You are on page 1of 15

[G.R. NO.

162583 : June 8, 2007]


ALBERTO NAVARRO, Petitioner, v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. INC., MANUEL GARCIA and RUSTUM
ALEJANDRINO, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner was an employee of the respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola) for more than a decade.
Specifically, he worked as a forklift operator for Coca-Cola from November 1, 1987 to February 27, 1998.
The respondent company has an Employees Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations, which includes Rule 002-85.
Section 4(i) of the rule provided for the penalty of DISCHARGE for a tenth AWOP 4/AWOL,5 whether consecutive or
not, following other AWOP/AWOLs within one calendar year.
On August 11, 1997, petitioner did not report to work because of heavy rains which flooded the entire barangay where he
resided. In a Memorandum dated October 1, 1997, he was required to explain in writing within 24 hours why no
disciplinary action should be imposed on him for his tenth absence without permission. In response, petitioner submitted
a written explanation accompanied by a Certification6 from his Barangay Captain, stating that his absence was due to heavy
rains and subsequent flooding that hit his barangay. Later, petitioner filed a Supplemental Written Explanation, 7in lieu of
answers to a questionnaire provided by the company. Petitioner stated that on August 11, 1997, his house was heavily
flooded and that on the next day, he immediately filed an application for leave of absence. Despite his compliance and
explanation, petitioner was dismissed on February 27, 1998 and given a notice of termination8 which enumerated the dates
of his absences without permission.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, which was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals annulled the resolution of the NLRC. The appellate court also denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE
DECISION OF THE NLRC AND REINSTATING, WITH MODIFICATION, THAT OF THE LABOR
ARBITER WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, THE RULING OF THE COMMISSION IS MORE IN ACCORD WITH
THE EVIDENCE AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HEED THE INJUNCTION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT THAT: "AS IS WELL-SETTLED, IF DOUBTS EXIST BETWEEN THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE, THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
MUST BE TILTED IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE. SINCE IT IS A TIME-HONORED RULE THAT
IN CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN A LABORER AND HIS MASTER, DOUBTS REASONABLY
ARISING FROM THE EVIDENCE, OR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WRITINGS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THE FORMER'S FAVOR" IN RENDERING THE DISPUTED
DECISION AND RESOLUTION.
3. WHETHER PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE OF ABSENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ALLOWED BY THE COMPANY.

RULING: Respondents contend that the application for leave was correctly denied, and that petitioner violated the
Employees Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations when he incurred his tenth absence.Petitioner, on the other hand,
argues that his absence was excusable under the circumstances.
On this point, we are in agreement that petitioner's application for leave should have been approved by the company. His
absence was due to a fortuitous event outside of petitioner's control.
In our view, petitioner had no wrongful, perverse or even negligent attitude, intended to defy the order of his employer
when he absented himself. He did so because heavy rains flooded their residential area which was along the railroad. 12 In
his favor, the Barangay Captain certified that indeed there was flooding in their place of residence.
A worker cannot be reasonably expected to anticipate times of sickness nor emergency. Hence, to require prior notice of
such times would be absurd. He can only give proper notice after the occurrence of the event - which is what petitioner
did in this case.
In earlier cases, we have expressed disapproval of dismissal of employees who have absented themselves due to emergency
circumstances. In Brew Master International, Inc. v. National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU),13 the employee's absence was
precipitated by a grave family problem when his wife unexpectedly deserted him and abandoned the family. Under said
circumstances, his absence was deemed justified. Similarly, in this case, the reason for petitioner's absence was not of his
own doing much less to his liking, thus we are of the view that he did not merit the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service.
We reiterate that the State policy is to afford full protection to labor. When conflicting interests of labor and capital are
weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of capital should be counterbalanced by the compassion that
the law accords the less privileged workingman. 14 Under Article 27915 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly
dismissed is entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to the payment of full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him
WHEREFORE, both the assailed Decision dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
March 8, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. is hereby ORDERED:
(1) to immediately reinstate petitioner Navarro to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges;
(2) to pay his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time of his actual reinstatement; andcralawlibrary
(3) to pay petitioner Navarro attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of his total monetary award.
Costs against respondents.

G & M Philippines, Inc., vs. Romil V. Cuambot


CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 162308 November 22, 2006

Illegal Dismissal, Labor Law, Overseas Employment

FACTS:

Respondent Romil V. Cuambot was deployed to Saudi Arabia as a car body builder with petitioner G & M Philippines,
Inc., a duly licensed placement and recruitment agency. On a two-year employment contract, he worked with the Al Waha
Workshop. However, respondent did not finish his contract and returned to the Philippines barely six months later. Upon
returning, he immediately filed before the NLRC a complaint for unpaid wages, withheld salaries, refund of plane ticket
and repatriation bond, which was later amended to include illegal dismissal, claim for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract, actual, exemplary and moral damages, and attorney’s fees.

Respondent Cuambot alleged that at the Al Waha Workshop where he worked, he was subjected to inhumane and
unbearable working conditions. Except for a meal allowance of 100 Riyals a month, he was not paid his monthly salary of
1,200 Riyals. And he was required to render six (6) hours of overtime work daily, except Friday, without overtime pay; he
was also seriously insulted by his employer every time he demanded for his salary, and some of the letters sent to him by
his family were withheld by his employer.

He thus filed a petition for payment of the unpaid salaries including interests, until the same will be fully paid.

