Marcos Vs Manglapus
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a
time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following
supervening events:
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese
arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
Honasan’s failed coup
Communist insurgency movements
secessionist movements in Mindanao
devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents
to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President
Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner
questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the
claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted
outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty,
property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that
it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the
constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of
the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According
to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define
what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-
23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined
& exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution
which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged
to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II,
Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt,
dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the
Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the
President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain
peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on
the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions,
or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to
the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether
it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there
exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest
to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are
factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her
decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-
preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the
Constitution.
David V Arroyo
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and
lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued
earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University
of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against
representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of
inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP
1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners
filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions
impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the
proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it
violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and
assembly.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and
the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as
respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the
constitutionality of the proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming
powers incident to Martial Law are used?
Ruling:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President
express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a
law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of
the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are
ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot
take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public
interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are
illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well
as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles
for publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because there
was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus
standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful
search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of
national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may
temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must
enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under
which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance
that due process of law would be observed.
Tio vs Videogram regulatory board
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely
affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the
National Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject
to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent
(30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease
or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program.”
“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where
the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared
equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.”
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or
any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the
operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused
a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and
other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million
annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from
rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million
in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the
viability of the movie industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy
of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need
for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,
the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying
objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no
question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair
competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the
viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed
video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences;
and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to
mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed
since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to
engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
BP blg 129 Section 9
Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of
Regional Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commission, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the
fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
RA 9282
Section 7. Section 7 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
"a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
"1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or
other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
"2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue
Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the
National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case
the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
"3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction;
"4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs
duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property
affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Customs;
"5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
"6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him
automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are
adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
"7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural
product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing
duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and
safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal
the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
"b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
"1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of
the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where
the principal amount o taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is
less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount
claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be
appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filling of such civil action separately from the
criminal action will be recognized.
"2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
"a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be
Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected territorial subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
jurisdiction.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
"b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally
the election protest.
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,
"c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally
"1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provided, however, That
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be tried
agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial
authority.
Court.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with
"2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
"a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective government.
territorial jurisdiction.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
"b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases
Tanada Vs Tuvera
originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction." Article 2 of the civil code ensures the constitutional right to due process and to
information
Angara vs comelec
So what we have here is the due process was invoked by the petitioners to demand
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al.
the disclosure of a number of PDs which they claimed had not been published in the
were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the
OG as required by law.
first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as
member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his The government then argued that while it is true that there is a necessity for the
oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. publication of laws, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided”, since the
8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral their approval.
Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935,
the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the The Court then ordered the respondents to publish to the OG all unpublished PDs
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the which are of
NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a
1. General Application
Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no
longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and
Now, the petitioners filed a move for clarification/reconsideration of that decision,
asking the
1.) What is meany by “general applicability”?
2.) Must there be a distinction made between laws of general applicability and
those which are not?
3.) What is meant by Publication
4.) What and where is the publication to be made?
Now, the petitioners argue that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those that are not;
After a careful study of the provision in the CC and of the arguments made by the
parties, the court holds that the clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the
date of effectivity and not the requirement of publication itself.
 However, this does not mean that the legislature can make a law effective
immediately upon approval without its publication
 BUT the legislature in its discretion provide that the 15 day period be
shortened or extended
Surely it is not within the intent of laws to deny the public knowledge of such laws
that govern them, otherwise it would prejudice the people who are supposed to
know the law.
They furthered that the term “laws” should refer to all laws and not merely for
general application, for all laws relate to the people one way or another. As long as
the law affects the public interest, even if it might only affect one person, then it
should still follow what is prescribed in Art.2
The court therefore holds that all statues, including those of local application and
private laws shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
15 days of its publication unless a different date is fixed by the legislature
This includes:
1.) PDs, Eos
2.) Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforece or implement existing laws
3.) Charter of a city
Other regulations that only affect the internal operations of a particular institution
or organization need not be published, as long as it does not necessarily affect the
