CASES ON JURISDICTION

1.Ponce Enrile vs Vinuya, 37 SCRA 381, January 30, 1971,

FACTS: Upon the application of the Anti-Smuggling Action Center (ASAC), the then Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and detention against the Cadillac car
involved in this case, the owner-claimant being a certain, Rodolfo Ceñadoza, as the taxes and
duties had not been paid. The warrant was served and enforced prior to the filing of a complaint
for replevin with respondent Judge. A certain Jess O. Tuazon, General Manager of the Lee Sabre
Car Exchange, Manila, executed an affidavit, to the effect that Rodolfo Ceñadoza had left the said
car in his possession for the purpose of selling the same and that the affiant had obligated himself
to waive his rights to sell the above-mentioned car not until the proper taxes due to the
government has been satisfactorily paid. Said Jess Tuazon, who then had possession of the said
Cadillac car, through his lawyer, Thomas S. Cortez, executed a promissory note, obligating himself
to pay the corresponding taxes and duties.” It was moreover shown in the petition that the
owner, Rodolfo Ceñadoza, had sold such car to one Francisco Dee from whom respondent Vinuya
acquired the same. Under claim that he was aggrieved by such seizure and detention of the car
in question, respondent Vinuya filed a complaint for replevin in the sala of respondent Judge.
After filing a bond of P60,000.00 an ex-parte order was issued by respondent Judge directing a
special sheriff to take possession of the Cadillac car in question. On the very same day respondent
Judge likewise gave due course to the complaint for replevin and required petitioners to file their
answer. There was, on the part of petitioners, a motion to dismiss as well as to lift the ex-parte
order. In seeking such dismissal, the attention of respondent Judge was invited to the fact that
forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted before the Collector of Customs who has the
sole jurisdiction to determine questions affecting the disposition of property under seizure as
well as the absence of a cause of action. There was an opposition by respondent Vinuya and a
denial thereof in an order of respondent Judge on the ground that such motion to dismiss “is
withoutmerit.”

ISSUE: Whether Judge Walfrido de los Angeles is vested with jurisdiction to entertain a complaint
for replevin filed by the other respondent, Andres M. Vinuya, for the recovery of a Cadillac car,
subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceeding?

RULING: No. From a study of the records of the case as well as the applicable law, the conclusion
reached by us, as mentioned at the outset, is that the petition should be granted.
The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in
the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance from assuming cognizance over such
a matter. This has been so, as noted, since Pacis vs Averia. In an opinion penned by Justice J. P.
Bengzon, there was a statement of the legal provisions that call for application. Thus: “The Tariff
and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, lists the kinds of property subject to forfeiture. At
the same time, in Part 2 of Title VI thereof, it provides for the procedure in seizure and forfeiture
cases and vests in the Collector of Customs the authority to hear and decide said cases. The
Collector’s decision is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs whose decision is in turn
appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals. An aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the
Court of Tax Appeals directly to this Court. On the other hand, Section 44 (c) of the Judiciary Act
of 1948 lodges in the Court of First Instance original jurisdiction in all cases in which the value of
the property in controversy amounts to more than ten thousand pesos. This original jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which
is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to
render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
This is precisely what took place in this case. The crucial question whether Section 44(c) of the
Judiciary Act should give way to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code was answered in
the affirmative, the opinion clearly stating that “the Court of First Instance should yield to the
jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided
for in Republic Act 1937 which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of
1948. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute. Moreover, on grounds of public
policy, it is more reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First
Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture
proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of
property for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the simple devise of
replevin.” Respondents, however, notwithstanding the compelling force of the above doctrines,
would assert that respondent Judge could entertain the replevin suit as the seizure is illegal,
allegedly because the warrant issued is invalid and the seizing officer likewise was devoid of
authority. This is to lose sight of the distinction, as earlier made mention of, between the
existence of the power and the regularity of the proceeding taken under it. The governmental
agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be
assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be correctly
imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of
discretion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction.

2. REPUBLIC vs. CFI MANILA and MAYER STEEL PIPE CORP., G.R. No. 43747; September 2, 1992

Doctrine: Application of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction – The question of forfeiture of the
properties sought to be imported is for the Collector of Customs to determine and then by the
Commissioner of Customs. Thereafter, appeals must be brought to the Court of Tax Appeals.

