Bismarck's Realpolitik

Author(s): Hajo Holborn

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1960), pp. 84-98
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 BISMARCK'S REALPOLITIK
BY HAJOHOLBORN
In viewof the closeconnection of Bismarck's workwiththe rise
and defeatof Germanyas a worldpowerand,evenmoreimportant,
withEurope'sloss of leadershipin worldaffairs, it is not surprising
thatevensixtyyearsafterhisdeaththefigure oftheGermanchancel-
lorhas remained shrouded in controversies.'Thesecontroversies can-
not be easilysettled,but we cannothope forprogress as longas we
do notclearlydefinethe historical ideas and the politicaland social
movements thatmoldedhis natureand the configuration of objec-
tive historicalpowersin whichhe acted. Bismarckhas oftenbeen
described, particularly byGermanwriters, as a manwhowasnottruly
a memberof his ownage, but ratherbelongedto an earlierhistoric
age if notto a timelessage of heroes.2Foreignstudentshave been
inclinedto neglectthetime-bound conditions ofhis growth withthe
resultthathe has appearedmoremodernthanhe was.
Obviously it is quiteimpossibleto placeBismarck outsidethecen-
turyon thepoliticalfortunes of whichhe had a greaterimpactthan
almostanyotherperson.At thesanme time,uniquelypersonalas his
historicalrole was, Bismarckwas to someextentthe beneficiary of
priorhistoricdecisions.If it seemedin theearly part of the XIXth
century thatliberalism mightsteadilyspreadfromWesternto Cen-
tralEurope,the successof Bismarck'spoliciesin the 1860'sbrought
thismovementto a standstill.But the weaknessof the forcesof
liberalism in CentralEuropehad alreadybeenrevealedby thecourse
of the revolutions of 1848-49,and someeffective methodsforsub-
verting liberalism had beenpracticedby Louis Bonaparteand Prince
FelixSchwarzenberg at a timewhenBismarckwas stillin a largely
meditative stageofhiscareer.
In a famousletterto Leopoldvon GerlachBismarckexpressed
hisbeliefthat" nobodyeverlosesthestampwhichtheage ofyouth-
fulimpressions has imposedon him,"3 and he distancedhimself from
theoldermanwhohad formed hisidealsduring the war of liberation
on Bismarckis moreextensive
literature
1 The historical thanthaton anyother
personalityin GermanhistoryexceptLutherand Goethe. Outsideof Germany
onlyNapoleonand Lincolnhaveeliciteda comparable amountofstudy. The most
recentintroductionto the Bismarckbibliography is to be foundin WalterBuss-
mann,Das ZeitalterBismarcks(Konstanz,1957), 251-74 (Vol. III of Brandt,
Meyer,Just,Handbuchder deutschen Geschichte).
2 GustavAdolf Rein,Die Revolutionin derPolitikBismarcks(Gottingen,1957),
352,usestheterm" antediluvianisch" to describetheunzeitgemdsse-out-of-season
-characterof Bismarck.
3BismarcksBriefean GeneralLeopold von Gerlach,ed. by 9:. Kohl (Berlin,
1896),347.
84
 BISMARCK' S REALPOLITIK 85

fromNapoleon. Friedrich Meineckealreadyhas calledattention 4 to

therelatively coolattitudewhichBismarckalwaysdisplayedwithre-
gardto the periodof Prussianreformand liberation.To be sure,
the struggleagainstforeigndominationseemedto him a worthy
cause,but he deniedthatthe simultaneous attemptof the Prussian
reformers to establishan ideal Germanstatehad made an essential
contribution to eventualliberation.The philosophical idealismof
theage ofKant,Fichte,and Schleiermacher, in which a Stein,Hum-
boldt,Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,and Boyenhad foundthe expression
oftheirownideallongings, was aliento Bismarck.
Bismarckgrew up when theGermanphilosophy oftheclassicage
ceasedto satisfytheheartsoftheyoung. In theyearsafter1815,the
Germanphilosophy had grownmorescholastic, and thedeephuman
experiences whichhad once led to its creationwerelargelyhidden
undera crustof abstractlogicalthought.The generation whichbe-
gan to takethe stageafter1835,the yearin whichDavid Friedrich
Strausspublishedhis Life of Jesus,criticized idealismforits failure
to understand thenewrealityand to givea positivedirection to life.
Strauss,and thoseafterhim,LudwigFeuerbach,BrunoBauer,and
Karl Marx,all manifested thegathering trendtowardrealism,which
withtheseYoung-Hegelians, however, assumedat firstan evenmore
intensely tingethanwiththeold Hegel.
rationalistic
It was thisrationalism that Bismarckresented.As a youthhe
had receivedreligiousinstruction fromSchleiermacher, the warm-
heartedphilosopher and patrioticpreacherwhosevindication of re-
ligionand emphasison sentiment and feelinghad meantto an earlier
generation the releasefromthe exclusiverule of reason. Bismarck
discoveredin Schleiermacher's teachingsonly an intellectualistic
pantheism, whichhe proceededto combinewitha skepticism that
deniedthepossibility of anyhumanknowledge of God'splan of the
worldandoftheplaceoftheindividual in it. Thisagnosticism, which
accordingto Bismarckderivedchiefly fromSpinozaand the Stoics,
alwayswelledup as one important elementin Bismarck'sthinking,
and particularlyin hislate years.
Bismarck'ssearchforthe concretebeautyof lifeneverfullyre-
lieved the boredomand melancholythat his skepticism produced.
He was alwayscloseto nature. His widereadingsin Germanclassic
literatureand mostofall in Shakespeare, as wellas themusicofBee-
thoven,gave his imaginative mindmodelsof heroicmen and great
tragic situations. Shakespeare had been declaredthe poeticgenius
by Herderand theyoungGoethe. Bismarckfullyacceptedthemod-
Meinecke,
4Friedrich " BismareksEintritt Kreis,"
in denchristlich-germanischen
XC, 56ff.,
Zeitschrift,
Historische in PreussenundDeutschland
reprinted im 19. und
20. Jahrhundert(Munich,1918),296ff.
86 HAJO HOLBORN

