Under Art 649, easements of right of way are compulsory and legally demandable, - PR failed to establish the existence

the existence of the 4 requisites mandated by law.

subject to indemnity and the concurrence of other conditions. they must be a real o Costabella showed the CA that there is another outlet for the PR to
necessity, not mere convenience for the dominant estate. the main road. Even the CA admitted that legally the old road could
COSTABELLA CORP. v CA be closed. True standard of grant of legal right is “adequacy.” When
193 SCRA 122 25 January 1991 there is already an existing outlet, even if the said outlet is
inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is unjustified.
FACTS There must be a real, not fictitious or artificial necessity for it.
- Costabella owns real estate properties designated as Lots 5122 and 5124 of o PR failed to indicate that they were willing to indemnify Costabella
the Opon Castre at Lapu-Lapu City. It constructed a resort and hotel. for the right of way.
- Private respondents (PR) are the owners of the adjoining properties known as o PR not able to prove that the isolation of the property was not due to
Lots 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon Cadastre. their personal or their predecessors-in-interest’s own acts.
- Before the construction of the beach hotel, PR passed through a passageway o PR not able to how that the passageway they seek to be re-opened
which traversed Costabella’s property to go to and from their properties and is at a point least prejudicial to Costabella.
the provincial road.
o In 1981, Costabella closed the passageway when it began the hotel
construction, but opened another route across its property through
which the PR were allowed to pass.
o In 1982, for the 2nd phase of the construction of the hotel, Costabella
fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway
o An action for injunction with damages was filed against Costabella
by PR before the CFI Cebu
- PR Claims: The passageway is an ancient road right of way, existing before
WW2 and since then was used by them, the community, and the general
public, either as pedestrians or by means of vehicles.
o They also alleged that Costabella constructed a dike on the beach
fronting its property without the necessary permit, obstructing
passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris
and flotsam on the beach.
- Costabella: denied the existence of an ancient road through its property and
averred that it and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted the temporary,
intermittent, and gratuitous use of, or passage through, its property by the PR
and others by mere tolerance and purely as an act of neighborliness.
o Justified the fencing for the protection of the privacy and convenience
of its hotel patrons and guests.
- TC: in favor of PR.
- CA: Easement of a right of way is a discontinuous one which may only be
acquired by title and not by prescription. But, by equity jurisdiction, the
easement is legally demandable by the owner of the dominant estate from the
owner of the servient estate. In favor of PR.

W/N private respondents acquired an easement of right of way (passageway) on

Costabella’s property? – NO
- Based on Arts 649 and 650, the owner of the dominant estate may validly
claim and compulsory right of way after he has established the existence of
the 4 requisites:
o Dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway
o Payment of proper indemnity
o Isolation was not due to the proprietor’s own acts
o Right of way claims is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate

Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga

Dominant estate’s needs determine the width of the easement
VILLANUEVA v. JUDGE VELASCO, Sebastian, and Lorilla
346 SCRA 99 27 November 2000
FACTS
- Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by a TCT. He
bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation (mortgagee). The bank acquired it
from Sps. Macimo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction.
o When it was bought, there was a small house on its southeastern
portion which occupied one meter of the 2-meter wide easement of
right of way of the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas
(predecessor-in-interest of Sebastian and Lorilla, private
respondents/PR in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way).
o Unknown to Villanueva even before he bought the land, the Gabriels
had constructed a small house encroaching upon said easement.
o He was also unaware that PR filed a civil case for easement against
Sps Gabriel. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted
to enforce the contract of easement.
- Villanueva’s claim: The contract cannot be enforced against him.
o A right of way cannot exist when it is not expressly stated or
annotated on the Torrens title.
o A person dealing with registered land is not required to go beyond
what is recorded in the title.
o It is PR who should have made sure their right of way was
safeguarded by having the same annotated on the title.
- Sebastian and Lorilla’s claim:
o Villanueva was bound by the contract as a voluntary and as a legal
easement.
o A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exist unless
its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the
easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance with
Art 649 in accordance with Art 617.
- Both TC and CA declared the existence of the easement.
W/N the easement on the property binds Villanueva – YES
- The small house obstructs the entry of PR’s cement mixer and motor vehicle.
1 meter is insufficient for the needs of the PR. It is well settled that the needs
of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.
o Villanueva ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the
easement in view of the needs of the PR’s estate.
- The easement is in the nature of legal easement, hence, Villanueva is legally
bound to provide the dominant estate ingress from and egress to the public
highway.
- As to the enforcement of the contract from a prior civil case upon which
Villanueva was not a party to: a decision in a case is conclusive and binding
upon the parties to said case and those who are their successor in interest by
title after said case has been commenced or filed in court.
Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga
It is not enough that the easement be where the way is shortest. It is more important
that it be where it will cause the least prejudice to the servient estate
CRISTOBAL v CA, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., Sps. Pacione
291 SCRA 122 22 June 1998
FACTS
- Cristobal, et al, own a house and lot at #10 Visayas Ave Ext, QC where they
have been residing from 1961 to the present.
o Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc (Cesar), is the owner of a
subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Ave which once include
the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and 2, originally part of a private
road known as Road Lot 2 owned by Cesar.
o Cristobal, et al, used Road Lot 2 in going to and from the nearest
public road.
- When Visayas Ave became operational as a national road in 1979, Cesar filed
a petition to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots. Petition was
granted. Cesar sold both lots 1 and 2 to Mariano Pacione who later conveyed
to lots to Sps. Pacione (son and daughter-in-law).
o When Sps. Pacione intended to build a house on Lot 1 and visited
the lot, they found out that the lot was occupied by a squatter named
Juanita Geronimo and a portion was being used as a passageway
by Cristobal et al to reach Visayas Ave.
o Sps. complained about the intrusion into the barangay. Cristobal et
al offered to pay for the use of the portion of Lot 1 as a passageway
but Sps Pacione rejected the offer.
o After failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, Sps Pacione started
enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence.
- Cristobal et al protested the enclosure. Their property was bounded on all
sides by the residential houses belonging to different owners and had no
adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Ave except through Sps Pacione’s
property.
o At the instance of the parties, an ocular inspection was ordered by
the trial court to which it was reported that there is another way from
Visayas Ave identified as Ma. Elena St, meeting a private road…
W/N the elements/requisites to establish entitlement to a compulsory easement
of right of way was established by Cristobal, et al? – NO
- First element is absent (that dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public highway), as observed
through the report from the ocular inspection which is determined to be
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate. Cristobal, et al, has no cause
to complain that they have no adequate outlet to Visayas Ave.

FLORO v LLENADO
244 SCRA 713 2 June 1995
FACTS
- Simeon Floro owns the Floro Park Subdivision in Brgy Saluysoy,
Meycauayan, Bulacan
o The subdivision has its own egress and ingress to and from the
MacArthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level
crossing
- Llenado was the registered owner of 2 parcels of land known as Llenado
Homes Subdivision. It is bounded on the South by the 5-6 m wide Palanas
Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park.
o Llenado Homs does not have any existing road of passage to the
highway.
o A proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo
has been provided in the subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision (the subdivision before Llenado bought it and changed it
to Llenado Homes), duly approved by the defunct Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission, now HLURB
- 1983, Llenados sought and were granted permission by the Floros to use
Road Lots 4 and 5 as passageway to and from the MacArthur Highway.
Months later, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts,
and adobe stones, preventing its use by the Llenados.
o Request to reopen Road Lot 5 was denied. Llenado instituted a
complaint for easement of right of way.
FRANCISCO v IAC and Ramos
177 SCRA 527 15 September 1989
FACTS
- Ramos’ lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate. Lot 860
was owned by Cornelia and Frisca Dila, and had a frontage along Parada
Road measuring 51.90 meters.
o Adjoining Lot 860 was Lot 26 owned by Francisco which also had a
frontage along Parada road of 62. 10 meters.
o Lot 860 was subdivided. Former co-owners evidently overlooked the
fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Lot 860-B effectively isolated
from Parada Road the other lots (860-A/C/D)
o 860-A was eventually sold to Eugenio sisters and then to Ramos.
- Ramos set up a piggery. He then asked his lawyer to write to Francsico, owner
of the adjoining lot, to ask for a right of way through the latter’s land.
o Negotiations failed to bring about a satisfactory arrangement.
o Ramos succeeded in obtaining a 3-meter wide passageway through
Lot 860-B. But he put up a 10-foot concrete wall on his lot, thereby
closing the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860-B.
o Francisco learned of Ramos’ intention to pursue the passage in Lot
266 due to convenience, he then replaced the barbed wire fence in
his lot with a stone wall.
W/N Ramos is entitled to a right of way on Francisco’s property – NO
- Isolation was due to Ramos’ own fault since he was given an adequate
easement on Lot 860-B but he built a wall so such easement cannot be used.

