Republic v.
Estonilo GR No 157306 November 25, 2005 to private rights, if any thereby, the following described parcels of public domain,
T o segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of the
Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation to that effect. A court
judgment is not necessary to make the proclamation effective or valid.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the February 21, 2003 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR CV No. 66807. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the ruling of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED.[3]
The Facts
The antecedents were summarized by the CA as follows:
This case originated from an application for registration of a parcel of land known as
Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an area of
357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original [a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the
defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her
application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously owned and
possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the
heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself,
Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty (Exhibit A) on June 14, 1954.
After due notice and publication of said application, only the Provincial Fiscal of
Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines [AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed its opposition
thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrable land pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared Lot
4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 265. RESERVING FOR THE USE OF THE
PHILIPPINE ARMY THREE PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN
THE BARRIOS OF BULUA AND CARMEN, MUNICIPALITY OF CAGAYAN,
PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, ISLAND OF MINDANAO.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and
pursuant to the provision of section eighty-three of Commonwealth Act Number One
Hundred and Forty-one, I hereby withdraw from sale of settlement and reserve for
the use of the Philippine Army, under the administration of the Chief of Staff subject
situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan, Province of
Misamis Oriental, Island of Mindanao, and particularly described in Bureau of Lands
SWO-15234, to wit:
Lot No. 4318. x x x.
Containing an area of 354,377 square meters.
During the initial hearing set on February 12, 1955, an Order of General Default was
issued by the lower court. On July 29, 1959, Bombeo died and was substituted by
her daughter Cipriana Actub Tiu who eventually died on December 5, 1990.
Thereafter, due to intervening deaths of the parties, the case literally went to slumber
until it was re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 17) of Misamis Oriental on
October 16, 1991 and was pursued anew by the daughters of Cipriana Actub Tiu,
namely, Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po. On the other hand,
Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines; were represented by the
Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Abbu and Major Raul Llacuna of JAGO [Judge
Advocate Generals Office]. On May 27, 1994, the trial court confirmed title over Lot
4318 to Nazaria Bombeo substituted by her heirs Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and
Andrea Actub Tiu Po and ordered registration thereof under the names of the latter.
Consequently, Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of
the Philippines, through the Solicitor Generals Office; filed an appeal to said decision
x x x.
During the pendency of the appeal, however, Presidential Proclamation No.
330[4] took effect on June 20, 2000, excluding Lot 4318 from the operation of
Presidential Proclamation No. 265[.]
xxxxxxxxx
In view of the aforesaid decree, x x x [respondents urged the CA] to finally put to
rest the controversy in their favor considering that the opposition of the Republic has
no longer any basis.[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 (Proc 265) failed
to segregate effectively Lot 4318 as part of the military reservation. The CA said that
the proclamation was not self-executory and self-adjudicating considering that there
is a need to determine private rights of claimants over lands sought to be reserved.
Moreover, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondents were able
to establish with sufficient evidence their right to have the land registered under their
names. It acknowledged that possession by respondents predecessors-in-interest
had ripened into an imperfect title of ownership, subject to judicial confirmation. It
added that ownership of the land would still be deemed vested in respondents, in
view of their almost half a century of open, continuous, adverse and peaceful
possession, even if possession by their predecessors-in-interest were not taken into
consideration.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 did not effectively segregate Lot 4318 from the public domain.
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that respondents were
able to establish that they have already acquired private right over Lot 4318 which
already amounted to a title.
III.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the passage of
Presidential Proclamation No. 330 which excludes from the operation of Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 Lot 4318 negates the claim of the AFP that the land in dispute
is actively possessed and used by it.[7]
In short, the main issue is whether respondents have duly proven their title to the
subject land and may thus register it under the Public Land Act.
The Courts Ruling: The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Validity of Respondents Title
The Public Land Act[8] requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect titles to prove
(1) that the land is alienable public land;[9] and (2) that their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property has taken place
either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed by law. When the legal
conditions are complied with, the possessor of the land -- by operation of law --
acquires a right to a government grant, without necessitating the issuance of a
certificate of title.[10]
After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and the appellate courts,
as well as of the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents failed to satisfy
the above legal requirements.
Nature of Lot 4318
It is not disputed that Proc 265 specifically reserved Lot 4318 for the use of the
Philippine Army. Respondents maintain, though, that the land was not effectively
segregated as a military reservation by the Proclamation. Relying on Baloy v.
CA,[11] they allege that a petition for reservation or a court judgment declaring the
reservation is necessary to make Proc 265 effective. They maintain that the
provision in the Proclamation subjecting the reservation to private rights presumes
that notice and hearing will be afforded to all persons claiming ownership rights over
the land. Otherwise, the reservation would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law. They further allege that the AFP failed to observe these
requirements, thus causing the reservation to be ineffectual.
Petitioner, however, argues that the Public Land Act does not require a judicial order
to create a military reservation. It contends that the proviso requiring the reservation
to be subject to private rights means that persons claiming rights over the reserved
land are not precluded from proving their claims. It contends further that respondents
were afforded due process when their application for registration of title to Lot 4318
was heard by the lower courts.
We agree with petitioner. The segregation of land for a public purpose is governed
by the Public Land Act, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land
of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or
of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations
prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public
interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads,
hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales,
public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's village and other
improvements for the public benefit.
SECTION 86. A certified copy of every proclamation of the President issued under
the provisions of this title shall be forwarded to the Director of Lands for record in
his office, and a copy of this record shall be forwarded to the Register of Deeds of
the province or city where the land lies. Upon receipt of such certified copy, the
Director of Lands shall order the immediate survey of the proposed reservation if the
land has not yet been surveyed, and as soon as the plat has been completed, he
shall proceed in accordance with the next following section.
SECTION 87. If all the lands included in the proclamation of the President are not
registered under the Land Registration Act, the Solicitor General, if requested to do
so by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall proceed in
accordance with the provision of Section fifty-three of this Act.