public interest directly.
The court also opined that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Considering also that
newspapers of general circulation would expedite the dissemination of information
with regards to new statutes, this, however, is not within the boundaries of the
judiciary, and only the legislative can it make it.
Wherefore, it is hereby declared that all laws shall be published in full in the OG, to
become effective only 15 days from their publication, or in any date specified by the
legislature.
Honasan II v. The panel of investigating prosecutors of the department of Justice
Facts:
Senator Gringo Honasan was charged with the crime of coup d’etat before DOJ. ,
Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood,
made a public statement aired on nation television, stating their withdrawal of
support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and they are willing to risk their lives in order to achieve
the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which they believe is the only
program that would solve the ills of society. Subpoena was issued for preliminary
investigation.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the
case, asserting that since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public
office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to
conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be
filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take
cognizance of the case considering that he belongs to the group of public officials
with Salary Grade 31.
He is directed to file a counter-affidavit, but instead Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II
filed the herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order on the ground that the DOJ has no
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Honasan’s contention:
Ombudsman and not DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation
over all public officials, including him as he is a senator. Since, Honasan is charged
with coup d’etat in relation to his office. As according the Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, it confers to the Ombudsman the power to investigate moto proprio,
or by complaint of any person, any act or omission that appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987 Administrative Code
and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution.
DOJ’s contention:
DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation pursuant to the
Revised Administrative Code. And Coup d’etat is not directly related to his public
office as a senator. Thus, the jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant and is not
derived from provisions of the joint circular.
Ombudsman;s contention:
DOJ has the jurisdiction because coup d’etat falls under the Sandiganbayan only if
it’s committed in relation to office. Thus, Joint Circulat need not be published
because it is merely an internal arrangement between DOJ and Ombudsman and it
neither regulates nor penalizes conduct of persons.
Issue: Whether or not DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over
the charge of coup d’etat against Senator Gringo Honasan II.
Held: The Court finds the petition without merit.
The jurisdiction of DOJ is not derived from the Joint Circular, OMB-DOJ Circular No.
95-001 but on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title
III, Book IV, governing the DOJ. Sec. 1. As a principal law agency which shall be
both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of
the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system;
and investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system. Thus, in Section 13(1), it does not exclude other
government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute public officials.
However, under Ombudsman Act of 1987, was enacted empowering Ombudsman
with primary jurisdiction over cognizable cases by Sandiganbayan. It may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government. Moreover,
Ombudsman recognizes its concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative body of
the government.
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation because petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the
case against him falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to
investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a Salary
Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to
investigate the charge of coup d'etat against him.
Tawang Multipurpose Cooperative V. La Trinidad Water District
FACTS:
TMPC is a cooperative organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay
Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. On the other hand, LTWD is a local water utility
created under PD 198 which authorized to LTWD supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the NWRB an application for a certificate of
public convenience to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay
Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC’s application claiming that under Section 47 of PD
No. 198 its franchise is exclusive.
In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPC’s
application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWD’s
franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and
found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a
waterworks system.
ISSUE:
Whether the authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is exclusive.
RULING:
NO. The constitution provides in Section 11, Article XII that: No franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. The
Constitution is clear that franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be
exclusive in character.
This constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception. On the other
hand, PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states that, "No franchise shall
be granted to any other person or agency x x x unless and except to the extent that
the board of directors consents thereto x x x subject to review by the
Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring exception to the absolute prohibition
in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines V. duque
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the
DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the
questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that
all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR
which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
Held: YES
under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and
regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution
reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established
that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature
BAYAN MUNA V. Romulo
In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by
the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by
then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to
protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that
might be brought against them in international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and
ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at
least declared as without force and effect.
ISSUE: [1] Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of
the Rome Statute?
[2] Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least
2/3 of all the members of the Senate?
HELD: The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from,
the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other.
As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the
ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].” the
Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP,
over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling
or unable to prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-
Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome
Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the
Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the
treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party,
the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered
into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome
Statute.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the
earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements
and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously
questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As
the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs
of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the
President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed
by long practice. DISMISSED.
Magtajas v. pryce properties
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it
leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there
during the Christmas season.
Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements
echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth.
Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media
trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos.
On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created
PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on
land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition
for review.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid
Held: No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered
to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare
Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the
local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate
of the statute.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
City of Manila v. Laguio
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars,
karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was
notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist
Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels
and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment.
MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for
entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels
but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise
emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the
limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case
at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power
as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
White light corp vs City of Manila
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance”
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses
and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of
mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is
a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the
City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes
upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance
invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash
up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed
rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by
the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The
SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
Sps. Benzonan vs CA
FACTS: In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review on
the decision made by herein respondent Court of Appeals – sustaining the right of
private respondent Pe to repurchase a parcel of land sold to petitioners. It started
when respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired through free patent,
however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB; developed it into commercial complex.
Failed to pay the mortgaged, DBP foreclosed the lot; Pe leased it to DBP; the former
failed to redeem such property within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners
Benzonan. Then Pe filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA affirmed and
granted the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a complaint against CA, alledging,
among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision re. the five-year period in
foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and instead
relied on the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court which was applied
retroactively. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the
foreclosure sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v. Angeles and
instead applied retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?
HELD: Yes.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth
certificate may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.

