(REPORT) Suspension and Removal of Judges and Justices

SUSPENSION AND
REMOVAL OF JUDGES
AND JUSTICES
Legal Ethics
Submitted to: Atty. Carlisle Marie M. Fabie
Francisco, Jayson
Javier, Mac Vincent
Madrid, Reden
Dado, Sarah Jean
Devis, Jocelyn
de Vera, Gladys
May 2018
Table of Contents
Discipline of Members of the Judiciary .................................................................................................... 4
A. SUPREME COURT........................................................................................................................ 4
1. IMPEACHMENT ....................................................................................................................... 4
2. IMPEACHMENT OF FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO CORONA .......................... 4
3. QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE USED ......................................................................................... 5
B. JUDGES OF THE LOWER COURTS AND JUSTICES OF COURT OF APPEALS AND
SANDIGANBAYAN ............................................................................................................................... 5
TENURE .............................................................................................................................................. 5
DISCIPLINING BODY IS THE SUPREME COURT .................................................................... 5
HOW INSTITUTED ........................................................................................................................... 6
INVESTIGATION .............................................................................................................................. 6
HEARING AND TERMINATION ................................................................................................... 6
REPORT AND ACTION ................................................................................................................... 6
AUTOMATIC CONVERSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASES TO DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................................................................. 7
EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OR DESISTANCE ........................................................................ 7
C. GROUNDS AND SANCTIONS..................................................................................................... 7
SERIOUS CHARGES ........................................................................................................................ 7
LESS SERIOUS CHARGES.............................................................................................................. 8
LIGHT CHARGES ............................................................................................................................. 8
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES................................................................................................................... 9
Disqualifications of Justices and Judges [Rule 137, Rules of Court] ................................................... 10
A. COMPULSORY DISQUALIFICATION ................................................................................... 10
REASON FOR THE RULE ............................................................................................................. 10
B. VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION ...................................................................................... 10
REASON FOR THE RULE ............................................................................................................. 10
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT................................................................................................ 11
LIST OF SUPREME COURT CASES REGARDING SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL OF
JUDGE AND JUSTICES ......................................................................................................................... 15
Case 1: OLGA M. SAMSON versus JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO ..................................... 23
Case 2: Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs Judge Florentino V. Floro ............................... 25
Case 3: PROSECUTOR JORGE D. BACULI vs JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN ............ 26
Case 4: CORAZON GUERRERO vs. JUDGE MARCIAL M. DERAY ............................................. 27
Case 5: FLAVIANO B. CORTES vs. JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI ........................................ 29
Case 6: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE ISMAEL SANCHEZ y
BALAIS...................................................................................................................................................... 31
Case 7: WILFREDO F. TUVILLO vs. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON ................................................. 32
Case 8: FEDERICO S. CALILUNG vs. JUDGE WILFREDO S. SURIAGA .................................... 33
Case 9: FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO VS. JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA ............................. 35
Case 10: JUDGE NAPOLEON E. INOTURAN vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO ................... 37
Case 11: ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS vs. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG ......................... 39
Case 12: GARY P. ROSAURO vs. JUDGE ALFREDO E. KALLOS ................................................. 40
Case 13: MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B. RAFOLS v. JUDGE TEODORO A. DIZON
.................................................................................................................................................................... 41
Case 14: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE ANATALIO S.
NECESSARIO........................................................................................................................................... 41
Case 15: RUFINO CASIMIRO vs. Judge OCTAVIO FERNANDEZ ................................................. 43
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Case 16: ROMEO T. ZACARIAS vs. JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS and SHIRLEY M.
VISAYA ..................................................................................................................................................... 44
Case 17: JOSE E. FERNANDEZ vs. JUDGE JAIME T. HAMOY ..................................................... 45
Case 18: RANDALL-LYON GARCIA BUENO vs. JUDGE SAIDALI M. DIMANGADAP ........... 46
Case 19: JORDAN P. OKTUBRE vs. JUDGE RAMON P. VELASCO .............................................. 47
Case 20: NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) vs. JUDGE LUISITO T. ADAOAG
.................................................................................................................................................................... 49
Case 21: Spouses ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELISA A. NAZARENO vs. JUDGE ENRIQUE M.
ALMARIO ................................................................................................................................................. 50
Case 22: LUCIANA VDA. DE ARAGO vs. JUDGE PATERNO T. ALVAREZ ................................ 51
Case 23: DR. CORA J. VIRATA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO G. SUPNET .......................................... 52
Case 24: CARLOS DIONISIO vs. HON. ZOSIMO V. ESCANO ........................................................ 53
Case 25: VICTORINO CRUZ vs. JUDGE REYNOLD Q. YANEZA ................................................. 54
Case 26: THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE IBP BAGUIO-BENGUET CHAPTER,
CESAR G. ORACION, PRESIDENT vs. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN ...................................... 55
Case 27: LUALHATI M. LIWANAG vs. JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE ...................................... 57
Case 28: ESTANISLAO V. ALVIOLA vs JUDGE HENRY B. AVELINO ........................................ 58
Case 29: GREGORIO LIMPOT LUMAPAS vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN ............................... 59
Case 31: Judge Martonino R. Marcos v. Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller............................................ 61
Case 32: Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Rosabella Tormis ............................................. 62
Case 33: Judge Dolores Espaol v. Judge Lorinda Toledo-Mupas ........................................................ 63
Case 34: Atty. Plaridel Nava II v. Judge Ofelia M. D. Artuz ................................................................ 64
Case 35: Ma. Liza M. Jorda v. Judge Crisologo Bitas ........................................................................... 65
Case 36: OCA v. Judge Joseph Cedrick Ruiz ........................................................................................ 67
Case 37: OCA v. Judge Aguilar ............................................................................................................... 70
Case 38: IN THE MATTER OF: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT FOR DISHONESTY, GRAVE
MISCONDUCT AND PERJURY COMMITTED BY JUDGE JAIME E. CONTRERAS ............... 71
Case 39: RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN ............................................................................................ 73
Case 40: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT v. PRESIDING JUDGE EXEQUIL L. DAGALA ............. 76
Case 41: Manuel B. Arcenas vs. Judge Henry B. Avelino ..................................................................... 78
Case 42: Sherlita O. Tan vs. Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot ........................................................................ 79
Case 43: Asuncion B. Visbal vs. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ............................................................... 80
Case 44: Mary Jane V Allentos Jamin vs. Judge Manuel A. De Castro .............................................. 81
Case 45: OCA vs. Judge James Go.......................................................................................................... 82
Case 46: Sandra L. Mino vs. Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro ........................................................... 83
Case 47: Atty. Odel S. Janda, et al. vs. Judge Eddie R. Rojas .............................................................. 84
Case 48: Office of the Solicitor General vs. Judge Antonio I. De Castro ............................................. 85
Case 49: Carmen P. Edano vs. Judge Fatima G. Asdala ....................................................................... 86
Case 50: Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon. Judge Cader P. Indar ...................................... 87
Case 51: SALAMA S. ANSA vs. JUDGE SALIH MUSA ..................................................................... 88
Case 52: NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION vs. JUDGE RAMON B. REYES .............. 89
Case 53: JOSE E. GURAY vs. JUDGE FABIAN M. BAUTISTA ....................................................... 90
Case 54: DR. EDGARDO ALDAY, MERCEDES FAVIS, MARNA VILLAFUERTE, and
CHRISTOPHER GARCIA vs. JUDGE ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR. ........................................... 91
Case 55: CONG. MANUEL N. MAMBA, et.al. vs. JUDGE DOMINADOR L. GARCIA................. 92
Case 56: HILARIO DE GUZMAN, JR. vs. JUDGE DEODORO J. SISON ....................................... 93
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Case 57: CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE RTC OF DAGUPAN CITY vs. JUDGE ERNA
FALLORAN-ALIPOSA ........................................................................................................................... 94
Case 58: MS. ALICE DAVILA vs. JUDGE JOSELITO S.D. GENEROSO ....................................... 96
Case 59: EVELYN AGPALASIN vs. JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI ........................................ 97
Case 60: SAPHIA M. MAGARANG vs. JUDGE GALDINO B. JARDIN, SR. .................................. 99
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Discipline of Members of the Judiciary
A. SUPREME COURT
1. IMPEACHMENT
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust1.
The impeachment of public officials has been established for removing otherwise
constitutionally tenured and independent public officials for culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. The power to initiate impeachment cases rests with the House while the power to try the
same rests with the Senate.
Based on Sec. 3, Article VI, Constitution, the steps leading to impeachment are as follows:
(1) A verified complaint for impeachment is filed by a member of the House or endorsed from
any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any member of the House;
(2) The complaint is included in the order of business of the House within ten (10) session
days;
(3) The House refers the complaint to the proper committee within three (3) session days
thereafter;
(4) The committee holds a hearing, approves the resolution calling for impeachment, and
submits the same to the House within sixty (60) days;
(5) The House considers the resolution and votes to approve it by at least one-third of all its
members, which resolution becomes the article of impeachment to be filed with the Senate
when approved; and
(6) The Senate tries the public official under the article2
Limitations of Filing an Impeachment Complaint
No Impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one (1) year.3
2. IMPEACHMENT OF FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO CORONA
On December 12, 2011, the House of Representatives voted to impeach Chief Justice Corona.
They charged him with eight articles of impeachment alleging:
a. Betrayal of public trust;

b. Graft and corruption; and
c. Culpable violation of the Constitution.
ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
Article I: Partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo administration;

Article II: Failure to disclose to the public his statement of assets and liabilities;
Article III: Flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases, creating excessive
entanglement with Former President Arroyo, and discussing with litigants regarding the cases
pending before the Supreme Court;
Article IV: Irregularities in issuing a quo ante order against the House of Representatives in
the impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez;
Article V: Gerrymandering in the case of the 16-newly created cities and promotion of Dinagat
into a province;
Article VI: Improper investigation in the plagiarism case of Associate Justice Mariano del
Castillo;
1 Sec. 2, Article X, 1987 Constitution

2 Abad, J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Gutierrez v. HOR Committee on Justice (2011)
3 Sec 3, par (5), Article X, 1987 Constitution
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Article VII: Granting a temporary restraining order to Former President Arroyo and husband
Mike Arroyo after the Department of Justice prevented them to go out of the country;
Article VIII: Graft and corruption when he failed and refused to account for the judiciary
development fund and special allowance for the judiciary collections. On January 16, 2012,
the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, began the trial. The prosecution dropped Articles
I, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, leaving only Articles II and III as their grounds for impeachment.
On May 29, 2012, the Senate found Chief Justice Corona guilty under Article II of the articles
of impeachment for his failure to declare his true statements of assets, liabilities and net worth.
After 20 senators voted in favor of impeachment under this ground, the Senate no longer voted
under Article III. Three senators voted to acquit Corona on that ground.
3. QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE USED
An impeachment proceeding is sui generis; it is neither purely political nor criminal. Thus, it
does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the course of the impeachment trial, the
senator-judges expressed differing views. Some argued that it requires “clear and convincing
proof,” while some argued that it needs “preponderance of evidence.”
The Senate has traditionally left the choice of the applicable standard of proof to each
individual Senator4.
Former Chief Justice Corona was the first justice of the Supreme Court to be impeached and
convicted. He was found guilty for culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayal of
public trust for not correctly declaring his statements of assets, liabilities and net worth. The
prosecution alleged that he inaccurately declared his peso and dollar deports, and real estate
properties. The defense argued that he did not declare his dollar deposits and peso deposits
because of the banking secrecy and foreign currency deposit laws. It was also said that some
undeclared assets are also co-mingled funds that he does not own solely.
B. JUDGES OF THE LOWER COURTS AND JUSTICES OF COURT OF

APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
TENURE
The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during a good
behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office.
DISCIPLINING BODY IS THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order
their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon5
General rule: A judge cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal, or administrative –

for any his official acts, not matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith6.
Ratio: A judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon
his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This
concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to
preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary7.
4 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook (1974)

5 Sec 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution
6 Valdez v Valera (1978)
7 Pabalan v Guevarra (1976)
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HOW INSTITUTED
Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted:
1. Motu propio by the Supreme Court;
2. Upon the verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said
allegations; or
3. Upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and
omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for judges8.
The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary
that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. The procedural
requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must
initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charges9.
INVESTIGATION
Upon the filing of the comment of the respondent or upon the expiration of the period for
such filing, which is ten days from the date of service to him of the copy of the complaint10,
the SC shall:
1. Refer the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report,
and recommendation; or
2. Assign the case for investigation, report, and recommendation to:
a. A retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a justice of the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
b. A justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a judge of a Regional Trial
Court or of a special court of equivalent rank; or
c. A judge of the Regional Trial Court, if the respondent is a judge of an inferior
court11
HEARING AND TERMINATION
The investigating justice of judge shall set a day for the hearing and send notice to the
parties. If the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. The
investigating justice or judge shall terminate the proceedings:
1. Within 90 days from the date of its commencement; or

2. Within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant12
REPORT AND ACTION
Within 30 days from termination, the investigating justice or judge shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendation, accompanied
by the evidence and pleadings filed by the parties. Such report shall be confidential and
shall be for the exclusive use of the Supreme Court.
A copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be attached to the record of the
respondent in the OCA13.
8 Sec 1, Rule 140, Rules of Court

9 Figueros v Jimenez (2014)
10 Sec. 2, Rule 140, Rules of Court
13 Sec 5 and 12, Rule 140, Rules of Court
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The Supreme Court shall take action on the report as the facts and the law may warrant.14
AUTOMATIC CONVERSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASES TO

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, administrative cases against justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, judges of regular and special courts, and court officials
who are lawyers, shall also be considered a disciplinary action against them, if they are
based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the
bar for:
1. Violation of the Lawyer's Oath;

2. Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
3. Violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics; or
4. Such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as
grounds for the discipline of lawyers. The respondent is required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.
EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OR DESISTANCE
The actuations of a judge seriously affect the public interest inasmuch as they involve the
administration of justice. It is for this reason that a motion to withdraw a complaint will
not justify the dismissal of the administrative case against the judge. To condition
administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act, is to strip the Supreme Court of its supervisory power to
discipline erring members of the judiciary15.
Complainant's desistance is not an obstacle to the taking of disciplinary action against a

judge if the record reveals that he had not performed his duties properly16.
C. GROUNDS AND SANCTIONS
Administrative charges are classified as serious, less serious, or light17
SERIOUS CHARGES
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (RA 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in
an appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits18
The word “misconduct” implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error or judgment. For
serious [or gross] misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial
acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules19

15 Anguluan v. Taguba (1979)
16 Espayos v. Lee (1979)
18 Sec 8, Rule 140, Rules of Court
19 In re: Impeachment of Horrilleno (1922)
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In the absence of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do injustice, incorrect
rulings do not constitute misconduct and may not give rise to a charge of gross ignorance of
the law20.
Sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Forfeiture of benefits does not
include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00;21
LESS SERIOUS CHARGES
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;

2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
3. Unauthorized practice of law;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
7. Simple misconduct 22
Sanctions:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more
than three months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.0023.
LIGHT CHARGES
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;

2. Gambling in public;
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
Sanctions:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
20 Cruz v. Iturralde (2003)

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ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
The following have been subject to discipline by the Supreme Court:
1. Failure to deposit funds with the municipal treasurer or produce them despite promise to
do so24;
2. Misappropriation of fiduciary funds (i.e., proceeds of cash bail bond) by depositing the
check in a personal account, thus converting the trust fund to personal use25;
3. Extorting money from a party-litigant who has a pending case26;
4. Solicitation of donation for office equipment27;
5. Frequent unauthorized absences in office28;
6. Delay in the disposition of cases in violation of the canon that a judge must promptly
dispose of all matters submitted to him29;
7. Unduly granting repeated motions for postponement30;
8. Unawareness of or unfamiliarity with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
and duration and graduation of penalties31;
9. Reducing to a ridiculous amount (P6,000.00) the bail bond of the accused murderer,
enabling him to escape the toils of the law32;
10. Imposing the penalty of subsidiary imprisonment on a party for failure to pay civil
indemnity in violation of RA 546533.
24 Montemayor v. Collado (1981)

25 Barja v. Beracio (1976)
26 Haw Tay v. Singayao (1988)
27 Lecaroz v. Garcia (1981)
28 Municipal Council of Casiguruhan, Quezon v. Morales (1974)
29 Balagot v. Opinion (1991)
30 [Araza v. Reyes (1975)
31 In re: Paulin (1980)
32 Soriano v. Mabbayad (1975)
33 Monsanto v. Palarca (1983)
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Disqualifications of Justices and Judges [Rule 137, Rules of Court]
A. COMPULSORY DISQUALIFICATION
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case, without the written consent of all parties in
interest and entered upon the record, in which:
1. He, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; or
2. He is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law;
3. He has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel; or
4. He has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review34.
REASON FOR THE RULE
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case rests on the salutary principle
that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing
it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law
conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for
that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of
written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and
confidence in the courts' justice35
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to
the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only possible, due process
demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza36.
B. VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION
Rule 137. Sec. 1., 2nd par. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned.
REASON FOR THE RULE
A judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants. He must hold
himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his
actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself
from the case.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances
appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or
incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better
course for the judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids
being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved.37
Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties to a suit
is no ground for disqualification. That one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial
judge is not a legal ground for the disqualification of the said judge. To allow it would
unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred. But if the
relationship between the judge and an attorney for a party is such that there would be a natural
inclination to prejudice the case, the judge should be disqualified in order to guaranty a fair
trial.38
34 Sec. 1, 1st par., Rule 137, Rules of Court

35 Garcia v. De La Peña (1994)
36 Javier v. Comelec (1996)
37 Bautista v. Rebueno (1978)
38 Query of Executive Judge Estrada (1987)]
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THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
PREAMBLE
An honorable competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice and thus promote
the unity of the country, the stability of government, and the well-being of the people.
CANON 1
A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE

JUDICIARY
RULE 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
RULE 1.02 - A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
RULE 1.03. - A judge should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert the independence of the
judiciary and should forthwith resist any pressure from whatever source intended to influence the
performance of official functions.
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
RULE 2.02 - A judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.
RULE 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
RULE 2.04 - A judge should refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
CANON 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
RULE 3.02 - In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
RULE 3.03 - A judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court.
RULE 3.04 - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of
the courts for the litigants.
RULE 3.05 - A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
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RULE 3.06 - While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some
obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be
borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the
ascertainment of truth.
RULE 3.07 - A judge should abstain from making public comments on any pending or impending
case and should require similar restraint on the part of court personnel.
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain

professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative
functions or other judges and court personnel.
RULE 3.09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public
service and fidelity.
RULE 3.10 - A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
RULE 3.11 - A judge should appoint commissioners, receivers, trustees, guardians, administrators
and others strictly on the basis of merit and qualifications, avoiding nepotism and favoritism.
Unless otherwise allowed by law, the same criteria should be observed in recommending
appointment of court personnel. Where the payment of compensation is allowed, it should be
reasonable and commensurate with the fair value of services rendered.
DISQUALIFICATION
RULE 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or
the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to
counsel within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or
any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION
RULE 3.13 - A judge disqualified by the terms of rule 3.12 may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of disqualification. If, bases on such disclosure, the
parties and lawyers independently of judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for
the inhibition is immaterial or insubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The
agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
12 | P a g e
CANON 5
A JUDGE SHOULD REGULATE EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK

OF CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL DUTIES
ADVOCATIONAL, CIVIC AND CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES
RULE 5.01 - A judge may engage in the following activities provided that they do not interfere
with the performance of judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the court:
(a) write, teach and speak on non-legal subjects;

