The French Army’s Tank Force

and Armoured Warfare in

the Great War
The Artillerie Spéciale

Tim Gale
 This figure has intentionally been removed for copyright reasons.
To view this image, please refer to the printed version of this book

General Jean-Baptiste Estienne reviewing the troops.

Courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London (IWM Q56439).
This book is dedicated to my parents
John and Lisel Gale
 THE FRENCH ARMY’S TANK FORCE AND
ARMOURED WARFARE IN THE GREAT WAR

Recent scholarship has challenged the assumption that military commanders

during the First World War were inflexible, backward-looking and unwilling
to exploit new technologies. Instead a very different picture is now emerging
of armies desperately looking to a wide range of often untested and immature
scientific and technological innovations to help break the deadlock of the Western
Front. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the development of tank warfare,
which both the British and the French hoped would give them a decisive edge in
their offensives of 1917 and 1918. Whilst the British efforts to develop armoured
warfare have been well chronicled, there has been no academic study in English
on the French tank force – the Artillerie Spéciale – during the Great War. As
such, this book provides a welcome new perspective on an important but much
misunderstood area of the war.

Such was the scale of the French tanks’ failure in their first engagement in 1917,
it was rumoured that the Artillerie Spéciale was in danger of being disbanded,
yet, by the end of the war it was the world’s largest and most technologically
advanced tank force. This work examines this important facet of the French
army’s performance in the First World War, arguing that the Artillerie Spéciale
fought the war in as intelligent and sensible a manner as was possible, given the
immature state of the technology available. No amount of sound tank doctrine
could compensate for the fragility of the material, for the paucity of battlefield
communication equipment and for the lack of tank-infantry training opportunities.
Only by 1918 was the French army equipped with enough reliable tanks, as well
as aircraft and heavy-artillery, to begin to exercise a mastery of the new form of
combined-arms warfare. The successful French armoured effort outlined in this
study (including a listing of all the combat engagements of the French tank service
in the Great War) highlights a level of military effectiveness within the French
army that has hitherto been little acknowledged.

About the author

Dr Tim Gale undertook his doctoral research on the French tank service (the
Artillerie Spéciale) at the Department of War Studies, King’s College, under the
supervision of Professor William Philpott. His interests continue to be the Artillerie
Spéciale and other aspects of French Army in the Great War.
 Ashgate Studies in
First World War History

Series Editor

John Bourne
University of Birmingham, UK

The First World War is a subject of perennial interest to historians and is often
regarded as a watershed event, marking the end of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the ‘modern’ industrial world. The sheer scale of the conflict
and massive loss of life means that it is constantly being assessed and reassessed
to examine its lasting military, political, sociological, industrial, cultural and
economic impact. Reflecting the latest international scholarly research, the
Ashgate Studies in First World War History series provides a unique platform for
the publication of monographs and edited volumes on all aspects of the Great War.
Whilst the main thrust of the series is on the military aspects of the conflict, other
related areas (including cultural, political and social) are also addressed. Books
published are aimed primarily at a post-graduate academic audience, furthering
exciting recent interpretations of the war, whilst still being accessible enough to
appeal to a wider audience of educated lay readers.

Also in this series

The Clergy in Khaki

New Perspectives on British Army Chaplaincy in the First World War
Michael Snape and Edward Madigan

British Artillery on the Western Front in the First World War

‘The Infantry cannot do with a gun less’
Sanders Marble

Early Trench Tactics in the French Army The Second

Battle of Artois, May–June 1915
Jonathan Krause
The French Army’s Tank Force
and Armoured Warfare in
the Great War
The Artillerie Spéciale

TIM GALE
First published 2013 by Ashgate Publishing

Published 2016 by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 2013 Tim Gale

Tim Gale has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be
identified as the author of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any
form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publishers.
Notice:
Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only
for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gale, Tim, 1956-
The French army’s tank force and armoured warfare in the Great War : the Artillerie
Spéciale / by Tim Gale.
pages cm. -- (Ashgate studies in First World War history)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4094-6661-1 (hardcover) 1. France. Armée. Artillerie Spéciale. 2. France.
Armée--History--World War, 1914-1918. 3. World War, 1914-1918--Tank warfare.
4. Tanks (Military science)--France--History--20th century. I. Title.
D608.G35 2013
920.4'1244--dc23
2013008982

ISBN 9781409466611 (hbk)

ISBN 9781315558004 (ebk)
 Contents

List of Figures, Photographs, Maps and Tables ix

Series Editor’s Foreword xi
Acknowledgements xiii
List of Abbreviations xv

Introduction: The French Armoured Force: The Artillerie Spéciale 1

1 ‘It takes a lot of stuff to kill a German’: French Material and

Technological Responses to the Western Front 13

2 ‘Our sacrifice will not be in vain’: The Artillerie Spéciale in the

Nivelle Offensive 1917 33

3 The Battle Behind the Lines: Aftermath of the Nivelle Offensive 61

4 ‘A Masterpiece of Tactics’: The Battle of Malmaison 79

5 ‘A Charming Toy’: The Light and Heavy Tanks and

Other Projects 107

6 The Charge at Chaudun: The Tank Regulations and the

Introduction of the Renault Light Tank into Service 125

7 All the Perfect Engines of Modern War: The Battles of Cutry

and Antheuil and Directive No 5 145

8 ‘The Greatest Day Since the Marne’:

