dante
Tan. 1[3]

1. Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative
devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares. 2[4] 3[5] 2. Criminal
Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of
BW shares. DOJ Chief Prosecutor filed a motion for consolidation. Petitioner was arraigned on
16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges Petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal
Case 119830 due to failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. He was claiming for
his right to speedy trial. The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the
parties had an earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until after that of
Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of
the five cases involved involved were to be done separately. RTC ordered the dismissal of
Criminal Case 119830. Hence Hence Appeal to the CA. CA reinstated Criminal Case 119830
RTC to conduct further proceeding. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and
filed a motion for inhibition of the Justices who decided the case. Petitioner Dante Tan,
henceforth, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:

ISSUES: 1. WON the Acting Sec. of Justice may validly execute the Certificate of Non Forum
Shopping filed by the People. 2. WON the petition for Certiorari violated Tan’s right against
double jeopardy 3. WON Criminal Case 119830 was correctly dismissed by the Trial Court on
the ground of violation of Tans right to speedly trial. 4. WON the Court gravely abuse its
discretion. IV.

HELD:

We first resolve the preliminary issues. In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed,
petitioner contends that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the People’s appeal
before the Court of Appeals should have been signed by the Chairman of the SEC as
complainant in the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez.

Petitioner’s argument is futile. The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the authority of
Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas Gutierrez to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping of the
petition for certiorari before said court. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no
room for doubt and establishes that criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the People of
the Philippines, It is the DOJ, through its prosecutors, which is authorized to prosecute criminal
cases on behalf of the People of the Philippines, the DOJ is best suited to attest whether a similar
or related case has been filed or is pending in another court of tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being the head of the DOJ, therefore, had the authority to sign the
certificate of nonforum shopping for Criminal Case No. 119830, which was filed on behalf of the
People of the Philippines. The preliminary issues having been resolved, the Court shall proceed
to discuss the main issues.

At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante
Tan’s right to speedy trial. An accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is
guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a
speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its
“salutary objective” being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest
possible time compatible with the presentation and 4[21] consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for t
he delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer
of evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and
defense admit that no evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period
of almost two years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for
Criminal Case No. 119830. The question we have to answer now is whether there was
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay . To this, we apply the four-factor test previously
mentioned. Petitioner’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied consent to
the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case . No objection
was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial hearing.
5[33] Petitioner’s conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary
hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for
Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecution’s manifestation that
the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel
bind his client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice. 6[34] In fact,
petitioner’s acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial
presentation of the People’s evidence in the five BW cases on 27 February 2001, herein quoted
below:

During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court that the parties had agreed to the
separate trials of the BW Cases:The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001
hearing further clarifies that only the two cases against Dante Tan were being prosecuted:

For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution
is guilty of violating petitioner’s right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact
definition, but generally re fers to “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction .” Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a
criminal case is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case. Ther e is also no
merit to petitioner’s claim that a reversal of the RTC’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No.
119830 is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal was
founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy shields one from a second or later prosecution for the same offense. Article III,
Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense, providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall For double jeopardy to attach then, the
following elements in the constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. first criminal
case must be present: (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (b) The court had jurisdiction; (c) The accused had
been arraigned and had pleaded; and (d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the 7[43] accused.

Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element, conviction or
acquittal, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. This element is crucial since, as a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting
in acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not 8[44]
place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and 9[45] denial of the right to speedy trial. From the foregoing, it
follows that petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy attached when said RTC order was
reversed by the Court of Appeals. Double jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that
there is no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February 2006 Decision and 17 July 2006 Resolution issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED. The instant case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City for further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 119830 with reasonable dispatch. SO ORDERED.

20. Coscolluela vs. SB, GR No. 191411, 15 July 2013

G.R. No. 191411 July 15, 2013

Rafael L. Coscolluela, petitioner,

vs.

Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, respondents

Facts

Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental for three (3) full terms
which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects
Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.
 On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-
complaint dated November 7, 2001 from People’s Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to
investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the
amount of P20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped
down from office.

Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report dated April 16,
2002 which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. Consequently,
petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits.

On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares prepared a
Resolution, finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information. On even date, the Information was
prepared and signed by Cañares and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C.
Miro for recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003.
However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, came only on May 21,
2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB.

Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information
only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB.

On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against
him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted.
Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela’s motion.

In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash dated August 7, 2009,
explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to go
through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also pointed out that petitioners
never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the interim.