REASONING: HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no
support in existing legislation.
At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still the
Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at bar. Issue on the change of first name
However, the respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
rendering a decision in favor of the private respondent. But the Supreme Court
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL
sustained the claims of the petitioners. The Court said that though they are bound
ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
by decisions pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code, the Court also stressed that:
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This law provides that
“while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article
it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the change of
4 of the Civil Code which states that “laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his
contrary is provided””. Moreover, the Court emphasized that “when a doctrine of
first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed
this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is
applied prospectively xxx.” Therefore, respondents cannot rely on the Belisario
based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the
ruling because it should be applied prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in
law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
its decision regarding this case. Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set
aside. (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
Silverio vs RP
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who
the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
feels trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in
community; or
Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful – he (she) now has a female body.
Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name (from (3) The change will avoid confusion.
Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the
petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-
so that he can marry his American fiancé. assignment as the basis.

The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based Issue on the change of sex
on equity; that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a
doing and should not be in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition
petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to
to his petition (even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point);
support it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved.
that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth,
awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
their dreams.
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes
sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if Silverio’s petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.”
Re: Resolution Granting Automatic Permanent Total Disability benefits to heirs of
justices and judges who die in actual service.
Ting V. Velez-ting
Petitioner Benjamin Ting and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while
they were classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July
26, 1975. The couple begot six (6) children.
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years, Carmen filed a
petition before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage,
which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:
1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary
to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to
pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to
give regular financial support to his family.24
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained
that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that
it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played
mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses
(psychiatrist) to refute each others claim.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be
applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February
13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC. On
review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling, reversing its first ruling and
sustaining the trial court’s decision. Petitioner filed MR-denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases
DECISION:
NO. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal
rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability.
In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and
do not disturb the calm."
Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as
vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of
the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal
stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.
Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an
obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing
choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in
stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis —
constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis
involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis
involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy
more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows
for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule
where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2)
it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves
the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and,
(4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect
stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged
test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than
a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so
changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.
Castro v. JBC
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case regarding the appointment of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to Associate Justice Renato Corona as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
All the petitions to the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the
incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement. The question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance
to the nation because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any President’s most
important appointment. The conflicting provisions are Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII,
Sec. 9.
CONSIDERING, ART. VII, UNDER EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
ART. VII, SEC. 15. TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT
SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS, EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO
EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE
PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.
IN RELATION TO ART. VIII, UNDER JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT,
ART. VIII, SEC. 9. THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDGES OF THE
LOWER COURTS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF AT LEAST
THREE NOMINEES PREPARED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EVERY
VACANCY. SUCH APPOINTMENTS NEED NO CONFIRMATION.
FOR THE LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENTS
WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST.

Rspondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina ISSUE:
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Whether the prohibition against presidential appointments under Art. VII, Sec. 15
Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained that the (Midnight Appointment Ban), does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of HELD:
the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
Prohibition under Art. VII, Sec.15 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
prospicit, non respicit" (The law looks forward, not backward).

Philippine Farming Corporation, LTD. V. Llanos, et al.

