EN BANC abuse of superior strength, nighttime attack, assault, strike and hit

ROLANDO SEVILLA with wooden clubs (bahi) used as their night sticks,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174483 hitting the latter at the different parts of his body and tying down his hands
Plaintiff-Appellee, and feet with a rope, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal
Present: wounds which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his
PUNO, C.J., legal heirs.
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, On October 9, 1998, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their counsel, entered a plea
- versus - CORONA, of not guilty to the offense charged.[4] Thereafter, trial ensued.
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses: Zaldy Siglos, Nancy Sara,
CHICO-NAZARIO,* Ryan Sara, Armando Cabais Poblete, Ronnie Siglos, Cynthia Sevilla, Norma Torres, Policeman
VELASCO, JR., Jose Gregorio, Cenen Talagtag, Cesar Sazon and Dr. Mario Cerillo, while Antonio Relato and
NACHURA,** Nicanor Regonia testified on rebuttal. Nancy Sara, Cynthia Sevilla and Ryan Sara were
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,* and presented for a second time also as rebuttal witnesses.
RAMON REGALARIO, PERALTA, JJ.
MARCIANO REGALARIO, On their part, accused-appellants took the witness stand. All raised the defense of
SOTERO REGALARIO, Promulgated: denial except for Ramon who admitted the act charged but claimed self-defense. To corroborate
BIENVENIDO REGALARIO and March 31, 2009 their defense, Jose Poblete and Adonis Velasco were presented. The defense also presented
NOEL REGALARIO, Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Jimmy Colisao, Harold Reolo, Ma. Julieta Razonable, and Dr.
Accused-Appellants. Leopoldo Barrosa II.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
On August 24, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision[5] giving full faith and credit to the
DECISION prosecutions evidence. It ruled out accused-appellant Ramon Regalarios claim of self defense,
and held that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: as shown in the manner in which all of them inflicted the wounds on the victims body. It further
ruled that the killing was qualified to murder by abuse of superior strength and by their scoffing
For automatic review is the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR at the body of the victim. It also appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
No. 01556 which affirmed with modification, an earlier decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court voluntary surrender. The pertinent dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No. 3613, finding accused-appellants Ramon,
Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido and Noel, all surnamed Regalario guilty of murder and sentencing WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding Ramon,
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs Sotero, Bienvenido, Marciano and Noel, all surnamed Regalario, guilty
of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, and another sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Par. 1, of Art. 248
and to pay the costs of the proceedings. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the aggravating circumstance
of scoffing at the corpse of the victim. However, accused are entitled to the
In the court of origin, accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido and benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which offset
Noel were originally charged with Homicide. However, after reinvestigation of the case, the the aggravating circumstance of scoffing at his corpse, hence, are hereby
Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, Legaspi City, consisting of State Prosecutors sentenced to suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua together with the
Romulo SJ Tolentino, Mary May B. De Leoz and Elmer M. Lanuzo filed an amended accessory penalties provided for by law.
information[3] charging the accused-appellants with murder, committed as follows:
The accused are hereby ordered to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the late Rolando Sevilla the amount of P50,000.00 and another
That on February 22, 1997 at about 11:00 in the evening, at Brgy. sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.
Natasan, Municipality of Libon, province of Albay, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill, did the P200,000.00 bail bond put up by accused Marciano Regalario is hereby
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with cruelty, treachery, cancelled and is ordered recommitted to jail.

1

SO ORDERED.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review, in view of
the penalty imposed.
In our Resolution[6] of August 13, 2001, We accepted the appeal and directed the
Chief of the Judicial Records Office, to send notices to the parties to file their respective
briefs. The Court also required the Jail Warden, Municipal Jail, Polangui, Albay to transfer
accused-appellants to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, and make a report of such
transfer within ten (10) days from notice. Likewise, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
was required to confirm the detention of accused-appellants. Accused-appellants filed their
Appellants Brief[7] on December 4, 2001, while the People, thru the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its Appellee's Brief[8] on July 30, 2002.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo[9] which modified the provisions
of the Rules of Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in
cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, this case was referred for appropriate action and disposition to the CA where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 01556.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General,
as follows:
Accused-appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are barangay
officials of Natasan, Libon, Albay and related to one another by
consanguinity. Marciano, barangay chairman, Sotero, barangay kagawad
and Ramon, barangay tanod, are brothers while Bienvenido Regalario, also
barangay tanod, is their cousin and Noel is the son of Marciano. (TSN,
November 16, 1998, p. 9; RTC Order dated October 9, 1998, pp. 115-117)
On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being
held in the barangay pavilion of Natasan, Libon, Albay. At around ten
oclock that evening, Rolando Sevilla and Armando Poblete were enjoying
the festivities when appellant Sotero Regalario approached them (TSN,
December 7, 1998, p.4). To avoid trouble, the two distanced themselves
from Sotero. Nevertheless, a commotion ensued. (ibid., p. 5). Appellants
Sotero and Bienvenido Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla
several times with their respective nightsticks, locally known as bahi. (TSN,
November 16, 1998, pp. 13-17, 32, 34, 36-37). The blows caused Sevilla to
fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he was able to get up
(ibid., pp. 16-17). He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant
Mariano Regalario, the barangay captain (ibid., pp. 18-38). Bienvenido and
Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla (ibid., p. 38, TSN, December 7, 1998. p.
6). When Sevilla was already near Marcianos house, he was waylaid by
appellant Ramon Regalario and at this point, Marciano Regalario and his
son Noel Regalario came out of their house (TSN, December 7, 1998, pp. 7-
9 and 35). Noel was carrying a seven-inch knife. The five appellants caught
the victim in front of Marcianos house. Armed with their nightsticks, they
took turns in hitting the victim until he slumped to the ground face down
(ibid., pp. 8, 35 and 38). In that position, Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in
the jaw. After a while, when Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano first
ordered the others to kill the victim and to tie him up (ibid., pp. 36-
37). Upon hearing the order, Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the
neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope used by farmers for
tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching. (ibid., pp. 37-
38).
In the early morning of February 23, 1997, Cynthia Sevilla, the victims
widow, after she was informed of her husbands death, went to
the poblacion of Libon to report the incident at the towns police station
(TSN, December 8, 1998, pp. 7-8). However, her statements were not
entered in the police blotter because appellant Marciano Regalario had
earlier reported to them, at two oclock in the morning, a different version of
the incident, i.e., it was the victim Sevilla who shot Marcianos brother
Ramon and that Sevilla, allegedly still alive, was placed under the custody
of the barangay tanods. (ibid., p. 7; TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M.
Session], pp. 9-10). At around eight oclock of the same morning, SPO4 Jose
Gregorio, with some other police officers and Cynthia Sevilla, left the police
station on board a truck and proceeded to the crime scene in Natasan. SPO4
Gregorio conducted an investigation of the incident. (TSN, November 20,
1998 [A.M. Session], pp. 10-12). Thereafter, the policemen took the victims
cadaver to the police station in the poblacion (ibid., p. 26) where pictures
were taken showing the victims hands and legs tied behind him [Exhibits C
and D] (ibid., pp. 14-15; TSN, December 8, 1998, p. 10; TSN, November
20, 1998 [P.M. Session], pp 5-7). On that same day, SPO4 Gregorio
requested the Libons Rural Health Unit to conduct an autopsy on the victims
body but since the municipal health officer was not around, it was only
performed the next day, February 24 (TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M.
Session], p. 26; TSN, December 8, 1998, pp. 10-11; TSN, November 20,
1998 [P.M. Session], p. 11). After Dr. Mario Cerillo, Municipal Health
Officer of Libon conducted the autopsy, he forthwith issued a Medico-Legal
Report dated February 24, 1997 (Exhibit B), the pertinent portions of which
read:
Findings:
Head : Lacerated wound 4 cm
frontal area, Right.
: Lacerated wound 8 cm.
occipital area, Right.
: Lacerated wound 4 cm.
with fractured skull
(post auricular area),
Right.
: Abrasion 4 x 2 cm.
2
eyebrow, Right.
: Abrasion 2 cm. x 1 cm. On the other hand, the accused-appellants Brief presents a different story:
with lacerated wound
1 cm. eyebrow, Left. At the time of the incident in question, accused Marciano
: Periorbital Hematoma Regalario was the incumbent barangay captain of Natasan, Libon,
Left and Right eye. Albay. Accused Sotero was a kagawad, while Ramon and Bienvenido were
: Lacerated wound 1 cm. barangay tanods of the same place. Noel Regalario had no public
lower lip, Left. position. He is the son of one of the other accused.
Neck : Stab wound 2 cm.
penetrating lateral base On the night of February 22, 1997, a public dance and singing
of the neck just above contest was held in their barangay. Naturally, being barangay officials, the
the clavicle, Right. accused, (except Noel who is not an official and whose wife has just given
: Stab wound 2 cm., 6 cm. birth) were at the place of the celebration, discharging their peace-keeping
depth lateral base of the duties. They were posted at different places in that vicinity.
neck just above the
clavicle, Right. At first, a fire broke out in the toilet of the Day Care Center. It
was attended to by the persons assigned in that area. A while later, there
Trunk : Hematoma 10 x 8 cm. was another commotion in the area assigned to accused Ramon
clavicular area, Right. Regalario. When he approached the group where the disturbance was taking
: Multiple abrasion chest place and tried to investigate, Rolando Sevilla suddenly emerged from the
: Contusion 7 x 2 cm., group and without any ado, fired a shot at him. He was hit at the left
7th Intercorsal space and shoulder. Instinctively, and in order to disable Sevilla from firing more
clavicular line, left. shots, which might prove fatal, he struck his assailant with his nightstick
and hit him at the back of his head. This is the blow which Nancy Sara and
Extremities : Multiple abrasion and Zaldy Siglos said were delivered by Sotero and Bienvenido. This blow
contusion on both Right caused Sevilla to reel backward and lean on the bamboo fence. To prevent
and Left arm and forearm. Sevilla from regaining his balance, Ramon pressed his counter-attack by
: Abrasion (Ropemark) continuing to harass him with blows of his nightstick. As Ramon pressed
around Right and Left wrist. on forward, Sevilla retreated backward. Ramon kept him busy parrying the
: Abrasion (Ropemark) around blows which hit his arms and front part of the body, as they were face to
distal 3rd of both Right and face with each other. But even in the course of such harassment, Sevilla was
Left leg. able to fire a second shot which missed Ramon.

xxx xxx xxx xxx
Cause of Death:
Sever blood loss secondary to stab wound and multiple
lacerated wound, probably secondary to intracranial
hemorrhage.
On the witness stand, Dr. Cerillo opined that the victims lacerated
wounds could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a hard stick, a
stone or iron bar, his stab wounds by a sharp-edged instrument or knife, his
contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or through contact with a blunt
instrument. Also according to the physician, the sharp object which caused
the victims stab wounds could have been a knife 2 cm. wide and 6 cm. long
because they were clean cut wounds. (TSN, November 20, 1998 [P.M.
Session], pp. 14-15).[10]
When they reached the end of the road pavement, Sevilla lost his
footing on edge of the pavement and fell down. At that juncture, Sotero
arrived and shouted to Ramon to stop beating Rolando. But Ramon told him
that Rolando still had the gun. So, Sotero plunged at Rolando and they
wrestled on the ground for the possession of the gun. As they struggled, the
gun went off but no one was hurt. When Rolando raised his arms to move
the gun away from Sotero, Ramon knocked the gun off his hand and it fell
near the place where Jose Poblete was standing. Poblete just arrived at the
scene along with Marciano Regalario who was already told that his brother
Ramon was shot by Sevilla. Poblete picked up the gun. He was instructed
by Marciano to keep it until it is turned over to the authorities.
The wounded Ramon Regalario was brought to town for
treatment and later to the provincial hospital. Marciano and Sotero
proceeded to the police station to report the shooting of Ramon.

3
 Bienvenido Regalario, the barangay tanod, arrived at the scene
after the fact. He was instructed by Marciano, the barangay captain to effect
the arrest of Rolando Sevilla for the crime of shooting Ramon. According
to Bienvenido, they were taught in their training seminar to just use a rope
in lieu of handcuffs because they could not be supplied with it. So, he tied
the hands and feet of Rolando Sevilla for fear that he might be able to
escape.
On the early morning of February 23, a team of policemen went
to Natasan and found the dead body of Rolando Sevilla. Jose Poblete also
turned over to the police, Rolando Sevillas gun. Meanwhile, Noel
Regalario, after learning of the incident, scoured the place where the third
shot was fired during the struggle between Sotero and Rolando. He found a
.38 caliber slug which was also turned over to the police. [11]
On May 31, 2006, the CA promulgated the herein challenged decision affirming for
the most part the decision of the trial court with modification as to the penalty imposed. Unlike
the trial court, the CA did not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of the accused-appellants. Thus, the penalty was changed from reclusion perpetua to
death, and an additional award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages was likewise
imposed. Pertinently, the CA decision reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The accused-appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of DEATH and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Rolando Sevilla the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for its
review, pursuant to AM No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases) which took
effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.[12]
As can be gleaned from the above quote, the CA elevated the instant case to this Court
in view of the penalty imposed. In our Resolution[13] dated November 14, 2006, we required the
parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. On December 12, 2006,
the people filed a manifestation[14] stating that it is waiving the filing of a supplemental
brief. Accused-appellants filed their supplemental brief[15] on February 15, 2007.
In their Brief, accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL OF THE
ACCUSED PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLING OF ROLANDO
SEVILLA AND BASING ITS DECISION, NOT ON DIRECT
EVIDENCE BUT ON ITS OWN SUPPOSITIONS, CONJECTURES
AND INFERENCES;
2. THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE
EVIDENCE AND DISPLAYED BIAS WHEN IT LEANED IN
FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DESPITE THEIR
VITAL CONTRADICTIONS AND OBVIOUS FALSEHOODS;
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY AMONG THE ACCUSED AND THAT THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE WAS ATTENDED BY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH AND SCOFFING AT THE BODY OF THE VICTIM;
4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
DECEASED WAS KILLED IN SELF-DEFENSE AND/OR
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO
THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED.[16]
We begin our evaluation with accused-appellant Ramon Regalarios claim of self-
defense. Both the CA and the trial court gave no credence to this theory of self-defense.
When self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he
necessarily owns up to the killing but may escape criminal liability by proving that it was
justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. Hence, the three (3) elements of self-
defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. However, without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, either complete
or incomplete.[17]
Accused-appellant Ramon contends that the victim Rolando Sevilla committed an act
of unlawful aggression with no provocation on his [Ramons] part. Ramon testified that he was
trying to investigate a commotion when, without warning, Rolando emerged from the group,
thrust and fired his gun at him, hitting him in the left shoulder. To disable Rolando from firing
more shots, Ramon struck the victims head at the back with his nightstick, causing the victim to
reel backward and lean on the bamboo fence. He continued hitting Rolando to prevent the latter
from regaining his balance and, as he pressed on farther, the victim retreated backward.
By Ramons own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latters
head and he continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From that moment, the
inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of
the offensive stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer
any danger, but still Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People v.
Cajurao,[18] we held:
4
 and thus, cannot be given any weight on the scales of justice.[19] The participation of each of the
The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, accused-appellants can be fully ascertained from the clear, categorical and spontaneous
the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former testimony given by prosecution witness, Ronnie Siglos, who was at the scene of the crime, thus:
aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Upon the cessation
of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the PROSECUTOR RESARI:
necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary
ceases. If he persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the Q While you were walking on your way home, was there an unusual
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Self-defense does not justify the incident and can you recall?
unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray. A Yes, maam
(Emphasis supplied)
Q What was that incident about?
Ramons claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds A While I was on my way towards the house of my parents, I just suddenly
on the neck, four (4) lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions saw a person being beaten on the road.
on different parts of the victims body, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Mario Cerillo
who conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim revealed that the victims lacerated Q When you first noticed that there was a man being beaten along the road,
wounds could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a hard stick, a stone or an iron bar; how far were you?
his stab wounds by a sharp-edged instrument or knife; his contusions and hematoma by a fist A I was about more or less 9 to 10 meters.
blow or through contact with a blunt instrument. He also declared that the sharp object which
caused the victims stab wounds could have been a knife 2 centimeters (cms.) wide and 6 cms. xxx xxx xxx
long because they were clean-cut wounds. Indeed, even if it were true that the victim fired a gun
at Ramon, the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated that Q When you saw a man being beaten what did you do?
the force used against him by Ramon and his co-accused was not only to disarm the victim or A I continue walking, but upon reaching that place near the person being
prevent him from doing harm to others. beaten, I stopped.

The four (4) other accused-appellants, namely, Sotero, Marciano, Bienvenido and Q Why did you stop?
Noel, to exonerate themselves, denied their involvement in inflicting wounds on Rolando. A To verify and know as to who that person being beaten.

Sotero claimed that he arrived at the scene of the crime at the time when Rolando lost xxx xxx xxx
his footing on the edge of the pavement and fell down. He even shouted at Ramon to stop beating
Rolando. However, when Ramon told him that Rolando still had the gun, he jumped on Rolando Q And who was that person being beaten?
and they wrestled on the ground for the possession of the gun. A Rolando Sevilla.

Marciano maintained that he, together with Jose Poblete, arrived at the crime scene Q Who were the persons beating Rolando Sevilla?
when Ramon had already knocked the gun out of Rolandos hand and the gun fell near the place A Marciano Regalario, Sotero Regalario, Ramon Regalario, Bienvenido
where Jose Poblete was standing. When he went to that place, he already knew that his brother Regalario, Noel Regalario, Ernani Regalario, Reynante Regalario,
(Ramon) had been shot, so, he told the latter to go to the hospital. Thereafter, he and Sotero Jose Poblete, Jose Quinno and Virgilio Rebanal.
proceeded to the police station to report the shooting incident.
Q Who else?
Bienvenido asserted that he arrived at the crime scene after the shooting incident. He A Cecilio Lunas.
was asked by Marciano to arrest Rolando.
Q If some of the persons you saw beating Rolando Sevilla are present in
Lastly, Noel insisted that he was not present when the shooting incident took place. He this court room, will you be able to point and identify them?
was inside their house sleeping, as his wife had just given birth. A Yes, maam.