Petitioner G & M insisted that respondent was religiously paid his salaries as they fell due. After working for a little over
seven months, respondent pleaded with his employer to be allowed to return home since there were family problems he
had to settle personally. Respondent even submitted a resignation letter. To support such claim, petitioner submitted in
evidence copies of seven payslips duly authenticated by the Philippine Labor Attaché in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Respondent countered that his signatures in the purported payslips were forged. He also stated that he was never given a
copy of the contract of employment. To counter the allegation of forgery, petitioner claimed that there was a great
possibility that respondent had changed his signature while abroad so that he could file a complaint for illegal dismissal
upon his return. The argument that the stroke and handwriting on the payslips was written by one and the same person is
mere conjecture, as respondent could have requested someone, to prepare the resignation letter for him. Petitioner further
pointed out that respondent has different signatures, not only in the pleadings submitted before the Labor Arbiter, but
also in respondents’ personal documents.

On January 30, 1997, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent Cuambot, finding unreliable the G & M's evidence
of Cuambot's alleged signature in the payslips which was similar to the handwritings in the payslips and the handwritings
in the purported resignation letter of the Cuambot. In an appeal to the NLRC, the latter remanded the case to its origin
for referral to a government agency that can conduct calligraphy examination on the questioned documents.

The case was then re-raffled to another Labor Arbiter, and this time, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. The
new Labor Arbiter said the respondent failed to substantiate his claim of poor working conditions and long hours of
employment. The fact that he executed a handwritten resignation letter was enough evidence of the fact that he voluntarily
resigned from work. Respondent also failed to submit any evidence to refute the payslips duly signed and authenticated
by the labor attaché in Saudi Arabia, inasmuch as their probative value cannot be impugned by mere self-serving allegations.
The Labor Arbiter concluded that as between the oral allegations of workers that they were not paid monetary benefits
and the documentary evidence presented by employer, the latter should prevail.

Respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC, alleging that the Labor Arbiter failed to consider the genuineness of the
signature which appears in the purported resignation as well as those that appeared in the seven payslips. He insisted that
these documents should have been endorsed to the National Bureau of Investigation Questioned Documents Division or
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for calligraphy examination.

The NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. It held that the questioned documents could not be endorsed to the
agency concerned since mere photocopies had been submitted in evidence. It also stressed that the parties had earlier
agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence on record; that if respondent had
wanted to have the documents endorsed to the NBI or the PNP, he should have insisted that the documents be examined
by a handwriting expert of the government. Thus, respondent was estopped from assailing the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.

On a petition for certiorari before the CA, the latter reversed the ruling of the NLRC. According to the appellate court,
among others, a visual examination of the questioned signatures would instantly reveal significant differences in the
handwriting.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the employee voluntarily resigned from employment or was illegally dismissed?

RULING:

We find in respondent’s favor. That the petitioner failed to submit the original copies of the payslips and the resignation
letter raises doubts as to the veracity of its claim that they were actually signed by the respondent.

As correctly noted by the CA, the opinions of handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of forged
documents because of the technical procedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the courts. A finding of
forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
No less than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of
the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered
or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.”

Even a cursory perusal of the resignation letter and the handwritten pay slips will readily show that they were written by
only one person.

Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor
of labor, in order to give effect to the policy of the State to “afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers,” and
to “assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work.”

The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner Angelina Francisco was hired by respondent Kasei Corporation during its incorporation stage as Accountant
and Corporate Secretary and later as Liaison Officer. Subsequently she was also designated Acting Manager until replaced,
but was assured by the company that she was still connected as Technical Consultant. Thereafter, Kasei Corporation
reduced petitioner’s salary until it was later withheld despite repeated follow-ups. Petitioner once again asked for her salary
but was informed that she is no longer connected with the company. Petitioner thus filed an action for constructive
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Respondent Kasei Corporation averred that petitioner is not their employee as she
performed her work at her own discretion without their control and supervision. Both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC
tribunal found for petitioner. CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not there was employer-employee relationship between the parties.

Ruling: YES.

In certain cases the control test is not sufficient to give a complete picture of the relationship between the parties, owing
to the complexity of such a relationship where several positions have been held by the worker. The better approach would
therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative employer’s power to control the employee with respect
to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the
activity or relationship.

By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because she was under
the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporation’s Technical Consultant. She reported for work regularly
and served in various capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate
Secretary, with substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering accounting and tax services to the company and
performing functions necessary and desirable for the proper operation of the corporation such as securing business permits
and other licenses over an indefinite period of engagement.

Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an employee of respondent corporation
because she had served the company for six years before her dismissal, receiving check vouchers indicating her
salaries/wages, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as well as deductions and Social Security contributions.
Petitioner’s membership in the SSS as manifested by a copy of the SSS specimen signature card which was signed by the
President of Kasei Corporation and the inclusion of her name in the on-line inquiry system of the SSS evinces the existence
of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent corporation. It is therefore apparent that
petitioner is economically dependent on respondent corporation for her continued employment in the latter’s line of
business.

JOSE SONZA vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION


G.R. No. 138051
June 10, 2004

Facts: In May 1994, ABS-CBN signed an agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and Development Corporation
(MJMDC). ABS-CBN was represented by its corporate officers while MJMDC was represented by Sonza, as President
and general manager, and Tiangco as its EVP and treasurer. Referred to in the agreement as agent, MJMDC agreed to
provide Sonza’s services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. ABS-CBN agreed to pay Sonza a
monthly talent fee of P310, 000 for the first year and P317, 000 for the second and third year.

