DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE In this case, Cudia has not particularly identified any documents,
witness testimony, or oral or written presentation of facts
CUDIA vs. PMA
The case stemmed out from Cudia’s apparent tardiness in his
English class. When made to explain, Cudia stated that his being late
was out of his control because his Operations Research class was
dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also.
However, his professor in OR testified that she did not dismiss the
class late.
Cudia was then made to face the Honor Committee for his alleged
dishonesty. The HC ruled against his favor. Cudia appealed to the HC
Chairman but his appeal was denied. The Superintendent of the
PMA then ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
The case of Cudia was then referred to the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB). Notably, however, the HC did not
submit all of its records of the proceedings, including video footages
of the deliberations and voting on the ground of confidentiality of
records. Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. AFP Chief of Staff
affirmed. Cudia then argued that PMA has no legal basis for the
claim of confidentiality of records. He contended that it is the
ministerial duty of the HC to submit to the CRAB all its records of
the proceedings.
ISSUE: WON PMA’s failure to sumbit to CRAB all of its records
pertaining to Cudia’s case is fatal to its cause.
HELD: NO.
submitted at the hearing that would support his defense. The Court
may require that an administrative record be supplemented, but
only where there is a 'strong showing of bad faith or improper
behavior' on the part of the agency—both of which are not present
here. Cudia did not specifically indicate the nature of the concealed
evidence, if any, and the reason for withholding it. What he did was
simply suppose that his guilty verdict would be overturned with the
production and examination of such documents, footages, and
recordings. Besides even if such records were produced, they would
not necessarily relieve Cudia’s predicament. If at all, their non-
production was a harmless procedural error.
G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015
SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA AND LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON,
Petitioners, v. VICENTE CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT,
LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR AND VIOLETA C. BINADAS,
Respondent.
Herein petitioners claimed that they are the legitimate children of
the late Vicente and Benita Castillo. Petitioners likewise alleged that
by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over a land owned by
their parents pertained to them as heirs. Petitioners thereafter
learned that the estate of Vicente and a certain Leonora Ditablan
has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs, respondents herein.
Petitioners now insist that Vicente and Leonora were not married or
if they were so married, then said marriage was null and void by
reason of the subsisting marriage of their parents. To prove the
marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented
amongst others the duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial
of Vicente and Benita which was issued by the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente Church.
RTC ruled in favour of petitioners. The appellate court, however,
found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a
private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not
admissible in evidence.
Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public
document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local
civil registrar and the NSO. =Moreover, even assuming that the
Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain
that said document should be considered an ancient document
which should be excluded from the requirement of authentication.
ISSUES: WON the petitioners were able to prove the validity of the
marriage between Vicente and Benita through the Contracto
Matrimonial they presented
HELD: NO
Church registries of marriages made subsequent to the
promulgation of General Orders No. 6823 and the passage of Act
No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly
authorized public officials. They are private writings and their
authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private
writings in accordance with the rules of evidence. The Contrato
Matimonial falls under this.
Petitioners failed to present any witnesses to authenticate the said
contract as required under Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the ROC. In fact,
only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage
contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its
execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because
Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.
Moreover, the copy presented by the petitioners. A signed carbon
copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the
original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in
evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original.
But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a
carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no
public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy.
Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a
private document, they now argue that it is an ancient document
which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no
merit.
Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they
come from a place from which they might reasonably be expected
to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a
legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are
such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found
where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the
proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.
G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERGEL
ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, Accused-Appellants.
On October 19, 1998, appellants were charged with the crime of
Rape under the following Information, the accusatory portion of
which states:
That on the 16th day of July 1998, between the hours of 8:00 to
9:00 o'clock in the evening, at the house of the victim at Taytayan,
Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, confederating
and conspiring with one another, with deliberate intent, by means
of force and violence by boxing her on the stomach thereby
rendering her unconscious, with intimidation and lewd design, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge with AAA,3 while she was in a state of unconsciousness.
AAA, nineteen (19) years old, is a household help of the spouses
Constantino and Elvira Cueva. At around 8 o'clock in the evening of
July 16, 1998, she asked permission from her employers to go to her
parents' house. AAA's house is located in Barangay Taytayan, Bogo,
Cebu,7 the same barangay where her employers' house is situated.
