G.R. No.
L-50631 June 29, 1981 An information for robbery with homicide dated October 30, 1973, was filed in the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SALVADOR PERUELO, accused-appellant.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
In the morning of October 19, 1971, Alex de Guzman, a motorized tricycle driver of
Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, was found dead near a fishpond in Maasin,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The tricycle, he was driving, was missing. The autopsy
performed by Dr. Numeriano Presto, Health Officer of Mangaldan, revealed that
Alex de Guzman was stabbed with a long bladed weapon on the upper left side of
the abdomen. There was a five to six inch-wound on the abdomen which perforated
the liver and caused severe blood loss.
For some time, the police authorities of Dagupan City had no clue on the slaying of
Alex de Guzman until they apprehended some tricycle drivers, in the course of their
"anti-dognapping" campaign when they came across a certain Demetrio Runez on
May 9,1973.
According to police Sgt. Pedro Landingan who took part in the campaign, one of
the tricycle drivers told him that Demetrio Runez had something to do with the
slaying of Alex de Guzman. And when Sgt. Landingan investigated Demetrio, he
revealed the circumstances surrounding the death of de Guzman, and executed a
two-page sworn statement dated May 9,1973, Exh. "E".
Exhibit "E" stated -in substance that at around 8:30 in the evening of October 18,
1971, Demetrio Runez was invited by Salvador Peruelo and one "Teofing" to Pol's
Place in Dagupan City that thereafter Teofing invited him to Bonuan for a good
time; that at 10:30 o'clock they took a tricycle, he sat behind the driver and Peruelo
and "Teofing" were in the side car; that they reached Mardi Grass Night Club,
whereupon he noticed that the driver of the tricycle was Alex de Guzman; that they
proceeded to Maasin, until he noticed that they were in a fishpond; that they
stopped and his two companions alighted; that Teofing went into the motion of
urinating, but instead of urinating, "Teofing" produced a knife, went to Alex de
Guzman and stabbed the latter; that Salvador Peruelo, armed with a blunt weapon
struck Alex de Guzman causing the latter to fall to the ground; that he left the place
and walked towards Dagupan City; that while he was walking "Teofing" and
Salvador Peruelo overtook him in the same tricycle, then, driven by "Teofing", with
Peruelo in the side car; and that he did not report the incident to the police because
he was confused and was threatened by "Teofing" not to reveal the incident to
anybody.
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch XI), charging Salvador Peruelo and
two "Does" as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of October, 1971, in the City of
Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused SALVADOR PERUELO together with
JOHN DOE @ Teofing and one PETER DOE, whose real names
and Identities have not as yet been ascertained, accused
SALVADOR PERUELO being then armed with a deadly weapon
(dagger), confederating together, acting jointly and helping one
another, and with evident premeditation and treachery and with
intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
ALEX DE GUZMAN, a motorized tricycle driver whom the said
accused hired, by stabbing him so suddenly without giving him a
chance to defend himself while on stop riding on his tricycle,
while accused JOHN DOE @ "Teofing" and PETER DOE, stood
vigilant and on guard for any eventuality, which caused his death
thereafter, and on occasion thereof, the said accused
SALVADOR PERUELO, JOHN DOE @ "Teofing" and PETER
DOE, with intent of gain and by means of force and violence,
stole, robbed and rode away with the said motorized tricycle
taken from the said ALEX DE GUZMAN, the driver, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P12,000.00 damages, and other consequential damages
sustained.
On March 20, 1975, the case was archived, no arrest having been made of
Salvador Peruelo, who, it was said could not be found in his address at Mabayuan
Olongapo City.
On July 18, 1978, Salvador Peruelo showed up at the police headquarters. He was
accompanied by Atty. Roberto Merrera, Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, who
presented him to the police.
It turned out that on July 17, 1978, Salvador Peruelo, a waiter in Great China Night
Club in Olongapo City, applied with the Olongapo City Police Department for a
police clearance in connection with his application for employment in Olongapo
Naval Base. When informed that there was a pending case against him in Dagupan
City, Salvador Peruelo and his wife, Conchita de Guzman went to Conchita's uncle,
Pablo de Guzman in Linoc, Binmaley. Together, they asked the help of Mayor
Roberto Merrera, who brought Salvador to the Dagupan City police. Whereupon
Salvador Peruelo was detained at the Dagupan City jail.
On July 24, 1978, a certain Federico Moulic was summoned to the police
department. Federico Moulic was a caretaker of the fishpond, near which Alex de
Guzman was found dead. He was said to have seen the slaying of de Guzman that
evening of October 18, 1971, and recognized the assailants.
Federico Moulic confronted Salvador Peruelo and Demetrio Runez in the
investigation section of Dagupan City Police. He pointed at Peruelo as the person
who hit the victim at the back with a blunt instrument. Two pictures were taken
showing Moulic Identifying Peruelo, (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"). He also Identified
Demetrio Runez, as the one who stabbed the victim. Pictures were also taken of
Moulic pointing at Runez (Exhs. "C" and "C-3").
Federico Moulic executed a two-page sworn statement dated July 24, 1978, (Exh.
"B"), narrating what he witnessed that evening of October 18, 1971. His testimony,
as the lone prosecution eyewitness was but a repetition of this sworn statement.
On October 8, 1978, Salvador Peruelo was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. So
the case which had been filed five years before and archived for more than three
years was revived.
During the trial, the information was amended to substitute Demetrio Runez in lieu
of "Peter Doe" It appears, however, that Runez was never arrested and tried.
What started in 1971 as an indictment against Salvador Peruelo for robbery with
homicide, ended in 1979, with a conviction for murder. Robbery was discarded for
lack of evidence of such fact. The killing was denominated as murder qualified by
treachery with the aggravating circumstance of despoblado but mitigated by
voluntary surrender. Salvador Peruelo's alibi that in the evening of October 18,
1971, he was in his brother's house in Otero, Mabayuan Olongapo City, celebrating
with relatives the first birthday of his nephew, Jesus Peruelo, Jr., was rejected. In
its decision of February 21, 1979, the trial court held:
WHEREFORE, with these considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused, SALVADOR PERUELO, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as proven by
the evidence and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, ALEX DE GUZMAN, in the amount of Twelve
Thousand Pesos P12,000. 00 With one-third (1 /3) of the costs.
Before Us, Salvador Peruelo seeks acquittal on the ground that his guilt had not
been established beyond reasonable doubt. Through his able counsel, Atty.
Roberto Merrera, he points out seven interrelated errors committed by the court a
quo which for brevity may be summed up as follows: (a) The incriminating
testimony of Federico Moulic is weak, unconvincing and unreliable, and does not
therefore deserve the credence accorded to it by the trial court; (b) the sworn
statement of Demetrio Runez (Exh. "E") should not have been admitted as part of
the prosecution evidence, it being hearsay; and (c) his alibi is worthy of belief.
It is clear from the records that the conviction of the accused-appellant was
founded solely on the testimony of Federico Moulic.
Federico Moulic who claimed that in the evening of October 18, 1971, he saw how
the deceased was assaulted and stabbed by two assailants, showed up at the
Dagupan City Police Department on July 24, 1978, executed Exh. "B" and later,
testified during the trial that: As a caretaker of his brother-in-law's fishpond, he was
in his hut at around 8:00 o'clock that fateful evening when he heard somebody
shout. He got his flashlight and went out to investigate. He went to the direction of
the shout (south of his hut), and at about 10 meters from the source, he "flashed
the beam" of his flashlight towards it. Thereupon, he saw three persons
"struggling."
In his own words he narrated what he saw:
ATTY. FERRER:
Q: What were those three persons doing, if
any?
A: The three persons were struggling, sir.
Q: About the other one, what was he doing, if
any?
A: The third person clubbed one of the
protagonist hitting him at the back of the head,
sir.
Q: What happened to that person who was
clubbed or hit by the other one?
A: He was able to release himself with (sic.)
the person struggling, sir. He was able to loss
hold from the other one with home (sic.) he
was struggling.
Q: After that man who was hit, lossen his hold,
what happened next, if any?
A: The other one, stabbed him sir.
ATTY. FERRER Q: After that man who was stabbed and fell
down, what happened next if any? (sic.)
Q: Who was stabbed, the other fellow who was
also hit by the club? A: They shouted at me, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Who shouted at you?

Q: And who stabbed him, who stabbed that A: The person who stabbed, sir.
man who was earlier hit with the stone? Who
was hit? Q: What did you do when he shouted at you?

A: Their companion, sir. A: I switch off my flashlight, sir.

COURT: Q: And what did you do after you switch off

your flashlight?
Q: What other companion, the fellow
embracing him? A: I went nearer to them, sir.

A: Yes, sir. CONTINUING:

Proceed. I moved back a little bit, sir.

ATTY. FERRER ATTY. FERRER

Q: After that, what happened next after the
stabbing incident, what happened next?
A: He fell down, sir.
ATTY. FERRER:
Q: Why did you moved (sic.) backward?
A: Because they shouted at me, sir.
Q: What did you do if any when you moved
backward?

Q: Who fell down? A: I observed them, sir.

A: The person who was stabbed, sir. Q: And what did you observe if any?

Q: Could you tell us what did that man who fell A: They were tying his body, sir.
down was stabbed or. (sic). What instrument
the man who fell down was stabbed of? (sic.)
Q: Who was being tied?
A: I cannot remember, sir.
A: The person who was stabbed, sir.
 Q: And who were tying him?
A: The person who stabbed him, sir.
Q: And after that, what happened next?
A: Then they boarded the tricycle, sir.
Q: And did you notice where did they proceed
when they boarded on the tricycle? (sic.)
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did they proceed?
A: They proceeded west, sir.
Q: After that what did you do?
A: I returned to my hut, sir.
Q: How long did you stay in your hut when you
returned?
A: Until the next morning, sir. (TSN, pp. 62-66)
At 6:30 o'clock the following morning, this witness said that he went to the place of
the incident and he saw several persons but he could only recall Barangay Captain
Atong Gubatan, Trinidad Naboa and Nanding Damaso, and some policemen. He
approached By. Captain Gubatan and related to him the incident. When asked if he
knew the perpetrators, his reply (to Gubatan) was that he could recognize their
faces if he could see them again. He further said that he did not get near the
policemen investigating the case.
Federico Moulic described the person who hit the victim as tall and thin with an
oblong face, and said that it was the accused-appellant Salvador Peruelo. He also
described the one who stabbed the victim as small and dark. He looked at the
faces in the courtroom. There were many of them, but he said: "the person is not
here, sir. "
On Federico Moulic's testimony, the trial court, concluded:
Under the pertinent evidence, this Court must convict. The
prosecution had established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
But then, the crime proven is that of Murder, not Robbery with
Homicide, as charged in the Information. For so it is that
evidence is wanting on the fact that the main intention was to rob
and on the occasion thereof, death resulted. Rather, Alex de
Guzman's death was directly attributable to Salvador Peruelo's
acts of concerted aggression. Federico Moulic's testimony in this
regard is credibly believable. Doubtlessly, there was treachery.
The attack was suddenly made at night and with use of superior
strength. Alex de Guzman had no way to effectively repel, much
less, evade the aggression. All the odds were against him.
It is inconsequential that Federico Moulic only formally submitted
his version of the incident on July 24, 1978. (Exhibits 'B' and
series). For so it is that as early as May 9, 1973, Salvador
Peruelo was already named as one among the assailants.
(Exhibits "E" and series). But, an extensive investigation could
not be achieved. Salvador Peruelo was nowhere to be found. In
fact, the warrants of arrest served at his known residence were
unavailing. Precisely, for this reason, this case was archived on
March 20, 1975.
Even more, on the day after October 18, 1971, Ludovico Moulic
already made known to Maasin, Mangaldan Barangay Captain
Gubatan that he could establish the assailants' Identity in a
confront station. So that, when on July 24, 1978, Salvador
Peruelo, while under detention because of this case, was
Identified, there was no reason for him to complain. (Exhibits 'C'
and series). Certainly, Federico Moulic was never shown to
entertain an evil motive to implicate Salvador Peruelo. On the
contrary, his coming forward days immediately upon Salvador
Peruelo's detention, should be commended.
It may be that, under the evidence, Salvador Peruelo hit Alex de
Guzman at the back, not stab the victim, as charged in the
Information. But then, conspiracy was alleged and proven. For
Salvador Peruelo was in the company of Demetrio Runez at the
time. So that, the act of one is that of the other. More so that
evidence along this line never met any serious objections from
Salvador Peruelo. Even when Demetrio Runez was named in the
Amended Information, Salvador Peruelo never made the slightest
outcry. Since then, Demetrio Runez similarly evaded arrest.
On appeal, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses would not
normally be disturbed, in deference to the trial court's peculiar advantage of having
observed in the first instance, the demeanor or deportment of the witnesses in
giving their testimony. But it has been consistently held that this rule of appreciation
of evidence must yield to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is fundamental that an
accused is presumed innocent. And this presumption must prevail unless
overturned by competent and credible proof.
Evidence to be believed must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. On
this, the testimony of Federico Moulic the only person who was supposed to have
witnessed the commission of the crime must be tested.
It was said that upon hearing a shout, Federico Moulic went out of his hut, directly
to its source. At a distance of ten meters, he focused his flashlight at the source.
And, then, by the beam of his flashlight, Moulic watched the unfolding of a violent
assault, allegedly by Salvador Peruelo and Demetrio Runez upon the helpless
victim.
Moulic's story was just too pat to be true. No man in his normal wits would
deliberately approach and view a violent assault being perpetrated by armed
assailants, knowing that he himself was actually exposed to the danger of being
seen by them and risk possible liquidation. And, yet there was Moulic, unflinching
even as he focused his flashlight on what the culprits apparently preferred to
commit in the dark.
Equally strange - the culprits seemed unmindful that as they inflicted the fatal blows
upon the victim, they were being watched by a probable eye-witness. Following
Moulic's story, though, one of them shouted at him. But, what did Moulic allegedly
do? When shouted at, he shut off his flashlight and even went nearer the culprits,
then moved backward. Moulic, then saw the culprits tie the victim, and thereafter,
leave with the latter's tricycle.
It could be seen that Moulic's behavior was utterly unusual He could have sounded
a bit credible, if he said he ran away from the scene as fast as he could. But, to
compound it all, this witness only betrayed himself when he said he shut off his
flashlight and still saw the culprits tying the victim and then took his tricycle.
If indeed Moulic had seen the entire fateful scenario, would it not be natural for him
to approach the victim after the culprits had left? Instead he calmly walked back to
his hut, slept until the next morning, as if nothing had happened.
Finally, Federico Moulic claimed that he recognized the assailants and described
them in court. He thus pointed at Salvador Peruelo as the tall and thin man with an
oblong face who hit the victim with a blunt instrument.
It should be noted that this witness was testifying after more than eight years from
the fateful evening of October 18, 197 1, which was the first time he allegedly saw
the assailants. If this witness had indeed recognized the malefactors there appears
no reason why he kept silent for such a length of time.
The natural tendency of an eye-witness to a crime is to report it, and to describe the
malefactors to the authorities, at the earliest possible opportunity, According to
Moulic's uncorroborated story, he had that opportunity when at 6:30 o'clock of
October 19, 1971, he went to the scene of the crime where be saw Maasin By.
Captain Atong Gubatan and some policemen investigating the case. But Moulic did
not even approach the police investigators. It would be recalled that for some time
after the finding of de Guzman's dead body; the police had no clue at all as to the
slaying of the victim.
The trial court found it sufficient that Moulic had made known to By. Captain
Gubatan that he Moulic "could establish the assailant's Identity in a confrontation."
But if this witness had indeed recognized the culprits, why did he not describe their
appearance to the proper authorities, i.e. the police? His behaviour was unusual for
a man who claimed to have witnessed a startling occurrence the previous night and
to have recognized the evil-doers. If after a few hours from the occurrence Moulic
did not describe the assailants to the authorities, could he now be believed when
he described them during the trial after more than eight years?
All told, what is at once revealing of Moulic's incredibility is his claim that appellant
Salvador Peruelo struck the victim at the back of the head with a blunt instrument,
when Dr. Numeriano Presto who autopsied the victim's body on October 19, 1971,
categorically declared that the only wound he found on the victim's body was the
fatal stab wound on the abdomen.
To our mind, Federico Moulic's unconvincing and unreliable testimony failed to link
appellant Salvador Peruelo to the killing of Alex de Guzman. A conviction based on
this testimony alone, must perforce be reversed.
Neither did Exhibit "E" (the two-page sworn statement of Demetrio Runez)
strengthen the case of the prosecution. The statement was nothing but hearsay. It
did not serve as proof of the facts asserted therein. Runez, the affiant was not
presented in court. And so, Salvador Peruelo against whom the statement was
admitted in evidence, was not given an opportunity to cross examine him thereon.
Apparently, the prosecution made up for its failure to present Demetrio Runez, by
presenting Sgt. Pedro Landingan of the Dagupan City Police who allegedly took
Runez' affidavit. Landingan testified that Runez admitted to him that he Runez and
Salvador Peruelo assaulted the victim. But Landingan's testimony was double
hearsay and does not deserve even a slightest consideration.
Attached to the records, Exh. "E " is but a valueless scrap of paper. Unfortunately it
influenced the court a quo in its appreciation of Moulic's credibility, (Quoted
decision, supra) It also served as the basis of the information filed against the
accused-appellant.