FACTS: The CFI of Manila issued an injunction enjoining the Collector of Customs (Collector) from
enforcing an order to seize some packages of machinery from the Private Respondent, Mayer
Steel Pipe Corporation. The complaint with the CFI alleged the lack of due process in the
proceedings leading to the order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has the jurisdiction to issue an injunction over the order of the
Collector.

RULING: The mandate of the law is very specific. Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code
provides:

"SEC. 2312. Decision or Action by Collector in Protest and Seizure Cases. — When a protest in
proper form is presented in a case where protest is required, the Collector shall issue an order
for hearing within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the protest and hear the matter thus
presented. Upon the termination of the hearing, the Collector shall render a decision within thirty
(30) days, and if the protest is sustained, in whole or in part, he shall make the appropriate order,
the entry reliquidated if necessary."

On the other hand, Section 2313 of the same law states:

Review by Commissioner. — The person aggrieved by the decision or action of the Collector in
any matter presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen (15)
days after notification in writing by the Collector of his action or decision, give written notice to
the Collector and one copy furnished to the Commissioner of his desire to have the matter
reviewed by the Commissioner. Thereupon the Collector shall forthwith transmit all the records
of the proceedings to the Commissioner, who shall approve, modify or reverse the action or
decision of the collector and take such steps and make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to his decision.

Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125 (An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals) also provides:

Jurisdiction — The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review
by appeal, as herein provided —
xxx
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees
or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected: fines forfeitures or
other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or
other law or part of the law administered by the Bureau of Customs.

Clearly then, the question of seizure and forfeiture is for the Collector of Customs to determine
in the first instance and then the Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A
court of first instance is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter. Lastly, in the case of
Enrile vs. Vinuya, it was held that “the prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in
seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance
from assuming cognizance over such a matter.” As regards to the allegation that there was
violation of due process, the Court noted that there was a hearing with 6 witnesses and for the
purposes of administrative proceedings.

Wherefore, the order of injunction issued by the CFI of Manila was annulled.

3. Chia vs Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755, September 26, 1989

FACTS: Acting on a verified report of a confidential informant that assorted electronic and
electrical equipment and other articles illegally imported into the Philippines by a syndicate
engaged in unlawful “shipside” activities (foreign goods are unloaded from foreign ships in transit
through Philippine waters into motorized bancas and landed on Philippine soil without passing
through the Bureau of Customs, thereby evading payment of the corresponding customs duties
and taxes thereon) were found inside “Tom’s Electronic” and “Sony Merchandising (Philip-pines)
stores. A letter-request was addressed to the Collector of Customs by the Deputy Director of the
Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center for the issuance of warrants of seizure and detention.
After evaluation, the Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Seizure and Detention Nos. 14925
and 14925-A, directing the Anti-Smuggling Action Center to seize the goods. Petitioner Tomas
Chia filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the Collector of
Customs and/or his agents from further proceeding with the forfeiture hearing and prayed that
the search warrants be declared null and void, that the respondents be ordered to return the
confiscated articles to the petitioner, and to pay damages. Respondents contend that the goods
seized from petitioner’s stores by the RASAC-MBA team were only those subject to customs
duties and taxes but which were not supported by any evidence of payment of those duties and
taxes. Those goods are subject to forfeiture for having been imported in violation of Section 2536
of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, in relation to Section 2530 (m)-1.

ISSUE: Whether the warrants of seizure and detention (or Seizure Identifications Nos. 14925 and
14925-A) are general warrants issued in violation of Rule 126, Section 3, of the Rules of Court

RULING: No. Not only may goods be seized without a search and seizure warrant under Section
2536 of the Customs and Tariff Code, when they (the goods) are openly offered for sale or kept
in storage in a store as in this case, but the fact is that petitioner’s stores, Tom’s Electronics and
Sony Merchandising (Phil.) were searched upon warrants of search and detention issued by the
Collector of Customs, who, under the 1973 Constitution, was a responsible officer authorized by
law to issue them. Sections 2208 and 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code provide when a search
may be made without a warrant and when a warrant is necessary:

SEC. 2208. RIGHT OF POLICE OFFICER TO ENTER INCLOSURE.·For the more effective discharge of
his official duties, any person exercising the powers herein conferred, may at any time enter, pass
through or search any land or inclosure or any warehouse, store or other building, not being a
dwelling house. „A warehouse, store or other building or inclosure used for the keeping or
storage of articles does not become a dwelling house within the meaning hereof merely by
reason of the fact that a person employed as watchman lives in the place, nor will the fact that
his family stays there with him alter the case.