W/N Llenados are entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way – NO

- Llenado omitted to state that there is a proposed access road through the
Ipapo property. There being an existing right of way over the Ipapo property,
the first requirement for a grant of compulsory easement over the Floro Park
has not been met.
- Second requisite (compensation/indemnity) was also not met. Complaint did
not contain a prayer for the fixing of an amount.
- The isolation was due to the doing of its owner/developer/applicant. The
access road in the Plan of Emmanuel/Llenado Homes was for which a right of
way over the Ipapo property was procured merely for the sake of securing an
approval of the proposed development plan, but no proofs of actual work
having been done to construct a road over the right of way to connect the
subdivision to the highway was shown. Nevertheless, Llenado admitted that
the Ipapo riceland was no longer being cultivated. There was no reason for
Llenado’s failure to develop the right of way except the inconvenience and
expenses it would cost him.

Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga

QUIMEN v CA, Oliveros o Right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree
257 SCRA 122 29 May 1996 to be cut down. (this is to be preferred)

FACTS
- Anastasia Quimen with her siblings, inherited a piece of property in Pandi,
Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves.
- Oliveros was offered one of the lots. She initially hesitated because it had no
access to a public road. But Quimen prevailed upon her to buy the lot with
assurance that she would be given a right of way on Quimen’s adjoining
property. Oliveros bought the lot and constructed a house.
o When Oliveros offered to pay for the use of the pathway on Quimen’s
property, Quimen refused to accept payment. Oliveros was also
barred by Quimen from passing through her property.
- Oliveros bought another lot from Antonio Quimen (one of the siblings with a
share on the subdivided property). It provided her a pathway but it was not
adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with
facility because of Sotero’s sari-sari store (Sotero is another sibling) which
obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the
façade of the store to reach the road.
- Oliveros filed an action praying for a right of way through Anastacia Quimen’s
property.
o Based on the TC’s ocular inspection, it reported/proposed a right of
way at the back of the sari-sari store which was unobstructed except
for an avocado tree standing in the middle.
o TC dismissed for lack of cause of action. The right of way through
Sotero’s property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting
through Anastacia’s property would no longer make the path straight.
It was more practical to extend the pathway by removing a portion of
the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the public
road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing
through Anastacia’s property.
o CA reversed. Oliveros was entitled to a right of way and Oliveros’
proposal would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient
estate.

W/N Oliveros has a right to an easement on Anastacia Quimen’s property? – YES

- The voluntary easement (which Quimen now denies) has become a legal
easement by necessity constituted by law.
- The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of shortest distance. While shortest distance may imply least
prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures
obstructing the shortest distance
- Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and cause
the least damage should be chosen. If the 2 circumstances do not concur, the
way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be
the shortest.
- Choices:
o Right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials; or

Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga

Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria v. Court of o When they purchased the lot, it was already surrounded by other
Appeals and Spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo immovables
GR No. 127549 4. Right of way is least prejudicial to servient estate (650)
January 28, 1998 o No significant structure would be adversely affected, there is
sufficient vacant space between their houses (11 meters)
Facts of the case o Based on the ocular reports, among the 3 possible servient estates,
- The Fajardo spouses are the registered owners of a piece of land of the the Sta Maria properties would afford the shortest distance and least
Obando Cadastre (1043 square meters) – Lot 124 prejudicial
o Acquired said lot under a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro
Sanchez et al. CA decision is affirmed and the compulsory easement of right of way is granted.
- The lot is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond on the northeast, by Lot 126 owned
by a Florentino Cruz on the southeast, by Lot 6A (owned by Cesar and
Raquel) and a portion of 6B (Florcefida) on the southwest, and by Lot 122
owned by Jacinto family on the northwest
- On February 17, spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against the Sta Marias for
the establishment of an easement of right of way alleging that their lot is
surrounded by properties belonging to other persons and they had no
adequate outlet to the provincial road—an easement of right of way pasing
through either of the Sta Marias’ properties would be the only convenient,
direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road
o Their predecessors-in-interest have been passing through said
properties and that the mother of the Sta Marias even promised the
granting of an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the
absence of access to the provincial road
o The Sta Marias, despite request, refused to grant them an easement
- RTC found that based on an Ocular Inspection Report, there was no other
way through which the Fajardos could establish a right of way to reach the
provincial road except by traversing directly the property of the Sta Marias.
o Payment of indemnity would be in the amount of 3750.00 (1,250 to
Florcerfida and 2,500 to Cesar and Raquel)
- CA affirmed.
o Valuation is modified (from 50 to 2000 per square meter)

