CASE DIGESTS

IN
CRIMINAL LAW I

MIDTERMS

JHOANNA PAULA N. BITOR

2017-0575
FRIDAY
5:30 PM- 8:30 PM
FCJ 302
No. Case Date Reference Page no.
1 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FAUSTA March 19, 1990 G.R. No. 80762 3
GONZALES AUGUSTO GONZALES
2 ROLLIE CALIMUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE February 9, 2006 G.R. No. 152133 4
PHILIPPINES, ET AL.
3 THE UNITED STATES vs. A. H. BARNES November 18, 1908 G.R. No. 4774 6
4 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIO January 18, 1950 G.R. No. L-1477 7
GUILLEN
5 EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE November 29, 2005 G.R. No. 165842 8
PHILIPPINES
6 RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE February 28, 2006 G.R. No. 166479 9
PHILIPPINES
7 THE UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG March 19, 1910 G.R. No. 5272 11
8 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. July 27, 1943 G.R. No. 47722 12
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA
9 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. March 25, 1970 G.R. No. L-29066 13
MARCELO AMIT
10 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. April 30, 1985 G.R. No. L-47941 14
JAIME TOMOTORGO y ALARCON
11 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. June 20, 1988 G.R. No. L-36858 16
MACARIO A. ULEP
12 FILOMENO URBANO vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE January 7, 1988 G.R. No. 72964 17
APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
13 SULPICIO INTOD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF October 21, 1992 G.R. No. 103119 18
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
14 RIVERA vs. PEOPLE January 25, 2006 G.R. No. 166326 19
480 SCRA 188
15 RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs. PEOPLE February 28, 2006 G.R. No. 166479 21
16 PEOPLE vs. CABALLERO April 2, 2003 G.R. No. 149028-30 23
400 SCRA 424
17 PEOPLE vs. LISTERIO July 5, 2000 G.R. No. 122099 25
335 SCRA 40
18 PEOPLE vs. PALAGANAS September 12, 2006 G.R. No. 165483 27
19 PEOPLE vs. ACA-AC April 20, 2001 G.R. No. 142500 29
357 SCRA 373
20 PEOPLE vs. FABRO February 10, 2000 G.R. No. 114261 31
325 SCRA 285
21 ANGELES v. DESIERTO September 23, 2002 G.R. No. 131966 32
501 SCRA 202
22 PEOPLE v. MAPALO February 6, 2007 G.R. No. 172608 34
23 SULPICIO INTOD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF November 29, 2006 509 SCRA 302 36
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
24 COSME NACARIO v. PEOPLE September 30, 2008 G.R. No. 173106 37
25 PEOPLE v. FLORA June 23, 2000 G.R. No. 125909 38
26 GUILLERMO v. PEOPLE June 30, 2008 G.R. No. 153287 40
27 PEOPLE v. ADLAWAN January 20, 2002 G.R. No. 131839 42
28 CABUSLAY v. PEOPLE September 30, 2005 G.R. No. 129875 44

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29 TY v. PEOPLE September 27, 2004 G.R. No. 149275 45
439 SCRA 220
30 MAMANGUN v. PEOPLE February 2, 2007 G.R. No. 149152 47
31 PEOPLE v. ANCHETA November 29, 1938 G.R. No. L-45344 49
66 Phil 638
32 PEOPLE v. ULEP September 20, 2000 340 SCRA 688 51
33 PEOPLE v. CABRERA March 4, 1922 G.R. No. 17748 52
100 SCRA 424

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FAUSTA GONZALES AUGUSTO GONZALES
March 19, 1990 G.R. No. 80762

FACTS: At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay
captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus
would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing
and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the
spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. That same night, Patrolman
Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla.
Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja’s residence where Fausta was made to stay, while
Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter’s residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the
killing incident allegedly occurred. There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in
underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. The group stayed for about an hour during which time
Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate
surroundings.

The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno,
accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations.
Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the
police substation in Ajuy. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas “found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are
fatal because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased.” The
decision of the trial court was based on the testimony of witness Jose Huntoria. Huntoria said that appellant
was also one of the attackers of the deceased. Appellant maintained that he was asleep at the moment.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected appellant s defense of alibi.

Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales Sr., Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio
Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida were all found guilty of murder for killing Lloyd Peñacerrada. All of them
except for Custodio Sr. withdrew their appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant was guilty of murder for killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.

RULING: The Supreme Court found Huntoria to be an unreliable witness. Huntoria admitted during cross-
examination that he cannot determine the group of people stabbing the deceased. He failed to point
definitely that appellant also did the crime. As stated in Arts. 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for one to
be criminally liable, an act should be committed. The Supreme Court found no sufficient proof that appellant
has acted. Lastly, the Supreme Court found Huntoria was an interested witness as he was also the tenant
of the deceased. His testimony was sought to ingratiate himself with the deceased s family. The Supreme
Court found appellant’s guilt not proven by reasonable doubt thus acquitting him.

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 ROLLIE CALIMUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.
February 9, 2006 G.R. No. 152133

FACTS:
February 4, 1996 around 10 am, Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other companions,
had a drinking spree at a videoke bar but as they were headed home, they crossed paths with Calimutan
and Michael Bulalacao.·Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9 inches, had a grudge against Bulalacao, a 15 year-
old boy of 5ft. for suspecting that he threw stones at the his house on a previous night so he punched him.
Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre, Calimutan picked a stone, as big as a man’s fist and
hitting Cantre at the left side of his back not noticing that Bulalacao was already able to run away.

Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and Calimutan desisted from any other act of
violence. Witness Sañano then brought Cantre home where he complained of backache and also of
stomach ache and was unable to eat. By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating profusely
and his entire body felt numb. Having no vehicle, they could not bring him to a doctor so his mother just
continue to wipe him with a piece of cloth and brought him some food when he asked. After eating a little,
he vomited, shortly after complaining again of his backache and stomach ache, he died.
·
The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of Death, issued and signed by Dr.
Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected
food poisoning. With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, an
autopsy was done by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez which showed that there was internal hemorrhage and
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by a blunt object
like a stone. RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the
crime of homicide.

The Regional Trial Court essentially adopting the prosecution’s account of the incident, held that
Calimutan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. It is not an act of defense of stranger, because
after the boxing Bulalacao, he was able to run thereby the unlawful aggression by Cantre ceased. The act
of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was treacherous and
therefore he is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the
ultimate result had not been intended. The Court of Apeals affirmed RTC’s decision. Calimutan filed a
petition for review on certiorari contending that the dissimilar findings on the cause of death constituted
reasonable doubt

ISSUE: Whether or not Rollie Calimutan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide

RULING: No. The Supreme Court modified CA’s ruling and that Rollie Calimutan is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to
a maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional.

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· Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (not absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of
error). Moreover, Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and although it does not
necessarily bind the courts, it is accorded great weight and probative value. It may also sufficiently
establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of
the Cantre which resulted in the latter’s death.