ern Germanoutlookthat originated withthe literaryrevolution of

SturmundDrang. He desiredpassionand sentiment and,therefore,
foundmuchof the workof the romanticwritersto his liking. Yet
it was nottheromanticism whichlookedforan escapefromthereali-
tiesintoa realmofartificial beautyor ofreligionthatattracted him,
but thoseromanticefforts that led to a clearergrasp of reality.
Throughits devotionto the uniquevalue of individuality, romanti-
cism,indeed,preparedthe groundfora morerealisticstudyof the
world,as thegrowth ofmodernhistorical studiesin Germany showed.
Withsharpand piercingeyesthe youngBismarcklookedaroundin
his ownpersonalworldand earlyrevealedan extraordinary giftfor
literarynarration and characterization.
In theschoolofromanticism the cultof personalityflourished to
excess,and in thisrespectalso Bismarckwas a truechildof his age.
For some time Byronwas dearerto him than Shakespeare. The
youngBismarckgave freereignto his pugnaciousness in dozensof
duels,and he plungedheadlongintostormy loveaffairs.Eventually
he refusedto enter,as a Prussianofhis classwas expectedto do,the
government servicesor make the armyhis career. " I do not like
superiors,"he exclaimed, and anothertime," I wantto makemusic
as I likeit or not at all." Thus he withdrew to the familyestates,
whichhe managedveryeffectively. But onlypart of his energies
wereengaged.Therewastimeleftto resumethesearchforthemean-
ing of life,and even moreto paradehis self-confidence beforethe
neighborsby audacious acts of sportsmanship or by extravagant
pranks. The unbridled cultof individualitywas threatening to cor-
rodeanyseriouspurposeofhis existence.It was his conversion to a
positivetheisticChristian viewand his marriage, in 1847,thatended
thisperiodoflifeofthe " mad junker,"as he had beencalled.
Bismarck'sreligiousconversion has been muchstudied.5 Prac-
ticallyno one has questionedthe sincerity of his religiousfeelings,
thoughmany have pointed out thatBismarck's adoptionof a theistic
faithwas closelyrelatedto his wishto be acceptedby his devout
futurebrideand herpietisticfamily. The suddendeathof a close
friend, Marievon Blankenburg, and thelove forherfriendJohanna
vonPuttkamer naturally gavehisquestionsaboutlifea newurgency,
v Besidesthe above articleby F. Meinecke, the mostimportant treatments are
stillE. Marcks,BismarcksJugend(Stuttgart, 1909), and Otto Baumgarten, Bis-
marcksGlaube (Tiubingen, 1915). The strongcriticism recentlyleveledagainst
Meineckeand Marcksby S. A. Kachler" Zur Deutungvon Bismarcks'Bekeh-
rung,"'in Glaubeund Geschichte, FestschriftfurFriedrich Gogarten,ed. by Hein-
richRunte(Giessen,1948),189ff., failsto discussthefullevidence.Cf. also A. 0.
Meyer,BismarcksGlaube (Munich,1932), the same author'sbiographyof Bis-
marck,ed. by H. Rothfels(Stuttgart, 1949), and Erich Eyck,Bismarck,Vol. I
1941).
(Erlenbach-Ziurich,
 BISMARCK 'S REALPOLITIK 87

and thereligion ofhisfriends madea seriousimpression onhim. Still,

therewas a strongvoluntaristic side to Bismarck'sdecision. By em-
bracinga personalGodhe setan endto hisdrifting in doubts. At the
same timehis marriagegave him a firmanchoragein Prussianso-
ciety,in whichhe had hisnaturalroots,but fromwhichso farhe had
longedto fleeintoa worldof freeand heroicaction. Togetherwith
his pantheismhe dismissedwhathe occasionallycalledhis republi-
canism. In the same breathhe won a wifeand a religiousand po-
liticalfaith. He had chosenhis fundamental positionwhena little
latertherevolution drewhimintothepoliticalarena,firstas a parlia-
mentarian, subsequently as a diplomat,and finallyas a minister of
state.
Yet beforeappraising his statecraft we muststressthatBismarck
did notbecomea Pietistin 1847. He placedhis trustin a personal
God,whomhe acceptedas the creatorand kingof the universe, but
he,obviously caredlittleforChristiandogmas. He prayedto God,
whosewayshe considered unfathomable and whomhe did notthink
to move by his prayer. But he said-probablyunawarethat the
wordscouldbe foundin Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre 6-that the
usefulness of prayerlay in submission to a strongpower. His new
beliefin a personalGod was actuallystillcompatiblewithmuchof
Bismarck's originalskepticism.Thoughlessgeneral, it was almostas
subjectiveas his earliernotions. As a matterof fact,in his later
yearshe seemsto havemovedevencloserto his earlyideas.
It wasprobably impossible in XIXth-century GermanProtestant-
ismto findany conception of the ChristianChurchas a divinelyor-
dainedcommunity whichpossesseda moralauthority independent
of the state.7 The ProtestantChurcheswereessentiallystate-con-
trolledinstitutesforpreaching.The Pietistswerecriticsofthisstate-
systemand oftenopposedto ministers.But all theycoulddo was
to formsmallconventicles suchas thosein whichBismarck had come
in contactwithPietisticorthodoxy.Bismarcknevercultivatedanly
groupworshipafterhis conversionand favoredthe state-church,
thoughhe himself, as he putit,didnotwishto be " edifiedbymouth
of ministers."Yet sincehe suspectedministers of beingdesirousof
power,he preferred havingthemunderthe supervision of the state.
Another observation can be made. The new faithhelped to giveBis-
marck'swholethinking a firmorientation.It also made him act not
onlywithgreaterdetermination but also witha heightened senseof
moralresponsibility. Yet it didnotchangehisrelationswithhisfel-
low-men.He remainedthe cavalier,normallypoliteto his equals,
(2nd ed., Berlin,1830-31)II,
6 Glaubenslehre 476.
" Der deutsche
7 Hajo Holborn, Beleuchtung,"
Idealismusin sozialgeschichtlicher
t,vol. 174 (1952),359ff.
Zeitschrif
Historische
88 HAJO HOLBORN