The Battle of Soissons – July 1918 163

9 The Battle of Somme-Py: Champagne – Swansong of the

Medium Tanks 189

Conclusion: An Event as Important as the Invention of

Gunpowder and Cannon? 219
viii The French Army’s Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War

Appendix 1: Artillerie Spéciale – Order of Battle 24 May 1918 233

Appendix 2: Table of AS Engagements, 1917–18 235

Bibliography 247
Index 261
 List of Figures, Photographs,
Maps and Tables

Figure

5.1 Light tank deliveries 1917–18 116

Photographs

The publisher would like to apologize for not including the following photographs
in the eBook editions due to permissions restrictions. To view these images, please
refer to the printed version of this book.

1.1 Early Schneider (Q57721) 26

1.2 Early St Chamond (Q56451) 27
3.1 Modified Schneider – Front view (IWM Q72550) 65
3.2 Modified St Chamond without cupola (Q14646) 67
3.3 Modified Schneider – Side view (Q69504) 67
5.1 Renault light tank with 37mm gun (Q56448) 110
5.2 Renault light tanks being transported on lorries (Q56445) 111
5.3 Section of Renault light tanks (Q58238) 120
5.4 Wooden mock-up of FCM 1A tank (Q70879) 121

Maps

2.1 The Nivelle Offensive 39

4.1 The Battle of Malmaison 81
8.1 The Battle of Soissons 164
9.1 The Battle of Champagne 191

Tables

5.1 Construction statistics – medium-tank manufacture 115

A.1 Number of French tanks out of action because of
enemy activity 1917–18 245
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Series Editor’s Foreword

Despite its popular reputation as a sterile slogging match, the First World War
on the Western Front saw a transformation in the conduct of war that some
commentators have described as a ‘revolution in military affairs’. At the heart
of this transformation was the development of the ‘combined arms deep battle’.
This was made possible by a huge increase in the accuracy, range, volume and
destructiveness of artillery, by the military use of a very recent technology, powered
flight, and by the introduction of a wholly new weapon of war, the tank. The tank
was a British invention that had powerful contemporary champions, especially
Winston Churchill, and influential post-war propagandists, such as C.D. Baker-
Carr, J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart, who tended to portray British tank
development as a struggle between prophetic innovators and a reactionary military
establishment, an argument that has been demolished by modern scholarship. The
attention given to the history of British armoured development has, however,
overshadowed the importance of tanks in the French Army.
By the end of the war, France had the largest and most technologically
sophisticated tank arm in the world. Tim Gale’s scholarly study of French tank
development makes an important contribution to our understanding of armour
in the First World War in general and to our appreciation of the operational
effectiveness of the French Army in particular. The French Army’s first use of
tanks during the Nivelle Offensive of April 1917 was something of a disaster
and the continuation of the tank project owed much to the leadership of the head
of the Artillerie Spéciale, General Jean-Baptiste Estienne. Estienne understood
the potential of the tank but he also understood its limitations, technological,
industrial, operational and tactical. Tim Gale convincingly shows that within these
limitations the French tank arm was led with intelligence and sound military sense.
By the end of the war, tanks (when and where they were available) were making
a major contribution to French and Allied military success. This gave the German
Army, which had few tanks and no good ones, a convenient excuse for its defeat.
Less inhibited by an awareness of the tank’s limitations, it was the German Army
that was to take up armoured development in the inter-war period and lead it to the
next level, technologically and operationally, as the French and British learned to
their cost in the spring of 1940.

John Bourne
Centre for War Studies
Birmingham University
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Acknowledgements

A great number of people have assisted in the writing of this book. My primary
academic thanks must go to Professor William Philpott of the Department of
War Studies, King’s College London. His careful supervision of my doctoral
research and his great knowledge have been an inestimable help to me. Quite
simply, I cannot thank him enough. My friends and fellow researchers in the First
World War Operations and Tactics Group (KCL) can always be relied on to offer
trenchant and lively questions on any research presented and I am very proud to
be part of this great group of scholars. Professors Martin Alexander and Michael
Neiberg forced me to think more deeply about my research than I might have
without their probing questions and I am most grateful to them for this. The staff
of the archives at Vincennes have my deep gratitude for their help in navigating the
copious files devoted to the subject of this book and for running such a wonderful
service for researchers.
I am most grateful to John Bourne for inviting me to contribute to this series
on the Great War and to Tom Gray and Kayleigh Huelin at Ashgate for making the
publishing process so easy.
My family has been a great help. My parents, John and Lisel Gale, have been
unfailing in their enthusiasm and support for my academic research and that is
why this book is dedicated to them. My children have remained bemused by
my academic interests but have been marvellously supportive nonetheless. My
colleagues and friends in the Recorded Media Department at Equity have been
equally bemused but also equally supportive. However, Jennie Long, my partner,
has been inconvenienced the most of all by my research and I am very pleased that
I can acknowledge her unqualified support here. I really could not have written
this book without her.