On her way to her parents' house, she met appellants Vergel and
Allain who wanted to go with her but she refused. They suddenly
held her hands but she was able to get free from their hold. She
then decided to return to her employers' house9 but when she
thought about her parents' need for the money,10 she just stayed
and waited at the side of the road hoping that the appellants would
go away.
Thinking that appellants had already left, she continued walking to
her parents' house but appellants reappeared and held her hands
again.12 She shouted for help and struggled to be freed from their
hold but appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief13
and appellant Vergel punched her in the stomach which caused her
to lose consciousness.
At about 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, AAA regained her
consciousness and she noticed that she was only wearing her t-shirt
as her bra, panty and maong pants were on her side. She felt pain
all over her body. Her vagina hurt and it was covered with blood.
Her panty and maong pants were also stained with blood. She went
back to her employers' house and told them that she was raped by
appellants.
At around 9 o'clock in the morning of the same day, AAA was
accompanied by the Spouses Cuevas to the police station in Bogo,
Cebu to report the rape incident.20 The rape incident was
contained in a police blotter and AAA was later instructed to
undergo a physical examination which she did.
Dr. Mary Ann Jabat (Dr. Jabat) of the Severo Verallo Memorial
District Hospital, Bogo, Cebu, conducted an examination on AAA
and issued a Medical Certificate22 dated July 17, 1998. The medical
findings and testimony of Dr. Jabat revealed that AAA had
lacerations in the perineum and hymen (at 3 o'clock and 10 o'clock
positions); her labia majora had erythema and slight edema; and
the vaginal swab indicated the presence of spermatozoa. She said
that the lacerations in the perineum and the hymen were due to the
insertion of a foreign object or the male organ23 and that the
presence of spermatozoa signifies recent sexual intercourse.
On the other hand, appellants strongly denied the accusation and
interposed the defense of alibi. They both claimed that they were
not at the crime scene where AAA's alleged rape happened as they
were somewhere else. Appellants' sister Lucille and their mother
Amparo Ancajas corroborated their alibis.
The defense also presented Dr. Jesus Cerna, a medico legal expert,
who gave a different explanation on Dr. Jabat's medical findings,30
and Doroteo Booc, appellants' brother-in-law, to show that he saw
AAA walking with a male companion on that fateful night.31
Appellant Allain's birth certificate was presented to show that he
was still seventeen (17) years old at the time the alleged rape of
AAA was committed.32 Also presented was the police blotter.which
contained four (4) names as suspects on AAA's rape but the.same
police blotter also contained in the progress report that AAA only
suspected accused-appellants as her rapists arid refused to
acknowledge the other two.
On March 28, 2007, RTC found Vergel Ancajas and Allain Ancajas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The RTC ratiocinated that the elements of the crime of rape were
duly proven by the prosecution and the fact of rape had been
corroborated in its material details by the medical findings of Dr.
Jabat. It found that AAA had positively identified appellants whom
she was familiar with being her neighbors and childhood friends. On
April 27, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC
decision.
Appellants now claim that based on AAA's testimony, the element
of carnal knowledge was not established since she claimed to be
unconscious, hence, she would not know the act allegedly done to
her; that she only believed that they had carnal knowledge of her
because she felt pain on her vagina. They claim that there were
inconsistencies in her testimony and that her conduct after the
alleged rape negate the commission thereof.
Appellants' claim that rape was not was established as AAA had
been unconscious during its alleged commission is not persuasive.
While it is true that there was no direct evidence to establish that
appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA as the latter was
unconscious, however, proof of the commission of the crime need
not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could
also sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt.41 Indeed, the Court had affirmed convictions for
rape based on circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (3) and the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.43 A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the perpetrator.