well-mannered and benevolent evento members of thelesserclasses,

but on theotherhandrecklessin forcing peopleto servehimor hu-
miliatingthem ifthey refused,orwere suspectedofrefusing,co-opera-
tion. The manwholayawakewholenights" hating,"whocouldper-
hapsforget butnotforgive-allthisaccording to hisowntestimony-
hadnotthrough hisconversion become a new man.
FriedrichMeineckehas suggestedthat the declineof German
idealismin the 1830'smightbe responsible forBismarck'sturning
awayfromidealismto orthodoxy and therebyfromliberalism to con-
servatism.8He thoughtthat if Bismarckhad founda philosophy
whichwouldhave answeredthe burningquestionsof his personal
growth, he mighthavebecomea moreliberalstatesman likeCavour.
AlthoughI agreewithMeineckethat the formation of Bismarck's
personalconvictions cannotbe explainedoutsideofhis age,theques-
tionraisedby Meineckedefiesa solutionbecauseit is impossible to
visualizedifferent historicalcircumstances whileassumingthat the
personinvolvedwouldremainthesame. Bismarckactuallyabsorbed
certaininfluences of Germanidealism,and thesubjectiveand volun-
taristicreligionwhichhe adoptedwas clearly" post-idealistic," but
theliberaland humanitarian elements oftheclassicGermanphiloso-
phyfoundno responsein him.
In 1838 the youngGladstonewrotehis firstbook in whichhe
pleadedfortheclosestrelationbetweenChurchand state.9 Without
a sanctifying he argued,thestatewouldbecomea merema-
principle,
chinewithno otherfunction thanthatof registering and executing
opinionsofthepopularwilllikethehandsofa clock. Gladstonewas
thenstillan ardentTory,and his theseswerewarmlyapplaudedby
Frederick WilliamIV of Prussiaand his conservative friends.It is
well knownhow greatlyGladstone'spoliticalviewschangedin his
lateryears,whenhe becamea liberalout of Christianconvictions.
But as littleas he gave up his Christianbeliefdid he deviatefrom
his earlydemandthatcreativepoliticscalledfor" sanctifying prin-
ciples." Bismarcksaw in Gladstonemorethanin any other states-
man on the contemporary Europeanscenehis ideologicalopposite.
He was wrong,however,in assertingthat Gladstone-or,as he
labelled him with one of his strongestvituperativeexpressions,'0
"Professor'"Gladstone-wasruiningEngland,nor could he know
thata Gladstonean Professor Wilsonwas destinedto becomethefore-
mostdestroyer of the Germanmonarchy.
What made Bismarcka fieryenemyof Gladstonewas boththe
8 Op. cit.,312ff.,
354ff.
9 TheStatein itsRelationwiththeChurch(London,1839).
10 Otto Pflanze,"Bismarck's'Realpolitik,"'Reviewof Politics,XX (1958),
498f.
 BISMARCK 'S REALPOLITIK 89

liberalism and insistence ofGladstoneon a Christian program in poli-

tics. Bismarcksoonpartedcompanywithhis earlyconservative as-
sociates,the membersof the so-calledChristian-Germanic circle,1'
withregardto the applicationof Christianprinciplesto practical
politics. In Bismarck'sview,the worldand its orderswerecreated
by God and thecourseofhistory directedby him. The existingpo-
liticalinstitutions,consequently, werenot made by men nor could
theybe alteredbyidealconstructions ofhumanreason,as theliberals
proposed.But theconcrete planofGodwasunknown to man,except
thatit was clearthatin all history thedecisionshad beenreachedby
power used forselfishinterests, and thatthisraisond'etatcouldbe
studiedand actedupon. Thisnatureofthepoliticallifeoftheworld
was to himdivinelyinstituted and,therefore, essentiallyimmutable,
although lifewas a continuous and
conflict struggle. To hope that
mencouldchangethe natureof politicswouldbe sinfully arrogant
and wouldmean to meddlein divinegovernment.The statesman
mightgain, however,at rare momentsa fleetingadumbration of
divineactionon a higherplane.
These ideas excludedthe possibility of Christianizing the state
and theinternational life. There was no ideal let
state, alone an ideal
international order,but onlytheconcrete orderof history which de-
mandedfromeverybody obedienceto the positivelaw. This Bis-
marckianattitude has been calledLutheranby historical studentsof
Bismarck,and it is quite truethathis politicalconceptions showed
theearmarks ofthepoliticalthinking thathad developedin German
Lutheranism. But it would be erroneous to assumethatBismarck's
and Luther'sopinionswereidentical.'2The worldof stateswas for
Luthernot the arena forthe realizationof the kingdomof God.
Lutheradmittedthatstatecraft requiredspecialpoliticalknowledge
thoughto him thiswas not identicalwiththe raisond'etat. And
whileLutherdid notbelievethatthe stateas suchwas a Christian
institution, he considered it thedutyofeveryindividualChristian to
assertwithinthe publiclifea specialmoralattitudederivedfrom
his Christianfaith. In this respectBismarck'searlyconservative
companions, particularlyFriedrich JuliusStahl,werecloserto Luther
thanBismarck.
But Bismarckdid not denythat at least the statesmanhimself,
if he was a Christian, was boundby certainspecific principles.The
Meinecke'schapterin
11 On thisgroupFriedrich his Weltbiurgertum und Na-
(4thed.,Munich,1917),
is stillunsurpassed
tionalstaat 223ff.
12 The bestbriefstatement of Luther'sconceptionof the stateis in Karl Holl,
Gesammelte Aufsaitzezur I:
Kirchengeschichte, Luther (2nd ed.,Tiubingen,1923),
263ff.For an amplification of my own views,cf. my A Historyof ModernGer-
many: The Reformation (New York,1959), 187ff.
90 HAJO HOLBORN