(b) engage in the arts, sports, and other special recreational activities;
(c) participate in civic and charitable activities;
(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of a non-profit or non-political
educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES
RULE 5.02 - A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealing that tend to reflect adversely
on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage
investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for
disqualifications.
RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as officer, director, manager or advisor, or employee of any
business except as director of a family business of the judge.
RULE 5.04 - A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest,
factor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law.
RULE 5.05 - No information acquired in a judicial capacity shall be sued or disclosed by a judge
in any financial dealing or for any other purpose not related to judicial activities.
FIDUCIARY ACTIVITIES
RULE 5.06 - A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other
fiduciary, except for the estate, trusts, or person of a member of the immediate family, and then
only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. "Member of
immediate family" shall be limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of
consanguinity. As a family, a judge shall not:
(a) serve in proceedings that might come before the court of said judge; or
(b) act as such contrary to rules 5.02 to 5.05.
PRACTICE OF LAW AND OTHER PROFESSION
RULE 5.07 - A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the
Constitution or law, a judge may engage in the practice of any other profession provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
RULE 5.08 - A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by law.
RULE 5.09 - A judge shall not accept appointment or designation to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
13 | P a g e
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
RULE 5.10 - A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party
funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political
activities.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
All judges shall strictly comply with this Code.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
This Code, promulgated on 5 September 1989, shall take effect on 20 October 1989.
14 | P a g e
LIST OF SUPREME COURT CASES REGARDING
SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL OF JUDGE AND JUSTICES
C If
Suspensi
as Canons and suspension
Title of the Case Violation on or , for how
e Rules
Removal long?
#
1. Canon
Dishonest 1/Rule 1.01
Olga M Samson Vs Judge
and 2. Canon 7
1 Virgilio G Caballero A.M. No. Removal
Falsification 3. Canon
RTJ-08-2138 Aug 5, 2008
of Document 10/Rule 10.01
4. Canon 11
Reason of
Insanity
Office of the Court Simple 1. Canon
Administrator (OCA) vs Judge Misconduct 2/Rule 2.01,
2 Florentino V. Floro Resolution Gross 2.02 and 2.04 Removal
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 Mar 31, Ignorance of 3. Canon
2006 the Law 5/Rule 5.07
Unbecoming
Conduct
Prosecutor Jorge D Baculi Vs 1. Canon
Gross
Judge Medel Arnaldo B Belen 1/Rule 1.01 Suspensi
3 Ignorance of 6 months
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176 Apr 20, 2. Canon on
Law
2009 3/Rule 3.01
Gross
Incompetenc 1. Canon
Corazon Guerrero vs Judge
e and 1/Rule 1.02
4 Deray A.M. No. MTJ-02-1466 Removal
Efficiency 2. Canon
Dec 10, 2002
and Gross 3/Rule 3.05
Misconduct
1. Canon
1/Rule 1.01
Corruption, 2. Canon
Abuse of 2/Rule 2.01
Cortes vs Agcaoili A.M. No. Authority and 2.03 Suspende
5 10 days
RTJ-98-1414 Aug 20,1998 and 3. Canon d
Ignorance of 3/Rule 3.01
Law and 3.02
4. Canon
5/Rule 5.04
OCA vs Judge Ismael Sanchez
Gross Canon 2/Rule
6 A.M. No. RTJ-99-1486 Jun 26, Removal
Misconduct 2.01
2001
Immorality
Tuvillo vs Judge Laron A.M. Canon 4/Rule
7 and Serious Removal
No. MTJ-10-1755 Oct 18, 2016 4.01
Misconduct
Federico Calilung vs Judge
Canon 2/Rule
8 Suriaga A.M. No. MTJ-99-1191 Bribery Removal
2.01
Aug 31, 2000
1. Canon
1/Rule 1.04
Ocampo vs Judge Arcaya-Chua 2. Canon
Gross
9 A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ 2/Rule 2.01 Removal
Misconduct
Apr 23, 2010 and 2.02
3. Canon
4/Rule 4.01
Judge Inoturan vs Judge 1. Canon
Unethical
10 Limsiaco Jr/Guinanao vs Judge 1/Rule 1.07 Removal
Conduct and
Limsiaco Jr A.M. No. MTJ-01- and 1.08
15 | P a g e
1362 and A.M. No. MTJ-11- Gross 2. Canon
1785 Feb 22, 2011 Inefficiency 6/Rule 6.05
1. Section
21(1) of Batas
Pambansa
Blg. 129
2. 4(c) and 5,
ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. Rule 58 of the
Gross
GOMOS v. JUDGE SANTOS B. 1997 Rules of Suspensi
11 ignorance of 6 months
ADIONG A.M. No. RTJ-04- Civil on
the law
1863 October 22, 2004 Procedure
3. Section 3,
Rule 71 of the
1997 Rules of
Civil
Procedure.
Rule 5.02 and
GARY P. ROSAURO vs. Rule 5.06 and
JUDGE ALFREDO E. KALLOS 2.03 of the Suspensi
12 impropriety 3 months
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796 February Code of on
10, 2006 Judicial
Conduct.
acts of 1. Rule 1.01
impropriety Canon 1 Code
which did of Judicial
violence to conduct
MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and
the integrity 2. Rule 2.01
LOLITA B. RAFOLS vs.
of the Canon 1 Code
13 JUDGE TEODORO A. DIZON Removal
judiciary and of Judicial
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1426 January
degraded conduct
31, 2006
public 3. Section 8 of
confidence in Rule 140 of
the courts the Rules of
(bribery) Court
gross
inefficiency Canons 2 and
OCA v. JUDGE ANATALIO S. or neglect of 6 of the
14 NECESSARIO et. al. A.M. No. duty and of Canons of Removal
MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013 gross Judicial
ignorance of Ethics
the law
Rule 2.01 of
RUFINO CASIMIRO v. Judge
Canon 2 of
OCTAVIO FERNANDEZ A.M. gross Suspensi
15 the Canon of 3 months
No. MTJ-04-1525 January 29, misconduct on
Judicial
2004
Ethics
1. Section 4 of
Rule 114 of
GUILTY of
the Rules of
violating the
Court
Code of
2. Section 7 of
Judicial
ROMEO T. ZACARIAS vs. Rule 120 of
Conduct for
JUDGE MARTONINO R. the Rules of
impropriety Suspensi
16 MARCOS and SHIRLEY M. Court 4 months
and the on
VISAYA A.M. No. MTJ-04- 3. Code of
appearance
1520 January 27, 2004 Judicial
of
Conduct
impropriety
(Particular
in all
canon was not
activities
cited in the
decision)
16 | P a g e
failure to
decide
JOSE E. FERNANDEZ v. motions and Rule 1.02 of
JUDGE JAIME T. HAMOY pending the Code of
17 Removal
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1821 August incidents Judicial
12, 2004 within the Conduct
reglementary
period
1. Rule 112,
Section 5 of
the Revised
RANDALL-LYON GARCIA gross Rules on
BUENO v. JUDGE SAIDALI ignorance of Criminal
18 Removal
M. DIMANGADAP A.M. No. the law and Procedure
MTJ-02-1462 August 10, 2004 procedure 2. Canon 1.01
of the Code of
Judicial
Conduct
1. Grave
Misconduct
Rule 2.03 and
JORDAN P. OKTUBRE v. 2. Gross
Rule 3.12 of
JUDGE RAMON P. VELASCO Ignorance of
19 the Code of Removal
A.M. No. MTJ -02-1444 July 22, the Law
Judicial
2004 3. Grave
Conduct
Abuse of
Authority
NBI v. JUDGE LUISITO T. Sec 8 Rule
serious
20 ADAOAG A.M. No. MTJ-03- 140 of Rules Removal
misconduct
1503 November 16, 2006 of Court
Forfeitur
e of
retiremen
t benefits
with
Spouses Romeo Nazareno and Gross prejudice
Elisa Nazareno vs Judge Enrique misconduct --not specified to
21
M. Almario A.M. No. RTJ-94- and in the case-- reemploy
1195 February 26, 1997 dishonesty ment in
the gov't
in lieu of
dismissal
(retired
judge)
Forfeitur
e of
retiremen
t benefits
with
LUCIANA VDA. DE ARAGO 1. Grave prejudice
vs.JUDGE PATERNO T. misconduct --not specified to
22
ALVAREZ A.M. No. RTJ-89- 2. corrupt in the case-- reemploy
318 March 25, 1997 practices ment in
the gov't
in lieu of
dismissal
(retired
judge)
RE: COMPLAINT OF DR. Canon 1 of
1. Unethical,
CORA J. VIRATA AGAINST the Judicial
Immoral,
23 JUDGE FRANCISCO G. Code of Removal
Illegal
SUPNET, PRESIDING JUDGE, Conduct
Actuations
METROPOLITAN TRIAL Canon 2 of
17 | P a g e
COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY the Judicial
CITY FOR "UNETHICAL, Code of
IMMORAL, ILLEGAL Conduct
ACTUATIONS," IN
RELATION TO CRIM. CASES
NOS. 99-3586-88. (DR. CORA
J. VIRATA
Vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO G.
SUPNET, PRESIDING JUDGE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY
CITY) A.M. No. 02-2-12-SC
November 27, 2002
Rule 2.00 of
1. Canon 2 of
impropriety the Judicial
CARLOS DIONISIO vs HON. 2. conflict of Code of
ZOSIMO V. ESCANO A.M. interest Conduct Suspensi
24 6 months
No. RTJ-98-1400 February 1, 3. using court Rules 5.02, on
1999 spaces for 5.03 of Canon
personal V of the
gains Judicial Code
of Conduct
1. Rule 3.01,
Code of
1. unlawful Judicial
VICTORINO CRUZ vs. JUDGE
acts Conduct
REYNOLD Q. YANEZA A.M.
25 2. 2. Sec. 17, Removal
No. MTJ-99-1175 March 9,
incompetenc Rule 114, of
1999
e the Rules on
Criminal
Procedure
1. RULE
1. gross
3.01, CANON
ignorance of
THE OFFICERS AND 3 of the
the law
MEMBERS OF THE IBP Judicial Code
2. gross
BAGUIO-BENGUET of Conduct
violation of
CHAPTER, CESAR G. 2. RULE 1.
the
ORACION, PRESIDENT Vs 02, CANON 1 Suspensi
26 constitutional 1 year
FERNANDO VIL of the Judicial on
rights of the
PAMINTUAN, Presiding Judge, Code of
accused
Regional Trial Court, Branch III, Conduct
3. arrogance
Baguio City [A.M. No. RTJ-02- 3. Article
4. opression
1691. January 16, 2004] VIII, Sec. 5 of
5. graft and
the 1987
corruption
Constitution
Fine of
Canon 1 of
P40K
1. gross the Judicial
from his
LUALHATI M. LIWANAG Vs. immorality Code of
retiremen
JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE 2. gross Conduct
27 t benefits
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168 April misconduct Canon 2 of
in lieu of
21, 1999 (sexual the Judicial
suspensio
molestation) Code of
n (retired
Conduct
judge)
ESTANISLAO V. ALVIOLA,
Vs. JUDGE HENRY B. 1. gross violation of
Suspensi
28 AVELINO, MCTC, Pontevedra- neglect of A.M. No. 03- 2 months
on
Panay, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-P- duty 1-09-SC
08-1697 February 29, 2008
18 | P a g e
GREGORIO LIMPOT
LUMAPAS JUDGE CAMILO 1. grave
E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge, abuse of
disobedience
RTC, Branch 23, 9th Judicial authority
29 to order of a Removal
Region, Molave, Zamboanga del 2. gross
superior court
Sur ignorance of
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519 June 26, the law
2003
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
represented by SECRETARY
LEILA M. DE LIMA, vs
JUDGE ROLANDO G.
MISLANG -- A.M. No. RTJ-14-
2372 Sec 8, Rule
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11- 140 on the
1. gross
3736-RTJ] Discipline of
ignorance of
Judges and
30 the law Removal
HOME DEVELOPMENT Justices, as
2. gross
MUTUAL FUND (HDMF), amended by
misconduct
represented by ATTY. JOSE AM No. 01-8-
ROBERTO F. PO, Vs. JUDGE 10-SC
ROLANDO G. MISLANG July
26, 2016
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-
3907-RTJ]
Rule 1.01 and
Judge Martonino R. Marcos v. Rule 3. 01,
Gross
Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller Canon 3 of
31 ignorance of Removal
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472 January the Code of
the law
24, 2017 Judicial
Conduct.
gross Section 5,
Office of the Court
insufficiency Canon 6 of
Administrator v. Judge
32 and gross the New Code Removal
Rosabella Tormis A.M. No.
ignorance of of Judicial
MTJ-12-1817 March 12, 2013
the law Conduct
gross
Judge Dolores Espaol v. Judge ignorance of Canon 6 of
Lorinda Toledo-Mupas, A.M. law: Article the New Code
33 Removal
No. 03-1462-MTJ, April 19, 125 of the of Judicial
2007 Revised Conduct
Penal Code
Grave
CANON 1,
Misconduct,
CANON 7,
Atty. Plaridel Nava II v. Judge Dishonesty,
CANON 10,
34 Ofelia M. D. Artuz, A.M. No. and Removal
CANON 11--
MTJ-08-1717, August 29, 2017 Falsification
CPR; Rule
of official
10.01
document
gross
ignorance of
the law or
procedure
and use of Section 1,
Ma. Liza M. Jorda v. Judge
abusive and Canon 4 of Suspensi
35 Crisologo Bitas A.M. No. RTJ- 3 months
insulting the New Code on
14-2376 March 5, 2014
words: of Judicial
Section 7, Conduct,
Rule 114 of
the Revised
Rules of
19 | P a g e
Criminal
Procedure.
violations of
the Anti- Section 27,
OFFICE OF THE COURT
Graft and Rule 138 of
ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE
Corrupt the Rules of
JOSEPH CEDRICK O. RUIZ,
36 Practices Court,:Admin Removal
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361, A.M.
Law (R.A. istrative
No. RTJ-13-2361 February 2,
No. 3019): Matter No.
2016
moral 02-9-02-SC
turpitude
Section 11,
dishonesty
OCA v. Judge Aguilar A.M. No. Rule 140 of Suspensi
37 and 6 months
RTJ-07-2087 June 7, 2011 the Rules of on
misconduct
Court
IN THE MATTER OF: JUDGE Rule IV,
JAIME E. CONTRERAS A.M. Section 53 of Suspensi
38 dishonesty 1 year
No. RTJ-16-2452, March 09, the Civil on
2016 Service Rules
GUILTY of
GROSS
Canon 3
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MISCONDU
(Integrity) of
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CT,
39 the New Code Removal
GREGORY ONG A.M. No. SB- DISHONES
of Judicial
14-21-J September 23, 2014 TY and
Conduct.
IMPROPRIE
TY
Section 8 of
IMMORALI Rule 140 of
Anonymous Complainant v.
TY and the Rules of
Judge Dagala
40 GROSS Court, Canon Removal
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886 July 25,
MISCONDU 4 New Code
2017
CT of Judicial
Conduct.
Section 5,
Failure to
Canon 6 of
Manuel B. Arcenas vs. Judge decide a case
the New Code
Henry B. Avelino within the Suspensi
41 of Judicial 3 months
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1642 June 15, prescribed on
Conduct and
2007 period/Gross
Rule 140 of
inefficiency
Rules of court
Canon 1 of
Sherlita O. Tan vs. Judge Rexel the Judicial
M. Pacuribot Gross Code of
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 misconduct Conduct
42 Removal
December 14, 2007 and Canon 2 of
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757- immorality the Judicial
RTC) Code of
Conduct
Asuncion B. Visbal vs. Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis Gross
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692 misconduct Rule 140 of
Suspensi
43 November 28, 2007 and the Rules of 6 months
on
insubordinati Court
[Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. on
02-1289-MTJ]
Mary Jane V Allentos Jamin vs.
Section 8 (3)
Judge Manuel A. De Castro Gross
(8), Rule 140
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1616 October misconduct
44 of the Rules Removal
17, 2007 and
of Court,
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05- immorality
punishable by
1781-MTJ
20 | P a g e
section 11 of
the same rule
Sec. 23, Rule
XIV of the
Omnibus
OCA vs. Judge James Go
Civil Service Suspensi
45 A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667 Undue delay 3 months
Rules and on
September 27, 2007
Regulations
and Sec. 19,
Rule XIV
Canon 6
Section 3 and
Section 5,
Section 3.05
Sandra L. Mino vs. Judge
of the code of
Donato Sotero A. Navarro Gross
Judicial
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1645 August ignorance of Suspensi
46 conduct, 6 months
28, 2007 the law or on
Section 6(a)
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. procedure
of Rule 112
05-1702-MTJ]
and Section 8
of Rule 140 of
the Rules of
Court
Atty. Odel S. Janda, et al. vs. Rule 39,
Gross
Judge Eddie R. Rojas Section 1 of Suspensi
47 Ignorance of 1 year
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2054 the Rules of on
the law
December 14, 2007 Court
Sec. 4 of Rule
102, Sec. 13
of Rule 102,
Section 8 of
A.M. No. 01-
8-10-SC,
amending
Office of the Solicitor General
Gross Rule 140 of
vs. Judge Antonio I. De Castro Suspensi
48 Ignorance of the Rules of 3 months
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2018 August on
the law Court, Canon
3, 2007
6 of NEW
CODE OF
JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
FOR THE
PHILIPPINE
JUDICIARY
Carmen P. Edano vs. Judge Gross 1. Canon 2
Fatima G. Asdala Insubordinati Section 1
49 Removal
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2007 on and gross 2. Canon 2
December 6, 2010 misconduct Section 2
Undue Delay
Office of the Court 1. Canon
in Rendering
Administrator vs. Hon. Judge 1/Rule 1.01
an Orde and
50 Cader P. Indar 2. Canon 7 Removal
Conduct
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April and Section
Unbecoming
10, 2012 27 Rule 138
of a Judge
SALAMA S. ANSA vs. JUDGE 1. Canon
SALIH MUSA Gross 1/Rule 1.01
51 Removal
A.M. No. SCC-00-5, November Immorality 2. Canon
29, 2000 2/Rule 2.01
Section 3(e)
NATIONAL BUREAU OF
of R.A. No. 1. Canon
52 INVESTIGATION vs. JUDGE Removal
3019, Anti- 2/Rule 2.01
RAMON B. REYES
Graft and
21 | P a g e
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1120, Corrupt
February 21, 2000 Practices Act
1. Canon
1/Rule 1.01
JOSE E. GURAY vs. JUDGE
2. Canon
FABIAN M. BAUTISTA
2/Rule 2.01
53 A.M. No. MTJ-99-1188 July 2, Bribery Removal
3. Canon
2001 (formerly OCA IPI No. 98-
3/Rule 3.01
602-MTJ)
4. Canon
3/Rule 3.03
DR. EDGARDO ALDAY,
1. Canon
MERCEDES FAVIS, MARNA
Grave 1/Rule 1.01
VILLAFUERTE, and
misconduct 2. Civil
CHRISTOPHER GARCIA vs.
54 and failure to Service Removal
JUDGE ESCOLASTICO U.
obey court's Memorandum
CRUZ, JR.
order Circular No.
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530,
30, s. 1989
February 4, 2002
CONG. MANUEL N. MAMBA,
et.al. vs. JUDGE DOMINADOR
1. Canon
55 L. GARCIA Bribery Removal
2/Rule 2.01
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June
25, 2001
HILARIO DE GUZMAN, JR. acts
vs. JUDGE DEODORO J. manifesting
1. Canon 5
SISON impartiality
56 2. Canon Removal
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629 and gross
2/Rule 2.01
(Formerly A.M. No. 99-731- ignorance of
RTJ), March 26, 2001 the law
CONCERNED EMPLOYEES
OF THE RTC OF DAGUPAN 1. Canon
CITY vs. JUDGE ERNA 1/Rule 1.01
57 Corruption Removal
FALLORAN-ALIPOSA 2. Canon
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1446, March 3/Rule 3.01
9, 2000
MS. ALICE DAVILA vs.
JUDGE JOSELITO S.D. Failure to
1. Canon
58 GENEROSO decide on Removal
3/Rule 3.05
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1062, July 31, cases
2000
Anti-Graft
and Corrupt
Practices Act
or R.A. No.
EVELYN AGPALASIN vs. 3019 for
1. Canon
JUDGE EMERITO M. ordering or
2/Rule 2.01
59 AGCAOILI allowing a Removal
2. Canon
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April man with a
5/Rule 5.04
12, 2000 pending
criminal case
before him to
do his
biddings
SAPHIA M. MAGARANG vs.
JUDGE GALDINO B. JARDIN,
1. Canon
60 SR. Bribery Removal
2/Rule 2.01
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1448, April 6,
2000
22 | P a g e
Case 1: OLGA M. SAMSON versus JUDGE VIRGILIO G.
CABALLERO
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009
Facts: This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document
against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
It was alleged inter alia:

1. That the respondent should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the
constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence,
and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from
nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case;
2. That the respondent deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative
charges against him;
3. That there are criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised
Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman; and
4. That the respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties and exceeded his powers by
overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted;
The Office of Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty
and falsification of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended
respondent's dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of dishonest and falsification of an official document.
Held: Yes, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings of OCA. However, respondent is not to be
exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending
cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he committed dishonesty when he checked the
box indicating "No" to the question "Have you ever been formally charged?" in his March 21,
2006 Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed in the OCA RTC Personnel.
This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons
of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR):
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION...
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.
Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
BY OTHERS.
Respondent's misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be
suspended or disbarred. Thus:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
23 | P a g e
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Finally, the Supreme Court find respondent GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of an official
document. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
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Case 2: Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs Judge
Florentino V. Floro
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 Mar 31, 2006RTJ-99-1460
Facts: It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite
psychological evaluation on him then by the SC Clinic revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration"
and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In
June 1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with
self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro
was unfit to be a judge. But because of his impressive academic standing, the JBC allowed Atty.
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable
thus paving the way to Atty. Floro's appointment as RTC judge.
An administrative complaint was filed against him by court administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo.
Then he recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the
duration of the investigation against him. In a Resolution dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc
adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in
view of the commission of the acts or omissions as reported by the audit team.
One of those reported is for his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-
accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct or Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct. The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members
thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly concerning detention
prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on their bonds during
the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty.
Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention
prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent
prosecutor assigned to his sala. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence
or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he sided with the accused. Atty.
Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge
Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his
PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those
under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many
unfounded offenses.
Issue: W/n Judge Floro violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Held: Yes. Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means
that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and
honest" as well. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused,
opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate
that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up
suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes
public confidence in the judiciary.
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary

is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming
conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the public’s trust
in his ability to render justice.
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Case 3: PROSECUTOR JORGE D. BACULI vs JUDGE MEDEL
ARNALDO B. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176, April 20, 2009
Facts: The respondent judge was charged by the complainant with Grave Misconduct,
Misbehavior, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Disbarment, Grave Abuse of Authority, Harassment,
Oppressive and Malicious Conduct, and Violation of: (1) Articles 204 and 206 of the Revised
Penal Code; (2) Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713; (3) Code of Judicial Conduct; (4) Supreme Court
(SC) Administrative Circular No. 1-88; (5) The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (6)
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, relative to Criminal Case No. 13240-2005-C
entitled People of the Philippines v. Jay Ballestrinos for Frustrated Homicide.
The complainant stated that he filed against the accused an information for frustrated homicide
where he was directed by the respondent to submit evidence that the notice of preliminary
investigation was duly served and received by the accused. Thereafter, the complainant informed
the court that despite several opportunities given, the accused failed to submit his counter-affidavit.
The respondent directed the complainant to explain why he should be cited in contempt of court
for making unfounded statements in his pleadings. Thereafter, in a decision, respondent found the
complainant guilty of direct contempt of court for making scurrilous and contumacious statements
in the latter’s motion. In another decision, the complainant was cited for indirect contempt of court.
Thereafter, the respondent directed the clerk of court to issue the writ of execution and a warrant
of arrest.
With this, the complainant filed the instant complaint, asseverating, among others, that respondent
violated Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence in holding him liable
for contempt because the use of contemptuous language in a pleading, if submitted before the same
judge, would constitute only direct contempt of court. He assailed respondent with abuse court’s
power to cite persons for contempt.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted with abuse of power to cite the complainant
liable for contempt of court.
Held: Yes. The Court agrees with OCA that there was no order issued by respondent for the charge
of indirect contempt against complainant to be docketed separately; neither was there an order that
the said charge be consolidated with the principal action. In sum, respondent simply incorporated
or integrated the proceedings for indirect contempt with the principal case. This fortifies the OCA's
finding that respondent is grossly ignorant of basic procedure. When the law is so elementary, such
as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not know the same,
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The respondent failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under
the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that:
Rule 1.01. - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.
It is well settled that the power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to
preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However,
judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with
the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court,
and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in
contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive, principle; and on the
corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment.
The respondent is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby suspended from office
for a period of 6 months without salary and other benefits. He is sternly warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall merit a more serious penalty.
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Case 4: CORAZON GUERRERO vs. JUDGE MARCIAL M.
DERAY
A.M. No. MTJ -02-1466, December 10, 2002
Facts: The respondent was requested to be administratively liable for the alleged delay in the
resolution of the preliminary examination in Criminal Case No. 1903, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Rolando Guerrero.
The complainant is the legitimate spouse of the accused in the above-mentioned criminal case for
rape, pending before the MTC Mallig-Quezon, Isabela, presided by respondent judge. She alleged
that respondent judge conducted the preliminary examination and terminated the same as early as
1998. Up to the time of filing of the instant complaint, however, he has not resolved the criminal
complaint.
Meanwhile, accused has been languishing in jail. She went several times to respondent's court to
inquire about the status of the case against her husband but she was advised that the resolution was
forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Inquiry therein, however, disclosed that no
such resolution was ever received by it. Counsel for her accused husband filed several motions for
the early resolution of the case or for the immediate release of the accused, but to no avail.
Complainant contended that respondent's inaction violates the rights of the accused to a speedy
trial and disposition of the case and to due process.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent guilty of delay in resolving
the Preliminary investigation and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00),
with warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
Issue: Whether or not OCA is correct.
Held: Yes. However, the recommended fine is not commensurate to the gravity of respondent's
misdeed.
The conduct of preliminary investigation by judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit
trial courts is a non-judicial function, which is an exception to their usual duties and their findings
are subject to review by the Provincial Prosecutor concerned. The performance of this non-judicial
or executive function, however, does not place them beyond the disciplinary power of this Court
for any act or omission in relation or as an incident to their task, which is only in addition to their
judicial functions. Thus, the Court has imposed disciplinary sanctions on judges for their ignorance
or deliberate disregard of the laws on preliminary investigation.
Consistent, therefore, with an accused's right to a speedy trial, respondent had the duty to promptly
forward the case to the Provincial Prosecutor. Indeed, Rule 112, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure states in no uncertain terms that –
SEC. 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. - Within ten (10) days after the
preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction for appropriate action.
In the case at bar, respondent judge cannot deny that he failed to act on the preliminary examination
for more than five (5) years. Worse, as early as August 2000 - over three (3) years after accused
was arrested -Complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23 because of respondent's inaction on the rape case.
Delay not only results in undermining the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt
hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the
litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.
Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct state:
Rule 1.02. - A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
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Rule 3.05. - A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
Finally, the respondent is found guilty of gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He is dismissed from the service with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, and his retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED.
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Case 5: FLAVIANO B. CORTES vs. JUDGE EMERITO M.
AGCAOILI
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1414, August 20, 1998
Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator received from the complainant a sworn letter-
complaint addressed to Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, accusing the respondent of corruption,
abuse of authority and ignorance of the law.
1. That the respondent is irregular in attending his responsibility in his office. He is not
observing the prescribed office hours from Monday to Friday.
2. That the respondent was rumored to have a brand new car after the dismissal of the case
People v Chua. Dismissal of the case was decided by the respondent because the
prosecution has not proved the corpus delicti.
3. That the respondent was allegedly connived with Fiscal Bienvenido Miguel to dismissed
the case of People vs Siriban; Siriban was rumored to have given a brand new card to the
respondent along with a large amount of cash given to the fiscal.
4. That the respondent granted bail for humanitarian reason in the case of People vs Roldan
even though the prosecution has a very strong evidence and the case is considered a heinous
crime and should have been unbailable;
5. That the respondent is a corrupt judge; almost all cases of Chinese were tried in his sala.
6. All DENR cases of illegal logging and smuggling of lumber were tried in his sala. DENR
cases were all lost; and
7. That the respondent entertained his visitors in his cottage at the Cagayan State University
knowing fully well that they have pending cases in his sala.
In a very thorough report to the Court, Justice Martinez dissected the evidence presented before
her and recommended the charges against to the respondent on the following:
1. Irregular attendance in respondent’s office;