· Proximate cause – cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Prosecution
was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the Cantre was the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by
Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death, then the latter, without
doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are
committed, in particular:
(1) Intentional felonies – existence of malicious intent; act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice)
(2) Culpable felonies – absence of malicious intent; act or omission of the offender is not malicious the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill

Absence of intent, Rollie Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Reckless
imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

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 THE UNITED STATES vs. A. H. BARNES
November 18, 1908 G.R. No. 4774

FACTS:
The accused, along with 4 companions, one of which was Pedro Leonardo were out duck shooting
and went through the barrio of San Pablo, sitio of Muyot, in the municipality of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
They were about to go back when they noticed more ducks on the stream. Barnes fired his gun twice, with
Pedro Leonardo being near him. Barnes then reloaded his gun but was having a difficult time so he had to
force the cartridge in by pressing it upon his knee, at which moment the gun was discharged. At that time,
he was also on his knees and when he rose up to continue shooting after reloading, he saw Leonardo
sinking beneath the water. The accused, thinking that Leonardo was hurt, recovered the body with the help
of his other companions. They discovered that Leonardo was already dead and according to the surgeon
who examined the body, Leonardo suffered a mortal wound: gunshot wound in the back of his head. It had
not been indicated that the shot was purposely fired with the malicious and criminal intent to kill the man or
to cause bodily harm. The Provincial fiscal therefore filed a complaint against A.H. Barnes on the 27 th of
March, 1907, charging him with the crime of reckless negligence defined and punished by article 568 of the
penal code. The trial judge sentenced the accused the penalty of six months of arresto mayor,
to pay an indemnity of P300 to the heirs of the deceased or, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed one-third of the term of the main penalty, and costs, one-half of the time
during which he suffered prision preventive to be credited in his favor. From that judgment the accused has
appealed. Barnes’ defense was that the shot that killed Leonardo resulted from an involuntary act.
A.H. Barnes was acquitted.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the act of Barnes which resulted to the death of Leonardo was involuntary.
2) Whether or not Barnes is liable for homicide through reckless negligence.

RULING:
1) Yes. As it is proven in the proceedings, by undeniable evidence, the gun is of the automatic class, and
for the use of which the accused carried a license, went off at the moment when the accused was placing
the cartridge into the chamber and pressing the gun against his knee, and not when he was in the act of
aiming and firing.

2) No. Acts and omissions punishable by law are always voluntary unless the contrary shall appear. As it is
proven in the proceedings, the act of the accused, which resulted in the death of Leonardo, was
involuntary, thus not making him liable for homicide through reckless negligence

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 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIO GUILLEN
January 18, 195 G.R. No. L-1477

FACTS:
Julio Guillen had the opportunity to assassinate President Manuel A. Roxas on the night of March
10, 1947 at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen had
voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946 in which Manuel A. Roxas is the
successful candidate. Guillen became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the
pledges and fulfill his promises. Guillen had first intended to use a licensed revolver but having it lost, he
thought of two hand grenades. The morning at the same date, he went to the house of Amado Hernandez
whom he requested to prepare for him a document (his last will) and handed it to him only at about 6:00 in
the afternoon, which appears unsigned (but subsequently signed in the police headquarters after the
incident). When Guillen reached the said venue, he was carrying a concealed paper bag which contained
his two hand grenades and peanuts. He buried one of the grenades in a plant pot located close to the
platform, while he hurled the other one at the President. General Castañeda kicked it away from the
platform towards an open space when it caught his attention, and had then exploded in the middle of a
group of persons where Simeon Varela belongs. Simeon Varela died on the following day as a result of
mortal wounds. Guillen did not feel guilty in killing other people present in the event in order to attain his
main purpose of killing the president.

The trial court sentenced Guillen to death for murder and multiple frustrated murder. Guillen’s
counsel contended that trial court erred in finding him guilty of Valera’s death, in declaring his crimes to be
murder and multiple frustrated murder, and that Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should be ruled.
Where Article 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes states that when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela or under Article 48

RULING: The sentence of the trial court is affirmed that Julio Guillen is liable for the crime of Murder for the
killing of Simeon Varela and by unanimous vote; death sentence shall be executed in accordance with
article 81 of the Revised Penal Code. Facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant
that he is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and
of less physical injuries in regard to other victims. In throwing the hand grenade at the President with the
intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice and is therefore liable for all the consequences of his
wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. As held by the Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in
the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence.

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 EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
November 29, 2005 G.R. No. 165842

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting the petitioner of bigamy. The
petitioner married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975 in Makati. On the same year, Gaña was charged with
estafa. The petitioner visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again.

In January 1996, petitioner, then 39 years old met complainant Tina B. Gandalera, 21 years old, in
Dagupan City. Petitioner visited her several times in Baguio City, at one time he brought his parents whom
assured the complainant and her parents that the petitioner is single. On April 22, 1996, they had a civil
marriage in Baguio, settling at Irisan, Baguio. In their marriage contract, petitioner wrote that he was
“single”. After three years of marriage, complainant alleges that petitioner was home only twice or thrice a
year and that whenever complainant asks for sustenance, the petitioner would slap her. On January 2001,
the petitioner finally left and did not return. Petitioner alleges that the reason he left was that her wife has a
lover evidenced by the “love-bite” he saw on her neck.

The RTC of Baguio ruled against the petitioner, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty from
six years to ten month as minimum and ten years as maximum, and indemnity in the amount of
Php 200,000.00 by way of moral damages. After appealing with the Court of Appeals, the sentence was
reduced to two years, four months and one day minimum and ten years maximum.

ISSUES: Whether or not Eduardo Manuel acted with malicious intent

RULING: In the present case, the Eduardo courted Tina and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he
was single. He even brought his parents to Tina’s house where he and his parents made the same
assurance – that he was single. Thus, Tina agreed to marry the him, who even stated in the certificate of
marriage that he was single. She lived with Eduardo and dutifully performed her duties as his wife,
believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until Eduardo heartlessly
abandoned her, Tina had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.

Thus, Tina was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed her status from a single
woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have
married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not
her lawful husband. The Court ruled that the Eduardo’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during
and after his marriage with Tina were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter.
That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.

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 RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
February 28, 2006 G.R. No. 166479

FACTS:
April 19, 1998 7:30 am: Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in front
of his house when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Rodolfo C. Velasco dashed out of the tricycle,
approached the complainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. Velasco missed his
first shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper arm, causing him to stumble on the ground.
But, Frederick stood up and ran, while Velasco fired 6 more but missed. After being reported as wearing a
vest or a “chaleco”, the police, composed of SPO4 Romulo Villamil, PO3 Rolando Alvendo, and SPO1
Soliven pursued and caught Velasco who was on board a motorized tricycle to the highway going to
Barangay Banaoang in Calasiao town with a firearm protruding from the waistline.

Velasco’s Alibi: April 18, 1998, he spent the night at a friend’s house in Lingayen, Pangasinan and
between 6:00-7:00am, he left Lingayen riding in the Volkswagen car of Berting Soriano then alighted at the
corner of Banaoang diversion road to ride a tricycle where he heard a jeep behind him blowing its horn and
when he looked back he saw three men on board pointing their guns at him.
The RTC ruled that guilty of attempted murder appreciating treachery in the commission of the
crime sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum to
Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum and to pay P2,696 as actual damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision. Thus, velasco filed a petition for certiorari, assailing that he had
no motive to harm, much less kill, the victim for he was total stranger and since the identity of the assailant
is in doubt, motive becomes important and his alibi gains weight and value and that the testimony of
Armando Maramba is not credible, he being a relative of the victim

ISSUE: Whether or not Rodolfo Velasco is guilty of attempted murder

HELD: Yes, Rodolfo Velasco’s petition is therefore denied. It was not physically impossible for Velasco to
be at the crime scene when the crime was committed since it only takes a 10-minute ride from the place
where he allegedly alighted from the car of one Berting Soriano to the crime scene. Even without a ballistic
report, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove accused’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

It must be stressed that motive is a state of (one’s) mind which others cannot discern. It is not an
element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved. In fact, lack of motive for committing a
crime does not preclude conviction. It is judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for
no reason at all. Even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not
essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Motive assumes significance only
where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was. Since petitioner has been positively
identified the lack of motive is no longer of consequence.

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 Relationship could strengthen the witnesses’ credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative
to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit. The fact that the shooting occurred in broad
daylight does not render its commission impossible. The fact that petitioner was a navy man, a protector of
the people, does not mean that he is innocent of the crime charged or that he is incapable of doing it. The
suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed left private complainant with no option but to
run for his life. – treachery. Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts
of execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, petitioner
committed an attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill by
shooting private complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of
causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private complainant
sustained a wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that where
the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder,
since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the minimum
of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional, and the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period.

