De Leon vs.
Esguerra
153 SCRA 602
No. L-78059, August 31, 1987
FACTS: On May 17, 1982, Alfredo De Leon won as Brgy.
Captain and other petitioners won as Councilmen of
Brgy. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Under the Barangay Election
Act of 1982, their terms of office shall be six years, which
commenced on June 7, 1982 up to June 7, 1988. On Feb.
8, 1987, while the petitioners still have one year and four
months, Gov. Benjamin Esguerra of Rizal Province, issued
a memorandum designating Florentino Magno as the
new Brgy. Captain and other respondents as the new
Councilmen of the said barrangay. The respondents
relied on the Provisional Constitution of 1986, which
grants the governor to appoint or designate new
successors within the one year period which ended on
Feb. 25 1987. They also contended that the terms of
office of the petitioners were already been abolished and
that they continued in office simply because no new
successors were appointed yet; and that the provision in
the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay officials up to six years must have been
deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the
Provisional Constitution. Petitioners instituted an
original action for prohibition to review the order of the
governor.
ISSUE: Whether the designation was valid?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the memoranda
issued by Gov. Esguerra has no legal effect. Though the
designation was within the one year period which ended
on Feb. 25, 1987, however, it was cut short when the
1987 Constitution took effect on Feb. 2, 1987. When the
1987 Constitution was in effect, the governor no longer
had the authority to designate successors under the
Provisional Constitution which was deemed to have been
superseded. There has been no proclamation or
executive order terminating the term of elective
Barangay officials; and the Barangay Election Act is not
inconsistent with the Constitution. The writ of
prohibition was granted and the petitioners have
acquired the security of tenure.
Notes:
When did the 1987 Constitution take effect?
- The Supreme Court, with only one dissent, ruled in De
leon vs. Esguerra that the 1987 Constitution took effect
on February 2, 1987 which is the date of its ratification in
the plebiscite, by virtue of its provision under Article
XVIII, Section 27 that it “shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose.” (This provision was
unanimously approved by thirty-five votes in favor and
none against in the Con Com of 1986)
- The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on
the date of the ratification that is the date the people
have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. The act
of voting by the people is the act of ratification. It should
not be on the date of the proclamation of the President
since it is the act of the people. In fact, there should be
no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the
President, if there is, it is merely the official confirmatory
declaration of an act done by the people. The COMELEC,
on the other hand, should make the official
announcement that the votes show that the Constitution
was ratified, but the canvass is merely a mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the plebiscite.
San Juan vs. Civil Service Commisssion
GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was
left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan,
peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position
and the latter quickly assumed position. However,
Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and
recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as
PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This
appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM.
Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose
before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who
both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his
contention that he has the sole right and privilege to
recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and
that the appointee should come only from his nominees.
In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 112.
Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a
PBO who was not expressly nominated by the provincial
governor.
Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's
power to recommend is subject to the qualifications
prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO.
Consequently, in the event that the recommendations
made by the petitioner fall short of the required
standards, the appointing authority, public respondent
DBM is expected to reject the same. In the event that the
Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the
Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned"
must be given mandatory application in consonance with
the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the
1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2
thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend
cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative
issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the
right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the
petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's
Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important
constitutional policy and principle, that of local
autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy,
the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive
power over local governments to "general supervision . .
. as may be provided by law." The President controls the
executive departments. He has no such power over local
governments. He has only supervision and that
supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more
marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25
provides: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly,
set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of
qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to
the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have
the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
FACTS:
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the
President (acting through the Secretary of Local
Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos.
93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series
of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against
him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various
charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression,
grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and
arbitrary detention.
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon
instituted an action for prohibition against the
respondent Secretary of Local Government (now,
Interior) in the Regional Trial Court. Ganzon, after having
been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order
by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition for
prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from
implementing the said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10
administrative complaints on various charges on abuse
of authority and grave misconduct.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as

the alter ego of the President) has the authority to
In those case that this Court denied the President the
suspend and remove local officials.
power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the
President cannot exercise it on account of his limited
power, but because the law lodged the power
RULING:
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him
the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found
little difficulty in sustaining him.