Can a compulsory easement of right of way be established? Yes.

- According to the Supreme Court, the assailed RTC and CA decisions satisfied
the requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right
of way under the Civil Code
1. Dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and no outlet to a
highway (649 par 1)
o Property of Fajardos is completely surrounded with adobe fence
without any point of egress or ingress to the national road
o Only a passage way for people is available but it cannot be
considered an adequate outlet for the purpose of establishing an
easement—width of an easement shall be sufficient for the needs of
the dominant estate
2. Payment of proper indemnity (649 par 1)
o Fajardos testified on direct examination that they are willing to pay
the corresponding damage granted by law
3. Isolation is not due to acts of proprietor of dominant estate (649 last par)

Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga

Remigio Ramos Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty Inc., Eduardo Asprec, and Court of
Appeals
GR No. 75905
October 12, 1987
Facts of the case
- Ramos is the owner of a house and lot in Parañaque (901 square meters)
o It was acquired from Science Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision
o In the subdivision survey plan it was described as Lot 4133-G-11 and
2 road lots abut this said property with an area of 2160 square meters
 Proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan and Lot 4135
of the Parañaque Cadastre (now known as the Pambansa
Road but commonly referred to as Gatchalian Avenue)
- Asprec owns Lot 4135
- Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135, Gatchalian Realty was granted the
road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and
Asprec subdivision
- A complaint for easement of right of way was filed by Ramos against Asprec
and Gatchalian Realty because they built a 7-8 feet high concrete wall infront
of the Ramos’ premises blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road
- RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction to compel Gatchalian Realty and
Asprec to remove the wall – judgment was subsequently rendered in favor of
Ramos granting the right of way through Palanyag Road to and from A. Santos
Avenue and payment of 5000 as indemnity (to Asprec and Gatchalian)
o This decision was vacated (same was rendered even when
defendants had not yet presented evidence) and a new decision was
rendered
- CA found that Ramos failed to establish the existence of the preconditions to
be legally entitled to an easement of right of way
Is Ramos entitled to a right of way? No.
- Ramos has not successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the
grant are present
- Since there is no agreement between the contending parties to grant a right
of way, establishment of a voluntary easement is ruled out, what is left to
examine is whether Ramos is entitled to legal or compulsory easement of right
of way
1. Dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and no outlet to a
highway (649 par 1)
o Ramos failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to
Sucat Road except through Gatchalian Avenue
o There is a road provided by the Lombos Subdivision and to allow the
petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue would
completely ignore what jurisprudence consistently maintain through
the years regarding easement that mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis
- Since Ramos failed to prove the existence of the first requisite, no need to
discuss the others.
CA decision is affirmed.
Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga
Sps. Manuel and Rosalina Mejorada v. Glorificacion and Sol Vertudazo, Sps
Jimmy and Glosita Galvizo, Sps Fermin and Ellen Cabrera, Sps Felixto and Rena
Ariate, and Sps Raul and Arcila Arlalejo
GR No. 151797
October 11, 2007
Facts of the case
- In 1981, Vertudazo sps and their co-respondents established their permanent
residence on a 300 square meter lot in Surigao del Sur
o Property is landlocked being bordered on all sides by different lots
o As an access rout to Quiones St and the public highway, they utilized
a proposed undeveloped barangay road on the south side of their
property owned by Rosario Quiones
- In 1988, Mejorada sps bought Rosario’s 646 square meter lot adjacent to the
Vertudazo lot, included therein in an area measuring 55 square meters which
serves as an adequate outlet to Quiones St – for several years, the general
public have been using said area as passageway to and from Quiones St
- In 1997, Mejorada sps closed the passageway by building a new garage
for their service jeep
o Respondents brought the subject matter to the barangay but no
settlement was reached
 They filed a complaint with RTC praying for a grant of
easement of right of way over the property
- RTC ordered that passageway be opened during the day and closed in the
evening during the pendency of the case (5am-9pm)
o They did not abide by their commitment
- RTC rendered a decision decreeing the establishment of right of way.
- CA affirmed.
Are the respondents entitled to a right of way? Yes.
- Legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public
