TEAM CODE: CK9

ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW

NATIONAL MOOT COURT
COMPETITION
2016

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF BAMBIA

(UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BAMBIA)

RAMPON.....................................................................................APPELLANT
V.

PROVINCE................................................................................RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

-Table of Contents-
-Respondent-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS_______________________________________________________I
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS_________________________________________________II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES___________________________________________________IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION______________________________________________X
STATEMENT OF FACTS____________________________________________________XI
QUESTIONS OF LAW_____________________________________________________XIV
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS_______________________________________________XV
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED___________________________________________________1
1 THE PENAL ACTION IMPLICATED UPON THE ACCUSED IS VALID AND
JUSTIFIABLE.______________________________________________________________1
1.1The Appellant Has Conspired Against The State In Series Of Crime__________________1
1.2Circumstantial Evidence to Corroborate the Guilt of Accused_______________________5
1.3Acts of appellant constitute Waging War against the Government of Bambia___________7
2 THE CHARGES PRESSED AGAINST APPELLANT UNDER UAPA, 1967 AND
PMLA, 2002 ARE JUSTIFIED_________________________________________________10
2.1Unlawful Activity Prevention Act, 1967_______________________________________10
2.2Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002____________________________________14
3 THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH________________17
3.1Act of Government not violative of Article 14,19,21 of Constitution of Bambia,1950__ 17
PRAYER________________________________________________________________XXI

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INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

T MEANING
1. § SECTION
2. ¶ PARAGRAPH
3. & AND
4. Ads ADVERTISEMENTS
5. AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER
6. Annex. ANNEXURE
7. Anr. ANOTHER
8. Art. ARTICLE
9. BPC BAMBIA PENAL CODE
10. Cl. CLAUSE
11. Cr. CRIMINAL
12. CrLJ CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL
13. CrPC CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
14. CS CHARGE-SHEET
15. SDF SOIL DEFENCE FORCE
16. DW DEFENCE WITNESS
17. FIR FIRST INFORMATION REPORT
18. Govt. GOVERNMENT
19. HC HIGH COURT
20. Hon'ble HONORABLE
21. i.e. THAT IS
22. IPC INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
23. MANU MANUPATRA
24. No. NUMBER
25. Ors. OTHERS
26. P. PAGE
27. PS POLICE STATION
28. PW PROSECUTION WITNESS
29. r/w READ WITH
30. SC SUPREME COURT
31. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
32. SCR SUPREME COURT REPORTER
33. Supp. SUPPLEMENTARY
34. TADA TERRORIST & DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT
35. UAPA UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT
36. POTA PREVENTION OF TERRORIST ACT
37. PMLA PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT
38. Pat PATIALA
39. MLJ MAHARASTHTRA LAW JOURNAL
40. Bom BOMBAY

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41. LR LAW REPORTER

42. Tra-Co TRAVANCORE
43. Eds. EDITION
44. QB QUEENS BENCH
45. ER ENGLAND REPORTER
46. @ ALIAS
47. ACR ASSAM CRIMINAL REPORTER
48. U/S UNDER SECTION
49. UOI UNION OF INDIA
50. V./Vs VERSUS
51. Viz. NAMELY
52. w.r.t WITH RESPECT TO

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

1. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

2. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950
3. INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
4. INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
5. PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT,2002
6. TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT, 1985
7. THE ARMS ACT,1959
8. UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT,1967

BOOKS

1. D.D.BASU, Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Wadhwa,

Nagpur.

2. D.D.BASU, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Lexis Nexis Butterworths

Wadhwa, 4th Edn, 2010.

4th
3. GAUR K. D, The Indian Penal Code, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Ed.,
2013.

4. H.M. SEERVAI, Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary .

[Delhi. Universal Law Publishing Co. Ltd].

5. HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND, (VOLUME 11, PP. 44 AND 58., 4TH

EDITION).

6. HARI SINGH GOUR, The Penal Law Of India, 4869, (11th Edition, Delhi Law
House, New Delhi, 2006).

7. J. W. CECIL TURNER KENNY’S, Outlines of Criminal Law, Cambridge

University Press, 1952.

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8. KELKAR R. V., Criminal Procedure Code ,Pillai Eastern Book Company, 4th Ed.
2007 (Revised by Dr. K. N Chandrasekharan).

9. M P JAIN, Indian Constitutional Law, 1180, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa,

Nagpur, 2010.

10. PETER MURPHY, Evidence, Oxford University Press, 11 th Edition.

11. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL,The Code of Criminal Procedure, Lexis Nexis

Butterworths,Wadhwa,Nagpur, 20th Ed. 2011(YChandrachud J. &VRManohar J.).
12. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL,The Indian Penal Code, Lexis Nexis Butterworths,
Wadhwa, Nagpur, 30th Ed. 2008(Y VChandrachud J. &V R Manohar J.).
13. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL,The Law of Evidence, Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa & Company Nagpur, 24th Ed. 2012 (Y V Chandrachud J. & V R Manohar
J.).

14. SARKAR on The Code of Criminal Procedure, 10th Edn, 2012, Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, Wadhwa, Nagpur.

15. SIR JOHN WOODROFFE & SYED AMIR ALI, Law of Evidence, LexisNexis
Butterworth’s, 19th Ed. Vol. II.
16. SMITH AND HOGAN, Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law, Karl Laird & David
Ormerod eds., Oxford University Press, 2015.
17. VIBHUTE K. I ,P S A Pillai’s Criminal Law,.,LexisNexis Butterworth’s, 11th Ed.,
2012.
18. WILLIS, “Constitutional Law”, 579, (The Principia Press, United States, 1936).

ARTICLES

1. 305th Report of the Law Commission of United Kingdom, Assisting and Encouraging
Crime/ Participating in Crime, Para 2.49, 2007.
2. ANIL KALHAN, GERALD P. CONROY, MAMTA KAUSHAL, SAM SCOTT
MILLER, AND JED S. RAKOFF “Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism,
And Security Laws In India” Colum. J. Asian L. 93 2006-2007.

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3. RAMANAND GARGE,Combating Financing of Terror: An Indian Perspective ,

Vivekananda International Foundation.
4. FATF (2015), Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, FATF, Paris www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/emerging-terrorist-financing-
risks.html.
5. J. Venkatesan, “Binayak Sen gets bail in Supreme Court,” The Hindu, April 15, 2011,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1698939.ece?homepage=true.
6. MINORITIES IN INDIA, 11 Socio-Legal Rev. 103 2015.
7. ROBERT E RIGGS, “Substantive Due Process Of Law” , 1990 Wis. L . Rev. 941
8. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, PARTIES TO CRIME, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 581 1940-1941.
9. SANTOSH EJANTHKAR, The Growing Threat of Money Laundering, Capgemin
2011.
10. Sedition Laws & The Death Of Free Speech In India , Centre for the Study of Social
Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, National Law School of India University, Bangalore
& Alternative Law Forum, Bangalore, February, 2011.
11. SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, “Judicial Restraint In An Era Of Terrorism” 11 Socio-
Legal Rev. 103 2015.
12. SRIJONI SEN ET. AL, “Anti-Terrorism Law in India- A Study of Statutes and
Judgements, 2001-2014”, Vidhi – Centre for Legal Policy, June 2015.
13. VIVEK CHADDHA, “Life Blood of Terrorism”, Bloomsbury Publishing India Pvt.
Ltd., 2011.