Here, AAA was on her way to her parents' house when appellants,
her neighbors since childhood, appeared and held her hands. She
struggled and shouted but appellant Allain covered her mouth with
a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting, while appellant Vergel
punched her in the stomach which caused her to lose
consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain all
over her body and her vagina. She found her bra, bloodied parity
and maong pants beside her. She went back to her employers'
house and told them that appellants raped her. AAA's testimony
was corroborated by Dr. Jabat's declaration that the lacerations in
AAA's perineum and hymen were due to the insertion of a foreign
object or the male organ and the presence of spermatozoa signified
recent sexual intercourse. It is well settled that when the victim's
testimony is corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration,
there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the
essential requisites of carnal knowledge.45 The lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration.
We find no error committed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in
giving credence to AAA's testimony. In fact, it was put down in
record that AAA was crying while she was testifying before the trial
court.47 It has been held in several cases that the crying of a victim
during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges,
for the display of such emotion indicates the pain the victim feels
when she recounts the detail of her traumatic experience.48
The prosecution had established that appellants held AAA's hands,
and when she tried to shout, appellant Allain covered her mouth
with a handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in the
abdomen which caused her to lose consciousness. It is fundamental
for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of purpose and unity
in the execution of the unlawful objective which were present in
this case.
We find that the RTC correctly rejected appellants' defense of denial
and alibi. AAA positively identified appellants as the persons who
raped her. She knew them as they were neighbors since childhood.
Denial fails in the light of AAA's positive declaration.
Appellants' argument that AAA's conduct after the alleged sexual
assault, i.e., washing her bloodied panty and maong pants, and
washing her private part, are not the normal behavior of a woman
who had just been raped deserves scant consideration.
It is not accurate to say that there is a typical reaction or norm of
behavior among rape victims.53 On the contrary, people react
differently to emotional stress and no standard form of behavior
can be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement.54
What is notable in the records was the fact that after she had
regained consciousness at 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998,
she immediately went back to her employers' house and narrated
to them what appellants had done to her, later reported the rape
incident to the police and underwent a physical examination of her
private parts. Her actions indeed showed her desire to obtain justice
for what appellants did to her.
Appellants' contention that if AAA was positive as to their
identification as the perpetrators of the crime charged, why were
there two other names included in the police blotter, is also
unmeritorious.
The same police blotter stated a notation that:
Progress Report on Rape Alarm (Entry Nr. 98-257). As per sworn
statement of offended party AAA that the alleged suspects were
Allain Ancajas and Vergel Ancajas and she refused (sic) the other
suspects.
The inclusion of the two additional names was cured by the sworn
statement of AAA and her categorical declaration in open, court
that appellants were the perpetrators of the crime charged and no
other. It is well entrenched that entries in a police blotter, although
regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are
not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries, for these are often
incomplete and inaccurate. These, therefore, should not be given
undue significance or probative value as to the facts stated therein.
Appellants' claim that a DNA test on the spermatozoa found on
AAA's vagina should have been submitted for DNA testing to know
whether the sperm indeed came from both appellants or from
AAA's boyfriend.
It has already been established that appellants were the ones who
raped AAA. The DNA test is not essential, while there exists other
evidence pinning down appellants as the perpetrators.58 Moreover,
if the prosecution had not conducted such DNA test, appellants
should have moved for such test during the trial to prove their
innocence.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
REPUBLIC vs. MUPAS
AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government for the
construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-
operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. On the other hand,
Paircargo Consortium submitted its competitive proposal to the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).Paircargo
Consortium offered to pay the Government a total of P17.75 billion
as guaranteed payment for 27 years while AEDC offered to pay the
Government a total of P135 million for the same period. Hence,
DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium (that later
organized itself as PIATCO). A Concession Agreement with PIATCO
for the construction, development, and operation of the NAIA-IPT III
under a build-operate-transfer scheme was made to authorized
PIATCO to build, operate, and maintain the NAIA-IPT III during the
concession period of twenty-five (25) years.
On March 31, 2000, PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka and
Asahikosan to aid in constructing the project. However, PIATCO
defaulted on its obligation to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan
pursuant to their respective contracts. Takenaka and Asahikosan
agreed to defer PIATCO’s payments until June 2003. In 2002,
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech that the
Government would not honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same
day, Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO that they were
suspending the construction of the NAIA-IPT III for PIATCO’s failure
to provide adequate security. September 17, 2002, petitioners
Demosthenes Agan, et al., asked the Court to nullify the PIATCO
contracts, and to prohibit the DOTC and the MIAA from
implementing these contracts for being contrary to law. The case,
entitled Agan v. PIATCO, was docketed as G.R. No. 15500.