On April 1996, Sonza wrote a letter to ABS-CBN where he irrevocably resigned in view of the recent events concerning
his program and career. After the said letter, Sonza filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a complaint
alleging that ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries, separation pay, service incentive pay,13th month pay, signing bonus, travel
allowance and amounts under the Employees Stock Option Plan (ESOP). ABS-CBN contended that no employee-
employer relationship existed between the parties. However, ABS-CBN continued to remit Sonza’s monthly talent fees
but opened another account for the same purpose.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and found that there is no employee-employer relationship. NLRC affirmed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter. CA also affirmed the decision of NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not there was employer-employee relationship between the parties.

Ruling: Case law has consistently held that the elements of an employee-employer relationship are selection and
engagement of the employee, the payment of wages, the power of dismissal and the employer’s power to control the
employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The last element, the so-called "control test", is
the most important element.

Sonza’s services to co-host its television and radio programs are because of his peculiar talents, skills and celebrity status.
Independent contractors often present themselves to possess unique skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from
ordinary employees. The specific selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique skills, talent and celebrity status
not possessed by ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent contractual
relationship. All the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result of negotiations that led to the Agreement. For
violation of any provision of the Agreement, either party may terminate their relationship. Applying the control test to the
present case, we find that SONZA is not an employee but an independent contractor.

The control test is the most important test our courts apply in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.
This test is based on the extent of control the hirer exercises over a worker. The greater the supervision and control the
hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is deemed an employee. The converse holds true as well – the less control the
hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is considered an independent contractor. To perform his work, SONZA only
needed his skills and talent. How SONZA delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were outside
ABS-CBN’s control. ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to perform his job. ABS-CBN merely reserved the right to
modify the program format and airtime schedule "for more effective programming." ABS-CBN’s sole concern was the
quality of the shows and their standing in the ratings.

Clearly, ABS-CBN did not exercise control over the means and methods of performance of Sonza’s work. A radio
broadcast specialist who works under minimal supervision is an independent contractor. Sonza’s work as television and
radio program host required special skills and talent, which SONZA admittedly possesses.

ABS-CBN claims that there exists a prevailing practice in the broadcast and entertainment industries to treat talents like
Sonza as independent contractors. The right of labor to security of tenure as guaranteed in the Constitution arises only if
there is an employer-employee relationship under labor laws. Individuals with special skills, expertise or talent enjoy the
freedom to offer their services as independent contractors. The right to life and livelihood guarantees this freedom to
contract as independent contractors. The right of labor to security of tenure cannot operate to deprive an individual,
possessed with special skills, expertise and talent, of his right to contract as an independent contractor.

Dumpit-Murillo vs Court of Appeals


GR No. 164652 June 8, 2007

Thelma Dumpit-Murillo was hired by ABC as a newscaster in 1995. Her contract with the TV station was repeatedly
renewed until 1999. She then wrote Jose Javier (VP for News and Public Affairs of ABC) advising him of her intention to
renew the contract.
Javier did not respond.
Dumpit then demanded reinstatement as well as her backwages, service incentive leave pays and other monetary benefits.
ABC said they could only pay her backwages but her other claims had no basis as she was not entitled thereto because she
is considered as a talent and not a regular employee.
Dumpit sued ABC. The Labor Arbiter ruled against Dumpit. The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA.
The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and ruled that as per the contract between ABC and Dumpit, Dumpit is a fixed
term employee.

Issue: Whether or not the continuous renewal of petitioner’s talent contracts constitute regularity in the employment status.

Held: Yes. An employer-employee relationship was created when the private respondents started to merely renew the
contracts repeatedly 15 times for 4 consecutive years.
Petitioner was a regular employee under contemplation of law. The practice of having fixed-term contracts in the industry
does not automatically make all talent contracts valid and compliant with labor law. The assertion that a talent contract
exists does not necessarily prevent a regular employment status.

The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: a.) The selection and engagement of the
employee; b.) The payment of wages; c.) The power of dismissal; and d.) The employer’s control of the employee’s conduct,
not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it.

The duties of petitioner as enumerated in her employment contract indicate that ABC had control over the work or
petitioner. Aside from control, ABC also dictated the work assignments and payment of petitioner’s wages. ABC also had
power to dismiss her. All these being present, clearly there existed an employment relationship between petitioner and
ABC.

Concerning regular employment, the law provides for 2 kinds of employees, namely: 1.) Those who are engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and 2.) Those who have
rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken with respect to the activity in which they are employed.
In other words, regular status arises from either the nature of work of the employee or the duration of his employment.

The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee vis-a-vis the usual trade or business of the employer. This connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its
entirety. If the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and
merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity
if not indispensability of that activity to the business.

NELSON V. BEGINO, GENER DEL VALLE, MONINA A VILA-LLORIN AND MA. CRISTINA SUMAYAO,
Petitioners, vs. ABS-CBN CORPORATION (FORMERLY, ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION) AND
AMALIA VILLAFUERTE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 199166, 20 April 2015.

PEREZ, J.:

Respondent ABS-CBN, through Respondent Villafuerte, engaged the services of Petitioners as cameramen, editors or
reporters for TV Broadcasting. Petitioners signed regularly renewed Talent Contracts (3 months - 1 year) and Project
Assignment Forms which detailed the duration, budget and daily technical requirements of a particular project. Petitioners
were tasked with coverage of news items for subsequent daily airings in Respondents’ TV Patrol Bicol Program.

The Talent Contract has an exclusivity clause and provides that nothing therein shall be deemed or construed to establish
an employer-employee relationship between the parties.