DYNAMIC LINKS

1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.scconline.com
3. www.heinonline.org
4. www.westlawindia.com
5. www.lexisnexis.com
6. www.ebscohost.com

IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS

1. Appellant for the purpose of this memorandum shall stand for Rampon.
2. Respondent for the purpose of this memorandum shall stand for Province.

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CASES
1. A.K. Roy v. Union of India(1982) 1 SCC 271_______________________________17
2. Abdul Kader v. State AIR 1964 Bom. 133___________________________________5
3. Adnan Bilal Mulla v. State of Bombay, 2006 CriLJ NOC 406Bom________________9
4. Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1637__________________________5
5. Akanda v. Emperor, AIR 1944 Cal 339______________________________________3
6. Alive Hospitality and Food Private Limited v. Union of India, 2013 SCC OnLine Guj
3909________________________________________________________________15
7. Aravindan v. State of Kerala, 1983 Cr.L.J 1259_______________________________7
8. Aung Hla v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Rang. 235 at ¶236.___________________________6
9. Barinder Kumar Ghose v. Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1___________________________1
10. Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488__________________________________2
11. Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682._______4
12. Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 469_______________________4
13. Central Bureau Of Investigation v. Nalini & Ors., (1999) 5 SCC 253._____________4
14. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India1950 SCR 869_____________________18
15. Damodar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 4414____________________________5
16. Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 S.C.C (Cr.) 523________________________5
17. E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1762___________________________2
18. E.K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066______________________4
19. Emperor v. Maganlal (1946) Nag 126.______________________________________9
20. Emperor v. Subramaniyya Ayyer I.L.R 25Mad. 61 (P.C);________________________9
21. Firozuddin Basheeruddin & Ors. v. State of Kerala, (2001) 7 SCC 596.____________4
22. Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana, AIR 2005 SC 2969_________________________3
23. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cri LJ 517________12
24. Idris Bhai Daud Bhai v. State of Gujarat, 2003 SCC 277._______________________3
25. Izhar Ahmad v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 1052___________________________15
26. K.Hashim v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 1 SCC 237__________________________5
27. K.R Purushothaman v. State of Kerala, AIR 2006 SC 35._______________________5
28. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569___________________________17
29. Kartar Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 569___________________________________________9
30. Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, 1952 SCR 435_____________________17

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31. Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of W.B., AIR 1953 SC 404________________________17

32. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955_________________________19
33. Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1988) 3 SCC 609________________________2
34. M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P 2001 Cri LJ SC 515__________________________15
35. Mir Hasan Khan v. Emperor, AIR 1951 Pat. 60._______________________________7
36. Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and others v. State of Maharashtra,
1981 (2) SCC 443.______________________________________________________2
37. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2012 SC
3565.________________________________________________________________7
38. Mohd Hussain Umar Kochra v. KS Dalip Singhji, AIR 1970 SC 45_______________5
39. Mohd Khalid v. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334_____________________________5
40. Mohd. Jamiludin Nasir v. State of W.B., (2014) 7 SCC 443._____________________9
41. N.B. Khare (Dr) v. State of Delhi, 1950 SCR 519____________________________17
42. Neki Ram v. State of Haryana, (1974) 76 Punj. L.R 780________________________5
43. Pandurang Tukia and Bhillia v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 331.____________3
44. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India 1957 SCR 233____________________________17
45. R v. Hardie, (1820) 1 St. Tr. (N.S.) 765._____________________________________6
46. R v. Jones, (1832) 4 B & Ad 345__________________________________________2
47. R. v. Frost, (1839) 4.ST Tr. (N.S) 85:9 C &P. 129._____________________________6
48. R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821.______________________4
49. Rash Behari shaw v. Emperor, 38 Cr. L.J 545_________________________________1
50. Redaul Hussain Khan v. National Investigation Agency, (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 822____11
51. Saju v. State of Kerala ,(2001) 1 SCC 378___________________________________3
52. Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, (1964) 2 SCR 378._______5
53. Sharad Yadav And Ors. v. Union Of India, 82 (1999) DLT 13.___________________4
54. Shivanarayan Laxminarayan Joshi & ors v. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 2 SCC 465_5
55. State (Delhi administration) v. Dilbag Rai, 1984(2) Crimes 971 (Delhi).___________5
56. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru AIR 2005 SC 3820__________5
57. State of Bihar v. Paramhans Yadav, (1986) Pat LJR 688 (HC).___________________3
58. State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara1950 SCR 62_______________________________18
59. State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, 1957 SCR 874__________________17
60. State of M.P v. Desh Raj, 2004 Cri LJ 1415._________________________________3

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61. State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659__________________3, 9

62. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75_____________________18
63. State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Ors, AIR 1999 SC
2640._______________________________________________________________12
64. State v. Jaigovind, 52 Cr. L.J 646__________________________________________1
65. Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420._____________________4
66. Talib Haji Hussain v. Madhukar P. Mondkar1958 SCR 1226____________________17
67. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel 1985 SCC (L&S) 672________________________11
68. V. B. Raju v. Union Of India & Others, 1980 AIR 1671._______________________16
69. V.C Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1980 SC 1382_________________________1
70. Whitney v. Inland Revenue Commissioner 1926 AC 37_______________________14
71. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra2013 SCC OnLine SC 257_____14
72. Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab 1978 Cr LJ 189_____________________________5

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-Statement of Jurisdiction- -Respondent-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Bambia has the inherent jurisdiction to try, entertain and
dispose of the present case by virtue of Article 136 of The Constitution of Bambia.

“Article 136. Special Leave to Appeal by the Supreme Court

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause ( 1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the
Armed Forces”

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-Statement of Facts- -Respondent-

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I
Bambia is one of the largest countries in the world with cultural, lingual and religious
diversity with rich heritage. It is a quasi-federal, only democratic country and a leading
economic player in the Asian Region.
The Government of Bambia authorized corporate players to extract minerals. The initiative
was opposed on a large scale by the people of central province in general and by the
predominantly tribal districts in particular. The government deployed police and para-military
forces (PMF) to suppress the protests; but gradually the protests became more organised and
the protesters launched armed resistance(SDF) against Government initiatives. (SDF). In the
ensuing conflict between SDF and Governmental forces, casualties were reported from both
sides. Ribon continued his business in Dhatu and Karol, even after the dispute.
II
1 March 1993- PMF personnel roaming near Ribon’s locality. Around 2.00 am when his
family was asleep, few men in PMF attire knocked on his door and enquired about Ribon
from the servant, who opened the door. Ribon was then interrogated about certain SDF
people who were making purchases from his shop during daytime and was taken away for
further enquiries. Next morning at 10.00 am, when Ribon did not return home, his family
members tried to trace him but the police found his dead body on the outskirts of the Dathu
forest range.
After a Week(7 or 8 March 1993) – PMF shot all the family members, Rampon escaped and
lived with his uncle Akande. He managed studies and work together. Depressed individual
but bright student in academics influenced by writing different interpretations to the texts of
Marx, Engles and Mao.
III
2002- Rampon applied for common wealth scholarship and made it to a prestigious university
of England for higher studies and chose a topic ‘Majoritarian Democracy and the Plight of
Indigenous Minorities: A Socialist Perspective on Justice’ for his research project. Rampon’s
life changed thereafter. With his conversations and discussions he became very popular
among his batch mates. He started addressing the gatherings in the local community halls and
gave them different insights of socialist ideals. Soon, many popular and influential people
started coming to the places where Rampon addressed the public gatherings. A fan page was