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 THE UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG
March 19, 1910 G.R. No. 5272

FACTS:
The accused, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in Fort Mckinley and was sharing the house with
the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a house boy. The door of the room they were
occupying was not furnished with a permanent lock, and as a measure of security, they fasten the door by
propping a chair against it. One evening, Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force
open the door of their room. The deceased and the accused had an understanding that when either
returned late at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity. Ah Chong
sat up in bed and called out twice, “Who is there?” but heard no answer. The room was quite dark, and as
there had been recent robberies in Fort McKinley, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, he
leaped to his feet and called out. “If you enter the room, I will kill you.” Suddenly, he was struck by the edge
of the chair which had been placed against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow and wildly struck and fatally wounded the intruder who
turned out to be his roommate, Pascual, who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was
playing a trick on him. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual’s wounds. There had been several robberies not long prior to
the date of the incident, one of which took place in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a
knife under his pillow for his personal protection. Trial court held it as simple homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed
them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.

RULING: No. The rule is that one is not criminally liable if he acted without malice (criminal intent),
negligence, and imprudence. In the present case, the accused acted in good faith, without malice or
criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense.
Had the facts been as he believed them to be, he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act. Moreover, the accused cannot be said to have been negligent or reckless as the facts as
he saw them threatens his person and his property. Under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability,
as the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. The Regioal Trial court’s
decision should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA
July 27, 1943 G.R. No. 47722

FACTS:
Upon receiving a telegram from Major Guido ordering the arrest of Anselmo Balagtas, Captain
Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, asked that he be given
four men, one of whom who reported was defendant Alberto Galanta. The same instruction was given to
defendant Antonio Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta
taking the route leading to the house of a bailarina named Irene, where Balagtas was believed to be
staying. Upon arriving, the group went to the Irene’s room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers. It turned out later that the person shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent citizen named
Serapio Tecson, Irene’s paramour.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the defendants are criminally liable for the death of Serapio Tecson.
2) Whether or not the defendants are entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance of performance of duty
in case they are found criminally liable

RULING:
1) Yes. If a person acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of his official duties, then he
incurs no criminal liability. Nonetheless, the maxim ‘ignorantia facti excusat’, applies only when the mistake
is committed without fault or carelessness. In the instant case, Innocent mistake of fact does not apply, the
defendants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action, as the
person in the room being then asleep would give them ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity.
Moreover, they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive
only if resistance or aggression is offered by him. Thus, the crime committed by defendants was not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental.

2) Yes. The Court held that the defendants committed the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia, but may be entitled to an incomplete justifying circumstance as provided in Article 11, No. 5, of
the Revised Penal Code. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right;
and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first requisite is present. Thus,
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law in case the crime committed is not wholly excusable, was imposed, entitling the
defendants to a privileged mitigating circumstance.

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 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELO AMIT
March 25, 1970 G.R. No. L-29066

FACTS:
Marcelo Amit was charged in the court below with the complex crime of rape with homicide
described and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Arraigned with the
assistance of a counsel de officio, he pleaded guilty. Due to the gravity of the offense charged, however,
the Court required additional evidence from the prosecution, which the latter presented in the form of (1)
the extrajudicial confession of appellant in Ilocano (exhibit A) and its translation into English (Exhibit A-1)
wherein he narrated in detail how the crime was committed; (2) the autopsy report (Exhibit B) describing
the injuries suffered by the victim as she resisted appellant’s criminal advances against her honor; and (3)
the medical certificate (Exhibit C) describing the personal injuries suffered by the appellant himself during
the struggle put up against him by the victim. On the basis of appellant’s plea of guilty and the
abovementioned evidence, the trial court rendered judgment sentencing him “to suffer the supreme penalty
of death, with the accessories prescribed by law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rufina Arellano in
the amount of P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.”
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, said judgment was
elevated to us for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcelo Amit is liable under the principle of Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code that resulted to the complex crime of rape with homicide described and penalized in Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended

RULING: Yes. Marcelo Amit is liable of complex crime of rape with homicide described and penalized in
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. While appellant does not question the correctness of
the decision under review in so far as it finds him guilty of the crime charged, he claims, through his
counsel de officio, that the penalty of death imposed upon him should be reduced to reclusion perpetua in
view of the presence of three mitigating circumstances which the trial court should have considered in his
favor, namely: (1) plea of guilty; (2) voluntary surrender, and (3) lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed. The Solicitor General admits that the mitigating circumstances of plea
of guilty and voluntary surrender have been proven, but denies that the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed was similarly established. We agree
with this latter contention. Appellant’s contention — because of its nature, must necessarily be judged in
the light of the acts committed by him and the circumstances under which they were committed. Should
they show a great disproportion between the means employed to accomplish the criminal act — on the one
hand — and its consequences — on the other — the mitigating circumstance under consideration must be
considered in favor of the accused. At the time of the commission of the crime, appellant was 32 years of
age, while his victim was 25 years his senior; his victim resisted his attempt to rape her by biting and
scratching him; to subdue her, appellant boxed her and then “held her on the neck and pressed it down”
while she was lying on her back and he was on top of her. These acts, we believe, were reasonably
sufficient to produce the result that they actually produced – the death of appellant’s victim.

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 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME TOMOTORGO y ALARCON
April 30, 1985 G.R. No. L-47941

FACTS:
Magdalena de los Santos, wife of the herein accused, had been persistently asking her husband to
sell the conjugal home which was then located at Sitio Dinalungan, Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of
Siruma, Camarines Sur. She wanted their family to transfer to the house of her husband’s in-laws which is
in the town of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Accused Tomotorgo would not accede to his wife’s request. He
did not like to abandon the house wherein he and his wife were then living. Furthermore, he had no
inclination to leave because he has many plants and improvements on the land which he was then farming
in said municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur, a town very far from the place of his in-laws where his wife
desired their family to transfer to.

On June 23, 1977, at about seven o’clock in the morning, the accused left his home to work on his
farm Upon his return at about nine o’clock that same morning. He found his wife and his three-month old
baby already gone. He proceeded to look for both of them and sometime later on, on a trail about two
hundred (200) meters from their home, he finally saw his wife carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle
of clothes. He asked and pleaded with his wife that she should return home with their child but she
adamantly refused to do so.

When appellant sought to take the child from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy
portion of the trail hereby causing the latter to cry. This conduct of his wife aroused the ire of the herein
accused. Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond control, appellant picked lip a piece of wood nearby
and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground complaining of severe pains on her chest.
Realizing what he had done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. He
then returned to the place where the child was thrown and he likewise took this infant home. Soon
thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate her pains. After the
accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported the tragic incident to the Barangay Captain of their
place who brought him to Policeman Arellosa to whom the accused surrendered. He also brought with him
the piece of wood he used in beating his wife.

Charged with the crime of parricide, the accused at his arraignment on November 24, 1977, with
assistance from his counsel de-oficio, pleaded not guilty to the said offense. Upon being re-arraigned, the
accused entered a plea of guilty. He confirmed the manifestations made by his counsel to the court
regarding his desire to change his initial plea. He expressed his realization of the gravity of the offense
charged against him and the consequences of his plea. His counsel was then permitted by the court to
establish the mitigating circumstances which were then invoked in favor of the accused. After the accused
had testified and upon his plea given in open court, the court below found him guilty of the crime of
parricide, but with three mitigating circumstances in his favor, namely: voluntary surrender, plea of guilty,
and that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.