SECTION 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the opinion of
the President the public interests shall require it, to cause to be filed in the proper
Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead,
a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall
not have voluntarily come in under the provisions of this chapter or of the Land
Registration Act, stating in substance that the title of such holder, claimant,
possessor, or occupant is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such
land which has not been brought into court as aforesaid are open to question; or that
it is advisable that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated, and praying that
the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or the right to occupancy thereof
be settled and adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this section shall be in
accordance with the laws on adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
Clearly, under the above provisions, only a positive act of the President is needed
to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It must be noted that while Section
53 grants authority to the director of lands -- through the solicitor general -- to file a
petition against claimants of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is not
mandatory. The director of lands is required to file a petition only whenever in the
opinion of the President public interest requires it.
Inapplicable is the ruling in Baloy v. CA[12] requiring, after due notice and hearing, a
judicial declaration of reservation. The subject of the application for registration
in Baloy was originally private land, as evidenced by a possessory information title
issued in the applicants favor during the Spanish era. As will be explained shortly,
Lot 4318 in the present case is unquestionably public land. The only issue is whether
respondents have acquired title to the property.
Moreover, the governing law in Baloy was Act 627.[13] Under the provisions of that
law, the private character of the land shall be respected absent any court order
declaring that the property has become public. In the case before us, Proc 265 was
issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Accordingly, only a positive
act of the President is required to create a government reservation.
Verily, the Proclamation successfully segregated Lot 4318 as a military reservation.
Consequently, respondents could not have validly occupied it in 1954, because it
was considered inalienable[14] since its reservation in 1938.
Respondents Period of Possession
Notwithstanding the reservation in 1938 of Lot 4318 for military use, respondents
maintain their entitlement to have it registered under their names. They allege that
their predecessors-in-interest were already in adverse, open, peaceful and
continuous possession of the property for over 30 years prior to 1938. Thus, they
conclude that their imperfect title had already attached long before the issuance of
the Proclamation segregating the land as a military reservation.
We are not convinced. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on this Court. To this rule,
however, there are settled exceptions; for instance, when the judgment assailed is
not supported by sufficient evidence or is based on a misapprehension of
facts.[15] We find that these exceptions apply here.
Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belongs to the State as part of the public domain.[16] For this reason, imperfect
titles to agricultural lands are subjected to rigorous scrutiny before judicial
confirmation is granted.[17] In the same manner, persons claiming the protection of
private rights in order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by
clear and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question have been
acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands.[18]
In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the trial and the
appellate courts gave much weight to the tax declarations presented by the former.
However, while the tax declarations were issued under the names of respondents
predecessors-in-interest, the earliest one presented was issued only in 1954.[19] The
Director, Lands Management Bureau v. CA[20] held thus:
x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership. They are mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director of Lands vs.
Santiago:
x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had
been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation
purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For
although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder
had a claim of title over the property.[21]
In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by Calixto and
Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents predecessors had purportedly bought the
property. This alleged prior possession, though, was totally devoid of any
supporting
evidence on record. Respondents evidence hardly supported the conclusion that
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since time
immemorial.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the evidence
on record merely established the transfer of the property from Calixto Bacas to
Nazaria Bombeo. The evidence did not show the nature and the period of the alleged
possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles must present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general statements that are mere
conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession.[22]
It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving that
they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence of opposition from the
government does not relieve them of this burden.[23] Thus, it was erroneous for the
trial and the appellate courts to hold that the failure of the government to
dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land since 1954
already amounted to a title.

In this connection, the Court reiterates the following ruling in Director of Lands v.
Agustin:[24]

x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the
Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose
the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the
satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not
justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is
no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the
registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts
presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land
which he is attempting to have registered.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The segregation of Lot 4318 as part of a
military reservation is declared VALID. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.

HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in
substitution of original petitioner), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs,[1] instituted this petition
for review of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in "Trinidad de
Leon Vda. deRoxas v. Maguesun Management and Development: Corporation,"
(CA G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite.
The issue presented before us is whether or not private respondent Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over two
unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to
reopen or review a decree of registration.
The facts of the case are narrated below:
On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and
Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for
Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay,
Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area
of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The original registration case was
docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18,
presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration,
Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990,
executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to
be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original
petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half
months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna,
Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for
registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining
owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings.
Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly. [2] After
an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land
registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported,
among other things, that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for
registration in Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the
Court of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no
decision has been rendered thereon.[3] Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the
Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration
(Land Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following
dispositive portion:[4]
"WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of said
lands described in plan As-04-000108? Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area
of 3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and
shown by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the records,
in the name of Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, with office
address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liens and encumbrances and from
any other adverse claims of any kind and nature.
Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon which
eventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued.
SO ORDERED."
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree
on March 14, 1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-373 became
final[5] but not before it ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No.
500 (GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by Manuel A Roxas and Trinidad de
Leon, dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land
that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the
registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name.
Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional
Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of
registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She
alleged that the lots were among the properties she inherited from her husband,
former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family
had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject
property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for
its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that
she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her
signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
In support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents
to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that
Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant,
occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the Land
Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial
Hearing. As result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun
Corporation's application for registration was granted. She charged Maguesun
Corporation with knowledge or authorship of the fraud owing to the fact that
Maguesun Corporation's president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay after whom the
corporation was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes
Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help
with the latter's business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration
and insurance of the latter's cars.[6]
The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, was
whether or not Vda. de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged.[7] Petitioner,
who was then already 92 years of age, testified in open court on February 11, 1992
that she has never met Zenaida Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and
that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were
forged.[8] A document examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP) concluded
that there was no forgery.[9] Upon petitioner's motion, the signatures were re-
examined by another expert from the National Bureau of Investigation The latter
testified that the signatures on the questioned and sample documents were not
written by the same person.[10] Despite the foregoing testimonies and
pronouncements, the trial court dismissed the petition for review of decree of
registration on April 15, 1992.[11] Placing greater weight on the findings and
testimony of the PNP document examiner, it concluded that the questioned
documents were not forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not
Maguesun Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation
did not commit actual fraud. The court further noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad
Roxas had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact "exhibited what
appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any more," and
that her application for registration was "previously dismissed and abandoned," thus
indicating that "petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost . x x interest, if
not actually her rights, over the property in question."[12]
In a decision dated December 8, 1994,[13] respondent court denied the petition for
review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that
petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely
constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or
reviewing a decree of registration. Additionally, respondent court stated that the
discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
pointed out by petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters that are too trivial,
requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law and are "not necessarily and
exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith especially when considered in
the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed." The records also show, according
to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court
either the existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration
proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of the initial hearing
in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. [14]
Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting
the setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis
of Maguesun Corporation's good faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of the
subject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property
be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moral
damages not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less than P36,000.00
and attorney's fees of P60,000.00.