2. Anomalous dismissal of Criminal Case No. 09-805, entitled, ‘People of the Philippines vs.
Efren Chua’;
3. Irregular Dismissal of Criminal Case No. 09-755, entitled, ‘People of the Philippines vs.
Jimmy Siriban’;
4. Solicitation of fund, paint, spare parts of vehicles and free transportation pass be dismissed
for lack of competent evidence in support of said charges.
Issue: Whether or not the findings of Justice Martinez is correct.
Held: Yes. In determining the administrative liability of respondent, the Court takes into account
the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 1 -- A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF

THE JUDICIARY.
RULE 1.01 -- A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
CANON 2 -- A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01 -- A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
RULE 2.03 -- A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conductor judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
CANON 3 -- A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
“RULE 3.01 -- A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
RULE 3.02 -- In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
29 | P a g e
CANON 5. -- A JUDGE SHOULD REGULATE EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO
MINIMIZE THE RISK OF CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL DUTIES.
RULE 5.04 -- A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest,
favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law.
On the portions of the Report:

1. Ignorance of the Law
In this case, it was established that respondent judge failed to epitomize competence. In Crim.
Case No. 09-805 (People vs. Efren Chua), respondent issued an Order dated June 4, 1996, directing
the release of confiscated narra flitches and lumber to Jimmy Abad. Earlier, Efren Chua, the
accused in the said case, had “waived” his rights over such materials to Abad. Chua, however, had
no authority to possess the narra flitches. According to the Certification of Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer Santos Vallangca, Chua was neither a holder of a
“license or permit to cut/gather and/or remove timber or any forest products, nor [is] his possession
thereof covered [by] legal supporting documents.”
Thus, having no right to have custody of such materials, Chua could not have lawfully executed a
waiver in favor of Abad. It follows that the respondent judge had no authority to order the release
of the confiscated forest products to a person who had derived his title from another who had no
license, permit or authority to possess the same. Clearly, respondent’s Order disregarded, and was
oblivious to, an elementary provision of the Revised Forestry Code.
Therefore, the Supreme Court imposed a fine of P20,000 to respondent for gross ignorance of the
law.
2. Improper Grant of Bail

Accused Eddie Roldan was charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 10-91-381. As the
imposable penalty for the offense was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, bail
could be granted only in the absence of strong evidence of guilt. In cases like these, a judge is
required not only to conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise according to his discretion,
in order to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong; he is also
mandated to state in his order granting or refusing bail a summary of the evidence offered by the
prosecution. Such summary is an essential aspect of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense.
Because his present infraction is his second of this nature, it warrants an additional penalty. We
therefore impose on him the usual fine of P20,000, plus suspension without pay for ten days.
3. Impropriety
The investigating justice found respondent judge guilty of violating the aforementioned canon.
Upon review of the records of the case, especially the stenographic notes and the depositions, we
find no reason to disagree with Justice Martinez that the conduct of the Judge Agcaoili fell short
of this standard.
As a result of the abovementioned violations of the respondent, the Court hereby FINED the total
amount of P40,000 – P20,000 for gross ignorance of the law and P20,000 for the improper grant
of bail. He is also SUSPENDED for a period of ten days, this being his second infraction of the
rules on bail.
He is further REPRIMANDED for fraternizing with litigants. Finally, he is sternly WARNED that
a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions shall be penalized much more severely.
30 | P a g e
Case 6: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE
ISMAEL SANCHEZ y BALAIS
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1486, June 26, 2001
Facts: On 25 June 1999, the Chief Justice received an anonymous letter from a "Group to Clean
the Judiciary of Lucena City" informing the Court of the misconduct of Judge Ismael B. Sanchez
for using a car involved in a carnapping case in his sala. The Chief Justice thereafter endorsed the
letter to the Office of the Court Administrator and eventually recommended to the Chief Justice
that the investigation be considered as administrative complaint against the respondent.
Upon filing of the respondent’s response, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for investigation.
 Mr. Lopez narrated that he did not turn over the custody of the car to the Chief of Police
because on December 6, 1996, the court issued an order transferring the custody and
possession of the car to the court. Mr. Lopez claimed that after the car was repaired and
the missing parts replaced, the car remained in his custody and it was used by the court on
official matters where use of motor vehicle is necessary;
 This finding of Justice Atienza will undoubtedly show that the car was never in the
possession of respondent judge but only after a year that it was turned over to him for
storage purposes. If it was really his intention to use the vehicle, why was it in the custody
of Mr. Lopez for about a year?
 That just to prove his clean intention, he did not take immediate possession of the car when
it was recovered sometime in November 30, 1996, and instead, it was given to the Court's
process server for safekeeping and preservation. At the time of recovery, the car was
unserviceable and he even spent for the transfer from Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna
to Lucena City, Quezon.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct in office for taking
custody of a car subject of a criminal case after the court presided over by him provisionally
dismissed the case.
Held: Yes. The testimony of respondent judge, however, rings hollow vis-a-vis the fact that he
allowed his process server to use the car within Lucena City and to serve as the court's utility
vehicle for official business where the use of a motor vehicle was necessary. Then respondent
transferred the car from Lucena City to the private bodega of his kumpadre in Metro Manila.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
"CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD A VOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
"Rule 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary."
It is clear from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the appearance must concur. Case
law repeatedly teaches that judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and
imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and occupying an
exalted position in the administration of justice. The improper conduct of a judge erodes public
confidence in the judiciary. It is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any impression
of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.
The Court finds respondent guilty of serious misconduct in office and hereby DISMISSES him
from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits, if any, with prejudice
to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government
including government owned or controlled corporations.
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Case 7: WILFREDO F. TUVILLO vs. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016
Facts: This is a consolidation of two cases filed against Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of
Branch 65, Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City (MeTC). The first case arose from the complaint
of Wilfredo Tuvillo (Wilfredo) for immoral conduct and the second case from the complaint of
Melissa Tuvillo (Melissa) for unexplained wealth and immorality.
The case which Wilfredo has filed is about the respondent having an intimate relationship with his
wife Melissa. With this, the complainant herein filed an adultery case against Melissa and the
respondent but it was later dismissed for lack of probable cause.
While the case which Melissa filed is about questioning the respondent’s unexplained wealth. In
her letter complaint, she asked that Judge Laron be investigated because based on his salary as a
judge, he could not have acquired their P9 million house. She also claimed that Judge Laron could
not have afforded to buy several Lamarroza paintings, four Plasma televisions, expensive furniture,
a Nissan Patrol, and to send his three children to private schools. Her letter also bore her admission
that she was his mistress for three years.
Issue: Whether or not the case filed by Wilfredo and Melissa will result to dismissal from service.
Held: Wilfredo’s complaint will result to the respondent’s dismissal. The unexplained wealth issue
was dismissed because the petitioner failed to substantiate that by the respondent’s salary, he could
not afford to buy those properties and send his children to private schools.
The charge of immorality, however, is a serious one covered by Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court. The penalty therefor includes dismissal from the service. Section 8 of Rule 140 provides:
Serious charges include:

2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an
appropriate proceeding;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt
8. Immorality;
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
Moreover, members of the judiciary are essentially guided by the Code of Judicial Conduct and
the Canons of Judicial Ethics in their acts. Canon 4, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Judge Laron's conduct of carrying on an affair with a married woman is highly improper.
The Supreme Court find the respondent GUILTY of IMMORALITY and SERIOUS
MISCONDUCT, the Court hereby metes him the maximum penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits. He is likewise disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
32 | P a g e
Case 8: FEDERICO S. CALILUNG vs. JUDGE WILFREDO S.
SURIAGA
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1191, August 31, 2000
Facts: These consolidated administrative cases charge both respondent judges with irregular
activities amounting to serious misconduct in office.
The complainant assailed that while the case he filed against Emiliano Joven is pending, the
respondent approached him soliciting the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
in exchange for a favorable decision in the same case. The complainant paid the respondent
amounting to P300,000.00 where the latter agreed. Thereafter, the respondent decided in favor of
the complainant.
Joven filed an appeal to RTC. The respondent approached again the complainant and informed
him that there will be no problem with the appeal, because Judge Iturralde assured him of a
favorable decision in consideration of the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00)
Pesos. Complainant made it appear that he agreed to Judge Suriaga's proposal. The latter then
directed Calilung to prepare and deliver the money to him on Monday, April 9, 1999, at Judge
Suriaga's residence.
Before the due date, Calilung approached the NBI requesting the Bureau to apprehend the two
judges "while in the act of receiving the money xxx [to] cut short their illegal activities and to deter
them from victimizing other litigants in the future." Calilung was not able to talk to Judge Iturralde
personally. It was his counsel, Atty. Marlon Lauder, who talked to Judge Iturralde regarding
Calilung's case. According to Atty. Lauder, Judge Iturralde advised him to "talk to Judge Suriaga
instead as they had already come to an agreement regarding the matter."
In the subsequent entrapment operation against Judge Suriaga and it was confirmed that Judge
Suriaga possessed the mark money used by the NBI agents to entrap him in the said allegation.
The said entrapment operation was posted in Philippine Daily Inquirer.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to which the cases were subsequently referred for
evaluation and report, found the evidence sufficient to support the charges against respondent
judges and recommended that, among others: (1) Judge Suriaga be placed immediately under
suspension pending the resolution of the investigation and criminal charges against him; (2) Judge
Iturralde be likewise placed under suspension and until final orders from the Court;
Issue: Whether or not the OCA is correct.
Held: Yes. The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and conclusion of Justice Ramirez. The
culpability of respondent Judge Suriaga for serious misconduct has been established not just by
substantial evidence which suffices in an administrative investigation but by an overwhelming
preponderance thereof.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
Rule 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the appearance must concur.
Case law repeatedly teaches that "[j]udicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge
and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and occupying an
exalted position in the administration of justice.
The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. It is
thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the
image and integrity of the judiciary."
33 | P a g e
Bribery is a serious charge punishable by, inter alia, dismissal from service with forfeiture of
benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
In the case at bench, we find sufficient bases in the charge of malfeasance in office against
respondent. On past occasions where we had the disagreeable task of disciplining mulcting
magistrates, we did not hesitate to impose the penalty of dismissal. Conformably, as he has
demonstrated his unsuitability to remain a member of the bench, respondent is deservingly
dismissed from service with all its attendant consequences.
The Court find that the Respondent Wilfredo S. Suriaga is hereby DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
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Case 9: FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO VS. JUDGE EVELYN S.
ARCAYA-CHUA
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, April 23, 2010
Facts: This is consolidated cases which stemmed from administrative complaints filed against
respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049
The Office of the Court Administration (OCA), through then Court Administrator Christopher O.
Lock, informed the Office of the Chief Justice in a Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the reports
about the rampant selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in
the said case, granting, among others, the custody of the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein
petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and directing therein respondent, Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away
from the home and office of Chang Tan as well as from the school of the subject minor.
According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua received money from
Chang Tan in exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts clearly indicate that she was remiss
in issuing the TPO. Her speedy issuance of the Orders dated May 7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not
only showed her unusual interest in the case, but it also appeared that the Order dated May 8, 2007
was tailor-fitted to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in the latter's heated argument with
the OIC of Branch 144.
Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is justified under Sections 8 and 15 of
R.A. No. 9262, as well as under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC, which specifically applies to a petition
for custody of minors. Contrary to OCAs finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang Tan
in SP No. M-6373 did not contain the requisite allegation of violence committed by therein
respondent Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17 of the Application was
explicit that a complaint for child abuse was filed against Stephanie Pulliam, based on, among
other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi wherein she enumerated the many abuses that her
mother had committed upon her. The complaint for child abuse was attached as an annex to the
Application as well as to the Petition. Other annexes attached to the Application, mentioning in
detail the acts of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of the statements
of yaya Josie Leynes and Rafi herself, as well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report of Dr. Sonia
Rodriguez.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
A judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144,
which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, following reports of alleged
irregularities committed by respondent.
The initial audit report stated that as early as May 12, 2007, a Saturday, the Court ordered the
padlocking of Branch 144 and assigned guards thereat on a 24-hour basis. Before the audit team
began its audit on May 15, 2007, the members made it clear to OIC Victoria C. Jamora and the
court personnel present that actions on the records, including stitching should be held in abeyance
and that no records should be brought outside the court until after the audit.
In this case, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged in connection with the 1,975 copies of
marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized for the period covering January 2004 to April
2007 for the following acts:
(1) for allegedly ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose of the said copies of
marriage certificates;
(2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization fees of one thousand eight hundred nine (1,809)
marriages as verified from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC), Makati City and the RTC, OCC, Makati City, thereby depriving the Court of the said fees
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in the total amount of Five Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (P542,700.00) at
the rate of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) per marriage; and
(3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases
Issues:
1. Whether or not issuance of TPO in favor of Albert Chang Tan is proper;
2. Whether or not the findings in judicial audit is correct.
Held:
1. NO. The Court upholds the finding of Justice Salvador Fernando that respondent Judge Arcaya
Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner Albert
Chang Tan in SP Case No. M6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his
wife under R.A. No. 9292, known as the AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya Chua is expected to know the
correct implementation of R.A. No. 9292.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the respondent be suspended from office for six (6)
months without salary and other benefits.
2. Yes. There is substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua did not report inher
Monthly Reports the actual number of marriages she solemnized during her stint in the MeTC,
Makati City, Branch 63 and in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144, and that the solemnization
fees that were paid did not correspond to the number of marriages that were solemnized by her.
The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge Arcaya-Chua reported zero or a
lesser number of marriages solemnized by her compared with the marriage certificates that
were seized from her office.
The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 is violative of
the provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:
Canon 1, Sec. 4. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence the judge.
Canon 2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Canon 2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Canon 4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
In this case, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and punished with
DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding accrued leave credits,
with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality.
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Case 10: JUDGE NAPOLEON E. INOTURAN vs. JUDGE
MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362 (formerly A.M. No. 01-2-49-RTC) / A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785 (formerly
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-1945-MTJ), February 22, 2011
Facts: There are two (2) consolidated cases filed against Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. as the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Valladolid, San Enrique-
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The first case involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to comply
with the directives of the Court. The second case involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to decide
a case within the 90-day reglementary period.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362
A complaint was filed against Judge Limsiaco for his issuance of a Release Order in favor of an
accused in a criminal case before him. After considering the evidence, the Court then found Judge
Limsiaco guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure and of violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785
Judge Limsiaco was charged with Delay in the Disposition of a Case by complainant Sancho E.
Guinanao, a plaintiff in an ejectment case pending before Judge Limsiaco. Guinanao claimed that
Judge Limsiaco failed to seasonably decide the subject ejectment case which had been submitted
for resolution.
The OCA referred the matter to us when Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment to the
administrative complaint. Under the pain of a show cause order for contempt for failure to heed
the OCA directives to file a comment, Judge Limsiaco informed us that he had already decided
the case on February 4, 2008. Subsequently, the Court resolved to declare Judge Limsiaco in
contempt and to impose a fine of P1,000.00 for his continued failure to file the required comment
to the administrative complaint. The records show that Judge Limsiaco paid the P1,000.00 fine but
did not submit the required comment.
Issue: Whether or not his conduct as a judge will constitute disciplinary measures to be imposed
by the Court against him.
Held: Yes. Case law teaches us that a judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly of justice; he or she must, therefore, be the first to follow the law and weave an
example for the others to follow.
For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in
the complaint thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct, and may even be considered as
outright disrespect for the Court. The office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders
of his superiors.
After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court is not a mere request and should be complied with
promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak
in character, but has likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not
contempt of the judicial system.
As demonstrated by his present acts, the Court find it clear that Judge Limsiaco failed to heed the
necessary pronouncements. In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco did not fully obey our
directives.
Judge Limsiaco failed to file the required comment to our show cause resolution despite several
opportunities given to him by the Court. His disobedience was aggravated by his insincere
representations in his motions for extension of time that he would file the required comments.
The records also show Judge Limsiaco’s failure to comply with our decision and orders. In A.M.
No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment/answer to the charge of irregularity
pertaining to his approval of applications for bail in several criminal cases before him. He also
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failed to pay the P40,000.00 fine which we imposed by way of administrative penalty for his gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Incidentally,
in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment on the verified complaint
despite several orders issued by the Court.
This duty is verbalized in Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:

SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in
order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the Judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to
reinforce public confidence in the Judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.
In A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, the considerable delay Judge Limsiaco incurred in deciding the subject
ejectment case has been clearly established by the records and by his own admission.
Judge Limsiaco admitted that he decided the ejectment case only on February 4, 2008. In turn, the
records show that Judge Limsiaco did not deny Guinanao’s claim that the ejectment case was
submitted for resolution as early as April 25, 2005. Thus, it took Judge Limsiaco more than two
(2) years to decide the subject ejectment case after it was declared submitted for resolution.
The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct10 which mandates judges to perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In line
with jurisprudence, Judge Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide a
case within the reglementary period.
The Court find Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. administratively liable for unethical conduct and
gross inefficiency under the provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically, Sections
7 and 8 of Canon 1, and Section 5 of Canon 6.
For these infractions, the Court hereby DECLARE all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits if any, FORFEITED. He is likewise barred from re-employment in any branch or service
of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
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Case 11: ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS vs. JUDGE
SANTOS B. ADIONG
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863 October 22, 2004
Facts: OCA found that the respondent judge was liable for gross ignorance of the law, oppression
and abuse of authority; that the respondent, as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Marawi City, has no
authority to enforce a preliminary injunction in Makati City where the principal office of FAPE
was located; that he violated the rights of FAPE employees when he summarily cited them in
contempt without regard to the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court. He abused his authority
when he issued a warrant of arrest on May 25, 2001 despite a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Held: Respondent judge’s failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated by his total
inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction. As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he
should have known that Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction
insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions. The rationale, as explained in Embassy Farms, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, is "that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin acts being performed or about to be performed outside its territorial
jurisdiction."
In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is not a mere deficiency in
prudence, or lapse of judgment on the part of respondent judge but a blatant disregard of basic
rules constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. The responsibility of judges to keep abreast of the
law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court, is a pressing
need. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules.
Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – not even judges.
The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity,
inasmuch as respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws necessary to the good
order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves. As in all other powers of the
court, the contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and
sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or
pettiness in the performance of his duties.13 The failure of a judge to afford the alleged contemner
the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of law deserves administrative sanction.
The seeming eagerness and haste with which respondent judge demonstrated in issuing the assailed
orders, warrants and writ betray a design to railroad judicial processes to favor a preferred litigant.
The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which displays obvious
partiality is deplorable and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires
a judge to behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.14 A judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of judicial authority
for having precipitately adjudged guilty of indirect contempt in disregard of the elementary rules
of procedure.
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Case 12: GARY P. ROSAURO vs. JUDGE ALFREDO E. KALLOS
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796 February 10, 2006
Facts: Respondent judge offered to sell complainant an unregistered parcel of land which the former
claimed to be his own. Complainant agreed to buy for P 2 million which he will donate to his children
(Marivic and Allan) provided that the judge to take care the registration thereof at the expense of the judge.
When complainant have already paid P 1,695,000.00, a certain lawyer filed a petition for the registration
of the subject land in the name of Marivic and Allan. The petition is however dismissed. Complainant
subsequently learned, from a receipt7 and the Deed of Absolute Sale respondent Judge gave him, that a
certain Rodelia Esplana-Guerrero ("Guerrero") owned the lot. Complainant also learned that Guerrero had
sought the reconstitution of her alleged title to Lot.
With this new information and respondent Judge’s failure to register Lot No. 1470, complainant
hired a lawyer to rescind his contract with respondent Judge. Accordingly, complainant’s counsel
wrote respondent Judge on 21 August 2001, demanding rescission. On 12 September 2001,
respondent Judge, using his sala’s official stationery, replied that he needs more time to confer
with Guerrero. After a few months, complainant’s counsel reiterated the demand for rescission.
Again using his sala’s official stationery, respondent Judge replied on 8 May 2002 that Guerrero
is still raising the amount to refund complainant. Investigating justice recommended for a six
month suspension to respondent judge for violation of rule 5.06 cannon 5 of Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct
Held: Respondent Judge Violated Rule 5.02 and Rule 5.06 and 2.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Rule 5.02 of the Code provides that "[a] judge shall refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to x x x, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. Here, respondent Judge took
part in a commercial transaction falling outside of the area delineated in Rule 5.03. Worse,
respondent Judge did so in an underhanded manner, concealing vital information on Lot No.
1470’s ownership and non-registrability until after the sale had been consummated.
By serving as Guerrero’s attorney-in-fact, respondent Judge also violated Rule 5.06 of the Code
which provides: A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian,
or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the immediate family,
and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. xxx
(Emphasis supplied) and accordingly negated its purpose, namely — to limit a judge's involvement
in the affairs and interests of private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial
duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of his official
functions.
Respondent Judge Also Violated Rule 2.03. The Court also finds respondent Judge liable for
violating Rule 2.03 of the Code in using official stationery for his correspondence with
complainant and the latter’s counsel regarding Lot No. 1470. A court’s stationery, with its official
letterhead, should only be used for official correspondence. By using his sala’s stationery other
than for official purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his office to benefit
Guererro (and himself) in violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code.
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Case 13: MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B. RAFOLS v.
JUDGE TEODORO A. DIZON
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1426 January 31, 2006
Facts: This case stemmed from a civil case with Case No. 6209. Atty. Barrios represented complainants in
a civil case of cancelling a Deed of Sale. Atty. Barrios visited the residence of the complainants informing
that the judge wanted to meet and talk with them. In a meeting with the judge together with Atty. Barrios,
Judge Dizon inform Manuel that in order to win the case, he must deliver P150,000 at noon the same day.
Manuel were able to collect P 50,000 which he personally handed to the judge. The Atty. Barrios visited
again the complainants on board on the judge’s car relaying that they must give their balance to the judge.
Complainants raised only P80,000 which they gave too the Atty. Barrios. In a phone call, the judge ask for
the remaining P30,000. Complainants corrected their which is balance P20,000 but the judge insisted that
he only received P70,000. Manuel then was able to complete the P150,000. According to the complainants,
the Atty. Barrios demanded ₱25,000.00 as his expenses in securing the testimony of a certain person. In
addition, the Atty. Barrios requested the complainants to borrow ₱60,000.00 from the bank because he
wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed to give ₱11,000.00 to his nephew who
was due to leave for work abroad. Judge Dizon was later suspended from the service pending this case.
During the pendency, respondent wished to retire. Investigating Justice recommended in the spirit of
Christmas compassion to approve the retirement in a condition to return whatever to complainant the
amount of money the judge get from them. OCA recommends otherswise to dismiss respondent judge.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge be dismissed from service by reason of bribery.
Held: Yes. The Court has consistently imposed the penalty of dismissal on magistrates found guilty of
bribery.
The acts of respondent in demanding and receiving money from litigants before his court for a
favorable judgment constitute a "serious charge" as defined in Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court. Specifically, respondent committed direct bribery and gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct both of which are enumerated in that provision. The
particular provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct which respondent violated are the following:
CANON 1 – A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF

THE JUDICIARY
Rule 1.01 – A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
CANON 2 – A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Rule 2.01 – A judge should so behave at all times as to as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
By demanding and receiving money from a litigant before his court in consideration of a favorable
judgment, respondent performed acts of impropriety which did violence to the integrity of the
judiciary and degraded public confidence in the courts. In Avanceña v. Liwanag, the Court
articulated:
A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner
that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty (Office of the Court Administrator v. Barron,
297 SCRA 376, 392 [1998]; Yuson v. Noel, 227 SCRA 1, 7 [1993]). Integrity in a judicial office
is more than a virtue; it is a necessity (Capuno v. Jaramillo, Jr., 234 SCRA 212, 232 [1994]).
Bribery is classified as a serious charge punishable by, inter alia, dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from re-employment or appointment in any public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations. (NBI v. Reyes, 326 SCRA 109 [2000]).
It constitutes a serious misconduct in office, which this Court condemns in the strongest possible
terms. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with
the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely erodes
the respect for the law and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears
apart the very bonds of our polity. (Calilung v. Suriaga, 339 SCRA 340 [2000] citing Haw Tay v.
Singayao, 154 SCRA 107 [1987]).
Case 14: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.

JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
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Facts: The current case is an administrative case that stemmed from the July 6, 2007 Memorandum
of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). A judicial audit team was created by the OCA to
investigate on alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of
theMunicipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. It was
alleged that certain package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for
instant marriages.The Court treated the Memorandum as a formal administrative complaint and
directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge
EdgemeloC. Rosales of Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of the MTCC in Cebu City to submit
their respective comments and suspended the judges pending resolution of the cases against them.
The judicial audit team found a lot of irregularities, such as:

 280 marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The logbooks indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage
certificates in the courts' custody.
 Unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars
 Marriages solemnized with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some court employees, and
the suspension or admonition of others.
Issue: Whether the recommendation of the OCA be granted
Held: The respondent judges violated Canons 2 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact
competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously said
that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary,
ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity." In connection with this, the
administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases
to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more
importantly of justice.
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful. Any impression
of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided.
This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in
the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish
the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
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Case 15: RUFINO CASIMIRO vs. Judge OCTAVIO FERNANDEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1525 January 29, 2004
Facts: Petitioner Rufino Casimiro filed complaint against respondents Judge Octavio Fernandez
and Clerk of Court Teresita Esteban for refusing to return his P4,000.00 cash bond which he posted
for his provincial liberty in a criminal case despite its dismissal. Casimiro gave the cash bond to
Fernandez who, in turn, handed it to Esteban with the directive that the latter issue the
corresponding receipt. No receipt was issued, however. As despite the order directing Esteban to
release Casimiro’s cash bond, the latter failed to secure it. Esteban asserted that Casimiro did not
post the cash bond with her, in support of which she submitted a copy of an undated letter from
Mrs. R. Fernandez, the wife of Judge Fernandez, wherein Mrs. Fernandez stated that she
had ―sent [complainant] P4,000.00 [via] Allied [Bank] check addressed to Atty. [Lamberto]
Magbintang. Fernandez averred that ―the cash bond of P4,000 of Mr. Rufino Casimiro was
already received by him, when [he] personally sent him a check for refund thereof, which
the latter had encashed.
Issue: Whether or not Fernandez is guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty when they did not
follow the usual procedure for the acceptance of cash bail bonds and the return thereof.
Held: While there is no direct and hard evidence that respondent Judge made personal use of the
cash bond, his wife’s issuance of her personal check to complainant in the amount of the cash
bond, which check respondent judge even admitted in his letter of April 17, 2002 to have been
drawn from an account which was treated as "a joint account" with his wife, indicates so. His
subsequent justification for such issuance of a check by his wife - mistaken belief - is too shallow
to merit persuasion.
By his actuations then respondent Judge placed his honesty and integrity under serious doubt. The
Code of Judicial Conduct dictates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. And Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics mandates
that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. A judge should thus be above reproach and free from the appearance
of impropriety, and should at all times conduct himself in such a manner as to be above suspicion.
As Montemayor v. Collado teaches: The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the disposition of justice, like the courts below, from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct,
at all times, must not only be characterized with propriety and above all must be above suspicion.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary.1âwphi1 A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that
his conduct, official and otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks
up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.
Both the safekeeping of funds and collections are essential to an orderly administration of justice
and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars which are
designed to promote full accountability for government funds. It needs no emphasis that failure to
deposit fiduciary collections immediately with the authorized bank deprives the National Treasury
of the interest which such collections should have earned.
Respondent judge’s paying back of the collection does not thus absolve him.
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Case 16: ROMEO T. ZACARIAS vs. JUDGE MARTONINO R.
MARCOS and SHIRLEY M. VISAYA
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1520 January 27, 2004
Facts: Complainant while securing for clearance in a criminal case instituted against him, he found
out that he was already convicted with regards to the case which is pending before MTC presided
by the respondent judge herein. He averred that respondent clerk summoned him in the chambers
of the judge where the respondents tried to extort from him in order to change the decision before
it will be promulgated. Respondent clerk asked him to post cash bond for his provisional liberty
which complainant paid and an Order of Release was granted in his favor. Investigating justice
recommended that respondents be penalized with severe reprimand and suspension from office for
a period of one (1) month for grave misconduct.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Held: Yes. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate "should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities"; and "should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence." Since appearance and reality fuse in the performance of judicial
functions, the judge -- like Caesar's wife -- must not only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion
In this case, respondent judge's September 28, 2000 Order releasing complainant after he had been
arrested "to serve sentence" finds no support in the records. It must be noted that Section 4 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court grants bail, as a matter of right, to all persons in custody even after
conviction by the municipal trial court. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, on the other
hand, provides that "[a] judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
accused has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal, or the accused has applied for
probation.
Indeed, the actions of respondent judge were not free from all appearances of impropriety. His
conduct lacked the meticulous care expected of one ever mindful of the image of the judiciary that
one portrays. It is the kind of behavior for which he must be administratively dealt with, as it
erodes public confidence in the judicial system
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Case 17: JOSE E. FERNANDEZ vs. JUDGE JAIME T. HAMOY
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1821 August 12, 2004
Facts: This is an administrative complaint against Judge Jaime T. Hamoy for Abuse of Authority,
Dereliction of Duty and Violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Complainant Jose
E. Fernandez is the counsel for plaintiff in two Civil Cases filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City, Branch 15, then presided by respondent Judge. The judge failed to render
judgement despite more than 10 years have lapsed. The judge brought with him the case when he
was transferred to RTC Caloocan Branch 130. Complaiant wrote to OCA for help of the speedy
disposition of the case. OCA referred the letter to respondent but nothing was heard from the latter.
OCA again seek comment from the judge but to no avail. OCA then issued resolution to the judge
to show cause on why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to file a comment.
Respondent finally filed an explanation alleging he simply forgot to submit his comment and that
he misplaced the records of the two civil cases and that his utility aide mixed up the records of the
cases assigned to the Caloocan court. Subsequently the judge filed a Manifestation that he had
already decided the assailed cases. OCA recommended that the judge be fined for failure to decide
within the reglementary period and was warned that a repetition of the offense will subject him to
a more severe penalty of either suspension or dismissal from service.
Issue: Whether or not the judge be sanctioned more than the recommendation of the OCA for
failure to decide a case within the reglementary period.
Held: Yes, he must be dismissed from service. It appears that this is not respondent Judge's first
offense. He had been previously admonished by the Court in a Resolution dated March 20, 2002
for failure to decide motions and pending incidents within the reglementary period, and was
warned that any subsequent transgressions he commits would be dealt with more severely.
Judges have a duty to decide their cases within the reglementary period. On meritorious grounds,
they may ask for additional time. It must be stressed, however, that their application for extension
must be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period. A close scrutiny of the records does
not disclose any attempt by respondent Judge to request for a reasonable extension of time to
dispose of the aforementioned cases. Not only did he consign the cases in limbo for an
unreasonable period of 13 years, worse, respondent Judge brought the records of the unresolved
cases to his new station without clearance from the Office of the Court Administrator. Upon his
transfer to another post, respondent Judge should have asked the permission of the Court
Administrator to bring the records of the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised the
parties of his action with respect thereto. This way, the Office of the Court Administrator and the
parties involved are aware of the progress of the cases instead of leaving them in the dark. More
importantly, this would dispel any suspicion that the respondent Judge was unduly holding on to
the records for corrupt or ill motives.
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Case 18: RANDALL-LYON GARCIA BUENO vs. JUDGE
SAIDALI M. DIMANGADAP
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1462 August 10, 2004
Facts: Complainant, Chief of Police of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, filed an administrative complaint
against respondent judge for grave abuse of discretion for the release of the apprehended suspects
in thirteen criminal complaints he filed in court for preliminary investigation. Complainant averred
that respondent judge anomalously released the suspects in various grounds such as imposing cash
bonds without issuance of receipts, dismissal without hearing, posting bonds of lower amount, no
record of payment of bonds and other causes.
In his comment, respondent judge denied complainant’s charges and claimed that they were false,
fabricated and unfounded accusations which caused him mental anguish, besmirched reputation
and sleepless nights.
The complaint was referred to Executive Judge and in his report, it was found that the thirteen
cases were filed for preliminary investigation, of which eleven were dismissed on various grounds.
However, the resolutions and records of the cases were not transmitted to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, as required under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Further, the cash bonds approved by respondent judge were lower than those recommended in the
Bail Bond Guide. Moreover, the records do not show that official receipts were issued for the said
cash bonds. The OCA recommends that respondent judge be dismissed from the service
Issue: Whether the respondent judge be dismissed from the service for grave abuse of discretion
for the release of the apprehended suspects.
Held: Yes, respondent judge’s continued adherence to improper procedures on preliminary