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 With the imposition by the court below of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the herein accused
and the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration of the judgment rendered against him, the
accused through his counsel filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jaime Tomotorgo is liable of the crime of Parriide

RULING: Yes. The fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical injuries does
not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more serious crime committed. In the case of People vs.
Climaco Demiar, 108 Phil. 651, where the accused therein had choked his mother in a fit of anger because
the latter did not prepare any food for him, it was ruled that the crime committed by Demiar is parricide
(Article 246, Revised Penal Code), the deceased victim of his criminal act being his legitimate mother. Said
crime was declared as punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. As the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong (Article 13 of the RPC) The penalty imposed on the herein accused is
therefore correct in the light of the relevant provisions of law and jurisprudence.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MACARIO A. ULEP
June 20, 1988 G.R. No. L-36858

FACTS:
On May 21, 1970, at nine o’clock in the evening, in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, one Asuncion Pablo
Ulep died as a result of physical injuries inflicted upon her on that very day by her husband, accused
Macario Ulep. The following day, the Chief of Police of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte received a report of the
said death of Asuncion Pablo who allegedly died of a heart attack. The Chief of Police and the Rural Health
Officer went to the house of the deceased and there they saw the body on a bamboo bed surrounded by
relatives, friends, and the husband of the deceased, Macario. The Chief of Police suggested that an
autopsy be conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. However, the daughter of the deceased
by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to decide on her preference.

Two weeks after the burial, two (2) constabulary sergeants investigated Macario Ulep. Ulep
narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at their home at 5:30 in the afternoon. She 16op ali and
then went to bed, The accused then left for the fields and returned at around 9:00 in the evening and found
his wife dead on her bed. He reported this death to their barrio captain.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macario Ulep is liable for the tragic death of his wife, Asuncion Pablo Ulep

RULING: Yes. There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame for these in
human acts on his wife. He should answer for her tragic death.

We have previously stated that:

Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow
delivered by the accused —
(a) is the efficient cause of death; or
(b) accelerated his death; or
€ is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability.

The time-respected doctrine: “He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.”
must be highly considered. This is the rationale in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
“criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.” Again, We clarified that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick
does not cause any external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and
cause death, and even though the victim may have been previously affected by some internal malady, yet if
the blow with the fist or foot accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the
death as the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted. We are, therefore, convinced that there is no
fundamental disagreement between the two medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim’s death and
that cardiac arrest and primary shock took away the life of the victim, Asuncion Pablo.

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 FILOMENO URBANO vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
January 7, 1988 G.R. No. 72964

FACTS:
Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means of cutting grass which caused the
flooding of the storage area of the petitioner. Petitioner got angry and demanded Javier to pay for the
soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked
Javier hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier went to the hospital for the treatment of the wounds.
Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and tended to his tobacco plants.

Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital. Doctors findings showed
that he was suffering from tetanus infection. The next day, Javier died.

RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
Petitioner raised the case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his own
negligence.

ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of Javier.

RULING: No. According to the principle under Article 4, an accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.
The rule on proximate cause is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was
due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his
bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2
or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.

Moreover, if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause. CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITED of the crime of homicide.

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 SULPICIO INTOD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
October 21, 1992 G.R. No. 103119

FACTS:
Sometime in February of 1979, the petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, together with three other armed men
namely Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig, went to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany
them at the planned killing. Otherwise, he would also be killed.

On February 4, 1979 10:00 pm, All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan’s house and fired shots
at his bedroom. Unknown to them, Palangpangan was not in his bedroom, and the house was occupied by
his son-in-law and his family.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted Murder. Petioner raised the case to the
Court of Appeals but the same affirmed the decision. Petitioner now contends that he is only responsible for
an impossible crime under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sulpicio Intod is guilty of impossible crime only

RULING: Yes. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
(3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to
this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the
victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Moreover, were the thing intended
(attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that
the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in
reason committed.

Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality
the crime was impossible of commission therefore, petitioner is guilty of an impossible crime and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

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 RIVERA vs. PEOPLE
January 25, 2006 G.R. No. 166326 480 SCRA 188

FACTS:
As the victim, Ruben Rodil, went to a nearby store to buy food, accused Edgardo Rivera mocked
him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a
heated exchange of words ensued. In the evening of the following day, when Ruben and his three-year-old
daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo, together with his brother Esmeraldo Rivera and Ismael
Rivera, emerged from their house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist
blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area.

Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house only when the policemen arrived. Ruben
sustained injuries and was brought to the hospital. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and
superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened. The trial court
found the accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the accused, but the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification, changing the crime to attempted
murder and imposed an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and
1 day of prision mayor as maximum.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was intent to kill.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted
murder.
3) Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.

HELD:
1) Yes. The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter
alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. In the present case,
Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow
block. Even though the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death, intent to kill was presumed.

2) Yes. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. Although the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could
not have produced his death, it does not negate criminal liability of the accused for attempted murder. The
intent to kill was already presumed based on the overt acts of the accused. In fact, victim could have been
killed had the police not promptly intervened.

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3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no opportunity for the
victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the accused attacked the victim in a sudden and
unexpected manner as he was walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to
his life. He was overwhelmed with the assault of the accused and had no chance to defend himself and
retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.

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 RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs. PEOPLE
February 28, 2006 G.R. No. 166479 483 SCRA 649

FACTS:
April 19, 1998 7:30 am: Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in front
of his house when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Rodolfo C. Velasco dashed out of the tricycle,
approached the complainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. Velasco missed his
first shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper arm, causing him to stumble on the ground.
But, Frederick stood up and ran, while Velasco fired 6 more but missed. After being reported as wearing a
vest or a “chaleco”, the police, composed of SPO4 Romulo Villamil, PO3 Rolando Alvendo, and SPO1
Soliven pursued and caught Velasco who was on board a motorized tricycle to the highway going to
Barangay Banaoang in Calasiao town with a firearm protruding from the waistline.

Velasco’s Alibi: April 18, 1998, he spent the night at a friend’s house in Lingayen, Pangasinan and
between 6:00-7:00am, he left Lingayen riding in the Volkswagen car of Berting Soriano then alighted at the
corner of Banaoang diversion road to ride a tricycle where he heard a jeep behind him blowing its horn and
when he looked back he saw three men on board pointing their guns at him.
The RTC ruled that guilty of attempted murder appreciating treachery in the commission of the
crime sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum to
Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum and to pay P2,696 as actual damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision. Thus, velasco filed a petition for certiorari, assailing that he had
no motive to harm, much less kill, the victim for he was total stranger and since the identity of the assailant
is in doubt, motive becomes important and his alibi gains weight and value and that the testimony of
Armando Maramba is not credible, he being a relative of the victim

ISSUE: Whether or not Rodolfo Velasco is guilty of attempted murder

HELD: Yes, Rodolfo Velasco’s petition is therefore denied. It was not physically impossible for Velasco to
be at the crime scene when the crime was committed since it only takes a 10-minute ride from the place
where he allegedly alighted from the car of one Berting Soriano to the crime scene. Even without a ballistic
report, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove accused’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

It must be stressed that motive is a state of (one’s) mind which others cannot discern. It is not an
element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved. In fact, lack of motive for committing a
crime does not preclude conviction. It is judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for
no reason at all. Even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not
essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Motive assumes significance only
where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was. Since petitioner has been positively
identified the lack of motive is no longer of consequence.

21
 Relationship could strengthen the witnesses’ credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative
to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit. The fact that the shooting occurred in broad
daylight does not render its commission impossible. The fact that petitioner was a navy man, a protector of
the people, does not mean that he is innocent of the crime charged or that he is incapable of doing it. The
suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed left private complainant with no option but to
run for his life. – treachery. Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts
of execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, petitioner
committed an attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill by
shooting private complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of
causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private complainant
sustained a wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that where
the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder,
since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the minimum
of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional, and the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period.