exerciseof powerwas not to aim at personalendsbut was a calling

to preservethe naturalorderof thingsand to servethe state. No
doubt,thesewereimportant moralrestraints whichreflected genuine
ideas of Luther,thoughin somewhatweakerfashion. Lutherjusti-
fiedwaronlyin self-defense and recommended thatChristian princes
shouldrathersuffer someoccasionalinjusticeand forgetabouttheir
own' reputation'thango to a warthatwouldbringcalamitoussuf-
feringto theirpeople. Bismarckrepeatedlycondemned preventive
warsand neveracceptedwarlightheartedly, buthe did acceptit as a
meansforaccomplishing his politicalaims. Also,he ruledout wars
forprestige, butnotforthehonorofthestate.
The outlookon lifeand history withwhichBismarckenteredpoli-
tics endowedthe prevailingpoliticalconditions of Prussiawithan
auraofsanctity. Not only the monarchy but also the class
traditional
societyof Prussia,withthe junkerestate as the dominantsocial
group,was in his eyesthe God-willed orderof things,and its main-
tenanceby all meansofpolitical cunning theunquestionable dutyof
thestatesman.Liberalism, whichforhimcomprised everymovement
derivedfromtheideasoftheAmerican and FrenchRevolutions, was
theswornenemyof a healthypolitical life,since it attempted to re-
place historicallydevelopedformsof lifeby an arbitrary systemof
man-made institutions.In Bismarck's thought anykindofliberalism
was boundto lead to government by parties,and thisweakening of
the authority of the state wouldbringforththe chaos of a social
republic,fromwhicha people could be freedonlyby a regimeof
fireand sword. On theotherhand,a regimeofnakedforcewas dis-
likedby Bismarck, althoughmanygovernmental measureswhichhe
recommended or adoptedwereof highlydoubtfullegality. He was
notevena championof an unrestricted absolutemonarchy.He ob-
jectedto thesuppression oftheindependent rightsofthenobility by
rulers.Moreover, absolutism fedthat" boa constrictor," bureaucracy,
whichwas tyrannical but at thesametimea breeding groundof lib-
eralnotions.
These Bismarckian conceptions mighthave made this junkera
radicalreactionary afterthe breakdown of the Germanrevolution,
radicalto theextentofdemanding thesuppression ofthosemoderate
German-national and liberaltrendsthathad existedin Prussiabefore
1848,andevenmoreoftheconcessions madeduringtherevolution, of
whichthe Prussianconstitution of 1850 was the most important
grant. But in spite of his brazenly contemptuous attitudetoward
democracy and liberalismduringthe revolution, Bismarckwas not
foundamongtheextremedie-hardsin the 1850's. A parliament, in
particular, seemedto offer manypotentialadvantages. Throughit
the conservatives couldasserttheirviews-if need be even against
 BISMARCK S REALPOLITIK 91

crownand bureaucracy-andBismarckneverforgotthat the king

had falteredin the earlymonthsof the revolution.But the chief
value of a parliament was the chanceit providedforentering on a
contestwiththe liberalforces. Bismarckrealizedthat theseforces
couldnot be conqueredby mererepression and thatthe ideological
errorsand thepoliticalfutility of moderndemocracy wouldhave to
be shownup by wordand deed.
WhileBismarck, therefore,accepteda parliament, he remaineda
deadlyfoeof parliamentary government.The monarchical govern-
mentwas alwaysto retaina basis of powerof its own and forthis
reasonneversurrender its exclusivecontrolof the armyand foreign
affairs.Duringthe revolution of 1848-49Bismarckhad seen that
the Austrianand Prussianmonarchies recoveredtheirstrength be-
causetheirarmiesremained loyalto thedynastic cause. He had also
observedtheweaknesses in Germanliberalism, howthefearofsocial
revolution had impairedits aggressivespirit,howthepoliticalmoder-
ates and radicalshad divided,and howtheideas abouttheformsof
the desirednationalunion,gross-deutsch vs. klein-deutsch,had pro-
ducedfurther splitsin Germanliberalism.He had also noticedthat
the social and economicprogramof the liberalsfailedto keep its
early large followingunited, and that individual groups could be
boughtrathercheaplyby the old governments. It had not escaped
his attentionthatthemajorityof the Germanpeople,especiallythe
peasantand working quiescentand that
classes,werestillpolitically
it mightbe feasibleto mobilizethemforthesupportofmonarchical
government, as Louis Bonapartehad done.
ThesewereBismarck's formativeexperiences as he roseto become
the leadingstatesmanof the Prussianstate. His supremegoal was
andremained thepreservation and theelevationofthePrussianmili-
tarymonarchy.He was convinced thatthepowerof Prussiain Ger-
many and Europe could be enhanced once her policies were freed
fromtheshackleswhichtheChristian oftheold conserva-
principles
tismimposed. This appliednot onlyto foreignaffairsbut also to
domesticpolitics. As longas the sanctionof forceremainedfirmly
in thehandsof a sovereignking,he saw no dangerin adoptingsome
of the aims of what he called " the revolution." Jacob Burckhardt
provedhis giftof divinationwhen,in 1872, he wrotein a letterto a
friend:" Bismarcktookonlyintohis own handswhatwouldhave
happenedeventually,albeitwithouthim and againsthim. He saw
that the growingdemocratic-socialtide would somehow produce a
state of absoluteviolence.... Said he: 'I shall do it myself,'and con-
ducted the threewars of 1864, 1866, and 1870." 13
Briefe,ed. by
von Preen,26 April1872. J. Burckhardt,
13 Letterto Friedrich
F. Kaphahn(Leipzig,1935),348.
92 HAJO HOLBORN