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created on facebook followed by an account in his name by the end of 2005. Rampon and his
followers thought of propagating essence of socialism in the western world on a larger scale,
thereby conducting workshops in various places of North America and European Union.
IV
2009- Rampon became a popular name among communist countries. His views went viral on
all the social media and had around half a million followers on Twitter Rampon secured a
domain name truesocialism.org to update his followers on the developments and scheduling
of his events and programmes.
‘Quattics’, a company incorporated in Virginia (USA), offered him to be the ambassador for
their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) avenues. Quattics is engaged in research and
manufacture of nuclear and other technologically advanced weapons and has business
transactions worldwide to supply and deliver weapons to Governments and other
organizations.
V
14th August, 2010- trueisocialism.org crossed the mark of 20 million followers. He also
formed an NGO with the same name True-Socialism. True-Socialism received funds from
around the world and its contributors include politicians, heads of states, corporations, and so
on. Some of its contributors include the ones that are blacklisted by some western countries.
Nevertheless, the organization became a platform for all sorts of monetary contributions.
Quattics floated 20 million dollars subscribed capital. True-Socialism joined Alberico Co.
Ltd.( Jamaica), a television news channel and later acquired the majority of above floated
capital of Quattics. The funds received by true socialism thereafter were diverted for some
other purposes.
VI
5th December, 2012- Rampon and his group of six followers visited tribal people in the
jungle areas of Central Province in Bambia. Rampon was received with open arms. Rampon
happened to visit Karol wherein he was overwhelmed by his childhood memories, and one
midnight he was seen crying and screaming on the outskirts of Dathu forest range.
VII
Six Months Later( June 2013 tentatively)- Rampon married Amati, a lady doctor there who
happened to be the step daughter of one of the SDF leaders Memboya. Rampon moved
around to propagate his ideas as well as for business endeavors. But primarily, he resided in
Bambia. Through his NGO True-Socialism he opened the Institute for Studies in Scientific
Socialism in Mayowa and Makrona (districts).

VIII

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-Statement of Facts- -Respondent-

5th June, 2013- 4 persons with heavy range weapons were arrested for attempting to attack a
police station in Naipur district of Central Provinces. During interrogation, two of them
chewed cyanide and the remaining two confessed to being the alumni of Institute for Studies
in Scientific Socialism, Mayowa and ID proofs of Neoland nationalities were recovered from
all four of them.
Two weeks later(19/20 June 2013), during midnight, in an attack against PMF camp in the
remote area of Wharkhand district of Central Province, 136 people were killed, including
civilians and PMF personnel and weapons embossed with Quattics were recovered from the
scene.
23 August, 2013- Jagganagar tribal riots broke out and around 100 people from other
provinces were killed.
IX
25th November 2014- Parliament of Bambia was attacked by 20 armed persons, killed 3
gardeners and 4 security personnel. Thereafter, with the intervention of security forces 18
intruders were killed and 2 were arrested by the police. A detailed enquiry revealed the
involvement of True-Socialism and the funds received from TrueSocialism. Further enquiry
was not conducted as Rampon was in Chindesh for past two months to deliver lectures on
socialism.
X
11th February, 2015-Rampon was arrested from Makrona airport in Eastern Province. The
Sessions Court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On an appeal by the Province, the High
Court confirmed the charges but enhanced the punishment to death penalty. Rampon filed a
petition to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Bambia in April 2016.

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-Questions of Law- -Respondent-

QUESTIONS OF LAW

1. WHETHER THE CHARGES UNDER THE PENAL LAW IMPLICATED

UPON THE ACCUSED IS VALID AND JUSTIFIABLE?

2. WHETHER THE CHARGES PRESSED AGAINST APPELLANT UNDER

UAPA, 1967 AND PMLA, 2002 ARE JUSTIFIED?

3. WHETHER THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH?

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-Summary of Arguments- -Respondent-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. THE CHARGES UNDER PENAL LAW IMPLICATED UPON THE ACCUSED

IS VALID AND JUSTICIABLE
The counsel on behalf of State (hereinafter Respondent) most humbly submits that the penal
action imposed on Rampon is valid and justifiable. The petitioner has indulged in a series of
such criminal activities where his acts have created disturbance in the society and has
restrained the public law and order of the State. The acts carried out by the appellant has
created a state of terror in the mind of the people which has raised a grave question on the
capability of the State in preserving peace and order in the society. The State has construed
the penal provisions judiciously and has charged the appellant with the required penal
provisions as stated there under.
2. THE CHARGES PRESSED AGAINST APPELLANT UNDER UAPA, 1967
AND PMLA, 2002 ARE JUSTIFIED
The counsel on behalf of State (hereinafter Respondent) most humbly submits that the
charges pressed against the appellant under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 are justifiable. The appellant has carried out
such attacks on the State and State Bodies which are none other than terrorist attacks. Such
attacks has created terror in the mind of the general public and has shaken the foundation of
democracy of Bambia.Under such circumstances, the appellant can be declared as a terrorist
and the charges pressed against him is in consonance with the act committed by him. Then
again, the Appellant has diverted the money which he used to get for his NGO towards such
illegal activities. Under such circumstances, PMLA, 2002 is attracted judiciously.
3. THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.
The counsel on behalf of State (hereinafter Respondent) most humbly submits that the Due
Process of law has been complied with. The State has followed the due process of law and
moved the Sessions court after a detailed enquiry. The procedure of granting fair trial to the
appellant has been meted out even in such a case where the security of the nation is in
question. The charges were framed by the Sessions Court and the High Court confirmed it.
This certifies that Due process of Law has been complied with. The State has left no stone
unturned in giving fair and reasonable chance to the appellant to voice his plea in the
appropriate court of law.

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-Arguments Advanced- -Respondent-

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1 THE PENAL ACTION IMPLICATED UPON THE ACCUSED IS VALID AND

JUSTIFIABLE.
The counsel on behalf of the Province (hereinafter Respondent) pleads before the Hon’ble
Court that the lower courts’ decisions are valid and justifiable. Rampon (hereinafter
appellant) has conspired against the state in series of crime and the charges against him have
been proved by corboration of circumstantial evidence Ultimately, the appellant has breached
the allegiance to the sovereign by abetting the waging of war.

1.1 The Appellant Has Conspired Against The State In Series Of Crime
As per Section 120A of BPC “When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done –
(1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is
designated as criminal conspiracy”

The constituent elements of the offence of criminal conspiracy are:

1. An agreement between two or more persons
2. To do an illegal Act
3. To do a legal act by illegal means
4. An overt act done in the pursuance of the conspiracy.1

In Barinder Kumar Ghose v. Emperor2, Jetkins CJ observed:

“though to establish the charge of conspiracy there must be an agreement, there need not be
proof of direct meeting or combination, nor need the parties be brought into each other’s
presence; the agreement may be inferred from circumstances raising a presumption of a
common concerted plan to carry out the unlawful design3.