May 5, 2003, the Court nullified the PIATCO contracts after finding
that Paircargo Consortium (that later incorporated into PIATCO) was
not a duly pre-qualified bidder for failure to meet the minimum
equity requirements for the NAIA-IPT III project.
Security Bank (member of the Paircargo Consortium) invested its
entire net worth in a single undertaking or enterprise in gross
violation of Section 21-B of the General Banking Act (which limits a
commercial bank’s equity investment, whether allied or non-allied,
to fifteen percent (15%) of its net worth).
PIATCO contracts contained provisions that substantially departed
from the draft Concession Agreement
December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III before the RTC of Pasay, Branch 11
RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the Government. January
4, 2005, the RTC modified its December 21, 2004 order and
directed: (1) the Land Bank to immediately release to PIATCO the
amount of US$62,343,175.7725cralawred that would be deducted
from the just compensation; (2) the Government to submit to the
RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds for the payment of just
compensation; and (3) the Government to maintain and preserve
the NAIA-IPT III pending the expropriation proceedings and the full
payment of just compensation. The RTC likewise prohibited the
Government from performing acts of ownership over the NAIA-IPT
III such as awarding concessions or leasing any part of the NAIA-IPT
III to other parties
RTC appointed three Commissioners28 to determine just
compensation without consulting the Government and PIATCO
Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429
Government, et al., filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
assailing the validity of the January 4, 7, and 10, 2005 orders of the
RTC in the expropriation case
PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan sought to nullify the RTC
decision for alleged violation of their right to due process. They
complained that they were only furnished copies of the BOC Final
Report only after the promulgation of the May 23, 2011
decision.103 They averred that the RTC violated Sections 7 and 8,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court which provide that the clerk of court
shall serve copies of the commissioners’ report on all interested
parties, with notice that they be allowed ten days within which to
file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire
the offer to pay through an escrow account is not equivalent to
direct payment. PIATCO further denied the Government’s
allegations that there were several claimants on the just
compensation.
RTC ruled that it has residual jurisdiction to adjudicate the
Government’s Manifestation and Motion considering that the
motion was filed prior to the parties’ filing of the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC opined that the Manifestation and Motion was akin to a
motion for execution pending appeal. The Manifestation and
Motion showed the Government’s intent to voluntarily comply with
the May 23, 2011 decision which was pending appeal before the CA.
Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the RTC has the
residual power to issue orders for the protection and preservation
of the parties’ rights, and to order the execution of a decision
pending appeal. Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court provides that courts have incidental power to issue orders
that are necessary to effectuate their judgments.
The CA Rulings
CA upheld the validity of the RTC’s May 23, 2011 decision. The CA
ruled that the parties did not need to be furnished the BOC Final
Report since RA 8974 is silent on the appointment of the BOC, as
held in Gingoyon.
However, the CA modified the RTC rulings and arrived at its own
formula of the NAIA-IPT III’s replacement cost
The CA likewise observed that PIATCO’s summarized computation
of attendant costs was self-serving and unsubstantiated by relevant
evidence.
CA further ordered Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the
expenses of the BOC. Since Takenaka and Asahikosan’s inputs on
the construction costs of the NAIA-IPT III were heard by the RTC,
they should share in the expenses of the BOC.
Upon finality of judgment, interest on the sum due by then shall be
at 6% per annum until fully paid pursuant to BSP Circular No. 799,
series of 2013 which took effect on 01 July 2013, and which
effectively modified the interest rate rulings in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. Eastern Shipping was the basis of the
Court’s earlier imposition of a 12% interest from finality of
judgment.
The main issue in this petition is the propriety of the appointment
of DG Jones and Partners as an independent appraiser of the NAIA-
IPT III.
