MACARIOLA v ASUNCION

Judge Elias Asuncion, respondent herein, was the presiding Judge in civil case no. 3010, a complaint for
partition filed by the Reyes siblings against Bernardita Macariola concerning the properties left by their
common father, the deceased Francisco Reyes. Judge Asuncion rendered a decision apportioning the
properties, which was later on declared as final due to lack of an appeal. Thereafter, a project of partition
was submitted to Judge Asuncion, which he approved despite being signed only by the parties’ counsels
and not by the parties themselves.

Lot 1184 one of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was adjudicated to the
plaintiffs of the civil case in equal shares. Lot 1184-E, a portion of the lot subject herein, was sold
to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of The said lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.
Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge
Asuncion was the president.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge"
alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article
1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of
R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision
dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of
the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge
Asuncion be exonerated.

WON he violated the abovementioned provisions

Held
The court ruled that Judge Asuncion did not violate Article 14 due to the following reasons:

Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent.
•
That upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the UnitedStates and later on from the United States
to the Republic of thePhilippines,
Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is
change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of
the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re- enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.Likewise, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed
abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in
nature
Laurel vs. Misa
77 Phil. 856

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason for adhering to the enemy by giving them aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation. With this, he filed a petition a petition for habeas corpus insisting that he
cannot be prosecuted for treason under Article 114 of the RPC for the following reasons: 1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government the Philippines was suspended and, consequently, the
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was also thereby deemed suspended; and (2) that there was a
change of sovereignty over the Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

Issue:

Whether or not belligerent occupation suspends the allegiance of a Filipino citizen during the period of
said occupation

Held:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to
their legitimate governemnt or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by belligerent occupation because
the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. What
may be suspended is not sovereignty per se, but the exercise of rights of sovereignty. Sovereignty and
the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate sovereign subsist during the enemies’ occupation,
hence there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

In addition, political laws are suspended during the occupation. However, law on treason, although
political in nature, cannot be suspended for the reason that law on treason is essentiwl for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government. Change of our form
of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the
crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that “The
government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of
Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines.”

DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
Facts:

Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with the COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution byPeople’s initiative. His
proposal is to lift the term limits of elective officials andthus amending Sections 4 and 7 of Art VI, Section 4
of Art VII and Section 8 of Art X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In his petition, Delfin asked
theCOMELEC to issue an order (1) fixing the time and dates for signature gatheringall over the country; (2)
cause the publication of such order in newspaper of general and local circulation; and (3) instructing
municipal election registrars in allregions of the Philippines to assist him and his volunteers in establishing
signingstations. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and
of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the
IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol angKonstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to
dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC.

After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties,
the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their “memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda” within five days. On December 18, 1996,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the
following arguments, among others:

1. That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is

an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been
passed; and

2. That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the
Constitution.

Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementinglegislation the
same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
(potestas delegata non delegaripotest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the
latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s
initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of
the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative.
However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a
revision or amendment has become academic.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

et al.
G.R. No. 127325 | March 19, 1997
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:
Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of PIRMA, filed with the COMELEC a
“Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People’s Initiative” citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on
the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to
have the petition published.

ISSUE:
Whether RA No. 6735 is sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by
people’s initiative.

HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals
to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the
system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or
resolutions.” The use of the clause “proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed” denotes that R.A. No. 6735
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on
the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in
the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative
and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the

proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an
amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the
respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition. TRO issued on 18
December 1996 is made permanent

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006
(CARPIO, J.)

Requirements for Initiative Petition

• Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision
• Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

FACTS:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the
petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions
to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling

ISSUES:
• Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision
• Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct
proposal by the people

RULING:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people
Sec.2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the
framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant
American jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on
a petition containing such full text.
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present.

2 elements of initiative
1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
2.Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before – not after – signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which
is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve
a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The
signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to
sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people
the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a
gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be” directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law,
the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of
attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through
initiatives article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.

The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through
a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people’s initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “any amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to
“amendments to this Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment
of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose
both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?

Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber
of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment.

Amendment vs. Revision

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There
is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the
other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. Where the
proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section
or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision.

Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from .100% to 60% is an
amendment and not a
revision.

Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election

to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any
modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended.
These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among
or within the three branches.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example,
the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or
“theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure
of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,
as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances,
and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a

constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a
revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered
principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake
revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed &identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments & not revisions.

Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by
the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether
there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a
change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government & the system
of check and balances
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision
&Not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles
- Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-
equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation
of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive
Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within
the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes
changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative
body work full-time on the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative,
are called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an
occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent
of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the
intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate
from such categorical intent and language.

Holy See vs Rosario

G.R. No. 101949

238 SCRA 524

December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge

of
RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A,
registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D
under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was
donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents
the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy,
for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights
to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two
parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the
squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists
that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent
corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr.
Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific
performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr.
Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already
"shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special
civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity
for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution,
generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts
and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to
private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified
that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to
the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction
and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in
this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has
bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely,
the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its
mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern
is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio
thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise
clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the
lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters
living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints
were dismissed accordingly

FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the
Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal
Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of
6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the
name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in
the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos,
Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale
to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private
respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land,
and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the
Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos,
Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint —
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and
Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was
filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to
dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by
entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated
the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign
immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the
Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations
regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a
foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio,
has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957
(Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international
relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held
and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is
an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal,
in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A
for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for
the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are
still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises,
has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a
person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own
government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign
Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade
the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and
the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States,
Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905,
919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim,
the latter ceases to be a private cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in

Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

FACTS:
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in
the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to
RamonLicup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of
the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations
of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana
G.R. No. 101949 December 1,1994 THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR.,
as Presiding Judge of theRegional Trial Court of Makati,Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT
SALESENTERPRISES, INC.

FACTS: This petition arose from a controversyover a parcel of land, Lot 5-A, located in
theMunicipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila andregistered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot5-A is
contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-Dregistered in the name of the Philippine RealtyCorporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold toRamon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A.Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to
the sellers.Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale toprivate respondent, Starbright
Enterprises.The squatters refused to vacate thelots sold to private respondent so a disputearose
as to who of the parties has theresponsibility of evicting and clearing the landof squatters
occurred. Complicating therelations of the parties was the sale bypetitioner of Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Propertiesand Development Corporation (Tropicana).Private respondent filed a complaint
forannulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and
damagesagainst petitioner, represented by the PapalNuncio, and three other defendants:
namely,Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner Holy See isimmune from suit.

HELD: YES.The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in
theregular course of business. If the foreign stateis not engaged regularly in a business or
trade,the particular act or transaction must then betested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of
asovereign activity, or an incident thereof, thenit is an act jure imperii , especially when it isnot
undertaken for gain or profit.Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. Thedonation was made not for commercialpurpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residenceof the Papal Nuncio. The right of a
foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal,in a receiving state, necessary for the
creationand maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention
onDiplomatic Relations.In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity
from thecivil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating
toprivate immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoyholds
on behalf of the sending state for thepurposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a
diplomatic envoy, with all themore reason should immunity be recognized as regards the
sovereign itself, which in this caseis the Holy See

SALIENT POINTS: There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, according to the
Supreme Court: (a) Classical or absolute theory — a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be
made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign; and (b) Restrictive theory — the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acof a
state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. ACTS JURE IMPERII AND JURE
GESTIONIS. - "There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis. x x x
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether
the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state
is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it
is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit." The service
contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain
but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach. How does the Philippine
government treat the Holy See or Vatican? The Philippines has accorded the Holy See the
status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957. This appears to be the
universal practice in international relations. What is the treaty that governs the sovereign
immunity of diplomats and other state agents? The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
which was ratified on 18 April 1961, is a codification of centuries-old customary law affording
protection to foreign diplomats. The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions
to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers
or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d’ affairs accredited to the
ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the “staff of the (diplomatic) mission” are the diplomatic
staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Par in parem imperium non habet.
An equal has no power over an equal. Jenk. Cent. 174. Example: One of two judges of the
same court cannot commit the other for contempt.

Republic vs. Villasor

1. Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is
valid.

Discussions:

1. The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that “the State may not be
sued without its consent”. This provision is merely a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and express an affirmation of the
unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice.
Another justification is the practical consideration that the demands and
inconveniences of litigation will divert time and resources of the State
from the more pressing matters demanding its attention, to the prejudice
of the public welfare.
2. As a general rule, whether the money is deposited by way of general or
special deposit, they remain government funds and are not subject to
garnishment. An exception of the rule is a law or ordinance that has
been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid government
obligation.

Rulings:

1. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic

concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is
immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
 the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private
parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater is such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial
remedy were not thus restricted.
2. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the
dictates of the Constitution. From a logical and sound sense from the
basic concept of the non-suability of the State, public funds cannot be
the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued
had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,
as appropriated by law.