Petitioners filed against Respondents a complaint for regularization before the NLRC's Arbitration branch.

In support of their complaint, Petitioners claimed that they worked under the direct control of Respondent Villafuerte -
they were mandated to wear company IDs, they were provided the necessary equipment, they were informed about the
news to be covered the following day, and they were bound by the company’s policy on attendance and punctuality.

Respondents countered that, pursuant to their Talent Contracts and Project Assignment Forms, Petitioners were hired as
talents to act as reporters, editors and/or cameramen. Respondents further claimed they never imposed control as to how
Petitioners discharged their duties. At most, they were briefed regarding the general requirements of the project to be
executed.

While the case was pending, Petitioners contracts were terminated, prompting the latter to file a second complaint for
illegal dismissal.
The Arbitration Branch ruled that Petitioners were regular employees, and ordered Respondents to reinstate the
Petitioners.

The NLRC affirmed the ruling, but the CA overturned the decision.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioners are regular employees of Respondents.

RULING: Yes.

Of the criteria to determine whether there is an employer-employee relationship, the so-called "control test" is generally
regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the said relationship.

Under this test, an employer-employee relationship is said to exist where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves the right to control not only the end result but also the manner and means utilized to achieve the same.

Notwithstanding the nomenclature of their Talent Contracts and/or Project Assignment Forms and the terms and
condition embodied therein, petitioners are regular employees of ABS-CBN.

As cameramen, editors and reporters, it appears that Petitioners were subject to the control and supervision of
Respondents which provided them with the equipment essential for the discharge of their functions. The exclusivity clause
and prohibitions in their Talent Contract were likewise indicative of Respondents' control over them, however obliquely
worded.

Also,the presumption is that when the work done is an integral part of the regular business of the employer and when the
worker does not furnish an independent business or professional service, such work is a regular employment of such
employee and not an independent contractor.

Villamaria v CA & Bustamante GR No. 165881 April 19, 2006

FACTS:
- Oscar Villamaria, Jr. was the owner of Villamaria Motors, a sole proprietorship engaged in assembling passenger
jeepneys with a public utility franchise to operate along the Baclaran-Sucat route. By 1995, Villamaria stopped
assembling jeepneys and retained only nine, four of which operated by employing drivers on a “boundary basis.” One of
those drivers was respondent Bustamante.
- Bustamante remitted 450 a day to Villamaria as boundary and kept the residue of his daily earnings as compensation
for driving the vehicle. In August 1997, Villamaria verbally agreed to sell the jeepney to Bustamante under a “boundary-
hulog scheme”, where Bustamante would remit to Villamaria P550 a day for a period of 4 years; Bustamane would then
become the owner of the vehicle and continue to drive the same under Villamaria’s franchise, but with Php 10,000
downpayment.
- August 7, 1997, Villamaria executed a contract entitled “Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Sasakyan sa Pamamagitan ng
Boundary Hulog”. The parties agreed that if Bustamante failed to pay the boundary- hulog for 3 days, Villamaria Motors
would hold on to the vehicle until Bustamante paid his arrears, including a penalty of 50 a day; in case Bustamante failed
to remit the daily boundary-hulog for a period of one week, the Kasunduan would cease to have the legal effect and
Bustamante would have to return the vehicle to Villamaria motors.
- In 1999, Bustamante and other drivers who also had the same arrangement failed to pay their respective boundary-
hulog. The prompted Villamaria to serve a “Paalala”. On July 24, 2000. Villamaria took back the jeepney driven by
Bustamante and barred the latter from driving the vehicle.
- Bustamante filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:


*Labor Arbiter: petition dismissed.
*NLRC: dismissed appeal.
*CA: reversed NLRC, awarded Bustamante separation pay and backwages.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the existence of a boundary-hulog agreement negates the employer-employee relationship between the
vendor and vendee
(2) WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over a complaint for illegal dismissal in such a case.
HELD:
(1) NO. Under the boundary-hulog scheme, a dual juridical relationship is created; that of employer- employee and
vendor-vendee. The Kasanduan did not extinguish the employer employee relationship of the parties existing before the
execution of said deed.
a. Under this system the owner/operator exercises control and supervision over the driver. It is unlike in lease of chattels
where the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased but the lessee is still ultimately responsible for the
consequences of its use. The management of the business is still in the hands of the owner/operator, who, being the
holder of the certificate of public convenience, must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the
franchising and regulatory authority, and the rules promulgated with regard to the business operations.
b. The driver performs activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
owner/operator. Under the Kasunduan, respondent was required to remit Php 550 daily to petitioner, an amount which
represented the boundary of petitioner as well as respondent’s partial payment (hulog) of the purchase price of
the jeepney. Thus, the daily remittances also had a dual purpose: that of petitioner’s boundary
and respondent’s partial payment (hulog) for the vehicle.
c. The obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old one,
changes only the terms of payment and adds other obligations not incompatible with the old
provisions or where the contract merely supplements the previous one.
d. The existence of an employment relation is not dependent on how the worker is paid but on the presence or absence
of control over the means and method of the work. The amount earned in excess of the “boundary hulog” is equivalent
to wages and the fact that the power of dismissal was not mentioned in the Kasunduan did not mean that private
respondent never exercised such power, or could not exercise such power.

(2) YES. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has jurisdiction under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes
arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor
statues of their collective bargaining agreement.

OTHER NOTES:
(1) The rule is that the nature of an action and subject matter thereof, as well as, which court or agency of the
government has jurisdiction and the character of the reliefs prayed for, whether or not the complainant/plaintiff is
entitled to any or all of such reliefs.
(2) Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Actions between employers and employees
where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regular
courts.