SEC. 2209.·SEARCH OF A DWELLING HOUSE.·A dwelling house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a Judge of the court or such other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law, upon sworn application showing probable cause and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

The warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were not general warrants, as
erroneously alleged by the petitioner for they identified the stores to be searched, described the
articles to be seized and specified the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code violated. Upon
effecting the seizure of the goods, the Bureau of Customs acquired exclusive jurisdiction not only
over the case but also over the goods seized for the purpose of enforcing the tariff and customs
laws. Additional information on Appeal: A party dissatisfied with the decision of the Collector
may appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision is appealable to the Court of Tax
Appeals in the manner and within the period prescribed by law and regulations. The decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals may be elevated to the Supreme Court for review (Secs. 2309-2316;
2401 & 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code

4. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS , G.R. Nos. 111202-05. January 31,
2006

FACTS: On January 7, 1989, the vessel M/V “Star Ace,” entered the Port of San Fernando, La
Union (SFLU) for needed repairs. When the Bureau of Customs later became suspicious that the
vessel’s real purpose in docking was to smuggle its cargo into the country, seizure proceedings
were instituted and, subsequently, two Warrants of Seizure and Detention were issued for the
vessel and its cargo. Cesar S. Urbino, Sr., does not own the vessel or any of its cargo but claimed
a preferred maritime lien under a Salvage Agreement. To protect his claim, Urbino initially filed
two motions in the seizure and detention cases: a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Lift Warrant
of Seizure and Detention
Apparently not content with his administrative remedies, Urbino sought relief with the
regular courts by filing a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages before the RTC of SFLU,
seeking to restrain the District Collector of Customs from interfering with his salvage operation.
Urbino again filed another case for Certiorari and Mandamus with the RTC of Manila, presided
by Judge Arsenio M. Gonong, this time to enforce his maritime lien. The RTC of Manila later
rendered a decision finding in favor of Urbino.
Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Manila. The Special Sheriff executed the
decision and issued a notice of levy and sale against the vessel and its cargo. The Commissioner
of Customs, upon learning of the notice of levy and sale, filed with the RTC of Manila a motion to
recall the writ, but before it could be acted upon, the sheriff had auctioned off the vessel and the
cargo to Urbino for One Hundred and Twenty Million Pesos (P120,000,000). The CA issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the RTC of Manila from enforcing its cease and desist and
recall orders. The TRO was eventually substituted by a writ of preliminary injunction. A motion
to lift the injunction was filed by the Commissioner of Customs but it was denied. Urbino
attempted to enforce the RTC of Manila’s decision and the Certificate of Sale against the Bureau
of Customs by filing a third case, a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the
RTC of Kaloocan. The RTC of Kaloocan ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the Philippine Ports Authority and the Bureau of Customs from interfering with the
relocation of the vessel and its cargo by Urbino.
Executive Judge for the RTC of Manila, Judge Bernardo P. Pardo having been informed of
the circumstances of the sale, issued an order nullifying the report and all proceedings taken in
connection therewith. With this order Urbino filed his fourth case with the CA on, a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus against Judge Pardo. The CA issued a Resolution granting
the TRO against the Executive Judge to enjoin the implementation of his Order.
Going back to the seizure and detention proceedings, the decision of the District Collector
of Customs was to forfeit the vessel and cargo in favor of the Government. This decision was
affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs. The CTA issued an order authorizing the
Commissioner of Customs to assign customs police and guards around the vessel and to conduct
an inventory of the cargo. In response, Urbino filed a fifth Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with the CA to assail the order as well as the jurisdiction of the Presiding Judge and Associate
Judges of the CTA in the three cases. The CA issued a Resolution reminding the parties that the
vessel is under the control of the appellate court and the CA issued a joint Decision nullifying and
setting aside: 1) the Order recalling the writ of execution by Judge Gonong of the RTC of Manila;
2) the Order of Executive Judge Pardo of the RTC of Manila nullifying the Sheriff’s Report and all
proceedings connected therewith; and 3) the 3 Order of the CTA, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUEs:
1. Can the RTC of Kalookan be prohibited from further proceeding with the case?
2. Whether or not the decision of the RTC of Manila as to the defendant vessel has attained
finality.
3. Whether or not the CTA has power to determine issues of ownership over goods in the
custody of custom officials.