Issues

Whether or not the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of the petitioner was
violated.

Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.

First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted

amount of time to complete. Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution
of the case largely remains unjustified. Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted
for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases. Fourth, the Court
finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings
against them.

A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides “All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies”.

Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’ right to a speedy
disposition of their criminal case had been violated.

21. People vs. Ayson, GR No. 85215, 7 July 1989

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio
City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the
PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle
the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he
misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He
proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was
charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained
Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was
taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those
stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination
(only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime
charged- not present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion
of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the
specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed
at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused
include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.

2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him.

3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make
a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at
the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

22. People vs. Olvis, GR No. 71092, 30 September 1987

23. Beltran vs. Samson, GR No. 32025, 23 September 1929

24. Marcelo vs. SB, GR No. 109242, 26 January 1999

25. Rivera vs. People, GR No. 163996, 9 June 2005

26. People vs. Ortillas, GR No. 137666, 20 May 2004

FACTS

-The apellant, Marlon Ortillas, was accused of murder of Jose Mesqueriola (alias Joey) with the
use of a pillbox bomb on the latter and injured Russel Guiraldo, eyewitness and appellee, who
was with the victim.

-On December 21, 1994, Joey and Russel were leaving the Las Pinas Church when they were
thrown with an explosive pillbox. Joey ‘fell down’ and Russel immediately helped him and
rushed him to a nearby hospital. Joey died the next day as a result of a traumatic-head injury. The
explosion also injured Russel’s right face.

-Russel claimed that it was Ortillas who threw the pillbox and saw him hide immediately inside
his house as Russel was helping Joey.

-Ortillas denied the allegation, claiming that he was in his house during the incident.
Accordingly, Ortillas testified that Russel has a bad blood on him ever since because of a certain
stone-throwing incident in their school in which Russel was hit by a stone he thought came from
the direction of the appellant, not knowing it was his seatmate (sic) who threw the stone. So that
even if he was not responsible for Joey’s death, he was pointed to by Russel because of its
grudge on him.

-On Sept. 21 1998, Makati RTC under Judge Alumbres convicted Ortillas of murder, citing that
Ortillas claim is an alibi. Also cited was Ortillas’ evidence of guilt when Ortillas escaped from
prison on April 17, 1997.

ISSUES

-Whether or not the RTC ruled its decision based on the strength of the prosecution.

RULING

RTC ruling set aside. Ortillas acquitted.

The appellant was unlawfully deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine.

-Article III, 14(2) of Constitution provides that the accused shall have the right to confront
and scrutinize the witness against him.

-Judge

Prosecution failed to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

-There is no direct, positive testimony that Russel actually saw Ortillas throw the pillbox. Russel
only testified that both he and Joey were hit with the pillbox thrown by the accused (Ortillas).
This statement is a conclusion of fact rather than a declaration of what he actually saw as he did
not testify that he actually saw the accused the act of throwing the pillbox. Nor he even saw the
accused holding the pillbox before throwing it.

-There is a discrepancy on Russel’s testimony on the location of the actual incident. Russel
testified that they were thrown when they were about to leave the church but when asked with a
following question on how far they were from the church when the incident happened, he
answered that they were already far from the church as they were, at that time, in the plaza.

-Russel testified that Ortillas was fifteen (15) meters away from them at the opposite side of the
street. If Ortillas was indeed the one who threw the pillbox, then Russel should have seen the
actual throwing by the accused before the pillbox left its hands, otherwise, how could he say it
was Ortillas? Given the considerate distance of fifteen meters and the size of the pillbox, Russel
should have at least tried to avoid it. There is no testimony on the part of Russel the attempt to
dodge the incoming object nor any indication of reaction.

-Russel’s testimony that he helped Joey when the latter was hit and fell and at the same time saw
Ortillas run and hide in its house, which was at least six (6) meters from where he allegedly
threw the pillbox, is not credible. To be able to help Joey and see the accused run and hide after
being hit and injured by the exploding pillbox goes beyond human experience, as if he just stood
there all the time seeing the movements of the accused while being hit by the explosion. The
prosecution failed to explain this ‘remarkable’ feat, which is fatal to its cause.

The Trial Court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of witness, disregarding the
testimony of accused-appellant.

-The motive attributed by the RTC to accused in throwing a pillbox at Russel and Joey is not
based on the testimony of witness Russel but of appellant Ortillas.