Incidentally, it is noted that Demetrio Runez was not arrested in connection with
this case, despite his having allegedly executed Exhibit "E". On the whole this only
points to the weakness of the case of the prosecution.

It must also be stressed that no motive was shown for the killing of Alex de
Guzman. 'True, motive need not be proved where the killer has been positively
Identified. But where, as in this case, the Identification is extremely tenuous, proof
of motive is essential and the prosecution has shown none.

Salvador Peruelo testified as to his actual situs when the deceased was killed in
Maasin, Mangaldan, Pangasinan that evening of October 18, 1971. He was
attending a birthday celebration of his nephew, Jesus Peruelo, Jr. in Otero,
Mabayuan Olongapo City. Peruelo was amply corroborated by his wife Conchita
Ocampo, a brother Generoso Peruelo and a neighbor who went with him to the
birthday party, Herminigildo Liganad. And, the certificate of live birth of Jesus
Peruelo, Jr. (Exh. "2") showing that he was born on October 18, 1970, supported
Salvador's claim that October 18, 1971 was his nephew's birth anniversary.

It is true that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to
escape criminal liability. But where prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack
of reliability as to the Identification of the defendant, alibi assumes commensurate
strength. This is but consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. It will be noted, that the prosecution did not even attempt to show that it
was possible for the accused to have been at the place of the crime in Pangasinan,
either before or after the time he was in Olongapo City.

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused not having been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed Costs de oficio.
 [G.R. No. L-56858. December 27, 1982.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff appellee, v. AKMAD MARONG
and ABDURAJIK NADUWA, defendants whose death sentences are under
review.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Raul Roco (counsel de oficio), for Defendants-Appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Appellants, together with seven Moro National Liberation Front rebels, were
charged with the kidnapping for ransom of the captain and two security guards of
the fishing boat, MV Minerva I. Appellants pleaded not guilty and interposed the
defenses of denial and alibi. The People’s evidence culled principally from the
testimony of Halim disclosed that on the night of July 7, 1979 he peeped through
appellant Marong’s house and heard Marong instructing the seven rebels to kidnap
the captain of the fishing boat and to kill the two security guards. He left
immediately thereafter. The two security guards, testifying for the prosecution,
declared that at Bacalao where the victims were taken after their kidnapping, they
saw appellants ask money from the rebel leader Palsarip and, thereafter,
personally deliver the ransom money to him. On the other hand, evidence for the
defense, unrebutted by the prosecution, disclosed that the two security guards,
together with the ship’s captain, were released unharmed after payment of the
ransom money; that one of the negotiators, not Marong, personally delivered the
ransommoney to Paisarip; and that Lt. Bermudez, who personally investigated the
kidnapping case, did not implicate any of the appellants in the offense. The trial
judge giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
rendered judgment finding appellants guilty as charged.
The Supreme Court held that certain gaps, deficiencies and improbabilities in the
evidence of the prosecution engender reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellants
Assailed judgment is set aside and appellants are acquitted.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; NOT
MET IN CASE AT BAR. — The judgment of conviction cannot be sustained. The
gaps, deficiencies and improbabilities in the evidence of the prosecution engender
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Marong and Naduwa.
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF TESTIMONY; IMPROBABILITIES; CASE AT BAR. —
The incriminatory directive allegedly uttered by Marong was the only matter
covered by Halim’s testimony on direct examination. He left immediately after
hearing those words. To a seasoned trial lawyer, that testimony instantly evokes
incredulity because of its improbability. It appears to be a concocted story. It is just
too much of a coincidence that at the precise moment when Halim went near
Marong’s house Halim chanced to eavesdrop on Marong’s alleged utterance
regarding the kidnapping. Halim’s story is not credible because it does not accord
with the common experience of mankind. Marong’s small house (Exh. 2) could not
have accommodated seven rebels in addition to Marong and Naduwa, not to
mention Marong’s wife and children. Halim’s approach to Marong’s house and his
alleged act of peeping through the wall could not have passed unnoticed by the
persons inside the house. They would have sensed his presence immediately
considering his close propinquity to them. Another circumstance rendering Halim’s
version improbable is that the kidnapping, as actually executed, was not in
conformity with Marong’s alleged instruction to the seven terrorists. Marong and
Naduwa did not go with the rebels, although it was assumed in his directive that he
and Naduwa would accompany the terrorists. Moreover, contrary to Marong’s
alleged instruction, the two security guards were not killed. The prosecution’s
version that Marong recklessly threw all caution to the winds when he talked twice
with Palsarip in the presence of the three kidnapped victims is likewise not quite
believable. No sensible man perpetrating a grave offense would overexpose
himself as Marong did in this case, if the prosecution’s version is to be believed.
Marong would have known that after the three kidnapped victims had been set free
they would surely testify against him and, therefore, it would be suicidal for him to
deliver the ransom money in the presence of the three victims.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
This is a case of kidnapping for ransom. At about nine o’clock in the evening of July
7, 1979, seven rebels or terrorists, members of the Moro National Liberation Front,
armed with high-powered firearms and using two pumpboats, stealthily boarded the
MV Minerva I, a fishing boat anchored at the shoreline between Sitios Kalang
Salamat and Sitio Bojelebong, municipality of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan.
The rebels at gunpoint took into custody Benjamin de la Rosa, the captain of the
fishing boat or launch, and two security guards, Abdurasul Mannan, 20, and Teddy
P. Tarabasal (Amaikaidal Pawaki), 21, who were asleep, and took them to the two
pumpboats. The captives were brought by the rebels to Sitio Bucalao, Tipo-Tipo
and delivered to Palsarip (Far Sharif), the rebel zone commander in that place.
They were detained in a hut or camarin for thirteen days until the evening of July
20, 1979, when a ransom of twenty thousand pesos paid by Hadji Wahab Jalani
was delivered Palsarip who thereupon released the three kidnapped victim to Hadji
Salam Balamo, one of the negotiators, Balamo took the captives to Sitio Banah,
Tipo-Tipo where they were free.