We find the petition for review impressed with merit.
1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended
and codified laws relative to registration of property. [15] Adjudication of land in a
registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the
decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another party. [16] Absence, minority or other disability of any
person affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not
considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation
of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of
registration.[17] It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree,
that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been
transferred to an innocent purchaser.[18]
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from
an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact.[19] Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud
because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private
confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to
commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.[20]
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where
the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the
acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded
as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment
itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission
of the controversy.[21] Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the
transaction sued upon.[22]
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been
accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of
registration reopened and reviewed.[23] In the oft-cited Macabingkil v. People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation case, the Court drew from American
jurisprudence stating that "relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud
practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, (and)
that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court."[24] The
"fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No. 1529) is actual
and extrinsic, which includes, an intentional omission of fact required by law. [25]For
fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts
upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.[26] Persons who were fraudulently
deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled
to a review of a decree of registration.
In Ramirez v. CA,[27] this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that the
suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield
merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment and
misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interest
in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by
competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the
fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of
actual fraud.[28] Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which
benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.[29]
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud
in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner.
Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally
omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an
occupant of the subject property. In the corporation's application for registration filed
with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the following declaration appears:
"6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the
owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5
(mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan
as claimants are as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil. Leon Luna. Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house
No.)"[30]
The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters
of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid. Magesun Corporation, however,
annexed a differently-worded application for the petition to review case (Civil Case
No. TG-1183, "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and
Development Corporation, et al."). In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer
to the same number is as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas.[31]
The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word "Roxas" were
indeed erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house
No.)" in the original application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the
word "Roxas" was submitted to the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is
reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that
"Roxas" was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer,
occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the Land
Registration Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of
Presidential Decree No 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the
full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners,
if known and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them. Respondent
corporation likewise failed to comply with this requirement of law.
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property
uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez.[32] Respondent Maguesun
Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land
was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the
subject property. Respondent corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of
such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over
the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas
owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the
property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or
occupants could have been made facilely. Respondent corporation's intentional
concealment and representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as
possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening
and review of the decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas
family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their property, thus
effectively depriving them of their day in court.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed
from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interest
she may have in the registration proceedings for the records are replete with
references by Maguesun Corporation itself to petitioner. [33] Mention of the late
President's name as well as that of petitioner was made principally in the Formal
Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and
7239, tax declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient
compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the application for registration.
Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be
made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration,
otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and
will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims.
3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and
in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The
Court of Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of
law expressly states that "the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. x x x"
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an
indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a
component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as
possible" so that all persons having an adverse-interest in the land subject of the
registration proceedings may be notified thereof.[34] Although jurisdiction of the court
is not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general
circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the
land.
4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as
in the testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case,
compelled the Court to undertake a careful review of the facts of the case.[35] A close
scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that
forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of
respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution and
preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that
Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the
protection of the law.
In response to the questions fielded by the trial counsel and by counsel for petitioner,
PNP Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differences
pointed out in the questioned signatures and in the sample signatures as having
been caused merely by "natural variation."[36] He concluded that the questioned
signatures were not forged. In contrast, Chief of the Questioned Documents Division
of the National Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio Ramos testified with more specificity
as befits an expert that the questioned and sample signatures were not written by
one and the same person because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes the
personalized proportional characteristics of letters; the linking/connecting between
letters the structural pattern of letters and other minute details x x x." [37] Moreover,
petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas categorically declared that she has never
met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject property. [38] Petitioner, then over
ninety years old, has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and her family
also own several other pieces of property, some of which are leased out as
restaurants, e.g. Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant.[39] This is an
indication that petitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is
unlikely that she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime property
in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a measly P200,000.00. Finally, even to a layman's
eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures,
reveal forgery. The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several
documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smooth and
rounded, and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's
signatures, characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.
There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner.[40] In it she declares
that she is a resident of 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually
lives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati. She also states that she is the "sole
heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who died sometime on the year 1944 at Manila."
Petitioner's husband is President Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas. President Roxas was survived by petitioner and
their two children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased
petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general
public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering
a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too
glaring to have been ignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is
no reason why she should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning
herself and her family.
Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence.
Her given address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and
what led her to purchase the subject property? Respondent corporation could very
well have presented her to prove the legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were
selling said property, would she not have offered them first to interested relatives
such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an ordinary person sell more than thirteen
thousand square meters of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was earlier
purchased for P200,000.00? These questions highlight several implausibilities in the
alleged sale of the subject property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's
President who is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the
sale of the subject property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to
petitioner Vda. deRoxas, as one who even registered the latter's car, suggests
acquaintance with the late petitioner's properties as well as the possibility that she
took advantage of such knowledge.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its
possession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza
conveyed no title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she
was not the owner thereof.[41] Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled to the
registration decree which the trial court granted in its decision. Palpably, petitioner
has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted,
exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject lots
by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and
sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.[42]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v.
Maguesun Management & Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on
December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108,
Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters,
respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical descriptions
now forming part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to
ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID
HERBIETO, respondents.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December
1999,[2] granting the application for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David,
who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration
of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the
Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto
and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their application for
registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and
Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;[4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for the Subject Lots; [6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates
of title covering the Subject Lots;[7]
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and
disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;[8]
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831,
in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in
1994;[9] and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto
and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their
sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was
sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.[10]
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an
Opposition to the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing
that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the
Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine
and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of
the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging
to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.[12] All owners of
the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial
Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous
place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building
of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located. [14] Finally, the Notice
was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999 [15] and The Freeman
Banat News on 19 December 1999.[16]
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of
Special Default,[17] with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for
registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded
to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC
commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents
and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration
and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of
respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02
February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and
executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.[18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the
Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002,
affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered
has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963.