Tim Gale
August 2013
This page has been left blank intentionally
 List of Abbreviations

AL Artillerie Lourde – Heavy artillery

ALC Artillerie Lourde Courte – Heavy howitzers
ALGP Artillerie Lourde Grande Puissance – High-power (i.e. long-range)
Heavy artillery
ALL Artillerie Lourde Longue – Heavy artillery guns
ALVF Artillerie Lourde sur voie ferrée – Railway heavy artillery
AT Artillerie de Tranchée – Trench artillery
BCL Bataillon de chars légers – Light Tank Battalion
CA Corps d’armée – French Army Corps
CAC Corps d’armée colonial – French Colonial Army Corps
CC Corps de cavalerie – French Cavalry Corps
Cdt. Commandant (usually refers to a Major)
CM Machine-gun company
DI Division d’infanterie – French Infantry Division
DM Division marocaine – Moroccan (infantry) Division
DSA Direction du Service automobile – Army Motor Service
EM Etat-Major – Staff (EMA – Army Staff)
Esc Escadron – Squadron
GAC Groupe d’armées du centre – Central Army Group
GAE Groupe d’armées de l’Est – Eastern Army Group
GAN Groupe d’armées du Nord – Northern Army Group
GAR Groupe d’armées de reserve – Reserve Army Group
GB Groupe de bombardement – Air bomber unit
GPA Grand Parc d’artillerie – Central artillery park
GQG Grand Quartier Général – French equivalent to GHQ
GQGA Grand Quartier général des armées Alliées – Allied GHQ
ID Infantry Division (German, British or American)
IR Infantry Regiment (German, British or American)
PA Parc d’artillerie – Artillery park
PAD Parc d’artillerie divisionnaire – Divisional artillery park
PAOC Parc annexe d’organisation de Champlieu – Part of the AS base
at Champlieu
PC Poste de commandement – Command Post
PO Poste d’observation – Observation Post
PV Pigeon Voyager – Carrier Pigeons
RAC Régiment d’artillerie de campagne – French Field Artillery Regiment
RAL Régiment d’artillerie lourde – French Heavy Artillery Regiment
xvi The French Army’s Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War

RAP Régiment d’artillerie à pied – French Foot Artillery Regiment

RAS Régiment d’artillerie d’assaut – French Tank Regiment
RI Régiment d’infanterie – French Infantry Regiment
RIC Régiment d’infanterie coloniale – French Colonial Infantry Regiment
RIT Régiment d’infanterie territoriale – French Territorial
Infantry Regiment
RMZT Régiment mixte de Zouaves et Tirailleurs – North African
Infantry Regiment
SHD Service Historique de Défense – French military archives at Vincennes
SRR Section de Réparations et de Ravitaillement – Tank Re-supply and
Breakdown Section
TM Transport de matériel – Material transportation unit
TP Transport de personnel – Personnel transportation unit
TSF Télégraphie sans fil – Wireless telegraphy
VF Voie ferrée – Railway
 Introduction
The French Armoured Force:
The Artillerie Spéciale

Such was the scale of the French tanks’ failure in their first Great War engagement
in 1917, it was rumoured that the Artillerie Spéciale (Special Artillery – AS, the
code name for the French tank force) was in danger of being disbanded.1 However,
by the middle of the following year the AS was such a potent force on the battlefield
that it caused considerable awe in its German enemies; one German Major
captured in June 1918 by the AS told his captors that their tanks were crewed by
‘much more than men’.2 By end of the war, the Artillerie Spéciale was the world’s
largest and most technologically advanced tank force with sound tactical doctrine
and well trained units. This monograph examines this aspect of the French army’s
performance in the First World War and what light this sheds on the wider issue of
the competence of the French army. The evidence and arguments presented will
rely primarily on research undertaken at the Service Historique de la Défense,
the French military archives at Vincennes, although much of the useful material
printed in the 1920s and 1930s is also utilised.3
Although the French army ended the war as the best army in Europe, according
to Douglas Porch’s 1988 study, there has been surprisingly little academic research
undertaken on it in English or French until recent years.4 Groundbreaking works

1
Charles-Maurice Chenu, Du Képi Rouge aux Chars d’Assaut (Paris, 1932), p. 248.
The French tank force was also known as artillerie d’assaut (assault artillery). It is referred
to herein as the AS.
2
Artillerie d’Assaut, Groupement III, Rapport, undated [this is a report on the Battle
of the Matz]. 16N2163.
3
All material from the archives at Vincennes (SHD) is catalogued by a series number
and then the carton number. The AS files are in series 16N and the first carton is 2120, this
will be thus referred to as 16N2120. The French official history will also be used, where
possible, as it is more accessible to researchers than the archives; Ministère de la Guerre,
Les Armées françaises dans la grande guerre, 105 volumes, published in Paris from 1923.
For example, the tome covering 18 July to 26 September 1918 is Tome 7, which is split
into two volumes of text, with three appendix volumes. Thus the first text volume would
be abbreviated as AFGG 7/1. A document in an appendix volume would be AFGG 7/1,
annexes 1, 2, 3 etc, followed by the number of the document.
4
Douglas Porch, ‘The French Army in the First World War’ in Allan R. Millett and
Williamson Murray, eds, Military Effectiveness Volume 1: The First World War, (London:
Unwin Hyman, 1988, pp. 190–228), p. 226. This was reissued in 2010 with a new
introduction but no revisions to the rest of the material.
2 The French Army’s Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War