Facts:

Complainants (Jose Mel Bernarte and Renato Guevarra) aver that they were invited to join the PBA as referees. During the
leadership of Commissioner Emilio Bernardino, they were made to sign contracts on a year-to-year basis. During the term of
Commissioner Eala, however, changes were made on the terms of their employment.

Complainant Bernarte, for instance, was not made to sign a contract during the first conference of the All-Filipino Cup which was
from February 23, 2003 to June 2003. It was only during the second conference when he was made to sign a one and a half month
contract for the period July 1 to August 5, 2003.

On January 15, 2004, Bernarte received a letter from the Office of the Commissioner advising him that his contract would not be
renewed citing his unsatisfactory performance on and off the court. It was a total shock for Bernarte who was awarded Referee of
the year in 2003. He felt that the dismissal was caused by his refusal to fix a game upon order of Ernie De Leon.

On the other hand, complainant Guevarra alleges that he was invited to join the PBA pool of referees in February 2001. On March
1, 2001, he signed a contract as trainee. Beginning 2002, he signed a yearly contract as Regular Class C referee. On May 6, 2003,
respondent Martinez issued a memorandum to Guevarra expressing dissatisfaction over his questioning on the assignment of
referees officiating out-of-town games. Beginning February 2004, he was no longer made to sign a contract.
Respondents aver, on the other hand, that complainants entered into two contracts of retainer with the PBA in the year 2003. The
first contract was for the period January 1, 2003 to July 15, 2003; and the second was for September 1 to December 2003. After
the lapse of the latter period, PBA decided not to renew their contracts.

Complainants were not illegally dismissed because they were not employees of the PBA. Their respective contracts of retainer
were simply not renewed. PBA had the prerogative of whether or not to renew their contracts, which they knew were fixed.

Both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC decided that the petitioners were employees whose dismissals by respondents were illegal.

However, the Court of Appeals overturned the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter on the ground that the petitioner is an
independent contractor since respondents did not exercise any form of control over the means and methods by which petitioner
performed his work as a basketball referee.

Issue:

Whether petitioner is an employee of respondents, which in turn determines whether petitioner was illegally dismissed.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, case law has consistently applied the four-fold test, to wit: (a)
the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power
to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The so-called "control test" is the most
important indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship.

In this case, PBA admits repeatedly engaging petitioner's services, as shown in the retainer contracts. PBA pays petitioner a
retainer fee, exclusive of per diem or allowances, as stipulated in the retainer contract. PBA can terminate the retainer contract for
petitioner's violation of its terms and conditions.

However, respondents argue that the all-important element of control is lacking in this case, making petitioner an independent
contractor and not an employee of respondents.

We agree with respondents that once in the playing court, the referees exercise their own independent judgment, based on the
rules of the game, as to when and how a call or decision is to be made. The referees decide whether an infraction was committed,
and the PBA cannot overrule them once the decision is made on the playing court. The referees are the only, absolute, and final
authority on the playing court. Respondents or any of the PBA officers cannot and do not determine which calls to make or not to
make and cannot control the referee when he blows the whistle because such authority exclusively belongs to the referees. The
very nature of petitioner's job of officiating a professional basketball game undoubtedly calls for freedom of control by respondents.

Moreover, the following circumstances indicate that petitioner is an independent contractor: (1) the referees are required to report
for work only when PBA games are scheduled, which is three times a week spread over an average of only 105 playing days a
year, and they officiate games at an average of two hours per game; and (2) the only deductions from the fees received by the
referees are withholding taxes.

In other words, unlike regular employees who ordinarily report for work eight hours per day for five days a week, petitioner is
required to report for work only when PBA games are scheduled or three times a week at two hours per game. In addition, there
are no deductions for contributions to the Social Security System, Philhealth or Pag-Ibig, which are the usual deductions from
employees' salaries. These undisputed circumstances buttress the fact that petitioner is an independent contractor, and not an
employee of respondents.

Furthermore, the applicable foreign case law declares that a referee is an independent contractor, whose special skills and
independent judgment is required specifically for such position and cannot possibly be controlled by the hiring party.

In addition, the fact that PBA repeatedly hired petitioner does not by itself prove that petitioner is an employee of the former. For a
hired party to be considered an employee, the hiring party must have control over the means and methods by which the hired party
is to perform his work, which is absent in this case. The continuous rehiring by PBA of petitioner simply signifies the renewal of the
contract between PBA and petitioner, and highlights the satisfactory services rendered by petitioner warranting such contract
renewal. Conversely, if PBA decides to discontinue petitioner's services at the end of the term fixed in the contract, whether for
unsatisfactory services, or violation of the terms and conditions of the contract, or for whatever other reason, the same merely
results in the non-renewal of the contract, as in the present case. The non-renewal of the contract between the parties does not
constitute illegal dismissal of petitioner by respondents.

Jesus G. Reyes vs. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., Eye Referral Center and Manuel B. Agulto G.R. No. 189255,
June 17, 2015

Facts: Reyes alleged that he was hired by Glaucoma Research corporation as administrator of the latter’s Eye Referral
Center (ERC). He allegedly performed his duties as administrator and continuously received his monthly salary of
P20,000.00 until the end of January 2005. Beginning February 2005, Glaucoma Research withheld Reyes’s salary
without notice but he still continued to report for work. On April 11, 2005, Reyes wrote a letter to Glaucoma
Research Manuel Agulto (Agulto), who is the Executive Director of Glaucoma Research corporation, informing the
latter that he has not been receiving his salaries since February 2005 as well as his 14th month pay for 2004. Reyes
did not receive any response from Agulto. Subsequently, Reyes was informed by the Assistant to the Executive
Director as well as the Assistant Administrative Ocer, that he is no longer the Administrator of the ERC. Thereafter,
Reyes’s oce was padlocked and closed without notice. He still continued to report for work but on April 29, 2005 he
was no longer allowed by the security guard on duty to enter the premises of the ERC.