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three
questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the
phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President,
President of the power to investigate, suspend,
through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the
power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local
interior is exercising that power oppressively, and
Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the
needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
change in the constitutional language?
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as
which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all
existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local
term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
purposes, his suspension permanent.
prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from
exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did
not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed
Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649)
her to exercise disciplinary authority.
Facts:
It is the considered opinion of the Court that
notwithstanding the change in the constitutional Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement
language, the charter did not intend to divest the and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869,
legislature of its right or the President of her because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to and order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a right
provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided law. It waived the Manila Cit government’s right to
by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by
governments' autonomy from congress and to break law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the
Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The local government’s right to impose local taxes and
Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of
license fees. This is in contravention of the
local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.
authority over municipal corporations, in particular,
concerning discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini- Issue:

states out of local government units, as in the federal
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.
governments Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is
subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the
legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the
Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself Ruling:
suggest-is to wean local government units from over-
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal
dependence on the central government.
corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Their
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer
that power, otherwise the municipality cannot assume it.
Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a
legislative act which is superior having been passed upon
by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.”
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress.
It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are
mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to
“create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its
“general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has
the power of control over the Local governments. And if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax
certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or
even take back the power.
2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on
gambling, has long been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and
vested exclusively on the National Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the power
to issue “license or permits” for the operation of
gambling.
3. Local governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR
is government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks
are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a
dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos.
The latter role is governmental, which places it in the
category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt
from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause
of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
“Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government.”
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the
local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always
subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by
law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the
1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It
does not make local governments sovereign within the
state.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (G.R. No. 111097)
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de
Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to
Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated &
equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its
casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project.
Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business
permit and canceling existing business permit to the
establishment for the operation of the casino, and
Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the
casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on
the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree
No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power authority
to prohibit the operation of casino for the general
welfare.
Issue:
Whether the Ordinances are valid.
Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power under what is
known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long
line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance
must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the
status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified
by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest
that the local government units can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their power in
the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the
mandate of the statute.Hence, it was not competent for
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to
enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.
3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and
are therefore ultra vires and void.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Abbas vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA 6734
Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities in Mindanao and Palawan, was scheduled for
November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734,
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act).
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1)
enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and
(2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.
The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners
may generally be categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the
Constitution, and (b) that certain provisions of R.A. No.
6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic
Act are unconstitutional.
Held: The petition has no merit and the law is
constitutional.
1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the
Organic Act makes the creation of an autonomous region
absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in
favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be
created composed of the two provinces where the
favorable votes were obtained. there is a specific
provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the
Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same
requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in
the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety
(90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days
after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the
provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain the existing administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the
creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces
and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic
Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The
provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not
attained shall not be included in the autonomous region.
It may be that even if an autonomous region is created,
not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall
be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated
by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A.
No. 6734, shall compromise it.
2. The question has been raised as to what this majority
means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast
in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority
in each of the constituent units, or both?
The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that
the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite,
but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent
units and the proviso underscores this.
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act,
possess such concurrence in historical and cultural
heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including
areas, which do not strictly share the same characteristic
as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has
expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the
constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution
lays down the standards by which Congress shall
determine which areas should constitute the
autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional
criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that
share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of
the legislature's discretion. Any review of this
ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the
law.
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No.
6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional
guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The
objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which
mandates that should there be any conflict between the
Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and
the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts
created under the same Act should apply national law.
Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is
derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine
law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made"
national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by
enumerating possible instances of conflict between
provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein
an application of national law might be offensive to a
Muslim's religious convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real
litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving
the application of national law resulting in an alleged
violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in
this case may not be called upon to resolve what is
merely a perceived potential conflict between the
provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the
President the power to merge regions, a power which is
not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power
which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments. There is no conflict between the
power of the President to merge administrative regions
with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in
the merger of local government units because the
requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies
only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not
to administrative regions.
6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No.
6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two
petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
Chiongbian vs. Orbos
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v.