The fishing boat was operated by Hadji Jalani, an affluent businessman from Sitio
Banah who functioned as the overall commander of the special para-military force
and the Integrated Civil Home Defense Force in that locality. He had hired Mannan
and Tarabasal, members of the special paramilitary force, to guard the fishing boat.
On July 6, 1979 or one day before the kidnapping, the two guards were ferried from
Sitio Banah to the fishing boat by Abdurajik Naduwa, 26, a resident of Sitio Kalang
Salamat and an operator of a pumpboat who was employed by Hadji Jalani.
Naduwa is the nephew of Akmad Marong, 32, a fisherman residing at Sitio Kalang
Salamat, a former MNLF member, who was the commander of the Integrated Civil
Home Defense Force in that island.
In the morning of July 8, 1979 (about twelve hours after the kidnapping) both
ICHDF commanders Hadji Jalani and Marong conferred with Lieutenant Conrado
V. Bermudez, the commander of C company of the 41st Infantry Batallion stationed
at Sitio Bojelebong presumably about the kidnapping (Exh. F).
The seven terrorists were identified as Utoh Yakan, Talakawa Yakan, Gamal Abirin,
Saad Abirin, Muctar Eladjii, Aladdin Moro and Condah alias Commander
Fernandez. They guarded the kidnapped victims during the thirteen-day period of
their captivity in Sitio Bucalao.
On October 2, 1979, the provincial fiscal filed against Marong and Naduwa and the
eight rebels (including Palsarip) an information for kidnapping for ransom. Only
Marong Naduwa were arrested and tried.
Question: Did Marong, with his nephew Naduwa’s assistance, mastermind the
kidnapping for ransom?
The prosecution contends that Marong and Naduwa conspired with Palsarip and
the seven terrorists to perpetrate the kidnapping for ransom. Conrado D. Francisco,
34, a sergeant in the police force of Isabela, Basilan (not Tipo-Tipo where the crime
was committed) was the architect of the case for the prosecution. He was deputed
by the fiscal to investigate the case. On September 1 and 3, 1979 or more than fifty
days after the incident, he secured the affidavits of Barahim Halim and the two
guards, Mannan and Tarabasal, linking Marong and Naduwa to the kidnapping
(Exh. A to D).
Note that Lieutenant Bermudez who also investigated the case and got the verbal
statements of the kidnapped victims soon after they were released, did not
implicate Marong and Naduwa.
Mannan and Tarabasal declared in their affidavits and testimonies that in the
afternoon of July 6, 1979 while they were riding in Naduwa’s pumpboat from Sitio
Banah, the boat anchored at Kalang Salamat. Naduwa landed and went to his
house near the beach.
On that occasion, Marong and three rebels named Gamal Abirin, Muctar (a close
relative of Naduwa) and Hadjan Yakan emerged from Naduwa’s house. When the
two guards pointed their rifles at the three rebels, Marong allegedly told them not to
harm the three terrorists because they were under "surrender negotiation."
To show that Marong and Naduwa conspired with the seven rebels, the prosecution
presented as witness Halim, 36, a resident of Banah and a conductor in the
jeepney owned by Hadji Jalani’s grandson.
Halim declared in his affidavit (Exh. A) and testimony that in the evening of July 7,
1979 he decided to fish for squid in the waters near Kalang Salamat which is about
a kilometer away from Banah. He rode in his vinta and reached Kalang Salamal at
about seven-thirty. He walked to Marong’s house which was made of bamboo and
nipa. He intended to secure Marong’s permission to fish in the waters of Kalang
Salamat.
On nearing the house, he noticed that there were many persons inside it. Instead of
entering the door, he allegedly peeped through the wall and, by some unusual
coincidence, it was at that very moment when he heard Marong directing the seven
rebels already named to board two pumpboats, kidnap the captain on the fishing
boat and kill the two security guards and then proceed to Sitio Bucalao where
Palsarip was waiting (16 tsn). Naduwa was present at that conference.
After hearing that directive, Halim left the place, boarded his vinta, proceeded to
Sitio Magbe and slept in his cousin’s house in that place. He could not return to
Banah because it was curfew time already.
The two security guards also testified that on July 8, 1979 or at noontime of the day
following the kidnapping, Marong and Naduwa appeared at Sitio Bucalao. Marong
gave money to Palsarip who complimented him on the success of the kidnapping,
Marong promised to return to bring the ransom money. That meeting between
Marong and Palsarip took place within the sight and hearing of the two security
guards and De la Rosa.
The two guards also testified that it was Marong who in the evening of July 20,
1979 gave the ransom money to Palsarip. As a result, the captives were released
and delivered to Hadji Balamo.
Marong, 34, testified that in the evening of July 7, 1979, he was fishing. At that
time, no pumpboat docked at Kalang Salamat. He said that the testimonies of
Mannan, Tarabasal and Haum were not true. He admitted that on July 8, 1979 he
and Naduwa went to Sitio Banah but he did so in the company of some teachers
and children. Then, he went to see Captain Bermudez at Bojelebong where he
learned that De la Rosa and the two guards were kidnapped. He admitted that he is
acquainted with Palsarip.
He did not know why Mannan and Tarabasal testified against him. He had a
misunderstanding with Hadji Jalani regarding a fish corral but the trouble was
patched up. He said that Halim was a minion (bataan) of Hadji Jalani.
Abdurahman Balintin, a fisherman, rebutted the testimony that Marong had
intervened in collecting the ransom money by declaring that the twenty thousand
pesos were given to him (Balintin) and that he, together with Hadjis Salami, Gapur,
and Balamo and two persons named Atti and Pawaki, delivered that amount to
Palsarip, and then Balintin delivered to Hadji Jalani the kidnapped victims.
Accused Naduwa, 27, admitted that he was hired by Hadji Jalani on July 5, 1979 to
take the two security guard to the fishing boat. The next morning he brought the
two guards to Banah and in the afternoon he took them to the boat.
He testified that on July 7, 1979 he did not go to the fishing boat because he was
on guard duty in the tower near Marong’s house. He denied having gone to
Bucalao with Marong to talk with Palsarip. He explained that he was implicated in
the case because he was Marong’s nephew.
Judge Jainal D. Rasul rejected the alibis and denials of Marong and Naduwa and
gave credence to the testimonies of Halim, Mannan, Tarabasal and Sergeant
Francisco. He convicted Marong and Naduwa of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced them to death. No civil liability was imposed. The case was elevated to
this Court for review of the death penalty.
Counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in relying on Halim’s testimony,
in disregarding the alibis of Marong and Naduwa, in not taking into account the
alleged suspicious circumstances surrounding the investigation and prosecution of
the case and in not acquitting the two accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Our study of the record * convinces us that the judgment of conviction cannot be
sustained. The following gaps, deficiencies and improbabilities in the evidence of
the prosecution engender reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Marong and Naduwa:
1. Halim’s version is that at the moment when he allegedly peeped inside Marong’s
humble abode (made of nipa and woven bamboo as walls, as described by Halim
in his affidavit) he heard Marong saying: "We are going to board on two pumpboats
and proceed to the Minerva I (Jalani’s fishing boat) and get the captain of the boat
and kill his security guards, Abdurasul Mannan and Teddy Tarabasal and then
proceed to Bucalao because Palsarip is waiting there." (This version is different
from what Halim stated in his affidavit, Exhibit A).
That incriminatory directive was the only matter covered by Halim’s testimony on
direct examination. He left immediately after hearing those words. To a seasoned
trial lawyer, that testimony instantly evokes incredulity because of its improbability.
It appears to be a concocted story.
It is just too much of a coincidence that at the precise moment when Halim went
near Marong’s house Halim chanced to eavesdrop on Marong’s alleged utterance
regarding the kidnapping, Halim’s story is not credible because it does not accord
with the common experience of mankind. Marong’s small house (Exh. 2) could not
have accommodated seven rebels in addition to Marong and Naduwa, not to
mention Marong", wife and children. Halim’s approach to Marong’s house and his
alleged act of peeping through the wall could not have passed unnoticed by the
persons inside the house. They would have sensed his presence immediately
considering his close propinquity to them.
Another circumstance rendering Halim’s version improbable is that the kidnapping,
as actually executed was not in conformity with Marong’s alleged instruction to the
seven terrorists. Marong and Naduwa did not go with the rebels, although it was
assumed in his directive that he and Naduwa would accompany the terrorists.
Moreover, contrary to Marong’s alleged instruction, the two security guards were
not killed.
2. The prosecution’s version that Marong recklessly threw all caution to the winds
when he talked twice with Palsarip in the presence of the three kidnapped victims is
likewise not quite believable. No sensible man perpetrating a grave offense would
overexpose himself as Marong did in this case, if the prosecution’s version is to be
believed. Marong would have known that after the three kidnapped victims had
been set free they would surely testify against him and, therefore, it would be
suicidal for him to deliver the ransom money in the presence of the three victims.
3. Hadji Jalani, the owner of the fishing boat and the payor of the ransom money,
and De la Rosa, the captain of the boat, should have testified on the alleged
participation of Marong in the kidnapping. They did not testify. Their nonavailability
as witnesses was not explained by the prosecution.
The possibility that Marong, who as ICHDF commander was on the government’s
side, confabulated with the rebels, cannot be ruled out but the evidence that he
actually did so in this case is not convincing and trustworthy.
WHEREFORE, the trial court’s judgment of conviction is set aside. The two
accused are acquitted on the ground that the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient
to prove their guilt. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-5324. December 28, 1910. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AGAPITO LASADA, Defendant-
Appellant.
Chicote and Miranda for Appellant.
Attorney General Villamor for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION. — In a criminal
prosecution, the law always presumes that the defendant is not guilty of any crime
whatever, and this presumption stands until it is overcome by competent and
credible proof.
2. ID.; PROSECUTION MUST PROVE GUILT; REASONABLE DOUBT;
ACQUITTAL. — It is always incumbent upon the prosecution in a criminal cause to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if there remains a
reasonable doubt of guilt, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused and
he must be acquitted.
3. ID.; REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINED. — By reasonable doubt is not meant that
which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of
the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to
convict of a criminal charge, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition
of proof requisite to constitute the offense.
4. ID.; MODES OF IMPEACHING WITNESSES; DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF
COURT. — One mode is by close cross-examination, to involved the witness in
contradictions as to material facts stated by him. Immaterial discrepancies or
differences in the statements of witnesses do not affect their credibility, unless
there is something to show that they originate in willful falsehood. If there are
conflicts in the statements of witnesses, it is the duty of the court to reconciled, the
court must adopt the testimony which it believes to be true. In reaching this
conclusion it can take into consideration the character of the witness, his manner
and demeanor on the stand, the consistency or inconsistency of his statements,
their probability or improbability, his ability and willingness to speak the truth, his
intelligence and means of knowledge, and his motives to speak the truth or swear
to a falsehood.
5. ID.; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE;
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. — A motion for new trial, based upon newly
discovered merely of statements made in an affidavit which are so improbable and
unreasonable that they can not be believed.
DECISION
TRENT, J. :
On December 9, 1908, the provincial fiscal of the Province of Leyte filed a
complaint against Agapito Lasada, Santiago Lasada, Macario Lasada, and Panfilio
Closa, charging them for the crime of murder. The case was called for hearing on
the 26th of January, 1909. The accused Agapito Lasada, upon his own application,
was granted a separate trial, which commenced on that day. On being arraigned on
this charged he plead not guilty. After hearing and considering the proofs and
arguments presented the trial court found this accused, Agapito Lasada, guilty of
the crime of homicide and sentenced him to seventeen years four months and one
day of reclusion temporal, to the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, and to pay one-fourth of the cost. He appealed to this court, and his
case is the only one before us at this time.
Pedro Sopriengco, a Chinaman and resident of the barrio of Tarragona,
municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte, left his house about 8 a.m. on March 30,
1908, to visit his coconut grove or rice fields, with the intention of returning early
that same afternoon. His body was found the next day, March 31, about 100 brazas
from the bridge which crosses the River Balacoue, within the jurisdiction of his
barrio.
Counsel for the appellant insists: First, that the prosecution failed to establish the
guilt of his client of the crime charged; and, second, that it has not been shown that
the wounds inflicted upon the body of the Chinaman were the direct cause of his
death. We will determine the second proposition first:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That the Chinaman’s body was found on March 31 at a certain place near the river
is not questioned, neither is it questioned that when he left home the day before he
was enjoying reasonably good health. By order of the justice of the peace Ramon
Mandia, a mediquillo, examined this body on the day it was found, and according to
this witness’s testimony, which is not contradicted, the body presented the
following-described wounds and contusions: A contusions on the forehead,
apparently made by a blow; a wound in the right side cause by sharp cutting
instrument. This wound was 5 centimeters deep and 4 centimeters long. On the
neck and face there were livid marks. In the opinion of this witness the round in the
side would not, necessarily, have caused the death of the Chinaman, but the blow
on the forehead would have caused his death.
Julia Sopriengco, daughter of the deceased, gave about the same description of
the wounds on the body as did the mediquillo. The blow on the forehead was
evidently caused by some heavy blunt instrument, and we are fully satisfied that
this blow, together with the other wounds, was the direct cause of the death of this
Chinaman.
Agapito Lasada and Santiago Lasada were charged in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Leyte with the crime of lesiones graves. It was alleged in this
complaint that these two men did on the 23d of February, 1906, criminally and
maliciously maltreat Pedro Sopriengco, inflicting upon the person of the said
Sopriengco three contusions. The Court of First Instance found Agapito Lasada
guilty to the crime as charged in the complaint and sentenced him to be confined
for the period of four months and to indemnify the injured party in the sum of P50.
Lasada appealed to the Supreme Court and this court affirmed the verdict of guilty
but reduced the penalty to twenty-five days’ imprisonment in the municipal jail of
Abuyog, and fixed the amount of the indemnity the same as the trial court. 1 The
certificate, returning the record in this case to the Court of First Instance for the
execution of the sentenced, was signed by the clerk on the 31st of January, 1908,
and it must have arrived in the capital of the Province of Leyte some eight or ten
days later, and it required a few days more in sending the order from the capital to
Abuyog to the municipal president, directing him to carry the sentence of this
Supreme Court into effect. Agapito Lasada was, in a way, serving this sentence on
the 30th of March of that year; in fact he was then spending his time in the
municipality of Abuyog, but was not confined in the municipal jail. He was permitted
by the president, Vicente Tiauzon, to go where he pleased in the town and stayed,
at least a part of the time, in the house of Tiauzon. On account of Tiauzon failing to
confine the accused in accordance with the decision of this court, the deceased
Chinaman desired to go to the capital of the province in order to notify the
provincial authorities of the noncompliance with the order directing the confinement
of Lasada by Tiauzon.
The two principal witnesses for the prosecution were Espiridion Moldes and Benito
Resardo, who testified substantially as follows: That about 5 o’clock on the
afternoon of the 30th of March, 1908, as they were returning to the barrio of
Tarragona, and while they were washing their feet in the creek of Tañguigui, the
Chinaman, Pedro Sopriengco, came along; that they asked him to wait and all
three of them would go together, but the Chinaman did not wait, saying that he had
to make some collections and went on, leaving the other two there. A little later,
Moldes and Resardo continued their march, looking for the main road. After they
had crossed the Balocaue River — it then beginning to get a little dark — they
heard screams, saying: "Do not kill me." That on hearing these screams they
walked a little faster, turning away from the main road and hiding in the shrubbery;
that from the place of their hiding they saw, at a distance of about 4 brazas, Agapito
Lasada, Santiago Lasada, Macario Lasada, and Panfilio Closa, the three first
named armed with sticks and the lasts with the dagger, beating Pedro Sopreingco;
that the Chinaman was holding him by the hair; that they then heard the accused
Agapito Lasada say, speaking to the Chinaman: "You are efficient in making
complaints, now you will not do it again."cralaw virtua1aw library
Lorenzo Gonzaga, another witness for the prosecution, testified that about 4 p.m.
on that day he saw the accused, Agapito Lasada, carrying a club and dressed in
cañamo clothes, arrive hurriedly at the River Vito, outside the town of Abuyog, and
that the accused crossed this river in his (the witness’s) banca; that after crossing
the river the accused continued his march in the direction of Tarragona, but he did
not travel in the usually traveled road.
Lope Margate testified that on returning from the town of Abuyog to the barrio of
Tarragona he saw this accused about 8 p.m. on March 30; that the accused was
then dressed in cañamo clothes and carried a club or stick; that at that time the
accused was accompanied by three men, two of whom he knew, being Santiago
Lasada and Panfilio Closa; that these four men, including the accused, entered the
house of Santiago Lasada in that barrio.
Ramon Mandia, another witness for the prosecution, testified that he saw the
defendant, Agapito Lasada, on the morning of March 31 a little after 8 o’clock,
some distance from the tribunal in that part of the town called Vitug, the municipal
building being on the other side of town, or in that part called Nalibunan; that when
he saw the accused on this morning he was dressed in cañamo clothes.
The defense sought to establish an alibi, and for this purpose presented Vicente
Tiauzon, his son Jose Tiauzon, Ramon Gonzaga, Espiridion Vera, and Doctor
Stallman.
Vicente Tiauzon was at that time municipal president of the town of Abuyog. He
testified that the defendant was in his house in the town on March 30; that he never
left the town during that day, nor that night; that he was there serving a sentence,
but was not in the municipal jail on account of his sickness; and that he slept in his
(witness’s) house on the night of March 30.
The second witness, Jose Tiauzon, testified that the defendant was in his
(witness’s) father’s house and that they dined together there about 8 p. m. on
March 30; that he remembers this because they had quite a conversation on that
night.
Ramon Gonzaga testified that he saw the defendant on March 30 in the tribunal
and that when he was taking a walk he saw him (the defendant) in the window of
the house of the president about ten minutes after 6 in the evening.
Espiridion Vera stated that he went to the house of the municipal president one
night during the latter part of the month of March, but he could not remember the
day. Counsel for the defendant withdrew the testimony of this witness.
Mr. Stallman, a surgeon in the regular United States Army, testified that he saw the
defendant on the 14th of March and various other times from that time until April 4;
that the defendant had beriberi; that when he saw the defendant on the 4th of April
he was in a worse condition with this disease than he was on the 14th of March,
and on being asked whether or not the defendant could make a journey on foot
which would require two or three hours’ walking, he replied that the defendant could
walk for three hours by stopping at intervals, but to do so it would be very difficult;
that it would take a person in the condition of the defendant nearly four hours to
walk from the town of Abuyog to the barrio of Tarragona. This witness further
testified that he saw the defendant walking around the town before and after the 4th
of April; that he did not treat this defendant for this disease, but his attention was
called to it when he went to the house of the president, and that he examined the
defendant twice, first on the 14th of March and the second time on the 4th of April.
If the testimony of the witness for the defense be accepted as true, the judgment
must be reversed and the defendant acquitted, but if the prosecution’s witnesses
have truthfully stated the facts, the defendant is guilty. To determine this question
an analysis of the proofs is necessary. The law presumes that a defendant is not
guilty of any crime, and this presumption stands until it is overturned by competent
and credible proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and if there remains a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt or innocence this doubt must be resolved in his favor and he must be
acquitted. By reasonable doubt in not meant that which of possibility may arise, but
it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainly of guilt. Absolute
certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but
moral certainty is required, and this certainly is required as to every proposition of
proof requisite to constitute the offense. There are several modes of impeaching a
witness. One mode is by close cross-examination to involve the witness in
contradictions and discrepancies as to material facts stated by him. Immaterial
discrepancies or differences in the statements of witnesses do not affect their
credibility, unless there is something to show that they originate in willful falsehood.
If there are conflicts in the statements of different witnesses, it is the duty of the
court to reconcile them, if it can be done, for the law presumes that every witness
has sworn the truth. But if the conflicts in the testimony can not be so reconciled as
to admit of every witness swearing the truth, the court must adopt that testimony
which it believes to be true; and in reaching this conclusion it can take into
consideration the general character of the witness, his manner and demeanor on
the stand while testifying, the consistency or inconsistency of his statements, their
probability or improbability, his ability and willingness to speak the truth, his
intelligence and means of knowledge, his motive to speak the truth or swear a
falsehood.
In reaching a conclusion in the case under consideration we are deprived of the
advantage of seeing the witnesses, hearing them testify, and nothing their
demeanor on the stand, which are of great assistance in reaching a conclusion
when the testimony is so conflicting.
Counsel for the defendant in his printed brief points out what he considers a
number of contradictions in the testimony presented by the prosecution, and also
he gives what he thinks a number of good reasons why this testimony can not be
believed.
Benito Resardo and Espiridion Moldes make different statements as to whether or
not there were house near the place where they saw the defendant and his
companions maltreating the Chinaman, and also as to whether or not they
separated after leaving that place or continued their journey together. These are
immaterial differences. The attention of these witnesses was not specially directed
to the question whether or not there were houses close by, and it is of no
importance so far as the truthfulness of their testimony if concerned whether there
were houses close by or whether they continued their journey together. Their
attention was directed to what they saw and they were not thinking about these
minor matters. It must be remembered that this trial took place some ten months
after the occurrence and these witnesses were no doubt honestly mistaken as to
some of the minor details, such as to where they were on the following day when
the authorities came to investigate the matter and with whom they talked on that
day.
Resardo said that he had only testified in this case once. A document was
presented to him and he was asked if it was signed by himself. He said it was. The
witness said he was only asked questions in the justice of the peace court. The
preliminary investigation, if any were held, is not made a part of this record. The
witness said that he did not testify before the justice of the peace, but explains this
by saying that the justice of the peace only asked him questions. This appears to
be a satisfactory explanation on that point. The same witness stated that he was
not related to Julia Sopriengco, the daughter of the deceased Chinaman; but, as
the court below said, he later explained this mistake.
The testimony of Geronimo Barbasan and Justino Mundala, wherein they stated
that they, together with Moldes and Resardo, were invited to the house of Julia
Sopriengco and while they were all there the said Julia offered them P200 each on
condition that they would testify that the defendant and his brothers killed her
father, is so unreasonable that it can not be believed. This testimony was flatly
denied by Moldes, Resardo, and Julia; in fact Julia and her sister Felisa testified
that they were not at home at any time from the 1st of April to the 7th of April. It is
not reasonable that Julia would have called these four men together and made this
offer in the presence of all of them, knowing the enmity which existed between
Barbasan and Mundala on one side and Moldes of the other.
Vicente Tiauzon, the principal witness for the defense, was evidently deeply
interested in this case. He had been directed to confine the defendant in
accordance with a decision of his court. He failed to do so as was keeping the
defendant at his own house. According to Julia Sopriengco, her father had
complained to the president about not confining the defendant, so it was to his
interest to testify in favor of the defendant. The same influence was no doubt
brought to bear upon his son, Jose Tiauzon.
The other witness, Gonzaga, as we have said, testified that he saw the defendant
in the house of the president about ten minutes after 6 on the evening of March 30.
This testimony was given some ten months afterwards.
Doctor Stallmen’s testimony is the strongest in support of the alibi, but he testified
that the defendant could have made the trip on foot from the town of Abuyog to the
barrio of Tarragona, which would have taken about three hours. He also testified
that he saw the defendant walking around the town during those days. The
defendant could and, in fact, did walk around in the town during that time and never
was in a condition so that he could not travel. According to the doctor, as we have
said, it would have taken the defendant about three hours to walk to this barrio, but
it must be remembered that the cocales or rice fields where the deceased went that
day are between the barrio and the town, and it took the deceased, walking fast, a
little less than an hour to walk from his home toward the town to these cocales.
The Chinaman was killed near the river on that day. Two witnesses saw the
defendant and his companions commit this murder. The testimony of these two
witnesses is corroborated by the witnesses Gonzaga and Margate. It is also
corroborated to a certain extent by Mandia. The testimony of all these witnesses is
reasonable. The motive on the part of the defendant for killing the deceased is
clearly shown.
The testimony of the witnesses for the defense, who sought to establish an alibi,
can not overcome the positive and direct testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution, especially when we consider the fact that the main witness for the
defense, Vicente Tiauzon, was deeply interested in favor of the defendant. Doctor
Stallman’s testimony can be accepted as true and then the alibi would not, by any
means, be established, as he stated that the defendant could have made that trip,
and it has been clearly established that the defendant was walking around the town
during these days.
same complaint, with having killed the Chinaman. He escaped from jail a very short
time after this alleged confession. These parties said nothing about this confession
until after Closa had made good his escape. He was confined in the jail at Tacloban
when this trial took place and he could have been presented without any difficulty
as a witness in favor of this defendant, and if his confession were true this could
have been ascertained at the time this trial took placed. No reason is given why
Closa made this confession. The statements of these two men in these affidavits
are so improbable and so unreasonable that they can not be believed, especially in
view of the fact that they said nothing about this matter until Closa made his
escape. For these reasons this motion is denied.
Three other affidavits were filed on February 10, 1910, but they were not
accompanied by any motion asking for a reopening of the case, or giving any
reason why these witnesses were not presented during the trial. So these affidavits
can not be considered.
The judgment appealed from is therefore, affirmed, with cost against the Appellant.
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Johnson, JJ., concur.

The trial judge had an opportunity to see these witnesses, hear them testify, and
observe their demeanor on the witness stand. This is one of the best ways of
determining the credibility of a witness. After hearing all these witnesses testify he
was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the witnesses for the prosecution
testified the truth. In view of these facts we must give great weight to the findings
made by the trial court. We only have the record, and, as we have said, the
testimony for the prosecution is reasonable. It is direct and positive. In view of the
clear and explicit findings made by the trial court, and after a careful consideration
of the testimony presented, we are fully satisfied that the defendant is guilty of this
crime.

On the 5th of April, 1909, counsel for the defendant presented in this court a motion
for the reopening of this cases for the purpose of presenting newly discovered
evidence. This motion is sworn to and accompanied by two affidavits. The first is
that of Apolonio Monton, and according to this affidavit Monton had a conversation
with Panfilio Closa in the carcel on the 2d day of March, 1909, and that during this
conservation the said Closa told this witness that he, Closa, and a brother-in-law of
his were the men who killed the Chinaman, and that this defendant and his brothers
had nothing to do with this murder. The other affidavit was made by Agapito
Suganob, and according to this affidavit Suganob heard this conversation between
Closa and Monton, and heard Closa say to Monton that he, Closa, and his brother-
in-law were the authors of this crime.