use or for public interest
- Owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right of way claim a legal
or compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of the
4 requisites (present in this case)
1. There is no other road which respondents could use leading to Quiones
St except the passageway on Mejorada’s property
2. They offered to pay indemnity for the easement of way
3. Isolation of the property was not due to their acts
4. Easement is at the point least prejudicial to the property—area of
easement is located at the corner of the landholding—no inconvenience
CA decision is affirmed.
Crispin Dichoso Jr., Evelyn Dichoso Valdez, and Rosemarie Dichoso Pe Benito
v. Patrocinio Marcos
GR No. 180282
April 11, 2011
Facts of the case
- On August 2, 2002, Dichoso filed a complaint for easement of right of way
against Marcos
o They allege that they are owners of Lot 21553 part of the Cadastral
Survey of Laoag while Marcos is the owner of Lot 1
 Dichoso has no access to a public road and from their
property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot 1 in
accessing the road since 1970
- Marcos blocked the passagewat with piles of sand
o Though Dichoso have been granted another passageway by
spouses Arce (owners of another adjacent lot)
- RTC rendered a decision granting them the right of way over 54 square meters
more or less over Lot 1 owned by Marcos and to pay 54,000 as proper
indemnity and ordered the RD to annotate the right of way on Marcos’ title to
the property
- CA reversed.
Are petitioners entitled to an easement of right of way? No.
- The easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to
the proprietor’s own acts
- Petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the
requirements for an easement of a right of way (Articles 649 and 650)
- They have been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot and other
lot owners have used said outlet in going to and coming from the public
highway
o There is an existing outlet to and from the public road!
- Concept of what is an adequate outlet is a complete disregard of the well-
entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of a
right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it
o Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by
law as the basis to set up compulsory easement
- Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
easement, the same should not be imposed
o Convenience of dominant estate has never been the gauge for the
grant of the compulsory right of way
CA decision is affirmed.
Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga
National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals and Dick Manglapus
GR No. 114348
September 20, 2000
Facts of the case
- On June 28, 1963, a free patent over 3 hectares of land (Cagayan) was issued
in the name of Manglapus’s predecessor-in-interest (Vicente Manglapus) and
registered under an OCT under his name
o Land was granted to Vicente and subject to the proviso expressly
stated in the title:
 “…and subject finally to all conditions and public easements
and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially
those mentioned in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and
114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended…”
- Dick acquired said lot from Vicenty by an absolute sale
o It was registered under Dick’s name under a TCT
- In 1982, NIA entered into a contract with Villamar Development Construction
where NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan
o NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus’ land and made diggings
and fillings thereon
- On 1991, Manglapus filed with RTC a complaint for damages under NIA
alleging that the diggings and fillings destroyed the agricultural use of his land
and that no other reasonable compensation was paid for its taking
- RTC rendered a decision in favor of Manglapus
o Pay sum of 150,600 and 50k as compensatory damages
- NIA filed a motion to lift the order of default but was denied by RTC and CA
- RTC gave due course to the appeal and ordered transmission of original
records to CA
o Manglapus filed for an execution of judgment with RTC
- CA affirmed the decision and appeal is dismissed.
Should NIA pay Manglapus for just compensation for the taking of a portion of
his property for use as easement of right of way? No.
- TCT covering the parcel contained reservations granting the government
a right of way over the land covered therein
o "...subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the
Public Land Act, as well as those of Mining Laws, if the land is
mineral, and subject, further to such conditions contained in the
original title as may be subsisting."
- Canal was only 11 meters in width, well within the limit provided by law—
Manglapus has no cause to complain!
- He cannot claim good faith since under the Torrens title, the vendee must see
the TCT and rely upon the same—here, the annotation is imposed upon
Manglapus to refer to the conditions annotated at the back of the TCT—which
he did not do!
Petition is granted. CA decision is reversed. NIA is not obligated to pay.
ABELLANA, SR. v. CA
GR No. 97039
April 24, 1992