22
 PEOPLE vs. CABALLERO
April 2, 2003 G.R. No. 149028-30 400 SCRA 424

FACTS:
Teresito (Dodong) Mondragon and his family lived in a compound surrounded by a barbed-wire
fence at New Sumakwel, Broce Street, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Living in the same compound
were Ricardo Caballero and his family; and Myrna Bawin, the sister of Eugene Tayactac, and her family.
Beside the compound was the house of Leonilo Broce, a nephew of Wilma Broce.

In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando (Baby), Robito (Bebot) and Marciano, Jr. (Jun), all
surnamed Caballero, were having a drinking spree in the house of their brother Ricardo in the Mondragon
Compound. Momentarily, Armando arrived in the store and asked Eugene in an angry tone: Gene 23op alit
ka? (Gene, will you buy?). Eugene replied: What is this all about? We dont have any quarrel between us.
Armando left the store but stood by the gate of the barbed-wired fence of the Mondragon Compound. His
brothers Ricardo, Robito and Marciano, Jr. joined him. Ricardo and Robito were armed with knives. When
Wilma told Eugene that she was closing the store already, he stood up and left the store on his way to
Susanas house. At that time, Myrna Bawin, who was standing by the window of their house saw her brother
Eugene going out of the store and proceeding to the house of Susana. She called out to him and advised
him to go home. Myrna then left the window to pacify her crying baby.

As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando suddenly grabbed Eugene
towards the compound. Eugene resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined
Armando and assaulted Eugene. Armando took the wooden pole supporting the clothesline and hit Eugene
with it. The latter tried to parry the blows of the Caballero brothers, to no avail. In the process, Eugene was
stabbed three times. As Eugene was being assaulted, Myrna returned to the window of her house and saw
the Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene. She shouted for help for her hapless brother. Wilma, who
witnessed the whole incident, was shocked to immobility at the sudden turn of events.

From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the commotion and rushed to the scene to pacify
the protagonists. Arnold told the Caballero brothers: Bay, what is the trouble between you and Eugene?
However, Ricardo accosted Arnold and stabbed the latter on the left side of his body. Forthwith, Robito,
Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of them stabbed Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled
for his life and hid under the house of a neighbor.

For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the commotion was. He was, however, met by
Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo retreated and pleaded to his uncle Lucio Broce for
help: Tio, help me because I am hit. The commotion stopped only upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon
who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all returned to the compound.

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In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo brought the injured Eugene, Leonilo and Arnold to the
Planters Hospital for medical treatment. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they
sustained.

ISSUE: Whetther or not Armando Caballero et al. are liable for the death of Eugene Tayactac and Leonilo
Broce

RULING: In light of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental), Branch 57, in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 up to RTC-1219 is affirmed with the following
modifications:

1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217, the Court, finding the appellants not guilty of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt REVERSES the judgment of the trial
court and ACQUITS them of the said charge.

2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery, and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac, the
amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.

3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code and are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in
its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. The appellants are hereby ordered to pay in solidum to the victim Arnold
Barcuma the amount of P25,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as temperate or moderate damages.
.

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 PEOPLE vs. LISTERIO
July 5, 2000 G.R. No. 122099 335 SCRA 40

FACTS:
Criminal Case No. 91-5842 and Criminal Case No. 91-5843 were filed against Agapito Listerio y
Prado and Samson dela Torre y Esquela. Upon arraignment, accused Agapito Listerio y Prado and
Samson dela Torre y Esquela pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Their other co-accused have
remained at large.

On May 14, 1991, Marlon Araque’s Version: Marlon and his brother Jeonito were in Purok 4,
Alabang, Muntinlupa to collect a sum of money from Tino. Having failed they turned back, as they were
passing Tramo near Tino’s place, a group composed of Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela
Torre, Marlon dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya blocked their path and attacked them with lead pipes and
bladed weapons.

Jeonito Araque from behind with 3 stab wounds: 1. Upper right portion of his back, 2. Lower right
portion and 3. Middle portion of the left side of his back causing him to fall down. Marlon was hit on the
head by Samson dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya with lead pipes and momentarily lost consciousness.
When he regained consciousness 3 minutes later, Jeonito was already dead and the group fled. He was
brought to the hospital for treatment of his forearm and the shoulder

Agapito Listerio’s Version: Agapito Listerio is a 39 years old, married, side walk vegetable vendor
and a resident of Purok 4.
1:00 pm: He was in store of Nimfa Agustin drinking beer with Edgar Demolador and Andres Gininao
2:00 pm: He went to his house and slept
5:00 pm: Remolador and Gininao woke him up and told him there was a quarrel near the railroad track
6:00 pm: 2 policemen passed by going to the house of Samson de la Torre while he was chatting with
Remolador and Gininao and invited them for questioning. But, the two were sent home. He was handed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Marlon Araque, implicating him for the death of Jeonito Araque and the
frustrated murder of Marlon Araque. When he confronted Marlon as to why he was being included in the
case, the latter replied “because you ejected us from your house”

Dr. Manimtim’s Autopsy Reports provides that:

1) Marlon Araque obtained 2 wounds on the forearm and on the shoulder and were caused by a sharp
object like a knife while the other 2 were caused by a blunt instrument such as a lead pipe.
2) Jeonito Araque obtained 3 stab wounds that were inflicted from behind by a sharp, pointed and single-
bladed instrument like a kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument. Considering the involvement of a
vital organ and a major blood vessel, the first wound was considered fatal. Unlike the first, the second and
third wounds were non-fatal. The first and second wounds were inflicted by knife thrusts delivered starting
below going upward by assailants who were standing behind the victim.

25
 The Regional Trial Court held that Agapito Listerio is criminally liable for attempted Homicide only
on the basis of Dr. Manimtim’s testimony that none of the wounds sustained by Marlon Araque were fatal.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a conspiracy for frustrated homicide

HELD: Yes. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found for criminals do not write down their lawless plans
and plots. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action
and community of interest.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged,
but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances, which
vary according to the purpose accomplished. Previous agreement to commit a crime is not essential to
establish a conspiracy, it being sufficient that the condition attending to its commission and the acts
executed may be indicative of a common design to accomplish a criminal purpose and objective. It is
necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in
the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his con-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship; it denotes an intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

All of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus criminis, indubitably shows their criminal
design to kill the victims. Conspirator is equally liable for the crime as it is unnecessary to determine who
inflicted the fatal wound because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. That circumstance
qualifies the crime into murder. The commission of the crime was also attended by abuse of superior
strength on account of the fact that accused-appellant and his companions were not only numerically
superior to the victims but also because all of them, armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, purposely
used force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked. However, this
aggravating circumstance is already absorbed in treachery. In the light of the finding of conspiracy, evident
premeditation need not be further appreciated, absent concrete proof as to how and when the plan to kill
was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out. Intent to kill of the malefactors herein
who were armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes can hardly be doubted given the prevailing facts of
the case. Lastly it cannot be denied that the crime is a frustrated felony not an attempted offense
considering that after being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of which he lost
consciousness and fell, Marlon’s attackers apparently thought he was already dead and fled.

26
 PEOPLE vs. PALAGANAS
September 12, 2006 G.R. No. 165483

FACTS:
Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house but
later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter,
Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. When Jaime Palaganas
was singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him. Jaime got irritated and insulted. He felt that he was being
mocked by Melton that caused him to go to the latter’s table and uttered statements which began the fight.
Ferdinand sought help from Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the bar and upon seeing the Ferrers
instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of
unlicensed firearm. As a result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in
his right shoulder.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Rujjeric Palaganas was guilty of the crime of homicide and 2 counts of frustrated
murder.
(2) Whether or not the use of the unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance which should be
appreciated by the court at the case at bar.