Panfilio Closa was charged, along with this defendant and the other accused, in the
G.R. No. L-68574 July 7, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOROTEO BAAO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Renato J. Bihasa for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Two issues immediately present themselves in this appeal from a decision
convicting the accused-appellant of two counts of rape committed on a thirteen-
year old girl:
1. Would the complainant concoct a tale of multiple rape against her simply to get
back at the accused-appellant for scolding her when he allegedly caught her
stealing from his store?
2. If so, how about the physical evidence of her defloration and the indications of
subsequent coitus during the period when the rapes were allegedly committed?
Rowena Federio, the complainant, is a school drop-out at thirteen, finishing only
Grade I, and of limited native intelligence. 1 According to the trial judge, "She
typifies the unschooled timid barrio lass soft-spoken and shy in her ways. She
exhibits a low mentality and obvious susceptibility to yield to persuasions, to
suggestions; a pronounced inability to argue and to resist." 2 She has an invalid
father and a mother who is out of the house every day making a living and
occasionally does not sleep with her family. 3
It is this girl who claims she was raped five-times by the accused-appellant, three
times in December 1982, and twice in February 1983. 4 Shortly after the fifth rape,
on March 4, 1983, she decided to tell her mother about the offenses because, as
she put it, she could not keep her terrible secret any longer. 5
According to her, the first three rapes were committed in the bathroom of the
accused-appellant's house, the fourth in the backyard, and the fifth in the living
room of the same house. 6 The first three rapes were committed in the morning, at
about 8 o'clock, on dates in December she cannot recall, the fourth at about 10
o'clock in the evening of February 17, 1983, and the fifth at about noon of February
23, 1983. 7
All the five rapes were perpetrated in substantially the same way, through the use
of force and with threat of death for resisting during the act and for reporting it
thereafter. 8 The first rape caused laceration of the complainant's hymen, 9 and
there was full penetration and pain in every one of the five rapes. 10
In the statement she gave to the police, as taken and authenticated by Pat. Isagani
Simera one of the prosecution witnesses 11 she narrated her experiences in
Tagalog in a straightforward manner. 12 But testifying in court, as the trial judge
noted, she was hesitant, inaudible at times, and understandably nervous prompting
him to advise her speak louder." "Do not be afraid." "Do not hesitate to tell the
truth." "Just testify."13
The loss of the complainant's virginity and her several accounts of sexual
intercourse were borne out by the testimony of Dr. Maximo Reyes, medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, 14 who also made the following report
as summarized by the trial court in its decision:
Genital findings compatible with sexual intercourse with man on
or about the alleged date of commission "The presence of
hymenal laceration completely healed at 7:00 o'clock position
corresponding to the face of the watch, conformably with the
allegation of the victim that the alleged crime was committed way
back or from January up to February prior to the date of the
examination which was March 7" (hearing of Oct. 5, 1983, t.s.n.,
p. 72)"; ... inasmuch as the edge of the said laceration is still
sharp and coaptible, meaning, that the alleged time of the
commission or infliction of said injury is three (3) months below
(Ibid, p. 73); and that, the victim underwent sexual intercourse for
not more than five (5) times-"Considering the fact that the vaginal
orifice is moderately tight and the rugosities are moderately
prominent. 15
Lucia Federio, the complainant's mother, testified on how she came to know about
the multiple rapes of her daughter. 16 She also said that the accused-appellant's
wife had approached her and offered her P2,000.00 in consideration for the
withdrawal of her daughter's charges. 17
Against this evidence of the prosecution, the accused-appellant relied mainly on
denial and alibi.
He flatly rejected the complainant's allegations, claiming he had been falsely
accused because he had once caught the girl stealing soft drinks from his store and
had scolded her. This had led to an altercation between him and Lucia Federio, the
mother, who then decided to file the case against him. 18
His other defense was that he was not in Dasmarinas, Cavite, when the alleged
rapes were committed but with his daughter at her house at the Manila International
Airport in Baclaran.19 This was corroborated by his daughter, Alicia Baao who said
he was in her house from December 10 to 23, 1983, and practically did not leave
the place during that period. The reason for his stay, she said, was some carpentry
work he had to do for her. 20
Additionally, the defense argued that the complaint was filed to extort money from
him, in the amount of P15,000.00, later reduced to P8,000.00. 21
Weighing the evidence for the contending parties, we incline with the trial court
toward the prosecution. The testimony of the complainant herself, as supported by
the medical examination report, is in our view, more credible than the posture taken
by the accused-appellant.
We do not believe, given the naivete and limited intelligence of the complainant,
that she could have fabricated her charges against the accused-appellant, weaving
a tale of pure fantasy out of mere imagination. She does not appear to have such
inventiveness.
Neither do we suspect, again considering what the trial judge described as her "low
mentality," that the complainant's testimony was coached and thereafter recited
from memory. She would not be capable of such a feat, and let it be added, such
deceptiveness.
It is true that there were some inconsistencies in her narration of her ordeal but
they do not in our view detract from its basic truthfulness.
One might also ask why, having been burned the first time, the girl did not
thereafter stay away from the accused-appellant but in fact gave him other
opportunities to inflict his lust on her. The explanation is that we are dealing here
not with a worldy-wise woman but with a simple thirteen-year old girl whose acts
were dominated more by fear than by reason, a fear made more harrowing by the
fact that it was a lonely fear she dared not share, until later, even with her own
mother.
The defense of alibi, which is an inherently weak defense, is made more so here by
the circumstance that it is corroborated only by the accused-appellant's
daughter, 22 whose motives are not exactly unbiased.
Moreover, the defendant does not show he could not have gone to and returned
from Dasmariñas on the days of the alleged rapes while he was actually staying
with his daughter in Baclaran.
The accused-appellant was admittedly in Dasmariñas from the first to the ninth and
(deducting the period of his supposed stay with his daughter in Baclaran) from the
twenty-fourth to the thirty-first of December. The complainant could not remember
the exact dates in December when she claimed she was raped, saying simply that
these took place in that month. 23 It is possible then that the rapes were committed
on those dates when the accused-appellant was actually not in Baclaran, but in
Dasmarinas.
We also find it hard to believe that the complainant's mother would have sought to
extort P15,000.00 from the accused- appellant to settle the case, knowing that he
would not be able to raise the amount from his small sari-sari store business. Even
if the demand had been reduced to P8,000.00, as claimed, Lucia Federio would
also not have expected that such demand could be met by this small storekeeper.
As the Court sees it, her own testimony that she had been offered P2,000.00 to
withdraw the charges is more realistic and credible. 24
Invoking falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, the defense contends that, having
rejected the complainant's charge of the second, third and fifth rapes, the trial judge
should also have found that she was lying on the first and fourth rapes. Hence, it
should have absolved the accused-appellant of all the five rapes. 25 Conversely,
however, it can also be argued that, having been found truthful on the first and
fourth rapes, the complainant should also be believed on the other three alleged
rapes, of which the accused-appellant should likewise have been convicted.
In effect, therefore, the choice suggested is between a total acquittal or a total
conviction of the accused-appellant of all the five alleged rapes, depending upon
the total credibility or the total incredibility of the complainant.
We are inclined to give full credence to the complainant's testimony and so to
support her charges of rape on all five counts as narrated by her. To repeat, she
appears to be an artless and inexperienced girl devoid of malice or evil motive and
incapable of improvising the sordid story she recounted to the trial court in all its
ugly detail.
However, realizing that we go only by the insensate record, we shall defer to the
factual findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses
and assess their demeanor, to mark every nuance of tone or pause of hesitation or
flush of face, and to determine, by the totality of his impressions and the plausibility
of their testimony, if the evidence justified acquittal or conviction.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction of the accused-appellant for the first and
fourth rapes and his exoneration of the three other alleged rapes, as held by the
trial court. In arriving at this decision, we merely declare with the trial court, that as
to the second, third and fifth rapes, the prosecution has failed to establish that
degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt necessary to hold the defendant guilty.
We sustain the penalty imposed, viz., reclusion perpetua for each of the two rapes,
plus P50,000.00 moral damages. If we could, we would have added to these
penalties that "special place in hell for child molesters," to use the words of Mr.
Justice Vicente Abad Santos, "for they are men who are dirty, despicable, deviant
and the dregs of society. " 26

One last observation and we are done with this nauseating case.

It is bad enough that a man imposes his lust on a woman mature in years and
emotion and perhaps already knowledgeable in the ways of the flesh, for carnal
greed is to be deplored and denounced in every case. It is worse, however, if, as in
this case, the victim is a girl barely in her teens, whose first experiences with sex
had to be brutalized with the ugliness of an illicit force and the menace of an evil
threat imposed upon her by a man whose age alone, which was more than thrice
hers, should have deterred him from unleashing on her the animal in him.

Pity the helpless and innocent victim, the bewildered and violated child, the
spotless holocaust forever besmeared! Her emerging into womanhood can never
be for her a tender and cherished memory of fulfillment and discovery, as it has
been and as it will be for others before a similar threshold but in a more pleasurable
ambience. Her own sordid initiation is an experience she is doomed to recall with
distate, recoiling at every remembered detail of how her chastity was ruptured and
her honor debased.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed in full, with costs
against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48929 November 28, 1984 victim. After the four (4) assailants fled, Filomeno returned home.
The next morning, Filomeno learned that it was his brother Isidro
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, who was the subject of the attack and mauling by Melchor and
vs. Ponciano and their two other companions. Filomeno reported the
PONCIANO AMON and MELCHOR AMON, defendants-appellants. incident to the PC authorities, and gave his written statement
(Exh. "C") on October 14, 1973.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
The victim's corpse was examined by Municipal Health Officer
Jesus Manalo, M.D. on October 11, 1973. Aside from several
Posadas & Brito Law Office for defendants-appellants. abrasions, the victim Isidro Poblete also sustained a gunshot
wound, whose point of entrance was on the upper front teeth and
a point of exit somewhere on the right side of the mouth. (Exhs.
"A" and "A-1".) The victim's death was caused by hemorrhage,
severe with shock due to gunshot wounds. (Exhs. "A" and "B".) 2
DE LA FUENTE, J.:

In appealing the said judgment, the accused-appellants assail the sufficiency of

Appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case No. TG-233-74, Court of First Instance
evidence adduced by the prosecution as proof of their guilt beyond reasonable
of Cavite, wherein the accused Ponciano Amon and Melchor Amon were found
doubt.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, as charged in the indictment, and were
sentenced "to suffer reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law", etc. 1 Instead of a brief, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation 3 wherein he
recommends acquittal of both appellants upon the submission that the testimony of
the lone eyewitness not being clear, explicit and positive, does not measure up to
Said judgment, it appears, is predicated mainly on the testimony of Filomeno
the legal yardstick of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Poblete, brother of the deceased Isidro Poblete, alleged to be the lone eyewitness
to the commission of the crime. The prosecution also presented Dr. Jesus Manalo,
the Municipal Health Officer who autopsied the cadaver of the victim, and Mrs. After careful examination of the entire record of this case, We are convinced that
Leonida Poblete Alejandro, half sister of the said deceased, who testified on the said submittal is well taken.
alleged altercation between the deceased and the accused Melchor Amon in front
of her horse in Silang, Cavite. It is settled that factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
As narrated by the trial court in its decision, the facts established by the evidence appeal considering its vantage point in observing and hearing the
for the prosecution are: witnesses. 4 However, whenever some indubitable facts and circumstances
favoring the accused-appellants have either been overlooked or misinterpreted by
the trial court, adherence to such rule is not proper. Mere deference to the
... at about 7:00 p.m. on October 10, 1973, Isidro Poblete and
conclusion reached by the trial court would not negate or override the constitutional
Melchor Amon had a heated argument in front of the house of
presumption of innocence 5and the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the
Leonida Poblete situated at the Poblacion, Silang, Cavite,
accused must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 6
regarding the palay allegedly stolen by Melchor's son Ponciano
Amon. At about 10:30 p.m., while (Filomeno) Poblete was on his
way to the Poblacion to meet his brother Isidro Poblete, and As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his said manifestation,
when he was somewhere along the road in Bo. Tibig, (Filomeno)
saw four (4) persons attacking and mauling another person A close scrutiny of the testimony of Filomeno Poblete reveals the
whom he did not recognize. Filomeno hid himself and saw following circumstances which cast serious doubts on his
Melchor Amon holding the victim from behind, while the two other credibility.
assailants were each holding the victim's hands. The fourth
assailant was Ponciano Amon, who was then standing in front of
the victim, with a long firearm pointed at the victim. At this 1. He was not able to identify the victim of the alleged shooting
juncture, Filomeno saw that Ponciano Amon fired a shot at the incident which he allegedly witnessed. (T.S.N., pp. 12-13,
November 26, 1975.) He only came to know that his brother was
shot in the morning of October 11, 1973. (T.S.N., pp. 13-14, Ibid)
2. He was supposedly on his way to meet his deceased brother,
Isidro Poblete, when he allegedly witnessed the shooting
incident. (T.S.N., p. 4, Ibid.) Yet, he did not attempt to go near
and view the victim's body, after the assailants had left, to Identify
who it was. In fact, he went home immediately and forgot all
about his avowed meeting with his brother.
3. There appeared no sign of apprehension on his part, that his
brother was the victim, even when the latter was not able to
arrive at their house that night. Filomeno Poblete was in fact
going to the market to sell bananas when he was informed that
his brother had been killed. (T.S.N., p. 14, November 26, 1975.)
The obvious lack of concern about his brother's whereabouts,
despite allegedly having witnessed the shooting of his brother is
highly unnatural.
4. On direct examination, Filomeno Poblete testified that his
brother was held by three persons. (T.S.N., p. 9, Ibid) Santiago
Velando was allegedly holding the right hand of the victim, Jaime
Pumaran was allegedly holding the left hand while Melchor Amon
was embracing the victim from the right side.(T.S.N., pp. 9-10,
November 26, 1975.) Santiago Velando and Jaime Pumaran
were respectively on the left and right side of the victim (ibid)
On cross-examination, he stated that Melchor Amon was holding
the right hand of the victim that the former was on the left side of
the latter. (T.S.N., p. 12, April 6, 1976.) Moreover, he testified
that he was not able to recognize two others because they had
their back against him. (T. S. N., p. 11, Ibid)
These material inconsistencies cast serious doubts on Filomeno
Poblete's reliability as a witness.
5. Dr. Jesus Manalo, Municipal Health Officer of Silang, Cavite,
conducted a post-mortem examination of the cadaver of Isidro
Poblete. He testified that the bullet entered the mouth of the
deceased and exited on the right cheek. (T.S.N., p. 8, September
10, 1975.) Considering the testimony of Filomeno Poblete, on
direct examination, that Melchor Amon and Jaime Pumaran were
on the right side of the victim, it is incredible that neither of the
two were hit when the bullet made its exit on the right cheek of
the victim
6. Filomeno Poblete executed two sworn statements in
connection with the death of his brother. One was executed on
October 14, 1973 and the other on November 9, 1973. Material
discrepancies between the two statements were brought out by
the court itself as borne out by the following questions, to wit:
COURT:
Question number 9 in exhibit "C", "sabi mo na
dumaan sila sa tabi ng iyong pinagtataguan,
ano-ano ang kanilang dala", ang, "sagot-wala
po akong nakitang dala-dala nila Melchor at
Ponciano, ngunit ang isa nilang kasama na
hindi ko kilala ay may bitbit na baril na hindi ko
matiyak kung carbin o garand". Was that
question asked of you and was that the answer
you gave?
A:
Yes, your honor.
COURT:
Question number 9 in your statement of
November 9, 1973, reads: "At sino ang may
bitbit ng baril ng sila ay magsitakbuhan
pagkabaril ng iyong kapatid?" Sagot — "Ang
may bitbit ng baril ay si Kapitan Velando dahil
kinuha niya agad ang baril kay Ponciano Amon
ng matapos mabaril ang aking kapatid." Was
that question asked of you and was that the
answer you gave?
A:
Yes, your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Question number 18, "tanong — Hindi ba si
Santiago Velando ang isa sa mga kasama nila
 Melchor at Ponciano Amon na bumaril sa iyong
kapatid? Sagot — Hindi ko matiyak kung siya
ang isa na may bitbit na baril dahil halos
sabaysabay sila sa mabilis na paglakad at
malayo-layo ang may bitbit ng baril at natakpan
nila Melchor at Ponciano Amon." Was that
question asked of you and was that the exact
answer you gave to that question? (The
witness reading again the answers)
A:
Yes, your honor.
COURT:
the following day. It is not improbable Filomeno Poblete did not witness the
commission of the crime, which explains the inconsistencies noted in the
manifestation.
Self-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very material and substantial matter
seriously erodes the credibility of a witness. 8
For evidence to be believed "must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself- such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. There is
no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial
cognizance. 9

If according to you, the answer you gave to
question number 9, in the statement you gave
on November 9, 1973, was already stated by
you on October 14 when Exhibit "C" was given
by you, why is your answer to question number
18 very different from your answer to question
number 9 in the statement of November 9?
A:
Because it was not on the same day when I
made the statement. (t.s.n., pp. 32-35,
November 26, 1975).
Additionally, apart from the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution, the
defense of alibi which was brushed aside by the trial court appears to be supported
by clear and convincing evidence. We refer to the testimonies of Vicente Gonzales
and Nicasio Revilla; but it would be a superfluity to discuss the same under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment should be, as it is hereby, REVERSED and
SET ASIDE for insufficient proof of the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Another one shall be entered acquitting said appellants, Ponciano Amon and
Melchor Amon. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

If Filomeno Poblete really had witnessed the shooting incident,

and at such vantage position as testified to by him (around ten
meters), it is inexplicable why he would make inconsistent
statements on such a material point. His explanation to the trial
court betrays a lack of respect for truth.