DALE SANDERS, ET AL. v. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, ET AL.

162 SCRA 88 | June 10, 1988
Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services director of the US Naval
Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Private respondents, Anthony Rossi and
Ralph Wyers, are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines
and were employed as game room attendants in the special services
department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised
that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders
disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of the reinstatement of private
respondents to permanent part-time plus back wages. Respondents allege
that the letters contained libelous imputations which caused them to be
ridiculed and, thus, filed for damages against petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the
acts for which they have been sued for damages.

HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners
are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their
official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in
their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related
matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the official character of the
above-described letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being
sued as officers of the United States government. There should be no
question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government
sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The
private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in
accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens
and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO

LEDESMA, petitioners, vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), et
al. respondents.

G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961

Facts: The action in question was — upon complaint of the respondents

Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto
Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting
prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of
Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General
Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The
complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been
engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the
employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the
complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-
organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment
in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.

The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and

Mariano Ledesmadenied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the
and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that
respondents PacificoAdvincula, Roberto
Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending
result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil
Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no
juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an
industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the
Republic performing government functions. For relief, they prayed that the
case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be
heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing
on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for
suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of
such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the
trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained
the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of
Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the
prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by
the court in banc.

Note: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the

Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the
Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all
printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by
the National Government and such other work of the same character as said
Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive
Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It
has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the
General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the
Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in
business or occupation for pecuniary profit.

Issue: whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.

Ruling: No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or

juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or
proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit,
action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that
the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its
objection.

It is true that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on
holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are
"exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is
done only when the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of
administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such
payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its
current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the
functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Clearly, while the
Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional
work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and
although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no
showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate
and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.

BOP v BPEA, 1 SCRA, 340

April 26, 2014

Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the

Industrial Court against petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General
Services and Director of BOP). The complaint alleged that both the secretary
of DOG and the director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor practices.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair
labor practices attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants
were suspended pending result of administrative investigation against them
for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the BOP is not an
industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but of the republic
performing governmental functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge
of Industrial Court sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the
functions of the BOP are “exclusively proprietary in nature,” since they
receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime
work on regular working days and holidays, therefore consequently denied the
prayed for dismissal, which brought the petitioners (BOP) to present petition
for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.

Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical

personality, the BOP cannot be sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court).

It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are
paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, but these facts
do not justify the conclusion that its functions are “exclusively proprietary in
nature”. Overtime work in the BOP is done only when the interest of the
service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime
compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head
of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be
the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in
character.

Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the
rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much
less over its jurisdiction.

Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders

complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against
the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the
respondent court.
IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in

behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE
CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible

Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the

constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected
by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case

or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question
or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before
a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment

Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning
not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of
the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to
one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as
not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses
the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or
put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the
act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of
the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act

is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it
in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence.
But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid
portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law;
and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when
life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided,
at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they
agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the

traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by
the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the
view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to
the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm
and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with
this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices
that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that
the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the
term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA
4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure
that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
 fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep
in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure
shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered

“mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested,
evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or

participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a
religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not
the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy
or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or
the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even

with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family
as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or
family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of
marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a

procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH
Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section
23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or
legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or
next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as
it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-
surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about

family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and
control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception
may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the

RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of

Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of
parents in the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”.
The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of

the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents
in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and

other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very
well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution
as the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not
vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation
to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”.
The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing
of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated
by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern
family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well
as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to

Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH

program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that
the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide
medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number,
since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the
RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH

education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second,
 Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their

religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or
otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering
that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter
now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S.

has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged
that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed,
to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through

an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi
is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than
one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs,
such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in
the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the
Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the
petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of
procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case,
a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
 germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the

human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development,
the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education
and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and

“responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive
the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT

UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)

require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-
parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider
who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar

as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the

rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are
ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH
Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business).
Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from
having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.

 a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or

corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
 aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are
allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of
 juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this
Act.

 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry.
 provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it
unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:

1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
them of their liberty and property without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the
aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted.

RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class
are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by

alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s
target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien
and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his
living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State
cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the
needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the
people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of
pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control
on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times of crisis
and emergency.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the

Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take

advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the
retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail
business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the
ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).
He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the
country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given
equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or

generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle.

In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted
principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be
in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it
represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence,
Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay
city market.

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational
Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by
their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to:
 1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the
country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,

renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following

grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which

properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent

the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as

generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development,
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.