investigation and bail greatly prejudiced the administration of justice, thereby making him
unworthy to wear the judicial robe.
Respondent judge failed to comply with Rule 112, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which specifies the duty of the investigating judge upon conclusion of the preliminary
investigation.
Respondent judge’s failure to transmit the resolutions and records in eleven of the thirteen cases
for preliminary investigation was a disregard of the clear mandate of the aforecited provision that
it is mandatory for the investigating judge to transmit to the provincial or city prosecutor the
resolution dismissing or admitting the complaint, together with the entire records of the case.
All the foregoing clearly show respondent judge’s ignorance of the law and the rules. As a judge,
he is the visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, he is expected to be "the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence" to
maintain public confidence in the legal system.8 Judges are expected to keep abreast of
developments in law and jurisprudence9 and is expected to have more than a cursory knowledge
of the rules on preliminary investigation and bail. Respondent judge’s failure to observe the basic
laws and rules is not only inexcusable, but renders him susceptible to administrative sanction for
gross ignorance of the law and incompetence. Failure to follow basic legal commands embodied
in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one is excused, and
surely not a judge
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Case 19: JORDAN P. OKTUBRE vs. JUDGE RAMON P.
VELASCO
A.M. No. MTJ -02-1444 July 22, 2004
Facts: Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy Louise D'Arcy vda. De Paler ("D'Arcy"),
a non-resident American. D'Arcy is the widow of Abraham Paler ("Abraham"), a resident of
Maasin City, Southern Leyte. Respondent Judge is Abraham's nephew. D’Arcy administers a
building built by his husband through complainant. Respondent stayed in the building with the
permission of D’Arcy but an extension to stay was denied by the later for she will be using the
room occupied by respondent. Nevertheless, the judge continued staying in the building.
Because refusal of extension, the judge send letters using the letter head of his office to tenants
that he is the new administrator of the building and that all rentals be deposited in his MTC Office.
He also sent letter to D’Arcy strongly worded to intimidate her. He also moved out in the garage
a jeep owned by D’Arcy without the permission of the complainant. He also destroyed the padlock
of the complainant’s room and changed the padlock of the gate for the ingress and egress of the
building. He also false accused the complainant for robbery which caused the latter to be put
behind bars for 6 hours. He used his seal as a judge for personal use. OCA recommends that
respondent judge be fined.
Issue: Whether the Judge must be sanctioned with dismissal despite OCA’s recommendation of
fine only.
Held: Yes, Canon 2, Rule 2.03 ("Rule 2.03") of the Code of Judicial Conduct ("Code") provides:
“A judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests
of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence the judge.”
Rule 3.12 of the Code ("Rule 3.12"), which is substantially similar to Rule 137, Section 1 ("Rule
137, Section 1") of the 1964 Rules of Court, mandates that – A judge should take no part in a
proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include,
among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; (b)
the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matters in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material witness therein; (c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject
of review; (d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth
degree or to counsel within the fourth degree; (e) the judge knows that the judge's spouse or child
has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding.
Respondent Judge should know that a court's letterhead should be used only for official
correspondence. Respondent Judge aggravates his liability when, in his letters to the tenants, he
further required them to pay their rent at the MTC Maasin, although he was then staying at the
Paler building. By these calculated steps, respondent Judge in the words of Rule 2.03, clearly
intended to "use the prestige of his judicial office" to advance the interest of his maternal co-heirs.
Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not
disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No.
5485, resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated
Rule 3.12 and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of
criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation in this case does not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such enumeration is not
exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is
related to a party or to counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judge from doing so in cases where he is a
party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his own case is anathema to the notion of
impartiality that such was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by
Section 1 of Rule 137.
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Case 20: NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) vs.
JUDGE LUISITO T. ADAOAG
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1503 November 16, 2006
Facts: Respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest to Desiree Legario for violation of BP 22.
Judge Adaoag informed Legario that she should prepare a money amounting to P 20,000 for the
dismissal of the case. Legario seek the help of NBI. NBI performed an entrapment operation where
they succeeded. Judge Adaoag was suspended pending final outcome of the criminal procedure
against him. During the suspension, Judge Adaoag issued a warrant of arrest. Respondent Judge
was thus directed to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service for violating the
resolution suspending him from service. In his reply, he said that he intended to return the money
but NBI officials came in before he could return it. Respondent Judge was recommended by Justice
Atienza of the Office of the Ombudsman to be dismissed from service for violation of R.A. No.
3019, as amended.
Issue: Whether respondent committed bribery and must be dismissed from service.
Held: Yes. In the instant case, the intention of respondent Judge to accept the money was clearly
established by his act of pocketing the same.1âwphi1 That he touched the marked bills, contrary
to his testimony that he merely peeked at the envelope, is proven by the results of the laboratory
examination that the palmar and dorsal aspects of his left and right hands were positive for
fluorescent powder. It is hard to believe that he intended to return the money to Legario because,
instead of immediately rushing towards the door to catch up with Legario and return the money,
respondent Judge pocketed it. Indeed, such act shows a resolve to take the money as his own and
not to return the same.
Respondent Judge tainted the image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to
keep it all times unsullied and worthy of the people’s trust. The Court has time and again
admonished judges to conduct themselves in a manner that is free even from the appearance of
impropriety. For judicial officers to enjoy the trust and respect of the people, it is necessary that
they live up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded by the profession and by the Code of
Judicial Conduct. This is especially true in the case of judges who, on a daily basis, interact with
the public. Their official conduct, as well as personal behavior should always be beyond reproach.
Bribery is classified as a serious charge punishable by, inter alia, dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from re-employment or appointment in any public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations. (NBI v. Reyes, 326 SCRA 109 [2000]).
It constitutes a serious misconduct in office, which this Court condemns in the strongest possible
terms. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with
the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely erodes
the respect for the law and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears
apart the very bonds of our polity. (Calilung v. Suriaga, 339 SCRA 340 [2000] citing Haw Tay v.
Singayao, 154 SCRA 107 [1987]).
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Case 21: Spouses ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELISA A.
NAZARENO vs. JUDGE ENRIQUE M. ALMARIO
[A.M. No. RTJ-94-1195. February 26, 1997]
Facts: Spouses Romeo and Eliza Nazareno filed a sworn complaint against Judge Enrique Almario, then
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 15, Naic Cavite. The complaint dated February 28,
1994 alleged that Judge Almario asked money from the spouses multiple times in exchange of acquiring
favorable decisions. The spouses have four cases pending before the sala of Judge Almario, including
Romeo’s civil case where he served as an estate administrator. In one instance, Almario invited the spouses
to his chamber. He told Romeo that he will change him as administrator of the state because of his
conviction in a criminal case filed against him by his sister Natividad. In another instance in 1990, he invited
Eliza in his chamber, where he said he would need plenty of money because he was already retiring. In
November 1992, the Judge sent his employee and told spouses that the Judge was asking for food to be
taken to the a seaside restaurant in Naic, Cavite. On 14 June 1994, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) based on findings that the matters/issues raised in the complaint are factual in nature recommended
that the charges against Judge Almario be assigned to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for a
full blown investigation. On 27 July 1994, the Court approved the OCA recommendation and designated
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales to conduct an investigation and submit a report
and recommendation. Judge Almario compulsorily retired in July 1955.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Almario should be held liable despite his retirement
Held: Yes. The time honored rule is that a public official whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice,
be he a judge of a lower court or tribunal or a justice of the appellate courts, should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest. In
the present case, respondent's denial of the charges leveled by complainants that he had asked for and
accepted food contributions on at least two (2) occasions from litigants (herein complainants) is
contradicted by his own witnesses, Roldan Alcantara and Jose R.. Salvadora, Jr., who are both employees
of the court. Nothing in the testimonies of these two (2) court employees shows any motivation other than
to tell the truth.\
On the charge of having accepted P20,000.00 from the Nazareno spouses and receiving cash in exchange
for his salary check which he never gave to Mrs. Nazareno, the Court agrees with the conclusions of Justice
Morales that complainant Elisa Nazareno had convincingly proven having given: a) P10,000.00 to
respondent judge on two (2) occasions and b) cash for respondent's salary check. As correctly observed by
Justice Morales, the testimony of Mrs. Nazareno was undented even when subjected to an extended cross
examination by respondent judge.[17]In sum, the Court finds the charges of gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming a judge as having been sufficiently substantiated. Judge Enrique M. Almario deserves no less
than the penalty of dismissal from the service.
However, based on the records of this case, respondent judge had already compulsorily retired in July 1995.
The proper penalty, therefore, in lieu of his removal from office, is forfeiture of all his retirement benefits.
Judge Almario is also barred from any reemployment in government service, including government-owned
and –controlled corporations.
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Case 22: LUCIANA VDA. DE ARAGO vs. JUDGE PATERNO T.
ALVAREZ
A.M. No. RTJ-89-318 March 25, 1997
Facts: Mrs. Luciana Vda. de Arago filed an administrative complaint against Judge Paterno T.
Alvarez, presiding judge of Branch II,Regional Trial Court of Borongan Eastern Samar. This is on
the grounds of grave misconduct in office and corrupt practices. Judge Alvarez is accused of
demanding and actually receiving from de Arago and her in-laws the sum of P17,000 in exchange
promised positive results in a criminal and a civil case. Judge Alvarez refuted the complaints,
saying it was politically motivated. In his answer, Judge Alvarez said, "The truth is that, accused
in Criminal Case No. (88-56) 046, For Robbery with Homicide are known to be identified with
Mayor Anacta who is a political enemy of the Aragos. It happened that Mayor Anacta is my
compadre being a sponsor in the wedding of my son Nicasio Alvarez II. Because of this
relationship the Aragos are of the belief that I will be influenced by the Mayor. . The complainant
is the sister-in-law of Mr. Arago who ran against Mayor Anacta in the January 1988 elections and
lost to Mayor Anacta. There is, therefore, some political color to this case."
Eladio Arago, husband of complainant Luciana Vda. de Arago and son of Restituto Arago, was
robbed and killed on 21 July 1988 by the accused in Criminal Case No. 88-10016. Restituto Arago
is also an aggrieved party in the case and party litigant in Civil Case No. 88-162 against Froilan
Yaona, et al., for Breach of Contract, both cases then pending before the sala of respondent Judge
Alvarez. Respondent is known to the Arago family, being a frequent visitor in their house which
is located in Barrio Songco, Borongan, Eastern Samar where respondent's boarding house is also
located. It was respondent who initially offered to assist complainant and Prescila Arago Racal
with regard to said criminal case then undergoing preliminary investigation at the municipal trial
court and the civil case pending in respondent's sala in return for pecuniary considerations when
the driver, Rudy Salunoy, fetched them in the morning of the second week of August 1988.
The Supreme Court en banc directed a resolution referring the case to Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Regina Ordonez-Benitez for investigation.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Alvarez should be held liable? If yes, what penalty should be imposed?
Held. Yes, Judge Alvarez liable. After a careful review of the record, including the transcript of
the testimonies of the witnesses and the documentary evidence submitted by the parties, the Court
agrees with the conclusions of fact and the recommendation of the Investigating Justice. The Court
is more than inclined to give more weight to the allegations of the complainant. The alleged
demand for money was not an isolated incident but a series of demands — "unabated" as
complainant described it. We cannot conceive of any reason why complainant would enumerate
different amounts and dates when respondent demanded and received money from her and her in-
laws which would require more evidence than one incident only if the said charges were not true.
To our mind complainant was not relating a fairy tale.In line with his own professed belief that "it
is part of the hazards of his position that baseless and unfounded charges may be filed against him
by disgruntled litigants" respondent should have scrupulously avoided any suspicion of
impropriety in all his acts.
Judge Alvarez is dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, with prejudice to
reemployment in the government, and GOCCs. He is ordered to immediately cease and desist from
performing his duties.
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Case 23: DR. CORA J. VIRATA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO G.
SUPNET
[A.M. No. 02-2-12-SC. November 27, 2002]
Facts: Dr. Cora J. Virata, a 79-year-old medical doctor, sent two letters to the Oversight
Committee of the Supreme Court, accusing Pasay Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 47 Judge
Francisco Supnet o f unethical, immoral, and illegal actuations. Judge Supnet asked money from
Dr. Virata multiple times, in exchange of a promise that she will win in a criminal complaint
against Editha S. Bailon, for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or BP 22. In the seriousness
of the charge, the Oversight Committe recommended to the Court that respondent be directed to
hold in abeyance the reported promulgation of the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-3586 to 88
on February 13, 2002, and to suspend further proceedings thereon until further notice. The Court,
in a Resolution dated February 12, 2002, approved and adopted the recommendation of the
Oversight Committee and required respondent judge to comment on the complaint within ten (10)
days from notice thereof. On February 19, 2002, the Court referred the matter to Assistant Court
Administrator (ACA) Carlos L. de Leon for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the records of the case. ACA de Leon's report disclosed the candid
accounts of complainant Dr. Virata as to her five (5) telephone conversations with respondent
Judge Supnet, wherein the latter made direct monetary demands from her.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Supnet should be dismissed from service
Held: Yes. Judge Supnet was found guilty of corruption. The acts of respondent Judge in
demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court constitute serious
misconduct in office. Serious misconduct is such conduct which affects a public officers
performance of his duties as such officer and not only that which affects his character as a private
individual. For serious misconduct to warrant a dismissal from the service, there must be reliable
evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to
violate the law. t must (1) be serious, important, weighty, momentary, and not trifling; (2) imply
wrongful intention and not mere error of judgment; and (3) have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of his duties.[9] All these elements are present in the case at bar.
A judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He must be first
in observing the law scrupulously. We cannot tolerate a discordant robe in the judiciary. This Court
condemns in the strongest possible terms the misconduct of respondent judge. It is this kind of
gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes the respect for law
and the courts. Corruption operates to make him a deceased member, which must be decisively
severed from the body of the judiciary and cast aside. Judge Supnet is ordered dismissed from
service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits.
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Case 24: CARLOS DIONISIO vs. HON. ZOSIMO V. ESCANO
Facts: Carlos Dionisio filed a letter-complaint to the Supreme Court charging Judge Zosimo
Escano, judge of Parañaque RTC Branch 259, with allegedly using the bulletin board of the court
in advertising for attractive waitresses and cooks for his restaurant business. The same
advertisement appeared on the classified ads of Manila Bulletin. Taking note of this advertisement,
a staff member of ABS-CBN's public service show "Hoy Gising!" disguised as an applicant was
sent to conduct a videotaped investigation on the veracity of the advertisement. The incidents of
the investigation were aired live on televesion in their regular program. Respondent admitted that
he owns the restaurant. He also said the following: "I will be requiring yung mga waitress, yung
medyo naka-mini or depende sa mga uniporme. Tapos yung medyo paseksi din dito (respondent
was making gestures on the upper part of his body, obviously referring to just above the breast).
Yung konti lang naman, yung medyo paduda, alam mo na, I hope you are getting me, yung medyo
nakaano nang konti yon... May mga customers tayo na mga DOM. Medyo hahawak-hawak sa
kamay." For singers, he explained, "Pagkanta mo ron, hindi yung nakaganyan ka, kwan ka.
Magsuot ka ng medyo makatawag pansin sa mga lalaki Siempre lalake, mga crowd natin lalaki.
Kung umikot makikita pati panty, pati ano. Paseksihan na yon, eh. That's the Entertainment World
Today." Juddge Escano answered the complaint by saying that it would be convenient for him to
conduct the screening of applicants in his office since his residence is three kilometers away from
the main gate of the subdivision. The case was referred to Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes of
the Court of Appeals for investigation. Justice Gonzaga-Reyes established that Judge Escano
posted the advertisement on the court's bulletin board.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Zosimo should be held liable. If yes, what penalty should be imposed?
Held: Yes, Judge Zosimo is liable for violation Rule 2.00 of Canon 2 and Rules 5.02 and 5.03 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Zosimo Escano has behaved in a manner unbecoming of his
judicial robe, betrayed the people's high expectations, and diminished the esteem in which they
hold the judiciary in general. It is of no import that respondent Judge's act of using the court's
facilities be motivated by a good cause, no matter how honorable. The excuse advanced by
respondent Judge that in order for the prospective applicants not to have difficulty of locating their
residence it would be more convenient if the screening was made inside his court, is a reason
lacking in circumspection and delicadeza. It over-extends his authority as judge by failing to avoid
situations that make him suspect to committing immorality. For judges are enjoined to avoid not
just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. This is true not only
in the performance of their judicial duties but in all their activities, including their private lives.
Judges must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. he acts
of posting advertisements for the restaurant personnel on the court bulletin board, using his court
address to receive the applications, and of screening applicants in his court constitute involvement
in private business and improper use of office facilities for the promotion of the family business
in violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. The restriction enshrined under Rules 5.02 and 5.03 of
the Code of Judicial Ethics on judges with regard to their own business interests is based on the
possible interference which may be created by these business involvements in the exercise of their
judicial duties which may tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the courts as the bastion of
justice. Judges must not allow themselves to be distracted from the performance of their judicial
tasks by other lawful enterprises. It has been a time honored rule that judges and all court
employees should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high respect accorded to
those who wield the gavel of justice. Judge Escano is meted the penalty of suspension for six
months.
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Case 25: VICTORINO CRUZ vs. JUDGE REYNOLD Q. YANEZA
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1175. March 9, 1999]
Facts: Radio broadcaster Raffy Tulfo furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with
a copy of the unsworn letter-complaint of a certain Victorino Cruz against Judge Reynold Yaneza
of MeTC-Branch 45, Navotas, Manila. He is accused of violating Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure by irregularly approving bail bonds from outside of his jurisdiction and by
isuance of release orders. In addition, Yaneza, together with his clerk of court, is accused of
extorting money from a litigant. The OCA found that Judge Yaneza unlawfully approved bail
bonds and ordered the release of an accused charged with a non-bailable offense pending in another
court.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Yaneza should be dismissed
Held: Yes. Judge Yaneza must be dismissed. Judge Yaneza cannot shield himself from the
consequences of his persistent deviant activities by the simple invocation of good faith and the
supplication that he was only moved by pity for the poor and forsaken accused. The numerous
cases and series of events previously adverted to manifest without any modicum of doubt the
gravity of his incompetence and arbitrariness. As a judge, respondent must have the basic rules at
the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional competence at all times. ince Judge
Yaneza presides over MeTC-Br. 54 in Navotas, Metro Manila, his territorial jurisdiction is
confined therein. Therefore, to approve bail applications and issue corresponding release orders in
cases pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction, some even in courts as far as Nueva
Ecija and Palawan, particularly so where the accused are detained thereat and not in his jurisdiction
and therefore cannot personally appear before him as required, constitute ignorance of the law so
gross as to amount to incompetence and even corruption. Respondent Judge argues in his
Supplemental Explanation that it is his honest belief and interpretation that his single-sala MeTC
in Navotas, being part of the Metropolitan Trial Court salas spread out in Metro Manila, has the
lawful authority to act on bail bonds posted by accused in criminal cases lodged in other courts
salas, within Metro Manila or otherwise detained within Metro Manila which (he) honestly deems
a contiguous area, in situations or occasions that the handling trial court judge is absent or not
available. We remain unconvinced. The above commentary is not only tiresome; it is futile. This
Court has the duty and prerogative to define the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of court.
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Case 26: THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE IBP
BAGUIO-BENGUET CHAPTER, CESAR G. ORACION,
PRESIDENT vs. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN
[A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691. January 16, 2004]
Facts: The officers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Baguio-Benguet
Chapter filed an administrative complaint gainst Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Baguio City, for gross ignorance of the law, gross violation of
constitutional rights of the accused, arrogance, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
oppression and graft and corruption. Besides not giving the accused the opportunity to present his
side, Judge Pamintuan is also accused of arrogance by insutling lawyers, berating lowly security
guards, insulting litigants, verbally assaulting lawyers, and looking down at old lawyers. He also
insulted retired Court of Appeals Justice Sixto Domondon because he came to court late once. The
Investigating Justices recommended the dismissal of Juge Pamintuan for gross ignorance of the
constitutional rights of the accused, arrogance, oprresive conduct, and violations of the Canon of
Judicial Ethics.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Pamintuan should be held liable
Held: Yes.
1. The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the imposition of penalties in crimes
punishable by the Revised Penal Code is a basic precept. The respondent judges repeated
misapplication thereof in quite a number of criminal cases he had rendered constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence. It bears stressing that.. "Competence is a mark
of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes
the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law.
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to
be proficient in the law." The respondent judge has utterly failed to live up to the standard of
competence required of him. His erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
committed not just once or twice but in at least seventeen (17) instances is a compelling
evidence of his gross ignorance of the law.
2. The unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the motions submitted for his
resolution clearly constituted a violation of the parties constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of their cases.
3. As correctly enumerated by the Investigating Justice, the following incidents establish the
respondent judges arrogant and oppressive conduct:
a. Arrogance
When he tried to limit the cross examination by Atty. Fernando Manapat Jr., who was
representing the accused in People vs. Andrada, of the prosecution witness to ten (10)
minutes with an advice of not repeating questions that were already asked during the direct
examination;
b. Arrogance and Oppression

Atty. J[o]ris Karl B. Dacaw[i], a young lawyer, who became the beneficiary of respondents
arrogance and oppressive conduct on 11 March 1999. On said date, Atty. Dacaw[i], as
plaintiffs lawyer, moved for the cancellation of the hearing of the case entitled Alejo
Cabre[r]os vs. Susie Edralin alleging although his witness Alejo Cabre[r]os was present,
said witness however was not feeling well. This simple manifestation caught the ire of
respondent judge who instantaneously ordered Alejo Cabre[r]os to stand and told him not
to pay his lawyer his attorneys fees because he did not do anything for that day;
c. Oppression and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Atty. Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez, while appearing as counsel de oficio for Liwayway Cruz in
Criminal Case No. 7304-R, for estafa last 29 July 1999, was extremely embarrassed when he was
ordered by respondent judge to stand in behalf of accused, who was then absent despite due notice,
and face the Clerk of Court during the reading of the full text of the decision when said case was
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called for promulgation. Accordingly, Atty. Agranzamendez asked respondent judge to allow him
to take his seat as there were several people inside the courtroom who, being unmindful of the
rules might think that he was the accused. But his pleas, however, got respondent mad, for instead
of allowing him to sit down, respondent instead banged his gavel and told Atty. Agranzamendez
not to argue with the court and to stand straight as he leaned over avoid the glances of the Clerk
of Court.
Clearly, the respondent judge has failed to observe courtesy and civility to the lawyers as well as
to the litigants who appeared before him.
Finally, the Court frowns upon the highly irregular practice of the respondent judge of
promulgating a decision, copies of which were not then ready for release to the parties.
This conduct of the respondent judge was utterly unbecoming a magistrate and violated the
following canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 1 - A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE

JUDICIARY
Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Rule 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
Rule 3.01. - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
Judge Pamintuan is suspended for one year.
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Case 27: LUALHATI M. LIWANAG vs. JUDGE PATERNO H.
LUSTRE
[A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999]
Facts: Complainant Lualhati Liwanag sent a letter to the Supreme Court, praying for the dismissal
of Judge Paterno Lustre of the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna. Attached to her letter
was a sworn statement, detailing how the Judge allegedly molested her. In one instance, the Judge
kissed her torridly in the lips, and in other case, he asked her to masturbate him. Liwanag is the
spouse of Jose Zafra, who filed 12 counts of violation of BP 22 against three indiviudals. These
individual issued checks amounting to P3.5-million but were dishonored. In November 1994, she
personally went to the office of Judge Lustre to inquire on the status of the case. She asked here if
it is possible to schedule hearings from January to February 1995. He told her to come back on
December 14, 1994, after the hearing. She then returned. He said that he had prepared an order
against the accused. Liwanag replied, saying she and her husband would give the five percent of
the payment of the accused as token. He stood up and said he does not need the money. While he
was giving a copy of the order, he touched her shoulder, down to the breasts. He told her to return
in January, but she did not. Judge Lustre then delayed the proceedings of the case. In March 1995,
she went to see the Judge at 7 am. He ushered her inside and kissed her on the lips. He even asked
her to masturbate him. The Judge then again delayed the proceedings, and asked Liwanag to see
him again, but she did not accede.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Lustre is liable despite his retirement during the pendency of the case
Held: Yes. We find credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag. Her narration
bears the earmarks of truth, for the incidents giving rise to the acts complained of are so finely
etched by her as to preclude any suspicion of wild imagining or other similar fictive handiwork. It
is an essential baring of rage, revulsion and disgust. The OCA recommended that the case be
formally docketed as an administrative complaint and that respondent be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
of the government, including government-owned and -controlled corporations. Clearly, we have
to review the records of this case for a comprehensive view of the entire controversy. Moreover,
it is essential to lay stress on basic canons of conduct applicable to judges, in whatever level of the
judicial hierarchy they may be. Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent
due to the unjustifiable delays in the hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she falsely accuse
respondent with sexual molestation only to get back at him? This goes against the grain of human
nature and therefore unlikely. She should know that by revealing her sexual misadventures with
respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she would only be exposing herself and
her family to shame and ridicule. In lieu of suspension or dismissal, the Court fined Lustre of
P40,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
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Case 28: ESTANISLAO V. ALVIOLA vs JUDGE HENRY B.
AVELINO
A.M. No. MTJ-P-08-1697 February 29, 2008
Facts: Judge Henry Avelino of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pontevedra-Panay, is
charged for gross neglect of duty relative to a civil case for unlawful detainer and damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 405 or "Spouses Estanislao V. Alviola and Carmen L. Alviola v.
Spouses Dullano and Theresa Suplido." Judge Avelino had not issued a pre-trial order, after the
termination of the pre-trial conference. Complainant had already filed before the sala of respondent
judge a manifestation regarding this matter but respondent Judge still failed to issue the required
pre-trial order. espondent Judge admitted that the delay in the issuance of the pre-trial order was
due to the fact that he had opted to concentrate on the disposal of other cases required to be
terminated before 30 December 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. Respondent judge, thus,
argued that he cannot be held liable for gross neglect of duty due to his efforts to unclog the courts
docket of pending cases as borne out by the record. The Office of the Court Administrator found
Judge Avelino guilty of violating Paragraph 8, Title I (A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC. The said
provision requires judges to issue the required pre-trial order within ten (10) days after the
termination of the pre-trial conference
Issue: Whether or not the OCA finding should be affirmed
Held: Yes. Judge Avelino is guilty of gross inefficiency. The reason for the adoption of the Rules
on Summary Procedure is precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases. It is
therefore not encouraging when, as in the case at bar, it is the judge himself who occasions the
delay sought to be prevented by the rule. By no means is the aim of speedy disposition of cases
served by respondent judges inaction. Section 9 (1) Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised Rules
of Court provides that undue delay in rendering an order is classified as a less serious charge
punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Judge Avelino is suspended for two months.
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Case 29: GREGORIO LIMPOT LUMAPAS vs. JUDGE CAMILO
E. TAMIN
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519 June 26, 2003
Facts: Respondent Judge Camilo Tan is charged with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse
of authority for refusing to fulfill the ministerial duty of issuing a writ of execution of the final and
executory judgment in a civil case. Respondent judge claimed that the Court of Appeals awarded
to the complainant only a conditional right of possession to the land in question, conditioned upon
the validity of his title to be determined in an appropriate proceeding. Since the complainant had
yet to institute the proper proceedings in court to determine the validity of his title to the land in
question, the issuance of a writ of execution was premature. According to the respondent, the
situation poses a dilemma for him. On one hand, if he issues the writ of possession before the
complainant has complied with the suspensive condition imposed in the Court of Appeals decision,
he would be liable for illegally issuing the writ of possession. On the other hand, if he does not
issue the writ of possession, the Office of the Court Administrator would prosecute the instant
administrative case. The Court referred the matter to Court of Appeals Justice Conchita Carpio-
Morales for investigation and recommendation. Justice Morales found Judge Lumapas liable for
grave abuse of authority.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Lumapas acted in grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the
law
Held: Yes. The complainant has the right of possession pending the determination of the validity
of his title. Moreover, it is absurd to recognize the right of possession of the complainant and in
the same stroke makes it dependent on a determination of the validity of his title.It is hardly
necessary to remind respondent that judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher
tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from which all other courts should take their
bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it
be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. f at all, this omission not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in respondent’s character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court’s lawful
orders and directives which is only too deserving of reproof. Indifference or defiance to the Court’s
orders or resolutions may be punished with dismissal, suspension, or fine as warranted by the
circumstances. Judge Tamin is dismissed from service.
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Case 30: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, represented by SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA,
Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROLANDO G. MISLANG
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372

[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3736-RTJ]
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF), represented by ATTY. JOSE ROBERTO