Held: In the first issue, Rujjeric Palaganas is guilty of homicide for the death of Melton Ferrer, frustrated
homicide for fatally wounding Servillano Ferrer and attempted homicide for shooting Michael at his right
shoulder. Petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present in the instant case and,
thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun on that fateful night, he was then
a victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in
his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.

Under Article 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
In the case at bar, no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified the act of
petitioner in shooting them. Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke bar and were
not carrying any weapon. When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not in a state of
actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5 meters) of the latter from the location of the
former. He was still capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by taking cover. He could have also
called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
In the case at bar, gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. X x x.
Unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self-defense. It is an essential and indispensable requisite,
for without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim

27
 When the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not
any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if
the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is
only attempted murder or attempted homicide.

On the second issue, yes, the unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance. An
aggravating circumstance was provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic
Act 8294 which is a special law that was passed stating that: if homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of the petitioner
in this case is merely an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

28
 PEOPLE vs. ACA-AC
April 20, 2001 G.R. No. 142500 357 SCRA 373

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision, dated February 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
4, City of Tagbilaran, finding accused-appellant Decoroso Aca-ac y Cespon, alias Kokong, guilty of
frustrated rape and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties, and to indemnify the complainant Fritzie Aca-ac the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. Originally taken to the
Court of Appeals, the appeal was certified to this Court pursuant to Rule 124, 13 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure in view of the appeals courts’ ruling that accused-appellant is guilty of consummated,
not frustrated, rape and that the appropriate penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua.

On the basis of criminal complaints of the minor Fritzie Aca-ac, four informations for rape were filed
against accused-appellant in the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.

In Criminal Case No. 7091, the information alleged:

That on or about the 22nd day of September, 1990 at Barangay Villalimpia, Municipality of Loay,
Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused through craft, lured and brought the victim Fritzie Aca-ac, a minor below twelve years of age, to
the formers house and to his bedroom and thereafter, with intent to have sexual intercourse, removed the
victims panty, let her lie down while he lay on top her, inserted his penis into her labia minora near the
clitoris of the vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim with her vitiated consent
since she is below twelve years old, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

In Criminal Case No. 7092, the information charged:

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1990 at Barangay Villalimpia, Municipality of Loay,
Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused through craft, lured the victim Fritzie Aca-ac, a minor below twelve years of age to remove her
shorts and panty and to lie down on the ground, and thereafter, the accused inserted his penis into her
vagina near the clitoris and vaginal opening and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim with
her vitiated consent since she is below twelve years old, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party.

In Criminal Case No. 7093, the information alleged:

That on or about the 12th day of January, 1991 at Barangay Villalimpia, Municipality of Loay,
Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused through craft, lured the victim Fritzie Aca-ac, a minor below twelve years of age to go to a bushy
place near a nipa plantation, and, upon reaching the place, let her undress and lie down while he lay on top

29
of her, and thereafter, he inserted his penis inside her vaginal opening near her clitoris and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with the victim with her vitiated consent since she is below twelve years old, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

In Criminal Case No. 7094, the information asserted:

That on or about the 8th day of September, 1990 at Barangay Villalimpia, Municipality of Loay,
Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused through craft, lured and brought the victim Fritzie Aca-ac, a minor below twelve years of age, to an
old uninhabited house, and thereafter, upon reaching the place, took off her shorts and her panty with intent
to have sexual intercourse with her and then let her lie down after which the accused lay on top of her and
inserted his penis into the labia minora near the clitoris of the vagina of the victim and succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with her vitiated consent since she is below twelve years old, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.

ISSUE: Whether or not Decoroso Aca-ac y Cespon is guilty of frustrated rape

RULING: No. Decoroso Aca-ac y Cespon is criminally liable for consummated rape. Rape is only either
attempted or consummated. There can be no frustrated rape. “Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the
moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be
done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the
felony is consummated. In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527 (1925); People v. Hernandez,
49 Phil. 980 (1925); People v. Royeras, 56 SCRA 666 (1974); People v. Amores, 58 SCRA 505 (1974)), we
have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil.
559 (1935); People v. Rabadan and Olaybar, 53 Phil. 694 (1927); United States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434
(1907)) because not all acts of execution were performed. The offender merely commenced the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements, and manner of
execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated
stage in rape can ever be committed.”

30
 PEOPLE vs. FABRO
February 10, 2000 G.R. No. 114261 325 SCRA 285

FACTS:
Appellant Fabro together with her common-law husband Donald Pilay and Irene Martin was
charged with the crime of “violation of Section 21 (b) Art. IV, in relation to Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act
No. 6425. They conspired and sold/delivered to PO2 APDUHAN, who acted as poseur-buyer, one (1) kilo
of dried marijuana leaves. Two concerned individuals, Gloria and Emma Borce, reported to Chief Inspector
Evasco that a in Baguio City, was engaged in selling marijuana. They added that sales usually took place
between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. acting on that report, Chief Inspector Evasco organized two teams to conduct
a buy-bust operation. Senior Inspector Mabanag was to be the overall team leader with Batag as his
assistant. SPO2 Ellonito Apduhan was designated poseur-buyer in the operation. After briefing the group,
Chief Inspector Evasco gave P600.00 as purchase money to Apduhan. The amount consisted of six P100-
bills with their serial numbers duly listed down. As Apduhan, Gloria and Emma drew near Pilay’s residence,
appellant met them. Donald Pilay who appeared drunk was inside the house by the main door. Gloria and
Emma introduced Apduhan to appellant as a stranger in the place who wanted to buy marijuana. Appellant
told them that a kilo would cost them P700.00 but she agreed to Apduhan’s price of P600.00. After
Apduhan had ordered a kilo of the contraband, appellant told them to wait a while. Appellant then went to a
house just behind her own. After a few minutes, she returned in the company of another woman who was
later identified as Irene Martin. Appellant handed the stuff to Apduhan. Her companion, Irene Martin,
demanded payment therefor. Apduhan gave her the P600.00. After ascertaining that it was a brick of
marijuana, he made the pre-arranged signal of lighting his cigarette. Immediately, the back-up team rushed
towards their direction. However, before the team could reach them, Irene Martin ran away. Apduhan held
appellant so that she could not escape. Donald Pilay was also arrested.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is conspiracy in the commission of the crime

RULING: Yes. Appellant’s contention that Irene Martin was the real culprit being the source of the
contraband does not in any way absolve her of the crime of selling marijuana. While it is true that it was
Irene Martin who took the money, appellant was the one who negotiated with the poseur-buyers; fetched
her co-accused; carried and handed over the marijuana to Apduhan. The acts of Martin and appellant
clearly show a unity of purpose in the consummation of the sale of marijuana. In other words, between
Martin and appellant, conspiracy in the commission of the crime was indubitably proven by the prosecution.
Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425 punishes the mere conspiracy to commit the offense of selling, delivering,
distributing and transporting of dangerous drugs. Conspiracy herein refers to the mere agreement to
commit the said acts and not the actual execution thereof. While the rule is that a mere conspiracy to
commit a crime without doing any overt act is not punishable, the exception is when such is specifically
penalized by law, as in the case of Section 21 of Republic Act 6425. Conspiracy as crime should be
distinguished from conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability the latter being applicable to the
case at bar.

31
 ANGELES v. DESIERTO
September 23, 2002 G.R. No. 131966 501 SCRA 202

FACTS:
This refers to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court brought by the Republic
of the Philippines assailing the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of the complaint filed by
petitioner against herein private respondents in OMB-0-90-2811 for Violation of Republic Act No. 3019
(otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended) and other penal laws.

