Professional Documents
Culture Documents
and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there were relations of possible justice.
To say that there is nothing just or unjust, but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is
the same as saying that, before the describing of a circle, all the radii were not equal."
-Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, in "The Spirit of the Laws"
The Latin “prosequi” meant “to follow after, accompany, chase, pursue, attack, assail, or abuse.”
It is composed of the prefix “pro” meaning “forward” and “sequi,” meaning “follow,” in the same
sense as “sequel.” In its most literal sense, prosequi means, “follow forward.” In Latin, prosequi
was usually used in two ways: literally to mean “follow a path” or figuratively to mean “follow a
course of action.” The past participle of prosequi is “prosecutus.” Prosequi became a Latin agent
noun “prosecutor” in medieval times. Prosecutus became “prosecute” in the early 15th century,
usually meaning “to go into detail.” The first recorded use of the word to mean “bring to a court of
law” is in the 1570s. At this time, the person who brought a case in a court of law was a
“promoter.” Prosecutor, in turn, acquired its modern meaning in the 1620s.
ULTRA VIRES;
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States
v. Alfonso D. Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. _ (2012)
Section 4. Religious freedom. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied
any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his opinions concerning religion;
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or
affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the good
order, peace or safety of the state. No person shall be required to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship, religious sect or denomination against his consent. Nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.
Section 6. Equality of justice. Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy
remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice
should be administered without sale, denial or delay.
Section 13. Right to bear arms. The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of
his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned,
shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the
practice of carrying concealed weapons.
Section 17. Imprisonment of witnesses depositions form. No person shall be imprisoned for the
purpose of securing his testimony in any case longer than may be necessary in order to take his
deposition. If he can give security he shall be discharged; if he cannot give security his deposition
shall be taken by some judge of the supreme, district or county court, at the earliest time he can
attend, at some convenient place by him appointed for that purpose, of which time and place the
accused and the attorney prosecuting for the people shall have reasonable notice. The accused shall
have the right to appear in person and by counsel. If he has no counsel, the judge shall assign him
one in his behalf only. On the completion of such examination the witness shall be discharged on his
own recognizance, entered into before said judge, but such deposition shall not be used if in the
opinion of the court the personal attendance of the witness might be procured by the prosecution, or
is procured by the accused. No exception shall be taken to such deposition as to matters of form.
Section 21. Suspension of habeas corpus. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never
be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.
Section 24. Right to assemble and petition. The people have the right peaceably to assemble
for the common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for
redress of grievances, by petition or remonstrance.
re·mon·strance
1. a forcefully reproachful protest.
force·ful·ly
1. in a strong and assertive manner; vigorously.
re·proach·ful
1. expressing disapproval or disappointment.
Section 28. Rights reserved not disparaged. The enumeration in this constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny, impair or disparage others retained by the people.
CASE LAW
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,508 U.S. 520 (1993)-States and Cities
can't ban Religions they don't like
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___
(2018)- State discrimination of Religion
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014)- Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920)
Mellouli v. Lynch 575 U.S. _ (2015)- Harrison Act
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)- Rights of Churches to create Schools
separate from State schools, “The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees
was present and very real, not a mere possibility in the remote future.”
Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U.S. 296 (1908)- Treaty of Paris
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)- Heat Sensor (FLIR) is a Search, needs
Warrant
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___ (2013)- Dogs are a Search and need a
Warrant
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696 (1976)- Church Rules
must be acknowledged in Civil Court
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)- New Branches are still Religions
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)- No need for Government to be Hostile towards religion
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)- Pro Se, Ancient Religion denied in
Jail
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)- 2nd Amendment
People v. Newton (1970)- Black Panther Police Murder, overturned because it was involuntary
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)- Men may believe what they can not prove
New Hampshire v. Maine,532 U.S. 742 (2001)- Res Judicata and Judicial
Estoppel MAYFIELD v. TDCJ No. 06-50490 (2008)- Religion in Jail
NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COM. TO END WAR IN VIET NAM v. Foran, 297 F. Supp. 1
(N.D. Ill. 1968)- 3 Judge Review Panel
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)- Non-Mainstream Religion
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)- Right to publish even lies about Public
officials
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)- Slander and libel
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co.,118 U.S. 394 (1886)- Corporations
are people
Ketchum v. Cruz, 775 F. Supp. 1399 (D. Colo. 1991)- Martinez Report
Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3 (1883)
Muskrat v. US, 219 US 346 (1911)- Jury Nullification Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)- Lemon Test
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)- Can't Tax
Religion out of Existence
Church of the Holy Light of the Queen V Mukasey 615 F.Supp.2d 1210 (2009)- O
Centro case continued
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents 403 U.S. 388 (1971)- Suing
Federal Agents Ex Parte Young 209 U.S. 123 (1908)- Suing State Agents in
Federal Court Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966)- Miranda Rights
Coffin V United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895)- Innocent until proven Guilty
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015)- Right to decide who you are North
Carolina v. Pearce 395 U.S. 711 (1969)- Time Served, Double Jeopardy
United States of America, Appellee, v. Mario Biaggi, Stanley Simon, Richard Biaggi,
Peter Neglia,john Mariotta, and Bernard Ehrlich, Defendants-appellants, 909 F.2d 662
(2d Cir. 1990)-Public Corruption
Wahad v. FBI, 813 F. Supp. 224 (SDNY 1993)- Reading Mail and Listening to Phone
Calls
Struth v. FBI, 673 F. Supp. 949 (ED Wis. 1987)- FBI FOIA
Review; Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982)-Civil Conspiracy
Quo Warranto in Colorado Supreme Court
Burns v. District Court of Eighteenth Judicial Dist., 356 P.2d 245 (1960)
In Re: the People of the State of Colorado, 00SA127 (Co Sup Crt 1999)
4th Amendment Property Rights at Home “Right to retreat into home”, Curtilage,
Fenced area, etc. no momre Right than a Trick or Treater, must not avert gaze, but
can not go looking in Gardens and windows
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
Soldal V Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States 251 U.S. 385 (1920)
Africa v. Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) -Vegetarians & Religion in
Jail IN RE: CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LITIGATION (3rd Cir 1998) – Bombing
In Re City of Philadelphia Litigation, 938 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
Abdullah Mustafaa v. Dutton, 958 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1992)-Flesh/Blood of God
Sacramental or ceremonial material shall be provided by the chaplain or volunteer worship leader and
shall be used only in the area designated by the warden for the worship leader and shall not be in the
possession of inmates at any time. These materials include:
a. Wine or grape juice, bread or communion wafers for Christian
communion/mass; b. Wine or grape juice, matsoh, raisins, nuts, and spices for
Jewish ceremonial meals; c. Tobacco, herbs, and pipes for Native American
ceremonies; d. Incense, candles and anointing oils for all faith groups.
United States v. ARTICLE OR DEVICE, ETC., 333 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1971)
An initial issue presented is whether the normal Food and Drug remedies, 21 U.S.C. § 334, may under any
circumstances be applied to the device when used by some as an "artifact" of a church. A law designed to afford
protection to the public against genuine evils may be used to regulate the activities of religion only if the regulation
involved is the narrowest possible remedy to achieve the legitimate non-religious end, which in this case is only to protect
the public against misrepresentation since the E-meter is harmless in itself. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.
Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963); Barnett v. Rodgers, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 296, 410 F.2d 995 (1969).