RULING:
1. Yes. The RTC of Kalookan issued the Order against the Philippine Ports Authority and Bureau
of Customs solely on the basis of Urbino’s alleged ownership over the vessel by virtue of his
certificate of sale. By this the RTC of Kalookan committed a serious and reversible error in
interfering with the jurisdiction of customs authorities and should have dismissed the petition
outright. In Mison v. Natividad, this Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs In Mison v. Natividad, this Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs. The facts in this case are like those in that case. Urbino claimed to be the owner of the
vessel and he sought to restrain the PPA and the Bureau of Customs from interfering with his
rights as owner. His remedy, therefore, was not with the RTC but with the CTA where the seizure
and detention cases are now pending and where he was already allowed to intervene. Moreover,
this Court, on numerous occasions, cautioned judges in their issuance of temporary restraining
orders and writs of preliminary injunction against the Collector of Customs based on the principle
enunciated in Mison v. Natividad and has issued
Administrative Circular No. 7-99 to carry out this policy. This Court again reminds all concerned
that the rule is clear: the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings and trial courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such
matters even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus

2. No. The Court finds the decision of the RTC of Manila, in so far as it relates to the vessel M/V
“Star Ace,”to be void as jurisdiction was never acquired over the vessel. In filing the case, Urbino
had impleaded the vessel as a defendant to enforce his alleged maritime lien. This meant that he
brought an action in rem under the Code of Commerce under which the vessel may be attached
and sold. However, the basic operative fact for the institution and perfection of proceedings in
rem is the actual or constructive possession of the res by the tribunal empowered by law to
conduct the proceedings. This means that to acquire jurisdiction over the vessel, as a defendant,
the trial court must have obtained either actual or constructive possession over it. Neither was
accomplished by the RTC of Manila.
In his comment to the petition, Urbino plainly stated that petitioner has actual physical
custody not only of the goods and/or cargo but the subject vessel, M/V Star Ace, as well. This is
clearly an admission that the RTC of Manila did not have jurisdiction over the res. While Urbino
contends that the Commissioner of Custom’s custody was illegal, such fact, even if true, does not
deprive the Commissioner of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. This is a question that ought to be
resolved in the seizure and forfeiture cases, which are now pending with the CTA, and not by the
regular courts as a collateral matter to enforce his lien. By simply filing a case in rem against the
vessel, despite its being in the custody of customs officials, Urbino has circumvented the rule that
regular trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure
and forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, on his mere assertion that the
administrative proceedings were a nullity. On the other hand, the Bureau of Customs had
acquired jurisdiction over the res ahead and to the exclusion of the RTC of Manila.

3. As regards the jurisdiction of the CTA, the CA was clearly in error when it issued an injunction
against it from deciding the forfeiture case on the basis that it interfered with the subject of
ownership over the vessel which was, according to the CA, beyond the jurisdiction of the CTA.
Firstly, the execution of the Decision against the vessel and cargo, as aforesaid, was a nullity and
therefore the sale of the vessel was invalid. Without a valid certificate of sale, there can be no
claim of ownership which Urbino can present against the Government. Secondly, as previously
stated, allegations of ownership neither divest the Collector of Customs of such jurisdiction nor
confer upon the trial court jurisdiction over the case. Ownership of goods or the legality of its
acquisition can be raised as defenses in a seizure proceeding. The actions of the Collectors of
Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. Clearly, issues of ownership over goods in the
custody of custom officials are within the power of the CTA to determine.

5. Asian Terminals, Inc. vs. Bautista-Ricafort, G.R. No. 166901, October 27, 2006

FACTS: Section 1, Republic Act (RA) No. 8506, which took effect on February 22, 1998, provides
that it shall be unlawful for any person to import, cause the importation of, register, cause the
registration of, use or operate any vehicle with its steering wheel right hand side thereof in any
highway, street or road, whether private or public, or at the national or local.
Private respondents were duly-licensed importers of vehicles who imported 72 secondhand
right-hand drive buses from Japan. When the shipment arrived at the South Harbor, Port of
Manila, the District Collector of Customs impounded the vehicles and ordered them stored at the
warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI), a customs-bonded warehouse under the custody of
the Aviation and Cargo Regional Division. Conformably with Section 2607 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, the District Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Distraint against the
shipment and set the sale at public auction on September 10, 1998. The importers filed a
complaint in RTC of Parañaque City, against the Secretary of Finance, Customs Commissioner,
and the Chief Executive of the Societe Generale de Surillee, for replevin with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages.