We are not convinced. xxx xxx xxx

Accused-appellants denials cannot overcome the positive identification by the PROSECUTOR:

prosecutions witnesses. Elementary is the rule that positive identification, where categorical and
consistent, prevails over unsubstantiated denials because the latter are negative and self-serving,

5
Q You stated that you saw the persons you have just named as beating
Rolando Sevilla. Were there weapons used in beating Rolando
Sevilla?
A Yes.
Q What kind of weapons (was) used?
A Sotero was armed with bahi wood, and also Ramon. Bienvenido was also
armed with bahi, as well as Cecilio Lunas, Jose Quinno were also
armed with malo-palo.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What kind of weapon was being held by Noel Regalario?
A A knife.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when you saw Rolando Sevilla being beaten by the persons you
mentioned before, what did you notice on the condition of Rolando
Sevilla?
A He was lying on his stomach.
Q Did you see the face of Rolando Sevilla?
A Yes.
Q How were you able to see the face of Rolando Sevilla?
A Because Sotero was holding him by his hair.
Q What was your observation on the condition of Rolando Sevilla?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
He was already motionless. He is not moving anymore.
PROSECUTOR:
Of the persons you named as holding weapons, you did not mention
Marciano Regalario as holding any weapon. What was Marciano
Regalario doing then?
A He boxed Rolando Sevilla and Rolando was hit on his jaw.
Q What else did Marciano Regalario do if any?
A After he boxed Rolando Sevilla, he went inside his house but after about
one (1) minute he again return(ed) back.
testimony of Armando Poblete:
Q After Marciano Regalario returned back, what did he do if any?
A He shouted to kill that.
Q After you heard Marciano Regalario (say) to kill that, what did you do?
A I proceeded towards home.
Q While you were walking, was there any unusual incident which again
happened?
A Yes.
Q And, what was that incident?
A While I was walking towards home, again I heard Marciano Regalario
shouted to tie him, that is why I again stopped.
Q When you heard Marciano Regalario to tie him how far were you from
him?
A More or less 7 meters.
Q You said that upon hearing Marciano Regalario, you stopped. What else
happened?
A Bienvenido Regalario passed by me and went to that sleigh (pababa)
which is on the lower portion and got a rope.
Q What did Bienvenido Regalario do with the rope?
A He tied Rolando Sevilla by placing he rope around his neck and tied his
hands.
Q Was there somebody who assisted Bienvenido Regalario in tying
Rolando Sevilla?
A Yes.
Q Who were the persons, if any?
A Sotero Regalario.
Q Aside from Sotero, was there anybody else who helped Bienvenido
Regalario in tying Rolando Sevilla?
A No more.
Q While Rolando Sevilla was being hog tied, where were the persons of
Marciano Regalario, Noel Regalario, Ramon Regalario and the rest
of the persons whom you just mentioned awhile ago?
A They were there standing beside Rolando Sevilla and they were watching.
Q Did you notice whether Rolando Sevilla was still moving when he was
still being tied up by Bienvenido and Sotero?
A He was not moving anymore.[20]
The aforequoted testimony of Ronnie Siglos is corroborated by the following
Q While you were standing by the road, what did you notice?
6
A Then I saw Rolando Sevilla being chased by Bienvenido and Sotero both
surnamed Regalario We agree with the findings of the two courts below as to the presence of
conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
Q To what direction was Rolando Sevilla being chased by Sotero and commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for
Bienvenido Regalario? criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime,
A Towards the place of Kapitan. however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or
inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
xxx xxx xxx intent. It does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and
each incurs the same criminal liability.[22] We quote with approval the findings and observations
PROSECUTOR RESARI: of the CA, thus:

Q Considering that was already nighttime, how were you able to know that
the person being chased was Rolando Sevilla and the persons
chasing him were the two (2) Regalarios which you have identified?
A Because, I was with Sevilla during that time and it was moonlit night.
Q When the two (2) were chasing Rolando Sevilla, what happened next?
A Ramon waylaid Rolando Sevilla.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you saw Ramon Regalario waylaid Rolando Sevilla, what else did
you see?
A After that I saw the group of Sotero, Regalario, Marciano, Noel, caught
up with Rolando.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR RESARI:
The eyewitnesses account surrounding Rolando Sevillas death
shows that the accused-appellants performed concerted acts in pursuit of a
common objective. Sotero, Bienvenido, and Ramon, armed with
nightsticks, and Noel armed with a knife, seven inches in length, beat
Rolando Sevilla. All five accused-appellants caught up with the victim,
blocked all means through which the victim could escape and ensured the
achievement of their plan to kill Rolando Sevilla even as the latter already
fell to the ground. Accused-appellant Marciano hit the victim on his jaw and
later, ordered his co-accused to kill and tie the victim. Upon hearing
Marcianos instruction, Bienvenido Regalario tied Rolandos neck, hands and
feet with a rope. The collective act of the accused-appellants is sufficient to
make them co-principals to the killing.[23]
Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the attack against Rolando
was carried out, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses positively identifying the
accused-appellants as the assailants, we concur in the rulings of the CA, affirming those of the
trial court, in (a) disregarding Ramon Regalarios declaration that he attacked the victim in self-
defense and (b) holding that all the accused-appellants acted in concert and killed Rolando.

Q Since Bienvenido Regalario and Sotero Regalario were the ones chasing
Rolando Sevilla, from what direction did Ramon Regalario come
from when he waylaid Rolando Sevilla?
A That side, left side going towards the house of Kapitan.
Q And where did Marciano and Noel xxx come from?
A From their house.
Q After the five (5) caught up with Rolando Sevilla, what happened to
Rolando Sevilla?
A They took turns in beating him.
Q Did they use any weapon in beating Rolando Sevilla?
A Yes, their night sticks.
Q When Bienvenido and Sotero caught up with Rolando Sevilla; and the
three (3) other accused also joined the two (2), how far was your
distance to them?
A More or less 14 to 15 meters.[21]
We likewise rule that both the CA and the trial court were correct in appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength in killing Rolando Sevilla. To take
advantage of superior strength is to use force out of proportion to the means available to the
person attacked to defend himself. In order to be appreciated, it must be clearly shown that there
was deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage thereof. [24] In this case,
as testified to by the prosecution eyewitnesses, accused-appellants Ramon, Sotero and
Bienvenido, with the exception of Marciano, were armed with nightsticks (bahi) while Noel was
holding a knife. Clearly they took advantage of their superiority in number and arms in killing
the victim, as shown by numerous wounds the latter suffered in different parts of his body.
Also affirmed is the ruling of both courts appreciating the presence of the generic
aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the body of the victim. Accused-appellants did not just
kill the victim. They tied him hog-style after rendering him immobilized. This action constituted
outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. In this connection, we agree with the trial courts
observation:
The concerted acts committed by all the accused mostly armed with wooden
clubs and one with a 7-inch long knife after the victim fell pummeling him
with mortal blows on the forehead and back of his head and stab wounds on

7
 his neck and one of them telling his co-accused to kill the victim clearly 9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00[32] while
proved that the Regalarios conspired and took advantage of their strength the award of exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.[33]
and number. Not satisfied with delivering mortal blows even when their
hapless victim was already immobile, Bienvenido and Sotero, upon order WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2006 in CA-G.R.
of their co-accused Marciano, tied their victim hog style. The manner by CR No. 01556 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications: (1) the penalty of death
which Rolando was tied as vividly captured in the picture (Exhs. C & D) imposed on accused-appellants is lowered to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
clearly speaks for itself that it was nothing but to scoff at their victim. [25] (2) the monetary awards to be paid jointly and severally by accused-appellants are as
follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
The CA was likewise correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of exemplary damages; and (3) interest on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from
voluntary surrender in favor of accused-appellants. For said circumstance to be appreciated, it this date until fully paid is imposed.[34]
must be spontaneous, in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes SO ORDERED.
to save them the trouble and expense of finding and capturing him.[26] In the case at bar, accused-
appellants remained at large even after Judge Jose S. Saez issued the warrant for their arrest on
February 6, 1998. Accused-appellants surrendered only on September 9, 1998 after several alias
warrants of arrest were issued against them. Hence, voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated
in their favor as mitigating circumstance.

The accused-appellants acts plainly amount to murder, qualified by abuse of superior

strength. As the generic aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the body of the victim was
alleged and proven, and as there was no mitigating circumstance, the CA correctly sentenced
accused-appellants to death in accordance with Art. 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
in relation to Art. 63(1) of the revised Penal Code.

In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,[27] the imposition of the
death penalty has been prohibited. Thus, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants should
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided
for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous.[28] Consequently,
the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00. In People v. Quiachon,[29] we explained
that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on appellant because of the prohibition in
Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the
ratiocination in People v. Victor (292 SCRA 186), the said award is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.

As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the CA correctly held accused-
appellants jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of Rolando Sevilla for the same. Moral
damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the
victims heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. [30] If a
crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. This kind of damage
is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as vindication of undue sufferings
and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct.[31] However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the
imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No.

8
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18
December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June
2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of
the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders,
the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN
DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001,
Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001
dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING,
AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order
dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in
the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith
Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe"
Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T.
Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which
were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4
Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all
of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal
who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a
sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3
Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for
the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz,
and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001,
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to
the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued
a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the
cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this
Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor
Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and
prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order
dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of
Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October
2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring
the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations
for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of
the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition
and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting
aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21,
2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523
and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001
issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused
cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
9
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement
of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch
36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of
dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals’
ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction
of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through
compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as
when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico
vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must
first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for
judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and
Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived
of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation;
to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue,
assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their
motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications
for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the
case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized
under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was
dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been
arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold
the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And
in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from
the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of
probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash
or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody
of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction
over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the
law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding
him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the
body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have
been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of
someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived
of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no
right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained
the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that,
as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative
relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant
being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail
is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus,
‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.’"
The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the
former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his
bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
10
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very
issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused
is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative
relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The
following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were
not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction
of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash
an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground
of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from
enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with
the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and
to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist
from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests
against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail
are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to
persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail
will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if
ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to
persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled
to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of
arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of
probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause
after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues
in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any
time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken
against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous
to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher
preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the
deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary
of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge
Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First,
he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently
filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable
cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court
in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed
the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge
Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings
is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan
as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against
petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor’s
resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review
of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing
of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the
adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the
same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order
if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional
proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal
of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the
contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated
by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence
to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge
Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is
apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable
cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination
11
personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order
since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s certification. 28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication that he
relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to
determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied by supporting
documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The
supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and
Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan
of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive
part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge
Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1)
it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it
was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years;
(3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4)
it was given during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago
City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and
former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson
Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the
findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the
province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb 33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well
put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it
requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there
was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice.
However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, Judge Anghad
summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41,
Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the mastermind
and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001
Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn
Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said
officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001
statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees with the
defense’s views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected
the prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel
Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court
decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001,
praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision
of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886,
acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the
prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose
Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and
interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the
accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different
accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact
that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that the
crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly
is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here
an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill
respondent Tuliao’s son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of
respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is
now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of
our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the
probability of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly
meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two days after we
resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from
further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were
dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Court’s resolve to
issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside
by the nullified proceeding.
12
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or
reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad
to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the
Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or
merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely
a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect
the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court
of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June
2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of
Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the
declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of
arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based
on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so.
The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are
also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally
examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we
have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable
cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the
finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in
the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause,
also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524,
alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According
to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated
November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent
Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent
before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision,
only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to
wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed
Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or
nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals
decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution.
Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001
Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time
in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge
Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder."
On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous
referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places
the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In
claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001
Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15
November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution.
In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent
Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on
15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to
lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which
require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent, 39 the prayer to cite
public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should
be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not
constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been
arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his
motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case,
we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince
us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of
People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in
the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City
of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10)
days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise
directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer
of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases
within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this
Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance;
and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said
cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest
for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B.
13
 Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED.
Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

14
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and
defendant-appellant.
F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees.
Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio.
Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant-appellant Manila
Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
DIZON, J.:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil
Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest
thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs.
As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants'
properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and
the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the
same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making
some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a
counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued
a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the
plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on
Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two
grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the
payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court
not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also the
following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under
the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no
previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter
the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the
plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. On the date set for the
hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of
five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court
granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued
without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such
order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on
appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein
no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957,
by holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and
compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule
59 of the Rules of Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against
the herein bonding company-appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent
motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of
execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of jurisdiction,
neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962,
decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion
asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the
Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees
action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the
sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the
subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest
and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision
and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the
appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of
the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us. The
pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for
collection of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was
originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about
a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original
15
 jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than
P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important one
which merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19,
1948. This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout
the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after
receipt of this Court's adverse decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy
of consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas
Compañia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan
Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591, September 26,
1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No.
L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon
the 'undesirable practice' of appellants submitting their case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when
adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue"
(See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to
certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme Court.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended,
let the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an
amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date
when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter
is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority
of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which
shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the
case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948, that is, almostfifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12,
1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the
Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed
a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin (Record
on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in
connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of
Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only
filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the
grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not
being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety
appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto.
This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion
to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way
of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because
the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid
and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated —
obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis
etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the
Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court
in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty.
16
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc.
vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial
Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948,
it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well
as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the
judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not
only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for
collection of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants'
properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under Section 12
of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied,
plaintiffs moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution
against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But
the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was "no
showing that a demand had been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for
payment of the amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the
judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a
motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the surety,
with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the surety received
copy of said motion and notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel
asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was
issued in open court, as follows:1äwphï1.ñët
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday, November 6,
1957, to file his answer to the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which this incident shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court, this 2nd day of November, 1957, at Cebu City,
Philippines.
(Sgd.) JOSE M. MENDOZA
Judge
(Record on Appeal, pp.
64-65, emphasis ours)
Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period given
him, the court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for
execution against the surety; and on December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of
execution was issued.
On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the
ground that the same was "issued without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of
the Rules of Court having been complied with," more specifically, that the same was
issued without the required "summary hearing". This motion was denied by order of
February 10, 1958.
On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-
stated order of denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, 1958.
From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 — denying
the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for reconsideration,
respectively — the surety has interposed the appeal on hand.
The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ
of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing required by
Section 17 of Rule 59, which reads;
"Sec. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. —
If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or
17
 sureties on any bond given pursuant to the provisions of this role to secure
the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged on such bond,
and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due under the
judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties
after notice and summary hearing in the same action." (Emphasis ours)
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
Reyes, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ca

Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which

ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a
question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to
ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that
"the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear
what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an
adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and
latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the discretion of the court,
depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up for
consideration.

In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution
and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the
surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his
request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an
answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The
surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion "for the simple
reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion even if the
same are not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit
in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will show that when the motion
was called, what the surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time
to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open court upon request
of the surety's counsel that after the four-day period within which to file an answer,
"the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution"; and counsel apparently
agreed, as the order was issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection
thereto.

It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is no
need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment against the
surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our
opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of Rule 59, "to
secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action," and
stands "in place of the property so released". Hence, after the judgment for the
plaintiff has become executory and the execution is "returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17,
Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure
of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor,
writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.

18
G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel
P. Paderanga in this appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises issues
centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as
a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members
of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the
mayor at the time. The original information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the
Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City,1 had initially indicted for multiple murder eight
accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo,
Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in
the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son,
Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried
and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have
remained at large up to the present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime.
In an amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused
therein. As herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas
engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the
preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30,
1989 but which he later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the
supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. 3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case
per his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said
prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for
purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No.
86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989,
petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second
amended information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein
as a co-accused all the way to this Court in G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P.
Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F.
Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated
on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended information
against him.4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an
arrest warrant for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him,
petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail
with the trial court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner
duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin
Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for
bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only Assistant Prosecutor
Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office appeared for the
prosecution.5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due
to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody
over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of
the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he
considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand,
informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office,
Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting
nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the
sound discretion of the trail judge.6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated
November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of
P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak
but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of
court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter
arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the
scheduled court hearings of the case.7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on
November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for
admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order
dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later, Prosecutor
Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special civil action
for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner
annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that they were
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application
for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily
surrendered. It further noted that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was
19
strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for
which reasons it held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the
prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded an opportunity to oppose
petitioner's application for bail contrary to the requirements of due process. Hence,
this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago
vs. Vasquez etc., et al.,9 his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial
court effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all
intents and purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the
"invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is
sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring
him within the custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such
strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the
prosecution, by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation
of evidence to oppose the application for bail and whose representation in court in
behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial
of procedural due process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil action
for certiorari was filed in respondent court after an unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in
this case, the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon
his appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule.
Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until
his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.10 As bail is intended to obtain
or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him
has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary
surrender.11 As this Court has put it in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to
one who is free."12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his
bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance
therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.13 Thus, in Feliciano
vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,14 where the petitioner who had been charged with
kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly
thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his
release pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner
was not eligible for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested,
detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the
protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional
release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or
information to be filed against him as it is available to "all persons"15 where the
offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that
the applicant is in the custody of the law.16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he
is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule
112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule
112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper
authorities.17 in this light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez,
etc., et al.,18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to
be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner
was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries
which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought
leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings." On the basis
of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the
Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her provisional
liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of her physical incapacity and
as a matter of humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she question
the jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the
ground that "she neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from
the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before
said court" In rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations
in the urgent ex parte motion for bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction.
Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had
effectively submitted to its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of
bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the same cannot be posted before custody
of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion
for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He
may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as
being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar
circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for
purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted
his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial
court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by
actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person
20
 making the arrest.19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house
arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted
to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could
not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College
General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical
clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding
their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger
to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but
the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since
he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer
away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the
law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since
they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he
expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the
application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his
actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the
jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant
for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent
to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities
since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and
until the day of the hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on
account of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily
verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of
the authority of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the court that they
were surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Misamis Oriental Chapter.20 In other words, the motion for admission to
bail was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the former practice which the
law proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority and jurisdiction of the courts,
as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy employed to
obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the application
therefore be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as
amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial
court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its
personal nature21 and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the
law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not
be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense,
an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto
being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment23 and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said
general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the
accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically
determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114.
On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the
court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,24 is required with the participation of both
the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.25 Of course, the
burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum. 26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce
before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due
process.27 If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural
due process, as a consequence of which the court's order in respect of the motion or petition is
void.28 At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.29 When, eventually, the court issues an
order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong.30 The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely
objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the
quantum of evidence that the law requires.31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due
process when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick
P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor expressly authorized to handle
the case and who received his copy of the motion only on the day after the hearing had been
conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at
all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and
to submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the
prosecution was not afforded "reasonable time" to oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as
the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-
39 on the basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was
sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which was to be continuing until and
unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on July 12,
1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-
tan questioned the authority of Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor
21
II Erlindo Abejo to enter their appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said Place that manifestation on record. For the record,
criminal case.32 It was in fact by virtue of this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado Fiscal Abejo, would you like to formally enter your
and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the appearance in this matter?
previous hearing in said case.33 Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its receipt of the
notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on November 5, 1992.
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar State Prosecutor's Office represented by State
with the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.
Regional State Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office
received its copy of the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is, October 28,
1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution COURT:
was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were
submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the By that manifestation do you want the Court to
prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was waiving the presentation of any understand that in effect, at least, the prosecution is
countervailing evidence. When the court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not that dispensing with the presentation of evidence to show
was the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered that the guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .
in the affirmative.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
The following exchanges bear this out:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
COURT:
I was informed to appear in this case just now Your
Honor. Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the
incident covered by this particular motion for resolution
COURT: by this court?

Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

copy of the motion as early as October 28. There is an
element of urgency here. Yes, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR ABEJO: COURT:

I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only Without presenting any further evidence?
informed just now. The one assigned here is State
Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who unfortunately
is in the hospital attending to his sick son. I do not know PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
about this but before I came I received an instruction
from our Chief to relay to this court the stand of the Yes, Your Honor.34
office regarding the motion to admit bail. That office is
neither supporting nor opposing it and we are
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of
submitting to the sound discretion of the Honorable
Regional State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for
Court.
bail and this should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither
supporting nor opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation that
COURT: the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable
22
Court." By that, it could not be any clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the
introduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage of the
proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had
fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,35 it was stressed that where the trial
court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the
application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error
or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from the
prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is
strong. And, in the very recent administrative matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July
21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon,Chief State Prosecutor, Department of
Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro
Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor
interposes no objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should
nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from
the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application.
petitioner. But then, the certiorariproceeding was initiated before the respondent
court long after trial on the merits of the case had ensued in the court below with the
active participation of prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any
rate, the definitive rule now in that the special civil action for certiorari should not be
instituted beyond a period of the three months,38 the same to be reckoned by taking
into account the duration of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained to annul the same.39
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,
promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as
well as said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid
resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P.
Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed

to the trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the
transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992
and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to
procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court
exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on
the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite
summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after
sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could be provisionally
released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the
present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.

As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present its
evidence within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate
that the Regional State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the application
for bail on the very same day that the it was filed with the trial court on October 28,
1992. Counted from said date up to the day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the
prosecution had more than one (1) week to muster such evidence as it would have
wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the
circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor
Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on November 6, 1992 is beside
the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was
authorized to appear for the People.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably
unreasonable period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent
court the resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six (6)
months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the
attendant difficulties which characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against
23
G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475 May 30, 2011 Misconduct and Acts Inimical to the Interest of the Public Service in violation of Section 52A
(1), (3) and (20) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.5
THERON V. LACSON, Petitioner,
vs. Meanwhile, on October 14, 2002, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) requested
THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT the Ombudsman for authority to conduct administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
COMMISSION, PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, and TEODORICO C. TAGUINOD, petitioners and other individuals involved in the Project.6
in his capacity as General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of the Public Estates
Authority, Respondents. In its Letter-Reply dated October 17, 2002,7 the Ombudsman responded in the following
manner:
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
This has reference to your letter dated 14 October 2002 requesting for authority to conduct
G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489 administrative disciplinary proceedings against the presidential appointees at the Public Estates
Authority (PEA) named respondents in the case involving the construction of the President
JAIME R. MILLAN and BERNARDO T. VIRAY, Petitioners, Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard (PDMB). It is our humble view that the authority is not
vs. necessary.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION, and the PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, Respondents. The Office takes the opportunity to confirm the fact that the case filed with this Office on 3
October 2002, involving the subject controversy, is criminal in nature. It now bears the docket
DECISION number OMB-C-C-02-0667-J, entitled "Sulficio Tagud, Jr., et al. versus Ernest Villareal, et al."
The basic complaint has not been further docketed as an administrative case. Thus, the same
did not preclude the subsequent filing with the PAGC of an administrative complaint
MENDOZA, J.: against the concerned PEA officials. [Emphasis supplied]

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the
June 8, 2004 Decision and the September 20, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78749 and CA-G.R. SP No.78290.1
The Facts
Petitioners Theron V. Lacson (Lacson), Jaime R. Millan (Millan) and Bernardo T.
Viray (Viray) were non-presidential appointees and career service officials of respondent
Philippine Estates Authority (PEA), holding the positions of Deputy General Manager for
Finance, Legal and Administration; Assistant General Manager; and Department General
Manager, respectively.2
On October 3, 2002, Sulficio O. Tagud (Tagud) filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) accusing petitioners Lacson, Millan and Viray for overpricing,
by ₱600,000,000.00, the contract for the construction of the Central Boulevard Project (the
Project), otherwise known as the President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard. 3
Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation of both the criminal
and the administrative aspects of the case.4 The criminal case, docketed as OMB-C-C-02-0667-
J and entitled "Sulficio O. Tagud Jr., et al. v. Ernesto Villareal, et al.," charged petitioners for
committing an act in violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080. The administrative case,
docketed as OMB-C-A-02-0523-K, on the other hand, charged them with Dishonesty, Serious
Subsequently, on November 12, 2002, a formal complaint was filed by the Investigation Office
of PAGC charging several employees of PEA, including petitioners, with acts and/or omissions
contrary to: (1) Item 1B2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1594, as amended; (2) Section 3(i), (g) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended;
(3) Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. No. 3019, as amended; (4) Articles
8.1 and 8.2 of the Construction Agreement signed on April 10, 2000 between PEA and J.D.
Legaspi Construction; and (5) Section 46 (a) and (b) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, as
amended, in particular Item (B), Nos. 3, 4 and 27, in relation to R.A. No. 3019, as amended. 8
On the same date, PAGC issued an order requiring petitioners to file their counter-
affidavit/verified answer (not a motion to dismiss or motion for bill of particulars) within a non-
extendible period of 10 days from receipt of the order. Preliminary conference was set on
November 22, 2002.9
During the preliminary conference, petitioners raised several jurisdictional issues, particularly
the following: the absence of certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint; the primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate them; the lack of jurisdiction of PAGC over the
complaint against them considering that they were not presidential appointees and there was no
allegation that they had conspired with the presidential appointees who were charged with them;
the futility of any investigation by PAGC as the same would have no bearing on the case filed
with the Ombudsman; and the fatally defective complaint which was not based on personal
knowledge of the complainant who, as an officer of PAGC, was merely a nominal party and
was never privy to the project subject of the investigation.10

24
PAGC directed petitioners to file their memoranda to formalize their arguments. 11
On November 28, 2002, PAGC issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of petitioners
from PEA with the imposition of the corresponding accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits and disqualification from employment in the government.12
In a letter dated December 16, 2002, the Office of the President, through the Executive
Secretary, informed the PEA Chairman and Members of the Board that the President approved
the recommendation of PAGC in its November 28, 2002 Resolution dismissing the petitioners
from PEA and imposing upon them the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits
and disqualification from employment in the government service, and directed them to take the
necessary actions to effect the instructions of the President. 13
On December 18, 2002, petitioners received a notice dated December 4, 2002 informing them
that PAGC had resolved their case and that the records therein had been forwarded to the Office
of the President. It also advised the petitioners that any inquiry relative thereto should be
addressed to the said office.14
After securing a copy of the PAGC Resolution, petitioners Millan and Viray, together with
Manuel R. Beriña, Jr. (Beriña) filed a motion for reconsideration15 dated January 2, 2003 with
the Office of the President assailing the November 28, 2002 Resolution and Recommendation
of the PAGC.
This motion was not acted upon.16
On July 25, 2003, PEA dismissed the petitioners. They received their copies of the notice of
dismissal on July 28, 2003.17
Aggrieved, Beriña, Millan and Viray filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 with the CA on July 30, 2003, which was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 78290.18
Lacson, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order 19 in a letter
dated August 11, 2003 addressed to Teodorico C. Taguinod (Taguinod), PEA General Manager
and Chief Executive Officer. This motion, however, was denied on August 20, 2003. 20
On August 25, 2003, Ernesto L. Enriquez (Enriquez) and Lacson filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 with the CA, which was docketed as CA G.R. SP No.
78749.21 Said petition, however, was later consolidated with CA G.R. SP No. 78290 upon
motion of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). But, before the consolidation of the
mentioned petitions, writs of preliminary injunction were issued.22 The writs, dated August 6,
2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 78290 and September 16, 2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 78749, temporarily
enjoined the respondents from implementing the dismissal orders. 23
Finally, in a consolidated decision dated June 29, 2004, the CA dismissed the consolidated
petitions.24
On July 5, 2004 and July 22, 2004, Lacson in CA-G.R. SP No. 78749 and Beriña, Millan and
Viray in CA-G.R. SP No. 78290, filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.25 Unfortunately for petitioners, both motions were denied in a resolution dated
September 20, 2004.26
Hence, these petitions.
Upon motion of the OSG, on behalf of respondents Executive Secretary and PAGC, the Court
issued a resolution ordering the consolidation of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489
with the petitions in G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475.27
ISSUES
In their respective petitions for review, petitioners assigned the following errors, to wit:
I.
Respondents erred when they issued the questioned memoranda and ordered the
dismissal of Petitioners allegedly on the basis of the recommendation of the
respondent PAGC, in that:
A. Under the constitution and the laws applicable, it is the ombudsman which has the
jurisdiction to investigate and recommend the dismissal of career service officers such
as petitioners herein.
B. it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the investigation and
removal of Petitioners and not Respondent PAGC.
C. Executive Order No. 12, series of 2002, which grants Respondent PAGC the
authority to investigate and recommend the dismissal of public officers and employees
within the civil service who are non-presidential appointees as petitioners herein is
unconstitutional and invalid for being contrary to law.
D. The direct action of Respondents in dismissing the PetitionerS from the service
without the head of respondent PEA having conducted any investigation at all is
contrary to law.
II.
Respondents erred in dismissing the Petitioners from Respondent PEA and public office in that:
a. Petitioners’ dismissal was violative of their right to due process of law, petitioners
having been deprived of a formal investigation which they are entitled to under the
25
 rules of procedure of the ombudsman and the uniform rules on administrative cases
in the civil service.
b. The Petitioners’ dismissal was violative of their right to security of tenure as they
were terminated from service upon a mere presidential directive.
iii.
Respondents engaged in prohibited forum shopping by the filing of multiple administrative
complaints against Petitioners for the same cause; hence, the instant charge against petitioners
should be dismissed.28
These alleged errors in G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475 and G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489 can
be categorized into two principal issues:
(1) Whether it is the Ombudsman who should conduct the investigation on the charge
of overpricing of the Project against petitioners; and
(2) Whether the Court can still review the dismissal ordered by PEA.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with similarly authorized agencies
Petitioners argue that because they are not presidential appointees, it is only the Ombudsman
which has jurisdiction over them.
In this regard, the petitioners are not correct. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the power of
the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense
charged. 29 Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the Ombudsman may share its authority to
conduct an investigation concerning administrative charges against them with other agencies.
At any rate, this issue is already moot and academic as the Ombudsman has terminated its
investigation of petitioners. This can be gleaned from the certified true copies of the
Ombudsman’s May 30, 2008 Decision as well as the July 3, 2008 Review and Recommendation
which the petitioners submitted in compliance with the November 22, 2010 Resolution requiring
them to inform the Court of the status of their cases before the Ombudsman. It appears therefrom
that the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative case against the petitioners because the
charges had already been passed upon by PAGC.30
Having been dismissed by PEA, petitioners should have appealed to the Civil Service
Commission
Despite the claim of petitioners that the decision to dismiss them was upon orders of the
President or upon undue pressure exerted by the Office of the President to implement the PAGC
recommendations, still the undeniable fact is that the dismissal of petitioners was actually made
and effected by PEA.
Granting that PEA committed an error, whether substantial or procedural, petitioners should
have appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Title
I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), to wit:
(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or
salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed
directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any
department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The
results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may
be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending
appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case
the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
concerned."[Emphasis Supplied]
It is only after appealing the case to the CSC that it can be elevated to the CA via a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. From there, said case can be appealed to the Court
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Unfortunately, petitioners chose the wrong remedy. Instead of appealing their dismissal by the
PEA to the CSC, they chose to question it before the CA.
For their failure to appeal to the proper forum, the decision of the PEA dismissing them has
become final and executory. It should be emphasized that "the right to appeal is a statutory right
and the party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the
law. Failure to do so, the right to appeal is lost."31
As petitioners’ dismissal has become final and executory, the Court no longer has the power to
review and act on the matter.
There was no violation of petitioners’ right to due process and security of tenure
26
Even granting that this Court can still review the PEA action to terminate the petitioners, they
have not shown that their right to due process and security of tenure was violated.
Petitioners argue that they were denied due process because their order of dismissal was not
accompanied by any justification from the PEA Board of Directors who merely relied on the
findings of PAGC.
This argument, however, deserves scant consideration.
As conversely pointed out by respondents, petitioners cannot claim that their dismissal was
unattended by the requisite due process because they were given the opportunity to be heard in
the course of PAGC’s investigation.
Indeed, as career service officers, the petitioners enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed under
the 1987 Constitution.32 This is further reiterated in Section 36(a) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise
known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, which clearly provides that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by
law and after due process."
The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both procedural and
substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that the dismissal, when warranted, be
effected only after notice and hearing. On the other hand, substantive due process requires,
among others, that the dismissal be for legal cause, which must relate to and effect the
administration of the office of which the concerned employee is a member of and must be
restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the
public.33
Nevertheless, the right to security of tenure is not tantamount to immunity from dismissal.
Petitioners cannot seek absolute protection from this constitutional provision. As long as their
dismissal is for a legal cause and the requirements of due process were met, the law will not
prevent their removal from office.
Per records of the case, the exercise of disciplinary action against petitioners was justified
because (1) they committed acts punishable under the anti-graft laws; and (2) their conduct was
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.34 Thus, their removal from office was for a legal
cause.
Anent the alleged failure of respondents to observe due process, well-established is the rule that
the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side
or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he
may have in support of his defense.35 The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the
parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.36In the landmark case
of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,37 this Court laid down the cardinal and primary
rights to be observed and respected in administrative proceedings:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have some evidence to support a finding or conclusion;
(4) The evidence must be substantial (that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion);
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the view of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision; and
(7) The tribunal should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and
the reasons for the decisions rendered.38
In this regard, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings before PAGC where they were
afforded the opportunity to explain their actions through their memoranda. The essence of due
process is the right to be heard and this evidently was afforded to them. Thus, petitioners’
assertion that their dismissal was unattended by the requisite due process cannot be
sustained.1avvphi1
In sum, the removal from office of petitioners was valid. PEA dismissed them for cause and in
accordance with the requisites of due process. Petitioners, as PEA officers and employees, are
under the disciplining authority of the PEA Board, pursuant to Section 11 of P.D. No. 1084, the
Charter of the Public Estates Authority,39 which states that:
Section 11. Appointment, control and discipline of personnel. The Board, upon
recommendation of the General Manager of the Authority, shall appoint the officers and
employees of the Authority and its subsidiaries; fix their compensation, allowances and benefits,
their working hours and such other conditions of employment as it may deem proper; grant them
leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate; discipline and/or remove them
for cause; and establish and maintain a recruitment and merit system for the Authority and its
affiliates and subsidiaries. (Emphases supplied)
At any rate, as earlier stated, as the petitioners did not appeal the decision of the PEA to dismiss
them to the CSC, it has become final and executory and the Court can no longer review it.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.
27
 (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of
SECOND DIVISION the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169004

The facts follow.
Petitioner,

Present:

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the

-versus- VELASCO, JR.,* Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The

PERALTA, Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on

BERSAMIN,* and December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The
Information reads:
ABAD, JJ.

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA,
Promulgated: That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or
Respondents. subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
September 15, 2010 ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government
of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS
(P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his
office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period
DECISION required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances
of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
PERALTA, J.:

CONTRARY TO LAW.

For this Court's resolution is a petition[1] dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan

28
 Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] dated April 7, 2005 with the the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249,

Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order[4] dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter

to submit its comment.Petitioner filed its Opposition [5] to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in
2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution[6] on July 20, 2005 dismissing relation to public office.

the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The
dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby In his Comment[8] dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased
ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
the proper court.
was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the

paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that
SO ORDERED.
it has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public

official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below

grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a)

to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379
Thus, the present petition. and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves

offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public

official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.
involving public officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as

amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position

classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan
R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27
Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v.