-Prosecution must rely on its own evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, therefore, RTC must not depend on the evidence of the defense to support the
conviction of accused.
-Judge gave credibility to the testimony of appellant, using his testimony to establish motive on
his part to commit the crime. But same testimony may be used likewise to prove that witness
Russel had an ill-motive to testify against appellant.

-When evidence admits of two interpretations, that which is favorable to appellant should
prevail.

-RTC misapprehended Ortillas’ testimony and interpreted it against him to explain his motive in
throwing the pillbox.

-Nonetheless, Ortillas’ testimony explained why Russel testified against him, as Russel
believed Ortillas was the one who threw the stone toward him in the classroom.

Although denial, like alibi, can be fabricated, it is not always false and without merit, and when
coupled with the improbabilities and uncertainties of the prosecution evidence, the defense of
alibi deserves merit. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The weakness of the defense does not
relieve it of this responsibility. And when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of
establishing the guilt of an accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. A
judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.] It is thus required that
every circumstance favoring his innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against
him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.There must be moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant
who committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration
for accused-appellant.

As the Court declared in People vs. Tajada:

While we strongly condemn the senseless and gruesome crime and sincerely commiserate with
the suffering and emotional stress suffered by the bereaved family of the victim, nevertheless, we
find the pieces of circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite moral certainty, as they admit of the
alternative inference that other persons, not necessarily the accused-appellant, may have
perpetrated the crime. Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one which is consistent
with guilt and the other with innocence, the accused must be acquitted. Indeed, it would be better
to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one
innocent man for a crime he did not commit.
-27. People vs. Escote, GR No. 140756, 4 April 2003. G

E. Double Jeopardy

1. Bangayan Jr. vs. Bangayan, GR No. 172777, 19 October 2011

2. People vs. Velasco, GR No. 127444, 13 September 2000

3. People vs. Go, GR No. 191015, 6 August 2014

4. Canceran vs. People, GR No. 206442, 1 July 2015

5. Tan vs. People, GR No. 173673, 21 April 2009

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated 22 February 2006 and
Resolution2 dated 17 July 2006 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Briccio C. Ygana, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 153, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City and Dante Tan."

The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830, earlier dismissed by the trial court
due to an alleged violation of petitioner Dante T. Tan's right to speedy trial.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ

The assailed Resolution denied his Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Inhibit.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of

the People of the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832, all entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan."

Criminal Case No. 1198303 pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises
in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares. On the other hand, Criminal
Cases No. 1198314and No. 1198325 involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of
BW shares.

In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and
Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. These
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829.
On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a
Motion for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832
be consolidated together with Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829, which the trial court
granted.

On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 were raffled
off to the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, presided by Judge Briccio C. Ygana. Criminal Cases No.
119828 and No. 119829 also went to the same court.

Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges.6

On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among other things,
the first date of trial on 27 February 2001.7

Atty. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under the direct control
and supervision of Public Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro, entered her appearance for the People; Atty.
Agnes Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan; Atty. Sigfrid Fortun for Eduardo Lim, Jr.; and Atty.
Rudolf Brittanico for Jimmy Juan. State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva later
on took over as lawyers for the People.

The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001, the
parties agreed that Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal
Case No. 119830, and that petitioner would not interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor
would the trial court disapprove it.

Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832. On
18 September 2001, the prosecution completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered
by the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within thirty days.

After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the prosecution was
able to file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 on 25 November
2003.8

On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due to the People's
alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner faults the
People for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without giving
any excuse or justification for the delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting
his right to speedy trial, which he had allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to
have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.

The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier
agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the five cases
involved were to be done separately. The presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832, however, were done simultaneously, because they involved similar offenses of
non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of stocks proscribed under Rule 36(a)-19 in relation to
Sections 32(a)-110and 5611 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178, otherwise known as the "Revised
Securities Act." Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to alleged violation of Section 27 (b),12 in
relation to Section 56 of said act.

On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, ruled that the
delays which attended the proceedings of petitioner's case (Criminal Case No. 119830) were
vexatious, capricious and oppressive, resulting in violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial.
The RTC ordered13 the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered and finding the motion to dismiss to be
meritorious, the Court hereby orders Criminal Case No. 119830 DISMISSED.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ

On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to hold separate
trials of the BW cases, with petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution of Criminal Cases No.
119831 and No. 119832 ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830. In an Order dated 20 January 2004,
the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

The RTC's order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari,
with the People contending that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE

PEOPLE VIOLATED DANTE TAN'S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL, ALBEIT, THE LATTER
AND RESPONDENT JUDGE HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO THE DEFERMENT OF
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 PENDING HEARING OF THE TWO OTHER RELATED
CASES.