It is apparent that the testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses is

vague. It is not clear, explicit and positive. Hence, the principle
that alibi is a weak defense loses its applicability to the instant
case. 7

It is pertinent to mention, at this juncture, that We find in the record unrebutted

testimonies of Federico Brigonia and Francisco Seda that the alleged eyewitness,
Filomeno Poblete, had been playing bingo in the house of Federico Brigonia from
6:30 o'clock in the evening of October 10, 1973, until 4:00 o'clock in the morning of
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181493 When arraigned on 7 March 2002, appellant, assisted by his
Plaintiff-Appellee, counsel de oficio, pleaded Not guilty to the charge.[6] Trial on the merits thereafter
Present: followed.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Dionilo Cabague (Cabague), BBB

YNARES-SANTIAGO, (AAAs husband), and Dr. George Galindez (Dr. Galindez). Their testimonies are
- versus Chairperson, summarized as follows:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, Cabague, neighbor of appellant, testified that on 25 July 2001, at
NACHURA, and about 4:30 p.m., he and his wife arrived at their house
REYES, JJ. in Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Provinceof XXX. He noticed that
RICARDO the buri leaves which served as the doors lock was untied. Thereupon, he heard a
NOTARION yZANORIA, noise coming from inside the house. He pushed the door and saw appellant and
Accused-Appellant. Promulgated: AAA. Appellant was then putting on his shorts, while AAA was sprawled and
motionless on the floor near appellant. Appellant approached and pointed a knife at
August 28, 2008 him. Appellant warned him not to tell anyone of what he saw or he would kill him, his
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x wife and his relatives. Frightened, Cabague and his wife immediately left their house
and proceeded to his brothers house where they spent the whole night. [7]

In the morning of the following day, he and his wife returned to their house
DECISION
and learned that AAA was already dead, and that the latters cadaver was found 10
meters away therefrom.[8]
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
BBB, husband of AAA, recounted that in the early morning of 25 July 2001,
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
he went out fishing. Upon arriving home at about 4:00 p.m., he noticed that AAA was
02103, dated 24 August 2007,[1] affirming with modifications the Decision of
not around. He went out of the house to look for AAA. At around 8:00 p.m. of the
the MasbateRegional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49, in Criminal Case No.
same day, he met appellant who asked him where he came from. He replied that he
1511,[2] finding accused-appellant Ricardo Notarion y Zanoria guilty of the special
was looking for AAA. Appellant became nervous, dropped his torch and hurriedly
complex crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
left. Later that evening, he and some relatives and neighbors found AAAs lifeless
death.
body several meters away from Cabagues house.[9]
The facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Dr. Galindez, Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate, declared that he
conducted a post-mortem examination on AAAs corpse. His findings are as
On 28 November 2001, an Information[3]
was filed with the RTC charging
follows[10]:
appellant with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. The accusatory
portion of the information reads:
POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION FINDINGS:
That on or about the 25th
day of July, 2001, in the afternoon thereof,
1. (+) Hematoma frontal area.
at XXX, Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
2. (+) lacerated wound 2 cm. x 0.5 cm left upper eyelid.
above-named accused by means of violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
3. (+) lacerated wound 3 cm. x 1 cm right upper eyelid.
intercourse with one AAA[4] against the latters will and with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
4. (+) Hematoma periorbital area.
assault and stab said AAA with the use of a hunting knife, hitting
the latter on the different parts of her body which caused her
5. (+) Hematoma right cheek.
death.[5]
6. (+) lacerated wound 2 cm. x 0.5 cm left upper lip.
 7. (+) lacerated wound 1 cm. x 0.5 cm right upper lip. He also concluded that AAA was raped as shown by the following
observations: (1) enlargement of AAAs cervical area; (2) second-degree burns in
8. (+) avulsed teeth 2 upper central incisor. AAAs labia majora(wound no. 15); (3) second-degree burns in AAAs left and right
thighs (wound nos. 16 and 17); (4) multiple nail marks in AAAs buttocks (wound no.
9. (+) avulsed tooth 1 left lateral incisor. 18); and (5) the presence of human spermatozoa in AAAs vagina. [13]

10. (+) avulsed tooth 1 left canine. The prosecution also proffered documentary evidence to bolster the
testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (a) affidavit of Cabague (Exhibit A);[14] (2) affidavit
11. (+) confluent hematoma surrounding the neck and of BBB (Exhibit B);[15] and (3) post-mortem examination report signed and issued by
shoulder. Dr. Galindez (Exhibit C).[16]

12. (+) confluent hematoma chest. For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant
and Maricar Notarion (Maricar). Appellant denied the foregoing accusation and
13. (+) hematoma left wrist. pointed to a certain Solomon Monsanto (Monsanto) as the real perpetrator.

14. (+) hematoma hypogastric area with abdominal Appellant testified that on 25 July 2001, at about 4:30 p.m., he was at his
distention. farm tending his carabao. Later, he saw Monsanto standing beside the lifeless body
of AAA which was lying on the ground. Monsanto approached him, poked a gun at
15. (+) 2nd degree burns both labia majora. him, and threatened to kill him and his family if he would report what he
saw. Subsequently, appellant was arrested and charged with raping and killing
16. (+) 2nd degree burns circular left thigh. AAA.[17]

17. (+) 2nd degree burns circular right thigh. Maricar, daughter of appellant, narrated that on 25 July 2001, at
about 4:30 in the afternoon, she and appellant went to their farm to fetch
18. (+) multiple nail marks both buttocks lateral area. their carabao. Thereafter, she and appellant saw Monsanto hack and shoot AAA.
Monsanto approached appellant and poked a gun at the latter. Monsanto warned
19. (+) multiple abrasion right elbow. appellant not to tell anyone of the incident or he and his family would be killed. She
and appellant then hurriedly went home.[18]
SPECULUM EXAMINATION DONE:
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 23 January 2006 convicting
- (+) cystocele. appellant of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant was
sentenced to death. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of AAA the amounts
- Collected 1 ml. whitish fluid in the vaginal canal. of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
SPERM ANALYSIS AT CATAINGAN DISTRICT HOSPITAL:
WHEREFORE, beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds
(+) spermatozoa the accused, RICARDO NOTARION, guilty of the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide falling under Article 335 of the
CONCLUSION: Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 4111 and RA 7659 and
accordingly sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF
1. Asphyxia 2o strangulation DEATH.

2. Rape[11] Accused is ordered to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED

THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity; FIFTY
Dr. Galindez stated that the confluent hematoma (wound no. 11) around THOUSAND (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and
AAAs neck and shoulder indicated suffocation. He said that AAA died of asphyxia exemplary damages of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS to
secondary to strangulation.[12] the heirs of the victim.[19]

Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 24 August 2007, the
appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC
Decision. It held that the death penalty imposed by the RTC on appellant should be
reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Section 2(a) of Republic Act No. 9346 with
appellant not eligible for parole under the said law. It also ruled that although the
heirs of AAA were not entitled to actual damages because they did not present proof
thereof, such as receipts for funeral and burial expenses, they were, nonetheless,
entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, since it was reasonable
to expect that the heirs of AAA incurred funeral and burial expenses. Further, it
increased the amount of moral damages to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages
to P25,000.00.[20] Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed
Decision dated January 23, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cataingan, Masbate, Branch 49 finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that (a) the death
penalty imposed by the trial court is reduced
to reclusion perpetua and (b) the judgment on the civil liability is
modified by ordering the accused-appellant to pay the amounts
of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages to the heirs of the victim.[21]
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 11 September 2007.[22]
Before us, appellant assigned the following errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME
OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[23]
Apropos the first issue, appellant maintains that his testimony pointing to
Monsanto as the one who raped and killed AAA is more credible than the testimony
of Cabague.[24]
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court
is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not
disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity
to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a
witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible
witness.[25]
We have gone over the testimony of Cabague and found no cogent reason
to overturn the RTCs ruling finding Cabagues testimony credible. Cabague testified
in a clear and truthful manner that he saw appellant and AAA inside his house on the
day and time of the incident. Appellant then was putting on his shorts while AAA was
slumped motionless on the floor near appellant. Appellant approached him and
pointed a knife at him. Appellant warned him not to tell anyone of what he saw or he
would kill him, his wife and his relatives. Terrified, Cabague and his wife immediately
left their house and proceeded to his brothers house where they spent the whole
night.[26]
BBB and Dr. Galindez corroborated the testimony of Cabague on its
relevant points.
Further, the above-mentioned testimonies are consistent with the
documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals found the testimonies of Cabague, BBB and Dr. Galindez to be consistent
and honest. Both courts did not find any ill motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses.
In stark contrast, the testimony of appellant and Maricar composed of denial
and alibi were confusing, contradictory and unreliable. Appellant did not mention in
his testimony that he was with Maricar when he allegedly saw Monsanto kill
AAA.[27] Maricar, nevertheless, testified that she was with appellant when the alleged
incident transpired.[28] Further, appellant and Maricar testified that they saw
Monsanto kill AAA.[29] Subsequently, however, appellant and Maricar declared that
they did not see Monsanto kill AAA.[30]
It is settled that as between bare denials and positive testimony on
affirmative matters, the latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight. [31]
Appellant, nonetheless, argues that the evidence presented by the
prosecution were merely circumstantial and, thus, insufficient to prove his guilt of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. [32] Also, the fact that Monsanto was
relieved by the prosecution from this case as an accused casts doubt on the identity
of the real perpetrator.[33]
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix from
which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence
allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of
guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts
from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. [34]
In rape with homicide, the evidence against the accused is usually
circumstantial. The nature of the crime, in which only the victim and the rapist-killer
would have been around during its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense
particularly difficult because the victim could no longer testify against the
perpetrator. Thus, resorting to circumstantial evidence is almost always inevitable,
and to demand direct evidence to prove in such instance the modality of the offense
and the identity of the perpetrator would be unreasonable.[35]
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the inference is based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances
produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing
parameters to this case, we hold that the evidence adduced by the prosecution
adequately proved the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant. As correctly
found by the RTC, the following circumstances, when pieced together, lead to the
ineluctable conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime charged:
1. The victim and the accused were inside a single
room house;
2. The uncontroverted fact that the victim was lying
motionless on the floor while the accused was sitting and
putting on his short pants;
3. There was no other person in the house;
4. The accused threatened to kill the witness (Cabague)
and the latters relatives if he (the witness) says anything
on what he saw;
5. The witness did not see any wound or blood on the
motionless body of the victim;
6. Death of the victim by strangulation;
7. The victims dead body was found about ten (10)
meters away from the house (of Cabague).[36]
In addition thereto, BBB narrated that appellant was nervous and uneasy
when he met him along the road on the night of 25 July 2001. When he told appellant
that he was looking for AAA, appellant dropped his torch and hurriedly walked
away.[37]
Further, Dr. Galindez testified that AAA was raped because human
spermatozoa and several wounds were found in and near AAAs vagina. [38]
All of the foregoing circumstances, which were duly proven, undoubtedly
constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion
that appellant raped and killed AAA.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of
error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree
of proof which produces a conviction in an unprejudiced mind. [39] This was sufficiently
established in the case at bar.
The fact that Monsanto was relieved by the prosecution from this case as
an accused is immaterial because appellants guilt was duly proven by the evidence
of the prosecution.
We shall now determine the propriety of the penalties imposed by the Court
of Appeals.
The penalty for the special complex crime of rape with homicide is death
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. However, in view of the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 9346[40] prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
to be meted out to appellant shall be reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section
2 thereof, which reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following
shall be imposed:
a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the
law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not
eligible for parole following Section 3 of said law, which provides:
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
 parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.

Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing on appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole.

With regard to damages, the heirs of AAA are entitled to civil indemnity
amounting to P100,000.00 in keeping with current jurisprudence authorizing the
mandatory award of P50,000.00 in case of death, and P50,000.00 upon the finding
of the fact of rape.[41] The award of moral damages amounting to P75,000.00 is also
just and reasonable in cases of rape with homicide. [42] The Court of Appeals,
therefore, acted accordingly in awarding civil indemnity amounting to P100,000.00
and moral damages amounting to P75,000.00 in favor of AAAs heirs.
As to actual damages, we have held that if the amount of the actual
damages cannot be determined because no receipts were presented to prove the
same, but it was shown that the heirs are entitled thereto, temperate damages
amounting to P25,000.00 may be awarded.[43] In the instant case, no receipt or
competent proof was presented to show the amount of actual damages incurred by
AAAs heirs. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that AAAs heirs incurred
expenses for her coffin, burial, and food during the wake. Hence, the Court of
Appeals properly awarded temperate damages amounting to P25,000.00 in lieu of
actual damages.

With respect to exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the New Civil

Code[44] allows the award thereof as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The aggravating
circumstance must be expressly and specifically alleged in the
information;[45] otherwise, it cannot be considered by the trial court in its judgment,
even if such circumstance was subsequently proved during the trial. [46] In the case at
bar, no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the information. Thus, the RTC and
the Court of Appeals erred in awarding exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02103, dated 24 August 2007, is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is deleted.
G.R. No. L-61356-57 September 30, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICISIMO JARA, REYMUNDO VERGARA and ROBERTO
BERNADAS, defendants-appellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
We are once again constrained to take a hard look into the sufficiency of extra-
judicial confessions as the sole basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of
DEATH.
The three appellants were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564 for
robbery with homicide. In the companion case of parricide, one was sentenced
to another death penalty while the two other appellants received sentenced ranging
from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment.
Our task is made difficult by the fact that the crimes were specially ruthless and
barbarous in their commission. No less than the counsel for the appellants states
that the people of Puerto Princesa are no strangers to crime and that the frequency
of criminal acts in their city has somehow benumbed the sensibilities of its citizens.
Yet, the discovery on June 9, 1978 of the brutally and badly bashed corpses of two
well-known and loved women of their community was still shocking to their senses.
There is the added factor that the police officers who investigated the crime and
secured the confessions seemed socertain that indeed the three appellants are the
malefactors. The confessions are convincing in their details. The trial court noted
that "both victims were assaulted and killed with the might and fury of one really
who had harbored so long a grudge and hate" and only Felicisimo Jara had that
kind of ill-will against his estranged wife and her female companion. Moreover,
Jara, a recidivist for the crime of homicide, was characterized as an experienced
killer. There must be many residents of Puerto Princesa who are thus convinced
about the correct solution of the crime. And perhaps, the appellants could have
been the killers.
The function of this Court, however, is not to indulge in surmises or probabilities.
The issue before us is whether or not the evidence of guilt is admissible under the
standards fixed by the Constitution and if the quantum of proof, which we are
allowed by the Constitution to consider, establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The decision of the former Court of First Instance of Palawan, 7th Judicial District,
Branch 1 in the consolidated cases of People of the Philippines versus Felicisimo
Jara, et al. (Criminal Case No. 2564) for Robbery with Homicide and People of the
Philippines vs. Felicisimo Jara, et al. (Criminal Case No. 2565) for Parricide is
involved in this automatic review. All the three accused in Criminal Case No. 2564
were sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased Amparo Bantigue in the sum of Pl,000.00, the
amount stolen, and the sum of P12,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 2565, for the
killing of Luisa Jara, accused Felicisimo Jara was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and meted out the maximum penalty of death while
the two other accused were found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. All the accused were ordered to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Luisa Jara in the sum of P12,000.00.
The information for the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2564
reads as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June, 1978, about 1:30 o'clock in
the morning, at Malvar St., Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, after gaining entrance to the house thru the window,
an opening not intended for entrance or egress, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike with a hammer
Amparo Vda. de Bantigue hitting her on the vital parts of her
body and stab with a scissor while she was soundly sleeping in
her bedroom with one Luisa Jara, thereby causing her
instantaneous death as a result thereof, and that after killing
Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, accused in conspiracy with each
other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner
thereof, took, stole and carried away a piggy bank and a buddha
bank containing money in the amount of not more than P200.00,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Amparo Vda. de
Bantigue, in the total amount of TWELVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P12,200.00) Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with aggravating
circumstances of Recidivism with respect to accused Felicisimo
Jara, the latter having been previously convicted of the crime of
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and the
aggravating circumstance against all the accused that the crime
was committed with treachery, in the dwelling of the offended
party, in the nighttime, and with respect to accused Reymundo
Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, for having participated in the
commission of the crime in consideration of a prize or reward.
In Criminal Case No. 2565, the information charged the accused as follows:
 That on or about June 9, 1978, at about 1:30 o'clock in the
morning, at Malvar St., Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously strike several times, with a hammer one Luisa Jara,
who is the lawfully wedded wife of accused Felicisimo Jara, and
thereafter, stabbed her with a scissor in her chest and abdomen,
while the latter was soundly sleeping with one Amparo Vda. de
Bantigue, resulting to the instantaneous death of said Luisa Jara,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Luisa Jara in the
amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency,
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with the aggravating
circumstances of Recidivism with respect to accused Felicisimo
Jara, the latter having been previously convicted of the crime of
homicide in the CFI of Iloilo, and the aggravating circumstance
against all the accused, namely: (1) that the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, (2) in the
nighttime, (3) and treachery; and the aggravating circumstance
against accused Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas of
having participated in the commission of the crime in
consideration of a prize or reward.
All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. On motion by the
prosecution and the defense, the court a quo ordered a joint trial of the two cases
which arose from one incident and where the witnesses are the same.
The facts according to the prosecution are as follows:
At about 6:00 o'clock in the early morning of June 9, 1978, the
waitresses at Alvin's Canteen situated in Malvar Street, Puerto
Princesa City, wondered why their employer, the deceased
Amparo Bantigue, did not answer when they called at her door
that morning (p. 7, TSN, March 21, 1979). They went to the
kitchen and peeped through a hole. They saw Amparo and Luisa
Jara seemingly asleep. They again went to the door and knocked
but still no answer came. The waitresses called one of Luisa
Jara's waitresses at Aileen's canteen next door. Becoming
apprehensive, they went back to the kitchen for a second look.
They discovered the following- . Amparo and Luisa were both
lying in bed; Luisa was dressed only in her underwear and there
was dried blood in one of her hands; Amparo, seemingly asleep,
lay beside her (pp. 9-11, TSN, March 21, 1979). Finally, they
decided to inform Luisa's daughter, Minerva, about their
apprehension. When they met Minerva at the public market, she
tearfully accompanied them back to Amparo's room. When no
one answered their knocking, Minerva kicked open the door. (pp.
11-12, TSN, March 21, 1979). Inside, they found the two women
dead from wounds inflicted on their persons (p. 13, TSN, March
21, 1979).
The husband of Luisa, appellant Felicisimo Jara, then entered
the room and saw the condition of the victims (p. 15, TSN, March
21, 1979).
Inside the room, several ceramic piggy banks belonging to
Amparo containing coins estimated in the amount of P1,000.00
were missing (p. 43, TSN, February 6, 1979). Scattered
underneath the window of Amparo's bedroom were coins and bits
and pieces of what used to be ceramic piggy banks (Exh. F; pp.
17-20, TSN' Feb. 6, 1979).
Later, two suspects in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara
and Roberto Bernadas. were apprehended (pp. 59-60, TSN,
March 19, 1979). After investigation, they confessed their guilt to
the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in
Palawan and other police investigators (pp. 26-31, TSN, May 28,
1979). They also positively Identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as
the mastermind who had plotted the killing and who promised
them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their participation (Exhibits O
and N). Before the City Fiscal and First Assistant Fiscal of Puerto
Princesa City, respectively, appellants Vergara and Bernadas
subscribed and swore to their extra-judicial statements wherein
they narrated their role and that of Felicisimo Jara in the killing
(see Exhibits O and N).
Thereafter, the killing was reenacted before the military
authorities and the public, with appellants Vergara and Bernadas
participating (p. 14, TSN, July 19, 1979).
The autopsy reports (Exhibits "A" and "C") submitted by Dr. Rufino Ynzon, the City
Health Officer of Puerto Princesa on the examination of the cadavers of the
deceased victims indicate that death in both cases resulted from "hemorrhage,
intra-cranial secondary to multiple comminuted-depressed fracture of the cranial
bones." Amparo Bantigue's wounds were described as follows:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS
1. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/4 inches 12. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest,
in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying central portion, penetrating the sternum, then thoracic cavity
bone located at the forehead, right, upper portion. piercing the right auricle, heart.

2. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 1/3 inches 13. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the right
in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying upper abdomen penetrating the abdominal cavity involving the
bone located at the forehead, central portion. liver and stomach. (Exhibit "A").

3. Wound, macerated, roughly circular in shape, about 1 1/5 CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE INTRA-CRANIAL SEC. TO
inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the MULTIPLE COMMINUTED-DEPRESSED FRACTURE OF THE
underlying bone located at the forehead, medially to the left CRANIAL BONES."
eyebrow.
On the other hand, Luisa Jara suffered from the following wounds:
4. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape with depressed
-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located above the POST MORTEM FINDINGS
left eyebrow. 5. Wound, macerated, elongated with fracture of the
alveolar bone, located at the upper lip, central portion.
1. Wound,macerated,roughly circular in shape,about 1 1/2 inches
in diameter with depressed-comminuted fracture of the
6. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 31/2 inches in length underlying bones, located at the right frontal region.
with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone with
brain tissue coming out located at the left parieto temporal
region. 2. Wound, macerated, with a letter T shape, about 2 inches in
length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying
bone, located at the central portion of the frontal region.
7. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 21/2 inches in length
with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone
located at the left temporal region, anterior portion. 3. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape, about 1 1/2
inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the
underlying bone, located at the right side of the nose.
8. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length, with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located
at the left face. 4. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 1 inch
in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying
bone, located at the left eyebrow, lateral portion.
9. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in
length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying
bone, located at the right temporal region. 5. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in
length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying
bone, located at the left lateral portion of the forehead.
10. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at
the right face. 6. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in
length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying
bone, located at the parietal region, left.
11. Wound, stabbed, about an inch in length at the right chest,
between the 3rd and 4th intercostal space, penetrating the
thoracic cavity involving the right lung. 7. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 1 inch in
length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying
bone, located at the temporal region, left.
 8. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 11/2
inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the
underlying bone, located at the temporal region, left.
9. Wound, macerated, roughly stellate in shape, about 2 inches
in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying
bone, located at the left mandibular region.
10. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/2 inches
in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying
bone, located at the left face.
11. Wound,incised,about l 3/4 inches in length, located at the left
upper portion of neck, left side.
12. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 3
inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the
underlying bone, located at the right temporal region.
13. Contusion with hematoma, circular in shape, located laterally
from the right eyebrow.
14. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 2
inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the
underlying bone, located at the occipital region, upper portion.
15. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest,
central portion penetrating inside the thoracic cavity involving
heart and lung.
16. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the level
of typhoid process penetrating the thoracic cavity involving the
right lung, lower lobe. (Exhibit "C")
CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE, INTRA-CRANIAL SEC.
TO MULTIPLE COMMINUTED-DEPRESSED FRACTURE OF
THE CRANIAL BONES.
Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa,
together with her friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and
testified that at the time the killings took place at Alvin's Canteen at Malvar Street,
Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his grandchildren at his step-
daughter's house in Pineda Subdivision. The other accused, Reymundo Vergara
and Roberto Bernadas retracted their respective extra-judicial confessions
admitting their participation in the crimes charged and Identifying their mastermind"
as the accused Jara during proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested
the admissibility of the extra-judicial confessions and the subsequent re- enactment
of the crime on the ground that their participations in these occasions were not free
and voluntary and were without the benefit of counsel.
The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Bernadas
and Vergara (Exhibits "N" and "O", respectively), together with the proof of corpus
delicti of the special crime of robbery with homicide established the guilt of the
accused beyond moral certainty.
In their brief, the accused-appellants contended that the court a quo erred:
I
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE UTTER
ABSENCE OF ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE, DIRECT OR
CIRCUMSTANTIAL.
II
IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS REYMUNDO
VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS WHICH WERE TAKEN
THRU FORCE AND WITHOUT BENEFIT OF COUNSEL.
III
IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS REYMUNDO
VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS AGAINST THEIR CO-
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FELICISIMO JARA.
IV
IN FINDING THE PRESENCE OF CONSPIRACY DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF PROOF THEREOF.
V
IN ALLOWING THE PLAYING OF AN ALLEGED TAPED
CONFESSION.
VI
 IN ADMITTING THE PICTURES, EXHS. "T" TO "T- 23", WHICH
WERE NEVER PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
All these assigned errors boil down to the issue of whether or not there is sufficient
evidence as borne by the records to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases were obtained in the
absence of counsel. According to the records, there was a waiver by the accused-
appellants of their right to counsel.
Was the waiver valid?
We are constrained to answer this question in the negative.
Before the extrajudicial confession of appellant Bernadas was reduced to writing,
Pfc. Henry E. Pulga, in the presence of four other police officers, made the
following "Pasubali" followed by the answer, "Opo":
PASUBALI: Ikaw ay nasa ilalim ng isang
pagsisiyasat at dahil dito ay ipinababatid namin
sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan na sa ilalim ng
ating Bagong Saligang Batas ay ikaw ay may
karapatang kumuha ng isang manananggol o
abogado ayon sa sarili mong pili mayroon ka
ring karapatan na hindi maaaring piliting
sumagot sa anumang itatanong sa iyo sa
alinmang Hukuman sa Pilipinas. Nauunawaan
mo ba ang lahat ng mga ipinaliwanag namin sa
iyo ngayon?
SAGOT: Opo.
Likewise, in the case of the accused Vergara, the foreword of Ms signed sworn
statement reads:
TANONG: Marunong po ba kayong sumulat
bumasa ng tagalog at umunawa ng wikang
tagalog na siya nating gagamitin sa
pagsisiyasat na ito?
SAGOT: Nakakaunawa po ako at nakakabasa
pero sa pagsulat ay hindi masyado.
PALIWANAG: Kung gayon po ay ipinababatid
ko sa inyo ang inyong karapatan na kayo ay
maaaring manatiling tahimik kung inyong nais,
magbigay o tumangging magbigay ng inyong
salaysay, maaari din na kayo ay sumangguni
muna sa isang abogado kung nais ninyo at ang
lahat po ng inyong sasabihin ay maaaring
gamiting pabor o laban sa inyo sa anumang
Hukuman dito sa ating kapuluan ngayong alam
na ninyo ang ilan sa inyong karapatan kayo po
ba naman ay handa na ngayong magsalaysay
kahit na kayo ay wala pang abogadong
kaharap na siyang mangangalaga sa inyong
karapatan at lahat po ng inyong sasabihin ay
pawang katutuhanan lamang
SAGOT: Opo.
(SGD.) REYMUNDO VERGARA
DELA CRUZ
PATUNAY: Ako si Reymundo Vergara dela
Cruz ay nagsasaad na ipinaalam sa akin ang
aking karapatang manatiling tahimik, kung
aking nanaisin, na ang lahat na aking
sasabihin ay maaaring gamiting pabor o laban
sa akin at nalaman ko rin na ako ay maaaring
kumuha ng sarili kong abogado na siyang
nangangalaga ng aking karapatan na kung
hindi ko kayang kumuha ay bibigyan ako ng
pamahalaan.
Nauunawaan ko ang mga karapatang ito,
handa at kusang loob akong nagbibigay ng
aking salaysay ngayon, sa tanong at sagot na
paraan. Hindi ko na kailangan ang tulong ng
isang abogado, nauunawaan ko ang aking
 ginagawa, walang pananakot, pananakit,
pangako, pabuya o anuman na ginawa sa akin
upang ako ay magsalaysay. Ito ay sarili kong
kagustuhan.
(SGD.) REYMUNDO VERGARA
DELA CRUZ
This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions
which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model.
Police investigators either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the
answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to
that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this
Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and
knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer
assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.
The records sustain the appellants' contention that their extrajudicial confessions
bear clear earmarks of illegality and improbability.
The Solicitor General gives the following arguments for voluntariness:
An extra-judicial confession is generally presumed to have been
voluntarily executed (People v. Castañeda, 93 SCRA 56). The
confessant carries the burden of convincing the trial judge that
his admissions are involuntary or untrue (People v. Ramos, 94
SCRA 842).
The trial court in this case was not convinced that the
extrajudicial confessions of appellants were made involuntarily.
Consider the following reasons for the court's refusal to lend
credence to appellants' claim:
(1) Apart from appellants' self-serving claim no other evidence on
record supports the allegation of involuntariness (People v. Villa,
93 SCRA 716).
(2) On the contrary, several prosecution witnesses testified that
the confessions were voluntarily given.
(3) Appellants' oral and written confessions given at various times
to several investigating authorities, not to mention the public re-
enactment of the crime itself, did not vary and they revealed
details only the assailants could have possibly known (People v.
Ty Sui Wong, 83 SCRA 125; People v. Bautista y Aquino, 92
SCRA 465).
(4) Appellants' confessions were corroborated by the existence
of corpus delicti established by independent evidence (People v.
Francisco, 93 SCRA 351).
(5) The claim of coercion cannot prevail over the testimony of the
subscribing fiscal that said confession was voluntary (People v.
Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150).
The People v. Castañeda ruling applies to a crime committed before the Bill of
Rights was amended to include Section 20 on the right to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed of such right. The presumption that "no one would
declare anything against himself unless such declarations were true" assumes that
such declarations are given freely and voluntarily. The new Constitution, in
expressly adopting the so-called Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) rule, has
reversed the presumption. The prosecution must now prove that an extrajudicial
confession was voluntarily given, instead of relying on a presumption and requiring
the accused to offset it. There would have been no need to amend the centuries old
provisions of the Bill of Rights and to expressly add the interdiction that "no force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him (the person being investigated)" if the framers intended us to
continue applying the pre-1973 or pre-amendment presumptions.
Miranda v. Arizona, in explaining the rule which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted,
states:
While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when
voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale
of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to
explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation,
the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an
inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly,
to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a
corner and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so
painfully evident . . . made the (continental) system so odious as
to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.
It is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the confessions
in these cases should testify that the statements were voluntarily given. However,
the records show that the interrogations were conducted incommunicado in a
police-dominated atmosphere. When appellant Bernadas gave his confession, his
companions in the room were five police officers. The only people with Vergara
when he confessed were also police investigators.
We quote some more passages from Miranda:
Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. As
we have stated before, 'Since Chambers v. Florida, 309, US 227
[84 L ed 716, 60 S Ct 472], this Court has recognized that
coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of
the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition.' Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 US 199, 206, 4 L ed 2d
242, 247, 80 S Ct 274 (1960). Interrogation still takes place in
privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap
in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation
rooms. A valuable source of information about present police
practices, however, may be found in various police manuals and
texts which document procedures employed with success in the
past, and which recommend various other effective tactics.
These texts are used by law enforcement agencies themselves
as guides. It should be noted that these texts professedly present
the most enlightened and effective means presently used to
obtain statements through custodial interrogation. By considering
these texts and other data, it is possible to describe procedures
observed and noted around the country.
The officers are told by the manuals that the 'principal
psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation
is privacy-being alone with the person under interrogation.' The
efficacy of this tactic has been explained as follows:
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the
investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The
subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In
his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He
is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his
indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home.
Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their presence
lending moral support. In his own office, the investigator
possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the
invincibility of the forces of the law.
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the
manuals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the
suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an
interest in confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to
be posited as a fact. The interrogator should direct his comments
toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather
than court failure by asking the subject whether he did it. Like
other men, perhaps the subject has a bad family life, had an
unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited
desire for women. The officers are instructed to minimize the
moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or
on society. These tactics are designed to put the subject in a
psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what
the police purport to know already-that he is guilty. Explanations
to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged.
The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator
should possess are patience and perseverance. One writer
describes the efficacy of these characteristics in this manner:
In the preceding paragraphs emphasis has been placed on
kindness and stratagems. The investigator wilt however,
encounter many situations where the sheer weight of his
personality wig be the deciding factor. Where emotional appeals
and tricks are employed to no avail he must rely on an
oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence. He must
interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no
prospect of surcease. He must dominate his subject and
overwhelm him with his inexorable will to obtain the truth. He
should interrogate for a spell of several hours pausing only for
the subject's necessities in acknowledgment of the need to avoid
a charge of duress that can be technically substantiated. In a
serious case, the interrogation may continue for days, with the
required intervals for food and sleep, but without respite from the
atmosphere of domination. It is possible in this way to induce the
subject to talk without resorting to duress or coercion. The
method should be used only when the guilt of the subject
appears highly probable. ' " (384 US at pp. 448-451)
The cited police manuals state that the above methods should be used only when
the guilt of the subject appears highly probable. As earlier stated, the investigators
in the cases now before us appear to have been convinced that the accused-
appellants were the culprits. Nonetheless, the evils of incommunicado
interrogations without adequate safeguards to insure voluntariness could still result
in the conviction of innocent persons. More important, what the Constitution
commands must be obeyed even at the risk of letting even hardened criminals mix
once more with the law-abiding world.
As to the re-enactment, the extra-judicial-confessions served as a script for what
was to follow. Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible
confession are themselves inadmissible.
There are other factors to be considered in these cases. Vergara and Barnadas
had been detained for more than two (2) weeks before they decided to give
"voluntary" confessions. We doubt if it was two weeks of soul-searching and
introspection alone which led them to confess. There must have been other
persuasions.
There were two sensational murder cases in Palawan which preceded the killings
now before us, The PC command and the Integrated National Police were under
pressure to "solve" these additional sensational killings.
The counsel for appellants mentions a factor not refuted by the appellee in its brief,
namely:
LT. COL. SABAS IMBONG, SGT. EUGENIO ENRIQUEZ, PFC
HENRY PULGA and CPL. ADOLFO JAGMIS — all are
connected with the Provincial Constabulary Command which
investigated the case, prematurely publicized the solution of the
case with the alleged 'extra-judicial confessions' of two (2)
accused, but who were rebuffed when the two (2) accused, upon
the first opportunity to do so in public, which was the
preliminary investigation, recanted and retracted their alleged
'extra-judicial confessions' as they were taken with the use of
force, violence, and intimidation, was prepared by the
investigators themselves, and without benefit of counsel.
All are comrades in-arms of Pat. Mamerto Bantigue, who is the
son of the deceased Amparo Bantigue. Pat. Bantigue was
implicated in several coercion and physical injuries cases filed
with the City Court by persons who had been physically attacked
and violated by him in connection with the murder of his mother.
Likewise, he evaded justice by escaping from the law after
murdering a companion of accused Jara and attempting to kill the
latter. He remains at large.
A PC Sergeant, Oscar Ponce de Leon, assigned at the PC Medical Dispensary,
testified that he treated Roberto Bernadas for cigarette burns and Reymundo
Vergara for a wound at the tip of his right hand. While the medicine he applied was
only merthiolate the possibility cannot be discounted that in addition to the
psychological qqqplosy of incommunicado questioning, lighted cigarettes and other
means of persuasion which leave physical marks were also utilized to secure the
confessions.
Accused Reymundo Vergara was given an opportunity to go qqqscot free by
turning state witness. He refused.
Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other evidence to implicate Bernadas
and Vergara as perpetrators of the killing was introduced by the prosecution. Since
these confessions are inadmissible in evidence, the two appellants have to be
acquitted.
The strongest evidence against Felicisimo Jara are the extra-judicial confessions of
his two co-accused. Bernadas and Vergara point to Jara as the one who
bludgeoned the two victims with a hammer and then used a pair of scissors in
inflicting the stab wounds. He was also alleged to have offered them P1,000.00
each if they would help him in the killing of his wife.
However, since the confessions of Bernadas and Vergara are inadmissible against
them, with more reason can they not be used against Jara.
Apart from the above extra-judicial confessions, other circumstantial evidence was
presented to support a verdict of conviction. Would such evidence in the absence
of the extrajudicial confessions be sufficient to overturn the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused Jara?
Evidence attesting to the fact that accused Jara and his wife had not been in good
terms for about three years before the killings was presented. They used to quarrel
with each other and they had not been sleeping together since the deceased Luisa
Jara slept at Alvin's Canteen together with the other deceased Amparo Bantigue.
Godofredo Anasis nephew of Luisa Jara, testified that his aunt was a "tomboy" and
that she and Amparo Bantigue lived together as "husband and wife." The two went
to the movies together. The relationship of the two women angered Felicisimo Jara
and was a cause of their frequent quarrels. He resented not only his wife but also
her woman companion.
The testimony on the fact of Luisa Jara and Amparo Bantigue sleeping together is
corroborated by the fact that they were bludgeoned to death while sleeping on one
bed and their bodies discovered on that same bed. At the Aileen's Canteen
managed by the deceased Luisa, accused Felicisimo Jara did the cooking and
whenever he committed even the slightest mistakes, his wife scolded and cursed
him, treating him as though he were only one of the servants of the restaurant.
(TSN, May 31, 1979, pp. 1821-1830). The records are replete with testimony to
show that Felicisimo Jara had reason to hate his wife enough to kill her and her
companion.
The lower court, in its decision, stated that the nature and the number of wounds,
reflected in the autopsy reports, convincingly show that only a person who had
harbored so much hate and resentment could have inflicted such multiple fatal
blows. It opined that accused Jara is the only person who would have sufficient
motive to wish the death of the deceased for he had not been treated well as a
husband by his wife.
During the investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains were found
splattered in the trousers and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses were also
smeared with blood. When asked to explain the presence of said blood stains,
accused Jara told the police that before he learned about the killing, he was with
his stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the public market dressing chickens. (TSN,
May 28, 1979, pp. 397398) He also said in his testimony in open court that when he
saw his wife lying dead on the bed, he approached her and hugged her in his effort
to wake her up. (TSN, September 30, 1980, p. 1230) After a laboratory examination
of the eyeglasses (Exhibit "I"), trousers (Exhibit "J"), and shirt (Exhibit "K"), the NBI
biologist verified in her report that the blood stains were not chicken blood but
human blood (Exhibit "L"). The blood stains found in accused Jara's trousers
formed certain Identical circular patterns, a splattering of blood which, according to
the NBI biologist, could be caused by an instrument like that of a hammner. Such
circular patterns will only occur at the time of the impact of the instrument, the very
moment it hits the victim. He further explained that there was no possibility of the
splattering of blood if the victim died hours before because blood starts to
coagulate or clog 15 minutes after the wound is caused. (TSN, March 19, 1979, pp.
227; 244; 248-250) The blood of the deceased victims in the case at bar had
already qqqcoagulated in the morning of June 9, 1978 when accused Jara claimed
that the blood stains on his shirt were smudged when he hugged his wife.
The NBI biologist, whose findings were later signed by the Chief of the Forensic
Chemistry Division testified that human blood was found on the eyeglasses of
appellant Jara, on the front side lower portion of the left leg of the trousers, at the
left buttocks of the pants and the back portion near the trousers, and smudged
human blood stains on the appellant's T-shirt. The human blood stains were Type
B. A failure to get evidence on the blood types of the two victims keeps this second
circumstantial evidence, together with the clear motive, from being well-nigh
conclusive. However, it is still strong evidence in the chain of circumstances
pointing to Jara as the killer of his wife.
Another circumstance is the cover-up attempt by Jara. He lied about the blood on
his clothes and eyeglasses. He falsely claimed that the blood came from the
chickens he had been slaughtering for the market. There is no explanation about
the source and cause of the human blood stains splattered all over him.
There is no question that appellant Jara was at the scene of the crime. Upon the
discovery of the bodies 'and the forcible opening of the door, Jara was with the
group. He went through the motions of embracing his wife although the observers
noted that even in death there was no love lost between husband and wife. One of
the waitresses at the Alvin's Canteen who saw accused Jara's reaction as he
entered the room where the victims lay dead observed that he shed no tears and
his face did not show any indication of sorrow (TSN, March 21, 1979, pp. 373-374).
The hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which appellant Jara is
familiar. It was proven during the trial of the case that the hammer with the letter "A"
on its handle which was one of the instruments used in the perpetration of the
crime belonged to Luisa Jara who had kept it at Aileen's Canteen where her
husband, appellant Jara helped as cook.
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:
Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v.
Duero, 136 SCRA 515).
Circumstantial evidence, as a basis for conviction of crime, should be acted on and
weighed with great caution, particularly where the crime is heinous and the penalty
is death, as in the instant cases. In determining the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence to support a conviction, each case is to be determined on its own peculiar
circumstances and all of the facts and circumstances are to be considered together
as a whole, and, when so considered, may be sufficient to support a conviction,
although one or more of the facts taken separately would not be sufficient for this
purpose. (23 CJS p. 555). No general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which wig suffice for any case, but that matters not. For all
that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and
with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. (People v. Contante, 12
SCRA 653).
The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present in
this case. The aforementioned circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading
to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the guilt of the accused
qqqjara beyond reasonable doubt (See US v. Villos, 6 Phil. 510; People v. Subano,
73 Phil. 692). Mere denials of the accused as to his participation in the crime are
only self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence
clearly establishing his active participation in the crime.
The defense of alibi given by the accused Jara is weak. Aside from himself, the
only person who vouched for his presence at some place away from the scene of
the crime was his stepdaughter from whom he had sought abode. Hence, the alibi
is made more dubious considering that no other credible persons were presented
who would, in the natural order of things be best situated to support the tendered
alibi (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94, citing People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336;
People v. Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236; People v. Carino, 55 SCRA 516). More
importantly, the defense of alibi cannot prosper because it is not enough to prove
that defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must,
likewise, demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at that time (People v. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812). Such proof is
wanting in this case.