by Robert Doughty and Michel Goya strongly argue that the French army’s
performance during the Great War was not as dismal as is commonly assumed
but they have so far failed to stimulate much further research.5 Scholarly attention
on the French army mutinies in 1917 has produced some fine work, from Guy
Pedroncini and Leonard Smith in particular, but this has again obscured how
effective the army became after the reforms of Pétain, during the extensive fighting
in 1918.6 Thus the French army remains little studied in either English or French
despite its importance to any understanding of the Great War in general or the
military developments that occurred within it in particular.7
The evidence presented in this volume will show that the AS fought the war in as
intelligent and sensible a manner as was possible, given the state of the technology
available. It will be shown that it was the limitations of this technology that caused
the most problems in AS operations, rather than any failure of preparation, planning
or execution. Not only was tank technology dependent on the primitive automobile
industry of the time, for the most part it had to be tested and developed in the
field. No amount of sound tank doctrine could compensate for the fragility of the
material, for the paucity of battlefield communication equipment and for the lack
of tank–infantry training opportunities. This is an illustration of an important if
little acknowledged aspect of the war. Contrary to the common modern-caricature
of the Great War military, good ideas were usually quickly adopted but they often
had to wait for adequate equipment to come into service before they could be
implemented. There really was no lack of intellectual understanding of the tactical
war in French commanders by 1917, what was lacking was the equipment to put
this understanding into practice. Only by 1918 was the French army equipped

5
Robert Allan Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the
Great War (London: Harvard University Press, 2005), Michel Goya, La Chair et l’Acier:
L’invention de la guerre moderne (1914–1918) (Paris: Tallandier, 2004). See also Anthony
Clayton, Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914–18 (London: Cassell, 2003).
6
Guy Pedroncini, Les Mutineries de 1917 (Paris: PUP, 1967) and Leonard Smith,
Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French 5th Infantry Division during
World War 1 (Princeton: PUP, 1994). See also: André Loez and Nicolas Mariot eds, Obéir/
désobéir: Les Mutineries de 1917 en perspective (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2008) and
André Loez, 14–18, Les refus de la guerre, une histoire des mutins (Paris: Gallimard, 2010).
Why French historians have largely ignored this subject since the end of the Second World
War would make an interesting monograph in itself. Suffice to say, most contemporary
French academic studies on the Great War have been concerned with the 1917 mutinies and
to what extent the French soldiers continued fighting due to consent rather than coercion. In
relation to this, Smith is firmly on the side of consent whereas Loez believes coercion was
the primary driving force keeping order in the French army.
7
More recent good studies on the French army in the Great War include Michael
S. Neiberg, The Second Battle of the Marne (Bloomington: IUP, 2008), William Philpott,
Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth Century
(London: Little, Brown, 2009) and Jonathan Krause, Early Trench Tactics in the French
Army – The Second Battle of Artois, May–June 1915 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
 The French Armoured Force: The Artillerie Spéciale 3

with enough aircraft, enough tanks and, most importantly, enough heavy-artillery
to begin to exercise a mastery of the new form of combined-arms warfare that
arose in the Great War. I will thus argue that the successful French armoured effort
is indicative of a level of military effectiveness within the French army that has
hitherto been little acknowledged.
The tank arose as a technological response to the tactical problems of trench
warfare in the Great War, in particular the dominance of defensive firepower.
Although the power of artillery and aircraft changed to an enormous degree
through the course of the war, only two weapons systems arose during the war
that had not existed previously; chemical weapons (mainly gas) and tanks.8 Thus
the French army had to develop an armoured and tracked fighting vehicle from
scratch. This required a complex process of assessing the potential benefits of the
new weapon system, including the technical and technological issues involved
such as the allocation of industrial resources. This assessment was potentially
quite problematic as there was no benchmark to judge the possible utility of
armour against. A number of technological developments, such as the various
trench-digging machines that were tried, led nowhere, wasting valuable time and
resources. It is easy to see in hindsight that tanks justified the resources devoted
to them but this was certainly not clear at the time. These judgements had to be
combined with decisions of an intellectual nature determining how the tank could
be effectively integrated into the existing structures and doctrine of the army. This
is of crucial importance to the success of a new weapon system as many good
weapons have been ruined in their misapplication in use, one French example being
the Mitrailleuse of 1870, which was a promising infantry-support weapon that was
wrongly and disastrously applied tactically as an artillery piece. I will argue that
the development of tracked armoured vehicles in France during 1915–18 was a
remarkably successful technological and military venture, which more than repaid
the resources and effort devoted to it. This was achieved despite the problems
besetting both French industry, largely due to the loss of valuable industrial areas
of northern France in the occupation and its comparatively small industrial base
in 1914, and the beleaguered and battered French army. However, this story is not
a simple one of smooth technological determinism; the development of tanks in
France took a number of turns down technological and military cul-de-sacs and
there was one major shift in emphasis when the Renault light tank design replaced
the medium tanks.
Moreover, the successful development and integration of tanks into this army
during a period of continuous war indicates that the outdated general consensus on
the competence of the French army in the Great War, being largely negative, needs
urgent attention. Douglas Porch states that ‘the general historical verdict on the
French army in the First World War is that it put in a courageous but unintelligent