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of
patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription and that Ownership and
other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired
the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that
they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other
trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that
herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the
subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950.
Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees possession can be
reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been
classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the
appellant does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by
CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus
susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees
are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by
Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner
provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only
be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable,
herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open,
continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the
instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds
no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.[20]
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following
arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept
of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic,
possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in
determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject
Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENROs
certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year
acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v.
Doldol,[21] where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires
that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier,
for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of
the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned
by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed
by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case
they are co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed
only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in
case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same
province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and
when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied
with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply
with the procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the
proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction
over it.
I- Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the
respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of
the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even
though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually
seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the
respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with
and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts
pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the
above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the
Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner
or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory
has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of
the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject
Lots.
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows the following
situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as
they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing
of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the
same are located within the same province.[25] The Property Registration Decree is
silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single
application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual
registration of the parcels of land in their respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then
this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action.
Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of
Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be
applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the
Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint
application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a
misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for
registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed
separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of
the court to hear and proceed with the case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds
for dismissal thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes
of action and parties involve an implied admission of the courts jurisdiction. It
acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case
or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to
be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party,
also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been
corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is
regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the
application for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the
petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion
for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only
before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements
mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with
jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did
not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this
Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with
respondents application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in rem cannot be
acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and
service of notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given
Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing
shall be made in the following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette
shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including
the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time
to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its
declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to
validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of
the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the
requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then
all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general
circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the
same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication
of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the
Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that
the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not
reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be
owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. [31]

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held,
on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue
of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August
1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in
Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas
and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial
hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing,
would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was
published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was
deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC
on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents application for registration,
and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice
itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date
of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting
respondents application for registration and even the registration decree that may
be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default
on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result.
Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively
seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents application for
registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and
David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated
02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory,
and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject
Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II- Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject
Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear
and proceed with respondents application for registration, this Court nevertheless
deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession
for acquiring title to public land.
Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their
title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the
Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his
parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since
1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents
themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project
No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-
Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No.
932 dated June 29, 1992.[33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public
domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; [34] and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title
was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. [35]
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber
and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the
State.[36] It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed,
as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public
Land Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for
every mode.[38] Since respondents herein filed their application before the
MTC,[39] then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject
Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not
exceeding 144 hectares,[40] may be availed of by persons identified under Section
48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which
reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be
entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as
amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable
only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject
Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can
never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[41] It is
very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of
possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or
legalized.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based on the
erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under
the Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows
individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the
respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed
their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription
under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.[42]
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there
already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land
Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and
that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of
their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. [43] As established
by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to
register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and
respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public
Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their
application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance
with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right,
claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in
every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that
the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title
be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44]
Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have
complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real
rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically
governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act
may be considered a special law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil Code,
a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a
general law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non
derogant.[46]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November
2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case
No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are
declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

DIGNA VERGEL, EDUARDO SALVACRUZ, BEATRIZ MANACOP, FELICISIMA
FLORES, GENEROSO SALVACRUZ, BLANDINO SALVACRUZ, MILAGROS
SALVACRUZ and THE HEIRS OF CORAZON SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and DOROTEA TAMISIN GONZALES, respondents.
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] setting aside the orders[2] of the trial court that denied petitioners
motion to set aside the order of general default[3] in an application for registration of
a parcel of land, consisting of one thousand, one hundred seventy six (1,176),
situated in barrio Batong Malake, municipality of Los Baos, province of Laguna. [4]
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,[5] are as follows:
On May 26, 1994, Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz Maacop, Felicisima
Flores, Generoso and Blandino Salvacruz, Milagros Evangelista and the heirs of
Corazon Santiago, namely: Leocadio, Jr. and Concepcion Santiago (petitioners
herein) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna an application for
registration of a parcel of land (for titling purposes).
On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of
Lands filed an opposition to the application for registration.
On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued an order of general default against the
whole world with the exception of Republic of the Philippines x x x.
On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales filed with the trial court
an Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of General Default alleging, inter alia, in
her affidavit that she is claiming the land in question subject of this petition as an
owner x x x which motion was opposed by the petitioners herein.
On October 12, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a reply to the opposition
interposed by the petitioners and, at the same time, filed an Urgent Motion praying
for the suspension of the proceedings.
On October 18, 1995, the trial court issued the first assailed order, the dispositive
portion of which is quoted, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motion to set aside the Order of default as well as the motion to
suspend the proceedings filed by the movant through counsel is hereby denied for
lack of merit.
On October 20, 1995, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Strike Out
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceeding.
On November 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to set aside the order of general
default, which motion petitioners opposed.
On November 28, 1995, the trial court issued its second questioned order, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration, dated
November 16, 1995, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
On December 13, 1995, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals [6] a petition for
certiorari alleging that the trial court judge acted capriciously and without or in excess
of his jurisdiction and gravely abused the exercise of his discretion in issuing the two
aforementioned orders.[7]
On April 02, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision annulling the trial
courts orders dated October 18, 1995 and November 28, 1995, and consequently,
setting aside the trial courts order of general default dated December 15, 1994, in
Land Registration Case No. 88-94-C with respect to respondent.[8]
Hence, this appeal.[9]
The Issue
The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial
courts order of general default in the land registration case involved without making
a specific finding of fraud, negligence, accident or excusable mistake but relying on
its view that substantial justice and speedy determination of the controversy would
be better attained in lifting the order of general default, to enable a claimant to
oppose and to establish a case of ownership in herself.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set aside the trial courts order
of general default without factual basis save for its own gut feeling, ipse
dixit.[10] Respondents failure to file timely opposition to the application for land
registration because she missed reading the publication of the notice in the Official
Gazette[11] or in the newspaper Malaya issue of August 8, 1994, [12] in itself may not
be considered excusable negligence.