The Government argues that once a violation of the Act is established, the devices seized may be treated the
same as any other misbranded device. Since the bona fides of the religion remains unquestioned on this
record, the Government's position is an oversimplification. Here is a pseudo-science that has been adopted
and adapted for religious purposes. The literature held to make false representations, while in itself non-
religious, nevertheless comprises for some, part of the writings, teachings, and history of a religion. Those
who belong to the Church and accept its beliefs assert that many illnesses may be alleviated by religious
counseling designed to free the spirit of encumbrances. They find in the rationale and procedures of
Scientology satisfactory early explanations and techniques to implement what is essentially faith healing by
use of the E-meter. Thus they purport to read the purely secular writings of Scientology with semantic
interpretations fostered by their evolving religious doctrine. Purely scientific statements are given a
theological slant by the initiated and the occasional theological indications in the writings are given
enthusiastic exaggeration. What the layman reads as straight science fiction becomes to the believer a bit of
early imperfect scripture. The result of all this is that what may appear to the layman as a factual scientific
representation (clearly false) is not necessarily this at all when read by one who has embraced the doctrine of
the Church.
Accordingly, the Government's protestations that it is not interfering with religious practice when it seeks to condemn
the E-meter and related literature must be qualified. The Church is a religious institution protected by the First
Amendment. The E-meter is used by its ministers as part of the ritual and practice of the Church. Serious interference
indeed results if the Church is entirely prohibited from using the E-meter by condemnation or if the Court orders the
Food and Drug Administration to oversee a general rewriting of all the writings the Church purveys. Where there is a
belief in a scientific fraud there is nonetheless an interference with the religion that entertains that belief if its writings
are censored or suppressed. Similarly, if a church uses a machine harmless in itself to aid its ministers in
communicating with adherents, the destruction of that machine intrudes on religion. The dilemma cannot be resolved
by attempting to isolate purely false scientific claims from claims that have sufficient religious content to be outside
the Food and Drug laws. There is a religious substance to everything when seen with the eyes of the believer.
Each user, purchaser, and distributee of the E-meter shall sign a written statement that he has read such
warning and understands its contents and such statements shall be preserved.
Any and all literature which refers to the E-meter or to auditing, including advertisements, distributed directly or
indirectly by the seller or distributor of the E-meter or by anyone utilizing or promoting the use of the E-meter,
should bear a prominent notice printed in or permanently affixed to each item or such literature, stating that the
device known as a Hubbard Electrometer, or E-meter, used in auditing, has been condemned by *365 a United
States District Court on the grounds that the literature of Dianetics and Scientology contains false and
misleading claims of a medical or scientific nature and that the E-meter has no proven usefulness in the
diagnosis, treatment or prevention of any disease, nor is it medically or scientifically capable of improving any
bodily function. Where the notice is printed in or affixed to literature, it should appear either on the outside front
cover or on the title page in letters no smaller than 11-point type.
The E-meter should not be sold to any person or used in any counseling of any person except pursuant
to a written contract, signed by the purchaser or counselee, which includes, among other things, a
prominent notification as specified immediately above.
The effect of this judgment will be to eliminate the E-meter as far as further secular use by Scientologists
or others is concerned. E-meter auditing will be permitted only in a religious setting subject to placing
explicit warning disclaimers on the meter itself and on all labeling. The Government has requested an
opportunity to show that complete forfeiture and destruction of the E-meter is required, but the Court has
concluded that however desirable this may be in the public interest, the Court is without power to so order
in view of the protections afforded claimant and others similarly situated under the First Amendment
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)
Even the most dedicated trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an
adversary presentation. Cf. Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367, 393 U. S. 369-370 (1969). In fact, one of
the consolidated cases here was initially dismissed by the same judge who later ruled for respondents,
possibly because Younger v. Gilmore was not cited.
“In order to prevent "effectively foreclosed access," indigent prisoners must be allowed to file appeals and
habeas corpus petitions without payment of docket fees. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252, 360 U. S. 257
(1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 (1961). Because we recognized that "adequate and effective
appellate review" is impossible without a trial transcript or adequate substitute, we held that States must
provide trial records to inmates unable to buy them. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 351 U. S. 20 (1956).