8
One may wish to add air-power to this list as although it was a minor component of
most armies in 1914, the war saw it come to fruition as an important arm in its own right.
4 The French Army’s Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War

performance’, a verdict he agrees with.9 The development and use of tanks will be
examined to see whether, at least in respect of the Artillerie Spéciale, the French
army put in an ‘unintelligent performance’ or not.
However, a certain codicil must be made: the main story of the AS is an integral
part of the late-war French army. The first half of the war has received considerably
more attention by the French than the second half, the fighting in 1918 being
particularly under-researched, a trend that started with the French official history,
which devotes considerably more space to 1914 than 1918. This has helped to
distort our understanding of how effective the French army had become by the
end of the war. The operational development of the AS largely occurred during
the period when Pétain commanded the army. The important parts that both
Joffre and Nivelle had to play in the genesis of the tank arm are discussed and the
evidence presented should suggest that their generally poor reputations should be
re-considered. Joffre and Nivelle were clearly imaginative enough to understand
how this weapon system might prove advantageous, although not necessarily
with immediate effect. However, it was within Pétain’s reformed army that the AS
came to military fruition, after the French army mutinies of 1917. The ‘clear and
increasingly continuous learning curves’ that Dennis Showalter attributes to the
British and German armies of the Great War are, as will be shown, quite apparent
in the French army but largely unknown.10
This study will illustrate an important aspect of this process through the
development of the AS. It is worth noting that Grand Quartier Général (GQG),
the French General Headquarters, recognised the potential of armour (as did the
British) whilst the often now better-regarded Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL), the
German GHQ, did not, until it was too late; the Germans getting only one tank
design into action, the A7V, rightly categorised as the worst design of the war.
This alone suggests that a revision of GQG’s reputation is in order. De Gaulle said
that after the Nivelle Offensive: ‘the front became a workshop in which the army
was forged anew.’11 This metaphor of industrialisation epitomises what happened
within the French army between 1914 and 1918. Over the course of the war it was
transformed from an army whose components would have been comprehensible to
a general of the Napoleonic era, based on manpower; the infantry and the cavalry,
to one whose most powerful components were technology based; aircraft, tanks
and artillery. The story of the AS is a prism through which to see more general
aspects of the French army’s performance during the war.
How the French army successfully managed this transformation and to what
extent it came to rely on technology for effectiveness will be considered in what

9
Porch, French Army, p. 225.
10
Dennis E. Showalter, ‘Mass Warfare and the Impact of Technology’ in Roger
Chickering and Stig Forster eds, Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilisation on the
Western Front, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), p. 85.
11
Charles de Gaulle, France and her Army (trans. F.L. Dash, London: Hutchinson,
undated, printed during WW2), p. 101.
 The French Armoured Force: The Artillerie Spéciale 5

follows by examining the operational and tactical performance of the AS. This
evidence will be used to see what light it throws specifically on the French army’s
ability to adapt successfully to the conditions of modern warfare. I will argue that,
when the operational use of the AS is examined, a clear and successful ‘learning
curve’ is evident between the actions in 1917 and those of late 1918. In fact, ideas
on how to use the tanks were evolving continuously from the moment of their
inception to the end of the war, as will be discussed. Sufficient weight will be
given to how difficult it was for a military organisation such as the French army in
the Great War to institute change in such circumstances.
Although this study is primarily concerned with the military effectiveness
of the French tank-arm on the battlefield, this effectiveness was often severely
compromised by organisational and material problems that were outside of
the control of the AS. I will consider how these problems arose and how they
were addressed by the various parties involved. It is important to note that the
administration of the French military effort during the war was split into two distinct
parts: the zone des armées, under the control of the commander-in-chief and GQG,
and the interior, where various civilian ministries exercised their responsibilities.12
For a project such as the French tank programme, control and responsibilities
would be split between the army and the government. Thus the commander of the
AS, Colonel (later General) Jean-Baptiste Estienne, was caught in a complicated
web of bureaucracy within the French government and military from its inception.
It was initially attached to the Sous-Secrétariat de l’Artillerie (under-secretariat
for artillery), a department within the ministère de la Guerre (Ministry of War),
with Albert Thomas in charge as under-secretary. When Thomas became ministre
de l’Armement (Armaments Minister), in November 1916, the Sous-Secrétariat
de l’Artillerie was moved to his ministry and so too was the AS. The ministry
also controlled the Direction Service Automobile that was responsible for all
motor transport in the French Army. This supplied all the technical staff for the
AS, including Estienne’s technical advisor Major Aimé Doumenc.13 Estienne was
instructed to report to both Albert Thomas and the chief of the DSA.14 In addition,
the DSA ran the AS camps outside of the zone des armées and was responsible
for initial training of AS personnel.15 Two other parts of the ministry were closely
involved with the tank programme; the Sous-Secrétariat d’Etat des Inventions
(under-secretariat for Inventions) was responsible for military inventions and the
Sous-Secrétariat d’Etat des Fabrications de guerre (under-secretariat for War