Setting aside the trial court's order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for
certiorari in its Decision dated 22 February 2006. In resolving the petition, the appellate court
reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830 in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed Orders dated December 22, 2003 and
January 20, 2004 are set aside. Criminal Case No. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is
ordered to conduct further proceedings in said case immediately.14

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for inhibition of the
Justices who decided the case.

On 17 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied both motions.

Petitioner Dante Tan, henceforth, filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari

raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY VALIDLY EXECUTE

THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN
THOUGH THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A COMPLAINT
SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED TAN'S RIGHT

AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY

THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF TAN'S RIGHT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION.

Ruling

the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February 2006 Decision and 17 July 2006
Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED.

The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City for further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 119830 with reasonable dispatch.

F. Ex Post Facto Law / Bill of Attainder

1. People vs. SB, GR No. 101724, 3 July 1992

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

facts

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the resolution
promulgated on August 1, 1991 by the Sandiganbayan which granted the private respondent's
motion to quash the information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.
No. 3019) on the ground of prescription of the crime charged.

Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and December 9, 1986, with the
Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after the private respondent had
replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del Sur in March 1986 (p. 235,
Rollo). Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the
provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of
1,391 sq. m., more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur.

On February 23, 1989, the tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of Butuan City
who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was served on, and received by, the
Station Commander of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite
the absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy
conducted a preliminary investigation ex-parte. He recommended that an information be filed in
court. His recommendation was approved by the Tanodbayan who, on August 10, 1989, filed the
following information in the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-03368:

That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer, being then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having
been duly appointed and qualified as such, taking advantage of his public position, did, then and
there, wilfully and unlawfully persuade, influence and induce the Land Inspector of the Bureau
of Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison to violate an existing rule or regulation duly
promulgated by competent authority by misrepresenting to the latter that the land subject of an
application filed by the accused with the Bureau of Lands is disposable by a free patent when the
accused well knew that the said land had already been reserved for a school site, thus by the
accused's personal misrepresentation in his capacity as Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur
and applicant for a free patent, a report favorably recommending the issuance of a free patent
was given by the said Armando L. Luison, land inspector, thereby paving the way to the release
of a decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur, an act committed by the accused,
in outright prejudice of the public interest. (pp. 3-4, Rollo.)
Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the information
and the warrant of arrest were null and void because he had been denied his right to a
preliminary investigation. Paredes refused to post bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus
praying this Court to order his release (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464), but we
denied her petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a bail bond of P20,000
fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move to quash the information before
being arraigned.

On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash Information
and to Recall Warrant of Arrest" alleging that:

1. he is charged for an offense which has prescribed:

2. the preliminary investigation, as well as the Information prepared by the Tanodbayan and the
Warrant of Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan were invalid for lack of notice to him of the
preliminary investigation conducted by Deputized Tanodbayan Ernesto M. Brocoy and
Tanodbayan Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez; and

3. his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the long delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation.

After the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on
August 1, 1991 granting the motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the offense
charged. The Sandiganbayan's ratiocination of its resolution is quoted below:

The crime charged is alleged to have been committed "on or about January 21, 1976" when the
accused allegedly misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the land
subject of the herein movant's Application for a Free Patent was disposable land. This
misrepresentation allegedly resulted in the issuance of a Torrens Title under a Free Patent to the
herein accused-movant. This, the Information avers, was prejudicial to the public interest
because the land in question had been reserved for a school site and was, therefore, not
disposable.

Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 because the accused had
allegedly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public Lands Inspector to violate existing law,
rules and regulations by recommending approval of the free patent application.

The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime (January 21,
1976) the period of prescription was ten (10) years under Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime
should have prescribed in 1986. The prosecution seems to agree with the movant's statement as
to the term of the prescriptive period with the qualification that the period of prescription should
have commenced to run from March 28, 1985, when the complaint was allegedly filed by the
Republic for the cancellation of the title.
Issue

The question then is this: when should the period of prescription have commenced to run as to
the alleged misrepresentation which persuaded, influenced and induced the Lands Inspector of
the Bureau of Lands resulting in the approval of the application of the accused for a free patent?