As borne by the records, in a Complaint dated February 27, 1990 filed by petitioners with the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), private respondents were charged with violation
of R.A. 3019 and other penal laws, committed as follows:

Respondents, in conspiracy with Dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos and other individuals whose
identities and whereabouts may be established later, confederating together and mutually helping each
other, acting in their official capacity members of the Governing Board of the Philippine Coconut Authority
(PCA), a government agency under the Office of the President, being subordinates and close associates of
the said Dictator Marcos, and also as members of the Boards of Directors of both the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) and United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM) which were acquired with the use of
coconut levy funds being administered by them, in utter neglect of their fiduciary responsibilities and with
intent to gain, taking undue advantage of their public office and close relationship with dictator Marcos, did
then and there, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality knowingly, willfully and unlawfully
misappropriated huge amounts of the coconut levy funds in connection with the acquisition of 16 oil mills
only to be mothballed and assume the defaulted obligations of seven of the said mills in order to establish a
monopoly, thus violating the provisions of RA 3019, as amended, and Art. 186 of the Revised Penal Code.

Respondent Cojuangco, Jr. alleges that: (1) the petition was filed out of time; (2) the petition is
merely a substitute for a lost appeal; (3) the PCGG is not authorized to file the petition; (4) the offense has
prescribed; (5) the case should have been dismissed due to the long and unreasonable delay in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation; and (6) the Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion.

The other respondents filed no comment on the petition. The petition must be granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be entertained even though it was filed by the PCGG without the
intervention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

RULING: Yes. It is true that the OSG is mandated to represent the Government in the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, and in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG should have filed the instant
petition in behalf of the Republic. However, the ends of substantial justice affords an exception thereto.

32
 We have ruled if the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in the action
could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, then the petition should be
entertained. Even assuming arguendo that the PCGG has no authority to file the petition, its unauthorized
filing was ratified, and the defect was cured, when the OSG signed as co-counsel for the Republic in its
Consolidated Reply.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Resolution dated June 2, 1997 of Graft
Investigation Officer II Aleu A. Amante, dismissing petitioners complaint in OMB-0-90-2811, approved by
the Ombudsman, and, the Order dated September 18, 1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration,
are hereby annulled and set aside. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to proceed with the preliminary
investigation of OMB-0-90-2811, and, to exclude respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion
as defendants therein.

33
 PEOPLE v. MAPALO
February 6, 2007 G.R. No. 172608

FACTS:
On 12 February 1994, a pre-Valentine dance was held in Sitio Baracbac, Brgy. Sta. Cecilia in
Aringay, La Union. He watched the dance, along with the appellant and Jimmy Frigillana.10 In the early
morning of 13 February 1994, at around 3:00 a.m., a fight erupted between Manuel Piamonte (Piamonte)
and the group of Lando Mapalo, Jimmy Frigillana, and the appellant.

Garcia further testified that he witnessed the fight from a distance of more or less five (5) meters.
He claimed that he could see the incident very clearly because of the light at the dancing hall. He saw the
appellant club Piamonte with a lead pipe from behind, hitting him on the right side of the head.The pipe was
one and a half (1 and ½) feet in length, and one and a half (1 and ½) inches in diameter. At that time when
the appellant struck Piamonte with a lead pipe, he saw Jimmy Frigillana and Lando Mapalo standing in
front of Piamonte. Later, he saw the dead body of Piamonte, which had suffered multiple stab wounds.He
saw stab wounds on the left and right parts of the abdomen, and below the left breast, as well as small
wounds on the front part of his left hip. Garcia disclosed that he neither witnessed how Piamonte was
stabbed, nor did he see the act of stabbing Piamonte. He does not know who stabbed the latter. It was only
when Piamonte’s shirt was removed when he saw stab wounds on the former’s dead body.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder. The Court of Appeals found no adequate reason to disturb the findings of the RTC in weighing the
testimony of Garcia, however, found reason to modify the findings of the RTC. It convicted the appellant of
frustrated murder only. It was not convinced that the evidence on record established conspiracy among the
appellant and his co-accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bernard Mapalo is liable as a principal in the crime of murder due to the existence
of conspiracy

RULING: There being no conspiracy, the liability of the appellant will revolve around his individual
participation in the event. Conspiracy must be established by a positive and conclusive evidence. A
conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly
and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself.

In the case at bar, no injury was shown to be attributable to the appellant. The only medical
evidence that appears on records is the deceased Piamonte’s death certificate, which indicates that the
cause of death is massive hypovolemia secondary to multiple stab wounds. The factual findings of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals coincide to show that the cause of death of Piamonte is multiple stab wounds.
Nothing has been shown otherwise. Other than the presence of multiple stab wounds, no other type of
injury on the deceased was established. No contusions or injury on the head of the victim or anywhere else
in his body caused by a lead pipe was shown.

34
 The witness Garcia, in his testimony, merely pointed to stab wounds on the different parts of the
body of the deceased. No proof on the injury that was sustained by the deceased that can be attributable to
appellant’s act was demonstrated. No other physical evidence was proffered.

We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The principal and
essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailant’s intent to take the life of
the person attacked. Such intent must be proved clearly and convincingly, so as to exclude reasonable
doubt thereof. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons
used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the
manner the crime was committed; and € words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted
by him on the victim.

Wherefore, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 21 November 2005, in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00408 is modified. Appellant Bernard Mapalo is acquitted of the charge of murder for lack of evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. He is found guilty of the crime of maltreatment, as defined and punished by
Article 266, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

35
 SULPICIO INTOD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
November 29, 2006 509 SCRA 302

FACTS:
Sometime in February of 1979, the petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, together with three other armed men
namely Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig, went to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany
them at the planned killing. Otherwise, he would also be killed.

On February 4, 1979 10:00 pm, All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan’s house and fired shots
at his bedroom. Unknown to them, Palangpangan was not in his bedroom, and the house was occupied by
his son-in-law and his family.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted Murder. Petioner raised the case to the
Court of Appeals but the same affirmed the decision. Petitioner now contends that he is only responsible for
an impossible crime under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sulpicio Intod is guilty of impossible crime only

RULING: Yes. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
(3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to
this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the
victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Moreover, were the thing intended
(attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that
the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in
reason committed.

Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality
the crime was impossible of commission therefore, petitioner is guilty of an impossible crime and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

36
 COSME NACARIO v. PEOPLE
September 30, 2008 G.R. No. 173106

FACTS:
In the afternoon of March 29, 1997, Medardo de Villa (the victim), while on board a bicycle along a
road at Iriga City, met petitioner who was also on board a bicycle coming from the opposite direction. After
both alighted from their respective bicycles, petitioner stabbed the victim with a balisong (fan knife) at the
upper left portion of the abdomen. Not long after the incident, petitioner surrendered to the police. Petitioner
admitted having stabbed the victim. He interposed self-defense.

The Regional Trial Court, found the accused, Cosme Nacario, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of Frustrated Homicide. In ruling out self-defense, the trial court held:
Accused could not claim self-defense because, after having wrestled away the knife from complainant, if at
all complainant was originally in possession of the knife and tried to stab him , there was already an
interval of time when complainant turned his back from him and picked up a stone. Assuming without
admitting that complainant picked up a stone to throw at him, he could always run away from the fight. After
all he was patient enough to ward off complainant’s attempts to stab him. This version of the accused is not
credible. The court believes that it was accused who was in possession of the knife all the time when they
met and he stabbed him.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the penalty after
considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of petitioner. Hence, the present petition for
review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cosme Nacario is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Frustrated
Homicide

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed with modification. As did the lower courts, the Court thus
brushes aside petitioner’s plea of self-defense. Having interposed self-defense, petitioner had the onus of
proving its elements, viz: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) employment of reasonable
necessity to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

Petitioner maintained that the victim provoked the incident by waylaying him, and that after he
wrested the knife from the victim, the latter instantaneously picked up stones, thus making him (petitioner)
believe that “an attack was still forthcoming and [he] was still threatened by some evil or injury,” hence, his
stabbing of the victim. Assuming arguendo that unlawful aggression initially came from the victim, the
aggression ceased when the victim was divested of his balisong. At that instant, there was no longer any
imminent risk to petitioner’s life or personal safety. Petitioner’s conviction of Frustrated Murder is thus
upheld. The award of P25,000 as indemnity is deleted; in its stead, the award of P30,000 as temperate
damages is ordered. In all other respects, the appellate court’s Decision is affirmed.