1 State v. Jaigovind, 52 Cr. L.J 646; Rash Behari Shaw v. Emperor, 38 Cr. L.J 545.

2 AIR 1925 PC 1.

3 State of Tamil Nadu through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini, AIR 1999 SC 2640; V.C Shukla v.
State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1980 SC 1382.

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-Arguments Advanced- -Respondent-

In the case of Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India4, the court came up with the following
reasoning:
“It is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details of the scheme nor be a
participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or object of the
conspiracy.5

Also, the SC states that- “The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law6”.
Motive is something, which prompts a man to form intention. 7 The facts which constitute
Motive for Rampon to be a party to the conspiracy are relevant in the present case. 8 The
Hon’ble Apex Court of India has held that, for an offence under section 120-B of the BPC,
1860, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do
or cause to be done the illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. 9
Hence, even if any agreement between the parties has not been proved prima facie, it can be
deduced from series of events, which is admissible in the court of law.

In the instant case there are series of events that shows the involvement of accused in various
crimes. There was a police station attack in 2013 as well as an attack on PMF camp. Later,
the post of the accused on social media post has created terror in the mind of people, resulting
in the migration of 2 lakhs people of Bambia, and parliament attack, which has threaten the
security of the state of Bambia. In all these events, there has been direct or indirect
involvement of True Socialism and the accused10.
1.1.1 Agreement can be proved by necessary implication

4 (1993) 3 SCC 609.

5 R v. Jones, (1832) 4 B & Ad 345.

6 E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1762.

7 Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488.

8 §8, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

9 Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and others v. State of Maharashtra, 1981
(2) SCC 443.

10 Moot Proposition, Page 5, ¶14, ¶15, ¶16.

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The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The
agreement may be express or implied, or in part express and in part implied. It is not,
however, necessary that each conspirator should have been in communication with the
other.11 Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct
evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to
infer that they were done in reference to their common intention. The prosecution will also
more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The express agreement, however, need not be
proved. Nor actual meeting of two persons is necessary, neither it is necessary to prove the
actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the
unlawful design may be sufficient.12

1.1.2 Appellant has been involved in illegal activity, in furtherance of agreement

The second essential for proving existence of a criminal conspiracy is that of establishing that
the agreement to conspire is to do an illegal act or a legal act by legal means. To establish this
charge, knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is
necessary.13 It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such crime, or is
merely incidental to it.14 Under Section 43 of the BPC, an act would be illegal if it is an
offence or if it is prohibited by law. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a
particular unlawful use was intended as, the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions.15

When the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions 16, it would not be necessary for the
prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators
had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do 17, so long as it is known that the

11 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND, (VOLUME 11, PP. 44 AND 58., 4TH EDITION).

12 Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1988) 3 SCC 609, SCC pp. 732-33, ¶275.

13 Infra note 17

14 Saju v. State of Kerala ,(2001) 1 SCC 378.

15 State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, AIR1996 SC 1744.

16 State of Bihar v. Paramhans Yadav, (1986) Pat LJR 688 (HC).

17 State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659.

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collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use. 18 The offence of criminal
conspiracy consists in the co-operation of two or more persons. It is necessary all the persons
should share the common intention. The ‘common intention’ implies a prior concert, that is, a
prior meeting of minds and participation of all the members of the group in the execution of
that plan.19 Common intention also means a desire to commit a criminal act without any
contemplation of offence.20 It deals with doing of several acts, similar or diverse in
furtherance of common intention.21 Direct proof of common intention is seldom; therefore
intention could be inferred from circumstantial evidences. 22 To infer common intention an
inference by a Court must be premise on the incriminating facts established by the
prosecution.23

Section 120-A of BPC read with Section 10 of the Bambian Evidence Act, 1872 will come
into play when court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground for belief that two or more
persons have conspired together to commit an offence.24 There is no difference between the
mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any other offence; it can be established
by direct or circumstantial evidence25. Conspiracies are not hatched in the open, by their
nature, they are secretly planned, they can be proved even by circumstantial evidence 26, and
the lack of direct evidence relating to conspiracy has no consequence.27

18 Id.

19 Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana, AIR 2005 SC 2969; Pandurang Tukia and Bhillia v.
State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 331.

20 Akanda v. Emperor, AIR 1944 Cal 339.

21 Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC.

22 State of M.P v. Desh Raj, 2004 Cri LJ 1415.

23 Idris Bhai Daud Bhai v. State of Gujarat, 2003 SCC 277.

24 DR. HARI SINGH GAUR, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 364, (15TH EDITION, DELHI
LAW HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 2016)

25 Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682.

26 Central Bureau Of Investigation v. Nalini & Ors., (1999) 5 SCC 253.

27 E.K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066.

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The agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at the same time, but may be
reached by successive actions evidencing their joining of the conspiracy.28 The rationale of
conspiracy is that the required objective manifestation of disposition to criminality is
provided by the act of agreement. Conspiracy is a clandestine activity. Persons generally do
not form illegal covenants openly.29

1.1.3 Overt Act has been done in the pursuance of conspiracy

The provisions, do not require that each and every person who is a party to the conspiracy
must do some overt act towards the fulfilment of the object of conspiracy, the essential
ingredient being an agreement between the conspirators to commit the crime and if these
requirements and ingredients are established, the act would fall within the trappings of the
provisions contained in Section 120-B.30 Overt acts are significant, since by the means of
such acts that the existence of a conspiracy can be made out. In cases of conspiracy, the
agreement between the conspirators cannot directly be proved but only be inferred from the
facts.31 For an offence under Section 120B BPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove
that the conspirators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement
may be proved by necessary implication.32

The charge of conspiracy against the appellant is proved by the existence of all the above
mentioned essentials of conspiracy. The Appellant has propagated the idea of tribal rights
movement which is their common intention. In pursuance of this common intention, the
appellant and his organization is using illegal means to support the tribal rights which is legal
in nature. It is very evident in the instant case that the move of the appellant is violent and is
creating disturbance in the society which is straining the public law and order of the society.
If the appellant is supporting the tribal rights, then there is a legal way to proceed with the

28 Sharad Yadav And Ors. v. Union Of India, 82 (1999) DLT 13.

29 Firozuddin Basheeruddin & Ors. v. State of Kerala, (2001) 7 SCC 596.

30 Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420.

31 Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 469; State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005)
11 SCC 600.

32 R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821.

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same. Whereas, the step taken by the Appellant is not right in any of the way as it is only
creating terror in the mind of the general people.

1.2 Circumstantial Evidence to Corroborate the Guilt of Accused

As per section 11(2) of Bambian Evidence Act,1860 “Facts not otherwise relevant are
relevant, if by themselves or in connection with other facts highly probable or improbable”

Conspirators cannot discuss the plans in the presence of stranger.33 Since privacy and secrecy
are the elements of criminal conspiracy, it is difficult to obtain direct evidence in its proof. It
can, therefore be proved by evidence of surroundings circumstances and conduct of accused
both before and after the alleged commission of crime 34 In State of Bihar v Paramhans35 it
was observed that “Conspiracy can be proved by circumstances and other materials 36, the
evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient.”