Sandiganbayan,[7] claiming that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or

confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v.
amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, Sandiganbayan and Amante[9] is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the
R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members

29
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The
only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One
Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount
of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code
of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[10] as a
background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of
public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the
people.[11]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[12]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983,
further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on
March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on
May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that
should be applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about
December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively
explained in the earlier mentioned case,
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at
the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense.[13] The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as
well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A.
No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as
the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the
said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense: x x x.[14]
Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses
and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved
where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is
the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time
of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present
30
 (c) Officials of the
case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. diplomatic service occupying the
1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that: position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air

force colonels, naval captains, and
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original all officers of higher rank;
jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(e) PNP chief

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise superintendent and PNP officers of
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, higher rank;
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
(f) City and provincial
time of the commission of the offense:
prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying Special Prosecutor;
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
(g) Presidents, directors or
No. 6758), specifically including:
trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or
(a) Provincial governors, educational institutions or
vice-governors, members of the foundations;
sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
heads;
classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(b) City mayors, vice

mayors, members of the
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice
sangguniang panlungsod, city
to the provisions of the Constitution;
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads.

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional

Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

31

(5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are
specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order
for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter
must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch
occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are
provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers
of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the
same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their
office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[15]
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent
provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the
alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding[16] case wherein it was ruled that the
officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the
Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier
case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,[17] that the Inding case did not categorically
nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged
is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with
violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its
disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically
enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where offenses or felonies involved
are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
32
 b. Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision
shows that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan
with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or
felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies
are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in
relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled
that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated
while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to
commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he
not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted
for an offense committed in relation to his office.[18] Thus, in the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,[19] where the crime involved was
murder, this Court held that:
The phrase other offenses or felonies is too
broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it
was committed in relation to the accuseds official
functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines theSandiganbayans jurisdiction is the
official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x
xx
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[20] where the public
official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended
information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official
functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats
as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal
councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and
threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing,
after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical
of petitioners administration. Clearly, based on such
allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected
with the discharge of petitioners official functions.
This was elaborated upon by public respondent in
its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the
accused was performing his official duty as municipal
mayor when he attended said public hearing and that
accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants
criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latters
privilege speech. It was his response to private
complainants attack to his office. If he was not the
mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by
whatever private complainant might have said during
said privilege speech. Thus, based on the allegations
in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading
of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was
committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if
the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the
exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert
jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not
disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said
offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in
Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were
committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In
33
expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
relation to office, this Court held: always presumed. (Italics supplied.)[24]

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627

(1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v.
of the term offense committed in relation to [an
accuseds] office by referring to the principle laid down Sandiganbayan and Amante,[25] the issue as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now
in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an
attained clarity.
exception to that principle which was recognized
in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an
offense may be considered as committed in relation to
the accuseds office if the offense cannot exist without WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the
the office such that the office [is] a constituent element
of the crime x x x. In People v. Montejo, the Court, Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is
through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan
public office is not an element of the crime of murder
in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may for further proceedings.
show that

SO ORDERED.
x x x the offense therein charged is
intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no
personal motive to commit the crime and they would
not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. x x x[21]

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of

Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials
involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of thesame section. Therefore, it refers to those public
officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words
of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,[22] unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[23] The
intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists

34
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202687 January 14, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JERIC PAVIA Y PALIZA @ "JERIC" AND JUAN BUENDIA Y DELOS REYES@
"JUNE", Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
For resolution of the Court is the appeal filed by Jeric Pavia and Juan Buendia (appellants) from
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 7 February 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
04020. The CA affirmed the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, San
Pedro, Laguna which found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs punishable under Section 13, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165. Appellants were sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of ₱500,000.00.
The Antecedents
On 29 March 2005, at around 6:00 in the evening, a confidential informant reported to SPO3
Melchor delaPeña (SPO3 Dela Peña) of the San Pedro Municipal Police Station, San Pedro,
Laguna, that a pot session was taking place at the house of a certain "Obet" located at Barangay
Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. Upon receipt of the information, SPO3 Dela Peña formed a team to
conduct police operations against the suspect. The team was composed of the confidential
informant, PO2 Rommel Bautista (PO2 Bautista), PO3 Jay Parunggao (PO3 Parunggao), PO1
Jifford Signap and SPO3 Dela Peña as team leader.3
At around 9:00 in the evening of the same date, the team proceeded to the target area. When the
team arrived, the members saw that Obet’s house was closed. Since the house was not
surrounded by a fence, PO2 Bautista approached the house and peeped through a small opening
in a window where he saw four persons in a circle having a pot session in the living room. PO3
Parunggao then tried to find a way to enter the house and found an unlocked door. He entered
the house,followed by PO2 Bautista and they caught the four persons engaged in a pot session
by surprise. After they introduced themselves as police officers, they arrested the four suspects
and seized the drug paraphernalia found at the scene.4 Among those arrested were herein
appellants, from each of whom a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance were
confiscated by PO3 Parunggao after he conducted a body search on their persons. 5 PO3
Parunggao marked the plastic sachet he seized from appellant Pavia with "JP," representing the
initials of Jeric Pavia while that taken from appellant Buendia was marked, also by PO3
Parunggao, with "JB," representing the initials of Juan Buendia. 6 These plastic sachets were
transmitted tothe crime laboratory for qualitative examination where they tested positive for
"shabu."7
Consequently, appellants were charged with violation of Section 13, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
in two separate but identically worded informations which read:
That on or about 29 March 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused without authority of the
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody [of] METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, commonly known as shabu, a
dangerous drug, weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram, in the company of two
persons.8When arraigned, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the offense.9
A joint trial of the cases ensued.
In defense, appellants provided a different version of the incident. According to them, on the
questioned date and time, they were roaming the streets of Baranggay Cuyab, selling star apples.
A prospective buyer of the fruits called them over to his house and requested them to go inside,
to which they acceded. Whenthey were about to leave the house, several persons who introduced
themselves as policemen arrived and invited appellants to go with them to the precinct. There,
they were incarcerated and falsely charged with violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002.10
The Ruling of the RTC
The trial court found that the prosecution was able to prove the offense charged through the
spontaneous, positive and credible testimony of its witness. The trial court noted that the police
officers carried out a lawful arrest before they proceeded with the bodily search of appellants.
Moreover, there was no clear and convincing evidence that the team of PO3 Parunggao was
inspired by any improper motive whenthey carried out their operation. Thus, the testimony of
PO2 Bautista on the witness stand, narrating the events leading to the apprehension of
appellants, deserves full faith and credit.11
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that the evidence on record
support the trial court’s conclusion that a lawful arrest, search and seizure took place, and that
the prosecution fully discharged its burden of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, all the
elements necessary for the conviction of the offense charged.12
On the contention of appellants that their warrantless arrest was illegal and, therefore, the items
seized from them as a result of that arrest were inadmissible in evidence against them, the CA
held that this argument totally lacks merit. According to the CA:
We stress at the outset that the [appellants] failed to question the legality of their warrantless
arrest. The established rule is that an accused [is] estopped from assailing the legality of [his]
arrest if [he] failed to move for the quashing of the Information against [him] before [his]
arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court’s acquisition of
35
jurisdiction overthe person of an accused must be made before [he] enter[s] [his] plea; otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived.
In any event, we carefully examined the records and now hold that the warrantless arrests
conducted on [appellants] were valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
lists the situations when a person may be arrested without a warrant x x x.
xxxx
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictoto be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence in its totality, we hold that the prosecution successfully
established that the petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto.
We emphasize that the series of events that led the police to the house where the pot session was
conducted and to their arrest were triggered by a "tip" from a concerned citizen that a "pot
session" was in progress at the house of a certain "Obet" at Baranggay Cuyab, San Pedro,
Laguna. Under the circumstances, the police did not have enough time to secure a search warrant
considering the "time element" involved in the process (i.e., a pot session may not bean extended
period of time and it was then 9:00 p.m.). In view of the urgency, SPO3 Melchor dela Peña
immediately dispatched his men to proceed to the identified place to verify the report. At the
place, the responding police officers verified through a small opening in the window and saw
the accused-appellants and their other two (2) companions sniffing "shabu" to use the words of
PO2 Bautista. There was therefore sufficient probable cause for the police officers to believe
that the accused-appellants were then and there committing a crime. As it turned out, the
accused-appellants indeed possessed and were even using a prohibited drug, contrary to law.
When an accused is caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only authorized but
are duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
In the course of the arrest and in accordance with police procedures, the [appellants] were
frisked, which search yielded the prohibited drug in their possession. These circumstances were
sufficient to justify the warrantless search x x x thatyielded two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets
of "shabu." x x x
xxxx
All the x x x requirements for a lawful search and seizure are present in this case. The police
officers had prior justification to be at a certain "Obet’s" place as they were dispatched by their
desk officer; they arrested the [appellants] as they had reason to believe that they were illegally
using and possessing a prohibited drug and drug paraphernalia. The search of the [appellants]
incident to their arrest yielded the confiscated crystalline substance which later proved to be
"shabu". In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug
paraphernalia scattered in the living room. As these items were plainly visible, the police
officers were justified in seizing them.
xxxx
As correctly found by the trial court, the [appellants'] story is unworthy of belief. Their denial
mustfail in the light of the positive identification and declarations made by the prosecution
witness. As stated earlier, PO2 Bautista testified in a straightforward and categorical manner
regarding the identities of the malefactors. He did not waver despite the defense counsel's rigid
questioning.
Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with which
anaccused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is both negative and self-
serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimony of the prosecution witness
who testified clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime
committed. One such positive evidence is the result of the laboratory examination conducted by
the PNP crime Laboratory on the drugs recovered from the [appellants] which revealed that the
confiscated plastic sachets tested positive for the presence of "shabu": two (2) heated transparent
plastic sachet with markings "JB" and "JP" containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance
each both yielded positive results.13
With respect to appellants’ claim that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody
because the police operatives failed to strictly comply with Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, the
CA has this to say:
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
Contrary to what the [appellants] want to portray, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited
drug was shown not to have been broken. After the seizure of the plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance from the [appellants'] possession and of the various drug
paraphernalia in the living room, the police immediately brought the [appellants] to the police
station, together with the seized items. PO3 Parunggao himself brought these items to the police
station and marked them. The plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance was marked
"JB" and "JP". These confiscated items were immediately turned over by PO2 Bautista to the
PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office Calabarzon, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City for
examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a qualitative examination
conducted on the specimens, Forensic Chemist Lorna Ravelas Tria concluded that the plastic
sachets recovered from the accused-appellants tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a prohibited drug, per Chemistry Report Nos. D-0381-05 and D-0382-05.
When the prosecution presented these marked specimens in court, PO2 Baustista positively
identified them to be the same items they seized from the [appellants] and which PO3 Parunggao
later marked at the police station, from where the seized items were turned over to the laboratory
for examination based on a duly prepared request.
36
Thus, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items xxxx
from the time they were first discovered until they were brought for examination. Besides, as
earlier stated, the [appellants] did not contest the admissibility of the seized items during the q. In what part of the house where [sic] this [sic] people engaged in a pot session?
tria1. The integrity and the evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the accused-appellants
were therefore duly proven not to have been compromised.
a. At the sala, maam [sic].
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that failure to strictly comply, with Section 2l (1),
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused's arrestillegal or the items q. And what was their reaction when PO3 Parunggao and the rest of the team barged
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation in?
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the present case, we see substantial a. They were surprised, maam [sic].
compliance by the police with the required procedure on the custody and control of the
confiscated items, thus showing that the integrity of the seized evidence was not compromised. xxxx
We refer particularly to the succession of events established by evidence, to the overall handling
of the seized items by specified individuals, to the test results obtained, under a situation where
no objection to admissibility was ever raised by the defense. All these, to the unprejudiced mind, q. And what did you do after that?
show that the evidence seized were the same evidence tested and subsequently identified and
testified to in court.14 x x x a. PO3 Parunggao introduced ourselves as police officers, maam [sic].

Our Ruling q. What happened after that?

We deny the appeal. a. We confiscated the drug paraphernalias [sic] and then PO3 Parunggao conducted
body search and was able to confiscate shabu from the two of the people there maam
Appellants are charged under Section 13, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which provides: [sic].

Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. – q. Where were you when PO3 Parunggao conducted a search?
Any person found possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum a. I was behind him, maam [sic].
penalties provided for in Section 11 of this Act, regardless of the quantity and purity of such
dangerous drugs.
q. Did you see him conducting a search?

The elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165
a. Yes, maam [sic].
are the same as those for the violation of Section 11 of the law: (1) possession bythe accused of
an item or object identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; (3) the free and conscious possession of the drug by the accused, 15 with the q. What did you see him doing?
additional element that (4) the accused possessed the prohibited or dangerous drug during a
social gathering or meeting, or in the company of at least two persons. a. I saw that he was able to confiscate small plastic sachet containing shabu, maam
[sic].
As correctly found by the CA, the evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these
elements. The testimony of PO2 Bautista on this point is determinative: q. From whom?

q. When you said PO3 Parunggao saw that the door of the house was not locked, what a. From Jeric Pavia and Juan Buendia, maam [sic].
did you do?
q. If this Jeric Pavia is in court right now, will you be able to point to him?
a. He entered the house and we followed him, maam [sic].

37
a. Yes, maam [sic]. a. From the pocket of Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].

q. Please point to him? q. And do you know what PO3 Parunggao do with the item?

a. That man in the first row wearing yellow shirt, maam [sic] (pointed to a person a. He placed marking on it, maam [sic].
inside the courtroom who, when asked answered by the name of Jeric Pavia).
q. In what place did he put the marking?
q. You said that you saw PO3 Parunggao confiscated plastic sachet containing shabu
from Jeric Pavia,from what part of his body was he able to confiscate the same? a. At the police station maam [sic].

a. From the pocket of Jeric Pavia, maam [sic]. q. What markings did he place?

xxxx a. It was marked JP representing the initials of accused Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].

q. You said that PO3 Parunggao confiscated plastic sachet with white crystalline q. Where were you when Officer Parunggao placed that marking on the item?
substance from two person [sic], one was identified as Jeric Pavia, who was the other
one?
a. I was beside him, maam [sic].
a. It was Juan Buendia, maam [sic]
q. Can you describe the plastic sachet?
q. Please identify him if he is in court?
a. It is a small transparent plastic sachet which contains white crystalline substance
otherwise known as shabu, maam [sic].
a. That man also in the first row, at the right portion, wearing yellow shirt (pointed to
a person who, when asked answered by the name of Juan Buendia).
q. Who was in possession of the plastic sachet from the time PO3 Parunggao took it
from the possession of Jeric Pavia up to the police station?
q. Where were you when PO3 Parunggao confiscated from Juan Buendia the plastic
sachet of shabu?
a. It was P03 Parunggao, maam [sic].
a. I was behind him, maam [sic].
q. I am showing to you a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings
JP, please identify the same?
xxxx
a. This is the same item confiscated from Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].
q. On [sic] what part of the body of Juan Buendia was the item taken by Officer
Parunggao?
xxxx
a. Also in [sic] his pocket, maam [sic].16
q. Did you come to know what Officer Parunggao do with the plastic sachet
confiscated from Juan Buendia?
The same testimony of PO2 Bautista also established the chain of custody of the
prohibited drugs taken from appellants. Thus:
a. He brought it to the police station, maam [sic].
q. You said that you saw PO3 Parunggao confiscated [sic] plastic sachet containing
shabu from Jeric Pavia, from what part of his body was he able to confiscate the same? q. And what did he do with it?

38
 a. He placed the markings JB, maam [sic]. denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the case before us,
appellants failed to present sufficient evidence in support of their claims. Aside from their self-
q. Who was in possession of the plastic sachet with markings JB from Aplaya [where serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster their allegations.20 Consequently,
the pot session took place] to the police station? in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by any
improper motive, this Court will not appreciate the defense of denial or frame-up and instead
apply the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement
a. It was PO3 Parunggao, maam. agents.21

q. I am showing to you a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings In view of the foregoing, we see no reason to deviate from the well discussed decision of the
JB, please identify the same? CA, its findings and conclusions having been supported by both law and applicable
jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 2012 in
a. This is the same item confiscated from Juan Buendia by PO3 Parunggao, maam CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04020 is AFFIRMED.
[sic].17
SO ORDERED.
It is likewise important to note that it was PO2 Bautista himself who brought the request18 for
laboratory examination of the substance taken from appellants from the San Pedro Police Station
to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Calamba City, thereby ensuring that the integrity of the
confiscated items are preserved. Thus, the fact that the apprehending team did not strictly
comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not
necessarily render appellants’ arrest illegal or the items seized from them inadmissible in
evidence.

As held by this Court in the case of People v. Llanita:19

RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict
compliance as to the chain of custody rule. x x x. We have emphasized that what is essential is
"the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."

Briefly stated, non-compliance withthe procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR
relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a
serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.

xxxx

x x x. We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not
always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and
cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated
evidence.

Finally, both the trial court and the CA rejected appellants' defense of denial and frame-up for
failure to substantiate the same.

Indeed, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of
39
G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY
FERNANDEZ AND RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners, v. MORENO GENEROSO AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging
the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA)in CA� G.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel
Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.cralawred
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an
altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty.
Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and
Atty. Generoso reside.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station) to
report the incident.4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOI Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1
Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and
to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce,
A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one
hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly
beaten.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the
police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. 9 At the inquest
proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the
attack.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder
allegedly committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 20th day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of
Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y
FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack, to
his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid
warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were
the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station.
Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary
investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of their motion for preliminary
investigation.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The
CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the
meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer
for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a
valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the
RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon
which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found
that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of
April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition.cralawred
The Issues
40

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A
WARRANT.cralawred
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY
WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.cralawred
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW
UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever
issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation.
They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited."
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902 19 and the
1935,20 197321 and 198722 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their
persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term
"seizure."23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward
Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed
under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15,
1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the
Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The
declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational
component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free
Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him,
nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will
sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right. 30 [Emphasis
supplied]

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional
112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only
police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken those that are unreasonable.32� With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which
a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
of the crime.
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless
The petitioners additionally argue that the RTC's Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that,
Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.cralawred according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise
justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the
Philippines.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the
Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal
insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions
resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the
proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused. officers established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest
without a warrant in the Philippines.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining
in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were
interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved based on common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under
over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, the then Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the
development and the current applicable interpretation. prevention of public offenses.