The Supreme Court has clearly stated that even in the case of falsification of public documents,
prescription commences from its recording with the Registry of Deeds when the existence of the
document and the averments therein theoretically become a matter of public knowledge.

xxx xxx xxx

The matter of improper inducement, persuasion or influence upon the Lands Inspector allegedly
applied by the accused through his misrepresentation may have been unknown to others besides
the two of them because their interaction would presumably have been private. The fact of the
improper segregation of the piece of land in question and the grant thereof to the accused,
however, became, presumptively at least, a matter of public knowledge upon the issuance of a
Torrens Title over that parcel of non-disposable public land.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Notice to the whole world must be presumed at the very latest on May 28, 1976 when the
Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur issued Original Certificate of Title No. 8379 in the name of
the accused as a result of the grant of the patent on the school site reservation;

5. The act of filing the approved free patent with the Registry of Deeds is notice duly given to the
various offices and officials of the government, e.g., the Department (Ministry) of Agriculture
and the Bureau of Lands, who are affected thereby specially because it is the Bureau of Lands
which files the approved patent application with the Registry of Deeds. If the land in question
was indeed reserved for as school site, then the Department (Ministry) of Education would also
know or would be presumed to know. (pp. 28-33, Rollo.)

The Sandiganbayan could not abide the fact that the Lands Inspector (Luison) who was
supposedly induced by Paredes to violate the law, and who did violate it by recommending
approval of Paredes' free patent application was not charged with a crime. The Sandiganbayan
concluded:

It would seriously strain credulity to say that while the violation of law, rules or regulation by the
Lands Inspector was obvious and public (since the school site had been titled in the name of the
alleged inducer Pimentel **), the beneficiary thereof could not have been suspected of having
induced the violation itself. It would be grossly unfair and unjust to say that prescription would
run in favor of the Lands Inspector who had actually violated the law but not to the public
official who had benefitted therefrom and who may have, therefore, instigated the favorable
recommendation for the disposition of non-disposable land.

In view of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash the Information is granted. (p. 36, Rollo.)

The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is a special law, the computation
of the period for the prescription of the crime of violating it is governed by Section 29 of Act No.
3326 which provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.

The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the
operative date for the commencement of the period of prescription" (p. 34, Rollo).

Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to recommend approval of his
application for free patent (which both of them denied doing), the date of the violation, for the
purpose of computing the period of prescription, would be the date of filing his application on
January 21, 1976.

The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the filing
of Paredes' application because no one could have known about it except Paredes and Lands
Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it is not only the
Lands Inspector who passes upon the disposability of public land . . . other public officials pass
upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land and, therefore, the
disposable character thereof" (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department personnel,
who had a hand in processing and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who
inspected the land to ascertain its location and occupancy: (2) the surveyor who prepared its
technical description: (3) the regional director who assessed the application and determined the
land classification: (4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free patent: and (5) the
Department Secretary who signed it, could not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the
application was nondisposable public agricultural land.

The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes
application for a free patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to
recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's
complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late.

The reason for the extinction of the State's right to prosecute a crime after the lapse of the
statutory limitation period for filing the criminal action, is that:

Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of grace, and as a surrendering by the
sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion, and they are
considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are founded on the liberal theory that
prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode
only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of accused have by sheer lapse of
time passed beyond availability. They serve, not only to bar prosecutions on aged and
untrustworthy evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for crimes a reasonable time after
completion, when no further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity. (22
CJS 573-574.)

In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute of limitations begins to run on the
commission of an offense and not from the time when the offense is discovered or when the
offender becomes known, or it normally begins to run when the crime is complete. (22 CJS 585;
Emphasis supplied.)

Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the registration and issuance of
the free patent title by the Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration being constructive
notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period would have fully run its course on May 28,
1986, or five (5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than thirteen (13) years
before judicial proceedings were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by the filing
of the information therein.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A.
No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime"
which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial to the accused.
It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under
Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed
it.

Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. Where the statute
fixes a period of limitation as to a prosecution for a particular offense, the limitation so fixed is
jurisdictional, and the time within which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being
necessary that the indictment or information be actually filed within the time prescribed. (22 CJS
574.)
Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional necessarily determined that a prosecution
within the period specified is an essential element of the offense. (People vs. Allen, 118 P 2d,
927, Emphasis supplied.)

Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not apply to crimes
previously committed (22 CJS 576; People vs. Lurd, 12 Hun 282; Martine vs. State, 24 Tex 61;
Emphasis ours.)

To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his
situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been
extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. An ex post facto law is defined as:

A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively
changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S.
Const., the states are forbidden to pass "any ex post facto law". Most all state constitutions
contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a
person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a
crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law
that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at
the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming
to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right
which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful
protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267
So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)

Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987
Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no
longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P.
Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law should
apply only to those offense which were committed after the approval of B.P. 195.