" Onlythekingsmakerevolution in Prussia,"Bismarckoncesaid

to NapoleonIII,14 andon thispremisehe waswillingto playwiththe
devil. He feltstrongenoughto see to it that " God will remain
masterin the houseand the devilcan onlyshowhimselfin theen-
trancehall,eventhoughhe maysometimes pretendthereto be the
lord." ThesewordsofBismarck
15 revealedthesprings ofhispolitical
actions. He freelyco-operated in thediplomatic fieldnotonlywith
governments ofrevolutionary origins,if thisseemedadvantageous to
him,butequallywithrevolutionary forcesat home.The principle of
legitimate monarchy wasboldlyviolatedbyhimwhenhe dispossessed
thedynasties ofHanover,Hesse-Kassel,and Nassau,in 1866,and in-
troducedBonapartist devicessuchas universalsuffrage intoGerman
politics. The mostcrucialissuewas theproblem ofinationalism. Bis-
marck'sPrussianpatriotism originally far outweighed his German-
nationalsentiments.Nationalismto himsmelledtoo muchof the
democratic volontegeneraleand he saw thepoliticalworldgrounded
on historicstates. But Germanunification offered thegreatestsingle
opportunity for the growthof Prussianpower; it could not be
achievedwithoutsomeco-operation withthepopularnationalmove-
ment,whichmnight imperilthemonarchical structureof thePrussianl
state. Only insofaras nationalunification could be accomplished
withoutsubordinating the Prussiancrownto the ruleof partiesdid
it becomea practicalpolicy. On theotherhand,iftheroyalgovern-
mentsucceededin fulfilling the nationaldreamwhichthe Germlan
liberalshad failedto realizein 1848-49,thenationalprinciple would
strengthen conservatism, and liberalism would loseits appeal.
The politicalorderthatBismarckcreatedin Germanyfullycon-
firmed thesefundamental thoughtsand convictions.The new Ger-
man Empirewas built on the balance of a unionof the German
princesand states,represented in thechieffederalorgan,theBundes-
rat or FederalCouncilon the one side, and the popularnational
movement represented in theReichstagon theother. The Prussian
government was stillin undisputed controlof theroyalarmyand of
the conductof foreign policy;besides,it was capableof manipulat-
ing the balance betweenthe Germanprincesand the parties. In
thedecadeafter1866Bismarck leanedheavilyon thelargestpolitical
party,theliberalparty,becausehe was apprehensive ofthe attitude
of thenon-Prussian particularistforcesand equally the fierceop-
of
positionof his former friends,the Prussianconservatives, to which
he was exposedin thisperiod. In orderto gainthe supportof the
liberalsBismarckmadeveryimportant concessionsnotonlyin eco-
nomicpolicybut also in the establishment of fundamental political
14 Bismarck,Die Werke(Berlin, 1924-35), VIII, 459.
Gesammelten
'5 15 October 1850, ibid.,XIV, 175.
 BISMARCK S REALPOLITIK 93

institutions.But in themanagement of militaryand foreign affairs

he brookedno interference with the absoluteprerogatives of the
crown. Whenhe gainedtheimpression thatliberalsmighteventu-
ally gathersufficient strength to imposeparliamentary government,
he brokeup theliberalpartyby buyingthecontinued backingofthe
rightwingwiththegiftofindustrial protection andmaneuvering the
remaining leftliberalsintoa forlorn opposition.
After1878thebalancebetweenthe particularist and thenation-
alist forceswas shifted. The statesas represented in the Federal
Councilas wellas the Prussiangovernment wereused as a shieldto
stopthe further development of the centralparliament.The coali-
tionwiththe Prussianconservatives was thusrestoredand was ce-
mentedbythegrantofprotective importdutieson agrarianproducts.
After1878Bismarck also beganto relaxin thewarwhichhe had con-
ductedagainstthe CenterPartyin theyearsafter1872. Sincethe
politicalmovement of GermanCatholicism was linkedup withthe
particularist forcesand couldrelyon an autonomousand universal
authority, theRomanCatholicChurch,he had foughtboththe po-
liticalaspirationsof the GermanCatholicsand the claimsof the
RomanChurch. A compromise overstate-church relationswas de-
velopedin thecourseof the 1880's,and thoughthe Germangovern-
mentand theCenterPartycontinued to lookat eachotherwithdeep
distrust,theyco-operated in a goodmanypoliticalactions.
Afternationalunification had beenachieved,Bismarckwas quick
to brandeverybody whoopposedor criticized thenewconstitutional
orderan unpatriotic citizen,or as he expressedit, a Reichsfeind.
WhiletheleadersoftheCenterremainedat leastunderthesuspicion
of being" enemiesof the Empire" and the leftliberalsremained
markedmen,Bismarcksaw the chiefdangerforthe Empireafter
1878in thegrowing working classmovement.To be sure,he metit
notonlyby repressive measuresagainsttheSocial DemocraticParty
thataimedat thealleviationoftheconditions
but also by legislation
of the industrialworker. But whenthesepositivesocial policies,
whichwereconceivedin a paternalistic spirit,failedto produceim-
mediateresults,he preparedfora showdown withthe Social Demo-
cratsin 1890. In theexpectation thattheReichstagmightmakethe
suppression of theSocial DemocraticPartyimpossible, Bismarckbe-
gan to considerconcreteplansfora coup d'etatwhichwas intended
to createa docile federalparliament.16Germanconstitutionalism
was certainlyon unsafegrounds,and Max Weber'sdescription of
the Bismarckiansystemas " pseudo-constitutionalism " seems his-
toricallycorrect.
11 (Stutt-
Bismarcksund Wilhelms
16EgmontZechlin,Die Staatsstreichpldne
gart,1929).
94 HAJO HOLBORN