The RTC granted the application for replevin. While the Chief of Customs Police and four (4)
customs policemen prevented the Sheriff and the policemen assisting him from taking custody
of the vehicles claiming that District Collector of Customs had jurisdiction over the vehicles.
Eventually, agreed to transfer the custody of the vehicles to the RTC, on the condition that the
required taxes, dues, and other charges be paid and that they left nothing to oppose the writ due
to its order of arresting anyone who would obstruct the implementation of its order.
The SolGen filed an Omnibus Motion and prayed that the writ of replevin issued by the court be
quashed on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the vehicles subject of seizure and
detention before the Bureau of Customs. The OSG declared that the Bureau of Customs
which had custody of the vehicles through ATI had exclusive jurisdiction over said vehicles and
on the issues of the seizure and detention thereof. ATI then filed a Third-Party Claim over the
shipment, alleging that it had a lien over the vehicles for accumulated and unpaid storage and
arrastre charges, and wharfage dues which they subsequently filed a Motion for Intervention and
for Admission of its Complaint-in-Intervention. However, RTC dismissed the Complaint-in-
Intervention and also their motion for reconsideration. ATI filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 before the CA which the court dismissed the petition for lack of merit stating that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the main case, it was also bereft of authority to hear the third-party claim or the complaint-
in-intervention filed by ATI. CA denied the motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No. Section 602 of the TCC provides that the Bureau of Customs shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over seized and forfeited cars. It is tasked to enforce tariff, and supervise and control
customs law and all other laws, rules and regulations relating to the tariff and customs
administration; and to supervise and control all import and export cargoes, loaded or stored in
piers, terminal facilities, including container yards and freight stations, for the protection of
government revenues. Under Section 2301 of the TCC, the Collector of Customs is empowered
to make a seizure of cargoes and issue a receipt for the detention thereof. As the Court ruled in
Jao v. Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs
and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. It is the Collector of Customs, sitting
in seizure and forfeiture proceedings, who has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are
precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus.

The Court Said:

“It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Republic
Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, specify
the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised
concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the
Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals. The rule that
Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy
of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government’s drive, not only to prevent smuggling
and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the
collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out
the functions it has been instituted to perform”. In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the
issuance of the writ of replevin and its implementation are void. While it is true that the District
Collector of Customs allowed the release of the vehicles and the transfer thereof to the custody
of the RTC upon the payment by the private respondents of the required taxes, duties and
charges, he did not thereby lose jurisdiction over the vehicles; neither did it vest jurisdiction on
the RTC to take cognizance of and assume jurisdiction over the petition for replevin.

Note: The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention.

Considering that it had no jurisdiction over respondents’ action and over the shipment subject of
the complaint, all proceedings before it would be void. The RTC had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention and act thereon except to dismiss the same.
Moreover, considering that intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing
litigation and never an independent action, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily
results in the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention. Likewise, a court which has no
jurisdiction over the principal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-intervention.
Intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
of intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action.

6. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented

by the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, G.R. No. 161953. March 6, 2008.