On their part, Glaucoma Researchs contended that upon Reyes’s representation that he is an expert in corporate
organizational structure and management aairs, they engaged his services as a consultant or adviser in the
formulation of an updated organizational set-up and employees’ manual which is compatible with their present
condition. Based on his claim that there is a need for an administrator for the ERC, he later designated himself as
such on a trial basis. Glaucoma Researchs maintain that there is no employer-employee relationship between them
because Glaucoma Researchs had no control over Reyes in terms of working hours as he reports for work at anytime
of the day and leaves as he pleases. Glaucoma Researchs also had no control as to the manner in which he performs
his alleged duties as consultant. Reyes became overbearing and his relationship with the employees and ocers of
the company soured leading to the ling of three complaints against him. Likewise, Reyes was not dismissed as he
was the one who voluntarily severed his relations with Glaucoma Researchs. LA Ruling: The LA dismissed the
complaint. The LA held, among others, that Reyes failed to establish that the elements of an employer-employee
relationship existed between him and Glaucoma Researchs because he was unable to show that he was, in fact,
appointed as administrator of the ERC and received salaries as such. He also failed to deny that during his stint with
Glaucoma Researchs, he was, at the same time, a consultant of various government agencies such as the Manila
International Airport Authority, Manila Intercontinental Port Authority, AntiTerrorist Task Force for Aviation and Air
Transportation Sector. His actions were neither supervised nor controlled by the management of the ERC. Reyes,
likewise, did not observe working hours by reporting for work and leaving therefrom as he pleased; and, he was
receiving allowances, not salaries, as a consultant. NLRC Ruling: The NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the
LA. The NLRC declared Reyes as Glaucoma Researchs’ employee, that he was illegally dismissed and ordered
Glaucoma Researchs to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges with full
backwages. The NLRC held that the basis upon which the conclusion of the LA was drawn lacked support; that it was
incumbent for Glaucoma Researchs to discharge the burden of proving that Reyes’s dismissal was for cause and
eected after due process was observed; and, that Glaucoma Researchs failed to discharge this burden. Glaucoma
Researchs led a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the NLRC. CA Ruling: The CA annulled and set aside
the judgment of the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the LA. The CA held that the LA was correct in ruling that,
under the control test and the economic reality test, no employer-employee relationship existed between Glaucoma
Researchs and Reyes. Reyes led a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it.

Issue/s:
Whether or not an individual who was issued ID, assigned as administrator, required to submit the agreed result of
organizational structure but who was concurrently consultant with other rms, has employer-employee relationship
with the company.

SC Ruling:

The SC did not nd merit in the petition. Get a re-numbered and handy copy of the Labor Code 2017 with Notes
and/or Comments by Atty. Villanueva The SC held that it is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his
armative allegation. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on
the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. In an illegal dismissal case, the
onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However,
before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must rst be established. Thus, in
ling a complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal, based on the premise that he was an employee of Glaucoma
Researchs, it is incumbent upon Reyes to prove the employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence. Citing
the decision of the CA, the SC ratiocinated that Glaucoma Researchs’ power to approve or reject the organizational
plans drawn by Reyes cannot be the control contemplated in the “control test.” It is but logical that one who
commissions another to do a piece of work should have the right to accept or reject the product. The important
factor to consider in the “control test” is still the element of control over how the work itself is done, not just the
end result thereof. Well settled is the rule that where a person who works for another performs his job more or less
at his own pleasure, in the manner he sees t, not subject to denite hours or conditions of work, and is compensated
according to the result of his eorts and not the amount thereof, no employer-employee relationship exists. What
was glaring in the present case is the undisputed fact that Reyes was never subject to denite working hours. He never
denied that he goes to work and leaves therefrom as he pleases. In fact, on December 1-31, 2004, he went on leave
without seeking approval from the ocers of Glaucoma Research company. On the contrary, his letter simply informed
Glaucoma Researchs that he will be away for a month and even advised them that they have the option of appointing
his replacement during his absence The SC has held that there is no employer-employee relationship where the
supposed employee is not subject to a set of rules and regulations governing the performance of his duties under
the agreement with the company and is not required to report for work at any time, nor to devote his time
exclusively to working for the company. Reyes does not dispute the ndings of the CA that there are no deductions
for SSS and withholding tax from his compensation, which are the usual deductions from employees’ salaries. Thus,
the alleged pay slips may not be treated as competent evidence of Reyes’s claim that he is Glaucoma Researchs’
employee.

The designation of the payments to Reyes as salaries, is not determinative of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. Salary is a general term dened as a remuneration for services given. The Court does not agree with
Reyes’s insistence that his being hired as Glaucoma Research corporation’s administrator and his designation as such
in intra-company correspondence proves that he is an employee of the corporation. The fact alone that Reyes was
designated as an administrator does not necessarily mean that he is an employee of Glaucoma Researchs. Mere title
or designation in a corporation will not, by itself, determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Even the identication card which was issued to Reyes is not an adequate proof of Reyes’s claim that he is Glaucoma
Researchs’ employee. In addition, Reyes’s designation as an administrator neither disproves Glaucoma Researchs’
contention that he was engaged only as a consultant.