In respondents motion to set aside order of general default, she alleged that
petitioners were aware of her claim of ownership over the subject property, but did
not give her personal notice of the filing of the application. She learned about the
application by accident. In the petition for certiorari she filed with the Court of
Appeals, respondent alleged that petitioners filed the application in bad faith,
surreptitiously and without notice to her.[13] The Court of Appeals did not make a
finding on this.

Hence, we find that the appellate court erred in setting aside the order of general
default in the Land Registration Case No. 88-94-C, without making a specific finding
of fraud, accident or excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely
opposing the application.

We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to remand the case to the Court
of Appeals for it to make findings of fact constituting fraud, accident or excusable
neglect sufficient for the court to lift the order of general default in the land
registration case involved.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. SP No. 39239.

Let the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings with
instructions to determine whether there exists facts warranting the lifting of the order
of general default in LRC Case No. 88-94-C of the trial court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ,
in his capacity as Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY, respondents.
This Decree is issued pursuant to the Decision dated 31st day of May, 1966 of the
Hon. Pedro C. Navarro, Judge of [Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig,
Rizal], and the Honorable Briccio C. Ygaa, this 3rd day of July, 1998.
Issued at the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, Quezon
City, this 20th day of October, in the year of Our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-
seven at 8:01 a.m.

The Case (signed)

This is a petition for review[1] to reverse the Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993. The appellate court ADMINISTRATOR
affirmed the Resolution[3] dated 21 May 1999 issued by the Land Registration National Land Titles and Deeds
Authority (LRA) in Consulta No. 2879. The LRA ruled that a notice of lis Registration Administration
pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Entered in the Registration Book for Marikina, pursuant to the provisions of section
39 of PD No. 1529, on the 18th day of August nineteen hundred and ninety-eight, at
The Facts 1:16 p.m.
(signed)
Alfonso Sandoval (Sandoval) and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. (Ozaeta) filed an application EDGAR D. SANTOS
for registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 (land Register of Deeds (Emphasis added)
registration court), docketed as Case No. 2858, Land Registration Case No. N-
18887 (LRC No. N-18887). The land registration court issued an order of general Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare void Decree Nos.
default and hearings on the application followed. On 31 May 1966, the land N-217643 and N-217644 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. O-1603 and O-
registration court granted the application. The decision became final and executory, 1604. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show that incumbent Administrator
and the land registration court issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. [4] Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the Decrees on 20 October 1997, before he assumed
The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued on 20 October office on 8 July 1998 and even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaa issued the Order of 3
1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife July 1998.[12]
Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.[5]
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to
On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request and explained the
Presentacion L. Psinakis (petitioners), heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion[6] in inconsistencies in the dates in a letter[13] dated 1 December 1998. The entire letter
LRC No. N-18887. The motion alleged that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots states:
subject of the application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970.
Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Republic of the Philippines
Absolute Sale[7] over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective Department of Justice
spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Invoking Section 22 of Presidential Decree LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
No. 1529 (PD 1529),[8] petitioners also prayed that the court issue the decree of Quezon City
registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. 1 December 1998
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
The land registration court gave due course to the motion and conducted hearings. [9] Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra Law Offices
2nd Floor Benpres Building
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 Exchange Road corner Meralco Ave.
and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses only on 18 August Ortigas Center, Pasig City
1998.[10] The pertinent entries[11] in the Decrees read:
Sir:
This concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-
217644 issued in Land Registration Case No. N-2858, LRC Record No. N-18887,
both in the names of Alfonso Sandoval and his wife, Rosa Ruiz, and Roman Ozaeta,
Jr., and his wife, Ma. Salome Lao.
Records of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of registration were prepared
on October 20, 1977 pursuant to the decision of the court dated May 31, 1966 and
the order for issuance of decree dated August 24, 1993. Said decrees were
forwarded to the Office of the Administrator on August 8, 1998 and was [sic] released
therefrom on August 13, 1998. Consequently, said decrees were signed sometime
between August 8 and 13 1998 and definitely not on October 20, 1997 as what is
reflected thereon because the undersigned Administrator assumed office only on
July 8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the decrees were signed it was not noticed,
through oversight, that they were dated October 20, 1977. It is therefore hereby
clarified that Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were actually issued sometime
between August 8 and 13 1998 and not on October 20, 1997.
Regarding the claim that these decrees were prematurely issued as the motion for
the issuance of the decrees in favor of the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, the properties
involved having been sold to him by the applicants, is still pending with the court, it
is informed that no copy of said motion nor of the order directing this Office to
comment thereon appears on file in the records of the case. Hence, these matters
could not have been taken into consideration in the issuance of the decrees. Had
the Administration been apprised of these incidents, perhaps the issuance of the
decrees could have been held in abeyance until the court has resolved the same.
As to the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret to inform you that since the
certificates of title transcribed pursuant to said decrees have already been issued
and released by the Registrar of Deeds concerned, it is now beyond our authority to
recall them unless duly authorized by the court.
We hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the concerns raised in your letter.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
Administrator
On 25 November 1998, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City
an application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration court
a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void.[14] Petitioners attached to
the application a copy of the 25 November 1998 motion and the pertinent OCTs.
In a letter[15] dated 15 December 1998, the Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied
the application to annotate the notice of lis pendens. The entire letter states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Registry of Deeds, Marikina City
15 December 1998
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
2nd Floor, Benpres Bldg.
Exchange Road cor. Meralco Avenue
Pasig City
Sir:
This is in connection to [sic] your application to have a Notice of Lis Pendens
[annotated] at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 issued in the name of
ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND SPOUSE.
Pursuant to Sec. 76, PD No. 1529[,] the contents of the notice are the name[s] of
the parties, the court where the action is pending, the date the action was instituted
and a copy of the compalint [sic] in order to determine if the person named in the
title is impleaded.
We regret to inform you that the application, bereft of the original petition or compaint
[sic] upon which this office will base its action, is DENIED.
If you do not agree with our findings, you can, without withdrawing the documents
you submitted, elevate the matter en consulta five (5) days from receipt hereof to
the Office of the Administrator, Land Registration Authority, East Avenue cor. NIA
Road, Quezon City.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
EDGAR D. SANTOS
Register of Deeds
On 14 January 1999, three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the
denial in consulta to the LRA. The case was docketed as Consulta No. 2879.
