PFR Notes | 1
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may
not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
(1) Duty to Respect Dignity and Privacy
This Article enhances human dignity and personality. Social equality is not sought, but due
regard for decency and propriety. (Report, Code Commission, pp. 33-34).
(The acts referred to in the Article were asked in a bar exam).
(2) Remedies
(a) An action for damages;
(b) An action for prevention;
(c) Any other relief.
[A civil action may be instituted even if no crime is involved, and moral damages may be
obtained. (See Arts. 29 and 2219, Civil Code).].
(3) Scope
(a) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence — includes by implication respect for
another’s name, picture, or personality except insofar as is needed for publication of
information and pictures of legitimate news value. (Prosser, Torts, p. 1050).
(b) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another — includes
alienation of the affections of the husband or the wife. (Prosser, Torts, p. 916). (Thus, a girl
who makes love to a married man, even if there be no carnal relations, disturbs his family life,
and damages may therefore be asked of her.) Intriguing against another’s honor (gossiping)
is also included.
(c) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends — includes gossiping, and
reliance on hearsay.
(d) Vexing or humiliating — includes criticism of one’s health or features without justifiable
legal cause. (138 A.L.R. 25). Religious freedom does not authorize anyone to heap obloquy
and disrepute upon another by reason of the latter’s religion. (Commission Report, p. 33).
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his offi cial duty may fi le
an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
(1) Refusal or Neglect in the Performance of Official Duty
(a) The article refers to a public servant or employee. Taken from Art. 839 of the German
Civil Code, the purpose of Art. 27 is to end the pabagsak or bribery system, where the public
official for some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the performance of his duty until he gets
some kind of “pabagsak.” (See Bocobo, Study of Proposed Civil Code Changes, 16 Lawyers
Journal, p. 97).
In a sense, it may be said that there are three kinds of bribes:
1) the pabagsak — the gift given so that an illegal thing may be done.
2) the pampadulas — the gift given to facilitate or expedite the doing of a legal thing.
3) the pampasalamat — the gift given in appreciation of a thing already done.
[NOTE: An administrative case will generally be provisionally dismissed, where a criminal
case involving the same parties and the same charges as those of the administrative case is
sub judice. (Flores v. Ganaden, Adm. Matter No. P-152, Nov. 29, 1974).].
(b) There must be refusal or neglect without just cause to perform (non-feasance). (If duty is
performed, Art. 27 does not apply) (Bagalay v. Ursal, 50 O.G. 4231, GR L-6445, July 29,
1954) where the city assessor allegedly was demanding a double payment of realty taxes.
The taxpayer, however, did not state that he had already paid, and therefore the complaint
should be dismissed since the official was merely performing his duty. In Consunji v.
Villanueva, Adm. Matter P-205, Nov. 27, 1974, the Court ruled that if a public official fails to
do what is incumbent on him, the fact that he was about to retire when the incident occurred
may be an explanation, but certainly, it is NOT a justification. For the ideal of a public office
as a public trust implies that until the last day of one’s tenure, strictest compliance with one’s
duties is necessary. In Vda. De Laig v. CA, L-26882, Apr. 5, 1978, the Supreme Court ruled
that high officials (like a Secretary of a Department or a Director) is not liable for the mistakes
of their assistants, as long as said high officials were not motivated by malice.
(c) The NAWASA Manager may be compelled by mandamus to perform the acts required of
him by a resolution of the NAWASA Board, thus he can be ordered to execute deeds of sale
(for lots in a housing project) if same is authorized by Board Resolution. (Sergio M. Isada v.
Judge Juan L. Bocar, et al., L-33535, Jan. 17, 1975).
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in
labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person
who thereby suffers damages.
(1) Reason for Preventing Unfair Competition
The above provision is necessary in a system of free enterprise. Democracy becomes a
veritable mockery if any person or group of persons by any unjust or high-handed method
may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living.’’ (Report, Code
Commission, p. 31). “This Article is intended to lay down a general principle outlawing unfair
competition, both among enterprises and among laborers. Unfair competition must be
expressly denounced in this Chapter because same tends to undermine free enterprise.
While competition is necessary in a free enterprise, it must not be unfair.” (Memorandum of
the Code Commission, L.J., Aug. 31, 1953).
Test of Unfair Competition
Pro Line Sports Center, Inc. v. CA 88 SCAD 524 (1997)
The test of unfair competition is whether certain goods have been intentionally clothed with
an appearance which is likely to deceive the ordinary purchasers exercising ordinary care.
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Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is

acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant,
the court may require the plaintiff to fi le a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found
to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based
upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred
from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is
due to that ground.
(2) Criminal and Civil Liabilities
Under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 100) a person criminally
liable is also civilly liable. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other; the criminal aspect affects the
social order; the civil, private rights. One is for the punishment
or correction of the offender, while the other is for reparation of
damages suffered by the aggrieved party. (Report, Code Commission,
p. 45). Thus, even if the accused be acquitted because
of prescription of the crime, he is released only from criminal
responsibility, not civil liability; otherwise, the victim would
be prejudiced. (Sombilla and Positos v. Hodges and Mogar,
L-4660, May 30, 1952).