12
By decree of 2 December 1913, Inventaire Sommaire, p. 67.
13
The best modern survey of the DSA in the war and Doumenc’s wartime career is
Rémy Porte’s La Direction des Services Automobiles des Armées et la Motorisation des
Armées Françaises (1914–1918) – Vues au travers de l’action du Commandant Doumenc
(Paris: Lavauzelle, 2004).
14
See Albert Thomas, Le sous-Secrétaire d’état de l’artillerie et des munitions à
Monsieur le général en chef (1 Bureau), 30 September 1916. 16N2121.
15
Albert Thomas, 30 September 1916.
6 The French Army’s Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War

Manufacture) was responsible for military manufacturing. As the department

with ultimate responsibility for the Army, the ministère de la Guerre was also
involved. Thus Estienne was required, to some degree or another, to negotiate
with two ministers, the DSA, two under-secretaries and, of course, GQG over all
tank matters.
In particular, the relationship of the AS with the ministère de l’armement
and the DSA was problematic from the start of the tank programme, some of the
early difficulties having been mentioned previously. An AS officer, Captain Léon
Dutil, compared the situation to a client and his supplier, the AS being the client,
who wanted specific equipment, and the ministry being the supplier. However, in
the case of the AS, the client was under the orders of the supplier. This ‘bizarre
situation’, as Dutil characterised it, resulted in much friction between the AS and
the ministry.16 There were two major areas of concern; the difficulties that the AS
had getting modifications made to the existing tank designs and the considerable
problems with deliveries of both new tanks and the spare parts needed to keep
them in operation. In addition, the ministry constantly interfered in organisational
matters, particularly in relation to the training camps, as well as, surprisingly,
questions of tactics. On becoming commander-in-chief, General Philippe Pétain
was quickly alerted to this attitude when he received a letter on 1 July 1917 from
Albert Thomas quite improperly demanding information on the tactical handling
of the tanks on 16 April.17 An additional problem was that the DSA expected the
AS to conform to its modus operandi and refused to concede that, as the latter was
a combat arm, it should be treated differently.
It cannot be claimed that what follows is an exhaustive examination of the
issues the AS had with the Intérior, as this would require a monograph of its
own. The main areas of friction identified above will, however, be illustrated
and discussed. In particular, I will examine those areas where the bureaucratic
in-fighting had a direct and deleterious effect on the operational performance of
the AS. These include the difficulties of tank-manufacture, the supply of spare
parts and the interference of the ministry in areas well outside its competence.
The continual problems connected with the development and production of the
new tank, the Renault light tank, were, with hindsight, the most egregious, as this
was to prove the most successful tank design. Thus the problems connected with
this design will be examined in a separate chapter, while the general bureaucratic

16
Léon Dutil, Les Chars d’Assaut. Leur Création et leur Rôle pendant la Guerre
(1915–1918) (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1919), p. 108.
17
GAN, 3 Bureau, Le Général commandant en chef à Monsieur le ministre de
l’armement et des fabrications de guerre, 4 July 1917. 16N2120. Thomas’ letter also
demanded that the crews that had used extemporised petrol containers on 16 April should
be disciplined; Pétain wrote back sharply that these crews had already paid with their lives
for this mistake. This particular part of the minister’s letter did nothing to improve his
reputation within the AS.
 The French Armoured Force: The Artillerie Spéciale 7

struggle that took place between the AS, the ministère de l’Armement and DSA
during the war is covered in parts of other chapters.
There is another issue of wider interest here. The French army developed
sound offensive doctrine, much of which was in place prior to Pétain assuming
command, at the tactical and operational level but implementing this proved
very problematic, illustrating Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘everything in war is very
simple, but the simplest thing is difficult’.18 This is particularly the case in relation
to the French army’s tank regulations, which encompassed what would be called
doctrine today. What examination of the 1918 AS battles demonstrates is that
having sound ideas about tank tactics and their use is only half of what is required
for effectiveness. The other half requires that these regulations be understood and
then implemented: ‘Doctrine is “what is taught”, and to be effective it needs to
be read and understood’ says a current British Army field manual.’19 This study
will illustrate the difficulties encountered in bringing good ideas into action;
as Clausewitz says, ‘… in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even
moderate results’.20 The battles of Soissons and Champagne (each the subject of
a chapter herein) both demonstrate that the French infantry commanders, from
divisional level downwards, frequently either misunderstood or decided to ignore
the tank regulations, the latter being likely in the majority of cases. The French
army cannot be accused of failing to promulgate information to the infantry and
artillery commanders as numerous notes on tank use were sent out on a regular
basis. Of course, in a conflict where infantry losses could be so high, it is easy see
why infantry commanders took every opportunity to mitigate their own losses,
even if this was at the expense of the tank units.
As tanks were just one response, amongst many, to the tactical problems of
the Western Front, the AS cannot be considered by itself but as part of a complex
organisation. It needs to be judged and examined in the context of the development
of the French army’s ability to use multiple weapons systems together (combined-
arms) on the new type of battlefield created by the power of indirect fire. As the
French tank force never became a decisive strategic weapon during the war, only
the operational and tactical levels of war will be discussed. Thus, although this
study will be informed by the place of the AS within the overall industrial war
effort of France, it will be primarily concerned with the operational use of the
French tank arm; the development of its doctrine and its place within the French
army’s late war combined-arms system.
Timothy Lupfer’s general criticism of the Great War French army that its
‘tactical change was too often exclusively a function of a single dominant
personality’, will be shown to be rather accurate in relation to the AS in what