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In its resolution[16] dated 21 May 1999, the LRA stated that the sole question for
resolution is whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to
declare void the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds that
a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal
personality to file a notice of lis pendens relative to the pending case.
The LRA focused on petitioners standing in LRC No. N-18887. The LRA declared
that petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case
is a proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a party
in the case. Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the court has not
admitted. Based on Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should
have filed a motion to lift the order of general default. Pertinent portions of the LRA
decision read:
Until and after the Order of General Default in LRC Case No. 18887 is lifted,
petitioners cannot be clothed with personality as oppositors in said land registration
case by merely filing a motion after a judgement has been rendered. Such being the
case, a notice of lis pendens on the basis of the motion filed by petitioners cannot
be admitted for registration. To rule otherwise would preempt the judgment of the
Court in so far as the personalities of the movants as oppositors in the land
registration case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Authority is of the opinion and so holds
that the notice of lis pendens is not registrable.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of the
LRAs decision. Petitioners filed the petition on the ground of manifest error and
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the LRA Administrator when he ruled in
Consulta No. 2879 that the notice of lis pendens is not registrable.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court
reiterated the LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file
a notice of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal personality because they failed to
file a motion to lift the order of general default in the land registration case.
Issues
Petitioners present the following issues for resolution of this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONERS MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES
ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS FOR
FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, and
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE
DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN LRC CASE NO.
N-18887 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS NOT LIFTED THE
GENERAL ORDER OF DEFAULT.[18]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
We agree with the observation of the appellate court that the pleadings filed by
petitioners, public respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General cite more or
less the same provisions of the laws as applicable in support of their respective
contentions but differ x x x only with respect to their interpretation thereof.[19] With
this observation in mind, we quote the pertinent provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and of PD 1529.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of
possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is
claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province
in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice
shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of
filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order
of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused
it to be recorded.
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate,
or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or
other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to
vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as
against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice
stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same
is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to
the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected
and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered.
Notice of Lis Pendens
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit,
pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. [20]
The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the
registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or
contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result
of the pending litigation.[21]
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final
judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations.
Second, it binds a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to
the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the
filing of a notice of lis pendens does not create a right or lien that previously did not
exist.[22]
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying
only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party,
the supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former is not bound by
the property owners undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate of
title.[23] Thus, we have consistently held that
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the
court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an
extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended
merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that
they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the
property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may
well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid
down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a
mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of
it at any given time. And its continuance or removal x x x is not contingent on the
existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof.[24]
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title or possession
of a property, but also with the use or occupation of a property.[25] The litigation must
directly involve a specific property which is necessarily affected by the
judgment. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[26] enumerated the cases where a notice of lis pendens is appropriate:
[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land
or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the following
cases:
a) Preliminary attachments;
b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
c) Levies on execution;
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money judgment.[27]
As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain a
statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the court where the same is
pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain a
reference to the number of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate description
of the land affected and its registered owner.
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens because the
application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon which this office will
base its action.[28] In consulta to the LRA, petitioners pointed out that they have
complied with the requirements for the registration of the notice of lis pendens, as
follows:
7.2.1 The Notice of Lis Pendens contains a statement of the filing by the Heirs of
Eugenio Lopez of a motion to declare Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and
O-1604 null and void;
7.2.2 It contains the name of the court wherein the motion is pending which is the
registration court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig City. The date of the filing
of the motion is shown on the motion itself wherein the receipt of said motion by the
land registration court on November 25, 1998 is duly stamped;
7.2.3 The numbers of the Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 are
clearly indicated in the notice;
7.2.4 There is adequate description of the land affected in the Notice of Lis Pendens;
7.2.5 The names of the registered owners are indicated in Paragraph 4 of the Motion
attached to the Notice;
7.2.6 A copy of the motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and void,
dated November 25, 1998 upon which the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal
will base its action is attached as Annex A of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (Emphasis
in the original)[29]
Petitioners enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the
requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice
of lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in
LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in
Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register
of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the
application for a notice of lis pendens.
Reconveyance
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they filed a motion in LRC No.
N-18887 on 16 July 1997. The remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance
against Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses. Reconveyance is based on Section
55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3322, which states that xxx in all cases
of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights
of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title xxx.
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers
name. Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an
action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice
and not with the land registration court.[30] Reconveyance is always available as long
as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis
pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the
institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an
innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.[31]
Necessity of a Motion to Lift the Order of General Default
In its comment,[32] the LRA states that under Section 26 of PD 1529 the order of
default includes petitioners. Therefore, petitioners failure to move to lift the default
order did not give them standing in the case. As long as the court does not lift the
order of general default, petitioners have no legal standing to file the motion to
declare void the decrees of registration issued to the applicant. Section 26 of PD
1529 provides thus:
Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. If no person appears and answers within the time
allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a default to be recorded and require the applicant to present
evidence. By the description in the notice To All Whom It May Concern, all the world
are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default order.
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a default order shall
be entered against persons who did not appear and answer.
Petitioners justification for filing a motion to annul the decrees and titles, as opposed
to filing a motion to lift the order of general default, rests on two related assumptions.
First, with the filing of the 16 July 1997 motion and giving of due course to the motion
by the land registration court, petitioners assert that they acquired legal standing in
the registration proceedings. Second, buyer Eugenio Lopez, Sr. stepped into the
shoes of the sellers-applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta when applicants sold the
property to him. As successors-in-interest of the buyer, petitioners contend that they
are not strangers to the proceedings.
To justify their two assumptions, petitioners traced the antecedent of Section 22 of
PD 1529 to Section 29 of Act 496[33] and its judicial interpretation in Mendoza v.
Court of Appeals.[34]
Section 22 of PD 1529 provides:
SECTION 22. Dealings with land pending original registration.After the filing of the
application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein
described may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part, in which case the
interested party shall present to the court the pertinent instruments together with the
subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions
thereof, and the court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered
subject to the conveyance or encumbrance created by said instruments, or order
that the decree of registration be issued in the name of the person to whom the
property has been conveyed by said instruments.