CENTURY PROPERTIES, INC vs BABIANO and CONCEPCION

Doctrine:
The existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in the management
contract and providing therein that the "employee" is an independent contractor when the terms of the agreement clearly
show otherwise.

The Facts:
Babiano was hired by CPI as Director for Sales who eventually was promoted for VP for Sales. He is receiving a salary,
allowance and sales commission. His employment contract contains a clauses which bars him from disclosing confidential
information to business competing with CPI while he is employed and after 1 year from termination or resignation,
otherwise his compensation will be forfeited. Concepcion was hired as a Sales Agent who was promoted to Project
Director. She signed a Contract of Agency for Project Director and receives a monthly subsidy, commission and incentive.
She signed two contracts and both stipulated that no employee employer relationship exist. After receiving that Babiano
provided a competitor with information and being AWOL for 5 days, CPI sent a notice to explain why he should not be
charged with disloyalty, conflict of interest and breach of trust. He tendered his resignation but later he was terminated 8
days later. He revealed he was accepted as VP in a competitor company. 2 days before Babiano tendered, Concepcion also
tendered. Babiano and Concepcion filed before the NLRC for non-payment of commissions and damages against CPI.
CPI maintained that the they are just agents tasked with selling projects, there was due process and termination was based
on just cause. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of CPI. On Appeal, the NLRC concurred with the Labor Arbtiter,
that Babiano’s acts constituted just cause for termination however forefeiture is confiscatory and unreasonable. CPI went
to CA, while the affirmed the NLRC ruling, it ruled that there is a proper money claim from employee-employer
relationship. Hence this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

1. WON there was a breach of contract? 2. WON the CPI would be liable for unpaid commissions?

Ruling of the Court:


1. Yes. The Confidentiality and Non-Compete Clause is not limited to acts done after the cessation of employer-employee
relationship. Babiano categorically admitted that he sought employment with a competitor before his formal resignation.
This is a glaring violation of the Confidentiality and Non-Compete Clause. 2. Yes. There exists an employer-employee
relationship. This is proven by (a) CPI hired and promoted Concepcion (b) the monthly "subsidy" and cash incentives
that Concepcion was receiving from CPI are actually remuneration in the concept of wages (c) CPI had the power to
discipline or even dismiss Concepcion (d) CPI possessed the power of control because in the performance of her duties
as Project Director, she did not exercise independent discretion. While the employment contract is denominated as
"Contract of Agency for Project Director" the existence of employer-employee relations could not be negated by the
mere expedient of repudiating it in a contract. since there exists an employer-employee relationship between Concepcion
and CPI, thus the CA is correct in ruling that Labor Code, it nonetheless failed to include all of respondents' earned
commissions thus, necessitating the increase in award of unpaid commissions in Concepcion's favor.

BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P. JAVIER), Petitioner, vs. FLY ACE CORPORATION/FLORDELYN CASTILLO,
Respondents.

FACTS
On May 23, 2008, the petitioner Danilo (Bitoy) Javier filed a complaing against the respondents (Fly Ace Corporation /
Flordelyn Castillo) for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard benefits. Javier worked for the respondent’s
company since September 2007 as an all around worker around the respondent’s warehouse and a pahinante for the
company’s deliveries.

The petitioner claims that he worked for the respondent from 7:00 AM to 5:00 PM, Monday to Saturday during his time
of employment but was never issued a company ID nor any payslips like the other employees. On May 6, 2008, the
petitioner was barred from entering the company’s premises and despite repeated pleading to allow him to resume work
he was not allowed to. Petitioner further claims that when asked for a reason on why he was being barred from working,
his superior a certain Ruben Ong (Mr. Ong) replied by telling him“Tanungin mo anak mo” . Petitioner claims that Mr.
Ong had been courting his daughter and apparently after being spurned had terminated Javier without a chance to refute
the cause/s of his dismissal. To support his allegations, the petitioner presented an affidavit of one Bengie Valenzuela who
alleged that petitioner was a stevedore or pahinante of Fly Ace from September 2007 to January 2008. The said affidavit
was subscribed before the Labor Arbiter. Fly Ace on the other hand claims that the petitioner was contracted by its
employee Mr. Ong as a pahinante on a pakyaw (or per work) basis at an agreed rate of 300 per trip (later increased to 325
on January 2008). Mr. Ong had contracted the petitioner only roughly 5 to 6 times per month whenever their contracted
hauler (Milmar Hauling Services) was not available. Fly Ace submitted their contract with Milmar, and copies of
acknowledgement receipts evidencing the payment for the petitioner’s services with the words “daily manpower (pakyaw
/piece rate pay) with the petitioner’s signature /initials to try and prove that petitioner was not one of their employees.

LABOR ARBITER
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, saying that the petitioner failed to present proof of his regular
employment with the company:

Complainant has no employee ID showing his employment with the Respondent nor any document showing that he
received the benefits accorded to regular employees of the Respondents. His contention that Respondent failed to give
him said ID and payslips implies that indeed he was not a regular employee of Fly Ace considering that complainant was
a helper and that Respondent company has contracted a regular trucking for the delivery of its products.

Respondent Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking business but in the importation and sales of groceries.
Since there is a regular hauler to deliver its products, we give credence to Respondents’ claim that
complainant was contracted on "pakiao" basis.

