Case Digest – Persons
Court of Appeals (2001) – fell to his death
Art. 1-20
1. Tanada v. Tuvera, 1986 – Presidential Decrees
Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of several Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided”, as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
approval. The court decided in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the
decrees. The petitioners move for reconsideration or clarification of this decision.
Issue:
a. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and
laws which are not as to their publication;
b. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
Ruling:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application
because all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published in full in the Official Gazette as a condition for their effectivity (Art. 2,
Civil Code).
2. People v. Que Po Lay – Foreign exchange
Facts:
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars,
U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He was charged
for failing to sell the same to the Central Bank within one day as required by
Circular No. 20.
He appealed & claimed that said circular was not published in the Official Gazette
prior to the act of the appellant, & had no force & effect. Commonwealth Act. No.,
638 and Act 2930 require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, as an
order or notice of general applicability.
The SolGen answered that said Acts do not require its publication in the Official
Gazette in order to have force & effect.
Issue:
WON circulars & regulations should be published in order to have force & effect.
Held:
Circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in
question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is
bound by its contents, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Article 2 of the new Civil Code (RA No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take
effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
3. DM Consunji v.
Facts:
Jose Juergo, a construction worker of DM Consunji Inc. fell to his death 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. Juergo, together w/ Jaluag & Destejo
while performing their work in the elevator core of the 14th floor, was crushed to
death when the platform fell due to looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted
to the connecting points of the chain block and platform w/c they were in but without
a safety lock. Jaluag & Destejo were able to jump out of safety.
Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow, claimed death benefits from the State Insurance Fund
w/c is said to waive her right to claim damages from ordinary course of action
against DM Consunji.
After receiving the report of his late husband’s death, she filed a complaint for
damages & was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM
Consunji. The latter appeals for the said decision on the grounds that a claimant
cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code & prosecute an
ordinary course of action under the Civil Code.
Issue:
WON Maria can still claim damages from DM Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed from the State Insurance Fund
Held:
YES. The recovery of damages under the Worker’s Compensation Act is a bar to
recovery under an ordinary civil action & the worker has a choice of either
remedies. The SC allowed some exceptions.
The said case was an exception because Maria was unaware of the petitioner’s
negligence when she claimed death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The
decision was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact w/c nullifies the choice. Given
that Maria have been aware of the higher compensation of pursuing an ordinary
course of action against DM Consunji instead of claiming from the SIF, she would
have waived the latter to w/c she was entitled.
4. Cui v. Arellano
Facts:
Emetrio Cui took up preparatory law course in Arellano University & consequently,
enrolled to the latter’s College of Law. Cui finished his law studies until the 1st
semester of his 4th year. Plaintiff transferred to Abad Santos University for the
reason that his uncle Dean Francisco Capistrano, who was the dean of the
defendant university, accepted the deanship of ASU.
During Cui’s stay in the defendant university, he was awarded w/ scholarship grants
amounting to P1,003.87. Before he was awarded the same, he was made to sign a
contract waiving his right to transfer to another school w/o having refunded the
grants.
After graduating from ASU, plaintiff applied to take the bar, upon w/c he was
required to submit transcript of records from AU. The defendant refused to release
such document until after plaintiff paid back the amount of scholarship grant w/c the
plaintiff refunded as he could not take the bar examination.
Issue:
WON the contract is valid
Held:
The stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship
grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy
and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and
hence, null and void. Rights may be waived unless it is contrary to laws, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy (Art. 6, Civil Code).
 5. Bello v. Court of Appeals
6. Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil 867) – Inheritance
Facts
A citizen of Turkey, Joseph Brimo, made out a last will & testament providing that
his property shall be disposed of pursuant to Philippine laws. He further provided
that whoever fails to comply w/ this request would forfeit his inheritance.
Andre Brimo, the appellant, brother of the deceased, Joseph Brimo, opposed the
appellee (Juan Miciano)’s partition scheme of the estate w/c denies his participation
in the inheritance.
Issue:
Whether Turkish or Philippine law will be the basis of the distribution of Joseph
Brimo’s estates
Held:
The court held that the provision of a foreigner’s will that his properties shall be
distributed according to Philippine law & not his national law is illegal because it
expressly ignores the testator’s national law when, according to art. 16 of the Civil
Code, such national law of the testator should govern his testamentary dispositions.
7. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (174 SCRA 653)
Respondent Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina, and Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married at Friedenweiler in Germany. Geiling initiated a divorce
proceeding against Pilapil in Germany while Pilapil filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before RTC of Manila where it is still
pending as a civil case. The local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree
on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner.
Private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married
to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the
date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
suspension of proceedings. Respondent judge directed the arraignment of both
accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt
and fined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges against the petitioner is
still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.