FACTS: On November 3, 1999, then Secretary Edgardo B. Espiritu of the Department of Finance
(DOF) informed petitioner that its TDMs and TCCs were fraudulently issued and transferred, and
had to be cancelled. He asked petitioner to immediately pay the BoC and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue the value of the canceled TCCs as well as the related penalties, surcharges and interests.
Petitioner assailed the action of the DOF. It asserted that there was no legal and factual basis to
invalidate the TCCs. Because petitioner was an assignee in good faith (i.e., it observed the
procedure prescribed by the Center), the TCCs were authentic and genuine as far as it was
concerned. Petitioner likewise pointed out discrepancies between the amount claimed by
respondent and those it (petitioner) actually paid in satisfaction of its liabilities. Despite
petitioner's objections, Commissioner Nelson A. Tan of the BoC demanded from it the amount of
P209,129,141. Thus, petitioner filed a formal protest. However, the BoC did not act on this
protest. Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review questioning the legality of the
cancellation of the TCCs in the CTA. Meanwhile, respondent filed a complaint for collection in the
RTC. It alleged that the TCCs petitioner purchased from Filipino Way Industries amounting to
P10,088,912 were spurious and were used by petitioner to pay customs duties and taxes on its
importations in 1997. Thus, in view of the invalidation, petitioner still owed respondent the
amount of P10,088,912 in unpaid customs duties and taxes. Petitioner immediately moved to
dismiss the collection case. It contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
and that the complaint for collection was prematurely filed in view of its pending petition for
review in the CTA. RTC denied petitioner's motion and instead ordered it to file an answer.
Petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC. It averred that, in view of its pending petition
for review in the CTA, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to Yabes v.
Flojo. According to Yabes, the RTC acquires jurisdiction over a collection case only if an
assessment made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has become final and incontestable.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the filing of the collection case was a proper remedy
2. Whether RTC had no jurisdiction over the collection case inasmuch as the CTA had not yet
decided the petition for review

RULING:
1. Yes. An assessment or liquidation by the BoC attains finality and conclusiveness one year from
the date of the final payment of duties except when:(a) there was fraud; (b) there is a pending
protest or (c) the liquidation of import entry was merely tentative. None of the foregoing
exceptions is present in this case. There was no fraud as petitioner claimed (and was presumed)
to be in good faith. Respondent does not dispute this. Moreover, records show that petitioner
paid those duties without protest using its TCCs. Finally, the liquidation was not a tentative one
as the assessment had long become final and incontestable. Consequently, pursuant to Yabes
and because of the cancellation of the TCCs, respondent had the right to file a collection case.
Under Section 1204 of the TCCP, import duties constitute a personal debt of the importer that
must be paid in full. The importers liability therefore constitutes a lien on the article which the
government may choose to enforce while the imported articles are either in its custody or under
its control. When respondent released petitioner's goods, its (respondents) lien over the
imported goods was extinguished. Consequently, respondent could only enforce the payment of
petitioner's import duties in full by filing a case for collection against petitioner

2. The subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Respondent filed its complaint for
collection on April 3, 2002. The governing law at that time was RA 1125 or the old CTA Law.
Inasmuch as the present case did not involve a decision of the Commissioner of Customs in any
of the instances enumerated in Section 7(2) of RA 1125, the CTA had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It was the RTC that had jurisdiction under Section 19(6) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. In view of the foregoing, the RTC should forthwith proceed with Civil
Case No. 02-103191 and determine the extent of petitioner's liability. We are not unmindful of
petitioner's pending petition for review in the CTA where it is questioning the validity of the
cancellation of the TCCs. However, respondent cannot and should not await the resolution of
that case before it collects petitioner's outstanding customs duties and taxes for such delay will
unduly restrain the performance of its functions. Moreover, if the ultimate outcome of the CTA
case turns out to be favorable to petitioner, the law affords it the adequate remedy of seeking a
refund.
7. CHUA vs VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 157591, December 16, 2005

FACTS: On 23 September 2001, the vessel M/V Criston carrying the shipment consisting of thirty-
five thousand (35,000) bags of rice from the Port of Manila docked at the Port of Tabaco, Albay.
The rice was shipped to petitioners Antonio Chua, Jr. and Carlos Carillo by their supplier in Manila
and to be paid upon delivery thereof to Tabaco, Albay. Upon the arrival of the said vessel, Acting
Port Collector Rosalino L. Maravillo immediately conducted the usual Verification Order and/or
Hold Order based on the documents submitted. At about ten o’clock in the morning of the same
day, then Commissioner of Customs Titus Villanueva, who had been earlier informed by the NCR-
Central Luzon Philippine Coast Guard that M/V Criston was never given any departure clearance
by the said office, issued a verbal instruction to then District Collector Atty. Marcial F. Lopez to
issue immediately a WSD against M/V Criston and its cargo. Since it was a Sunday, District
Collector Lopez instructed his Deputy District Collector Atty. Winston B. Florin to issue a Warrant
of Seizure and Detention (WSD) against the vessel and its rice cargo, a part reads:
WHEREAS, based on the documents submitted to this Office, the undersigned cannot find any
violation to (sic) Section 2530 of the TCCP, as amended, however, reservation is hereby made to
make necessary amendments hereto should a violation arises (sic) thereafter.
To protect their property rights and interests against the alleged illegality of the actions of the
respondents Bureau of Customs officers, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order2 (TRO) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 15, docketed as Civil Case No. T-2170,
questioning the authority exercised by the Customs officials in issuing an invalid WSD with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Did the Bureau of Customs validly acquire jurisdiction over the subject property by virtue
of a warrant of seizure and detention considering that the same expressly state that there was
no violation committed under the Tariff and Customs Code?