[Footnote 8] Similarly, counsel must be appointed to give indigent inmates "a meaningful appeal" from their
convictions. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 372 U. S. 358 (1963).
Essentially the same standards of access were applied in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969), which struck
down a regulation prohibiting prisoners from assisting each other with habeas corpus applications and other
legal matters. Since inmates had no alternative form of legal assistance available to them, we reasoned that this
ban on jailhouse lawyers effectively prevented prisoners who were "unable themselves, with reasonable
adequacy, to prepare their petitions," from challenging the legality of their confinements. Id. at 393 U. S. 489.
Johnson was unanimously extended to cover assistance in civil rights actions in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S.
539, 418 U. S. 577-580 (1974). And even as it rejected a claim that indigent defendants have a constitutional
right to appointed counsel for discretionary appeals, the Court reaffirmed that States must "assure the indigent
defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 616.
"[M]eaningful access" to the courts is the touchstone. See id. at 417 U. S. 611, 417 U. S. 612, 417 U. S. 615.”
It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal
documents, with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them. States must forgo
collection of docket fees otherwise payable to the treasury and expend funds for transcripts. State expenditures
are necessary to pay lawyers for indigent defendants at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), and in appeals as of right, Douglas v. California, supra.
This would be understandable if the federal right in question were constitutional in nature. For example, the
State may be required by the Eighth Amendment to provide its inmates with food, shelter, and medical care, see
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 429 U. S. 103-104 (1976); similarly, an indigent defendant's right under the
Sixth Amendment places upon the State the affirmative duty to provide him with counsel for trials which may
result in deprivation of his liberty, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972); finally, constitutional principles of
due process and equal protection form the basis for the requirement that States expend resources in support of
a convicted defendant's right to appeal. See Douglas v. California, supra; Griffin v. Illinois, supra.
(provision of trial transcript may not be conditioned on approval of judge); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963)
(same); Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1963) (public defender's approval may not be required to obtain coram nobis
transcript); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 (1966) (unconstitutional to require reimbursement for cost of trial
transcript only from unsuccessful imprisoned defendants); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U. S. 192 (1966) (State
must provide transcript of post-conviction proceeding); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967) (State must provide
preliminary hearing transcript); Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367 (1969) (State must provide habeas corpus
transcript); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969) (State must provide transcript of petty offense trial);
Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) (State must provide transcript of nonfelony trial).
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 341 U. S. 486-487 (1951). If the court is so satisfied, the
claim of the privilege will be accepted without requiring further disclosure.
The void for vagueness doctrine stems from the Fifth Amendment's constitutional guarantee of due
process. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926).
"[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process of law." Id. See also, Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356, 1365 (10th
Cir.1981), (The words of a penal statute must "be clear and beyond speculation").
It is undisputed that there is no scientific consensus whether AET has a chemical structure that is substantially similar to
DMT or DET. The government's own chemists cannot agree on this point, and the U.S. attorneys' office once before declined
to prosecute defendant Forbes for the very conduct that is charged here. The scientific community cannot even agree on a
methodology to use to determine structural similarity. Thus, unlike the meaning of cocaine base or the boundaries of a
military reservation, a defendant cannot determine in advance of his contemplated conduct whether AET is or is not
substantially similar to a controlled substance. See, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, ___ U.S. ___, ___
_ ___, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2722, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888, 906-907 (1991), ("In the context before us, these
terms have no settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law"). Indeed, based on the prior refusal to
prosecute Forbes, these defendants believed that AET was not a controlled substance analogue. To
this day, AET is freely available for purchase through the U.S. mails, and the government has not
scheduled it as a controlled substance throughout the drug's 30 year existence.
[T]he term "controlled substance analogue" in § 813 is clearly and specifically defined.... It provides
adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited. The statute makes plain that drugs which have been
chemically designed to be similar to controlled substances, but which are not themselves listed on
the controlled substance schedules, will nonetheless be considered as schedule I substances....