ORBOS et.al.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734,
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an
autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the
creation of such region were later on known as the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent
with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of
RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the
existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O
No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners
contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative
power to the President by authorizing him to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions or at
any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated and that the power granted is not
expressed in the title of the law.aw They also challenge
the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power
granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge
regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire
administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to
transfer the regional center of Region IX from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it
contains no standard to guide the President’s discretion.
HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge
by administrative determination the existing regions
following the establishment of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the
pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the
initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The
choice of the President as delegate is logical because the
division of the country into regions is intended to
facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have
regional offices. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments.
(Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are not
territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The
power conferred on the President is similar to the power
to adjust municipal boundaries which has been described
as "administrative in nature.” (Pelaez v. Auditor
General)Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It
involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the
lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the
efficient delivery of essential services
(3) whether the power granted authorizes the
reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities
in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the
creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in
favor of it; and
(4) whether the power granted to the President
includes the power to transfer the regional center of
Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COADate: January 29,
1990Petitioner: Cordillera Broad Coalition Respondent:
COA, et alPonente: CortesFacts:-EO 220, issued by the
President in the exercise of her legislative powers under
Art. XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It
was created to accelerate economic and social growth
in the region and to prepare for the establishment of
the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main
function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the region,
particularly, to coordinate with the local government
units as well as with the executive departments of the
National Government in the supervision of field offices
and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting
projects and activities in the region. It shall also monitor
the implementation of all ongoing national and local
government projects in the region. The CAR shall have a
Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating
body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an
implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and
Executive Board shalle xist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and
organized. In these cases, petitioners principally argue
that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, inthe
exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening
of the first Congress under the 1987Constitution, has
virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task
of enacting an organicact and created an autonomous
region in the Cordilleras.
Issue:WON EO 220 is valid
RULING:Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal
that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line
departments and agencies of the National Government
in the areas covered by the administrative region as a
step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of
an organic act and the creation of an autonomous
region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of
the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall
show later. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR
does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner
Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim
autonomous region in the Cordilleras". The Constitution
provides for a basic structure of government in the
autonomous region composed of an elective executive
and legislature and special courts with personal, family
and property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we
find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous
regional government. It created a region, covering a
specified area, for administrative purposes with the
main objective of coordinating the planning and
implementation of programs and services. To determine
policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene
yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with,
among others, identifying priority projects and
development programs. To serve as an implementing
body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board. The
bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the
existing local governmental structure, nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They merely
constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings
together the existing local governments, the agencies of
the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or
tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
Issue: WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
Ruling: No We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by
the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners'
assertion that E.O. No. 220contravenes the Constitution
by creating a new territorial and political subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No.
220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and
political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger
subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation
or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have
a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities
and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers
that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g.
the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and
dispose of property, the power to create its own
sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was
created primarily to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the
covered areas. The creation of administrative regions
for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is
nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of
1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by
virtue of PD 1, established 11regions, later increased to
12, with definite regional centers and required
departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of
the National Government to set up field offices therein.
The functions of the regional offices to be established
pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to
implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and
regulations of the department or agency in the regional
areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective
service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with
regional offices of other departments, bureaus and
agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local
government units in the area; and (5) to perform such
other functions as may be provided by law.CAR is in the
same genre as the administrative regions created under
the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the
operation of the CAR requires the participation not only
of the line departments and agencies of the National
Government but also the local governments, ethno-
linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in
bringing about the desired objectives and the
appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province) andcity (Baguio City) which
compose the CAR.
Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers
to the administrative autonomy of local government
units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. Local
autonomy is not unique to the1987 Constitution, it
being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution. And
while there was no express guarantee under the 1935
Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy
Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A.
No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march
towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the
country. On the other hand, the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not
just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus,
the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous
regional government with a basic structure consisting of
ane xecutive department and a legislative assembly and
special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions. As we
have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory
coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of
adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already
enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Ordillo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
Gutierrez, J.