Held:
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written
document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
The best evidence rule ensures that the exact contents of a
document are brought before the court. In deeds, wills, and
contracts, a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in
the rights and obligations of the parties. A substantial hazard of
inaccuracy exists in the human process of making a copy by
handwriting or typewriting. Moreover, with respect to oral
testimony purporting to give the terms of a document from
memory, a special risk of error is present, greater than in the case of
attempts at describing other situations generally.286cralawrednad
The best evidence rule likewise acts as an insurance against fraud. If
a party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it,
and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the
presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat.
The rule likewise protects against misleading inferences resulting
from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected
portions of a larger set of writings.287cralawrednad
As exceptions to the best evidence rule, Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that non-original documents may be
produced in court in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the
theory that the original cannot be produced by the party who offers
the evidence within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.
PIATCO argues that its non-submission of original documents before
the trial court is justified under Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. It points out that a party need not submit the original
when it consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole. PIATCO insists that the lower courts erred in not giving
probative value to the report prepared by Reyes Tacandong& Co.,
an auditing firm, validating PIATCO’s computation of attendant
costs. Significantly, Reyes Tacandong& Co. failed to state that it
examined the original documents in validating PIATCO’s
computation of attendant costs.
We agree with PIATCO that it need not submit numerous and
voluminous invoices, official receipts, and other relevant documents
before the trial court to prove the attendant costs that it incurred in
the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. The trial court may admit a
summary of voluminous original documents, in lieu of original
documents, if the party has shown that the underlying writings are
numerous and that an in-court examination of these documents
would be inconvenient. In other words, Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court does away with the item-by-item court
identification and authentication of voluminous exhibits which
would only be burdensome and tedious for the parties and the
court.
However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary
of numerous documents, the proponent must lay a proper
foundation for the admission of the original documents on which
the summary is based. The proponent must prove that the source
documents being summarized are also admissible if presented in
court.
In concrete terms, the source documents must be shown to be
original, and not secondary. Furthermore, the source documents
must likewise be accessible to the opposing party so that the
correctness of the summary of the voluminous records may be
tested on cross-examination and/or may be refuted in pleadings. In
ordinary trial-type proceedings, a proper foundation for the
introduction of a summary may be established through the
“testimony of the person who is responsible for the summary's
preparation, or the person who supervised the preparation of the
summary.”
The primary reason for these procedural foundations is that the
summary of numerous documents is, in strict terms, hearsay
evidence. The trial court should not haphazardly allow a party to
present a summary of numerous documents and immediately admit
and give probative value to such summary without sufficiently
laying these foundations. If the source documents of the summary
are non-original, the trial court would commit a grave error in
admitting and/or giving probative value to the summary of non-
original documents; the evidence admitted would be double
hearsay.
Furthermore, when a party invokes Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, he does not similarly invoke Section 3 (a), (b), and/or
(d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He does not likewise claim that
the original documents have been lost or destroyed. The party
merely asserts that the numerous documents cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time and that the fact sought to be
established from these documents is only the general result of the
whole.
Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best evidence rule
pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he asks
permission from the trial court to produce a summary of numerous
documents, whose originals are available to the adverse party for
inspection. He does not ask permission from the trial court to
present in evidence the numerous non-original documents.
Otherwise, the very purpose of Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court would be defeated. In that case, every exhibit of non-
original documents would be identified, authenticated, and cross-
examined, leading to a tedious and protracted litigation.
Thus, if a party desires to present photocopies of the original
documents, he must first establish that the presentation of
photocopies is justified under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. He must establish the presence of all the
elements under these provisions.
In the case of lost or destroyed documents, the offeror of non-
original documents must first prove the following elements before
secondary evidence is admitted before the court: (a) the existence
or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the
original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the
absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. To conclude
otherwise is to allow the party to circumvent the best evidence rule
and the requirements under Section 3 (a), (b), and (d), Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court by merely invoking Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
In the present case, PIATCO attached to its Compliance dated
December 14, 2010, the photocopies of numerous documents, and
the validation of PIATCO’s computation of attendant costs prepared
by Reyes Tacandong& Co., among others. PIATCO justifies the non-
presentment of original documents pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
We affirm the lower courts’ uniform findings that PIATCO failed to
establish its attendant costs. PIATCO failed to establish that the
photocopied documents fall under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These photocopied documents are
hearsay evidence. They are mere scraps of paper and have no
weight as basis for the attendant costs of the NAIA-IPT III.