In State v. Nalini37 it was observed that “Mostly conspiracies are proved by circumstantial
evidence, as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair, usually both the existence of a
conspiracy and its object have to be inferred from the circumstances 38 and the conduct39 of
40
the accused”. In Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab41 it was observed that “it is not
necessary that all the conspirators must know each other and every detail of the conspiracy as
long as they are co participators in the main object of conspiracy… and in which each one

33 Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 S.C.C (Cr.) 523 at p. 527.

34 Neki Ram v. State of Haryana, (1974) 76 Punj. L.R 780at p. 786 (P&H) ; State (Delhi
administration) v. Dilbag Rai, 1984(2) Crimes 971 (Delhi).

35 1986 Pat LJR 688.

36 Mohd Khalid v. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334.

37 AIR 1999 SC 2640.

38 V.C Shukla v. State, 1980 Cr LJ 965.

39 Shivanarayan Laxminarayan Joshi & ors v. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 2 SCC 465; Sardar Sardul Singh
Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, (1964) 2 SCR 378.

40 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru AIR 2005 SC 3820.

41 1978 Cr LJ 189; Nazir Khan &ors v. State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 4427.

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must be interested.”42 In Abdul Kader v. State43 it was laid down that conspiracy is a
continuing offence and continues to subsist and committed wherever one of the conspirators
does an act or series of facts... And during its subsistence, whenever anyone of the
conspirators does an act or series of an act, he will be guilty44.

No doubt on the point that, in the case of conspiracy there cannot be any direct evidence.
Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be
considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. 45 In V.C. Shukla v. State46 it was
observed that a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a
conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit
an offence.

In the present case, the circumstantial evidence of the arms being recovered from the crime
scene with Quattics embossed on it, the riots, the attempted attacks on police station and
PMF camps, the depressing past of the appellant, the social media posts and the revengeful
tone of criticism, all these events put together indicate that the appellant was involved in
abetting the waging of the war against Bambia. The attackers of the events which happened
in 2013, were found to be the Students of the Institute which the appellant founded. All the
events throw light on the conspiracy being hatched and the abetment by the appellant by
funding the terrorist acts and also the involvement of True Socialism.

1.3 Acts of appellant constitute Waging War against the Government of Bambia

As per S. 12147 “Whoever, wages war against the [Government of Bambia], or attempts to
wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death,
or [imprisonment for life] [and shall also be liable to fine].”

42 Mohd Hussain Umar Kochra v. KS Dalip Singhji, AIR 1970 SC 45.

43 AIR 1964 Bom. 133; Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1637; K.R Purushothaman v. State of
Kerala, AIR 2006 SC 35.

44 Damodar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 4414; K.Hashim v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 1 SCC 237.

45 Nazir Khan & ors v. State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 4427.

46 1980 Cri. LJ 965.

47 Bambia Penal Code, 1860.

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To constitute high treason by levying war, there must be three elements- a. Insurrection, b.
There must be force accompanying that insurrection and, c. it must be for the
accomplishment of an object of general nature48. When a multitude rise and assemble to attain
by force and violence any object of a general public nature, that is levying war within the
contemplation of this section.49 To prove waging war, it is the purpose and intention, the
object they have in view which congregates and assembles them together, which gives them
the impulse in their arming and in their rising, it is that which constitutes treason and
distinguishes crime from that of riot or any other rising for a private purpose that can be
imagined.50

An illuminating discussion on the issue of “Waging war against the Government of India” is
to be found in Court’s decision in State (N.C.T. of Delhi), l v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan
Guru .51 P. Venkatarama Reddi, J., speaking for the Court, referred to the report of the Indian
Law Commission that examined the draft Penal Code in 1847 and quoted the following
passage from the report:

“We conceive the term ‘wages war against the Government’ naturally to
import a person arraying himself in defiance of the Government in like
manner and by like means as a foreign enemy would do, and it seems to us,
we presume it did to the authors of the Code that any definition of the term so
unambiguous would be superfluous.52”

In Section 12153, the word ‘overawe’ clearly imports more than the creation of apprehension
or alarm or fear. It connotes the creation of a situation in which the Government is compelled
to choose between yielding to force and exposing the Government or the members of the

48 R. v. Frost, (1839) 4.ST Tr. (N.S) 85:9 C &P. 129.

49 Aung Hla v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Rang. 235 at ¶236.

50 Per Lord President Hope in R v. Hardie, (1820) 1 St. Tr. (N.S.) 765.

51 AIR 2005 SC 3820.

52 Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2012 SC 3565.

53 Bambia Penal Code, 1860.

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public to a very serious danger.54 It is not necessary that the danger should be danger of
assassination or of bodily injury to them. The danger might well be a danger to public
property or to the safety of members of the general public.55

The evidence required to establish a case under S. 121 must be directed to proving of the
following points: 1. That the accused waged war or attempted to do so or abetted the same. 2.
That such war was against the Government of Bambia.56
1.3.1Attack on parliament is directly and evidently attracting Section 12157

Though every terrorist act does not amount to waging war, certain terrorist acts can also
constitute the offence of waging war and there is no dichotomy between the two. Terrorist
acts can manifest themselves into acts of war. Terrorist acts prompted by an intention to strike
at the sovereign authority of the State/Government, tantamount to waging war irrespective of
the number involved or the force employed. However, the degree of animus or intent and the
magnitude of the acts done or attempted to be done would assume some relevance in order to
consider whether the terrorist acts give rise to a state of war. Yet, the demarcating line is by
no means clear, much less transparent. It is often a difference in degree. The distinction gets
thinner if a comparison is made of terrorist acts with the acts aimed at overawing the
Government by means of criminal force. Conspiracy to commit the latter offence is covered
by S.121A.58 The incorporation of Chapter IV of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, shall not be viewed as deemed repeal of Section 121 of the Penal Code. As explained in
Navjot Sandhu case(Supra), a “terrorist act” and an act of “waging war against the
Government of India” may have some overlapping features.59

The expression “Government of India” is surely not used in the narrow and restricted sense in
Section 121. In our considered view, the expression “Government of India” is used in Section
54 Aravindan v. State of Kerala, 1983 Cr.L.J 1259.

55 Mir Hasan Khan v. Emperor, AIR 1951 Pat. 60.

56DR. HARI SINGH GAUR, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 364, (15TH EDITION, DELHI
LAW HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 2016).

57 Bambia Penal Code, 1860.

58 State (N.C.T. of Delhi), l v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820.

59 Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1.

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121 to imply the Indian State, the juristic embodiment of the sovereignty of the country that
derives its legitimacy from the collective will and consent of its people. The use of the phrase
“Government of India” is to signify the notion of sovereignty is consistent with the principles
of Public International Law, wherein sovereignty of a territorial unit is deemed to vest in the
people of the territory and exercised by a representative Government.60

The attack on parliament has facts similar to that of Parliament Attack Case61. The target
chosen was Parliament - a symbol of the sovereignty of the Indian republic. The undoubted
objective and determination of the deceased terrorists was to impinge on the sovereign
authority of the nation and it’s Government. Even if the conspired purpose and objective falls
short of installing some other authority or entity in the place of an established Government, it
does not detract from the offence of waging war. 62

The Supreme Court emphatically stated that the attempted attack on the Parliament is an
undoubted invasion of the sovereign attribute of the State including the ‘Government of India
which is its alter ego’63 and terrorist acts prompted by an intention to ‘strike at the sovereign
authority of the State/Government’ is tantamount to waging war, regardless of the numbers or
force employed.
In the instant case, the war on the parliament was to disrupt the proceedings of the parliament
which was in session to introduce the bill regarding Smart Economic Zones. Such an act
performed by True Socialism and the motivation and ideas propagated behind the veil of this
organization by the petitioner is a true picture of ‘Waging War’. The appellant widely
protested the Bill through his blog and also by his followers. An organized movement
attended with violence and attacks against the public officials and armed forces while
agitating for the repeal of an unpopular law or for preventing burdensome taxes were viewed
as “waging war”.64

60 Supra Note 61.

61 Supra Note 58.

62Id.