RULING: YES. Jurisdiction over the instant case is well-settled by law and jurisprudence.
The Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines under Section 602 provides:
SECTION 602. Functions of the Bureau. - The general duties, powers and jurisdiction of the Bureau
shall include:
(g) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases under the tariff and
customs laws.
The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended,
otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper for a and
procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these
proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.
The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even
through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The rule that Regional Trial Courts have
no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary
hindrance on the government’s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon
Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and
export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been
instituted to perform. Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet
to be proven, such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.

8. PPA vs FUENTES,

FACTS: On July 11, 1974, P.D. No. 505 was promulgated, creating the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA). The Decree was later amended by P.D. No. 857 dated December 23, 1975 (otherwise
known as the Revised PPA Charter). Under the Decree, the PPA is entrusted with the function of
carrying out an integrated program for the planning, development, financing and operation of
ports and port districts throughout the country. The powers, duties, and jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs concerning arrastre operations were transferred to and vested in the
petitioner PPA (Philippine Ports Authority vs. Mendoza, 138 SCRA 496, 503). Pursuant to said
decree, PPA was authorized to "regulate the rates or charges for port services or port related
services so that, taking one year with another, such rates or charges furnish adequate working
capital and produce an adequate return on the assets of the Authority" (PPA) (Section 20[b]) and
"to levy dues, rates, or charges for the use of the premises, works, appliances, facilities, or for
services provided by or belonging to the Authority or any other organization concerned with port
operations" (Section 6[b] [IX]). Furthermore, the PPA was authorized to impose a ten percent
(10%) charge on the monthly gross earnings of the operators of arrastre and stevedoring services
(also known as Government Share). In its Board Resolution No. 7 dated April 21, 1976 embodying
the "Memorandum Agreement," PPA laid down the terms and conditions under which TEFASCO
was allowed to construct specialized port and terminal facilities for incoming and outgoing
foreign and domestic vessels and authorized to render port services, particularly, arrastre and
stevedoring services on incoming and outgoing cargoes loaded on or unloaded from foreign and
domestic vessels. On August 30, 1988, TEFASCO filed in the trial court a complaint for
"declaration of nullity, prohibition, mandamus and damages with writ of preliminary injunction"
against PPA, asking the court to restrain PPA: (a) from imposing and/or collecting any form of
income-sharing whether under the guise of a government share or privilege fee or by such other
name or designation whether based on gross receipts from TEFASCO's arrastre/stevedoring or
other port-related services or operations; (b) from collecting from TEFASCO, PPA's share of ten
percent (10%) or any other percentage from the cargo handling revenue based on gross income;
x x x (h) from collecting 100% wharfage, harbor, and berthing dues on cargoes and vessels availing
of TEFASCO's port terminal facilities.

ISSUE: Is CTA vested with jurisdiction to review appeals from decisions or rulings of the Philippine
Ports Authority?
RULING: No. Since jurisdiction is conferred by law and under P.D. 857, the collection of port
charges ceased to be an administrative function of the Bureau of Customs and was transferred
to the PPA; that neither P.D. 857 nor R.A. 1125 contains a provision for an appeal to the Court of
Tax appeals from decisions of the PPA; and further considering that the Court of Tax Appeals is a
specialized court of limited jurisdiction, no appellate jurisdiction over PPA decisions may be
vested in the Court of Tax Appeals by mere implication. This issue was set at rest by the decision
of this Court in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals where we ruled:

"There is no law or statute which expressly vests jurisdiction upon the Court of Tax Appeals to
review appeals from decisions or rulings of the Philippine Ports Authority x x x. The jurisdiction
of a court to take cognizance of a case, we believe, should be clearly conferred and should not
be deemed to exist on mere implication, especially with respect to the Court of Tax Appeals which
is a specialized court of limited jurisdiction."