We likewise cannot give weight to the summary prepared by Reyes
Tacandong& Co. for being double hearsay. Reyes Tacandong& Co.,
whose letter was addressed to PIATCO and not to the trial court, did
not state in its report that it examined the original documents
allegedly proving attendant costs. Moreover, in a letter dated
December 14, 2010, Reyes Tacandong& Co stated it does not
“express any assurance on the attendant costs:”
We have performed the procedures agreed with Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., (“the Company”) with respect to
the Company’s attendant costs incurred in building NAIA Terminal 3
from 1997 to 2004. Our engagement was undertaken in accordance
with the Philippine Standard on Related Services applicable to
agreed-upon procedures engagements.
The sufficiency of the procedures is solely the responsibility of the
specified users of the report. Consequently, we make no
representation regarding the sufficiency of the procedures either
for the purpose for which this report has been requested or for any
other purpose.
Because the procedures do not constitute either an audit or a
review of financial statements made in accordance with Philippine
Standards on Auditing, we do not express any assurance on the
attendant costs.
G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N.
MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR.,
Respondents.
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and
Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children of
Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and
Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property is and was duly registered in the names of the
petitioner and Silvestra. In its certificate of title, appearing as Entry
No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela, Slivestra’s
niece.
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7,
2005, TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title,
TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue
of a Deed of Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra
allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the
purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit9 dated July
12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra.
It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by
Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati
City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005,
Fidela passed away.
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for
two counts of falsification of public documents under Articles 171
and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner. However,
said criminal charges were eventually dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the
heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of
Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the
petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner
averred that the respondents have no legal capacity to institute said
civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate
pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate
children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of their father and mother.
in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents
presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office38 where Fidela signed as the Informant in
item no. 17 of both documents.
The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively
prove the respondents' legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering
any evidence to the contrary. The certificates of live birth contain no
entry stating whether the respondents are of legitimate or
illegitimate filiation, making said documents unreliable and
unworthy of weight and value in the determination of the issue at
hand.
Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates
of live birth, only the signature of Fidela appears, and that they
were not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She argues that the birth
certificate must be signed by the father in order to be competent
evidence to establish filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
invoking Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila40 where it was held
that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father is not
competent evidence of paternity.
HELD:
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of
entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry)
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil
Registrar)." Thus, being public documents, the respondents'
certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed
by the father in order to be a competent evidence of legitimate
filiation does not find support in law and jurisprudence. Verily,
under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,46 the declaration of either parent
of the new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the
registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that
the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to
acknowledge the child.
GR No. 202514, Jul 25, 2016
ANNA MARIE L. GUMABON v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
On August 12, 2004, Anna Marie filed a complaint for recovery of
sum of money and damages before the RTC against the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and the PNB Delta branch manager Silverio
Fernandez (Fernandez). The case stemmed from the PNB's refusal
to release Anna Marie's money in a consolidated savings account
and in two foreign exchange time deposits, evidenced by Foreign
Exchange Certificates of Time Deposit (FXCTD).
In 2001, Anna Marie, together with her mother Angeles and her
siblings Anna Elena and Santiago, (the Gumabons) deposited with
the PNB Delta Branch $10,945.28 and $16,830.91, for which they
were issued FXCTD Nos. A-993902[5] and A-993992,[6] respectively.
The Gumabons also maintained eight (8) savings accounts[7] in the
same bank. Anna Marie decided to consolidate the eight (8) savings
accounts and to withdraw P-2,727,235.85 from the consolidated
savings account to help her sister's financial needs.
Anna Marie called the PNB employee handling her accounts, Reino
Antonio Salvoro (Salvoro), to facilitate the consolidation of the
savings accounts and the withdrawal. When she went to the bank
on April 14, 2003, she was informed that she could not withdraw
from the savings accounts since her bank records were missing and
Salvoro could not be contacted.
On April 15, 2003, Anna Marie presented her two FXCTDs, but was
also unable to withdraw against them. Fernandez informed her that
the bank would still verify and investigate before allowing the
withdrawal since Salvoro had not reported for work.