63 Supra Note 22

64 Mohd. Jamiludin Nasir v. State of W.B., (2014) 7 SCC 443.

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1.3.2 Appellant in the present case will come under the purview of Abetment of waging war

The offence of abetting the waging of war, having regard to the extraordinary facts and
circumstances of this case, justifies the imposition of capital punishment and therefore the
judgment of the High Court in regard to the conviction and sentence of Afzal 65 under S.121
B.P.C. shall stand.66 . The word “abets” needs to have the requisites of intention or
knowledge.67 But here, there is no distinction between the principal and accessory, and all
those who take part in the act incur the same guilt. 68Sec 121-A69of BPC makes conspiracy to
commit offense under this section punishable. An action of waging war, attempt to wage war
or abetment to wage war are also covered by s. 121-A. 70 It requires at least two persons to
conspire and there is no limit to their number. Any alleged financial assistance provided
would attract the enlarged definition of abetment given in Section 2(1)(a)(iii) of the TADA
Act.71 Conspiracy is not punishable unless it amounts to an abetment, i.e., unless it is
accompanied by an illegal act or omission.72 In the instant case, Abetment has been
committed on the part of the appellant.

In the instant case, the appellant has abetted the offence of waging war against the State. The
attack on the Parliament of Bambia has challenged the basic foundation of democracy and
such an attack is a direct proof that the people who had attacked the parliament had come
with proper planning and, had not the security forces intervened to stop them, the attack
could have been carried out with perfection. Such an attack cannot be carried out without
proper funds being invested in buying heavy arms and explosives to carry out such an attack.
After detailed inquiry, the investigators found that TrueSocialism was actively involved in

65 State (N.C.T. of Delhi), v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820.

66 Supra Note 65.

67 Kartar Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 569.

68 Emperor v. Maganlal (1946) Nag 126.

69 Bambia Penal Code, 1860.

70 Adnan Bilal Mulla v. State of Bombay, 2006 CriLJ NOC 406Bom.

71 State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659

72 Emperor v. Subramaniyya Ayyer I.L.R 25Mad. 61 (P.C); Supra Note 15.

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this attack. Being the founder of this NGO, it is implied that any financial transaction within
the NGO cannot be carried out with the intimation or assent of the appellant. This specifically
shows that the appellant has abetted the offence of assisting the attack financially which is
unlawful under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967.

2 WHETHER THE CHARGES PRESSED AGAINST APPELLANT UNDER UAPA,

1967 AND PMLA, 2002 ARE JUSTIFIED?
The council humbly submits in this Hon’ble court that, by analyzing the facts in hand, the
Session Court And High Court are very much justified in pressing charges of financing
terrorism and money laundering against the accused, as detailed enquiry has shown the
involvement of TrueSocialism and its fund.

2.1 Unlawful Activity Prevention Act, 1967

2.1.1That the True socialism will come under the purview of Terrorist organisation

Chapter VI of UAPA73 discusses about terrorist organization, where Section 35 discusses the
power of Central Government to add or remove any terrorist organization. In the present case,
the issue is that the organization in question has not been declared as unlawful organization.

Here, the acts carried out by the Appellant and his NGO-True Socialism are terrorist
activities. In such circumstances, it is very evident that the Appellant will take the plea that
his organization is not a terrorist organization as with accordance to The Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967. But, the counsel humbly contends that a mere inclusion or non-
inclusion into a list which is not exhaustive does not entail that True Socialism is a lawful
organization. The activities carried out by the organisation and its allied institutions are more
than enough to prove that the organization has played a major part in inciting terrorism in
various parts of the country.

In Redaul Hussain Khan v. NIA74, the Guwahati HC discussed at length the distinction
between a terrorist organization and terrorist gang. It observed that the intent behind making
the distinction was to ensure that even terrorist acts committed by individuals or

73 Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967

74 2012 SCC OnLine Gau 341, Pg. 81-97

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organizations not listed in the Schedule should not be permitted to escape prosecution under
the Act.
Merely because the organization concerned had not been declared as an “unlawful
association” when the appellant was arrested, it cannot be the said that the organization could
not have indulged in terrorist acts or that the appellant could not have had knowledge of such
activities.75

2.1.2 Section 1576- Terrorist Activity- Accused and his organisation has been indulged in
the terrorist activity

Under UAPA Section 15 gives the definition of terrorist Activity as “Whoever does any act
with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India
or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the
people in India or in any foreign country.” Further the sections provides for the different
methods for terrorist activity77.

The act of the appellant starting from the attack on the Police Station to the attack on the
Parliament, all these attacks have tried to create disturbance in the society and has challenged
the capability of the state in preserving the law and orders successfully. Such concurrent acts
of violence by the appellant has created a reign of terror in the minds of the general public as
such an attack was not only to disturb the law and order situation of the state but also to
create a state of fear in the minds of the citizens of Bambia. Such an act of the appellant
cannot be pardoned at any cost and the appellant has no such right to claim the fundamental
rights enshrined in the Constitution of India, 195078.

Public Order, Law and Order and Security of the State were discussed at length in the case of
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel.79

75 Redaul Hussain Khan v. National Investigation Agency, (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 822 at page
521.

76 Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967.

77 Id.

78 Page 5, ¶14, Moot Proposition, Army Institute of Law National Moot Court Competition
2016.

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The expressions “law and order”, “public order” and “security of the State”
have been used in different Acts. Situations which affect “public order” are
graver than those which affect “law and order” and situations which affect
“security of the State” are graver than those which affect “public order”.
Thus, of these situations those which affect “security of the State” are the
gravest. Danger to the security of the State may arise from without or within
the State. The expression “security of the State” does not mean security of the
entire country or a whole State. In includes security of a part of the State. It
also cannot be confined to an armed rebellion or revolt. There are various
ways in which security of the State can be affected. It can be affected by State
secrets or information relating to defence production or similar matters being
passed on to other countries, whether inimical or not to our country, or by
secret links with terrorists. It is difficult to enumerate the various ways in
which security of the State can be affected. The way in which security of the
State is affected may be either open or clandestine.

In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra80 the court said that

“A ‘terrorist’ activity does not merely arise by causing disturbance of law and
order or of public order. The fall out of the intended activity must be such that
it travels beyond the capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to
tackle it under the ordinary penal law”.81

Also in Kartar Singh’s case the Hon’ble 82Court with reference to Section 3 of TADA
(Same as section 15 of UAPA) has held that

“Section 3 when a person not only intends to overawe the Government or

create terror in people etc. but he uses the arms and ammunitions which
results in death or is likely to cause and damage to property etc. In other
words, a person becomes a terrorist or is guilty of terrorist activity when
intention, action and consequence all the three ingredients are found to
exist83.”