Ruling

the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The resolution dated August 1, 1991 of the
Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 13800 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
2. Salvador vs. Mapa Jr, GR No. 135080, 28 November 2007

FACTS

On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of

the People of the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832, all entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan."

Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises
in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares. On the other hand, Criminal
Cases No. 119831and No. 119832 involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of
BW shares.

In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and
Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. These
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829.

On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a
Motion for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832
be consolidated together with Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829, which the trial court
granted.

On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 were raffled
off to the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, presided by Judge Briccio C. Ygana. Criminal Cases No.
119828 and No. 119829 also went to the same court.

Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges.

On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among other things,
the first date of trial on 27 February 2001.

Atty. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under the direct control
and supervision of Public Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro, entered her appearance for the People; Atty.
Agnes Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan; Atty. Sigfrid Fortun for Eduardo Lim, Jr.; and Atty.
Rudolf Brittanico for Jimmy Juan. State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva later
on took over as lawyers for the People.

The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001, the
parties agreed that Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal
Case No. 119830, and that petitioner would not interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor
would the trial court disapprove it.
Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832. On
18 September 2001, the prosecution completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered
by the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within thirty days.

After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the prosecution was
able to file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 on 25 November
2003.

On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due to the People's
alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner faults the
People for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without giving
any excuse or justification for the delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting
his right to speedy trial, which he had allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to
have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.

The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier
agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the five cases
involved were to be done separately. The presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832, however, were done simultaneously, because they involved similar offenses of
non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of stocks proscribed under Rule 36(a)-1 in relation to
Sections 32(a)-1and 56 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178, otherwise known as the "Revised
Securities Act." Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to alleged violation of Section 27 (b), in
relation to Section 56 of said act.

On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, ruled that the
delays which attended the proceedings of petitioner's case (Criminal Case No. 119830) were
vexatious, capricious and oppressive, resulting in violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial.
The RTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered and finding the motion to dismiss to be
meritorious, the Court hereby orders Criminal Case No. 119830 DISMISSED.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ

On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to hold separate
trials of the BW cases, with petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution of Criminal Cases No.
119831 and No. 119832 ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830. In an Order dated 20 January 2004,
the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

The RTC's order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari,
with the People contending that:
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE
PEOPLE VIOLATED DANTE TAN'S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL, ALBEIT, THE LATTER
AND RESPONDENT JUDGE HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO THE DEFERMENT OF
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 PENDING HEARING OF THE TWO OTHER RELATED
CASES.

Setting aside the trial court's order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for
certiorari in its Decision dated 22 February 2006. In resolving the petition, the appellate court
reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830 in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed Orders dated December 22, 2003 and
January 20, 2004 are set aside. Criminal Case No. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is
ordered to conduct further proceedings in said case immediately

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for inhibition of the
Justices who decided the case.

On 17 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied both motions.

ISSUES

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY VALIDLY EXECUTE

THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN
THOUGH THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A COMPLAINT
SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED TAN'S RIGHT

AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY

THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF TAN'S RIGHT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL.

IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

RULING

the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February 2006 Decision and 17 July 2006
Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED.

The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City for further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 119830 with reasonable dispatch.

3. People vs. Ferrer, GR No. L-32613-14, 27 December 1972

People vs. Ferrer, GR No. L-32613-14 TESORO

FACTS:

Private respondents were among those charged with violations of the Anti-Subversion Act which
outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines and other “subversive associations,” and
punishes any person who “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member” of the Party or of any other similar “subversive” organization.
Respondent judge ruled that Act as unconstitutional for being a bill of attainder.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the Act is indeed a bill of attainder.

RULING:

NO. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it
become a bill of attainder. It is also necessary that the statute must apply retroactively and reach
past conduct in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder.

Questioned resolution is SET ASIDE. The two cases are REMANDED to the court a quo for
trial on the merits.
FURTHER

PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]

Facts:

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP)aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for
being members/leaders of the NPA,inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft,
and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress Usurped the powers of the judge
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of
safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.The Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 was approved
20 June 1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership
therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party
is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government,not only by force and violence
but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and
present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliated with full
knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation bya
designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in
court.Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2
witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the
renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its validexercise under freedom if thought, assembly and
association.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. For penalizing membership
of CPP(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held:

The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.A bill of attainder is solely
a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt.

In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present:
1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors.

The Act’s focus