HELD:
The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should only be the offended spouse. The fact that
private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is admitted. The
marriage of the couple were already finished, thus giving no merit to the charges
the respondent filed against the petitioner. Respondent holds no legal merit
to commence the adultery case as the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
8. Roehr v.Rodriguez (2003) – Child custody
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina in Germany. Carmen filed a petition for the nullification of their
marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to
dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance
of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the
children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree
had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent
RTC Judge Salonga. Carmen moved for reconsideration, to determine the issues of
custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her and
Wolfgang.
Issue:
WON Judge Salonga’s act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction
as regards child custody and support.
Held:
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care
and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
9. Garcia v. Recio (2002) - Remarry
Facts:
Rederick Recio was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in Rizal. A
decree of divorce was issued in an Australian family court purportedly dissolving
their marriage. Respondent became an Australian citizen & was married again to
petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio. In their application for marriage license, Recio
declared himself as single & Filipino.
Garcia filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
bigamy, having a prior susbsisting marriage at the time of their marriage. Recio
contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved.
Recio was able to obtain a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney Australia.
RTC declared Garcia & Recio’s marriage dissolved on the grounds that the
Australian divorce had ended the marriage thus there was no more marital union.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
Held:
Although the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to
be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of
the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. It must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
10. Nikko Hotel Manila v. Reyes (GR. No. 154249, 2009)
Facts:
An exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for a
prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who
was also the executive secretary of the hotel. She later noticed Robert Reyes who
was not on the list of exclusive guests in the lobby. Lim ascertained that the host
celebrant did not invite Reyes. Lim approached Reyes & told the latter, in a discreet
voice, to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes made a scene & was escorted
out of the party by policeman like a criminal.
Reyes sued the hotel for damages. He said that he was invited by Dr. Violeta Filart,
a party guest, who ignored his calls.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim but the CA ruled in favor of Reyes because Lim
abused her right & that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It is true
that Lim had the right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it
respectfully.
Issue:
WON Lim acted w/ abuse of rights
Held:
NO. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been
working for more than 20 years in the hotel & making a scene in a party she was
managing will only damage her reputation.
The Court ruled that Lim did not violate Art. 19 & 21 of the Civil Code. Reyes
testified in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very close to him – so
close that they could almost kiss, w/c implies that she intends for only Reyes to
hear her.
W/ regards to contra bonus mores, Lim & Reyes are not related personally so she
has no reason to treat him wrongfully.
By coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned
away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-
inflicted. Evidence also showed that Dr. Filart denied inviting Reyes into the party.
11. Sps. Quisumbing v. Meralco (GR. No. 142943, 2002)
Facts:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house
located in Quezon City. The defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel Orlino
conducted an inspection of all single-phase meters at the house and observed as
standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s
secretary. It was found that the meter had been tampered with.
The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further
verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to
temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. The inspectors returned
and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they
pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply
will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages.
Issue:
WON there is abuse if rights
Held:
Yes. Respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners’ electrical
supply without observing the requisites of law which are akin to due process. There
was no officer of the law or ERB representative at the time of inspection. Therefore,
the authority to disconnect, granted to Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply. The
action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric service constitutes
a breach of public policy. Public utilities have a clear duty to see to it that they do
not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers.
12. Gashem Shokat Baksh v. CA (219 SCRA 115)
13. Albenson Enterprise Corp v. CA (217 SCRA 16) - check
Facts:
Albenson Enterprise delivered Mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A
Pacific Banking Corp. check was paid from the account of EL Woodworks. The
check was dishonored for the reason of “Account Closed.” Albenson traced the
origin of the check or the president of Guaranteed, who is Eugenio Baltao.
Albenson made an extrajudicial demand for Baltao to make good the dishonored
check. Failing to do so, Albenson fileda complaint against Baltao for violation of BP
22. It appears that private respondent has a namesake who is his son, Eugenio
Baltao III, who manages EL Woodworks. The father made no effort to disclose this
to his son.
For unjustly filing a criminal case against him, Baltao filed a complaint for damages
from petitioners. He anchored his complain for damages from Art. 19, 20, & 21 of
the Civil Code. Albenson contend that this is malicious prosecution for there is
absence of malice in their part thus absolving them from liabilities.
Issue:
WON there is cause for damages against Albenson Enterpise based on Art. 19, 20
& 21
Held:
NO. In order to file a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution grounding
on the said articles, the following elements must prosper: 1.) fact of the prosecution
& that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, & action was finally terminated, 2.)
there is no probable cause & 3.) prosecutor was impelled by legal malice.
It was found that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister
design to unduly harass respondent, but only by anxiety to protect their own rights.
14. University of the East v. Jader (GR. No. 132344, 2000)
15. Tenchavez v. Escano 15 SCRA 355
Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño were secretly married, celebrated by a
military chaplain, without the knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent
social status. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted for a church
wedding but Escaño disagree because she heard that Tenchavez was having an
affair with another woman. Escaño went to the US where she acquired a decree of
absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also
married an American.
Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and alleged that Escaño’s parents
dissuaded her to go abroad and caused her to be estranged from him hence he’s
asking for damages. The lower court did not grant the legal separation and at the
same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaños.
Issue: WON damages should be awarded to either party
Held:
On the part of Tenchavez. YES. His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the
failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation. They never lived together
and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier. He failed to prove that
Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his
P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, Escaño left without the
knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez
being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages
and attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño and not her parents.
On the part of Escaño’s parents:
The P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños is
unfounded and the same must have caused them anxiety, the same could in no way
have seriously injured their reputation. They were not guilty of any improper conduct
in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded to P5,000.00
only.
16. Abunado v. People 2004
Facts:
Narcisa Arceño married Salvador Abunado. Later, Arceño left for Japan to work
there. She returned but Abunado was nowhere to be found as he left the family
home. Arceño found out that Abunado was already cohabiting with somebody else.
Further, Arceño also discovered that in Abunado married a certain Zenaida Biñas.
Abunado filed an annulment case against Arceño. Arceño filed a bigamy case
against Abunado. Both cases proceeded simultaneously and independently in
different courts.
Their marriage was annulled. Abunado was convicted by the trial court for bigamy.
Abunado now questions the judgment of conviction against him as he alleged that
the annulment case he filed against Arceño was a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case filed against him by Arceño. Hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should
have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abunado is correct.
HELD:
No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
Abunado eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled. In short, all the elements of bigamy were present – the nullity
of the prior marriage is immaterial.
17. Beltran v. People 2000
Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other, but after 24 years of
marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due
to Felix’s Psychological incapacity. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal
home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage
against Beltran. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him,
Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case filed by Felix. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue
conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets
resolved. The lower court denied Beltran’s petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the
RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a
prejudicial question in the case at bar.
HELD: NO. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s marriage
is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
18. Te v. Court of Appeals 2000
19. Quimiging v. Icao (34 SCRA 132) – not declare baby
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors
and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and
intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant
despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped
studying.
Plaintiff, assisted by her parents, claimed for support at P120 per month, damages
and attorney’s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in
Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl
but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint
averred no cause of action”.
Issue: W/N the plaintiff-appellants’s case be remanded
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child
she was carrying and an independent cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of
the unborn child, which includes its right to support from its progenitors. Article 742
of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations
through persons that legally represent it.
20. Geluz v. CA (2 SCRA 801) – 3 abortions
Facts:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar Lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz,
the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became
pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As
advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it
aborted by Geluz. After their marriage, she had her pregnancy aborted again on
October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant
and had a 3rd abortion for a 2-month old fetus at Geluz’ clinic. Oscar at this time
was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial
board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.Lazo filed a
case claiming for damages of the unborn child.
Issue:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury,
his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the
unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception as stated by Art. 5 of PD no. 603 or the “Child &
Youth Welfare Code.” w/c is subject to condition of Art. 41 of the Civil Code. This
personality is called presumptive personality. As stated by Art. 41, the child should
be alive at the time of the complete delivery from it’s mother’s womb for it to
possess legal personality. In the present case, the child was dead when separated
from its mother’s womb, extinguishing his capability to possess a personality &
therefore extinguishing the cause of action.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased child.
21. De Jesus v. Syquia (58 Phil. 866)
22. Limjoco v. The Estate of Pedro Fragrante (45 OG No. 9, p. 397) – ice
plant
Facts:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate
Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate
applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because
under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial
juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his
properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes
those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his
death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the Public Service Commission.
23. Dumlao v. Quality Plastics (GR no. L-27956, 30 April 1976) – failed
payment of fine/solidarity
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case was rendered ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria,
Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of
P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to
foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given.
Oria's land was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction which he has
given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died. Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria’s death. The
summons and copies of complaint was personally served by a deputy sheriff to
Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-
defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary
heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc. for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his
land. Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled
on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
HELD: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons just learned that Oria was
already dead prior case was filed. The Dumlaos’ agreed in their stipulation that
indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death and that they acted in good
faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is
a patent nullity. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is
the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death. Therefore the
case filed against him is rendered void for lack of jurisdiction.
24. Mo Ya Lim v. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292)
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation
obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was
declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to
Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January
1962
25. Frivaldo v. Comelec (GR no. 120295, 28 June 1996)
26. Uytengsu v. Republic (50 OG 4781)
27. Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec
28. Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec

Facts:

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the
Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to
come into the Philippines for a period of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00
to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from
the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or
his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines
up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy
Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took
place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung
could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She
did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the
Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya
Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,

native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant
for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go
through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute
for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have
the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have
to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a