18
Carl von Clausewitz, On War (first published in 1832, this edition was edited and
translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: PUP, 1984), p. 119.
19
Forward, British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, part 10, Countering Insurgency
(October 2009), p. ii.
20
Clausewitz, On War, p. 120.
8 The French Army’s Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War

follows, although the development of the AS also shows that such personalities
could often force through change more successfully than any institutional system.21
The creation of the French tank arm and its nurturing to maturity during the war
owes much to one man: Jean-Baptiste Estienne, a career artillery officer and one
of the pioneers of French military aviation. His energy and intelligence were great
assets but it was his powers of persuasion and his persistence that had the greatest
effect. It will be shown that he was able to persuade every commander-in-chief of
the French army, and many others in the military and the bureaucracy, that these
largely unproved weapons were worth devoting scarce resources and manpower
to. No comparable figure in Britain so dominated the early tank arm as Estienne
did the AS. Estienne’s citation on being elevated to the rank of commandant of the
Légion d’honneur refers to him overcoming ‘difficulties without number’, which
the following chapters will demonstrate was not an exaggeration.
I have considered it necessary to examine the French tanks’ battlefield
performance in detail for a number of reasons. Firstly there is such a paucity of
in-print information on the AS, particularly in English. The British tank effort
receives reasonable coverage in the British official histories, with one entire
volume being devoted to Cambrai, and its battlefield performance is well-covered
in the extant literature. This enables Paul Harris, for example, in his excellent
study of British ideas on armour up to 1939, to concentrate on military thought
and to direct readers to these other sources should they require more details of
British tank battles in the Great War.22 By contrast, the French official histories
make only passing comments on tank engagements and there is very little detail to
be found in English accounts. It is also necessary to look in detail at a number of
AS engagements to illustrate clearly the serious limitations of the equipment and
how the AS dealt with this. There will thus be an extensive analysis of French army
battlefield performance, in particular that of the AS, and how this contributed to the
development of offensive methodology by the French army. It thus seemed more
appropriate to consider in depth a number of case-studies on various aspects of
the AS, rather than spread the analysis too thin. Therefore, in relation to battlefield
performance, four important actions are examined rather than attempting to cover
every one of the numerous engagements of the AS.23
Initially, the origins of the Artillerie Spéciale are examined as part of the
technological response to the Western Front by the French Army, concentrating
on the role of Colonel Estienne in this process. The design and construction of

21
Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine; The Changes in German Tactical
Doctrine During the First World War (Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff
College, 1981), p. 56.
22
J.P. Harris, Men, Ideas & Tanks-British Military Thought and Armoured Forces,
1903–1939 (Manchester: MUP, 1995), p. 3. Good accounts of British tank battles include:
Basil Liddell Hart, The Tanks, 2 Volumes (London: Cassell, 1959). J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in
the Great War, 1914–1918 (London: John Murray, 1920).
23
See Appendix 2 – Table of AS Engagements 1917–18.
 The French Armoured Force: The Artillerie Spéciale 9

the first two tank designs are reviewed; the Schneider and the St Chamond. This
is followed by an analysis of the planning and first operational deployment of
French tanks during the Nivelle Offensive. The evidence presented suggests
that there should be a re-examination of this operation, as it was not nearly as
unsuccessful as its reputation might suggest. Where the operation was disastrous
was in relation to the tanks deployed: the AS took nearly 50 per cent losses in tanks
and heavy casualties in personnel. However, there was a very rapid reappraisal
of tank tactics and methods of deployment by the AS and GQG, resulting in a
relatively successful action two weeks later, on 4–5 May 1917. A discussion about
the problems that Estienne and the AS encountered with the French political and
military bureaucracy then follows. In particular, the fraught relationship between
the AS and the ministry of armaments is examined. The Battle of Malmaison on 23
October 1917 is considered next. This case study illustrates the development of the
French army’s offensive technique against a fortified area in an attack with limited
objectives. The battle is virtually unknown today but it had an important impact
on the development of French tactical thought during the war and thus its wider
implications are also reviewed. In addition, the extensive discussions that took
place in the aftermath of the battle about tactics, both tank and artillery, demonstrate
how difficult it was to make sound conclusions from battlefield experience.
The next chapter considers various armoured vehicle projects but largely
concentrates on the design and manufacturing of the revolutionary Renault
light tank and the markedly less successful heavy tank designs. The evidence
considered in this chapter will, it is hoped, add to the existing literature on wartime
innovation.24 There is also a discussion on the organisational changes instituted in
the AS in late 1917 and early 1918. The Renault’s introduction into combat and
the French tank regulations are examined in the following chapter. This includes a
detailed consideration of the important tank regulations issued as the end of 1917,
as well as of how these were put into action at the company-level for the Renault
tank units. In the following chapter, the battles of Cutry and Antheuil are examined
as an important step in developing French offensive methodology, the experience
of which would help form Pétain’s Directive No 5. This document would be used
as the theoretical basis of the Battle of Soissons, part of the Second Battle of the
Marne, in July 1918. For the first time, the German army was decisively defeated
by a well-planned combined-arms surprise attack, the success of which enabled the
allies to enter a new phase of successful and unrelenting offensives on the Western
Front that defeated the German Army. From the point of view of the AS, this battle
was its apogee, as so much material was used up that it was unable to field such a
large force again during the war. The Champagne operation by French IV Army in
late September 1918 is the final case study, examined because the tank operations
were conducted over heavily-fortified ground against an enemy with copious anti-