The killing of Amparo Bantigue was marked by treachery and evident

premeditation. The trial court noted recidivism insofar as Felicisimo Jara, previously
convicted of homicide, was concemed together with dwelling and nighttime.
However, the supposed robbery of the piggy bank and Buddha bank is proved only
by the extra-judicial statements found inadmissible. The offense against Bantigue
was simple murder. Insofar as the parricide case is concerned against accused
Jara, the lower court did not err in finding guilt as having been established beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is MODIFIED as follows:

In Crim. Case No. 2564, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are ACQUITTED of
the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Accused Jara is CONVICTED of the crime of MURDER and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of death

In Crim. Case No. 2565, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are likewise
ACQUITTED of the crime of HOMICIDE on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Accused Jara is CONVICTED of the crime of PARRICIDE and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death.

Considering. however, that the accused Jara is now over 70 years of age, the
penalty of death is lowered toreclusion perpetua.

In both cases, accused Jara is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Amparo Bantigue and Luisa Jara in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00), respectively.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191271 March 13, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GERALD SORIANO alias PEDRO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This is a review1 of the Decision dated 22 October 20092 issued by the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00474-MIN finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive part of
the assailed Decision reads:
FOR REASONS STATED, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City,
10th Judicial Region, Branch 10, in Civil Cases No. 3200-99, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the appellant Gerald Soriano alias Pedro is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. He is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim moral damages in the increased amount of
₱75,000 and temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.
SO ORDERED.3
On 17 February 1999, accused-appellant Gerald Soriano alias Pedro (Soriano) was
charged with rape with homicide in an Information, which reads in part:
That on or about December 31, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon at
Barangay Katutungan, Municipality of Wao, Province of Lanao del Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, grabbed AAA, a girl of eight (8) years old, covered her mouth, bitten
[sic] her right face and left breast and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her against her will, and thereafter grabbed the victim’s neck and
chocked her to death and threw her body into the water of irrigation canal of
Katutungan, Wao, Lanao del Sur.
CONTRARY to and in [v]iolation of the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended.4
Facts According to the Prosecution
Around 8:00 a.m. of 31 December 1998, Soriano arrived with the nephew of Alice
Hibaya (Hibaya) to drink liquor at her house until about 10:00 a.m. 5 Hibaya saw
Soriano drink some more at the house of one Noel Quinatadcan (Quinatadcan),
who lived about two meters away from her.6
She then witnessed Soriano leave with his other companions at approximately 3:00
p.m.7
Around that time, Vicky Bearneza (Vicky) was grazing her carabao on a palm road
when she saw Soriano, clad in a yellow t-shirt and blue denim, walk drunkenly
towards the shortcut to Wao. She did not see anyone else pass by the area until
she went home about 5:00 p.m.8
At roughly 3:30 p.m. of the same day, Vicky’s sister BBB saw Soriano, whom she
later similarly recalled was in yellow t-shirt and pants, pass by her house as he
walked to the direction of Wao. It was also around the same time that she was
expecting her eight-year-old daughter, AAA, to take the same shortcut on her way
home from harvesting palay.9
Thereafter, at approximately 6:00 p.m., BBB asked for help in looking for AAA. The
other residents assisted in the search, which lasted until midnight and turned out to
be unsuccessful.10
On 1 January 1999, about 8:00 a.m., Tomas Bearneza (Tomas), the husband of
Vicky, found the lifeless body of AAA in a canal along the shortcut. The victim was
naked except for her shorts, which loosely hung below her knees. Her face and
breast revealed bite marks.11
The health physician of the Wao District Hospital, Dr. Calico Haji Ali (Dr. Ali),
examined the body of AAA. He observed the presence of human bite marks on the
right side of her face and on her left breast.12 According to his examination, she
was raped and her death was caused by drowning.13
According to the mayor of Wao, Elvino C. Balicao (Mayor Balicao), Soriano
confessed to being under the influence of alcohol when the latter killed AAA, but
denied having raped her.14
On 2 January 1999, the Chief Investigator of Wao, Senior Police Officer 4 Edwin B.
Bacerra, Sr. (SPO4 Bacerra), questioned Soriano. Because there were no lawyers
available and Soriano claimed to be a minor, a representative from the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Mercedes Oyangoren (Oyangoren),
assisted him during the investigation. He admitted therein that he saw AAA near
the canal. She tried to run away, but he caught up with her. She then started
shouting for help, prompting him to panic and choke her. Thereafter, he removed
her clothes, bit her left breast and threw her into the water. These statements were
reduced into writing and signed by both Soriano and Oyangoren. 15
Facts According to the Defense
Soriano averred that at 8:00 a.m. on 31 December 1998 at Hibaya’s house, he and
three other men drank Tanduay while they roasted a pig. By 2:00 p.m., they had
transferred to the house of Quinatadcan, where they had a couple of beers. 16 At
around 3:30 p.m., Soriano claimed that he was not quite drunk when he went home
using the shortcut to Wao.17 He was home by 5:00 p.m.18
Some policemen came to his house the following morning. Thinking that he was
being hired to harvest corn, he voluntarily submitted himself to them. However, he
was detained at the police headquarters.19
Soriano claimed that, without informing him of the contents of the document, SPO4
Bacerra made him sign it in front of Oyangoren. Mayor Balicao purportedly
questioned Soriano inside the former’s vehicle, threatened him that he would be fed
to the crocodiles if he would not confess, and promised to help him if he would
admit to having perpetrated the crime. Allegedly for these reasons, Soriano
confessed to killing AAA.20
Upon the filing of an Information for rape with homicide against Soriano, the case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3200-99 and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court, 10th Judicial Region, Marawi City, Branch 10 (RTC Br. 10). It later rendered
a Decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.21 He was likewise ordered to pay the
heirs of AAA in the amount of ₱100,000 in civil indemnity and ₱50,000 in moral
damages.22
After the case was elevated for automatic review, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
trial court, but modified the sentence of Soriano to the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole and increased the civil liability to ₱75,000. He was also
ordered to pay the heirs of AAA moral and temperate damages in the increased
amounts of ₱75,000 and ₱25,000, respectively.23 He filed a Notice of Appeal.24
Considering that the CA has already disregarded his supposed confession to
Mayor Balicao, Soriano only raises the sole contention that the entirety of the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to sustain his
conviction.25
He posits the following arguments:
(a) The estimated time of death of AAA did not preclude the possibility that
other culprits had perpetrated the crime.
(b) The prosecution failed to establish that he had caused the bite marks
found on AAA.
(c) He had never been found to be in the company of the victim.
(d) It was not shown that he had gone to the place where her cadaver was
found;
(e) While he was seen going towards the direction of the crime scene, this
fact does not conclusively prove that he had raped and killed the victim.
(f) His soiled clothes were not found at or near the area where the crime
was committed, but were taken from his house without the benefit of a
search warrant.26
At the outset, it should be underscored that following Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution,27 the CA was correct in ruling that the extrajudicial confession elicited
by Mayor Balicao and SPO4 Bacerra from Soriano without the presence of counsel
is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the only issue is whether the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to hold Soriano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. Ruling in the negative, this
Court finds the appeal meritorious.
The prosecution faces a great deal of difficulty in cases involving the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. In these cases, both the rape and the
homicide must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, as the victim can no longer
testify against the perpetrator of the offense.28 Thus, a resort to circumstantial
evidence becomes inevitable to prove the case.29
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction when the concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as would prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances and
facts must be absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis propounding
the innocence of the accused.30
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish the existence of an unbroken
chain of circumstances that lead to no other logical conclusion but the guilt of the
accused.
RTC Br. 10 anchored its Decision finding Soriano guilty of the crime charged on the
following circumstances:
 1. That the accused together with his companions had a drinking spree
[at] the house and store of the two witnesses and admitted by accused
until 3:00 in the afternoon and that day of December 30, 1998.
2. That the accused was seen by one of the witnesses while grassing [sic]
their carabao at about 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. at the barangay road leading to
crossing [sic] when he passed by under the influence of liquor, wearing a
yellow T-shirt and maong pants that appeared clean but when witness
was shown of the soiled and dirty yellow T-shirt and maong pants during
the trial affirmed that it was the same clothes;
3. That accused was also seen by the mother of the victim and admitted
by the accused, to be wearing [the] same clothes aforesaid leading to
crossing Katutungan, where the crime was committed at around or
between 3:00 to 3:30 p.m. on the same day;
4. That the post mortem examination on the body of the victim contained
series of contusion which are signs of violence inflicted in the different
parts of the body of the victim, was raped before she was killed and that
there was laceration of the hymen;
5. That the position of the body of the victim indicated she had been raped
and simultaneously killed.
6. That the body of the victim was found in the grassy area near the canal
where her under pants was [sic] beside her and without clothes in her
body, where the accused was last seen to have pass [sic] by. And that no
other persons have passed by except the accused at that point in time. 31
Meanwhile, in sustaining the Decision of the trial court, the CA ruled in this wise:
In the instant case, appellant was seen walking towards the direction of the "short-
cut" road to Wao where the body of the child-victim was found. He admitted that he
used that road in going home. According to BBB, she saw appellant pass by her
house at around 3:30 p.m. That was also the time when AAA was supposed to be
on her way home using the same "short-cut" road. Appellant confirmed that BBB
saw him and that he had spent the day drinking liquor.
He was admittedly at the scene of the crime at the time the child was discovered to
be missing. Moreover, he was the only person seen going to that road. He admitted
that he saw no one else using that road. Appellant stated that he arrived at his
home at around 5:00 that same afternoon. By his own testimony, he was there at
the scene of the crime at around the time it happened. There can be no doubt that
he raped and killed AAA as he was the only one out there in the "short-cut" road.32
The foregoing findings unquestionably establish that AAA was raped and
killed.1âwphi1 However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution do not
form a solid and cohesive narrative that proves with moral certainty its contention
that Soriano perpetrated these heinous acts. To synthesize, the only circumstances
cited to implicate him in the crime are the following: (a) he passed through the
shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on 31 December 1998; (b) Vicky did not see
anyone else use that road from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on that day; and (c) the
soiled garments confiscated from him were identified to have been the same ones
he was wearing then.
To an unprejudiced mind, the fact that Soriano was the only one whom Vicky saw
pass through the shortcut to Wao from 3:00p.m. to 5:00 p.m. does not logically lead
to any conclusion regarding his participation in the raping and killing of AAA. It is a
mere conjecture that can be refuted by other equally conceivable and rational
inferences. It is possible that Vicky might have failed to see the perpetrator,
because he came from the same place as AAA; but, instead of traversing the
shortcut after raping and killing the victim, actually went back to his point of origin.
Neither can the mere fact that Soriano's clothes were soiled isolate him as the only
probable suspect, considering that his garments were not found anywhere near the
scene of the crime, but at his own home.
As a consequence, the circumstances borne out by the records are severely
insufficient to establish the culpability of Soriano as one may reasonably
extrapolate other possible scenarios other than those pointing to his guilt. The
evidence in this case having fallen short of the standard of moral certainty, any
doubt on the guilt of the accused should be considered in favor of his acquittal. The
law enforcers' missteps in the performance of the investigation and the prosecuting
attorney's careless presentation of the evidence cannot lead to any other
conclusion other than that there are doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision issued by the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00474-MIN dated 22 October 2009 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. He is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless
he is being confined for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is -directed to report to
this Court within five (5) days from his receipt of this Decision, the action he has
taken.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27365 January 30, 1970
FELIX L. LAZO, MERCEDES CASTRO DE LAZO, and JOSE ROBLES, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC. represented by ANTONIO M.
KOH, General Manager and as Attorney-in-Fact of plaintiffs, FELIX and
MERCEDES LAZO defendants-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on appeal by the defendants from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila (Branch I, Judge Francisco Arca, presiding) rendered on
December 7, 1966, in its Civil Case No. 55734.
The original complaint was filed on December 12, 1963, and subsequently
amended on November 9, 1964. The plaintiffs are the spouse Felix L. Lazo and
Mercedes Castro de Lazo, and Jose Robles; the defendants are Republic Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. its general manager Antonio M. Koh, the sheriff of Manila and
the Register of Deeds, also of Manila. The pertinent allegations which make up the
plaintiffs' cause of action are: that the spouses Lazo, acting as guarantors for Jose
Robles in connection with a loan of P12,000.00 obtained by the latter from the
Philippine Bank of Commerce, executed on August 18, 1953 a real estate
mortgage in favor of the defendant Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. in
consideration of its having consented to act as principal co-debtor for the loan
aforesaid; that the mortgage was foreclosed extra-judicially on July 1, 1958 and
sold to the mortgagee, as purchaser at such sale, for P18,627.00, the
corresponding sheriff's certificate of sale being formalized on August 2, 1958; that
defendant Antonio M. Koh, pursuant to the power granted to him in the instrument
of mortgage, executed on March 20, 1963 (for purposes of registration) a deed of
absolute sale of the foreclosed property of the mortgagee — purchaser which sale
was registered on March 28, 1963; that by virtue of such registration the certificate
of title in the name of the spouses Lazo was cancelled and a new one issued in the
name of the defendant company; that the foreclosure of the mortgage was invalid
because plaintiff Jose Robles had paid on the mortgage loan the sum of
P13,466.36 from August 20, 1953 to May 24, 1958; and that thereafter, from July 8,
1958 to August 23, 1963, he continued to make other payments, aggregating
P17,250.00.
The principal prayer of the plaintiffs was for the defendant company to render an
accounting of the payments thus made, so that if it should appear that the original
loan of P12,000.00, together with the stipulated interest, had been paid in full then
the real estate mortgage should be cancelled; otherwise the plaintiffs should be
allowed to pay, by way of legal redemption, whatever Balance still remained. An
additional prayer was for compensatory and moral damages as well as for
attorney's fees.
In a motion to dismiss filed by all the defendants with respect to the original
complaint, they raised two issues, namely: that the complaint did not state a cause
of action and that the claim or demand set forth therein had already prescribed. On
this second point the defendants pointed out that under the Rules of Court (Rule
39, Section 34) an accounting such as that prayed for by the plaintiffs could be
demanded only in cases where real property is sold on execution by virtue of a final
judgment and not where it is sold on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; and if
the rule is applicable at all in the latter case, it is available only to a mortgage