FACTS
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766
entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra
and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889
votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces
and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of
total population, and as such has the second smallest
number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been
approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in
the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a
memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC
resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province
which voted favorably – then. Alone, legally and validly
constitutes CAR.”
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861
setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of
March 1991.
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary
issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting
authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly
created under Executive Order No. 220.
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order
No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all
offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in
view of the ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent
unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No.
2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice,
Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861
and prohibit and restrain the respondents from
implementing the same and spending public funds for
the purpose
b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the
Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional
Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect
until another organic law for the Autonomous Region
shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly
ratified by the voters in the constituent units.
ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only
province which voted favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and
validly constitute such region.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution – provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made
up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region”
used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the
language of the Constitution, as much as possible should
be understood in the sense it has in common use and
that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed.
b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating
the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with
provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao
constituting the Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a
single province may constitute the autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd
situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial
officials and another set of regional officials exercising
their executive and legislative powers over exactly the
same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces
in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2;
Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)
- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government
for its initial organizational requirements can not be
construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art
XXI sec 13(B)(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming
from different provinces and cities” in the Region, as well
as tribal courts and the development of a common
regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art
XV RA 6766)
- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the
COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be
impractical and illogical.
Rogelio Bagabuyo vs Commission on Elections
573 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Local Government –
Reapportionment
Municipal Corporation – Plebiscite
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district.
But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO
instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two
legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo
assailed the validity of the said law and he went
immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the
COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming
elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district
was created without a plebiscite which he averred was
required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the
case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar.
RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in the House of Representatives and
Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established
under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only
apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no
such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place; and
R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan
de Oro’s territory, population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here
was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into
two legislative districts. Reapportionment is
the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and
12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative
districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan
de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one
representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily
means better access to their congressman since each
one now services only 250,000 constituents as against
the 500,000.
Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472, December 2,
1991
Petitioner: Felipe Evardone
Respondents: Comelec, Alexander Apelado, Victorino
Aclana and Noel Nival
Ponente: Padilla
Facts: Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern
Samar, having been elected to the position during the
1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately
after proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado,
Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for
the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local
Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec
issued a Resolution approving the recommendation of
Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of
petition for recall against Evardone.
Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent
prayer of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the Comelec
nullified the signing process for being violative of the TRO
of the court. Hence, this present petition.
Issue 1: WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated
by the COMELEC by virtue of its powers under the
Constitution and BP 337 (Local Government Code) was
valid.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of
the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there
was, during the period material to this case, no local
government code enacted by Congress after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that
matter on the subject of recall of elected government
officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall
proceedings in the case at bar is premature.
The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision
does not refer only to a local government code which is
in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the
guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the
provisions of the present LGC. Pending the enactment of
the amendatory law, the existing Local Government
Code remains operative.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express
provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the
1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended,
repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for
the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the
President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P.
Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But
the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only
on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable they wish to remain in their respective offices. Whether
to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the
Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the
337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
1986 Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an
Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC is electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge
valid and constitutional. Consequently, the COMELEC his office previously bestowed on him by the same
had the authority to approve the petition for recall and electorate. The constituents have made a judgment and
set the date for the signing of said petition. their will to recall Evardone has already been ascertained
and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the
signing process held last 14 July 1990 for the recall of
Issue 2: WON the TRO issued by this Court Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and
rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for has legal effect.
recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because
Held: No of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337.
The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national
Ratio: In the present case, the records show that and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more
Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the
on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election
Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in on recall approximately seven (7) months before the
following up and determining the outcome of such regular local election will be violative of the above
notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 provisions of the applicable Local Government Code
July 1990 that he came to know about the Resolution of
the COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall
on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the
issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for
prohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court
issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the
petition for recall took place just the same on the
scheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and
Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the
constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election
Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO
earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election
Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered
voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the
petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive
Secretary there is no turning back the

clock.

The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect

or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is
based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a
direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is
also predicated upon the idea that a public office is
"burdened" with public interests and that the
representatives of the people holding public offices are
simply agents or servants of the people with definite
powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if