Facts of the case

- Abellana, Sr., et al. who lived in a parcel of land abutting the northwestern side
of the Nonoc Homes Subdv, sued to establish an easement of right of way
over a subdivision road which they claim to be used as a footpath which they
and their ancestors had been using since time immemorial, and thus, acquired
through prescription.
- The construction of a wall by the respondents around the subdivision deprived
the petitioners of the use of the road which gives the residents access to the
public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls be removed and that
the road be opened to them.
o The respondents denied the pre-existing footpath and alleged that
the Nonoc Subdv. Roads are not the shortest way to a public road
for there is a more direct route from the petitioners’ land to the public
highway.

Are the petitioners entitled to the easement of right of way? NO.

- Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and
apparent and may be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil
Code, is erroneous. The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not
a continuous easement because its use is at intervals and depends upon the
acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over
somebody else's land. Hence, a right of way is NOT acquirable by
prescription.
- Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides that the
“owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any existing public road
or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of
way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the
government authorities concerned.”
o The provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision
(which petitioners are not) without access to a public highway.
- The petitioners' allegation that the footpaths which were converted to
subdivision roads have acquired the status of public streets, is not well taken.
In the first place, whether or not footpaths previously existed in the area which
is now known as the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, is a factual issue which this
Court may not determine for it is not a trier of facts.

Petition DENIED.

Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga

ENCARNACION v. CA value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the
GR No. 77628 servient estate pursuant to Article 649.
March 11, 1991

Facts of the case

- Tomas Encarnacion owns the dominant estate with an area of 2590sqm in
Buco, Talisay, Batangas.
o The property was bounded on the North by that of de Sagun and
Magsino; on the South by Taal Lake; on the East by that of Felino
Matienzo; and on the West by Pedro Matienzo.
o The servient estate of the respondent stands between the dominant
estate and the nation highway.
- Prior to 1960, the servient was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence.
However in 1960 when respondents constructed a fence around the servient
estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was
constituted to provide access to the highway. One-half meter width of the path
was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion was
taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was
asked and non was given for the portions constituting the pathway.
- About this time, Encarnacion started his plant nursery business on his land.
He would use the pathway as passage to the highway for his family and
customers. With the business flourishing, it became difficult to haul the plants
and garden soil to and from the nursery and highway with the use of pushcarts.
He bought an owner-type jeep but it can’t pass through the road path, so he
sought to buy 1.5m of the property of Sagun to widen the roadpath. This failed.
- TC and CA denied the petition for the widening, claiming that there is a dried
river bed only 80m away from the dominant estate which could be used.

Is Encarnacion entitled to the widening? YES.

- While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant
tenement, that access is grossly inadequate.
o The river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there
is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the
level of the highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up. Moreover,
during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods.
Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the
inherent disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult,
if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
- According to Art. 651, “the width of the easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly
be changed from time to time." Therefore, it is the needs of the dominant
property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these
needs may vary from time to time.
- Petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his
land to compensate private respondents for their loss. He must also indemnify
the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose
adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original path several years
ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a
continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the

Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga

VDA. DE BALTAZAR v. CA
GR No. 106082
June 27, 1995
Facts of the case
- Daniel Panganiban owns a parcel of land denominated as Lot 1027 at Sta.
Ines, Bulacan.
o In front is Lot 1026 of Vda de Baltazar and her son. Immediately
behind is Sta. Ana river. On either sides are Lots 1025 of Ricardo
Calimon, and Lot 1028 of Jose Legaspi.
o Braulio Street, a provincial road, runs along the frontage of Lots
1025, 1026, and 1028.
- Panagniban filed for the establishment of a permanent easement of right of
way for him to have access to the provincial road through the Baltazars’
property, Lot 1026.
o Baltazars opposed, alleging that there exists two other rights of way
adjacent to his property:
 A passageway running over the properties of Bernardo and
Jose Legaspi.
 A passageway over the properties of Calimons.
- TC denied, CA granted right of way.
Is Panaganiban entitled to claim and easement of right of way over Baltazars’
property? YES.
- The existence of the two passageways was not simultaneous and was granted
by respondent's neighbors, Calimon and Legaspi only upon respondent's
request when petitioner Baltazar closed the claimed passageway.
- The first requirement is established as Panganiban’s property is indeed
surrounded by immovables on three sides, and a river on the fourth.
- With respect to the second requirement, the CA was correct when it ordered
the remand of the case for the purpose of fixing the proper indemnity.
- For the third, the isolation of his property was not due to his own act for he
merely bought Lot 1027, which was formerly part of the Baltazars' Lot 1026-
A.
o Lot 1026-B which the respondents have been using as a right of way,
has been "existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used
by the appellant as a right of way for 30yrs during the lifetime of
petitioner's grandfather, Fidel and his father, Onisimo Baltazar. The
right of way was "closed and obstructed by the petitioners when they
closed the gate and placed plants across the gate of Lot 1026-B
when petitioners constructed their present residence.
- As to the fourth, both parties agreed that the passage claimed by respondent
as his right of way, compared to the other passageways, is the shortest
distance from respondent's lot to Braulio Street.
- The Baltazars could not have been inconvenienced by the passageway for,
as borne out by the records, the same is separate and distinct from the gate
used by them to enter their lot and residence. Such being the case, it is
concluded that respondent is entitled to claim a compulsory easement of right
of way over petitioners' Lot 1026-B
CA AFFIRMED.
Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga
DAVID-CHAN v. CA
GR No. 105294
Feb. 26, 1997
Facts of the case
- Pacita David-Chan’s property in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga, was
delineated on its northern and western sides by various business
establishments. Along its southern boundary was the land of Pineda family;
and on the east-northeastern boundary, and lying between her property and
the MacArthur Highway, was another lot owned by respondents Phil. Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc.
o Her only access to the highway was a very small opening measuring
2’4” wide through the property of the respondent. She believed that
she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right of way.
o She filed a case, alleging that the respondent was about to complete
the construction of its concrete fence which would result in depriving
her of the only available right of way.
- Respondents denied and claimed that as per another case, it was adjudged
that the petitioner was found to be illegally occupying her property.
Is the petitioner entitled to a right of way through private respondent’s property?
NO.
- The courts found that it was petitioner herself who built a concrete fence on
the southern boundary which separated it from the property of the Pinedas.
Additionally, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a
means to reach the National Highway without passing through the property of
the respondents. If she wants a bigger opening, she can always destroy the
concrete fence and pass through the property of Pineda, which has an open
space on the southern boundary of petitioner’s land.
- Furthermore, she even closed the small opening causing her property to be
isolated and losing one access to the National Highway.
- Therefore, she failed to meet the third requisite for the grant of easement
of right of way that the isolation is not due to the proprietors own acts.
- Also, the complaint contained no averment that demand for the easement of
right of way had been made after payment of the proper indemnity. There was
no showing that plaintiff ever made a tender of payment of the proper
indemnity for the right of way. As the lower court said, The fact that plaintiff
prays that defendant Rabbit be ordered to sell to her the disputed premises
hardly satisfies the requisite regarding the payment of the proper indemnity.
- Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of her legal arguments, petitioner who claims
to be an ordinary housewife with resources pleads that those who have less
in life should have more in law and that the Court should apply the Filipino
values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao in resolving the case.
o Such appeal, being based on equity, is applied only in the absence
of, and never against statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
Petition DENIED.
 Opone and Tudtud roads on the western and southern sides of
ALMENDRAS v. CA petitioners land.
GR No. 110067 o CA, in pointing to the longer way, considered the fact that this was
March 13, 1997 already existing and does not preclude its use by other parties.
- The way may be longer and not the most direct way to the provincial road, but
Facts of the case if the establishment of the easement in favor of petitioner on this roads
- Linda Almendras owned a parcel of lang in Banilad, Cebu. will cause the least prejudice, then the easement should be constituted
o The land is bounded on the north and east by lots of respondents there.
Tan Pang Eng and Fabina Yap; on the south by the lot of Celedonio
Bongo; and on the west by the properties of Tomas Opone and Case REMANDED to RTC for determination of least prejudicial road.
Zosimo Opone.
o On the western part of petitioner’s land abuts an existing private road,
6 meters wide, which leads to another private road which in turn
connects to the provincial road.
- Respondents Eng and Yap began building a concrete wall on their property
(N & E). Almendras offered to buy a portion of their lot so that she could have
access to the provincial road. This was denied on the round that there was an
existing private road, and that to grant the request would reduce the value of
the property sold, as the proposed right of way cuts across the middle of the
property.
- Bongo also fenced his property, closing off the South boundary of petitioner’s
lot.
- Petitioner brought an action for the establishment of a right of way.
Subsequently, Opone also closed off the Western side by erecting a fence,
with the result that the petitioner’s property became inaccessible.
- TC granted the establishment of right of way, CA reversed.