79 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 at page 508 ¶141

80 1995 Cri LJ 517.

81 State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Ors, AIR 1999 SC 2640.

82 Infra note 103.

83 Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cri LJ 517 as referred in
State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Ors.

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In the present case also, the chronology of facts shows that the Penal Code of Bambia is not
sufficient to tackle the indulge crimes by accused, also the indulged involvement of accused
is fulfilling the requisites of terrorist activity given in Kartar Singh case. Hence it is necessary
under law to convict the accused under UAPA to meet the end of justice.

2.1.3That the crime of Financing terrorism has been proved against the accused

According to Section 17 of UAPA, 1967 “Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly

or indirectly, raises or collects funds or provides funds to any person or persons or attempts
to provide funds to any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used by
such person or persons to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were
actually used or not for commission of such act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life,
and shall also be liable to fine.”

Authoritative Definition of terrorism is has not been given anywhere. Because of this
ambiguity, at different instances, terrorism has been defined in different ways. In Nazir Khan
v. State of Delhi different definition of terrorism has been discussed at length. This case has
mentioned that “All criminal acts directed against a State along with intended or calculated
to create a statute of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the
general public”84. Also “Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”85.

In Redaual Hussain Khan v. NIA86 while stating that money rose must be indented to be
used for terror financing, the court held that Section 1787 would cover raising collecting and
84 League of Nations Convention (1937).

85 Federal Bureau of Investigation.

86 2012 SCC Online Gau 341, ¶74.

87 Section 17, Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967: [Punishment for raising funds for
terrorist act. —Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, raises or
collects funds or provides funds to any person or persons or attempts to provide funds to any
person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used by such person or persons to
commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for
commission of such act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be

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providing funds to a person known to engage in terrorist acts. The fundraiser need not to
know exactly what terrorist act would be committed since it is difficult to find evidence of
conspiracy.

In the pertinent case, it has been clearly given that the organization of the appellant had been
involved in the Parliament Attack as well as in the process, the funds of the Organization has
also been used. This clearly makes the accused liable under section 15 and 17 of UAPA.

Other than the clear involvement in parliament attack, there are series of events which shows
the involvement of accused in various criminal Acts, like 1) Attempt at attack on Police
Station in Naipur, 2. Attack against PMF camps 3.Jagganagar Tribal Riots. A clear analogy
can be drawn here, because in all these criminal activities, object was same which was
propagated by the appellant. The circumstantial evidence collected from the crime scene
where the weapons collected was embossed with Quattics.88 The appellant has significant
shares in Quattics and he is the brand ambassador of it. Hence, there is no infirmity on the
part of respondent when it charged the accused under the purview of financing terrorism.

2.2 Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

As per Section 3 of PMLA,2000, which defines the offence of Money Laundering,

“Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a
party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime
and projecting it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering”.89

The essential ingredients of this definition are that: i) a crime has been committed; ii) there
are proceeds of or gain from the crime; and iii) there is a transaction in respect of the
proceeds of the gain. In Whitney v. Inland Revenue Commissioner90 regarding the
interpretation of special statute, it was observed as under: “A statute is designed to be

less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine.]

88 Moot Proposition, Page 5, ¶15.

89 Section 3, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

90 1926 AC 37.

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workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object unless
crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.”

In Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra 91 this Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that since it is not necessary for an organization to be declared unlawful for it to commit
terrorist acts, even support given to an association not declared unlawful would be
criminalized as long as there was knowledge that terrorist acts were being committed.

In Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra and Anr92 where by

discussing the object of money laundering act, this court has discussed that
“Organized crime has been for quite some years now come up as a very
serious threat to our society. It knows no national boundaries and is fuelled by
illegal wealth generated by contract, killing, extortion, smuggling in
contrabands, illegal trade in narcotics kidnappings for ransom, collection of
protection money and money laundering, etc. The illegal wealth and
black money generated by the organized crime being very huge, it has had
serious adverse effect on our economy. It was seen that the organized criminal
syndicates made a common cause with terrorist gangs and
foster terrorism which extend beyond the national boundaries. There was
reason to believe that organized criminal gangs have been operating in the
State and, thus, there was immediate need to curb their activities93.

2.2.1 Section 23- The court court can presume guilt, in series of events

According to Section 23 of the Act, if the involvement of organization in one crime has been
proved, the court can presume the involvement of the organization in other interconnected
events automatically.

In Izhar Ahmad v. Union of India94, Gajendragadkar, J. [as his Lordship then was] observed
(in the majority opinion of the Constitution Bench) that: The term “Presumption” in its
largest and most comprehensive signification, may be defined to be an inference, affirmative

91 2013 SCC OnLine SC 257.

92 AIR 2005 SC 2277.

93 Id.

94 AIR 1962 SC 1052.

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or disaffirmative of the truth of false-hood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a

process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted.

In M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P95, Justice Thomas observed that presumption is an

inference of a certain fact drawn from other proved facts. While inferring the existence of a
fact from another, the Court is only applying a process of intelligent reasoning which the
mind of a prudent man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption is not the final
conclusion to be drawn from other facts, but it could as well be final, if it remains
undisturbed later. Presumption in the law of evidence is a rule indicating the stage of shifting
the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts the Court can draw an inference and that
would remain until such inference is either disproved or dispelled.

Having regard to the fact that money-laundering is indulgence, informed assistance or being a
party to or actual involvement in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime
and projecting it as untainted property, inherently assuming a degree of deceit and
camouflage in the process of layering the proceeds of crime through a series of transactions,
in the considered legislative wisdom, a presumption in inter-connected transactions is
enjoined by Section 23 of the Act, contingent upon one or more of inter-connected
transactions having to be proved to be involved in money-laundering.96

The rule of presumption enjoined by Section 23 takes away judicial discretion either to attach
or not due probative value to the fact that one or more of the inter-connected transactions
have been proved to be involved money-laundering; and requires prima facie due probative
value to be attached and mandates an inference that the other transactions form part of the raft
of inter-connected transactions involved in money-laundering, subject of course to the said
presumption being rebutted by proof to the contrary.97

That, provisional order of attachment of the subject property and confirmation thereof do not
violate Article 14 or Article 20(1) and/or (2) of the Constitution of India. That, reliance

95 2001 Cri.L.J.SC 515.

96 Alive Hospitality and Food Private Limited v. Union of India, 2013 SCC OnLine Guj
3909.

97 Id.

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placed on Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of B.Rama Raju98, more
particularly emphasis supplied and marked as 1(a) to 1(h), 2(a) to 2(d), 3(a) to 3(d) and 4(a)
to 4(c) in this order, answer the challenge of the respective parties about exercising power
under Sections 5 and 8 of the PML Act being violative of Article 14, 20 and 21 of the
Constitution of India.

In the present case the accused and his organization’s funding was involved in the terrorist
attack on parliament and before this the organization was portraying that it is a lawful
organization which has not been indulged in any illegal activity, whereas the actual picture is
totally different. As the involvement in parliamentary attack has been proved, the court can
presume the involvement in other matters automatically. Also, here organizations have used
the name and fame of the accused as a cloak to hide their illegal activity. Hence, the courts
have not erred in convicting the accused under the prevention of money laundering act, and
the accused is liable under section 3, 4 and 23 of the Act.