41
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 43 of the
Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the
Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule
113, Section 5 which states that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that
of conjinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the
presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives
sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may
reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to
try him.

Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following
or is attempting to commit an offense;
circumstances are present:
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act,
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed amounting to a crime had been committed.
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. underscoring supplied]

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 37 of the Charter of Manila, which
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or
under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section S(b) has been described as
a "hot pursuit" arrest.44chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace. officer may arrest
persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) - the provision applicable in the present commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but
also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence. The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause
for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a
Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application. reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion,
action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113 officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed.
principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence
In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that
Code which provided that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the
old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held
whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the liable for its breach.48chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:
In The U.S. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27. Second. A person charged arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular
42
act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity. Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was
re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on Procedure, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's
reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway without a warrant, arrest a person:
on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
B. The 1940 Rules of Court attempting to commit an offense;
(Restricting the arresting officer's
determination of probable cause) (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially
incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
follows:50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant -When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person: In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
an offense in his presence;
As amended, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been
"just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
committed the crime.
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination
Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity
of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the person to be arrested has committed it.
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's
"reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of
person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Section S(b), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was
Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a
113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting
officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have objectified" the previously subjective determination of the
43
arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as
arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a
arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify
such information.58chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b),
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In Abelita III v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds
element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
arrested has committed the crime. actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be
Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.
The existence of ''probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the
arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge,
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113
for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary
cause in warrantless arrests
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the issuance of a warrant of arrest
Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be
reasonable. According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been
in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process. committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the
crime and should be held for trial.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable
Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is
synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough his witnesses.62chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual
basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of
situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought
possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired to be arrested.
later.56chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, before i suing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the
practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable
and the particular offense involved. 57chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule
possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or

44
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994.
A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis
Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an invalidated the warrantless arrest.
actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual
facts.65chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered
to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP
officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was
arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was
sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be. certainty as regards the commission of a crime.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been
"probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense
heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the
officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter.
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties. had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the
getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or
available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame. In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and
only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable invalid.
cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The
Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six (6) days after the commission of the crime
to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting"
proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who
criminal.67chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from statements made
by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113: was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered
in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid.
person to be arrested has committed it In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the
course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente
shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal
warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others
Criminal Procedure. had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.

45
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers
received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge
of the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who
pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the
warrantless arrest.
In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the
scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only
moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of
personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the
assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately
responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort
Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen.
When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that
the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch
was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity
of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated
the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting
a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported
statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just
committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of
Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate
the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge
Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident.
P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident
report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had
been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle
and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run
towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita
III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers
confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying
to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the
offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions."
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation
or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer
has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his
personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the
existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances
should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is
the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be
gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have
gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on
facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of
the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand,
with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be
limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very
limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police
officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following
must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed;
and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause
to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The
requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless
arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate
against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with,
namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting
officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the
crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the
time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the
attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners?
46
 personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
We rule in the affirmative. crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the
police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
III. Application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them
to make the warrantless arrests.
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts
in its decision.81 From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty.
knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as
in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the
of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even
alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another
Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. version of what transpired.
on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section S(b), Rule
and the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy;
than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, . the CA finding that the the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the
arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded. determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve
scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the
suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, 83 although they victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have
asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso. personal knowledge that a crime had been committed � the police immediately responded and
had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was
issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited
check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it
the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the
midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3 rd posterolateral aspect of police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of 7th rib (L ant. Chest circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician,
Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its
traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s. occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation
that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less the circumstances.
than one (1) hourafter the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is
those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived construed to mean as an authoritative command �
almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by
the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners'
although they narrated a different version of what transpired. 87chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making
47
the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or
a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part
of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.92chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have
the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso's account. SP02 Javier did not
need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him
to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual
force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired
personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest
of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but
was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the
petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan
Hills Police Station for investigation.94chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

V. The Order denying the motion for

preliminary investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the RTC Order denying the
petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued
in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution 95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court.96chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by
the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of
clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is
legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in
resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed
evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not
in the preliminary incidents leading up to the triaL

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court
is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would
only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we
uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the
petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the
decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to
proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

48
G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an appeal from the May 25, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31320 which affirmed in toto the December 11, 2007 Decision 2
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC), convicting appellant Nazareno
Villareal y Lualhati (appellant) of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
91653 (RA 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.
The Factual Antecedents
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon)
was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance
of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus,
PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU)
in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he
recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession. 4
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help
of a tricycle driver. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board
appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession.
Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station to fix his handcuffs,
and then they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic
sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06," representing his and appellant’s initials and the date of the
arrest.5
Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant
to the investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an
acknowledgment receipt6 and prepared a letter request7 for the laboratory examination of the
seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the request and the confiscated item to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were received by Police Senior
Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist.8
Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.9
Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs in an Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.03 gram which,
when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result of METHYLAMPHETAMIME
HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.11
In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leon’s allegations and instead claimed that on the date
and time of the incident, he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th
Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant
approached the person, who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked
him, and took his wallet which contained ₱1,000.00.12
Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was detained and mauled by
eight other detainees under the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to the
Sangandaan Headquarters where two other police officers, whose names he recalled were
"Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters’ firing range. There, "Michelle" and
"Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right beside his
ear each time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him when he continued to deny
knowledge about the cellphone.13 Thus, appellant sustained head injuries for which he was
brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper treatment. 14
The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal Guiyab, who informed
him that he was being charged with resisting arrest and "Section 11."15 The first charge was
eventually dismissed.
The RTC Ruling
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the
elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established, to wit: (1)
the appellant is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2)
that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possesses said drug. Finding no ill motive on the part of PO3 de Leon to testify falsely against
appellant, coupled with the fact that the former had previously arrested the latter for illegal
possession of drugs under Republic Act No. 642516 (RA 6425), the RTC gave full faith and
credit to PO3 de Leon’s testimony. Moreover, the RTC found the plain view doctrine to be
49
applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 de Leon at the place and time of
the arrest.
On the other hand, the RTC gave scant consideration to the defenses of denial and frame-up
proffered by the appellant, being uncorroborated, and in the light of the positive assertions of
PO3 de Leon. It refused to give credence to appellant’s claim that PO3 de Leon robbed him of
his money, since he failed to bring the incident to the attention of PO3 de Leon’s superiors or to
institute any action against the latter.
Consequently, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of
₱300,000.00.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, the CA sustained appellant’s conviction, finding "a clear case of in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest"17 as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA held that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange
conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion,"18aggravated by the existence of his past
criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him.
Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court likewise ruled that the prosecution had adequately
shown the continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, from the time it was
confiscated from appellant by PO3 de Leon, marked at the police station, turned over to PO2
Hipolito and delivered to the crime laboratory, where it was received by PSI Arturo, the forensic
chemist, up to the time it was presented in court for proper identification.
The Issue
The sole issue advanced before the Court for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming in
toto the RTC’s Decision convicting appellant of the offense charged.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on
lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.19 On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section
5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant
had committed it.20
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense
is absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under
paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
In sustaining appellant’s conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was a
clear case of an "in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.
The Court disagrees.
A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that there could have been
no lawful warrantless arrest. A portion of PO3 de Leon’s testimony on direct examination in
court is revelatory:
FISCAL LARIEGO: While you were there at 5th
Avenue, was there anything unusual that transpired?
PO3 DE LEON: Yes Ma’am.
Q: What was this incident?
A: While I was on board my motorcycle on my home, I saw a man looking at the shabu in his
hand, Ma’am.
50
Q: And exactly what time was this?
A: Around 11:30 in the morning, Ma’am.
Q: How far were you from this person that you said was verifying something in his hand?
A: Eight to ten meters, Ma’am.
Q: What exactly did you see he was verifying? A: The shabu that he was holding, Ma’am.
Q: After seeing what the man was doing, what did you do next?
A: I alighted from my motorcycle and approached him, Ma’am.
Q: In the first place why do you say that what he was examining and holding in his hand was a
shabu?
A: Because of the numerous arrests that I have done, they were all shabu,
Ma’am.21 (Underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon,
even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy,
from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a
negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet
allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving
shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands
was indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could
be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he
(appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts
per se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way
be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange
acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order
for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section
5, Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and
the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed
it.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge
that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de
Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must
in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de
Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous
charge22 for the same offense. The CA stressed this point when it said:
It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view.1âwphi1 PO3 Renato
de Leon saw appellant holding and scrutinizing a piece of plastic wrapper containing a white
powderly substance. PO3 Renato de Leon was quite familiar with appellant, having arrested him
twice before for the same illegal possession of drug. It was not just a hollow suspicion. The third
time around, PO3 de Leon had reasonably assumed that the piece of plastic wrapper appellant
was holding and scrutinizing also contained shabu as he had personal knowledge of facts
regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record. He would have been irresponsible to just
‘wait and see’ and give appellant a chance to scamper away. For his part, appellant being, in
fact, in possession of illegal drug, sensing trouble from an equally familiar face of authority, ran
away. Luckily, however, PO3 de Leon caught up with him through the aid of a tricycle driver.
Appellant’s act of running away, indeed, validated PO3 de Leon’s reasonable suspicion that
appellant was actually in possession of illegal drug. x x x23
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not
suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify
a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact
just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person’s
reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily
stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on
knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous
requisites laid out under Section 5.
It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on
"personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as this is
unquestionably not what "personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which must be
strictly construed.24
Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be
construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.25It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances,26 for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight,
including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and
fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.27 Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away
from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just
as it could likewise signify innocence.
In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if
they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense,
are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable
cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has
been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged.28 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such
51
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain
in appellant’s case.

Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the
officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the
nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty, 30 it
cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a citizen’s
constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty. As the Court succinctly explained in the case of
People v. Tudtud:31

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must
clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without
warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would
infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of
full protection.

Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from
appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be
acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and ordered immediately released from detention,
unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.

52
 SECOND DIVISION That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of
Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, ARNOLD MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR
DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y CAROLINO, ROLAND
PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 191366 DORIA y DIAZ and RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without
PHILIPPINES, authority of law, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one
Plaintiff-Appellee, another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff and
Present: possess dangerous drugs (shabu residues) contained in empty plastic sachets
CARPIO, J.,Chairperson, and rolled aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting,
NACHURA, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].
PERALTA,
ABAD, and Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.[3]
MENDOZA, JJ.
- versus -

Version of the Prosecution

ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y
As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard
ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON
Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Azardon (PO1 Azardon), one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector Lady Ellen
Promulgated:
Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL
GONZALES Y CUNANAN, December 13, 2010 Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical officer, it appears that on September 2,
Accused-Appellants. 2006, at around 12:45 oclock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police
Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered
X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
the precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael
Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1
DECISION
Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons
MENDOZA, J.:
and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from

This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located.

HC-NO. 03269, which affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding the accused guilty
of violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for
Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
The Facts
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando
Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they
saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin
Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front
of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum
foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.

The Information indicting the accused reads:

The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the
room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory
53

Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination on the seized items
and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of
used aluminum foil tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were
subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Version of the Defense
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed that
in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano Street in Trinidad
Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R.
Martinez and who was to give the materials for the painting of said jeep. As they were going
around the subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked
him if he noticed a person pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five
to seven policemen emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to the
police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and charged with sniffing
shabu.
The Ruling of the RTC
The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR
DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino, and RAFAEL
GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings defined and penalized under Section 13 in relation to Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine in the amount of
P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.
The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government
and to be disposed of in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1
Azardon, without any showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses of denial
and alibi put up by the accused.The accused were held to have been in constructive possession
of the subject items. A conspiracy was also found present as there was a common purpose to
possess the dangerous drug.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as
to the constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further held that
although the procedure regarding the custody and disposition of evidence prescribed by Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.
Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying
for the reversal of the subject decision, presenting the following
Assignment of Errors
For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez
1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants
to be having a pot session at the time of their arrest;
54
 2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the police
to plant the shabu paraphernalia to justify the arrest of the waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
accused-appellants without warrant; evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[6]

3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has not
been sufficiently established; Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused,
4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated it has been held that this Court has the power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if such is
testimony of PO1 Azardon insufficient to convict the accused-
necessary in arriving at a just decision,[7] especially when the transcendental matter of life and
appellants of the crime charged;
liberty is at stake.[8] While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than
5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants.
frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial
justice. Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are
For accused Rafael Gonzales
mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities

I should never be used to defeat substantive rights.[9] Thus, despite the procedural lapses of the
accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in the case at bench. The clear
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS infringement of the accuseds right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures
FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
cannot be ignored.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.

II
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. [10] Sec. 2, Art. III, of the
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE 1987 Constitution provides:
ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the evidence personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
of custody has not been duly established.

This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all

Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure
searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are
allowed even in the absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to
arrest;[11] (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
raise such issue before arraignment.[5] However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A
circumstances.[12]

55

This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered
valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7
of Rule 112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject
items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and
his Joint Affidavit[13] with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused
Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in
said house, to wit:
Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not
tell you how many persons were actually conducting the pot
session?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not
armed with a search warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you
did not know personally Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.
Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an]
ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this
report to you placed in the police blotter before you proceeded to
the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or
identity of the person who told you that he was allegedly informed
that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he
does not want to be identified because he was afraid, sir.
Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an
ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately
formed a group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you
could not see what is happening inside the house of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic
sachet of shabu on the table while you were outside the premises
of the property of Rafael Gonzales?
xxx
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?
COURT: Answer.
56
 A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them,
sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who
told you that he was informed by another person that there was
an ongoing pot session going on inside the house of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael
Gonzales and you arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.[14]
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b),
on the other hand, may be applicable and both require probable cause to be present in order for
a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. [15]
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases[16] that tipped
information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search,[17] such rulings cannot be
applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in
transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest.
None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest
and seizure based solely on an informers tip. The case of People v. Bolasa[18] is informative on
this matter.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman
were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the
house of the suspects. They walked towards the house accompanied by their informer. When
they reached the house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man and woman
repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers,
confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does
not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest
is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the
time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have
any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it.
Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a
penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view.
First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants
were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found
to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers
intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and
ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like
manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot
even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at
hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should
have conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and
address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting
the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for
arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant
prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio,
the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained
during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence,
their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law. [19]
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be
based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. [20]
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or were
about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael
Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just
57
committed an offense. As admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a
concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the information that was reported
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements
to the police:
of plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
accused was based on a tip-off by an informant?
A: Yes, sir. discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?
A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session search.[22]
in the house of one of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.

Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally
information originated but from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir. entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused
with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was
going on? [No Answer] insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless search in this case be
struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented
Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged
pot session was going on? warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.
circumstances.
Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was
going on somewhere in Arellano but you dont know the exact
place where the pot session was going on? The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that
A: Yes, sir.
the identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the
Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the veracity of surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have
the alleged pot session because he claimed that he derived that
information from somebody else? been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search
pot session, sir.
and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where? excluded.[23] The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug,
A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.
being the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its
xxx
inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the
alleged pot session?
A: No, sir. As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges
have glossed over illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are able to present
Q: That was, because your informant dont [sic] know physically what was
really happening there? the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session
there, sir.[21] [Emphasis supplied] attitude tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed rights in the name of law enforcement. It is

58
ironic that such enforcement of the law fosters the breakdown of our system of justice and the
eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law
enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and
the law.[24]
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused
would still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the chain of
custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with
moral certainty as the chain of custody appears to be questionable, the authorities having failed
to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug
Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series
of 1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no
photograph of the items taken, no compliance with the rule requiring the accused to sign the
inventory and to give them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled from
the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime laboratory for testing.
Therefore, the corpus delictiwas not proven, thereby producing reasonable doubt as to their
guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their favor was not overcome by
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused
was in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized by law,
and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.[25] Additionally, this
being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of the crime is
(iv) the possession of the dangerous drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social
gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.
The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to establish the
existence of the drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently established. The chain of custody
requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed
through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to
the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[26] Malillin v. People was the first in
a growing number of cases to explain the importance of chain of custody in dangerous drugs
cases, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same.[27]
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,[28] defines chain of custody as
follows:
b. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition;
59
 Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the
protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of seized
or confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their identity and integrity, as
follows:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance
turns it over to a supervising officer, who would then send it by courier to
the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable that
possession of the substance changes hand a number of times, it is imperative
for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to place his
marking on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive
tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic
container. At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized substance and
the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until it reaches the crime
laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put
it in one and seal the same. In this way the substance would assuredly reach
the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused. Further,
after the laboratory technician tests and verifies the nature of the substance
in the container, he should put his own mark on the plastic container and
seal it again with a new seal since the police officers seal has been
broken. At the trial, the technician can then describe the sealed condition of
the plastic container when it was handed to him and testify on the procedure
he took afterwards to preserve its integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the
prosecution would have to present every police officer, messenger,
laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody, no
matter how briefly ones possession has been. Each of them has to testify
that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or
substituted while in his care.[29]
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165
further elaborates, and provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.[Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not necessarily
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, provided that (i) there is a justifiable
ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. In this case, however, no justifiable ground is found availing, and it is
apparent that there was a failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of
presentation in court. A review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the
documentary records of the case reveals irreparably broken links in the chain of custody.
60
 SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:
According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following were
confiscated from the accused, to wit: A A1 to A115 One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet
with tag each containing suspected shabu residue without markings.

a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu B B1 to B11 Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each
residues. containing suspected shabu residue without markings.

b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) C C1 to C49 Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing
pcs colored yellow, one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored suspected shabu residue without markings.[33]
white ). [Emphases supplied]

c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a
residues. Confiscation Receipt was issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:

d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006
residues.