The pertinent portion of Section 29 of Act 496 provides:
SECTION 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree
of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein
described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in
the office of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title,
in the same manner as if no application had been made. The interested party may,
however, present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of
presenting them to the office of the Register of Deeds, together with a motion that
the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court, after notice to
the parties shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by
said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer
or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. x x
x
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals[35] explains the procedure in cases of conveyance of
the land subject of a registration proceeding by an instrument executed between the
time of filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by
substituting the buyer or the person to whom the property has been conveyed for
the applicant. Neither does it require that the buyer or the person to whom the
property has been conveyed be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger
to the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that
the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a
motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior
notice be given to the parties to the case xxx.[36]
Petitioners also assert that they do not dispute the judgment of the land registration
court. However, this position is in conflict with their 25 November 1998 motion to
have the decree and the titles declared void. Petitioners now assume the roles of
both successors-in-interest and oppositors. This confusion of roles brought about
petitioners grave error in procedure.
The land registration court granted the application in LRC No. N-18887 on 31 May
1966 and issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their
motion to consider the deed of sale in the registration on 16 July 1997. Petitioners
filed their motion to have the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title
declared void on 25 November 1998. Petitioners filed both motions long after the
decision in LRC No. N-18887 became final and executory. Neither petitioners nor
even the applicants from whom they base their claim presented the Deed of Sale
before the land registration court while the action was pending.
Considering the facts and arguments as presented above, we hold that the motion
filed by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in the land registration
proceedings for purposes of filing an application of a notice of lis pendens. However,
we disagree with the LRA and the appellate courts observation that petitioners need
to file a motion to lift the order of general default. A motion to lift the order of general
default should be filed before entry of final judgment. The land registration court
granted the application for registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued a
certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion on 16 July 1997.
Thus, even if petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of general default, the order
of default could not be set aside because the motion was filed out of time.
In Lim Toco v. Go Fay,[37] this Court explained the effect of an order of default to the
party defaulted. A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of
his loss of standing, a party in default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be
heard, or be entitled to notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from the
judgment rendered by the court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of
default under the grounds provided in what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, in its comment before this Court, the LRA stated thus:
Under Section 26, PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to have been included by the
default order. Those who did not file an answer should be considered as having lost
their standing in court from that stage (Republic v. Dela Rosa, 173 SCRA 12) except
when they file a motion to set aside the order [of] default on the grounds mentioned
in Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court (Toco v. Fay, 80 Phil. 166).
In land registration cases (as in the said LRC No. N-18887), an order of general
default was deemed to have been issued based on the presumption of regularity in
judicial proceedings (Pascual, et al. v. Ortega, et al., 58 O.G. 12 March 1962 C.A.).
Petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the order of general default
was lifted. Records disclosed that without first filing a motion to lift the order of
general default, petitioners filed a motion to declare as null and void the decrees and
titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the court, petitioner could not be
considered as a party to the action. They are deemed movants whose personality
as far as the case is concerned is not yet admitted by the court considering that the
order of default has not been lifted.[38]
One should be careful, however, to distinguish between movants as mere interested
parties prescribed under Section 22 of PD 1529 and movants as intervenors-
oppositors to the land registration proceedings. It is only in the latter case that a
motion to lift the order of general default is required. It is only in the latter case that
the doctrine pronounced in Serrano v. Palacio,[39] as repeatedly invoked by the LRA
and OSG, is applicable:
x x x [P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when they filed a motion to
intervene in the x x x land registration case for the proper procedure would have
been for them to ask first for the lifting of the order of general default, and then, if
lifted, to file an opposition to the application of the applicants. This is so because
proceedings in land registration are in rem, and not in personam, the sole object
being the registration applied for, and not the determination of any right not
connected with the registration (Estila vs. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498).
Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By filing their motion to have
the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title declared void, they took the
role of oppositors to the application for land registration.
The appellate court stated that in as much as it would want to oblige to the plea of
petitioners to hasten or expedite the proceedings and to avoid further expenses on
the part of the petitioners, however[,] (it) could not.[40] Indeed, it requires a delicate
balancing act between the objective of the Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding[41] and the strict
requirements for a notice of lis pendens. The facts in this case show that petitioners
have not complied with the requirements.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000.
SO ORDERED.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner vs. HON. NAZAR[1] U. CHAVES, RTC, BR.
18, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY and SPS. JUANITO &
AGUSTINA OBEDENCIO, respondents.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[2] dated February
29, 2000 and the Resolution[3] dated December 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 38152.
Private respondents, spouses Juanito and Agustina Obedencio, filed Civil Case No.
94-211 for Specific Performance at the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18. They prayed that the Social Security System
(SSS) be ordered (1) to cancel the mortgage on the properties of the spouses; (2)
to release the documents covering the said properties; and (3) to pay the spouses
moral damages in the sum of P80,000; litigation expenses in the sum of P5,000; and
attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.
The petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim alleging that the private
respondents had an unpaid obligation in the amount of P48,188.72 as of September
1, 1994.[4]
After the issues were joined, a pre-trial conference was scheduled on February 16,
1995. Atty. Rodrigo B. Filoteo, acting assistant branch manager of the SSS in
Cagayan de Oro City and allegedly the only lawyer of the said branch, entered his
appearance as counsel for the petitioner. He manifested that he had filed his pre-
trial brief through registered mail. The hearing was, however, cancelled because the
respondent judge was indisposed. The hearing of the case was reset on April 18,
1995. This time, Atty. Filoteo failed to attend because of an official mission
to Zamboanga City from April 7 to May 8, 1995 involving SSS cases.
On motion of Atty. Alberto Bacal, counsel of the respondent spouses, respondent
judge issued an Order dated April 18, 1995 declaring petitioner in default and
allowed private respondents to present their evidence ex-parte.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the lifting of the order of
default. The motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated May 22,
1995. On August 16, 1995, the petitioner appealed the Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari. [5]
In its Decision of February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.[6]
We deny the petition.
There is no question that it is the discretion of the trial judge to declare a party-
defendant as in default for failure to appear at a pre-trial conference. The declaration
of default for non-appearance at a pre-trial conference is sanctioned by Rule 20,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, thus:
- A party who fails to appear at a pretrial conference may be non-suited or
considered as in default.