Bismarck'sfall in 1890 was connectedwiththeseissues,though

it was essentiallycausedby thedesireof WilliamII to ruleby him-
self. By onesimplestroketheyoungemperor wasable to removenot
onlythefounder oftheEmpirebut also withhimtheleadingroleof
the ministers, which Bismarckhad considerednecessaryfor the
formulation of prudentpoliciesin a modernmonarchy.But he had
overrated his personalcapacityforkeepingthetrustof themonarch
and never contemplated the problemof his successionearnestly
enough. In the yearsafterhis dismissalBismarckbeganto clamor
forthestrengthening oftheparliament which,whilein power,he had
donehisbestto makeimpotent.Another majorweaknessofhispoli-
cies becameapparentonlyin the era of WilliamII. As mentioned
before, Bismarckdeeplyresented thepowerofbureaucracy in govern-
ment. He saw in bureaucracy a forcethattendedto disregard tradi-
tionalclass linesand regionaldifferencesin the lightof a conceptof
law applicableto everycitizenof the state. Actually,Bismarck's
semi-absolutistic statecouldnothaveexistedwithouta bureaucracy,
and the extension of governmental functionsto manynew fieldsin
the absenceof a markedincreaseof self-government was boundto
proliferate bureaucraticrule. Bismarck'scriticalattitudetoward
bureaucracy resultedmerelyin the weedingout of men of liberal
character, and the personalregimeof WilliamII inheriteda civil
serviceofunusuallyservileand spinelessbehavior.Bismarck himself
knewquiteclearlythe foundation of poweron whichhe had placed
thePrussiankings. At thelastmeetingwithWilliamII in 1897the
oldmanremarked, to themilitary
pointing oftheimperialen-
officers
tourage,thattheEmperorwouldbe able to act as he pleasedjust as
longas he had suchan officer corpsbehindhim.17Indeed,the Em-
pireof Bismarck and William II collapsedonlywhenthe German
armywas defeated.
Bismarck's was calledRealpolitik'" alreadyby his con-
statecraft
Meyer,Bismarck(Stuttgart,
17 A. 0. 1944),712.
18The term Realpolitikbecame fashionable underthe influence of the book
Grundsdtze derRealpolitik,angewendet ZustdndeDeutschlands,
auf die staatlicheu
publishedby AugustLudwigRochauin 1853. As a studentRochauhad partici-
patedin theabortiveFrankfurt putschof 1833. A fugitive froma lifesentence he
livedforfifteenyearsin Francewherehe camein contactwiththenewFrenchso-
ciology. The revolutionof 1848broughtRochauback to Germany.In his book
Rochau arguedthat what gravityis in nature,poweris in politics. But although
Rochau was an advocateof Germanunification throughPrussianleadership, the
powerwhichhe had in mindwassocialratherthanmilitary power. The statecould
gainstrength onlyby allyingitselfwiththestrongest forcesof society,and power
todayrestedwiththe bourgeoisie. Rochau wanted to achieveGermanunification
through reform.It was logicalthathe became,in 1859,thesecretary
constitutional
of the DeutscheNationalverein,whichfoughtand criticized Bismarckuntil1866
froma liberalpointof view. Cf. on Rochau: H. Liilmann,Die AnfangeAugust
 REALPOLITIK
BISMARCK'S 95
temporaries, particularlyby thoseGermanliberalswho after1866
wereeagerto maketheirpeace withBismarckeven if thisimplied
the abandonment of mostof theirpoliticalfaith. Therewas great
comfortin havingbeenshownwrongnotby a straight-line conserva-
tivepartisanbut by a man aboveideologies.Bismarckhimselfpro-
motedsuchsentiments.He was quite sincerewhenhe made many
confessions likethefollowing: " If I had to go through lifewithprin-
ciples,I wouldfeelas thoughI had to walk a narrowpath in the
woodsand had to carrya longpolein mymouth." He nevertiredof
emphasizing that the statesmancould not imposehis will on the
courseofhistory, but thaton thecontrary thegeneraldevelopments
forcedhis hands. Realistic observation of existingpoliticalcondi-
tionsand the abilityto wait forthe rightmomentof intervention
wereabsoluteprerequisites of any politicalaction. Moreover, since
the counteraction of othersand the fluctuating of
configuration po-
liticalforcescouldneverbe predictedwithcertainty, it was always
advisableto holdmorethanone policyreadyin orderto be prepared
forshifting circumstances.
Bismarck possessedtheabilityofkeepingtwoormoreironsin the
fireas wellas an acutesenseoftiming, and he was masterly in recog-
nizingand analyzingthe power factorsof any given situation. He
wasprofoundly consciousofthefactthatthepoliticalcraftwas " the
art of the possible." This goesfarto explainhis greatsuccessas a
statesman, butit doesnotexplainthe character of his policies. Bis-
marckwas not a mereopportunist who simplyrespondedto events
as theyunfolded.It is quitewrongto assumethathe had a fullyde-
velopedplan of Germanunification, roughlyidenticalwithhis sub-
sequentpolicies,whenhe becamePrussianprimeministerin 1862.
Actuallyhe considered varioussolutionsas late as 1866,and he hesi-
tatedfora longtimeto playforthehighstakeswhichwereinvolved
in thewarwithAustria. But all his policies,theonescontemplated
and theonesenacted,had theirgeneralunityand ultimatepurposein
firmprincipleswhichwereto him unchangeable ideals. Whilehe
deniedanyhumancapacityto improvethenatureof politicsby the
LudwigvonRochaus,1810-50(Heidelberg, 1921); F. Meinecke,Die Idee derStaats-
rasonin derNeuerenGeschichte (3rded.,Munich,1929),493f.;and recently S. A.
Kaehler," Realpolitikzur Zeit des Krimkrieges," Historische
Zeitschrift,vol. 174
and L. Krieger,The GermanIdea of Freedom(Boston,1957),353ff.
(1952),417ff.,
In spiteoftheenthusiastic receptiongivento it by theyoungTreitschke, Rochau's
bookwas veryquicklyforgotten.But thetermRealpolitikremainedcurrentand
eitherdenoteda policycontemptuous of all idealsand ideologies
and following the
interestsofthestateor it was merelyidentified witha policyexclusivelyemploying
powerfortheachievement ofitsends. The wordhas becomemisleading on account
of its ambiguities;
historicallyit shouldnotbe used,in myopinion,exceptforthe
statesmen whoenteredthescenein thedecadeafter1848,and eventhenit callsfor
exactdefinition.
96 HAJO HOLBORN