F. PO, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROLANDO G. MISLANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 167, Regional
Trial Court, Pasig City, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369
Facts: Judge Rolando Mislang of Branch 167 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 167,
was facing administrative complaints by the Department of Justice and Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF) for issuing orders that supposedly favored Globe Asiatique President Delfin
Lee. Lee is facing syndicated estafa that constituted economic sabotage for the multi-billion
housing scam that defrauded the HDMF or PAGIBIG Fund. Judge Mislang released orders that
stopped the DOJ to investigate Lee's involvement in the scam. After a careful review and
evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended in both
Complaints that Judge Mislang be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be dismissed
from service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Mislang should be dismissed from service
Held: Yes. The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings and
recommendations of the OCA. Verily, Judge Mislang manifested serious lack of knowledge and
understanding of the basic legal principles on prejudicial question and on jurisdiction in petitions
for suspension of criminal action based on prejudicial questions, as prescribed by Sections 6 and
7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard
of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to
have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or
failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance
of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same
applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Such, however, is not the
case with Judge Mislang. Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to know
it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge is presumed
to have acted with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions. But a blatant
disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars
enjoining their strict compliance, upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to
corresponding administrative sanctions. Judge Mislang was also found guilty in a previous
administrative case. Judge Mislang is dismissed from service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
and with prejudice to reemployment.
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Case 31: Judge Martonino R. Marcos v. Judge Perla V. Cabrera-
Faller
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472 January 24, 2017
Facts: The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant's grandson, Marc Andrei Marcos
(Marc Andrei), during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fratemitas (Lex Leonum) held on July
29, 2012 at the Veluz Farm, Dasmariñas City, Cavite.
Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused in the said case, Judge Cabrera-
Faller issued an order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and, at the same time, the
archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest of the accused. However, ten days later,
Judge Cabrera-Faller issued another order directing the recall of the warrants of arrest of the three
accused which she claimed were issued inadvertently. And on August 15, 2013, the said judge
issues the Omnibus Order quashing, lifting and setting aside the warrants for their arrest and
ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for lack of probable cause.
The order of dismissal prompted complainant to file this administrative case against Judge
Cabrera-Faller.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Cabrera-Faller is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and for violating
the Code of Judicial Conduct
Held:
Yes. The Court ruled finds Judge Cabrera-Faller guilty of gross ignorance of the law and for
violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 3. 01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULE 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
RULE 3.02 - In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
CANON 3 - A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.
When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the warrants, she also archived the case. She, however, did not
cite any ground in A.C. No. 7-A-92 for the suspension of the proceedings. What she did was
unprecedented. She did not even bother to wait for the return of the warrants or wait for the six-
month period. By doing so, she exhibited bias, if not incompetence and ignorance of the law and
jurisprudence. It could also be that she knew it, but she opted to completely ignore the law or the
regulations. Certainly, it was a case of grave abuse of discretion as her actuations were not in
accord with law or justice.
Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. The
appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of
justice as actual bias or prejudice.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. They are likewise mandated to be faithful to the law and to maintain
professional competence at all times. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be
proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of the laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Basic
rules must be at the palms of their hands for ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the
mainspring of injustice.
Unfortunately, Judge Cabrera-Faller fell short of this basic canon. Her utter disregard of the laws
and rules of procedure, to wit: the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, the recall
of the warrant of arrest which she claimed were issued inadvertently and the hasty dismissal of the
case displayed her lack of competence and probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of
authority. All these constitute gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.
Judge Cabrera-Faller was dismissed from service.
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Case 32: Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Rosabella
Tormis
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 March 12, 2013
Facts: The administrative matter stemmed from the Report of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) Audit Team which conducted the judicial audit on June 16 to 28, 2008 in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City. The team examined the records
of 5,120 cases consisting of 4,466 criminal and 654 civil cases.
The report revealed that Branch 4 does not maintain a docket book or any similar system of record-
keeping and monitoring. The Audit team found a lot of irregularities committed by Branch 4.
While recognizing the suspensions of Judge Tormis as one of the reasons for the delay in the
disposition of cases, the OCA observed that several of the cases had been overdue for decision or
resolution even prior to her suspension.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Tormis violated the Rules of Court and Supreme Court rules,
regulations and directives
Held: Yes. Judge Tormis is found guilty of gross insufficiency, violation of the Supreme Court
rules and gross ignorance of the law for having committed the following:
(1) undue delay in the disposition of cases; (2) mismanagement of the court and case records; (3)
non-promulgation of decisions; and (4) issuing a warrant of arrest without first apprising the
accused of the charge against him.
The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness
of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. The delay in
deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness.
An orderly and efficient case management system is no doubt essential in the expeditious
disposition of judicial caseloads, because only thereby can the judges, branch clerks of courts, and
the clerks-in-charge of the civil and criminal dockets ensure that the court records, which will be
the bases for rendering the judgments and dispositions, and the review of the judgments and
dispositions on appeal, if any, are intact, complete, updated, and current. Such a system necessarily
includes the regular and continuing physical inventory of cases to enable the judge to keep abreast
of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that everything in the court is in proper order.
In contrast, mismanaged or incomplete records, and the lack of periodic inventory definitely cause
unwanted delays in litigations and inflict unnecessary expenses on the parties and the State.
The Court also notes that although dismissed by the Court, Judge Tormis was involved in four
other administrative cases. At present, there are still two pending cases against her. Judge Tormis’
conduct as a repeat offender exhibits her unworthiness to don the judicial robes and merits a
sanction heavier than what is provided by our rules and jurisprudence.
Judge Tormis is dismissed from service.
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Case 33: Judge Dolores Espaol v. Judge Lorinda Toledo-Mupas
A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ April 19, 2007
Facts: This case started with Judge Mupas of the MTC of Dasmarinas, Cavite, filing an
administrative complaint against Judge Espaol of the (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, for
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service. She alleged that Judge Espaol illegally usurp the functions of the
Executive Judge of Dasmarias, Cavite, and ordered her (Mupas), in connection with Criminal Case
No. 9292-01 (People v. Belinda Ventura Singello), to desist from accepting, for preliminary
investigation,' criminal cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, where suspects
are apprehended pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Judge Espaol, in her comment, said that Judge Mupas operated the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite as
a One-Stop Shop where criminal suspects apprehended without a warrant are ordered detained in
the municipal jail by virtue of an unsigned Detention Pending Investigation of the Case, in lieu of
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as prescribed by R.A. No.
7438 and by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The case against Judge Espaol was dismissed by OCA and Judge Mupas was required to answer
to the allegations against her.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Mupas should be cited for violation of Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Held: Yes, the court finds Judge Mupas guilty of gross ignorance of law for the practice of issuing
"Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" orders
Canon 6 Competence and Diligence - Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and
enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of
judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should
be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
Respondent is presumed to know the basic measures to protect the rights of the accused during
preliminary investigation. Sadly, Respondent failed in this regard.Instead, she maintained the
practice of issuing this highly improper order, i.e., Detention Pending Investigation of the Case,
just to put a semblance of legality in the detention of the accused.
Judge Mupas is dismissed from the service.
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Case 34: Atty. Plaridel Nava II v. Judge Ofelia M. D. Artuz
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 August 29, 2017
Facts: These are two (2) consolidated cases filed by complainant Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II (Nava)
against respondent then Prosecutor, now Presiding Judge, Ofelia M. D. Artuz (Artuz) of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo City, Branch 5, (MTCC, Br. 5): (a) A.C. No. 7253 that
sought to disbar Artuz, then a Prosecutor at the time of the filing of the petition; and (b) A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1717 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-1911- MTJ) that sought to nullify the nomination and
appointment of Artuz as Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Br. 5, for being patently illegal, improper,
and irregular.
In the said petition for nullification of the nomination and appointment of Artuz as presiding judge
of MTCC Branch 5 filed on October 17, 2006, Nava alleged that Artuz was unfit and incompetent
to be appointed as trial judge, as she faced "several criminal administrative cases, the nature of
which involved her character, competence, probity, integrity and independence which should not
have been disregarded in her application to the judiciary."
To the OCA, Artuz deliberately lied in her answers in the subject PDS to conceal the truth and
make it appear that she is qualified for a judgeship position to which she was eventually appointed.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Artuz should be cited for violation of the CPR.
Held: Yes. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the OCA in A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1717 that Judge Artuz is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of
official document for her false statements in her two (2) PDS thus constituting a breach of the
following Canons of the CPR:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION x x x.
CANON 10-A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
BY OTHERS.
Membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench; his or her moral
fitness as a judge also reflects her moral fitness as a lawyer. Thus, a judge who disobeys the basic
rules of judicial conduct also violates her oath as a lawyer.
In A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717: Artuz is dismissed from service and is required to show cause within
15 days why she should not be disbarred for violations of the CPR.
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Case 35: Ma. Liza M. Jorda v. Judge Crisologo Bitas
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376 March 5, 2014
Facts: The complaint stemmed from criminal cases for Qualified Trafficking and Violation of
Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, which were filed against Danilo Miralles,
et al. before the RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City where respondent Judge Bitas presides.
Respondent Judge found that there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial for Violation of
4 (a & e) of R.A. 9208.
Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his duties and violated mandatory
provisions of the Rules of Court when he did not issue a warrant of arrest against the accused
Miralles, who was charged with two (2) non-bailable criminal offenses.Moreover, respondent
judge granted a reduced bail of ₱40,000.00 for accused Miralles even without any petition for the
fixing of bail. The prosecution was not given the opportunity to interpose its objections.
In his Answer, respondent judge reasoned that it was wrong to arrest Miralles, because the court
was still in the process of determining whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the accused for
trial. Respondent judge claimed that there was no more need for a petition for bail, because in the
judicial determination of probable cause the court found that the evidence against accused was
weak.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Bitas should be liable for granting bail to an accused without the
requirement of hearing.
Held: Yes.
In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C)
of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two Million Pesos
(₱2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos (₱5,000,000.00). Thus, by reason of the
penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only
by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the application
for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine
whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong.
Not only did respondent judge deviate from the requirement of a hearing where there is an
application for bail, respondent judge granted bail to Miralles without neither conducting a hearing
nor a motion for application for bail. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. ith life imprisonment
as one of the penalties prescribed for the offense charged against Miralles, he cannot be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In addition, "You better transfer to another court!; You are being influenced by politicians" was
improper and does not speak well his stature as an officer of the Court. Respondent Bitas' use of
abusive and insulting words, tending to project complainant’s ignorance of the laws and procedure,
prompted by his belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly
insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. The use of intemperate language is included in the
proscription provided by Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus: "Judges
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the activities of a judge." It bears
stressing that as a dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times,
avoiding vulgar and insulting language. He must maintain composure and equanimity.
Now, with regards to the error in granting bail:
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11 (A) of the
same Rule, as amended, if respondent judge is found guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
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3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bail are so clear and unmistakable that there can be
no room for doubt or even interpretation. There can, therefore, be no excuse for respondent judge's
error of law. To top it all, the actuations of respondent judge towards the complainants, as shown
by his use of abusive and insulting words against complainants in open court, and his
correspondence with the Court, are evident of his partiality to the accused. All these taken into
consideration, respondent judge deserves a penalty of suspension of three (3) months and one (1)
day for the two (2) cases, instead of ₱20,000.00 fine for each of the cases, as recommended by the
Investigating Justice.
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Case 36: OCA v. Judge Joseph Cedrick Ruiz
Facts: This administrative case traces its roots to the Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act ( R.A.) No. 3019 and malversation of public fund filed by the People of the
Philippines against the respondent judge before the Sandiganbayan.
The Informations essentially alleged that the respondent, then the City Mayor of Dapitan City, had
conspired with Police Inspector Pepe Nortal to facilitate the latter's withdrawal of P1 million from
the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF) and, thereafter, used this amount for his (the
respondent's) personal benefit.
The OCA reasoned out that conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is classified as a
serious charge under Section 8(b) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It likewise explained that the
Court's power to preventively suspend judges, although not clearly -delineated under Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all courts and their
personnel, and that a judge can be preventively suspended until a final decision is reached in an
administrative case against him,.
In his comment dated January 24, 2014, the respondent posited that the administrative complaint
against him is premature because his Sandiganbayan convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and
27468 are not yet final. The respondent also stated that he went on leave of absence after his
Sandiganbayan conviction, and had submitted his application for optional retirement on May 27,
2013. The respondent thus argued that there was no more need to suspend him from office because
he should be considered already retired from government service" when he received on January 9,
2014, a copy of the Court's November 20, 2013 Resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against him is premature because his criminal
convictions by the Sandiganbayan are not yet final.
Held: No
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and their personnel. This grant empowers the Supreme Court to oversee
the judges' and court personnel's administrative compliance with all laws, rules, and regulations,
and to take administrative actions against them if they violate these legal norms.
In the exercise of this power, the Court has promulgated rules of procedure in the discipline of
judges. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A. M. No. 01-8-10-SC, provides:
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts
and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the
Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations,
or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The
complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court,
or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Based on this rule, disciplinary proceedings against sitting judges and justices may be instituted:
(a) motu proprio, by the Court itself; (b) upon verified complaint, supported by the affidavits of
persons with personal knowledge of the facts alleged, or by documents substantiating the
allegations; or (c) upon anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
It was pursuant to this power that the Court - on its own initiative -ordered the re-docketing of the
OCA's report as a formal complaint against the respondent and as a regular administrative matter
for the Court's consideration. The Court likewise possesses the power to preventively suspend an
administratively charged judge until a final decision is reached, particularly when a serious charge
is involved and a strong likelihood of guilt exists. This power is inherent in the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel as a measure to allow unhampered
formal investigation. It is likewise a preventive measure to shield the public from any further
damage that the continued exercise by the judge of the functions of his office may cause.
In the present case, we placed the respondent under preventive suspension because he is alleged
to have committed transgressions that are classified as serious under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
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SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No.
3019);
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in

an appropriate proceeding;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
8. Immorality;
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits, (emphasis supplied)
The respondent's convictions by the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
and for malversation of public funds confirm that the administrative charges for which he may be
found liable are serious charges under Section 8(2) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Malversation is likewise considered as a serious charge since it is a crime involving moral turpitude.
On the issue of Administrative Liability. In the present proceedings, the court function is limited
to the determination of whether substantial evidence exists to hold the respondent administratively
liable for acts he is alleged to have committed while he was still the mayor of Dapitan City. In this
determination, it is immaterial that the respondent was not yet a member of the Judiciary when he
allegedly committed the acts imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts
committed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. Our Rules itself recognizes this situation,
as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication
of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary. It need not be shown that the respondent continued to do the act or
acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge/s against the
respondent through proof that the respondent committed the imputed act/s violative of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.
The court also reiterates that only substantial evidence is required to support the conclusions in
administrative proceedings. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The standard of substantial is
satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. That
the respondent committed acts constituting malversation or violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act should be adjudged in the same manner that other acts classified as serious
charges under Rule 140 (such as bribery, immorality, gross misconduct, dishonesty, and partisan
political activities) should be weighed — through substantial evidence. Expressed from the point
of view of criminal law, evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary in an
administrative proceeding like the present case.
The Court emphasized that judges should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence, and their conduct should be above reproach. They must adhere to exacting standards
of morality, decency, and probity. A magistrate is judged, not only by his official acts, but also
by his private morality and actions. Our people can only look up to him as an upright man
worthy of judging his fellow citizens' acts if he is both qualified and proficient in law, and equipped
with the morality that qualifies him for that higher plane that standing as a judge entails.
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz is hereby DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to reemployment in the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies including government-owned and -controlled corporations. As a consequence of this
ruling, Judge Ruiz is likewise declared DISBARRED and STRICKEN FROM the roll of
attorneys.
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Case 37: OCA v. Judge Aguilar
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087
Facts: This case stemmed from (1) the undated letter of Ramon Ona-Ligaya (Ligaya) of Olongapo
City, addressed to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, and the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC), expressing disappointment over the appointment of Ma. Ellen Aguilar (Aguilar) as judge
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Burgos, Pangasinan, since she had been charged with several
criminal offenses involving moral turpitude; and (2) the Indorsement letter dated December 4,
2006 of the Office of the City Legal Officer of Olongapo City, referring to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in
OMB-L-A-03-0718-G, which imposed upon Atty. Aguilar, formerly City Legal Officer of
Olongapo City, a fine equivalent to one month salary.
Charges against respondent:
● Falsification of Public Document, Perjury and Estafa for the existence of the two
documents with different amounts but one notarial document number
● Misconduct for notarizing public documents while being a notary public ex-officio which
is not related to her duties as a City Legal Officer.
Upon investigation, Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommends the penalty of dismissal from service
for the respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the responded should be dismissed from service due to charges of dishonesty
and misconduct
Held: No.
The court ruled that respondent should just be suspended and not dismissed from service taking
into consideration the following mitigating circumstances:
a) The criminal complaint for falsification, perjury and estafa against Judge Aguilar was
dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for lack of probable cause.
b) Judge Aguilar appeared to have believed that she was authorized to notarize said private
documents as part of her duties as City Legal Officer, and she neither charged any fee
nor received any consideration therefor;
c) Setting aside for the moment her previous administrative case, Judge Aguilar had
otherwise strong credentials for her appointment as a judge
d) Judge Aguilar has rendered more than 20 years of government service;
e) This is Judge Aguilar’s first and only administrative charge in the Judiciary for which
she was found guilty; and
f) Judge Aguilar readily acknowledged her offense, apologized, and promised to be more
circumspect and accurate in her future submissions
While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even at the first instance,
jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension
taking into account the presence of mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the
government and being a first time offender.
Since respondent has been in the service for fourteen (14) years and since this is her first offense
during employment in the judiciary, the Court deems it proper to impose the penalty of suspension
for six (6) months without pay.
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Case 38: IN THE MATTER OF: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT
FOR DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND PERJURY
COMMITTED BY JUDGE JAIME E. CONTRERAS
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2452 March 09, 2016
Facts: On November 12, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an
anonymous complaint dated October 16, 2014 charging Judge Contreras with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Perjury, relative to an administrative case filed against him before the Office of
the Ombudsman (OMB) docketed as OMB-ADM-1-94-1040, entitled Carlito I. Nudo v. Jaime
Contreras.
The complaint alleged that when Judge Contreras applied for a position in the judiciary, he failed
to disclose in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) that a previous administrative case was filed against
him while he was the 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Libmanan, Camarines Sur wherein he
was found guilty by the OMB for simple misconduct and was meted out a penalty of admonition.
On November 21, 2014, the OCA issued its 1st Indorsement directing Judge Contreras to file his
Comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt of the Indorsement.
Judge Contreras surmised that the anonymous complaint was filed by a certain Jose Arnel Rubio,
a former Sheriff of the RTC of Naga City, whom he dismissed from service before by reason of
his shady and anomalous transactions in the implementation of writs of execution and improper
conduct.
Moreover, Judge Contreras averred that he cannot categorically deny or affirm the charge against
him due to complainant's failure to attach the questioned PDS. Nonetheless, he maintained that
during the Judicial and Bar Council's (JBC) interviews, he had been disclosing information relating
to the cases filed against him with the OMB.
Also, Judge Contreras claimed that in administrative cases, admonition is not a penalty but merely
an advice.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Contreras should be dismissed for not disclosing a simple misconduct
he’s found guilty of in his PDS
Held: No. The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA finding Judge Contreras guilty
of dishonesty in filling out his PDS, but modifies the recommended penalty of dismissal to
suspension of one (1) year given the attendant circumstances.
"Civil service rules mandate the accomplishment of the PDS as a requirement for employment in
the government." "It is the repository of all information about any government employee and
official regarding his personal background, qualification, and eligibility." "Considering that
truthful completion of [PDS] is a requirement for employment in the Judiciary, the importance of
answering the same with candor need not be gainsaid."
Among the four cases, Judge Contreras, while he was then a Provincial Prosecutor, was
admonished for simple misconduct in OMB-ADM-1-94-1040 for exerting undue influence in
causing the arrest of a certain Carlito Nudo despite proof that the latter has posted a bail bond duly
approved by the court.
Undoubtedly, the finding of the OMB against Judge Contreras for simple misconduct in OMB-
ADM-1-94-1040 is considered an administrative offense, which he should have declared in his
PDS.
Dishonesty is considered a grave offense. It carries the maximum penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
Nonetheless, Rule IV, Section 53 of the Civil Service Rules also provides that in the determination
of the penalties to be imposed, extenuating, mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances
attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered. Among the circumstances that may
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be allowed to modify the penalty are (1) length of service in the government, (2) good faith, and
(3) other analogous circumstances.
In the present case, taking into account Judge Contreras' more than 30 years of government service,
and that this is his first offense as a member of the bench, this Court finds the imposition of
suspension of one (1) year without pay to be proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Judge Jaime E. Contreras is hereby found GUILTY of DISHONESTY and is

SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year without pay.
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Case 39: RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE
SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON
SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014
Facts: When the Pork Barrel Scam broke the news in 2013, incriminating evidence surfaced
implicating Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Ong, Multiple sworn statements and
verbal testimonies of Marina Sula pointed out that Ong had visited the office of key Pork Barrel
Scam player Janet Lim Napoles. A photo published by Rappler showed Senator Jinggoy Estrada,
Napoles and Ong together in a party. Ong explained himself in a letter to CJ Sereno, saying that
the photo was taken in one of Sen.Estrada’s birthday parties and it would have been rude of him
not to pose with other guests. He categorically stated that he did not attend any event hosted by
Napoles during or after she had a case (the Kevlar cases) in the Sandiganbayan in which she was
acquitted.
Sereno then requested the court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this
Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the
legal profession. Ong filed a comment saying that the testimony of Sula was merely hearsay and
that what Napoles told her was simply to convince the people helping her that their cases would
be fixed and may not have been true.
As to Sula’s testimony that Ong visited Napoles’ office, Ong clarified that he struck up a
conversation with Napoles during Senator Estrada's party regarding the “miraculous healing power
of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo” and that Napoles had a way to help Ong
access the statue in order to help him with his Prostate Cancer (they’re both devotees). Because of
this, he wanted to personally thank Napoles and that was the occasion when he went to her office
and that in that time she no longer had any pending case with the Sandiganbayan.
Upon the court finding possible transgressions to the New Code of Judicial Conduct, they
redocketed the case and assigned it to retired SC Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for
investigation. She examined the statements made by Benhur Luy during the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee investigations pointing out that because he is Napoles’ second cousin, she divulged to
him, prior to the release of the Kevlar case decision, that her contact in the Sandiganbayan was
Ong. He also testified that he kept ledger showing that Napoles spent a total of P100M in the
Sandiganbayan when she gave various amounts to different people during the pendency of the case
and to Ong in particular after which, she was already confident that she would be acquitted.
He also testified toa transaction between Ong and Napoles regarding P25.5M that they wanted to
put into an account so that it would accrue 13%interest and that he personally prepared the checks
used for this transaction.
Justice Sandoval Gutierrez also examined the statements made by Sula, an employee of JLN
corporation in charge of formation of corporations, applying for licenses and the like.
She corroborated the testimony of Benhur Luy and reiterated her previous testimony on Napoles
promising her that a TRO would be issued in the case investigating the PDAF case. She said that
every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that Justice Ong will help
her in the Kevlar case.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix the "PDAF
case" in the Sandiganbayan. In his defense, Ong denied that he ever met Napoles prior to or during
the pendency of the Kevlar case, denied that he received any money from Napoles, that the Kevlar
case was decided based on the merits, he never had any transactions with Napoles, he only visited
her office for the purpose of thanking her for that Black Nazarene thing, and that the
whistleblowers’ testimonies were conflicting and lack credibility.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez evaluated and concluded that the testimonies of Benhur Luy and
Marina Sula, because they were only denied and in no way challenged or refuted by Ong via
adverse testimony, were not lies. Ong did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur
and Sula and he failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay.
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He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding
their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. His act of visiting
Napoles’ office is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the
Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him.
Dishonesty violates Canon 2 ( 1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that judges
must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity
of the Judiciary and further constitutes gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of
the same Code.
Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities. In the end of her investigation report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez recommended
that Ong be found guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits.
Issue: Whether or not Justice Ong should be dismissed from service due to his alleged violations
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
Held: Yes, The SC adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating
Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by
the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they
testified. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility
of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases. In
particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and
Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his
association with Napoles.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior;
while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such
conduct as is not to be excused." Ong’s association with Napoles during the pendency of the Kevlar
case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming
or even preponderant. The testimonies of Luy and Sula, considering that they were employees of
Napoles privy to her daily business and personal activities and that she occasionally updated them
on developments regarding the case, were able to provide substantial evidence.
Ong’s act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper
and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. A judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants
tarnishes this appearance. The SC’s previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid
association or socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were
committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination
of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or
resolution.
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting
Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not
presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand,
Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office
appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. The Court finds that respondent, in not being
truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu
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proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;

lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
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Case 40: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT v. PRESIDING JUDGE
EXEQUIL L. DAGALA
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886 July 25, 2017
Facts: This administrative case arose from an anonymous letter-complaint filed against Judge
Exequil L. Dagala (Judge Dagala), presiding judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dapa-Socorro,
Dapa, Surigao Del Norte, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and indorsed to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
The dismissal stemmed from the 2015 anonymous letter-complaint to the Office of Ombudsman
from an unnamed resident of San Isidro, Siargao Island, Surigao Del Norte, who had witnessed
the altercation involving his neighbors and Judge Dagala over the ownership of his neighbor’s lot
and the trees planted thereof.
Judge Dagala shouted invectives while brandishing an M-16 armalite rifle, which was caught on
camera and tape by the other neighbors. He was also accused of involvement in alleged illegal
activities.
Upholding the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) which had been ordered
to investigate the case, the High Court held that there was sufficient evidence to hold Judge Dagala
accountable for gross misconduct in connection with the September 29, 2015 incident, as
recounted in the anonymous complaint.
OCA identified the man brandishing the armalite in video as Judge Dagala, who failed to deny or
refute the allegations.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Dagala violated The New Canon of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary
Held: Yes. The High Court further held that such finding of fact has various consequences, noting
that a certification issued by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosives Office
also disclosed that Dagala was not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre. It
underscored that Judge Dagala’s actuations as recorded in the video “are unacceptable for a
member of the bench and should merit a finding of administrative liability. This is without
prejudice to any criminal action that may also be filed against him.”
Likewise, the High Court agreed with OCA’s finding that Judge Dagala was guilty of immorality
for siring a child out of wedlock during the subsistence of his marriage.
The High Court stressed that while anonymous complaints should always be treated with great
caution, the anonymity of the complaint does not, in itself, justify its outright dismissal, provided
the allegations can be reliably verified and properly substantiated by competent evidence.
Immorality is a recognized ground for the discipline of judges and justices under the Rules of
Court. The record is clear as evidenced by the certificate of live birth, showing Judge Dagala was
the father of the child as shown by his signature in the affidavit of acknowledgement of paternity
and the date of birth was during the subsistence of his marriage to his legal wife.
The High Court noted that Judge Dagala, in his comment, admitted he was married but was
separated and “without any remorse” has three children with three different women. He denied
involvement in illegal activities, but admitted to owning Sugba Cockpit in Del Carmen, Surigao
del Norte, but had sold its rights in 2008.
In 2016, he submitted a letter of resignation, but the Court rejected it as he was still under
investigation.
The High Court said that it does not “seek to interfere with a judge’s relationships” but nevertheless
stressed that immorality is a valid ground for sanctioning members of the Judiciary because it (1)
challenges his or her capacity to dispense justice, (2) erodes the faith and confidence of the public
in the administration of justice, and (3) impacts the Judiciary’s legitimacy.
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“We understand the undeniable sadness of a failed marriage….We understand that judges and
justices are also human, and are naturally inclined to search for what is good and what gives
meaning, including happy and fulfilling relationships…Nevertheless choices are made within
particular contexts and in consideration of duties and obligations that must be honoured. More
importantly, choices have consequences. Judge Dagala made his choice. He must now face the
repercussions. Thus, as much as we commiserate with Judge Dagala, we remain a court of law
with a mandate to dispense even-handed justice,” the High Court stressed.
The High Court further stressed that “[all who desire to be part of the Judiciary must first decide
if he or she can live up to the highest standards of morality expected of judges and
justices….[O]nce a lawyer joins the Judiciary, he or she should abide by the rules. We remind all
judges that no position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant
than the judicial office.”
According to the OCA, while Judge Dagala may be excused for having sired two children prior to
his marriage, the record was clear that he had his third child during the subsistence of his marriage
with his legal wife.
Justice Marvic Leonen, who wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, said that while he agrees
with the majority that acts of grave misconduct were substantially proven, he found insufficient
the evidence to include immorality as a ground for dismissal.
He opined that any complaint for immorality should not be entertained except when it is
commenced by its victims.
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Case 41: Manuel B. Arcenas vs. Judge Henry B. Avelino
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1642 June 15, 2007
Facts: Arcenas is charging Judge Henry B. Avelino, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Pontevedra-Panay, Pontevedra, Capiz with Gross Inefficiency and Gross Neglect of Duty for
delay in resolving Civil Case No. 391 entitled Demetrio B. Arcenas,et al. v. Spouses Manolo Amador and
Rosemarie Amador for Unlawful Detainer. Arcenas filed an Ex Parte Motion to Render Judgment pursuant
to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Judge did not act on the motion. Arcenas filed
another motion remind respondent Judge of his failure to decide the case. Up to the time of filing of this
administrative case, respondent Judge has not rendered any judgment. Judge reasoned out the additional
workloads in other courts and lack of typewriters, as cause of delay in deciding the case.
Issue: Whether or not judge should be held liable for his failure to decide the case within the prescribed.
Held: Yes. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 5 mandates
judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness. Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the
reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the Constitution and the law, is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency. However, for reasons only known to respondent, he sat on the case, so to speak, and reasoned
that he already inhibited himself from the case, seeing complainant's lack of faith and bias in his
(respondent's) action.
Further, Section 21, Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, provides: Sec. 21. Appeal. – x x x The decision
of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.I
t is clear from the aforecited provision that the decision of the RTC in the appealed decision, in this case
Civil Case No. 391, is immediately executory. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, delay in rendering a
decision or order is classified as a less serious charge and is punishable with (a) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for a period of not less than one month but not more than three months;
or (b) fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Considering that this is the third time
that respondent is found guilty of gross inefficiency, the maximum penalty.
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Case 42: Sherlita O. Tan vs. Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 December 14, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
Facts: Judge Pacuribot was charged with rape and acts of lasciviousness by Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca.
Ms. Tan was deceived twice by Judge Pacuribot when he offered to take her to the bus terminal but instead
brought her to a motel where he ravished her. Not contented, he rented a room in the house of Ms. Tan
wherein he would order Miss Tan to go to his room when her husband was not around. Further, Judge
Pacuribot during office hours would also request Miss Tan’s presence in his chamber where respondent
would sexually harass her even in the presence of another person.
Ms. Villafranca was also deceived by the said Judge when he made her believe that they were going to go
out for dinner but instead brought her in a motel in Butuan City where he ravished her and took a nude
picture of her.
The respondent used such picture to blackmail Ms. Villafranca and would threaten her that in the event she
would refuse to submit to his lustful desires, he would send the picture to her family. After the incident, the
respondent would order her to bring food at his rented room and would subsequently rape her. Furthermore,
the respondent ordered the complainant to send sweet text messages and write love letters and greeting
cards to him and even ordered her to file an annulment case against her husband.
Both charges were denied by Judge Pacuribot. Moreover, He claimed that delay in the filing of the charges
against him casted doubt to the truthfulness of their claim and that if they were truly raped by him why did
they not refuse at all but instead continued to submit themselves to him. He alleged that the charges imputed
against him were complainants’ tool of revenge.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct and immorality.
Held: Yes.
Canon 1, Canon 2
Respondent judge actuations are aggravated by the fact that complainants are his subordinates over whom
he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and
power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires
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Case 43: Asuncion B. Visbal vs. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692 November 28, 2007
[Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1289-MTJ]
Facts:
• Considering the letter dated September 26, 2001 filed by Asuncion B. Visbal charging Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, with dishonesty and grave misconduct for deliberately making
untruthful statements in her affidavit of complaint and falsely testifying before the court relative to
a criminal complaint against her for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority docketed as Crim.
Case before MTCC
• In the same Resolution of September 18, 2002, acting on the July 29, 2002 letter of complainant,
the Court resolved to:
• (b) DIRECT Judge Tormis to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice why she should
not be administratively sanctioned for appearing in court without prior approval from the Court; x
xxx
• (d) require respondent judge to FURNISH complainant with a copy of her comment within ten (10)
days from notice hereof.
• Respondent, in compliance with the Courts September 18, 2002 Resolution, submitted an
Explanation stating that, inter alia, she thought that the rule for prior permission for judges to testify
in courts or proceedings would not apply to her as she was a victim of a crime; and that she had
furnished complainant with a copy of her Comment to the complaint.
• Resolution of October 6, 2003, to: (a) EXPLAIN why she should not be cited in contempt for her
obdurate defiance to the repeated directives of this Court for her to furnish complainant with a copy
of her Comment on the complaint; and (b) SHOW proof of service , for the last time, to complainant
Asuncion B. Visbal of her Comment to the complaint, both within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
• As the records do not show that respondent complied with the October 6, 2003 Resolution of the
Court despite her receipt thereof as shown by Registry Return Receipt
Issue: Whether or not failure of respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination.
Held:
• Yes.
• Respondents failure to comply with the directives of the Court in its Resolutions dated and to
furnish complainant Visbal a copy of her Comment cannot be countenanced. Respondent should
know that judges must respect the order and decisions of higher tribunals, especially the Supreme
Court, from which all other courts take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to
be construed as a mere request nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.
• The failure of respondent judge to comply with the Courts directives constitutes a less serious
offense which under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended is punishable with suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less tha[n] one (1) nor more than (3) months,
or a fine of more than P10,00.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
• Respondent judge was sanctioned by this Court. It appears that aside from this case, respondent
judge has been administratively charged eight (8) other times.
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Case 44: Mary Jane V Allentos Jamin vs. Judge Manuel A. De
Castro
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1616 October 17, 2007
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1781-MTJ
Facts:
• The said Judge after drinking the offered shot of wine, he went near cashier AgnesYbañez and
teased her about her scant dress ..., then stole a kiss on her cheek.
• Meanwhile, Judge de Castro dragged Mary Jane [Jamin] towards the bodega and a certain Baby
Olaer, a companion of Judge de Castro helped in pushing Mary Jane to go with him while Mary
Jane refused and I told them not to force her if it is against her will and yet they continued with
their act ... and when Mary Jane and Judge de Castro was (sic) inside the bodega, Baby Olaer closed
and locked the door of the bodega.
• Judge de Castro successfully raped Jamin.
• Respondent judge denied the charge of rape and likewise submitted an Affidavit of Retraction and
withdrawal of complainant dated and a similar affidavit executed by Ybañez on the same date.
• The OCA, while expressing its inability to pin down the respondent judge for rape, nonetheless
found the latter guilty of gross misconduct and immorality, acting as he did beyond the tolerable
bounds of decency, morality and propriety. The report thus recommended that the respondent judge
be dismissed from the service with the usual accessory penalties attached to dismissal. Disbarment,
after due proceedings, was also recommended.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge was guilty of gross misconduct and immorality?
Held: Yes.
Gross misconduct and immorality, under Section 8 (3) (8), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, are classified as
serious offenses punishable by any of the sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule.
The Judge hereby DISMISSED from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
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Case 45: OCA vs. Judge James Go
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667 September 27, 2007
Facts: A judicial audit and physical inventory of cases was conducted on September 25, 2006 to October
2, 2006 in the (MTCC), Branch 2, Butuan City. The audit findings revealed that respondent Judge Go failed
to immediately arraign the accused in 632 criminal cases; to archive 140 criminal cases; to act on summons
issued in 477 criminal cases; to act on 13 criminal cases which have no further setting; and to resolve
pending incidents in 15 criminal cases. He likewise failed to act on 17 civil cases from the time of their
filing; to take further action on 32civil cases; and to resolve motions or incidents in 88 civil cases. In his
Certificate of Service,he failed to indicate that there were still unresolved motions in both criminal and civil
cases as well as undecided civil cases submitted for decision. Judge Go, did not file any comment despite
the Court’s Resolution dated January 27, 2007 directing him to comment on the audit findings. Moreover,
he did not formally request for an extension of time to file comment. Records show that his "request" was
merely "relayed" by Clerk of Court Rosales through a "telegram for transmission." Notwithstanding, we
granted said request by giving him a period of two months to comply. However, instead of submitting a
comment, Judge Go merely denied the allegations in the audit report in a letter dated. Moreover he reports
to the court for only about an hour or two to preside over the hearings. Thereafter, he would leave and return
the following day. Judge Go erroneously believed that being a judge excuses him from complying with the
eight-hour service requirement every working day
Issue: Whether or not Judge Go was guilty of undue delay.
Held: Yes. SUSPENDED from office for three months without salary or other benefits.
Under Sec. 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, simple neglect of duty is
punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. However,
under Sec. 19, Rule XIV, the penalty of fine, instead of suspension, may also be imposed in the alternative.
Just like any ordinary government employee, judges are required to render at least eight-hours of service
office for three months without salary or other benefits effective upon receipt of this Resolution. Circular
No. 13 17 provides Judges are duty bound to comply with the required working hours to insure the
maximum efficiency of the trial courts for a speedy administration of justice. Daily trials at a minimum of
five hours per working day of the week will enable the judge to calendar as many cases as possible and to
dispose with regular dispatch the increasing number of litigations pending with the court. All other matters
needing the attention of the judge are to be attended to outside of this five-hour schedule of trial.
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Case 46: Sandra L. Mino vs. Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1645 August 28, 2007
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-1702-MTJ]
Facts: Sandra Mino charged Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro, Presiding Judge of Branch 6 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities in Cebu City, with gross inexcusable negligence arising from his failure to issue a
warrant of arrest, within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court, in Criminal Case No. 124511-R,
People of the Philippines v. Allan Arcilla, for Attempted Homicide. Despite repeated requests for the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the accused, respondent did not grant the same. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecution to present additional evidence within
five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing
of the complaint or information. Criminal Case No.124511-R was raffled to Branch 6, presided over by
respondent judge, on October 21, 2003. However, it took respondent judge ninety-seven (97) days longer
than the prescribed period to issue the questioned February 5, 2004 Order. The delay was further
exacerbated when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the Ex- Parte Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion for Inhibition filed by the prosecution on March 8, 2004. It was only on June 3, 2004, or after
almost three months from the time the motion was filed, that he inhibited himself from the case.
Issue: Whether or not the judge is guilty of Gross Ignorance.
Held: Yes. Canon 6:Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
SEC.3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal
qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the
training andother facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges. SEC. 5. Judges
shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness. He is reminded too of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which is applied
in suppletory character, requiring judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods. Since the law or procedure violated is so elementary for respondent not to know it or
act as if he does not know,he is guilty of gross ignorance. for which a penalty of (1) fine of more than ₱
20,000 but not exceeding ₱ 40,000, or (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three but not exceeding six months, or (3) dismissal from service.
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Case 47: Atty. Odel S. Janda, et al. vs. Judge Eddie R. Rojas
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2054 August 3, 2007
Facts:
The herein complainants charge Judge Rojas of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an
unjust order,because in his August 30, 2006 Order, he declared that the June 15, 2006 Decision was already
final and executory when he knew that it was not yet so and that it contravened Neypes v. Court of Appeals
7 which provides for a fresh period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a denial of a motion for
reconsideration within which to appeal. They claim that Judge Rojas showed manifest bias in directing the
contiguous execution of the Decision against Planters Bank,especially when he converted the Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal into a regular motion for execution in the August 30, 2006
Order.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Roxas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Held: Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court regarding execution of judgment or final order, specifically
provides:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. – Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion,
upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally
resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment
obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. The appellate court, may,
on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the
writ of execution. Notwithstanding his claims of good faith, Judge Rojas' unequal treatment of the two
motions of the contending parties in Civil Case No. 6474 is truly manifest. As aptly pointed out by the OCA,
it is one thing to strictly apply the procedural requirement on the notice of hearing of a motion, and it is
another to become overly lenient with respect to the requirement of a proper motion for execution of a
decision that purportedly became final and executor
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Case 48: Office of the Solicitor General vs. Judge Antonio I. De
Castro
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2018 August 3, 2007
Facts: Gao Yuan is a national of the People’s Republic of China and holder of a special non-immigrant
visa to the Philippines and an immigrant visa to Canada. Gao Yuan, her husband James Mahshi, a
U.S.national, and their two young children were on their way to a vacation in Canada when Philippine
immigration officers arrested Gao Yuan and prevented her from boarding her flight. Gao Yuan's arrest was
by virtue of an order issued by Bureau of Immigration (BI) Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, Jr., which, in
turn, was a response to a letter dated Aug. 9, 2004 from the Consul General of the PROC which alleged
that Gao Yuan was a fugitive from justice and charged with embezzlement by Chinese police and requested
her arrest and deportation to China. Gao Yuan was detained at the Detention Center. In short, it was an
order for Gao Yuan’s deportation. James Mahshi filed with the RTC Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus
wih TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He alleged that Gao Yuan was illegally detained since she is
“not a fugitive from justice as infact, she was not charged with any crime at the time she left China in 2001.”
Gao Yuan allegedly filed with the DOJ a petition for asylum as a political refugee.The same day that the
petition for habeas corpus was filed in RTC, Exec. Judge Eugenio, Jr. issued a 7-hour TRO enjoining the
BI from initiating any deportation proceeding and/or directing the suspension of any such proceedings
against Gao Yuan. During the clarificatory hearing, respondent Judge de Castro insisted on the release on
bail of Gao Yuan. Through an interlocutory order,the RTC took custody of Gao Yuan. The RTC clarified
that it was only a provisional release for the duration of the TRO. Respondent based the provisional release
on humanitarian reasons, considering that Gao Yuan was merely wanted as a witness in a case in the PROC
and she is a nursing mother to a 17-month old child. It was after the filing of the habeas corpus that a
summary deportation order was issued.
Issue: Whether the respondent Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Held: Yes. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent argues that under Sec. 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
RTC shave original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of habeas corpus which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions, and the material averments in James Mahshi's petition for habeas corpus
sufficiently raised the issue of legality of Gao Yuan's detention. The remedy of habeas corpus extends to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, and the prayer
for injunctive relief enjoining the deportation of Gao Yuan is merely incidental to the question of legality
of her detention.
Canon 6 Competence and Diligence. While judges should not be held accountable for every erroneous
judgment rendered in good faith, such good faith is no defense where the basic issues are simple and the
applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error.
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Case 49: Carmen P. Edano vs. Judge Fatima G. Asdala
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2007 December 6, 2010
Facts: Complainant laments the fact that without notice, much less consent, respondent JudgeAsdala met
privately with defendant Butler in her chambers to discuss the finding of indirect contempt against the latter
without any hearing or minutes of the proceedings and without her or her counsel’s participation. As a result
of the said private meeting, the fine was reduced from ₱ 30,000 to ₱ 5,000, the order of imprisonment was
deleted, and the Bench Warrant was recalled. The complainant likewise alleges that respondent Asdala
forced her to file a complaint for neglect of duty against her own counsel, Atty. Rowena Alejandria, with
the Public Attorneys’ Office (PAO), as respondent Asdala had a grudge against Atty. Alejandria. She
likewise claims that she was given ₱ 1,000 by respondent Judge Asdala for her silence. The complainant
also faults respondent Judge Asdala for ordering the support pendente lite to be deposited with the Office
of the Clerk of Court instead of being directly given to the complainant and for applying the money thus
deposited to the payment of the ₱ 5,000 fine instead of being given to the complainant. Further, she
questions the dismissal of the civil case for support on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, alleging
that the basis of the findings is the testimony of Butler which was already stricken off the record as of
January 28, 2001.
Issue: Whether not or Judge Asdala is found guilty of gross insubordination and gross misconduct
Held: Yes. Guilty of gross insubordination and gross misconduct unbefitting a member of the judiciary and
is accordingly DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to
which she may be entitled.
Section 1 Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to "ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers." Clearly, it is of vital importance not
only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their
decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid
any erosion of faith in the justice system. 13 Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to
avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its importance, Section 2,
Canon 2 states: Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity
of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. In the case at bar,
respondent Judge Asdala’s actions as above discussed put into question the impartiality, independence, and
integrity of the process by which the questioned amended orders were reached. Respondent judge ought to
know that the Constitution grants this Court administrative supervision over all the courts and personnel
thereof. In the case at bar, despite the Court’s approval of Amy Soneja’s designation, the respondent judge
allowed, if not insisted on, the continued discharge of the duties of OIC by respondent Nicandro.
Respondent Judge Asdala even had the gall to insist that as presiding judge she has the authority and
discretion to designate "anyone who works under her, as long as that person enjoys her trust and
confidence." Coming from a judge, such arrogance, if not ignorance, is inexcusable.
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Case 50: Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon. Judge Cader P.
Indar
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April 10, 2012
Facts: Lucia Magtibay (Lucia) is one of the heirs of the late Jose Olarte, who was one of the original
stockholders of Olarte Hermanos y Cia.Upon the death of the stockholders/owners, the surviving heirs,
including Lucia, filed a Petition for Involuntary Dissolution of the company before the sala of Judge Cader
Indar (Judge Indar).
An Intervention was filed by Mercedita Taguba-Dumlao, acting as attorney-in-fact of one Vicente Olarte,
who was allegedly an heir of the late Jose Olarte. Thereafter, the DPWH constructed a national highway
that traversed within the property of Olarte Hermanos y Cia.
Subsequently, Judge Indar ordered the DPWH to pay the partial consideration of the road right-of-way to
the heirs of Jose Olarte. Lucia, however, claimed that Dumlao collected a huge amount of money from the
DPWH as compensation for the road right-of-way claims of the heirs of Olarte Hermanos y Cia by
fraudulent misrepresentations. Consequently, the heirs of Jose Olarte filed an Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, to enjoin the DPWH from entertaining any
claims submitted by Dumlao. Judge Indar denied the application. Suspecting that Judge Indar was
lawyering for Dumlao, Lucia and the other heirs filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Inhibition of Judge Indar. However, Judge Indar left the motion unresolved. Magtibays representative tried
to secure some documents relative to the case but Judge Indar confronted them and said, "Denied na ung
motion nyo.Ireklamo ninyo na ako ng administratibo sa Supreme Court at sila ang magsabi kung pwede ko
kayong bigyan ng kopya ng records." Hence, Lucia filed the present administrative complaint.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Indar should be held liable for Undue Delay in Rendering an Order and
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge?
Held: Yes.
LEGAL ETHICS: undue delay in rendering an order; conduct unbecoming of a judge.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
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Case 51: SALAMA S. ANSA vs. JUDGE SALIH MUSA
A.M. No. SCC-00-5, November 29, 2000
Facts: Complainant, Salama S. Ansa, then assigned at the Sharia’s Court of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat,
was under the supervision of respondent Salih Musa who was then the Clerk of Court and at the
same time an ULAMA. Sometime in June 1994, respondent made amorous advances towards Ansa
to which the latter refused as she finds the behavior disgraceful and immoral since the former was
a married man. Being persistent Musa promised Ansa that there were no legal impediments to their
marrying so she should not worry that the affair was immoral. Eventually, Ansa succumbed to the
advances of Musa and their affair continued until respondent was appointed as Shari’a Judge. As
Musa did not fulfil his promise of marriage, Ansa sought the help of a mediator. The respondent
judge insulted her instead such pushed Ansa to file a complaint against the former with charges of
gross immorality. Executive Judge Santos Adiong, Regional Trial Court, Marawi City, Branch 8
in a decision concluded that there was sufficient evidence to hold Judge Musa liable for gross
immorality. He recommended that the same be suspended from the service for a period of three
(3) months.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Salih Musa is guilty of gross immorality and his suspension from the
service is warranted.
Held: The respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct transgressing the norms of decency
and high moral standard expected of a member of the Judiciary, to wit:
CANON 2 – A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01 – A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
It is essential for all judicial officers to engage and retain the respect and confidence of the
people. Judges in particular must live up to these high standards as they are expected to promote
public confidence. Respondent clearly committed an offense against said canon when he as the
immediate superior of Ansa took advantage of his position to manipulate the latter. Even more, he
was stern in refusing to amend is actions adding insult to the injury of Ansa.
Musa acted in contrast to the provision stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
in particular that which states:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law of and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Judge Salih Musa is guilty of gross immorality. However, the Court was unable to agree
that respondent be meted only the penalty of three (3) months suspension from office. His offense
is serious in character and therefore deserves a graver penalty of dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any other branch, instrumentality
or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
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Case 52: NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION vs. JUDGE
RAMON B. REYES
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1120 February 21, 2000
Facts: Reynaldo Magday, Melvin Dalangin, Rex Cordero and Primo Evangelista were caught
using methamphetamine chloride (shabu) during a drug session in Mabini, Batangas. The four
were charged of violating Section 16, Section 27, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The case was docketed before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court presided over by respondent Judge Ramon B. Reyes.
Not long after the said arrest, Nenita Dalangin, Marina Cordero and Nelia Evangelista, mothers of
the accused, approached respondent judge to plead for the release of their sons for the sum of
P240,000.00. Eventually the amount was lowered to P15,000.00.
Days before the pay-off, the mothers of the accused reported the alleged extortion to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at its Regional Office in Batangas City. An entrapment operation
was prepared. On the appointed date, Dalangin, Cordero and Evangelista, together with Cabardo
appeared at Judge Reyes's chambers where they gave him the money. As the NBI was about to
arrest him, they were unable to locate the envelope where the marked money were placed and
ultraviolet testing on respondent's hands yielded a negative result. During the questioning,
respondent judge admitted that he had taken the envelope containing the marked money using a
handkerchief and placed it inside his desk where it was later found by the authorities. Respondent
judge was charged for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act to which he filed a "Compliance/Motion for Reconsideration” averring
that the private complainants were guilty of instigation.
Issue: Whether or not the actions of Judge Reyes would merit his dismissal from service.
Held: Yes. There is sufficient evidence presented to warrant the imposition of dismissal from
service of Judge Ramon Reyes. The act of demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant
constitutes serious misconduct in office. The respondent judge, who is held guilty of bribery, has
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides:
CANON 2—A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01—A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
Meanwhile, the Court also held that Judge Reyes has violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides that a member of the bar who are found to be guilty of the
following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6)
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority maybe may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney.
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Case 53: JOSE E. GURAY vs. JUDGE FABIAN M. BAUTISTA
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1188 July 2, 2001 (formerly OCA IPI No. 98-602-MTJ)
Facts: Jose E. Guray is the private complainant in a case pending before respondent judge's sala
which involves complainant's son who allegedly was injured by one Edmar Nebrida causing his
blindness. Complainant moved to upgrade the charge to frustrated murder. Respondent judge
allegedly agreed to upgrade the charge, but for a consideration of P5,000.00. Complainant reported
the matter to the NBI as he wanted to put a stop to Bautista’s extortion schemes. Then, NBI
prepared an entrapment operation against respondent judge leading to the latter’s arrest in the
parking lot of the Balaoan municipal hall. Respondent judge was charged with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 before the Regional trial Court, Balaoan, La Union and direct bribery before the
Sandiganbayan.
After administrative and criminal cases were filed against the respondent judge, he continued to
plead with Guray through emissaries to convince the latter to issue an affidavit of desistence. As
such, complainant claiming that he is bothered by his conscience issued said affidavit. According
to him, he only thought Judge Bautista was asking him for money when he overhead the latter
borrowing money from his clerk of court. He also added that it was he who placed the marked
money in respondent judge's pocket. Complainant stated that he was no longer interest in pursuing
the charges against respondent judge moving cases against the latter be dismissed. The OCA
pointed out that retractions by witnesses are rarely given probative value since they can easily be
obtained through intimidation or for a consideration. It therefore recommended that Judge Bautista
be dismissed from service.
Issue: Whether or not the affidavit of desistance from the complainant would suffice for the
withdrawal of administrative complaint against the respondent.
Held: No. As a general rule, an administrative complaint against an official or employee of the
judiciary cannot simply be withdrawn by a complainant who suddenly claims a change of mind.
This is to avoid undermining the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline
of court personnel.
In case at bar, the respondent judge who is expected to be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence has clearly violated several provisions stated in the Code of Judicial
Conduct, in particular:
CANON 1 – A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary
RULE 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
CANON 2 – A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities
RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
CANON 3 – A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence
adjudicative responsibilities
RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
RULE 3.03 - A judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court.
Respondent has failed to uphold avowed duty to promote public confidence in the
judiciary. Thus, the Court concur with the OCA's recommendation that respondent be dismissed
from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in government.
The belated affidavit of desistance by complainant does not wash clean the odious taint of
respondent's serious misconduct in judicial office.
90 | P a g e
Case 54: DR. EDGARDO ALDAY, MERCEDES FAVIS, MARNA
VILLAFUERTE, and CHRISTOPHER GARCIA vs. JUDGE
ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR.
Facts: The Court promulgated a decision on March 14, 2001 suspending respondent Judge
Escolastico U. Cruz, Jr., for a year and further imposing on him a ₱50,000 fine, after finding him
guilty of gross misconduct as a result of a complaint filed against him by herein complainants
whom the former threatened with a gun during a traffic altercation. Respondent judge received a
copy of said decision on March 22, 2001 which is immediately executory. However, despite the
suspension order, respondent judge continued to discharge the duties and exercise the functions of
a judge which consequently posed doubt on the legality and validity of the orders and decisions
rendered in his sala during his suspension.
The Court issued on September 18, 2001, another resolution voiding the orders, decisions, and
other issuances of Judge Bautista that were done during the period of his suspension. It also
required the respondent Judge to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt or otherwise
be penalized for disobedience in disregarding the Court’s decision.
As a response, Judge Cruz stated that he thought he did not have to serve suspension immediately
since there is still a pending motion in Court regarding his case. Likewise, immediately serving
his suspension would have equated to abandonment of office as judge. Judge Cruz also maintains
that he intended to abide by the Court's decision when his motion for reconsideration is to be
denied. The OCA recommended that respondent judge be dismissed from the service for his
disobedience its order.
Issue: Whether or not the action of the respondent judge in disregarding the Court’s decision for
his suspension merit in his dismissal from service.
Held: Yes. Judges are expected to know the law and jurisprudence, and Judge Cruz is no exception
to this rule. In the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Judge Angel S. Malaya it has
been established that “penalties imposed in administrative cases are immediately executor”.
Therefore, respondent judge's deliberate refusal to obey Court’s order dated March 14, 2001
suspending him from office is a grave misconduct that merits the supreme penalty of dismissal
from the service.
Not only was the respondent judge found in violation of the Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 30, s. 1989, which imposes the penalty of dismissal for grave misconduct even for the first
offense, he has also violated CANON 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states
that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Court orders
should not be treated lightly and the administration of justice demands nothing less than a faithful
adherence to the rules and orders it lay out. The court therefore orders for the dismissal from the
service of the respondent judge.
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Case 55: CONG. MANUEL N. MAMBA, et.al. vs. JUDGE
DOMINADOR L. GARCIA
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110 June 25, 2001
Facts: On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 otherwise
known as the Illegal Possession of Firearms was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the
Cagayan Provincial Police Command before the sala of respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia of
the Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan. Following several postponement of scheduled
preliminary investigation, Bulatao complained to the NBI that P/Sr. Inspector Salvador with the
respondent judge demanded the amount of P30,000.00 for withdrawal of the criminal case against
him. The amount was later reduced to P6,000.00.
The NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent judge. Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial
Court and was led by the respondent judge in the office of the MTC court personnel where he
handed the marked money to SPO2 Jonathan Santos and SPO4 Carlos Poli, representatives of P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador during the preliminary investigation. During the investigation, respondent did
not appear despite due notice and so was deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and
the case was submitted for decision. Only his counter-affidavit was considered, in which he asserts
that it was Bulatao who asked permission to talk to the two police officers and he did not led them
into his chambers. Accordingly, the Investigating Judge recommended that the respondent be
found guilty of improper conduct and be punished accordingly.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented to sufficient to prosecute the respondent.
Held: While reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the two police
officers is inadmissible in evidence considering that it contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No.
4200, or the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, the findings are in accordance with the evidence holding the
respondent guilty of serious misconduct. Serious misconduct affects a public officer's performance
of his duties and not only that his character as a private individual thus warrants dismissal from
service.
In the case at bar, although presented evidence may not be sufficient to support conviction it is
adequate for the proceeding of an administrative case. The respondent judge committed bribery
and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which states:
CANON 2 – A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities
His dismissal from service is thus justified.
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Case 56: HILARIO DE GUZMAN, JR. vs. JUDGE DEODORO J.
SISON
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629 (Formerly A.M. No. 99-731-RTJ) March 26, 200
Facts: Complainant Hilario de Guzman, Jr. was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San
Jacinto, Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. Rolando E. Columbres, another mayoral candidate, filed
an election protest against the complainant which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
40, Dagupan City, presided over by respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison.
On December of same year, a decision was rendered by respondent judge finding in the forty two
precincts contested by Columbres showed that the latter won the mayoralty elections of San
Jacinto, Pangasinan, garnering 4,037 votes as against complainant's 3,302 votes.
As response, complainant charged the respondent with manifest partiality and gross
ignorance of the law. He further alleged that respondent prematurely terminated the presentation
of his evidence and declared the case submitted for decision despite the fact that he was not
furnished with a copy thereof and the same did not contain a notice of hearing. In his comment,
respondent refuted allegations against him and stated that his decision is supported by the evidence
and his perception of the applicable law. Judge Sison claimed that any error in his decision is
correctable by appeal and not through an administrative complaint, absent any showing of malice
or bad faith on his part. However Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and manifest partiality and recommended his dismissal from the service.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed acts manifesting impartiality and is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law.
Held: Judges and lawyers should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and
jurisprudence, as assured by CANON 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that “a lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students and assist in disseminating the law and jurisprudence.”
Respondent judge’s reason for deciding the case contradictory to existing law and
controlling jurisprudence was not acceptable. His action contradicts the norm as stated in the Code
of Judicial Conduct. Judges and other judicial officers are enjoined to be faithful to the law and to
maintain professional competence. As the Court has consistently held that laws and statutes
governing elections contests especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
technical infirmities, respondent’s act was unwarranted.
Likewise, with evidence that Judge Sison was found fraternizing with litigants, he also
undermines people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. He violated RULE 2.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which asserts that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
In the case at bar, respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison is therefore found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and manifest partiality, and is dismissed from service.
93 | P a g e
Case 57: CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE RTC OF
DAGUPAN CITY vs. JUDGE ERNA FALLORAN-ALIPOSA
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1446 March 9, 2000
Facts: Employees of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41, namely: Gloria Ydia,
Legal Researcher and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Branch Clerk of Court; Ever Mejia,
Court Interpreter; Melinda Macaraeg, Court Stenographer; Evelyn Daroy, Court Stenographer; and
Rosyla del Castillo, Clerk III, wrote a letter to the Chief Justice requesting of the re-assignment
of Judge Erna Falloran-Aliposa, respondent, for acts of corruption ranging from appropriating
exhibits and misappropriating funds of the City Government of Dagupan. Said employees imputed
the following alleged corrupt practices among many others of Judge Aliposa:
1. Vouchers in the amount of P62,000.00 for the payment by city government of office supplies
and equipment were not received by their office and were covered by fictitious receipts.
2. Respondent Judge called for party-litigants who gave her shrimps, crabs, mangoes, boneless
bangus, carabeef and the like, which she brought to her house in Pasay City on Fridays.
3. Most cases reviewed not on the merits but on the basis of the litigants' ability to pay. Highest
bidders were often the winners.
4. Respondent Judge acts as the commissioner in all ex parte proceedings because of the fees
which the collects. Depending upon the party's capabilities to pay, the commissioner's fees
range from P1,500.00 to P2,000.00.
5. In the case of Vice-Mayor Teodoro Manaois, respondent Judge demanded P80,000.00. After
the said amount was delivered to her, the Vice Mayor won in the said case.
6. The telephone which was provided by the local government is used personally by respondent
Judge.
7. Respondent instructed her subordinate to remove an Order in two cases and she replaced it
with another one;
8. Respondent asked her subordinate to antedate a decision in a case which the former was not
able to render within three (3) months;
9. Respondent asked her employees to solicit gifts, in cash or in kind, from the lawyers on the
occasion of her birthday.
Respondent Judge claims that complainants were motivated by ill-will because she was strict with
them and she reprimanded them for their incompetence and inefficiency. Investigating Justice
recommended that respondent judge be dismissed from the service.
Issue: Whether or not the “concerned employees of the RTC of Dagupan City” were motivated by
ill will in filing an administrative case against respondent Judge and whether or not their
allegations would suffice for the dismissal of the latter.
Held: The Court believes that complainants were not motivated by ill-will against respondent
judge but rather by the fact that they can no longer stand her corrupt practices. Relatedly, as a
general rule in administrative proceedings, preponderance of evidence already suffices to establish
the charges against a judge. It is evident that Judge Aliposa has failed to measure up to the
standards of conduct and integrity expected of members of the judiciary, as embodied in the
following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 2 - A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
RULE 2.01 — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3 — A Judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.
RULE 3.01 — A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
The Court "has repeatedly stressed that a judge is the visible representation of the law and the
embodiment of the people's sense of justice and that, accordingly, he should constantly keep away
from any act of impropriety, not only in the performance of his official duties but also his everyday
actuations. No other position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than perhaps a seat in the judiciary. A judge must be the first to abide by the law and
to weave an example for the others to follow."
94 | P a g e
Based on the foregoing, respondent Judge Erna Falloran-Aliposa is dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits with prejudice to re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality
95 | P a g e
Case 58: MS. ALICE DAVILA vs. JUDGE JOSELITO S.D.
GENEROSO
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1062 July 31, 2000
DR. LETICIA S. SANTOS vs. JUDGE JOSELITO S.D. GENEROSO