debtor who exercises his right of redemption within the period provided therefor. In
the present case, the defendants maintained, the redemption period had already
expired when the action was commenced.
The trial court did not resolve the motion to dismiss categorically, but in an order
dated September 22, 1964, set the case for trial, with the advertence that "evidence
on whether or not the action has prescribed shall first be presented ... (and) then
the court will consider the same ... as part of the evidence on the merits."
After the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on November 9, 1964 the
defendants answered the same, alleging inter alia that all the payments made by
the plaintiffs after the foreclosure sale on July 1, 1958 were made in the concept of
rents, for which the defendant company was under no obligation to render an
accounting.
The issue thus made out by the pleadings was whether or not the plaintiffs were
entitled to the accounting sought by them. A corollary issue — indeed the one on
which the first depends — was whether or not the right of redemption With respect
to the force losed property was still available. These issues were spelled out before
the court a quo by the plaintiffs themselves in their answer to the defendants'
memorandum below, where it was stated:
... The complaint at bar for accounting and liquidation is fully
sanctioned ... by section 34, of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court ... .
It is not disputed by the parties, that the mortgage was executed
by the plaintiffs, the spouses Felix L. Lazo and Mrs. Mercedes C
Castro de Lazo, to secure a loan of P12,000.00 which plaintiff
Jose Robles obtained from the defendant Republic Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. (sic) and neither is it disputed, that the
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. Two vital issues or
causes of action, therefore, are presented before this Hon. Court
by the case at bar, with:
a) — Can the plaintiffs demand an accounting and liquidation of
accounts from the defendant Republic Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. in the legal capacity of said plaintiffs as redemptioners; and,
 b) — Is the legal right of redemption of said plaintiffs still
subsisting, in the light of their indubitable causes of action in the
case at bar.
The trial court, however, went entirely out of the issues submitted to it and chose to
decide the case on a point which was not at all litigated. It said: "The key, as it
appears to this Court, lies in the validity or invalidity of the extrajudicial foreclosure
over the real estate mortgage, Exh.-A. If valid, then in the ordinary course of things,
all subsequent transactions by defendants dependent thereon can be taken to be
valid also. If not, then they of necessity must fall as a nullity."
In this connection it should be stated that the loan with the Philippine Bank of
Commerce was on a sixty-day note, which was renewed several times, until the
said bank refused to grant any further renewal. To accommodate the plaintiffs, on
August 14, 1954 the loan was transferred to the Republic Investment Co., The. as
the new creditor, on a note payable on December 12, 1954; and when after three
renewals the plaintiffs, again defaulted the defendant Republic Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. paid the account, and thereafter foreclosed the mortgage in its favor on
July 1, 1958. The trial court, after having stated what it believed to be the "key" to
the problem, ruled that the transfer of the loan to the Republic Investment Co., Inc.
constituted a novation of the obligation, and that the defendant company was
released from its liability as co-debtor because it does not appear to have signed
the new promissory note executed by the plaintiffs. Consequently, the court
concluded, the real estate mortgage in favor of said defendant was extinguished,
and the foreclosure thereof was a nullity.
The actuation of the trial court was not legally permissible especially because the
theory on which it proceeded involved factual considerations neither touched upon
the pleadings nor made the subject of evidence at the trial. Rule 6, Section 1, is
quite explicit in providing that "pleadings are the written allegations of the parties of
their respective claims and defenses submitted to the court for trial and judgment."
This rule has been consistently applied and adhered to by the courts.
The subject matter of any given case is determined ... by the
nature and character of the pleadings submitted by the parties to
the court for trial and judgment. Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar
Central Mill Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100, 103.
It is a fundamental principle that judgments must conform to both
the pleadings and the proof, and must be in accordance with the
theory of the action upon which the pleadings were framed and
the case was tried; that a party can no more succeed upon a
case proved. but not alleged, than upon one alleged but not
proved." (Ramon v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 742)
It is a well-known principle in procedure that courts of justice
have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue."
(Lim Toco vs. Go Pay, 80 Phil. 166)
A judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate
something upon which the parties were not heard, is not merely
irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid." (Salvante v. Cruz, 88 Phil.
236, 244.)
The parties here went to court and presented their respective sides on the premise,
admitted by both, that the mortgage was valid and subsisting. Evidence, therefore,
to establish such premise was unnecessary and uncalled for. Indeed, it was for that
reason and because in any event the record of this case, particularly with respect to
the actuations of the parties after the mortgage was foreclosed, shows with
overwhelming preponderance that the said mortgage had not been extinguished,
that this Court did not consider favorably the defendant company's petitions to
submit a photostat of the first promissory note, and signed duplicates of the three
renewal notes, executed by the plaintiffs in favor of Republic Investment Co., Inc.
bearing not only their signatures as debtors but also the signatures of the
defendants company as solidary co-debtor — all these being evidence which the
said defendant could have submitted at the trial if the validity and existence of the
mortgage had been a contentious issue raised in the pleadings. That the copy of
the note in the hands of the plaintiffs does not bear the signature of the defendant
company is not decisive of the latter's liability, the primary evidence thereof being
the original of the said note in the hands of the creditor, to whom, after all, the right
to recover exclusively belonged.
With particular reference to the first promissory note above mentioned, dated
August 14, 1954, the trial courts conclusion that defendant company never became
obligated thereunder in favor of the Republic Investment Co., Inc. is belied by the
plaintiffs' own Exhibit N, which is the indemnity agreement, also dated August 14,
1954, executed by the plaintiffs in favor of the defendant company precisely to
indemnify the latter for acting as solidary co-debtor said indemnity agreement being
identical in terms with the one previously executed when the loan was originally
contracted with the Philippine Bank of Commerce (Exh. G). And it was precisely
because the plaintiffs defaulted on the note of August 14, 1954 and on the
renewals thereof that the defendant company had to pay the Republic Investment
Co., Inc. and to foreclosed, in turn, the mortgage on the plaintiffs' property. It would
have been absurd for the plaintiffs to execute the indemnity agreement, and to
agree to pay the premium thereunder as well as interest in the contingencies
envisaged, if it were true that the said company has assumed no liability at all in
favor of the creditor.
We now come to the real issues as defined by the parties. The plaintiffs rely on
Rule 39, Section 34.1 In this connection Section 9 of Act No. 3135, as amended,
may also be cited.2
Implicit in the application of these provisions is the premise that the period for
redemption of the property sold on execution (on extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage in the present case) has not yet expired. For if the right to redeem has
been lost it stands to reason that there is no redemption price to speak of, to which
the rents received by the purchasers are to be applied or credited. 3
The plaintiffs' position is that since the sheriff's certificate of sale was recorded in
the office of the Register of Deeds for Manila on March 28, 1963, the one-year
period of legal redemption had not yet expired when the action was commenced on
December 12 of the same year.
There are, however, certain circumstances peculiar to this case which take it out of
the operation of the rule concerning registration in this regard. There is, to begin
with, the categorical statement in the certificate of sale that "the period of
redemption of the said property sold will expire on the 2nd day of July, 1959." Then
there is the fact that no lien or encumbrance, right or claim of any person, other
than the mortgage in question, appeared on the transfer certificate of title of the
plaintiff spouses covering the mortgaged property, such that when the defendant
company obtained a new transfer certificate in its name on March 28, 1963, the
same was entirely clean. In other words, no third parties who might have an interest
in the property, either as possible redemptioners or otherwise, had to be protected
by due notice of the sale through its registration.4 As far as the plaintiffs themselves
were concerned, not only were they duly notified of the sale but the same was
postponed twice, first upon their request and then upon written agreement of both
parties. These circumstances, in our opinion, have relevance in the consideration of
the equities, as distinguished from the purely legal technicalities, of this case.
But the more decisive developments ensued later: Beginning July 1958,
immediately after the foreclosure sale, the plaintiffs — in some instances in the joint
names of Jose Robles and Felix Lazo and in other instances in the name of Jose
Robles alone — started paying rents on the property to the defendant company,
indicating that the former owners, while remaining in occupancy, did so in the
concept of tenants. The receipts for such payments, until May 1961, invariably
referred to "rents" on the "foreclosed property of Felix Lazo, et al." Thereafter the
receipts merely stated "rents for the Nadelco property." The receipt dated June 30,
1959 (presented by the plaintiffs as their Exhibit J-16) is significantly worded as
follows:
At the insistent request of Messrs. Felix Lazo and Jose Robles,
we acknowledge receipt of the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
(P500.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as rental corresponding
to the months of July and August, 1959 for premises No. 32A/B
Callejon Nadelco, Manila, with the condition that the redemption
period provided by law for the property of the spouses Felix L.
Lazo and Mercedes Castro is thereby extended to the last time
up to August 31, 1959.
It is further provided that on or before August 31, 1959, the full
redemption price of P18,627, ... together with unpaid post
insurance premium must be fully paid as promised.
The foregoing was the first extension of the redemption period granted at the
request of the plaintiffs. It was an acknowledgment that the original period was
expiring and a conventional stipulation on a new period. This new period passed,
but the defendant company did not consolidate its title. Instead it sent a letter to the
Lazo spouses on March 30, 1960, as follows (Exh. 1):
On July 1, 1959, this company purchased the property ... at an
auction sale conducted by the Sheriff of Manila for the amount of
P18,627.00. The redemption period of said sale has expired on
the 2nd day of July 1959.
However ... we have deferred the consolidation of title to our
name. This is last call for you to act before it is too late. If you
wish to redeem the property above described, kindly call at this
office on or before April 30, 1960 to arrange for a settlement of
your obligation.
The foregoing letter elicited a reply from plaintiff Felix L. Lazo on April 8, 1960,
wherein he said (Exh. 2):
We wish to acknowledge receipt, with thanks, of your letter of
March 30, 1960, regarding our property involved in the
transaction of Mr. Jose Robles. I feel really grateful to you and
your old man for having given us time to redeem it. It is really
unfortunate that Mr. Jose Robles, to whom we loaned the
property as security for his mortgage, has kept the matter
dragging along for so many years. I have urged him to settle the
matter before April 30, 1960 and he promised earnestly to do so.
He says he is trying to raise the necessary funds, and will see
you before the target date.
We are very much worried about this matter.
Thus was a second extension granted — up to April 30, 1960. Still no payment was
tendered.
On May 30, 1960 it was plaintiff Jose Robles who wrote another letter to the
defendant company, making reference to the plaintiffs' "commitment to pay the
redemption price of the foreclosed property at the end of this month, May 1960,"
and pleading for a last extension of the redemption period. The letter continued
(Exh. 7):
 In spite of our several failures to secure the expected fund for
payment to your goodselves, we assure you that we have not
overlooked, nor forgotten, our said obligation. However, this time,
considering the fact that our said loan application only requires
the necessary inspection by our Bank before it is finally
approved, we are again constrained to request your kindselves to
grant us another period of one month (June) within which to remit
to you the amount of redemption for the said foreclosed property
of Mr. Lazo, and this would he the last extension that we will beg
of you to consider. Please be assured that should we be able to
get our funds much earlier than expected during the period of
extension herein requested, we shall tender to you our payment
without further delay. At the moment, we are tendering you the
amount of P250.00 as rental corresponding to the month of June,
1960.
Trusting for your usual kind consideration on the above request,
we are.
Felix L. Lazo himself confirmed the above request for extension by another letter
dated May 31, 1960 (Exh. 8), thus:
I am lawfully embarrassed for the failure of Mr. Jose Robles to
settle the amount ...
Out of equity, I am forced to consent to his extension for another
30 days by paying the advanced rental. He expects the loan to
be released in 15 days from now, and he promised to settle our
case.
May I ask again your kind indulgence on the matter.
The extension asked for was once more granted, this time up to June 30, 1960,
with the same negative result. Then again, on August 31, 1962 Felix L. Lazo wrote
still another letter (Exh. 9) as follows:
Here we come again about the house. I am really feeling
ashamed to you. But Mr. Robles said he failed to obtain the
amount of about P6,000 he was going to pay as down payment
for the repurchase — even without a contract yet. He expected to
get the sum in a week time or until the 10th of September.
If you could still hold the property until that time, kindly give your
consideration. May be this is the last chance.
The plaintiffs having reneged on all their repeated promises, the defendant
company finally consolidated its title to the property as purchaser at the foreclosure
sale on March 28, 1963, and obtained the corresponding transfer certificate of title.
That was almost five years after the said sale. It is clear, in the light of the facts and
circumstances above set forth, that the parties had abandoned entirely the concept
of legal redemption in this case and converted it into one of conventional
redemption, in which the only governing factor was the agreement between them.
The registration of the certificate of sale on March 28, 1963 was entirely
unnecessary and irrelevant to the question of when the period of redemption
agreed upon expired. The record shows that the last request for extension
approved by the defendant is that contained in the letter of Jose Robles dated May
30, 1960 (Exh. 7), at the bottom of which appears the handwrittten notation: "Ok for
last extension one month. Please attach note of Mr. Lazo," this last evidently
referring to the latter's confirmatory letter of May 31, 1960 (Exh. 8). Consequently,
the period to redeem expired on June 30, 1960.
There is no evidence that Felix L. Lazo next "last" request for extension, until
September 10, 1962, contained in his letter of August 31, 1962 (Exh. 9), was acted
upon or approved by the defendant company; but even if it was, then after
September 10, 1962 the right to redeem had Become irretrievably lost.
The plaintiffs' repeated requests for time within which to redeem, each with a definite date of
expiration, generated binding contracts when approved by the defendant company. A
contract, needles to say, has the force of law between the parties. In any event, the principle
of estoppel would step in to prevent the plaintiffs from going back upon their own acts and
representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. This is a principle of
equity and natural justice, expressly adopted in our Civil Code (Arts. 1431 et seq.) and
articulated as one of the conclusive presumptions in Rule 31, Sec. 3(a), of our Rules of Court
as follows:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
In considering the equities of the case it may be pertinent to note that the property in question
consists of a small lot of 270 square meters and the house situated thereon, yielding a
monthly rent, of only P250.00, and that its fair value therefore, especially in 1958, could not be
widely disparate from the sale price of P8,627.00. In the defendants' answer there is a
counterclaim for attorney's fees in the amount of P6,000, aside from moral damages. We do
not find this second item sufficiently justified, but with respect to attorney's fees there is a
stipulation in the mortgage contract, Exh. A, for "15% of the total indebtedness then unpaid."
Under this stipulation the sum of P2,700.00 is recoverable.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision appealed from is
reversed and the complaint dismissed; and on the counterclaim the plaintiffs appellees are
sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, defendant company the sum of P2,700.00 by way of
attorney's fees plus costs.