Thus, Anna Marie sent two demand letters[8] dated April 23 and
April 25, 2003 to the PNB.
After a month, the PNB finally consolidated the savings accounts
and issued a passbook for Savings Account (SA) No. 6121200.[9] The
PNB also confirmed that the total deposits amounted to P-
2,734,207.36. Anna Marie, her mother, and the PNB executed a
Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim dated May 23, 2003[10] to settle all
questions regarding the consolidation of the savings accounts. After
withdrawals, the balance of her consolidated savings account was
P250,741.82.
On July 30, 2003, the PNB sent letters to Anna Marie to inform her
that the PNB refused to honor its obligation under FXCTD Nos.
993902 and 993992,[11] and that the PNB withheld the release of
the balance of P-250,741.82 in the consolidated savings
account.[12] According to the PNB, Anna Marie pre-terminated,
withdrew and/or debited sums against her deposits.
Thus, Anna Marie filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of
money and damages against the PNB and Fernandez.
As to the two FXCTDs, Anna Marie contended that the PNB's refusal
to pay her time deposits is contrary to law. The PNB cannot claim
that the bank deposits have been paid since the certificates of the
time deposits are still with Anna Marie.
As to the consolidated savings account, Anna Marie stated that the
PNB had already acknowledged the account's balance in the Deed
of Waiver and Quitclaim amounting to P2,734,207.36. As of January
26, 2004, the remaining balance was P250,741.82. PNB presented
no concrete proof that this amount had been withdrawn.
Anna Marie prayed that the PNB and Fernandez be held solidarily
liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees, costs of suit, and legal interests because of the
PNB's refusal to honor its obligations.
In its answer,[15] the PNB argued that: (1) Anna Marie is not
entitled to the balance of the consolidated savings account based
on solutio indebiti; (2) the PNB already paid the $10,058.01 covered
by FXCTD No. 993902; (3) the PNB is liable to pay only $10,718.87 of
FXCTD No. 993992, instead of the full amount of $17,235.41; and (4)
Anna Marie is guilty of contributory negligence. The PNB's
arguments are discussed below.
First, Anna Marie is not entitled to the alleged balance of
P250,741.82. The PNB's investigation showed that Anna Marie
withdrew a total of P251,246.81[16] from two of the eight savings
accounts and she used this amount to purchase manager's check
no. 0000760633.[17] Hence, P251,246.81 should be deducted from
the sum agreed upon in the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim. The PNB
offered photocopies of the PNB's miscellaneous ticket[18] and the
manager's check as evidence to prove the withdrawals. The PNB
argued that unjust enrichment would result if Anna Marie would be
allowed to collect P-250,741.82 from the consolidated savings
account without deducting her previous withdrawal of P251,246.81.
Second, Anna Marie is not entitled to receive $10,058.01 covered by
FXCTD No. 993902. Based on the PNB's records, Anna Marie pre-
terminated FXCTD No. 993902 on March 11, 2002, and used the
deposit, together with another deposit covered by FXCTD No.
993914 (for $8,111.35), to purchase a foreign demand draft (FX
Demand Draft No. 4699831) payable to Anna Rose/Angeles
Gumabon. The PNB presented a facsimile copy of Anna Rose's
Statement of Account (SOA)[19] from the PNB Bank to prove that
the amount covered by FXCTD No. 993902 was already paid.
Third, Anna Marie is only entitled to receive $10,718.87 instead of
the full amount of $17,235.41 covered by FXCTD No. 993992
because: (a) the amount of $1,950.00 was part of the money used
by Anna Marie to purchase the manager's check; (2) the amount of
$2,566.54 was credited to Current Account No. 227-810961-8
owned by Anna Marie's aunt, Lolita Lim; and (3) the amount of
$2,000.00 was credited to Current Account No. 2108107498 of Anna
Marie and Savings Account No. 212-5057333 of Anna Marie/or
Angeles or Santiago/or Elena (all surnamed Gumabon). Hence,
these amounts should be deducted from the amount payable to
Anna Marie.
Finally, the PNB alleged that Anna Marie was guilty of contributory
negligence in her bank dealings.