applicationofChristian orliberalideas,he believedreligiously in the

dutyof the statesmanto conservea state independent of popular
forces.
Bismarckappliedtheseprinciplesnot onlyto nationalbut also
to internationalpolicies. In thepreservation of theHabsburgmon-
archyas a greatpowerafterSadowa and the closecooperation with
Russia,it was his chiefobjectiveto stemthe progress of the move-
mentof nationalities in easternEurope.'9 He was afraidthatthese
nationalstateswouldbe of revolutionary character.The existence
of the threehistoricempiresseemedto himalso a necessity forthe
maintenance of peace in Europe. Underparliamentary government
a stableforeignpolicywas continuously imperilled by shifting ma-
jorities. But the threeemperors stillheld fullcontroloverforeign
and militaryaffairs.To bringtheminto a lastingleague was the
chiefendeavorof Bismarckafter1871,and perhapsalreadyafter
1866.20 In thechapterofhis memoirs in whichhe epitomizes thein-
tentionof his policyof alliances,he describes his attemptto builda
leagueof the threeemperors as havingbeen motivatedby the ex-
pectationof an imminent strugglebetweenthetwoEuropeanmove-
ments,namedby Napoleonthe Republicanand the Cossackparty.
He goeson to say thathe wouldratherdescribethemin present-day
termsas " thesystemoforderon a monarchical basisin opposition to
thesocialrepublicintowhichtheanti-monarchical movement, slowly
orbyleapsusuallysinks."21
The historiancan pointout thatsuccessful as Bismarck'sdiplo-
macywas up to 1890,it did notsolveall theproblems of thefuture.
Monarchicalsuccessionmay produceeven greaterfreakishness than
varying parliamentary majorities.As a matteroffact,diplomatic re-
lationsbetweenGermany and Russiagrewmoredifficult underAlex-
anderIII thantheyhad beenunderAlexander II, and therisingpan-
slavismgainedin influence on the decisionsof the czaristregimein
foreign affairs.In Austria-Hungary theimperialgovernment proved
powerlessto checkthe continuousgrowthof nationalmovements.
Bismarck, althoughnot unawareof the developments in Russia and
Austria-Hungary, tended rather to minimize their significance. He
persuadedhimself tooeasilythattheAustrian monarchy stillhad the
powerto curb,through a coupd'etat,thenationalities by abrogating
the constitutional rightswhichit had concededafter1861. These
weresignsthathisdiplomatic aimsrestednotonlyon therealisticap-
praisalofeventsbut also on strongpoliticalconvictions.
19Cf.Hans Rothfels,
BismarckundderOsten(Leipzig,1934).
2"Bismarck,Die GesammeltenWerke,VIII, 106.
21Bismarck,Gedankeund Erinnerung, ed. by GerhardRitterand Rudolph
Gesammelte
Stadelmann, Werke(Berlin,1932),XV, 398.
 BISMARCK'S REALPOLITIK 97
In contrastto classicalliberalismBismarckdidnotconceiveofthe
stateas therepresentative ofthenation. Nordidhe followHegel,who
acceptedabsolutist governments butsawin thestatetheembodiment
of a nationalculture. This viewpresupposed at theveryleast some
causalinteraction betweentheprogress of a nationalcivilization and
the lifeof the state. Bismarck'sconceptof the state excludedall
forceswhichmightinterfere withthe independent authority vested
in the king. The statewas forhimidenticalwiththemonarchand
thosemenneededto maintainand exercisehis sovereignty, primarily
the noblemenservingin theking'sarmyand councils. Such an au-
thoritarian politicalphilosophy couldgainpopularsupportas longas
thechurches preachedobedienceto theestablished socialand political
orderand the peoplereadilyacceptedChristianteachings.But the
Roman Catholicsocial theory,thoughanti-revolutionary, was far
fromanti-critical, and vis-a-visthe Prussianmonarchy the German
Catholicshad goodreasonsto keep a reservedattitudeeven before
theKulturkampf.The Protestant Churches, on theotherhand,had
losttheirholdon theGermanurbanpopulation.
Bismarck's theoryof stateand government was ill-suitedto serve
as thepoliticalcreedof thenon-Prussian groupsincludedin thenew
Empire,and evenlessofthenewclasseswhichthemodernindustrial
expansioncreated. Bismarck himself was incapableofunderstanding
theyearnings fora higherhumandignity whichexpressed themselves
in liberalismand socialdemocracy as wellas in thepoliticalideas of
GermanCatholicism.To him all thesepoliticaltheoriesweresub-
versive. He deniedto the partiesany participation in the govern-
mentand kept themdividedamongthemselves by fomenting an-
tagonism overeconomic interests.The founder oftheunified Empire
failedto unifythepeople. Bismarck knewaboutthislackofintegra-
tion. Consciousof theneedformass-support he turnedto national-
ism. In a letterwritten to PrinceWilliamhalf-a-year beforethelat-
ter'saccessionto the imperialthrone,he said " the nationalidea is
stronger thanthe Christianidea, evenamongSocial-Democrats and
otherdemocrats, maybenotin thecountry, butin thecities."22 From
1871on Bismarckusedincreasingly nationaltonesin hispublicutter-
23
ances. He didnotuse thelanguageofliberalnationalism butliked
to talk of the perennialqualitiesof the Germanrace whichhe dis-
coveredin all ofGermanhistory and Teutonicpre-history.24 Hereit
22 GedankeundErinnerung, loc. cit.,466.
23 OttoPflanze," Bismarckand GermanNationalism," American HistoricalRe-
view,LX (1955),548ff.
exampleoftheuse ofold-Germanic
24 A curious mythology is thetitlewhichhe
gave his memoirs.They werepublishedas Gedankenund Erinnerungen (Reflec-
tionsand Reminiscences) afterhis death. But as G. Ritterand R. Stadelmann
98 HAJO HOLBORN