CONFISCATION RECEIPT
e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.[30]
[Emphases
supplied]
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon

At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were
indorsed to Duty Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano) for
proper disposition.[31] A letter-request for laboratory examination was prepared by Police
Superintendent Edgar Orduna Basbag for the following items:
a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu
residues marked DC&A-1.
b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu
residues marked DC&A-2.
of September 4, 2006, we together with our precinct supervisor, SPO4
Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed of SPO1 Marlon Decano,
PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and PO1 Aldrin Guarin
apprehended the following names of persons of ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y
ANGELES, 37 yrs old, married, jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this city;
EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle driver, a resident
of 471 Lucao Dist., this city. REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, 44 yrs
old, married, jitney driver, a resident of Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND
DORIA Y DIAZ, 39 yrs old, married, businessman, resident of Cabeldatan,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, 49 yrs
old, separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad Subd., Arellano-Bani this
city.

c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and
marked DC&A-3.[32] were brought to Dagupan City Police
[Emphases supplied] Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty Desk
Officer to record the incident and the sachet of suspected Shabu
Paraphernalias were brought to PNP Crime Laboratory, Lingayen,
The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp. Maranion by Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.

SPO3 Froilan Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L listed the Seizing Officer:
specimens which were submitted for testing, to wit:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
61
 Affiant Affiant Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that
place of Rafael Gonzales?
Remarks: A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.

Refused to Signed Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures
Refused to Signed taken, is that correct?
Refused to Signed A: Yes, sir.[37]
Refused to Signed [Emphasis
Refused to Signed[34] supplied]
[Emphases
supplied]
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance. The
The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 (of the
suddenness of the situation cannot justify non-compliance with the requirements. The police
49) pieces of used aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as identified in the Final
officers were not prevented from preparing an inventory and taking photographs. In fact, Section
Chemistry Report, were presented in court and marked as Exhibits H and series, I and series,
21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in case of warrantless seizures, the
and J and series, respectively. Said items were identified by PO1 Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion
inventory and photographs shall be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
at the witness stand.[35]
the apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of the situation may have had
should have dissipated by the time they reached the police station, as the suspects had already
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly
been arrested and the items seized. Moreover, it has been held that in case of warrantless seizures
preserved as there was sufficient evidence to prove that the items seized from the accused were
nothing prevents the apprehending officer from immediately conducting the physical inventory
the same ones forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination, as shown in the Confiscation
and photography of the items at their place of seizure, as it is more in keeping with the laws
Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination.
intent to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.[38]
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with Section
A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.
21 of R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items. Some cases are People v. Garcia,[39] People v. Dela Cruz,[40] People
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After seizure
v. Dela Cruz,[41] People v. Santos, Jr.,[42] People v. Nazareno,[43] People v. Orteza,[44] Zarraga
and confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory was conducted in the presence of
v. People,[45] and People v. Kimura.[46]
the accused, or their representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ,
and any elected public official. Thus, no inventory was prepared, signed, and provided to the
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is
accused in the manner required by law. PO1 Azardon, in his testimony,[36] admitted that no
instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit:
photographs were taken. The only discernable reason proffered by him for the failure to comply
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do
with the prescribed procedure was that the situation happened so suddenly. Thus:
not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these
formed a group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales? activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of
A: Yes, sir. arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the
"marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items
62
 that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should
be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately
upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent
persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the
apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence
under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on
the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an
envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of the seized items
require a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or
container shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned
over to the next officer in the chain of custody.[47] [Emphasis in the original]
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela
Cruz does it appear that the subject items were at all marked. It was only in the letter-request
for laboratory examination that the subject items were indicated to have been marked
with DC&A-1, DC&A-2 and DC&A-3. There is no showing, however, as to who made those
markings and when they were made. Moreover, those purported markings were never
mentioned when the subject items were identified by the prosecution witnesses when they took
the stand.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets,
rolled and cut aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain to any
individual item in each group.Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry Report[48] that the
precise number of each type of item was indicated and enumerated. The Court notes that in all
documents prior to said report, the subject items were never accurately quantified but only
described as pieces,[49] several pcs,[50] and shabu paraphernallas.[51] Strangely, the Chemistry
Report indicates that all the subject items had no markings, although each item was reported to
have been marked by P/Insp. Maranion in the course of processing the subject items during
laboratory examination and testing.[52] Doubt, therefore, arises as to the identity of the subject
items. It cannot be determined with moral certainty that the subject items seized from the
accused were the same ones subjected to the laboratory examination and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking of
seized items in dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v. People,[53] People v.
Kimura,[54] and People v. Laxa.[55]
Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below gives rise
to more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day of the seizure of the items, it was
prepared only three days after. More important, the receipt did not even indicate exactly what
items were confiscated and their quantity. These are basic information that a confiscation receipt
should provide. The only information contained in the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of
arrest of the accused and the general description of the subject items as the sachet of suspected
Shabu paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The receipt is made even
more dubious by PO1 Azardons admission in his testimony[56] that he did not personally prepare
the Confiscation Receipt and he did not know exactly who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification[57] issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the subject items
were indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano for proper
disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp. Maranion. There is,
however, no showing of how and when the subject items were transferred from SPO1 Urbano
to SPO3 Esteban.
Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No witness testified
on how the subject items were kept after they were tested prior to their presentation in court. This
Court has highlighted similar shortcomings in People v. Cervantes,[58] People v.
Garcia,[59] People v. Sanchez,[60] and Malillin v. People.[61]
More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary to
PO1 Azardons testimony[62] that they were tipped off by a concerned citizen while at the police
station, the Letter[63] to the Executive Director of the DDB states that the apprehending officers
were tipped off while conducting monitoring/surveillance. Said letter also indicates, as does the
Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and seizure occurred on September 4, 2006, and
not September 2, 2006, as alleged in the Information. It was also mentioned in the
63
aforementioned Certification of the Dagupan Police and Joint Affidavit of the police officers duty.[67] Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, the presumption of regularity
that a glass tube suspected to contain shabu residue was also confiscated from the accused. cannot stand.
Interestingly, no glass tube was submitted for laboratory examination.

In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the
In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to be
prosecutions position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly
irregular. When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the presumption of
preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the CA, the Confiscation Receipt and
regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of the accused. [68]
the letter-request for laboratory examination, have been shown to be grossly insufficient in
proving the identity of the corpus delicti. The corpus delictiin dangerous drugs cases constitutes
the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous
drug is essential before the accused can be found guilty.[64] drugs cases due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search and seizure
procedure under the law.[69]Some bona fide arrests and seizures in dangerous drugs cases result
in the acquittal of the accused because drug enforcement operatives compromise the integrity
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of
and evidentiary worth of the seized items. It behooves this Court to remind law enforcement
R.A. No. 9165, in People v. Sta. Maria,[65] this Court held that said section was silent as to the
agencies to exert greater effort to apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control,
consequences of such failure, and said silence could not be interpreted as a legislative intent to
and handling of seized drugs.
make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal, nor evidence obtained pursuant to
such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead
agency in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165
enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as may not always be possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is not necessarily
illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. fatal. However, the lapses in procedure must be recognized, addressed and explained in terms
of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must
be shown to have been preserved.[70]
Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not
affect the admissibility of the evidence but only its weight.[66] Thus, had the subject items in this
case been admissible, their evidentiary merit and probative value would be insufficient to
warrant conviction.

It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should prevail. However, such
presumption obtains only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec.
11[71] (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15[72] (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No.
64
9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous
law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec.
basis for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last 15.
paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the
law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use,
WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO.
provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15. The minimum
03269 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered ACQUITTING the
penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of
accused and ordering their immediate release from detention, unless they are confined for any
twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is
other lawful cause.
a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11
on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of
and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue
Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this decision the
on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous
action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director-General, Philippine National
drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of
Police, and the Director-General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information
custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for
and guidance.
use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under
Sec. 14[73] (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the seized
Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the items to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
maximum penalty under Sec. 12[74] (Possession of Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who
SO ORDERED.
shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs.
Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In
fact, under the same section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia
is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to
have violated Sec. 15.

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court
thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion
in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue
and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such
cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving
65
[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NASARIO MOLINA y
MANAMAT @ BOBONG and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @
BOBOY, accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the
society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values
upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend.[1]
For automatic review is the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 8,[3] of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425),
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[4] and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of
death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grams of dried
marijuana which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
accusation against them.[6] Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police
Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S.
Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine
National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information
regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. [7]The first time he came
to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1
Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to
the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina,
SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and
addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they
were arrested.[8]
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City any time that
morning.[9] Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the
PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4
Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and
SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait
for the alleged pusher to pass by.[10]
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the
house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that
instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the
team boarded their vehicle and overtook the trisikad.[11] SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house,
thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted.[12]
The police officers then ordered the trisikad to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula
who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently,
SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to
open the bag.[13] Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will settle this.[14] SPO1 Pamplona insisted
on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-
appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.[15]
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence
for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.[16] The demurrer was denied by the trial court.[17] A motion for reconsideration
was filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision,[18] the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence from both
accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their counsels, more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt,
pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and
GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through
lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided
for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records of
this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review of their
case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules
of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:
I.
66
 THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN
SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS
NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC.
8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.[20]
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he
prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a
reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the
existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.[21]
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under
Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[22] Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit
this Courts high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. [23]
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible
in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when
the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;[24] and (6) stop
and frisk situations (Terry search).[25]
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In
this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made ---
the process cannot be reversed.[26] As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless
arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).[27]
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that
the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace
officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of
prohibited drugs.[28] This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search
and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,[29] the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent
case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or
constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,[30] probable cause means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when,
in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that reliable information alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of
the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin,[31] it was held that the accused-appellant
was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when
the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and
so subject to apprehension.
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,[32] the Court did not consider eyes... darting from side to
side ... [while] holding ... [ones] abdomen, in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt
acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable
67
cause. According to the Court, [b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred
from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or
was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers] presence. So also, in People v.
Encinada,[33] the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding
a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,[34] the trial court concluded that petitioner was
attempting to commit a crime as he was standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon
Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and looking at every person that come (sic) nearer
(sic) to them.[35] In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light
of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical
act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.[36]
It went on to state that -
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast - an observation
which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it
was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.[37]
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.[38]
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify
their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-
appellant Molina responded Boss, if possible we will settle this to the request of SPO1 Pamplona
to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the arresting officers
that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing
alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it
not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed
accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of
accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mulas
name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed
recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to
see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of
the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at
accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1
Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants
even before the arrest, to wit -
Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and how did you
know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person?
A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina, when
they pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one
who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina[39]
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless. SPO1
Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon
because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of
accused-appellants name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the
arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants identity, and
were, from all indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant
Encinada even before the arrest because of the latters illegal gambling activities, thus, lending
at least a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the
Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal,
holding that [t]he prosecutions evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the
appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating
a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances.[40]
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.[41]
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise
illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as
evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in
favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the
achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of
individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of
criminals.
68
 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in
Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, are ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

69
G.R. No. L-63630 April 6, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region
at San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P20,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San Fernando,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO, knowing
fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have his possession, control and custody one (1) bag of dried
marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the
same to Olongapo City, without authority of law to do so. (At p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based
is narrated by the trial court as follows:
It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late evening of
March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San
Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were
conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at
Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed not
only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on
persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations
supplied by informers; that it was around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen
noticed a person caring a traveling bag (Exhibit G) who was acting suspiciously and
they confronted him; that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and
Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on
when the patrolmen identified themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana
leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less;
that the person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and
he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to
Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat.
Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report
(Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or on
March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto Quevedo,
who happens to be his brother and who has had special training on narcotics, to
conduct a field test on a little portion of the marijuana leaves and to have the remaining
portion examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that Pat.
Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana leaves and found
positive result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the remaining bigger quantity of the
marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo
that same day of March 3, 1982 (Exhibit A and A-1) and when examined, the same
were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1). (At pp. 9-10, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:
The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his wife begot a
child on June 10, 1982; that he was formerly employed in the poultry farm of his uncle
Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he is engaged in the business of selling
poultry medicine and feeds, including chicks, and used to conduct his business at
Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to Subic at times in connection with his business and
whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose
the same in Manila; that he never left his residence at Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2,
1982; that on March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to collect a balance of P100.00 from a
customer thereat and to buy C-rations; that he was able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00
o'clock in the evening and he stayed in Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock because he
had a drinking spree with Nena's son; that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to
Manila from Olongapo City but he failed and was able to take the bus only by 9:00
o'clock that evening that it was a Victory Liner Bus that he rode and because he was
tipsy, he did not notice that the bus was only bound for San Fernando, Pampanga; that
upon alighting at the Victory Liner Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed
the street to wait for a bus going to Manila; that while thus waiting for a bus, a man
whom he came to know later as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he
has any residence certificate; that when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the
wallet and took all the money inside the wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat.
Punzalan told him that he'll be taken to the municipal building for verification as he
may be an NPA member; that at the municipal building, he saw a policeman,
identified by him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened when he
arrived that Pat. Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out everything from
his pocket saying that the prisoners inside the jail may get the same from him; that
inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat. Quevedo took the same, telling him
that it shall be returned to him but that it was never returned to him; that he was
thereafter placed under detention and somebody told him that he is being charged with
possession of marijuana and if he would like to be bailed out, somebody is willing to
70
 help him; and, that when he was visited by his wife, he told his wife that Patrolman
Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he told his wife not to complain
anymore as it would be useless. (Rollo, pp. 10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone assignment of error in
his appeal:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
AND FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT
AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48, Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating the lower court's
findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique
Chan died. Thereafter, this court appointed a new counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra and
pursuant thereto, the Deputy Clerk of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of Court, required the new
counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter complied and, in her brief, raised the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE
OF MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS
IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED
PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY
SEIZED FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (At pp. 92-
93, Rollo)
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful
search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This
case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a
lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted with the same
issue, held that:
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not need
a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The
warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco V.
Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos
of marijuana.
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Amininudin, 163 SCRA 402
[1988]. In that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-
appellant. was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on
this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank,
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The
Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally.
The records show, however, that there were certain facts, not sing in the case before us, which
led the Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:
The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the
PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at react two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its
arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill
of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
71
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not
mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed
to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search
warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search
warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms,
jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from
him was never authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He
capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the
PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused.
We rule, however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana package
together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad
likewise testified that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said letter-
request bore the name of the accused, then the requirements of proper authentication of evidence
were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package examined by the forensic checklist was
satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.
Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly
authenticated, still, we cannot discount the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto
Quevedo which yielded positive results for marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient and
doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer should have been
presented before the lower court. We discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an
already settled issue. This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer,
where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the
prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R.
No. 64262, March 16, 1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Cerelegia,
147 SCRA 538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue
of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the
highest consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within
the province of the trial judge, who had first hand opportunity to watch and observe the
demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their
testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989; People v. Turla, 167 SCRA
278), we find no reason to disturb the following findings:
The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo
Punzalan are positive and sufficiently clean to show the commission by the accused
of the offense herein chatted. These prosecution witnesses have no motive to fabricate
the facts and to foist a very serious offense against the accused. The knowledge on
what these witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the official
performance of their duties and then, (sic) being no showing that they are prejudiced
against the accused, their testimonies deserve full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in the
possession of the accused were marijuana leaves were corroborated by the
examination findings conducted by Pat. October to Salangad of the PCCL, with
station at camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1). (Rollo, p. 11)
Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat.
Punzalan got all the money from his wallet when he was accosted at the Victory Liner
Terminal and was told just to keep quiet otherwise he will be "salvaged" why will Pat.
Punzalan still bring the accused to the municipal Building for interrogation and/or
verification? Would not Pat. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the accused? This
is unnatural. And this is also true on the testimony to the accused that Pat. Silverio
Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill arid never returned the same to him. If the policemen
really got any money from the accused and that the marijuana leaves do not belong to
the accused, why will the two policemen still produce in Court as evidence that
expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from the accused and which
contained the marijuana in question if the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the
prosecution in this case were all based on personal knowledge acquired by the
prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their official duties and there is
nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or that they have any
prejudice against the herein accused. Between the testimonies of these prosecution
witnesses and that of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the accused,
the former should prevail. (Rollo, p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed
himself through compulsory court processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since
not one other witness was presented nor was any justification for the non-appearance given, the
inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the
positive testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly observed by
the lower court, is an added circumstance tending to establish his guilt.
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:
The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs one (1) kilo,
more or less. The intent to transport the same is clear from the testimony of Pat.
Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other things, that when he confronted the
accused that night, the latter told him that he (accused) is bringing the marijuana
leaves to Olongapo City. Moreover, considering the quantity of the marijuana leaves
found in the possession of the accused and the place he was arrested which is at San
Fernando, Pampanga, a place where the accused is not residing, it can be said that the
72
 intent to transport the marijuana leaves has been clearly established. (Rollo, pp. 13-
14)

The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he categorically
denied in court, that he is transporting the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied
upon. Even assuming it to be true, the extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted because it
does not appear in the records that the accused, during custodial investigation, was apprised of
his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. In People
v. Duero 104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the prosecution failed
to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and
intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was
reiterated in People v. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that:

In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official
acts relative to admissibility of statements taken during in-custody interrogation but
likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this
jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a trial that prior
to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights.