In her reply, Anna Marie argued that the best evidence of her
withdrawals is the withdrawal slips duly signed by her and the
passbooks pertaining to the accounts. PNB, however, failed to show
any of the withdrawal slips and/or passbooks, and also failed to
present sufficient evidence that she used her accounts' funds.
The RTC ruled in Anna Marie's favour. It held that the PNB had not
yet paid the remaining balance of $10,058.01 under FXCTD No.
993902. Anna Marie's SOA,[22] which the PNB relied upon, is a
mere photocopy and does not satisfy the best evidence rule.
Moreover, there is no indication on the stated amounts in the SOA
that the funds have come from FXCTD No. 993902.[23] The PNB
failed to obtain the deposition of a PNC Bank officer or present any
other evidence to show that the amounts stated in the SOA came
from FXCTD No. 993902. The RTC also held that the alleged pre-
termination of FXCTD No. 993902 on March 11, 2002, is hard to
believe since the certificate shows that the last entry was made on
March 24, 2003, with a reflected balance of $10,058.01.
On FXCTD No. 993992, the RTC held that the PNB failed to prove
Anna Marie's alleged withdrawals. These alleged withdrawals are
not reflected at the back of the certificate. Anna Marie's ledger was
also not presented as evidence to show that several withdrawals
had been made against FXCTD No. 993992.
On the consolidated savings account, the RTC held that the PNB
failed to prove that Anna Marie withdrew the balance of
P250,741.82. The RTC excluded PNB's evidence, i.e., photocopies of
the miscellaneous ticket and manager's check, to prove the alleged
withdrawals, since these documents were just photocopies and thus
failed to satisfy the best evidence rule.
The RTC awarded damages to Anna Marie due to the PNB's
mishandling of her account through its employee, Salvoro. The RTC
also held that the PNB failed to establish Anna Marie's contributory
negligence. The CA reversed the RTC's ruling.
The CA held that the PNB had paid the actual amounts claimed by
Anna Marie in her complaint. The CA noted Anna Marie's suspicious
and exclusive dealings with Salvoro and the Gumabons' instruction
to Salvoro to make unauthorized and unrecorded withdrawals.
Hence, there are no entries of withdrawals reflected in Anna
Marie's passbook.
The CA also considered Anna Rose's SOA as proof that the PNB had
paid the remaining balance of $10,058.01 on FXCTD No. 993902.
The CA held that the PNB verified the SOA and it was corroborated
by the affidavit[25] of the PNB Branch Operations Officer in New
York. The CA stated that the RTC should have allowed the taking of
the deposition of the PNB bank officer.
The CA also relied on the PNB's investigation and concluded that the
PNB had already paid the amounts claimed by Anna Marie under
FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992.
As to Anna Marie's consolidated savings account, the CA gave
credence to the miscellaneous ticket and the manager's check
presented by the PNB to prove that it had already paid the balance.
Anna Marie moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the CA's
decision; hence, the present petition.
Anna Marie now argues that: first, the CA should not have
disregarded the RTC's conclusive findings; second, the CA erred in
considering the PNB New York bank officer's affidavit because it was
not formally offered as evidence; third, the CA erroneously relied on
a foreign demand draft[27] to prove the PNB's payment of the
amount due under FXCTD No. 993902; fourth, the CA erroneously
considered the miscellaneous ticket and the manager's check
because these documents are mere photocopies and inadmissible
under the best evidence rule; and fifth, the CA's conclusion about a
purported "connivance" between Anna Marie and Salvoro has no
evidentiary basis.
In its comment, the PNB counters that: first, the CA can rectify the
RTC's factual findings since the RTC committed errors in its
appreciation of the evidence; second, the RTC completely ignored
the PNB's several evidence proving its payment of Anna Marie's
FXCTDs; third, Anna Marie did not refute the PNB's allegations of
payment; fourth, the CA has the right to review even those exhibits
which were excluded by the RTC; and fifth, the CA correctly ruled
that the PNB should not be faulted about the unrecorded
transactions, and that the PNB had done its duty to its depositors
when it conducted investigations and an internal audit of Anna
Marie's accounts.

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