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among
others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the
Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties
and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Sec. 4(1) and
Sec. 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Sec. 9 states that the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a
list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Sec. 4(1) of the Article mandates the
President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Art. VII, Sec. 15 to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Taken into consideration also that the appointment of the next Chief Justice by the
incumbent President is preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and
Executive Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and
proclaimed at once become the leaders of their respective Departments. However,
the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the
independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire
Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant to the life of
the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the
appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the
incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is
no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the
next President.
Obra vs sps Badua
The case arose from a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way filed by respondents
Badua, et al against petitioners Anacleto and Resurreccion Obra, Donato and
Lucena Bucasas, and Paulino and Crisanta Badua. Respondents alleged that their
residential houses, erected on a lot commonly owned by them were located west of
the properties of the petitioners Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to
the national highway was a pathway traversing the northern portion of petitioner’s
property and the southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases and Baduas.
The pathway was more than one meter wide and sixteen meters long. They claimed
that this pathway had been established as early as 1955. In 1995, however,
petitioner Obra constructed a fence on the northern boundary of their property;
thus, blocking respondents’ access to the national highway. Respondents
demanded the demolition of the fence, but petitioner refused.
In her Answer, petitioner averred that respondents failed to satisfy the requisites
provided in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code in order to establish an easement
of right-of-way on the northern portion of her property. Moreover, she alleged that
respondents had another access as ingress and egress to the public road other than
the one traversing her property.
The RTC rendered a Decision3 dismissing the complaint. It held that respondents
"were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their claim of an easement of
right of way."
Issue: Whether or not the Court can motu proprio declare a compulsory right of
way on a property not the subject of a pending case (particularly Civil Case No.
5033).(Petitioner questions the propriety of the trial court’s issuance of an order
clarifying its final and executory decision and effectively establishing an easement
on petitioner’s property without proper adjudication)
Held: No.
The SC agrees with petitioner’s postulation that the trial court’s reference to the
"new" pathway was merely a declaration of its existence and not necessarily a
creation of an easement of right-of-way.
The plaintiffs were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their claim of an
easement of right of way; failing to prove that there is no adequate outlet from
their respective properties to a public highway.
The trial court was in error when it did not determine the legality of an easement of
right-of-way over the pathway located south of petitioner’s property.
The trial court, by issuing its Order directing petitioner to remove the fence that
limited respondents’ passage, effectively created a right-of-way on petitioner’s
property in favor of respondents allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement
between the parties. This directive was in contravention of its July 7, 2000 Decision;
thus, it was null and void for having been issued outside of the court’s jurisdiction.
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it
should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate,
and ordinarily must be in writing.16 No written instrument on this agreement was
adduced by respondents.
Office of the Ombudsman v Court of Appeals
Ombudsman v CA
G.R. No. 160675 June 16, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., GD
J.
petitioners OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
respondents COURT OF APPEALS (Sixteenth Division) and
NICOMEDES ARMILLA, DELIA BATASIN-IN, JAMES
FUENTES, OSCAR GADOR, SANTOS GUIGAYOMA, JR.,
CLARITO MIÑOZA, ERNESTO NARAJA, NELSON
OBESO,* SENEN SERIÑO, and MARTIN YASE
summary DENR entered a property to survey it. The owner of
the property filed a trespassing case with the Omb.
Omb also treated it as an admin case. DENR
explained that they were ordered by the RTC to take
a survey in relation to a pending civil case. Trespass
case dismissed but found guilty of simple
misconduct. Suspend for a month. CA agreed that
they were guilty of simple misconduct but ruled that
Omb can’t suspend people. Their power is merely
recommendatory. SC said that Omb can suspend and
pointed out to several provisions and deliberations.
facts of the case
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with Omb
against several DENR ees a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other
Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against. It was also treated as an
administrative complaint for abuse of authority and misconduct.
DENR entered without permission and despite a big "NO TRESPASSING" sign.
DENR: There was an RTC order involving a complaint for annulment and
cancellation of title for them to conduct a relocation survey of the questioned lots
and the Sudlon National Park. They entered the property with some police and
tanods and did their job.
OMB: dismiss criminal complaint but found them guilty of simple misconduct and
imposed on them the penalty of suspension for one month for the admin case
(except for Arregadas who was a DENR ee but not part of the team and wasn’t
even there.)
CA: affirmed Omb finding that they were guilty of simple misconduct but Omb
committed GAD in ordering their suspension. Omb does not have power to suspend
accdg to Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman’s power is limited only
to the recommendation of the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault.
Ano bang sabi sa Tapiador?
Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the
Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section
13, subparagraph 3, of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
"recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to
the public official concerned.
issue
WON Omb. has the power to suspend. YES
ratio
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals: the Court categorically pronounced that the
statement in Tapiador on the Ombudsman’s power "is, at best, merely an obiter
dictum" and, as such, "cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Supreme
Court."
Also in Ledesma SC cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3),
Article XI of the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to
"recommend" to the officer concerned the removal, suspension demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding
the term "recommend," according to the Court, the said provision, construed
together with the pertinent. provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
“Recommends” means that the implementation of the order(of suspension o ano
man ung punishment) be coursed through the proper officer.
The mandate of OMB is in the Constitution . Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman - the
foregoing enumeration is not exclusive and that the framers of the Constitution had
given Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional
powers to the Ombudsman.
Congress thus enacted Republic Act No. 6770 to provide for the functional and
structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. It outlined the mandate
and powers of the Omb on of which is that in connection with their administrative
disciplinary authority, the Ombudsman and his deputies are expressly given the
power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative
charges in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770. Sec. 25 lists the
penalties and makes reference to Presidential Decree No. 807. In that PD the
penalties that may be imposed by the disciplining authority in administrative
disciplinary cases are removal from the service, transfer, demotion in rank,
suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in an amount not
exceeding six months’ salary, or reprimand.

All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest
intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority.

SC made reference to the Senate delibs of RA 6770. There was an issue on whether
or not the Omb should have disciplinary powers because in the Consti enumeration
eh puro “direct” lang ung nakalagat, implying recommendatory powers only.

Sen. Angara explained that the grant of disciplinary power is something that the
Constitution does not forbid. The disciplinary power is necessary to achieving that
objective of making an effective Ombudsman. (sana ginawa rin nila ito para sa CHR)

The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that
the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative
disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee
found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be
"an activist watchman," not merely a passive one.

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model
whose function is merely to receive and process the people’s complaints against
corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as
protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers
and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such
officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable
him to implement his own actions.