3 . THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent humbly submits that the Due Process of Law has
been complied with. The case is of a grievous nature and the involvement of a terrorist in
such a case has made it of special importance where the procedural aspect has been set aside
for such acts which are not dealt under the general law and order provisions. A terrorist act, as
discussed, creates terror in the minds of the people which is a drawback for a democratic
country. In such cases, the constitutional validity of any such special penal statute cannot be
challenged which specifically deals with the procedure established by law regarding the trial
of the offence.

In the instant case, the Government has complied with the due process of law by carrying out
a detailed inquiry.99 The accused was produced in the Sessions Court where after the State
then preferred an appeal against the sentence given by the Sessions Court to the High Court
and after perusing through the facts of the case, the High Court went on to enhance the
punishment of life imprisonment to death sentence.100

98 V. B. Raju v. Union Of India & Others, 1980 AIR 1671.

99 Page 6, ¶ 16, Moot Proposition, Army Institute of Law National Moot Court Competition
2016.

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3.1 Act of Government not violative of Article 14, 19 and 21 of Constitution of

Bambia, 1950
Parliament has got the legislative competence to enact this law namely the TADA Act and the
Special Courts Act of 1984. When the validity of this section is scrutinised in the above
background, we can safely hold that the procedure prescribed under this Act cannot be said to
be unjust, unfair and oppressive, offending Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.101

The counsel contends that the procedure under the normal penal laws had become grossly
inadequate and ineffective to try the distinct group of offenders, i.e., terrorists and
disruptionists for the classified aggravated nature of offences and that his submission is
fortified by the statistics with regard to the terrorist crimes in the State of Punjab from 1984
to 1992, annexed in the compilation of his written submission before the court and the
debates and discussion made in the Parliament at the time of introduction of the Bill (TADA).

It is a well settled principle that stringency and harshness of provisions are not for courts to
determine.102

In the case of Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India103, the Supreme Court went on to say that
that mere possibility of abuse is not a valid ground to challenge the validity of a statute.

There have been many such instances where it has been argued that fair trial involves only
the accused. All the safeguards of constitution should be given to the accused in certain
circumstances. But in the case of Talib Haji Hussain v. Madhukar P. Mondkar 104, it has

100 Page 7, ¶ 17, Moot Proposition, Army Institute of Law National Moot Court Competition
2016.

101 Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569.

102 N.B. Khare (Dr) v. State of Delhi, 1950 SCR 519; Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of
Saurashtra, 1952 SCR 435 ; Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of W.B., AIR 1953 SC 404; State of
Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, 1957 SCR 874.

103 1957 SCR 233.

104 1958 SCR 1226.

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been ruled that fair trial has two objects in view, namely, it must be fair to the accused and
also to the prosecution.

In the instant case, the act of the accused has created internal disturbance in the province of
Bambia where such acts carried out by the accused has created a state of terror in the minds
of the general public. When the security of people at large is at stake, it is the role of the
Government as well as the courts to restrict such person who in-still fear in the minds of the
general public. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India105, it has been held that liberty of individual has
to be subordinated to the good of the people.

The Legislature is free to make classifications in the application of a statute which are
relevant to the legislative purpose. The ultimate test of validity is not whether the classes
differ but whether the differences between them are pertinent to the subject with respect to
which the classification is made.106

Article 14 have been elaborately explained in two earlier decisions of this Court viz.
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India 107 and State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara 108
and the principles laid down in those decisions have to be kept in view in deciding the present
case. One of these principles is that Article 14 is designed to protect all persons placed in
similar circumstances against legislative discrimination, and if the legislature takes care to
reasonably classify persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all persons
belonging to a well-defined class, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on
the ground that the law does not apply to other persons.

105 (1982) 1 SCC 271.

106 [90 L Ed 6 : 326 US 207 (1945)].

107 1950 SCR 869.

108 1950 SCR 62.

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In the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar 109, Fazi Ali,J., observed the
following:

“The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of
equal laws. It forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification
which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate. ‘It merely requires that all persons
subject to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and
conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.”110

3.1.1 The social media post by appellant will amount to sedition

In the instant case, the accused gave posted in the Social Media website the following
message; “go to places where you have come from, anti-tribal activities shall not be tolerated
by congregational procession in Badheli; surely, revenge shall be taken”.111

This message given by the accused created a lot of internal disturbance in Jagganagar and
Badheli as people who had not yet come over the plight of the Jagganagar riots had got a
reasonable inference that will again face a similar situation in the near future. Such an
apprehension raised an alarm in the society where all the migrants who had come for various
purposes started rushing to railway stations and airport to go back to their places. This created
a lot of disturbance in the law and order situation of the state where the Home Minister had to
intervene personally to appeal to the people for restoring peace and order in the State. Such
an action by the accused trying to disable the State machinery and disturb the tranquillity of
the State.

Section 124A deals with ‘Sedition’, Sedition is a crime against society nearly allied to that of
treason, and it frequently precedes treason by a short interval. Sedition in itself is a
comprehensive term, and it embraces all those practices, whether by word, deed, or writing,
which are calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the State, and lead ignorant persons to
endeavour to subvert the Government and laws of the country. The objects of sedition

109 AIR 1952 SC 75.

110 WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 579, (THE PRINCIPIA PRESS, UNITED

STATES, 1936).

111 Page 6, ¶15, Moot Proposition, Army Institute of Law National Moot Court Competition
2016.

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-Arguments Advanced- -Respondent-

generally are to induce discontent and insurrection, and stir up opposition to the Government,
and bring the administration of justice into contempt; and the very tendency of sedition is to
incite the people to insurrection and rebellion. Sedition has been described as disloyalty in
action, and the law considers as sedition all those practices which have for their object to
excite discontent or dissatisfaction, to create public disturbance, or to lead to civil war; to
bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign or the Government, the laws or constitutions of
the realm, and generally all endeavours to promote public disorder.112

After a brief perusal of the facts as well as the law involved, it can be easily inferred that the
acts carried out by the Appellant are illegal and penal in nature. The appellant has tried to
proceed with a legal procedure illegally by conforming to violence which strained the public
law and order situation of the State. Starting from the attack on the police station which killed
more than 136 members till the Parliament attacks, the circumstantial evidence proves that
the appellant has conspired the series of attacks to weaken the government machinery and
overawe the same. Such attacks on the Government did raise a question on the security of the
state and the security which it provides to the common people. This has created ripples of
disturbance across the province. To preserve the security of the State and the common
citizens, it is the need of the hour to stand together against terrorism and terrorism related
activities. Such activities cannot be tolerated and a strict procedure should be followed to
restrict such mis-happenings in the future. To create a deterrent, the honourable Supreme
Court should confirm the sentence awarded by the High Court.

112 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.

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PRAYER

IN THE LIGHT OF THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND AUTHORITIES CITED,

THE APPELLANT HUMBLY PLEADS BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT TO:

1. UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE SESSIONS COURT AND THE

HIGH COURT.

ANY OTHER ORDER AS IT DEEMS FIT IN THE INTEREST OF EQUITY,

JUSTICE AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.

FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE APPELLANT FACTION SHALL BE

DUTY BOUND FOREVER.

SD/-

(COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT)

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