As to the claim for underpayment of salaries, the payroll presented by the Respondents showing salaries of workers on
"pakiao" basis has evidentiary weight because although the signature of the complainant appearing thereon are not
uniform, they appeared to be his true signature.

NLRC

On appeal at the NLRC, Javier was favored. It ruled that the LA skirted the argument of Javier and immediately concluded
that he was not a regular employee simply because he failed to present proof. It was of the view that a pakyaw -basis
arrangement did not preclude the existence of employer-employee relationship.
CA

On March 18, 2010, the CA annulled the NLRC findings that Javier was indeed a former employee of Fly Ace and
reinstated the dismissal of Javier’s complaint as ordered by the LA.

In an illegal dismissal case the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal was for a valid cause.
However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established. x x
x it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove the employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence. It is
incumbent upon private respondent to prove, by substantial evidence, that he is an employee of petitioners, but he failed
to discharge his burden. The non-issuance of a company-issued identification card to private respondent supports
petitioners’ contention that private respondent was not its employee. Case was elevated to the SC on appeal.

ISSUES + HELD 1. WON the CA erred in holding that the petitioner was not a regular employee of FLY ACE (NO) 2.
WON the CA erred in holding that the petitioner is not entitles to his monetary claims (NO)

The Court affirms the assailed CA decision.


It must be noted that the issue of Javier’s alleged illegal dismissal is anchored on the existence of an employer -employee
relationship between him and Fly Ace. This is essentially a question of fact.

Generally, the Court does not review errors that raise factual questions. However, when there is conflict among the factual
findings of the antecedent deciding bodies like the LA, the NLRC and the CA, "it is proper, in the exercise of Our equity
jurisdiction, to review and re-evaluate the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and re-examine the
questioned findings." In dealing with factual issues in labor cases,"substantial evidence – that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion – is sufficient."

As the records bear out, the LA and the CA found Javier’s claim of employment with Fly Ace as wanting and deficient.
The Court is constrained to agree. Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
28 allows a relaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of liberality does not mean a complete
dispensation of proof.

In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate such claim by the
requisite quantum of evidence. "Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her
right thereto. Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.
While Javier remains firm in his position that as an employed stevedore of Fly Ace, he was made to work in the company
premises during weekdays arranging and cleaning grocery items for delivery to clients, no other proof was submitted to
fortify his claim.

The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was unsuccessful in strengthening Javier’s cause. The Court cannot
ignore the inescapable conclusion that his mere presence at the workplace falls short in proving employment therein. The
supporting affidavit could have, to an extent, bolstered Javier’s claim of being tasked to clean grocery items when there
were no scheduled delivery trips, but no information was offered in this subject simply because the witness had no personal
knowledge of Javier’s employment. The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-
settled tests to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz : (1) the selection and engagement of
the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct.
Of these elements, the most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the
employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be
accomplished.

In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his case. Fly Ace does not dispute
having contracted Javier and paid him on a "per trip" rate as a stevedore, albeit on a pakyaw basis. The Court cannot fail
to note that Fly Ace presented documentary proof that Javier was indeed paid on a pakyaw basis per the acknowledgment
receipts admitted as competent evidence by the LA. Unfortunately for Javier, his mere denial of the signatures affixed
therein cannot automatically sway us to ignore the documents because "forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery."

Considering the above findings, the Court does not see the necessity to resolve the second issue presented. The Court’s
decision does not contradict the settled rule that "payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not
define the essence of the relation." Payment on a piece-rate basis does not negate regular employment. "The term ‘wage’
is broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of
money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by the piece is just a method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that the petitioner is not covered by the
SSS affect the employer-employee relationship. However , in determining whether the relationship is that of employer
and employee or one of an independent contractor, each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features of
the relationship are to be considered. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection
of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor.
Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its
concern for the less privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause
in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every
case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.

PETITION DENIED, CA RULING AFFIRMED.

SOUTH EAST INTERNATIONAL RATTAN INC V. JESUS J. COMING (G.R. NO. 186621)
Facts:

Petitioner South East International Rattan is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and
exporting furniture to various countries. Respondent Coming was hired by petitioner as Sizing Machine Operator whose
work is initially compensated on ‘pakiao basis’ but sometime was fixed per day and a work schedule of 8:00am to 5:00pm.
Without any apparent reason, his employment was interrupted as he was told by petitioners to resume work in 2 months
time but was never called back. Respondent thus filed a complaint before the regional arbitration branch. The Labor
Arbiter ruled respondent as a regular employee of petitioner SEIRI but on appeal, was reversed by the NLRC. CA then
reversed the NLRC decision and ruled that there existed an employer-employee relationship between petitioners and
respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent.

Ruling: YES.
We affirm the CA.

To ascertain the existence of employer-employee relationship jurisprudence has invariably adhered to the four-fold test,
to wit: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power to control the employee’s conduct, or the so-called “control test.”

x x x As to the “control test”, the following facts indubitably reveal that respondents wielded control over the work
performance of petitioner, to wit: (1) they required him to work within the company premises; (2) they obliged petitioner
to report every day of the week and tasked him to usually perform the same job; (3) they enforced the observance of
definite hours of work from 8 o’clock in the morning to 5 o’clock in the afternoon; (4) the mode of payment of petitioner’s
salary was under their discretion, at first paying him on pakiao basis and thereafter, on daily basis; (5) they implemented
company rules and regulations; (6) [Estanislao] Agbay directly paid petitioner’s salaries and controlled all aspects of his
employment and (7) petitioner rendered work necessary and desirable in the business of the respondent company.

You might also like