Granberry, 916 F.2d at 1010, (emphasis added). Upjohn developed AET in 1960 as a prescription anti-
depressant. Obviously, it was not "chemically designed to be similar to controlled substances."
"(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties.
"(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
"(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." (emphasis in original).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71
(1948). Article 18
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar.
23, 1976. Article 18
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993). Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994).
2, 3, 4
FISA Court
145 N St NE Rm #2W115
Washington, DC 20530
"It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions
to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out,
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be
guarded against." -James Madison, when Introducing the Bill of Rights
“Commonwealth is ‘a society of men constituted for preser[ving] their civil <rights> interests.’
interests are ‘life, health, indolency of body, liberty, property.’ the magistrate’s jurisdn. extends
only to civil rights and from these considns.: the magistrate has no power but wt. ye. people
gave hm. the people hv. nt. givn. hm. <powr.> the care of souls bec. y cd. nt., y. cd. nt.
because no man hs. right to abandon ye. care of his salvation to another. no man has power
to let another prescribe his faith. faith is not faith witht. believing. no man can conform his
faith to the dictates of another. the life & essence of religion consists in the internal
persuasion or belief of the mind. external forms [of wor]ship, when against our belief, are
hypocrisy [and im]piety. Rom.14.23. ‘he that doubteth is damned, if he eat, because he
eateth not of faith: for whatsoever is not of faith is sin.’ if it be said the magistrate may make
use of a[rguments] and so draw the heterodox to truth: I [answer] every man has a
commission to admonish, exhort, convince another of error. [a church] is ‘a voluntary society
of men, joining [themselves] together of their own accord, in order to the [publick]
worshipping of god in such a manner as they judge [accept]able to him & effectual to the
salvation of their souls. [it is] voluntary because no man is by nature bound to any church. the
hopes of salvation is the cause of his entering into it. if he find any thing wrong in it, he
[sh]ould be as free to go out as he was to come in.
[w]hat is the power of that church &c.? as it is a society <of voluntary> it must have some
laws for it’s regulation. time & place of meeting, admitting & excluding members &c. must be
regulated. but as it was a spontaneous joining of members, it follows that it’s laws extend to
it’s own members only, not to those of any other voluntary society: for then by the same rule
some other voluntary society might usurp power <of> over them. Christ has said
‘wheresoever 2 or 3 are gatherd. togeth. in his name he will be in the midst of them.’ this is
his definition of a society. he does not make it essential that a bishop or presbyter govern
them. without them it suffices for the salvation of souls. from the dissensions among sects
themselves arises necessarily a right of chusing & necessity of deliberating to which we will
conform. but if we chuse for ourselves, we must allow others to chuse also, & so reciprocally.
this establishes religious liberty.”
-Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, 11 October–9 December 1776
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
Article 18
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23,
1976.
Article 18
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993).
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994).
2, 3, 4
"Before there were intelligent beings, they were possible; they had therefore possible
relations, and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there were relations of
possible justice. To say that there is nothing just or unjust, but what is commanded or
forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that, before the describing of a circle, all the
radii were not equal." -Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, in
"The Spirit of the Laws"
“VII. If the Creature is thus limited in his actions, being able to do only such Things as God
would have him to do, and not being able to refuse doing what God would have done; then
he can have no such thing as Liberty, Free-Will, or Power to do or refrain from an Action.
By Liberty is sometimes understood the absence of Opposition; and in this Sense, indeed, all
our Actions may be said to be the Effects of our Liberty: But it is the Liberty of the same
Nature with the Fall of a heavy Body to the Ground; it has Liberty to fall, that is, it meets with
nothing to hinder its Fall, but at the same Time it is necessitated to fall, and has no Power or
Liberty to remain suspended.” -Benjamin Franklin in “A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity,
Section 1 'of Liberty and Necessity', #VII