The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and from this
finding extracted a clear intent to transport the marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out, however,
that although the information stated the weight to be approximately one kilo, the forensic
chemist who examined the marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams
Such amount is not a considerable quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent
to transport the marijuana leaves.

Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused
was arrested at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place which is not his residence. Conviction of a
crime with an extremely severe penalty must be based on evidence which is clearer and more
convincing than the inferences in this case.

What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana
leaves but his actual session.

The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

73
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter
referred to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2)
days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus
stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused
planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight
out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with
body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco,
the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp
Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay,
Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports
that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police
Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and
inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt.
Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the
NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started
their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole
foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge
on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was
that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when
accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped
objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from
the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was
found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the
same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags
that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the
teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken
from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to
the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the
issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned
by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He
further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because
there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked
accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa
Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and
other Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging
on his neck containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers.
The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said
officer came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get
74
off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial
court did not give credence to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied
by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated
at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was
planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said
investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2)
travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as
amended.3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4,
Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional
Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under
Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged,
accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without
a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal
search are not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is
made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest
without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the
case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and
there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 8 The
required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. 9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and
attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had
prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer
of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way
to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein
accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him
prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San
Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs,
based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to
act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
75
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of
the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was
initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused,
during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The
failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to
arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily
present his identification papers when required to do so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport,
taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused
was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose
a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects
of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to
open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which
was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2)
teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide
his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To
deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search
even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

76
 [G.R. Nos. 136066-67. February 4, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BINAD SY CHUA, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two
separate Informations which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-507[1]
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control two (2)
plastic bags containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (SHABU) weighing more or less
two (2) kilos and one (1) small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine Hydrocloride
weighing more or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a regulated drug, without any authority
whatsoever.
Criminal Case No. 96-513[2]
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control twenty (20)
pieces of live .22 cal. ammunitions, without first having obtained a license or permit to possess
or carry the same.
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. The two cases were then
jointly tried.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police force of Angeles
City. Their testimonies can be synthesized as follows:
On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2
Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant
was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The
informer further reported that accused-appellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke
bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City, Col. Neopito
Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of operatives composed of Major Bernardino, Insp.
Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, P02 Emmeraldo Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian
assets, with SPO2 Mario Nulud, as team investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag
and the civilian informer positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai
Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant
which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-
appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag
hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant
pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from
his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded
twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2
Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline
substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice
box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant.
Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the
confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito,
Angeles City.[3]
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags
containing crystalline substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the
PNP Headquarters revealed that the siezed items contained shabu.[4] Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud
together with accused-appellant brought these items for further laboratory examination to the
Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due testing, forensic chemist
S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive results for shabu.
The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942
kilograms of shabu.[5]
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different
version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his wife
to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along
McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago,
Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approach and
examine the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately
pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on
identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his
wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and
proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the scene in
two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby
bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom
for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In
the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to
hold the box while pictures were being taken.[6]
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points.
He testified that he witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security check
around the premises of the Guess Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel. [7]
77
 On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a
decision,[8] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, the accused is hereby
acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu, accused
Binad Sy Chua is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING FINDINGS:
A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BINAD SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;
B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF
SHABU ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN A LAWFUL AND
VALID MANNER;
C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CRIME CHARGED IS
SUFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND
REAONABLE DOUBT.[10]
Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police
operatives was unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest
he has been under surveillance for two years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the
haste within which the arresting officers sought to arrest and search him without a warrant; that
the police officers had sufficient information about him and could have easily arrested
him. Accused-appellant further argues that since his arrest was null an void, the drugs that were
seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.
Accused-appellants argument is impressed with merit.
Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and
fast one.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of
witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the
course of their testimonies. The only exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the case.[11]
In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and substance that have
been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the
guilt of accused-appellant. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and
this includes the review of the penalty and indemnity imposed by the trial court.[12] We are
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance
in favor of the accused shall be considered.[13] This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate
that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon
accused-appellant, the court a quo made the following findings:
Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs (shabu). A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects x x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. x x x x
While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal affects (sic) of the accused, however, under the circumstances of
the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime.
xxxxxxxxx
In the present case, the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal
drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act
quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin
to a stop and frisk.[14]
A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial
court. It confused the two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante
delicto) and of a stop-and-frisk.
In Malacat v. Court of Appeals,[15] we distinguished the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and
of a search incidental to a lawful arrest, to wit:
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of
the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope.
78
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be madethe
process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may
search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon
or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or
which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
xxxxxxxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a stop-and-frisk as a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons, as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed andpresently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop-
and-frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-
frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.[16] (Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is
applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police
operatives on accused-appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the
search of a person and his belongings.[17] Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. [18]
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals
that when accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his
car along the McArthur Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance
of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious
manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation
of the law, the group of SPO2 Nulud hurriedly accosted[19] accused-appellant and later on
introduced themselves as police officers.[20]Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged
drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in this case was more imagined than real. Thus,
there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in light of the lack of
an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had committed a crime, was
committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests,
it has been held that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.[21] Hence, in People
v. Aminudin,[22] we ruled that the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.It was only when the informer pointed
to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension (Emphasis supplied).
The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben[23] to justify the polices actions is
misplaced. In the said case, based on the information supplied by informers, police officers
conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga
against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaged in the
traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a
red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to
open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified
themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police
officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge from the
very same informant of accused-appellants activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team
leader of the arresting operatives, admitted that their informant has been telling them about the
activities of accused-appellant for two years prior to his actual arrest on September 21, 1996.
An excerpt of the testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the illegality of the arrest of accused-
appellant as follows:
Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you the name of this chinese
drug pusher?
A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.
79
Q. And he had been mentioning these names to you even before September 21, Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice box?
1996?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling you about the activities of
this chinese drug pusher reckoning in relation to September 21, 1996? Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline substance is shabu?

A. That was about two years already. A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we have been tailing the accused
that he is really a drug pusher.
Q. Nothwithstanding his two years personal knowledge which you gained from the
civilian informant that this chinese drug pusher have been engaged pushing Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long time that you are very sure
drugs here in Angeles City, you did not think of applying for a search warrant that what was brought by him was shabu?
for this chinese drug pusher? A. Yes, sir.[24]
A. No, sir. The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of accused-
xxxxxxxxx appellant. Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was
already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually walking along the road police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and
near the Thunder Inn Hotel, is that right? searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to them hours before
accused-appellants arrest was not a product of an on-the-spot tip which may excuse them from
A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is the chinese drug pusher that obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting teams contention that their arrest of
will deliver to him also. accused-appellant was a product of an on-the-spot tip is untenable.
Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad Chua the accused in this In the same vein, there could be no valid stop-and-frisk in this case. A stop-and-frisk was
case he alighted with a Corolla car with plate number 999, I think, he just defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him
alighted when you saw him? for weapon(s)[25] or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make
A. Yes, sir. initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct,
in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.[26] The apprehending
Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked towards near the entrance of police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and
the Thunder Inn Hotel? the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him.[27] It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure
A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel but he was pinpointed should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.[28]
already by the civilian informer.
This principle of stop-and-frisk search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of
Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel? Appeals.[29] In said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes,
walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the
A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel.
validity of the search as akin to a stop-and-frisk. In People v. Solayao,[30] we also found
xxxxxxxxx justifiable reason to stop-and-frisk the accused after considering the following circumstances:
the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled
Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag pounced on him as you used when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an
pounced on him in your affidavit? intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.
A. Yes, sir. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid stop-
and-frisk in the case of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested
xxxxxxxxx
before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The
Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that alleged small plastic bag, is apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants
that correct? business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of
A. Yes, sir. accused-appellant. Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest
unusual and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by

80
jurisprudence and the law. There was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the
immediacy of accused-appellants arrest.
Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given to
them by their confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-
appellants warrantless arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid stop-and
frisk. For a valid stop-and-frisk the search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so
in this case. Besides, as we have earlier emphasized, the information about the illegal activities
of accused-appellant was not unknown to the apprehending officers. Hence, the search and
seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a valid stop-and-frisk.
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in
accused-appellants possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the
plastic bags found in the Zest-O juice box which contained crystalline substances later on
identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber
ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The police officers first arrested accused-
appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice box
before they were able to see and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu.
There was no clear showing that the sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried contained
prohibited drugs. Neither were the small plastic bags which allegedly contained crystalline
substance and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition visible.These prohibited substances were
not in plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the
poisonous tree.
In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and
emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate,
much more cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-
appellant. Neither can the presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked by
an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured
by the Constitution.[31] In People v. Nubla,[32] we clearly stated that:
were taken. In People v. Casimiro,[34] we struck down with disbelief the reliability of the identity
of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where they were seized, thus:
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise
not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus
reasonable doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same
brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the
crime laboratory.
The governments drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it
should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution.
The constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do.
Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds,
otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence.[35]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting accused-
appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody, unless
he is being lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for
affirming accused-appellants conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a
mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as
binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-
appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the
initial field test where the items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP
headquarters of Angeles City.[33] The items were therefore not marked at the place where they