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1260 July 31, 2000
Facts: Separate complains were sent to the Court Administrator regarding respondent’s delay in
the disposition of cases under his sala as the Presiding Judge of Branch 34 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City.
The first is from Alice Davila complaining of undue delay in the disposition of Criminal Case No.
12293 which was deemed submitted for decision on February 16, 1993 but has remained
undecided. The second is from Dr. Leticia S. Santos who stressed that Civil Case No. 11072
concerning mere ejectment, was submitted for decision on June 28, 1995 but was still undecided
as of June 17, 1996.
The Court administrator then asked Judge Generoso to explain the undue delay in the disposition
of subject cases before his court. However, the respondent failed to give an explanation and
therefore leading to the Court Administrator’s recommendation for the dismissal of the respondent
judge from the service.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge should be suspended due to failure to decide on cases.
Held: Judges are required to decide cases wary that delay in the disposition of cases wears away
the faith of the people in the judicial system. According to CANON 3, RULE 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, a “judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods." A judge who cannot comply with such a sworn duty should not serve the
judiciary any longer. Therefore, the Court echoes the ruling of the Court Administrator’s which
recommended for the dismissal of the respondent judge from the service.
96 | P a g e
Case 59: EVELYN AGPALASIN vs. JUDGE EMERITO M.
AGCAOILI
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308 April 12, 2000
Facts: In May 1991, while complainant Evelyn Agpalasin was approached by an employee of
respondent Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili approached her with the intent to purchase nipa shingles
for a poultry house project in CSU compound, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Agpalasin then went to the
area to estimate the number of shingles needed for the poultry house for which she found out that
5,500 shingles were needed. They agreed at a discounted price of P70.00 per hundred shingles
payable to the complainant upon segregation, freight on board Aparri, Cagayan. An amount of
P1,000.00 was paid as advance to complainant's employee.
When Agpalasin went to the chambers of the respondent to collect the balance, she was introduced
to Sixto Bumatay, then in trial for robbery and his counsel Atty. Juan Antonio. She was then asked
by Judge Agcaoili to deliver the nipa shingles to either of the two men. She was also told that
Bumatay would take charge of the payment of the balance of the purchase price. When the delivery
was being made, Bumatay asserts that the respondent judge would in fact be making the payment.
And so, upon the delivery of the shingles at the CSU compound, Judge Agcaoili issued a
Metrobank check for P2,850.00 to Arsenia Casilian, secretary of the complainant. The check was
dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds.
When the complainant went to the respondent’s office to inform him of the dishonour of the check,
the latter issued another for Landbank. He also made additional order of 2,300 nipa shingles at
P90.00 per hundred for which he issued another Metrobank check in the amount of P1,600.00.
More than one month after the delivery of the items complainant was summoned by respondent.
She was then slated her for allegedly lacking 200 nipa shingles out of 5,500 that were ordered and
then threatened her. Certain that she did not defraud respondent, complainant challenged him to
sue her in court. Respondent filed a case for estafa against complainant to which the MTC of Aparri
acquitted the latter.
As response to the estafa charge against her, Agpalasin filed her Counter-affidavit where she not
only denied the same but also charged the respondent. The Court of Appeals recommended that
Judge Agcaoili be charged with:
(a) ordering or allowing the accused in Criminal Case No. 09-594 to receive, transport and pay
the fare for 5,500 nipa shingles for respondent Judge's benefit and subsequently acquitting
the accused therein; and
(b) illegally constructing a poultry within the compound of the Cagayan State University, a
government property located at Carig, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or R.A.
No. 3019 for ordering or allowing a man with a pending criminal case before him to do his
biddings.
Held: The court finds that the act of Judge Agcaoili having ordered or allowed Sixto Bumatay, an
accused in a robbery case pending in his sala, to transport and pay for freight charges of 5,500 nipa
shingles, constitutes gross misconduct. He failed to live up to the norm that is expected from him
as a Judge that is to:
CANON 2 – A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Even more, he transgressed RULE 5.04 of the same code which states that “a judge or any
immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, factor or loan from anyone except
as may be allowed by law.” His act of allowing a litigant in his sala to pay for the freight of his
personal acquisitions is evident of his misconduct.
This was not the only case that the respondent judge has committed a transgression of
judicial ethics. Respondent Judge has habitually disobeyed judicial ethics and standards therefore
97 | P a g e
rendering him undeserving of the honor of his office. Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili is therefore
dismissed from the service.
98 | P a g e
Case 60: SAPHIA M. MAGARANG vs. JUDGE GALDINO B.
JARDIN, SR.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1448 April 6, 2000
Facts: On July 1998, the President of the Philippines appointed complainant Saphia M. Magarang's
husband, Nuruddin-Ali M. Magarang, Director III for Caraga of the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC).
On August of the same year, Alexander P. Mama-O filed a petition for quo warranto with
injunction, damages, attorney's fees and temporary restraining order, questioning the appointment
of Magarang such resulted to the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the respondent
enjoining the latter from assuming his office. After the hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 05, Butuan City, complainant went to the house of
Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., respondent judge, to request the latter to fairly decide the case but
Judge Jardin demanded for P200,000.00. A day after their interaction, respondent judge granted a
writ of preliminary injunction against Magarang, to which a motion for reconsideration was filed
by the latter.
During the pendency case, complainant went again to the respondent judge's office and handed
him P80,000.00 and committed the rest of the money the following day. To the dismay of the
complainant, Judge Jardin again denied the motion for reconsideration of her husband. As such, in
November 1998, complainant went to respondent judge's office to recover the P80,000.00 she gave
him to no avail.
Saphia then filed an administrative complaint with the Court Administrator, Supreme Court
charging respondent Judge Jardin with corruption, incompetence, ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of discretion. Respondent Judge denied the charges against him as false and fabricated. He
was later sanctioned by the investigating justice as suspension from office for a year.
Issue: Whether or not the investigating justice erred in the imposition of suspension from office
for one year despite finding that respondent judge committed acts of corruption.
Held: Yes. Respondent judge was found guilty of corruption in office receiving P200,000.00 from
petitioner Mama-O and P80,000.00 from complainant Magarang in consideration of favorable
action for the same case. His actions contravene provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
is expected to be observed by all Judges as well as other judicial officers. To wit, he violated the
following:
CANON 2 – A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities
Being a judge entails the highest degree of competence, integrity and independence. His office
demands public trust thus mandated to abide with the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct in
order to maintain faith among the people for the administration of justice. Respondent failed to
measure up to these standards by his acts of corruption which shows his unfitness to remain as a
Judge. Therefore, Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr. is dismissed from his position Judge of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 05, Butuan City as well as any position in the judiciary to which he may be
presently assigned.
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(REPORT) Suspension and Removal of Judges and Justices

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(REPORT) Suspension and Removal of Judges and Justices

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SUSPENSION AND

Submitted to: Atty. Carlisle Marie M. Fabie

Limitations of Filing an Impeachment Complaint

2. IMPEACHMENT OF FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO CORONA

a. Betrayal of public trust;

Article I: Partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo administration;

1 Sec. 2, Article X, 1987 Constitution

3. QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE USED

B. JUDGES OF THE LOWER COURTS AND JUSTICES OF COURT OF

DISCIPLINING BODY IS THE SUPREME COURT

General rule: A judge cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal, or administrative –

4 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook (1974)

HEARING AND TERMINATION

1. Within 90 days from the date of its commencement; or

REPORT AND ACTION

8 Sec 1, Rule 140, Rules of Court

AUTOMATIC CONVERSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASES TO

1. Violation of the Lawyer's Oath;

EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OR DESISTANCE

Complainant's desistance is not an obstacle to the taking of disciplinary action against a

C. GROUNDS AND SANCTIONS

Administrative charges are classified as serious, less serious, or light17

1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

14 Sec. 6, Rule 140, Rules of Court

LESS SERIOUS CHARGES

1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;

1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;

20 Cruz v. Iturralde (2003)

The following have been subject to discipline by the Supreme Court:

24 Montemayor v. Collado (1981)

REASON FOR THE RULE

REASON FOR THE RULE

34 Sec. 1, 1st par., Rule 137, Rules of Court

A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE

A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain

(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

A JUDGE SHOULD REGULATE EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK

ADVOCATIONAL, CIVIC AND CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES

(a) write, teach and speak on non-legal subjects;

PRACTICE OF LAW AND OTHER PROFESSION

COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

All judges shall strictly comply with this Code.

It was alleged inter alia:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary

Issue: Whether or not OCA is correct.

1. Irregular attendance in respondent’s office;

Issue: Whether or not the findings of Justice Martinez is correct.

CANON 1 -- A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF

CANON 2 -- A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

CANON 3 -- A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

On the portions of the Report:

2. Improper Grant of Bail

1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

Issue: Whether or not the OCA is correct.

The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785