BARREDO v.

GARCIA
G.R. No. L-48006

Date of Promulgation: July 8, 1942

Ponente: Bocobo, J.
Petitioner: Fausto Barredo
Respondents: Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario

Facts:
At about 1:30 am on May 3, 1986, there was a head-on collision between a Malate Taxicab car
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela (carriage) on which was riding 16-year-old Faustino
Garcia. Two days later, Garcia died from injuries sustained from the crash. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal convicted Fontanilla and reserved the right to bring a separate civil action.
Respondents Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, the boy’s parents, brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as proprietor of Malate Taxicab and
Fontanilla’s employer. The defense contends that Barredo’s liability is governed by the Revised
Penal Code and is only subsidiary, and since there has been no civil action against Fontanilla,
Barredo cannot be held responsible.

Issue/Held:
WON respondents may bring a separate civil action against petitioner Barredo, making him
primarily responsible under Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code - YES

Doctrines:
1. Art. 1157, CC. Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

1) Laws;
2) Contracts;
3) Quasi-contracts;
4) Acts and ommissions punished by law; and
5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

2. Art. 1161, CC. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the
penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book,
regulating damages. (1092a)

3. Art. 2176, CC. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

4. Art. 2180(1), CC. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
(1903a)
Ratio:
1. On the distinction and overlap between quasi-delicts and delicts

Authorities hold that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution with a
substantivity and individuality independent from delict or crime. In fact, the same negligent
act may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the RPC, or
create an action for culpa aquiliana under Articles 1902-1910 of the old CC.

The differences between crimes under the RPC and quasi-delicts under the CC are:

a. Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts are only of private concern.
b. The RPC punishes and corrects the criminal act, while the CC repairs damage by
indemnification.
c. Delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, which include all acts in which “any kind of
fault or negligence intervenes”.

In his analysis of a Spanish case involving a train collision, Maura stated that the action for
reparation cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities arising from a crime. Montero
also wrote that civil responsibility without criminal responsibility is separate from penal
liability. Indeed, the distinctive character of quasi-delicts traces back to the Roman Lex
Aquilia, from which the term culpa aquiliana originates.

However, given that Article 365 of the RPC punishes both reckless and simple negligence, it
would seem that very few acts or omissions fall under Article 1902. The Court addressed this
by saying, as previously mentioned, that the same act may give rise to civil liability arising
from a crime or an action for culpa aquiliana. The Court also gave the following grounds for
this doctrine:

a. If Articles 1902-1910 of the old CC were to be restricted to negligence or fault not

punished by law, culpa aquiliana would have very little application in real life.
b. To establish guilt in a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, unlike a
civil case which merely requires a preponderance of evidence.
c. To hold that Barredo is only subsidiarily liable would be to compel the plaintiffs to a
cumbersome remedy.
d. Given the common practice of seeking damages only through criminal cases, the
Court has seen it fit to restore culpa aquiliana.

2. On defendant Barredo’s liability

Aside from the above discussion, the Court also cited a similar Spanish case where a widow
sought damages for the death of her husband, who was run over by a street car. This case is
significant for the following reasons:

a. Like the instant case, the conductor in the former was not sued in a civil case.
b. Unlike in the Spanish case, the plaintiffs here chose to sue Barredo for his primarily
liability as an employer, not subsidiary.
 c. In the Spanish case, the employer was held liable civilly despite his conductor’s
acquittal; with greater reason should Barredo be held liable since Fontanilla was
convicted.

Decision:
Decision is affirmed.