81

[G.R. No. 100920. June 17, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOLI SALCEDO @
"KA TONY," GEMO IBAEZ @ "KA TITING," BOLODOY CALDERON,
JUANITO SUAL, JR., EDISON BANCULO, NONOY ESQUILONA, GIL
RAPSING, JOSE FERNANDEZ, REYNALDO CORTEZ, NOE ALBAO, ELY
RAPSING, PACO MANLAPAZ, DANILO LAURIO and NORIE
HUELVA, accused,
NOLI SALCEDO, EDISON BANCULO, JUAN SUAL, JR., and DANILO
LAURIO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The rights of a person under custodial investigation, particularly the right to remain silent
and to counsel, have been explained, echoed and stressed no end by this Court. They are no less
constitutionally enshrined.[1]Innumerable court decisions[2] have been rendered, evincing the
great importance with which the state regards them. A law[3] was recently enacted defining the
rights of persons arrested, detained or under custodial investigation as well as the duties of the
arresting, detaining and investigating officers; and penalizing violations thereof. In spite of these
clear constitutional, jurisprudential and statutory guidelines, one still finds persistent infractions
by public investigators and police authorities that have resulted in acquittals which oftentimes
are not understood or appreciated by the public at large.
In the present case, the issue confronts us once more. As we have held in similar cases, a
voluntary extrajudicial confession of an accused, even where it reflects the truth, if given
without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver thereof, is inadmissible in evidence
against him.[4]
Of course, where the statements in the uncounselled confession are reiterated in open
court, or where other conclusive evidence proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the court should not hesitate to convict and mete the proper penalty.[5]
In an Information[6] dated October 28, 1988, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Andres B.
Barsaga, Jr. charged Accused-appellants Noli Salcedo, Edison Banculo, Juanito Sual, Jr. and
Danilo Laurio, together with Nonoy (Teodulo, Jr.) Esquilona, Reynaldo Cortes, Paco
(Romarico) Manlapaz, Gemo Ibaez, Bolodoy Calderon, Gil Rapsing, Jose Fernandez, Noe
Albao, Ely Rapsing and Norie Huelva, with the crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about June 20, 1988, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Gabi, Municipality of
Baleno, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said
accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation(,) treachery and superiority of strenght (sic) and taking advantage of nighttime,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a gun(,)
hack with a bolo one Honorio Aparejado y Fideles, hitting the latter on the different parts of
the body, thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death.
On September 12, 1989, Accused Noli Salcedo, Juanito Sual, Jr., Edison Banculo, Danilo
Laurio, Reynaldo Cortes and Nonoy Esquilona, assisted by Attys. Ricardo Merdegia and Jose
Medina, pleaded not guilty to the above charge, while Accused Romarico Manlapaz, assisted
by Atty. Ruben Songco, entered the same plea on January 23, 1990. [7] The rest of the accused
remained at large. Trial ensued insofar as those apprehended and arraigned were concerned. On
May 6, 1991, the trial judge rendered judgment convicting Salcedo as principal; and Banculo,
Sual, Jr. and Laurio as accomplices in the crime of murder. Esquilona, Jr., Cortes and
Manlapaz were acquitted.[8]
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The principal witness for the prosecution, Edwin Cortes, a 30-year old farmer, resident of
Gabi, Baleno, Masbate, and brother-in-law of the victim, Honorio Aparejado, identified and
affirmed his statement[9] given on June 30, 1988 relative to the incident which he had subscribed
to before Municipal Circuit Trial Judge Vicente Lim Yu on July 11, 1988. The gist of Cortes
testimony[10] is as follows:
About 8:00 oclock in the evening of June 20, 1988, he was in his house together with his wife,
their four children and the victim when several armed men led by Accused Noli Salcedo
arrived. Salcedo shouted for him and the victim to come out of the house. Once outside,
Cortes and Aparejado were ordered to lie on the ground; then they were hogtied. Thereafter,
they were told to get up and were led to the other side of a creek, about twenty (20) meters
from the house, where they were ordered to lie down again. While the witness and the victim
were in such position about two or three meters apart, Salcedo shot Aparejado twice, then
hacked him. Salcedos companions likewise hacked the victim. Afterwards, they turned
Aparejados body around, opened his stomach and took out his liver. His kneecap was also
removed. Then all the accused left, bringing with them the victims liver and kneecap. Cortes
claimed to have witnessed all these since the accused had a flashlight and the moon was just
rising.
After the accused had left, Cortes ran towards a grassy area where he was able to untie his
hands. The following morning, he informed the relatives of the victim about the incident and
likewise reported the same to police authorities at Baleno, Masbate. Cortes further stated that
he had known Salcedo for about a year prior to the incident and that he had no knowledge of
any reason why the accused had killed Aparejado. Although he admitted not knowing the
identities of Salcedos companions at the time of the murder, he identified each of the accused
before the trial court and said that they were the ones who killed Aparejado.
82
 Municipal Health Officer Conchita Ulanday conducted the postmortem examination on
the body of the victim. Her findings included:
Signs of violence:
(1) Incised wound with a zigzag appearance 11 penetrating exposing the stomach and a
portion of the intestines, located at the epigastric area (Rt.) up to the level
of the navel.
(2) Incised wound slightly curving in appearance(,) 7 penetrating exposing a portion of
the intestines crossing the wound #1 at the level of the navel.
(3) Gunshot wound point of entry #2, 1 cm. circular each 1 apart pre-axillary line at the
level of the 4th and 5th (illegible) with the presence of tattoing (sic)
(powder burns) around the wound(,) back, left, with a downward-inward
in (sic) direction.
(4) Gunshot wound point of entry 1 cm. circular, scapular line, (with) tattoing (sic)
around the wound, lower back, left.
(5) Hack wound at the level of the nape of the neck, almost completely detaching the
head from the body.
(6) A emulsion (sic) knee cartilage, Rt.
Due to the above-mentioned post mortem findings (sic) was made that death was caused by
hack, gunshot and incised wounds.[11]
Dr. Ulanday described the first, second and last wounds as serious but not fatal, although
they might have been secondary to infection. However, the three other wounds were fatal since
they injured vital organs such as the lungs, heart and liver. [12]
Witness Lydia Aparejado, widow of the victim, testified on how she learned of the killing
of her husband. At that time, she was in Baleno attending to the needs of their children who
were studying there. She further testified to the actual expenses incurred as a consequence of
the death of her husband, amounting to P5,000.00. She also demanded indemnification for the
physical and mental anguish she felt due to the killing of her husband, in an amount she left to
the discretion of the court.[13]
P/Sgt. Jose Bajar of the Aroroy Police Station testified that he had conducted the
investigation of Accused Danilo Laurio, Juan[14] Sual, Jr. and Edison Banculo on August 22,
1988. The investigation was in the form of questions and answers in the vernacular which were
reduced into writing.[15] During cross-examination, he admitted that the three were not assisted
by counsel when they signed their respective waivers--neither during the investigation nor at the
time they affixed their signatures to their respective statements. [16]
Pfc. Wencell[17] Esquilona, member of the INP (now PNP) Baleno Police Station, was
presented as a rebuttal witness for the prosecution. He stated that he had effected the arrest of
six of the accused, namely: Manlapaz, Cortes, Esquilona, Jr., Laurio, Banculo and Sual. As to
the latter three, Esquilona admitted that he was not armed with a warrant for their arrest but that
he had only received a wire from the headquarters that the three were suspects in the murder of
Aparejado. At the time of the arrest, he likewise recovered one lantaka, an armalite revolver and
fatigue uniforms at the house where the three were arrested. He stated further that he did not
maltreat any of them and was not present during their investigation conducted by Sgt. Jose
Bajar.[18]
Evidence for the Defense
Accused Edison Banculo testified that he had been in Balite, Aroroy, Masbate, sleeping
in the house of his adoptive parents, Celia[19] Laydo and Angel Entines,[20] on the night the
incident occurred. His adoptive parents and co-accused Danilo Laurio were also in the same
house at that time. He declared that he had signed Exhibit G, purportedly his confession of his
participation in the killing of Aparejado, only because he could not bear the physical
maltreatment by the police who had further threatened to kill him. He confirmed that he was not
assisted by counsel or apprised of his rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel of his
own choice during his investigation.[21]
Another accused, Teodulo Esquilona, Jr., testified that he had been in Masbate, Masbate,
learning the art of wood lamination from a certain Eduardo Marabe, on the day the incident took
place. Among his co-accused, he knew only Reynaldo Cortes while he met the others for the
first time in court. He testified further that, contrary to the assertion of Prosecution Witness
Edwin Cortes, he personally knew the latter who had been his neighbor in the poblacion of
Baleno, Masbate from 1978 to 1986. Besides, his wife was the cousin of Edwin.[22]
Accused Reynaldo Cortes corroborated the alibi of Teodulo, Jr., stating that he slept in
the latters house on the night of June 20, 1988 at Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. The latter had left
early morning of that day and came back only the following day. He denied having known the
other accused previous to the filing of the case except for Romarico Manlapaz who was a
neighbor of Teodulo, Jr. He claimed to be a cousin of the victims father but knew no enmity or
ill feeling between them. He likewise claimed to have been physically maltreated by the police
during his investigation.[23]
The principal suspect, Noli Salcedo, likewise denied complicity in the murder of
Aparejado. He claimed to have been in Manila working as a construction laborer from 1987
until August 1988. When asked the name of his employer and of the firm where he worked, he
could not, however, name either. At the latter date, he went back to Bantigue (in Masbate) to
attend the fiesta. He was later arrested in his hometown of Kinamaligan. At the time of his
arrest, he had tried to escape, as a result of which he was shot by one of the police officers. He
denied knowing the Aparejados and his other co-accused.[24]
Another accused, Romarico Manlapaz, also claimed that he had been in Manila from May
10, 1988 until February 1989 when he returned to Lagta, Baleno. He admitted knowing, among
his co-accused, Teodulo Esquilona, Jr. and Reynaldo Cortes who were his neighbors in
83
Lagta. As to the rest, he only met them in jail. He also denied knowing the victim or his
widow.[25]
Juanito Sual, Jr. stated that he was in his house in Gabi, Baleno, Masbate during the night
of the incident. He admitted affixing his signature to the statement marked Exhibit F for the
prosecution, but only because he could no longer bear the maltreatment of Policeman Wencell
Esquilona. He confirmed that he had not been assisted by counsel during his investigation, and
denied that he had been informed of his rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel of
his own choice. He also claimed that at the time he was apprehended, there was no warrant for
his arrest. He denied having been in the company of Noli Salcedo, whom he allegedly met in
jail only in the evening of June 20, 1988. He said that, among the other accused, he knew only
Edison Banculo, Danilo Laurio and Reynaldo Cortes prior to this case. [26]
Danilo Laurio stated that he was sleeping at the house of his adoptive parents in Balite,
Aroroy, Masbate, on the night that Honorio Aparejado was killed. At that time, his co-accused
Edison Banculo was in the same house.He controverted the statement of Prosecution Witness
Edwin Cortes that he was one of those who had killed Aparejado. He further denied having
known the victim or the latters wife prior to his murder. He also stated that at the time of his
arrest, the arresting officer was not armed with a warrant. Although he admitted having signed
his alleged sworn statement presented by the prosecution, he claimed that he was forced to do
so after having been physically abused by Policeman Wencell Esquilona.[27]
The adoptive mother of Accused Banculo and Laurio, Celia Laydo Entines, testified that
she and the two went gold-panning in her land at Baliti (or Balite), Aroroy, Masbate on June 20,
1988 at daytime. About 7:00 oclock in the evening, they all went to sleep and woke up about
5:00 oclock the following morning. To her knowledge, her two adopted sons did not leave the
house that night.[28]
Two other witnesses were presented, corroborating the alibi of Cortes and Esquilona, Jr.,
and also attesting to their good character.
Ruling of the Trial Court
In discrediting Accused-appellant Noli Salcedos sole defense of alibi, the court a
quo reasoned thus:
Accused Noli Salcedo has been clearly and positively identified by lone witness Edwin
Cortes. His alibi therefore, that he was in Manila at the time the heinous crime was
perpetrated, cannot be sustained. Moreover, after examining the evidence in support of his
defense, the Court finds that his alibi has the aspect of fabrication.
xxx xxx xxx
When asked by the prosecution the firm or the name of his employer where he was working in
Manila, he could not remember the construction firm neither the name of his employer. This is
highly impossible, considering the fact that he reports to work daily. While he may in the
remote probability forget one, he could not forget both."[29]
With respect to the other accused, the trial court explained their complicity this wise:
It is to be remembered that Edwin Cortes, witness for the prosecution knew only Noli Salcedo
and Bolodoy Calderon of the eight (8) who came to his house. x x x
The other accused were merely referred to by the witness as companions of Noli Salcedo and
Bolodoy Calderon. That he was able to pinpoint the other accused in Court is understandable
considering that when the above-named accused were under custodial interrogation, he was
present. Under such circumstances, he could well remember the faces of the six (6) accused
for purposes of implicating them.
Their participation in the criminal act appears to be limited to being present in the premises
where the acts of co-defendants who, other than being present, giving moral support to the
principal accused, cannot be said to constitute direct participation in the acts of execution and
their presence and company were not necessary and essential to the perpetration of the murder
in question. Such co-defendants may only be considered guilty as accomplices x x x.[30]
However, the trial court noted that the inclusion of Accused Romarico (Paco) Manlapaz,
Reynaldo Cortes and Teodulo Esquilona, Jr. in the charge was based solely on the extrajudicial
confessions of Edison Banculo, Juan Sual, Jr. and Danilo Laurio which, absent independent
proof of conspiracy, were not admissible evidence against alleged co-conspirators[31] under
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a judgment of acquittal was rendered in favor
of Manlapaz, Cortes and Esquilona, Jr.
The full dispositive portion of the questioned Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused NOLI SALCEDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
to pay the heirs of the victim in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
Accused Edison Banculo, Juan Sual Jr. and Danilo Laurio as Accomplice (sic) in the crime of
Murder, they are hereby sentenced to suffer Indeterminate Penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, in the absence of any mitigating
circumstance.
All instruments seized from the accused are hereby confiscated in favor of the government, to
wit:
Exh. I - lantaka (homemade gun) long barrel;
Exh. L - armalite revolver, Smith and Wesson, US made;
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Exh. L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4 - live ammos; and
Exh. L-5 and L-6 - empty shells.
In the service of their sentence, accused Edison Banculo, Juan Sual Jr. and Danilo Laurio shall
be given the full credit of their detention.
Accused Teodulo Esquilona, Jr., Reynaldo Cortes and Paco Manlapaz are hereby
ACQUITTED.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued for the apprehension of the other accused who remain
at large up to the present, namely: Gemo Ibaez, Bolodoy Calderon, Gil Rapsing, Jose
Fernandez, Noe Albao, Ely Rapsing and Norie Huelva.[32]
Issues
In their appeal before us, accused-appellants aver that the trial court erred in not acquitting
them on the ground of reasonable doubt and in not giving due credit to their defense of denial
and alibi.[33] They claim that the prosecution failed to present clear and conclusive proof of
conspiracy and of the presence of all elements of the crime (without, however, specifying which
element was not proved). Thus, although alibi is an inherently weak defense, faced with the
improbabilities and uncertainties of the prosecutions evidence, it suffices to raise reasonable
doubt as to the accuseds responsibility.
The Solicitor General views Appellant Salcedos alibi as futile because he failed to prove
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Further, the prosecution eyewitness positive identification of him as one of the
culprits pulverizes his already weak defense. The state counsel recommends, however, the
acquittal of Appellants Banculo, Sual, Jr. and Laurio on the ground that their extrajudicial
confessions were executed without the assistance of counsel and are, hence, inadmissible in
evidence. He further states that since the only evidence implicating them in the crime are these
uncounselled confessions, the constitutional presumption of innocence must be resolved in their
favor.[34]
The Courts Ruling
After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the recommendation of the Solicitor
General justified. Thus, we partially grant this appeal insofar as the conviction of Appellants
Juanito Sual, Jr., Edison Banculo and Danilo Laurio is concerned. However, with regard to
Appellant Noli Salcedo, in the face of the clear and categorical testimony of Prosecution Witness
Edwin Cortes who related in minutiae the extent of Salcedos participation in the vicious
slaughtering of the hapless victim, his conviction must stand.
First Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Against Appellants Banculo, Sual, Jr. and Laurio
Appellants Banculo, Sual, Jr. and Laurio deny complicity in the murder of Aparejado and
refute the voluntariness of the execution of their purported confessions. The three claim to have
been physically maltreated by the apprehending officer and forced to sign the statements
prepared by the police investigator. The trial judge, however, gave no credit to their allegations
of maltreatment, and further ruled against the objections of the defense counsel to the
admissibility of appellants statements on the ground that they had been taken without the
assistance of counsel.
Significantly, the absence of counsel at the time of the investigation of the three above-
named appellants was confirmed by the police investigator himself, thus:
Q (When) Danilo Laurio signed the waiver, was he assisted by counsel?
A No, sir.
Q How about Juanito Sual, when he signed Exhibit F, his waiver, when he signed
the waiver on Exhibit F, was he assisted by his counsel?
A No, sir.
Q When he signed the entire body of your investigation was he also assisted by
counsel?
A No, sir.
Q How about Edison Banculo when he signed the waiver, was he assisted by
counsel?
A He was not assisted.
Q When he signed the entire investigation that you made?
A Yes, sir.[35]
Under these circumstances, this Court is left with no choice but to exclude the sworn
statements of Laurio, Sual, Jr., and Banculo from the evidence against them. We recently had
occasion to discourse on the inviolability of the constitutional rights of a person under custodial
investigation and we find our pronouncement in People vs. Parel once more worth repeating:
85
Under Sec. 12, par. 1, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, any person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The right
to be informed carries with it the correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to
explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding
what is being conveyed. Since what is sought to be attained is comprehension, the degree of
explanation required will vary and depend on education, intelligence and other relevant
personal circumstances of the person being investigated. In further ensuring the right to
counsel of the person being investigated, it is not enough that the subject be informed of that
right; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of the same and should be
told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one will be provided
him at his request. If he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail himself of one to
be provided him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid
and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.
Even assuming that in the instant case the extrajudicial confession made by appellant spoke
the truth and was not extracted through violence or intimidation, still the failure of the police
investigators to inform appellant of his right to remain silent, coupled with the denial of his
right to a competent and independent counsel or the absence of effective legal assistance when
he waived his constitutional rights, rendered the confession inadmissible under Sec. 12, par. 3,
Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution.[36] (Underscoring supplied.)
In People vs. Januario,[37] we reemphasized our unwavering commitment to safeguard
our peoples rights, particularly the right to counsel of persons under custodial investigation, as
follows:
The 1987 Constitution was crafted and ordained at a historic time when our nation was reeling
from ghastly memories of atrocities, excesses and outright violations of our peoples rights to
life, liberty and property. Hence, our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity of
human liberty and specifically to protect persons undergoing custodial investigations from
ignorant, overzealous and/or incompetent peace officers. The Constitution so dearly values
freedom and voluntariness that, inter alia, it unequivocally guarantees a person undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense not only the services of counsel, but a lawyer
who is not merely (a) competent but also (b) independent and (c) preferably of his own choice
as well.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court understands the difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies in apprehending
violators of the law x x x. It sympathizes with the public clamor for the bringing of criminals
before the altar of justice. However, quick solution of crimes and the consequent apprehension
of malefactors are not the end-all and be-all of law enforcement. Enforcers of the law must
follow the procedure mandated by the Constitution and the law. Otherwise, their efforts would
be meaningless. And their expenses in trying to solve crimes would constitute needless
expenditures of taxpayers money.
This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights
as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of
government.
The constitutionally infirm confessions of appellants, therefore, cannot be given
any iota of consideration. And without such statements, the remaining prosecution evidence is
sorely inadequate to prove the participation of Banculo, Sual, Jr. and Laurio in the crime. The
lone prosecution eyewitness, Edwin Cortes, tried to implicate all the accused by describing the
kind of weapon each had been armed with during the night of the incident.[38] His statements
relative thereto are, however, suspect. In the rest of his testimony, he referred to the accused,
other than Salcedo, merely as Salcedos companions. On a specific question proffered by the
public prosecutor, Cortes admitted not knowing the identities of the other accused, thus:
Q Do you want to impress to this Honorable Court that you do not know the rest of
the accused at the time when this victim was killed?
A Yes, sir.[39]
Even during his earlier investigation by the police, he had already claimed not to have
recognized the other assailants. The relevant part of his sworn statement is as follows:
Q How many persons all in all did you see?
A Eight.
Q Of these eight persons were you able to recognize any one of them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they?
A Noli Salcedo and Bolodoy Calderon.
Q How about the six, do you know them?
A I do not know them.[40]
Without knowing the other accused at the time of the incident, it is quite unbelievable that
the witness could recall exactly what kind of weapon each carried that night. No sufficient and
credible evidence is in the records to overturn another constitutional right of the accused: the
right to be presumed innocent of any offense until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Every circumstance favoring their innocence must be taken into account and proof
against them must survive the test of reason.[41] Under the above circumstances, the prosecution
failed to adduce that quantum of evidence required to warrant a conviction. Hence, the three
appellants deserve an acquittal.[42]
Against Appellant Salcedo
We cannot hold the same for Appellant Salcedo. He was positively and consistently
identified by Witness Edwin Cortes as the principal culprit. Upon the groups arrival at the
86
witness house, it was Salcedo who shouted for Cortes and Aparejado to get down from the ANSWER I was in my house at Gabi, Baleno, Masbate.
house. He was the one who gave orders for them to lie down on the ground, to be hogtied and
to proceed to the other side of the creek.[43] The witness was categorical in declaring that it was xxx xxx xxx
Salcedo who shot Aparejado twice and hacked him after that. He testified: Q While you were in your house on that date and time, do you remember of (sic)
Q When you were already lying flat on the ground near that creek what happened? any unusual incident that happened?

A Noli Salcedo shot Honorio Aparejado. A Yes sir.

Q Was Honorio Aparejado hit? Q Tell us what happened.

A Yes, sir. A During that date and time several persons arrived and told us to go down.

Q How far were you when you saw Honorio Aparejado ... Noli Salcedo when he Q How many persons all in all did you see?
shot Honorio Aparejado? A Eight.
A Just near, about two meters. Q Of these eight persons were you able to recognize any one of them?
Q How were you able to see that it was Noli Salcedo who shot Honorio Aparejado A Yes sir.
when it was nighttime?
Q Who are they?
A I could recognize his voice and his physical built.
A Noli Salcedo and Bolodoy Calderon.
Q Was there a light at that time?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened after you were told to lay flat faced down?
xxx xxx xxx
A While we were lying down, Noli Salcedo shot Norie Aparejado.
Q How many times did Noli Salcedo shoot Honorio Aparejado?
Q Was Norie Aparejado hit?
A Two times.
A Yes sir.[45]
Q Then after shooting Honorio Aparejado, what else transpired?
Appellant Salcedo, instead of introducing evidence to show that the witness had evil
A He was hacked. motive in imputing the crime to him, even admitted that he knew of no reason why Edwin Cortes
Q Do you want to tell us that Honorio Aparejado was again hacked? would testify falsely against him.[46]Consequently, Cortes positive and clear identification of
Salcedo is sufficient to convict him. It has been repeatedly held that the testimony of a single
A Yes, sir. witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict.[47]
Q By whom?
A The companions of Noli Salcedo.
Q How about Noli Salcedo, did he hack Honorio Aparejado? Second Issue: Alibi

A Yes, sir.
In the light of the prior discussion exculpating Appellants Banculo, Sual, Jr. and Laurio
Q How many times? from the murder of Aparejado, we shall no longer discuss the sufficiency and worthiness of their
A Only once.[44] alibi.

His testimony essentially affirmed his statements during the police investigation, thus:
QUESTION Last June 20, 1988 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening where were
you?
With respect to Appellant Salcedo, his defense of alibi, juxtaposed with the positive
identification made by Witness Cortes, pales in probative value and is totally inadequate to
justify an exoneration. Salcedo tried to establish that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime since he was supposedly working in Manila at that time. But
87
when asked by the public prosecutor the name of his employer in Manila, he simply replied that review. This Court now deems justified the award of moral damages in the amount
he could not remember anymore.[48] As aptly observed by the trial court, it is highly impossible of P50,000.00 to Lydia, the wife of Honorio Aparejado.
for one not to remember either the name of his employer or the firm where he had
worked.[49] Salcedo did not even attempt to try to recall either name. This lends grave doubt as WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is partially GRANTED. Appellants
to the truthfulness of his defense. The inherent weakness of alibi as a defense was not Edison Banculo, Juanito Sual, Jr. and Danilo Laurio are hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable
overcome. Indubitably, it cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution doubt and are ordered RELEASED immediately unless they are being detained for some other
witness.[50] legal cause. The assailed Decision finding Noli Salcedo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as the payment of the
sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim, Honorio Aparejado y Fideles,
is AFFIRMED. Furthermore, accused-appellant is also ordered to pay moral damages in the
Treachery amount of P50,000.00 to the victims wife, Lydia Aparejado. The other parts of the said
Decision, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the foregoing, are hereby also AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Although the trial court stated that the killing was qualified by treachery, it did not explain
what circumstances of treachery were present. Nonetheless, the facts established during trial
unmistakably point to the presence of means, method or form employed by the accused which
tended directly and specially to ensure the execution of the offense without risk to himself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. The Court is satisfied that these
essential requirements of treachery were proven by clear and convincing evidence
as conclusively as the killing itself.[51]
In the case before us, there were eight assailants, at least one of whom was armed with a
gun and a bolo. It was sufficiently established by the prosecution that the victim had first been
hogtied and then made to lie down facing the ground. And it was in such position that Salcedo
fatally shot and hacked him. Obviously, the killing was attended by alevosia. Aparejado was
rendered defenseless and absolutely with no means to repel or evade the attack.[52] This qualifies
the killing to murder.

Damages

This Court observes that the trial court did not rule on the damages sought to be recovered
by the widow of the victim. Lydia Aparejado testified that she incurred expenses for the
embalmment, the coffin and funeral lot in the estimated amount of P5,000.00. Of such expenses,
the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of the victim. [53] We scoured
the records for any receipt in support of her claim but found none. Actual damages cannot,
therefore, be granted to the victims heirs. However, we affirm the civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 given by the trial court. This is automatically awarded without need of further
evidence other than the fact of the victims death.
Anent moral damages, the victims widow did state that she suffered headaches due to the
death of her husband; with him gone, she worried about how to support her children. Moral
damages, which include physical suffering and mental anguish, may be recovered in criminal
offenses resulting in physical injuries[54] or the victims death, as in this case. The amount of
moral damages is left to the discretion of the court. Since the court a quodid not exercise such
discretion, this Court may do so because an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for

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