was demonstrated thattheGermanshad alwaysprospered whenthey

followedtheirkingsand exhibited theirbestvirtues, suchas supreme
bravery,to supporttheirleaders. Therewas also thereverseside,the
storiesabouttheendemicpartyspiritthateverso oftenhad spelled
disasterto thenation. Bismarck was farremovedfromthebiological
materialism oftheNational-Socialist racialtheory.He drewdistinc-
tionsbetween" masculine" and " feminine " racesand assertedthat
thebestpeoplewerethoseproducedfroma mixture ofthetwo. Hap-
pily,thePrussians, withtheirstrongSlav admixture, fittedintosuch
a pattern.AlsoBismarck's anti-semitismwas ratherundogmatic and
derivedlargelyfromclass-consciousness and Christianantipathy.
Yet he was alreadyaffected by thenewnaturalism or socialDarwin-
ismwhenhe describedtheworldof politicalpoweras mirroring na-
ture,in whicheternalwarwenton amonglowerand higheranimals
and the stronger prevailed. ErnstTroeltschhas shownhow easily
such naturalistic viewscouldbe graftedon the social teachingsof
Lutheranism.25 Lutheranism declaredit to be the divinewill that
governmental authority in thisworldhad to reston powerand since
the individualhad no recoursefromthe abuse of powerto ethical
principles,it was tempting to describesecularhistoryin naturalistic
terms.
Thus thelackofpoliticalideason whichtheloyaltiesofthelarge
massesofthemodernage mighthavebeenbuiltaidedthepromotion
of politicalideologies,ideologieswhichdid not representthe full
scopeof Bismarck'sthinking.A new Germangeneration was quick
to fastenuponthenationalist ideasofBismarckand expandon them.
Atthesametimea legendary Bismarck grewup andwasimmortalized
in theinnumerable statuesof him, erected between1890and 1914on
Germancitysquaresand hill-sites.In thesemonuments Bismarck
appearsas the fearlessmilitaryEmpire-builder and stonyTeutonic
hero,buttheyrevealnothingofthespiritualGermanheritagewhich
helpedto formhispersonality.
Yale University.
foundout whenpreparing theircriticaleditionof 1932,Bismarckhad giventhem
the titleGedankeund Erinnerung, whichshouldprobablybe translated:Thought
and Memory. The titlehad reference to huginand nunin(old-Nordic),the two
ravenswhichaccordingto legend,weresittingon the shouldersof Wotan. Ger-
manicscholarshavegivendifferent butthemostwidelycirculated
translations, book
in Germanicmythology in Bismarck'sdays had Gedankeund Erinnerung.See
Karl Simrock,Handbuchderdeutschen Mythologie (3rd ed.,Bonn 1869),170. (I
am grateful Konstantin
to Professor Reichardtof Yale forthe information about
mythology of
and theidentification the source.)
25ErnstTroeltsch,Gesammelte Schriften, der christ-
vol. 1: Die Soziallehren
lichenKirchenund Gruppen(3rd ed., Tiibingen, 1923), 537, 596ff.The distinc-
tionbetweenLutherand Lutheranism oughtto be moresharplydrawnthanwas
doneby Troeltsch,thoughforourproblemthisis notdecisive.