24
Works such as Stephen Peter Rosen’s Innovation and the Modern Military –
Winning the Next War (Ithaca: CUP, 1991) and Meir Finkel, On Flexibility – Recovery from
Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield (Stanford: SUP, 2011).
10 The French Army’s Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War

tank defences, in contrast to the Battle of Soissons where the German defences had
been considerably more extemporised. It was also the largest French tank action,
after Soissons, until the end of the war. The conclusion assesses the overall cost in
resources to the French army of the AS in detail and considers some of the wider
issues previously discussed.
As the archives are so extensive, it has not been possible to consider every
aspect of the AS. For example, the AS was engaged in over 100 separate
engagements during the war, so I am unable to discuss or even to refer to all
of these, although they are listed in Appendix 2.25 Most regrettably, there was
not enough space to discuss the Battle of the Matz, in June 1918, where the AS
helped Groupement Mangin to halt the German drive on Paris, at great cost in men
and machines. The tortuous saga of the heavy tank designs has been condensed,
primarily because none of these entered service during the war, although their
impact on the production of the medium and light tanks is considered along with
some detail on the 2C heavy tank programme.
I will demonstrate that the tank tacticians of the AS displayed considerable
adaptability throughout the war. As will be described, a very rapid re-evaluation
of tactics and the way the tanks were deployed was made in a two-week period
between the tanks’ first engagement in April 1917 and their second engagement in
the following month. Further innovation was made during the Battle of Malmaison,
later that year. There was a careful examination of these engagements by the AS
command and GQG, followed by extensive discussions. These allowed the French
army to have a sound tank doctrine in place by the end of 1917, after only three
engagements. Although these regulations only required small modifications to
accommodate the differences between the medium and light tanks, they were
subject to continuous discussions within the AS. This is an example that illustrates
an important dynamic within the French army that has been little acknowledged,
the constant discussion within and between all officer-ranks about the problems
presented in this new machine-dominated warfare. It will also be strongly
suggested that a complete reappraisal of the effectiveness of the French army in
the Great War should be undertaken, analogous to the work already compiled on
the British and German armies of the First World War.

A Note on Terminology

In official French army documents, Renault tanks are usually referred to as light
tanks (chars légers), while the Schneider and St Chamond tanks are confusingly
called both medium and heavy tanks, although the British Mark I–IVs were also
referred to as heavy tanks. From around mid 1918, with the expected introduction
of genuine heavy tanks into the French army, the Schneiders and St Chamonds are
generally called medium tanks. In what follows, the Schneiders and St Chamonds

25
See Appendix 2 – Table of AS Engagements 1917–18.
 The French Armoured Force: The Artillerie Spéciale 11

will be referred to throughout as medium tanks. Although the majority of light

tanks were manufactured at the Renault factory, a number of other manufacturers
were later brought in to boost production, as will be discussed. However, all French
light tanks in this volume will be referred to as Renaults, as the design remained the
same, regardless of the manufacturer. The medium tanks were initially organised
as the French artillery was, thus a tank groupement is equivalent to an artillery
battalion, a groupe to a company. Groupes of medium tanks are referred to in
official documents as both ‘AS’ followed by a number and ‘groupe’ followed by a
number. All have been changed here to read such that ‘groupe 40’ will be AS40.
The Renault units were organised along infantry lines in battalions and companies;
all AS units with three numerals are Renault companies, i.e. the first company of
the first Renault battalion was AS301 of 1 BCL (1 Bataillon de chars légers).
Following the convention of wartime French military documents, French
armies will be referred to with Roman numerals, while all lower formations
(corps, divisions, regiments etc.) will have Arabic numerals.26 The exception is in
relation to the medium tank groupements, which were given Roman numerals. All
other armies’ formations will be referred to in Arabic numerals.
In relation to personnel, the category of officers in French during the war does
not usually include sous-lieutenants, as these were counted separately. However,
I have included this grade in ‘officer casualties’ rather than keep it separate. The
tank crews were largely NCOs, being French brigadiers and corporals, although
in French casualty lists they are referred to as ‘other ranks’. They will be thus
referred to in relation to casualties as ‘men’.
Most French terms have been translated into English. Thus, for example,
position d’attente is translated as waiting position and position de départ is
translated as departure or jump-off position.27 Chef de bataillon (infantry) and
Chef d’escadron (cavalry) are equivalent to the British rank of major but have
usually not been translated as they give a useful indication of the officer’s original
arm of service.

26
Researchers using French military documents from the war will be aware of the
latter’s lack of consistency in style, particularly in relation to capitalisation. Conventions
were not rigidly adhered to and, for example, sometimes corps are numbered with Roman
numerals in French military documentation of the period. In relation to capitalisation, I
have changed this within titles of documents to conform to modern French usage.
27
This was often the same as the waiting position.