Is the petitioner entitled to a right of way through private respondents property?

NO.
- The road abutting the western boundary of petitioners lot, known as the Opone
road, is an existing, passable, private road which connects to another road,
the Tudtud road, on the southern side of petitioners lot. This road leads to the
Cebu-Banilad Cadre Provincial Road located on the eastern side of
petitioner’s lot.
- The Tudtud and Opone roads already constitute permanent easements. It
held that although the Tudtud easement was constituted by naming the
owners of the individual lots, the annotation of the easement nevertheless
categorically states that the easement is established as a gesture of
[Bienvenido Tudtuds] love and service to his fellowmen, which, the appellate
court interpreted to mean for the benefit of the public in general.
- The easement must be established at the point which is least prejudicial
to the servient estate and, whenever possible, the shortest to the
highway. If these two conditions exist on different properties, the land
where establishment of the easement will cause the least prejudice
should be chosen.
o TC ruled that the easement should be constituted through the land
of private respondents on the eastern side because it would be the
shortest way to the provincial road, being only 17.45 meters long,
compared to 149.22 meters if the easement was constituted on the

Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga

DIONISIO v. ORTIZ own or voluntary act, they themselves have caused the isolation of their
GR No. 95738 property from the access road. Article 649 provides:
December 10, 1991 o The easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
Facts of the case - The construction of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small passageway
- Adriana Dionisio, et al., are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other situated between them is an act imputable to the private respondents which precludes
in Sitio Kangkong, Balintawak, QC. them from asserting a right of way. The opening of the new gate would
- Respondents Pablo Gonzaga, et al., are also co-owners of lots which are definitely be very convenient to the private respondents but mere convenience
adjacent to the lots of petitioners. Lot 272-B was subdivided into two lots is not enough to serve as basis for the assertion of a right of way.
where Lot 272-A was assigned to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong. The
respondents are also owners of another lot at the upper portion of 272-B.
- By virtue of an agreement between the lot owners and the members of QC
Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), a right of way was granted over
Howmart Road, a private road traversing the contiguous lots of the petitioners,
in favor of the QCIEA members. In return, the QCIEA paid compensation to
the petitioners.
o The respondents are members of the QCIEA.
- In order to access Howmart Road, there is a in respondents lot fronting
Howmart, and another gate in Lot 272-A. As a result of the subdivision of Lot
272, respondents opened a new gate in 272-B.
- Under the directions of Maxima Dionisio certain persons commenced digging
holes and put up steel posts in front of the gate of respondents amidst their
protest.
o The petitioners claim that the gate opened directly into the house of
Maxima, exposing them to air and noise pollution.
- The respondents instituted a case for damages, and sought the removal of
the barricade erected in front of the iron gate.
- Petitioners removed the barricade in front of the gate of the respondents after
they failed to obtain a TRO from the CA.

Do the respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road? NO.
- A right of way was granted in favor of the private respondents over Howmart
Road but the records disclose that such right of way expired in December,
1988. The continued use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEA including the
private respondents is by the mere tolerance of the owners pending the
renegotiation of the terms and conditions of said right of way. This is precisely
shown by the two letters to the QCIEA requesting for an increase in
compensation for the use of Howmart Road. Absent an agreement of the
parties as to the consideration, among others, no contract of easement of right
of way has been validly entered into by the petitioners and QCIEA. Thus, the
private respondents' claim of an easement of right of way over Howmart Road
has no legal or factual basis.
- The records show that there are two gates through which the private
respondents may pass to have direct access to EDSA: (1) the northern gate
which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the southern gate along Howmart Road.
The records also disclose that the petitioners and the other lot owners
previously prohibited and prevented members of QCIEA from opening new
gates. The claim that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the
subdivision of Lot 272 where a wall was constructed between these 2 lots is
untenable. The private respondents can not assert a right of way when by their

Gaba, Mangaser, Sunga