To be relieved of the effects of the order of default, Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court provides that the defendant must file a motion under oath to set aside the
order of default; that he must show that his failure to appear at the pre-trial was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and accompany the motion with
affidavit of merit.
A motion to lift order of default should be under oath, verified and accompanied with
an affidavit of merit.
Aside from the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the motion to
lift the order of default must further show that the defendant has a meritorious
defense or that something would be gained by having the order of default set
aside. Otherwise, and if the motion is not accompanied by affidavits of merits, it may
properly be denied.
A perusal of petitioners motion to lift order of default shows that it is neither under
oath nor accompanied by an affidavit of merit. There was no notice of hearing. There
was also no showing, save in the instant petition, that it has meritorious defense or
that something would be gained by having the order of default set aside. Thus, the
trial Court correctly denied petitioners motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On March 16, 2000, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
Hence, petitioner through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) now assails the
Decision and Resolution of the appellate court, alleging that,
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION HAS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. Rules of Procedure should be liberally construed pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 of
the Rules of Court in order to protect the substantive rights of the parties.
B. Petitioner has the right to have its day in court in order to present its meritorious
defense against the unfounded and baseless claim of respondent spouses.[8]
The core issue particular to this case is whether the default order of the lower court
should be lifted, so that substantial justice would prevail over technical rules.
Seeking relief from Section 2, Rule 1 (now Section 6[9]), and Section 2, Rule 20 (now
Section 4, Rule 18[10]) of the Revised Rules of Court, and invoking our
pronouncements in Rinconada Telephone Company, Inc. v. Buenviaje,[11] Balagtas
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[12] and Alonso v.
Villamor,[13] the petitioner asserts that although respondent judge has the discretion
to declare a defendant in default for failure to appear during pre-trial conference, the
strict, rigid and arbitrary application thereof denied the petitioner a reasonable
opportunity to present its meritorious defense, refute the evidence of the private
respondents, present his own, and exercise his right to due process. The petitioner
contends that the rules should be liberally construed in order to protect the
substantive rights of the parties.
Citing further Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete[14] and Lucero v. Dacayo,[15] petitioner
suggests that its Motion for Reconsideration was in substance legally adequate,
whether or not it was verified with an affidavit of merit since the form of the motion
by which the default was sought to be lifted is secondary and the requirements of
Section 3, Rule 18[16] of the Rules of Court need not be strictly complied with, unlike
in cases of default for failure to answer. In sum, petitioner begs for the liberal
construction of the rules.
Petitioner further avers that contrary to the unsubstantiated claim of private
respondents, their obligation amounting to P48,188.72 as of September 1,
1994, remains outstanding. This is evidenced by the statement of account prepared
by the SSS Real Estate Loans Department. Consequently, petitioner concludes,
private respondents had yet no legal right to demand from petitioner the release of
the mortgage over their property.
Private respondents, in turn, insist that petitioner violated Section 2, Rule 20, (now
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18[17]) of the Revised Rules of Court and Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 15 as amended on July 1, 1997.[18]
Sadly, the records reveal that petitioner failed to comply not only with one rule. Other
than failing to appear during pre-trial, petitioner does not deny that its Motion for
Reconsideration to lift the order of default lacked verification, notice of hearing and
affidavit of merit. If not accompanied by affidavits of merit, the trial court has no
authority to consider the same. [19] A motion to lift an order of default is fatally flawed
and the trial court has no authority to consider the same where it was not under oath
and unaccompanied by an affidavit of merit. In effect, the petitioner failed to set aside
the order of default and must suffer the consequences thereof.[20]
Procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all
rules they are to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.[21] Here, the petitioner has not shown any persuasive reason why he
should be exempt from abiding by the rules. Accordingly, the order declaring the
petitioner in default and the denial of the motion to lift the order of default are
juridically unassailable.
We must stress, however, that a judgment of default against the petitioner who failed
to appear during pre-trial or, for that matter, any defendant who failed to file an
answer, does not imply a waiver of all of their rights, except their right to be heard
and to present evidence to support their allegations. Otherwise, it would be
meaningless to request presentation of evidence every time the other party is
declared in default. If it were so, a decision would then automatically be rendered in
favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly to the tenor of his prayer. [22]The law
also gives the defaulting parties some measure of protection because plaintiffs,
despite the default of defendants, are still required to substantiate their allegations
in the complaint.[23]
In the instant case, private respondents claim that they had fully paid their obligation
with the SSS. They allege that they already paid P63,000, an amount that exceeded
their supposed accountability of P56,427. In their prayer in Civil Case No. 94-211
for Specific Performance filed before the Regional Trial Court, they ask that
petitioner be ordered to cancel the mortgage on their properties, to release the
documents covering the said properties and to pay them damages, litigation
expenses and attorneys fees.
We note, though, that petitioner had earlier filed an answer stating that the private
respondent spouses had an unpaid obligation amounting to P48,188.72 as
of September 1, 1994. Likewise, before the petitioner was declared in default its
counsel, Atty. Filoteo, had manifested that he had filed his pre-trial brief by registered
mail. We also note that when the respondent judge issued the default order, it
allowed private respondents to present their evidence ex parte. With the pre-trial
brief and answer of petitioner, the trial court could then proceed to evaluate the
evidence like receipts, if any, of the private respondents against the allegations of
the petitioner, to determine the private respondents outstanding obligation, a crucial
factual question in this case. The petitioners averment that the private respondents
outstanding balance is P48,188.72 as of September 1, 1994 should be weighed
against the private respondents own evidence that they had fully paid their obligation
to petitioner.
In a civil case, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case through a
preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent. [24] The private
respondents cannot railroad the release of the mortgage through a default order.
The determination of the accurate outstanding balance of the private respondents
should first be resolved before the release of the subject mortgage can be
demanded. In this case, when the evidence during trial proves unsatisfactory and
inconclusive as to the full payment of private respondents obligation to SSS, then
the mortgage should not yet be cancelled prematurely.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision

dated February 29, 2000, and the Resolution dated December 12, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals, are AFFIRMED.The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.