37
 PEOPLE v. FLORA
June 23, 2000 G.R. No. 125909

FACTS:
Days before the incident, appellant Hermogenes Flora alias “Bodoy,” had a violent altercation with
a certain Oscar Villanueva. Oscars uncle, Ireneo Gallarte, pacified the two. On the evening of January 9,
1993, a dance party was held to celebrate the birthday of Jeng-jeng Malubago in Sitio Silab, Barangay
Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant Hermogenes Flora, allegedly a suitor of Jeng-jeng Malubago,
attended the party with his brother and co-appellant Edwin Flora, alias “Boboy”. Also in attendance were
Rosalie Roma, then a high school student; her mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt, Flor Espinas. Ireneo
Gallarte, a neighbor of the Romas, was there too.

The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted. On signal by Edwin Flora,
Hermogenes Flora fired his .38 caliber revolver twice. The first shot grazed the right shoulder of Flor
Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma, below her shoulder. The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte who slumped
onto the floor. Rosalie, was shocked and could only utter, “si Bodoy, si Bodoy”, referring to Hermogenes
Flora. Edwin Flora approached her and, poking a knife at her neck, threatened to kill her before he and his
brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene. The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health Unit in
Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna, where Emerita and Ireneo died. Early that same morning of January 10, 1993,
the police arrested Edwin Flora at his rented house in Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna.
Hermogenes Flora, after learning of the arrest of his brother, proceeded first to the house of his aunt,
Erlinda Pangan, in Pangil, Laguna but later that day, he fled to his hometown in Pipian, San Fernando,
Camarines Sur.

The trial court convicted accused-appellants of the crime of double murder and attempted murder.
Thereafter, accused-appellants seek the reversal of the decision dated November 7, 1995, of the Regional
Trial Court, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of double murder and attempted
murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hermogenes Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder
and attempted murder

RULING: No. Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the murder of Ireneo Gallarte.
For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused and co-accused
had the same purpose and were united in execution. Even if an accused did not fire a single shot but his
conduct indicated cooperation with his co-accused, as when his armed presence unquestionably gave
encouragement and a sense of security to the latter, his liability is that of a co-conspirator. To hold an
accused guilty as a co-conspirator by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he had performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.

38
 Edwin’s participation as the co-conspirator of Hermogenes was correctly appreciated by the trial
court. However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita Roma and the
injury of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts
done outside the contemplation of the conspirators only the actual perpetrators are liable. To conclude,
appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the murder of Ireneo Gallarte. He has no
liability for the death of Emerita Roma nor for the injuries of Flor Espinas caused by his co-accused
Hermogenes Flora.

39
 GUILLERMO v. PEOPLE
June 30, 2008 G.R. No. 153287

FACTS:
Eddie Roque alleged that at around 5:40 oclock in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, he, together with
Winnie Alon, Vicente Alon and Wilfredo Cabison, were inside the restaurant of Mrs. Heyres at Cuartero
Public Market to leave their tools of the chain saw and to eat and drink. Noel Guillermo, Arnel Socias, and
Joemer Palma were ahead of them to the restaurant and were drinking beer. They invited them and they
joined them. Before each of them could fully consume a bottle served upon each of them, Winnie Alon and
Arnel Socias argued about the cutting of wood by means of a chain saw . The argument was so heated
that each of the protagonists stood up and Arnel Socias took 2 bottles which were thrown to Vicente Alon
who was hit on the forehead.

Noel Guillermo hugged or embraced Winnie Alon and stabbed him three times (3) on the neck
with a Batangueo knife. Arnel Socias went around, then behind, and stabbed Winnie Alon once, on the left
side of his body, just below his left armpit, with a pointed object, but he could not determine what weapon
was used. Joemar Palma also helped in stabbing Winnie Alon once, hitting him at the right side of his body.
Winnie Alon resisted trying to struggle, but could not move because he was ganged up by the three.

The Regional Trial Cpurt, in its decision of January 8, 2000, convicted the petitioner of the crime of
homicide, but acquitted Arnaldo and Joemar. The petitioner appealed to the CA whose decision is now
assailed in the present petition. The petitioner essentially claims that the RTC and the CA erred in failing to
recognize the existence of all the elements of self-defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not Noel Guillermo the claim of self-defense is tenable

RULING: No. As the lower courts did, we do not recognize that the petitioner fully acted in self-defense.
As a rule, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. However, when the accused admits the killing and, by way of justification, pleads self-defense, the
burden of evidence shifts; he must then show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in
self-defense. For that purpose, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of the prosecution’s evidence.

The elements that the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence to successfully
plead self-defense are enumerated under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code. We see no reason to
disturb these findings as they are based on existing evidence, and the conclusions drawn therefrom are
patently reasonable. We have time and again held that the findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment
of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on
the these factual findings are to be given the highest respect; the trial court enjoys the unique advantage of
being able to observe, at close range, the conduct and deportment of witnesses as they testify.

40
 These factual findings, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and need
not be reviewed on the appeal to us. We are not a trier of facts; as a rule, we do not weigh anew the
evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. Only after a showing that the courts
below ignored, overlooked, misinterpreted, or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance
that would alter the outcome of the case, are we justified in undertaking a factual review. No such
exceptional grounds obtain in this case.

In sum, we rule that there was no rational equivalence between the means of the attack and the
means of defense sufficient to characterize the latter as reasonable.

41
 PEOPLE v. ADLAWAN
January 20, 2002 G.R. No. 131839

FACTS:
At dawn of November 15, 1992, the deceased, together with prosecution witnesses Benjamin
Basubas and Quirino Cinco, and a certain Oliver Bonayan, were inside a fenced disco area in Sitio Oril,
Mandaue City. At 2:00 a.m., Benjamin Basubas and Quirino Cinco were alerted by a commotion outside.
When they rushed out, they saw the deceased raising his hands in front of accused-appellant, who was
then in the company of Barangay Tanod Jerry Diaz and Jet Bonita. Likewise present was accused-
appellant’s father, Barangay Tanod Crispulo Adlawan, who was lying on the ground unconscious.
Prosecution witnesses Benjamin Basubas and Quirino Cinco stood approximately one meter away from the
deceased. All of a sudden, accused-appellant drew a gun from his waist, pointed it at the deceased, saying,
this is the one. He immediately fired the gun, hitting the deceased on the chest. The latter staggered toward
the direction of Benjamin Basubas. He was able to hold on to a deaf-mute bystander, but fell on a shallow
canal and landed on his belly with his head resting on the bank of the canal. Accused-appellant followed
the deceased, turned the latters head and delivered a fatal shot hitting him above the right ear. Thereafter,
accused-appellant surrendered the gun to a group of Barangay Tanod.

On the other hand, the defense averred that at around 2:00 in the morning of November 15, 1992,
while accused-appellant was inside a fenced disco area in Sitio Oril, Mandaue City, he heard somebody
shouting and when he turned to the source of the disturbance, he saw his father, lying on the ground
unconscious and with a bloodied face. Accused-appellant dashed to his father whom he thought was
already dead. As he tried to lift him, he saw the deceased about 2 1/2 arms length away, holding a gun and
told him, Do you want to follow your father? Thereafter, accused-appellant lunged at the deceased, twisted
his hand, forcing the muzzle of the gun to be pointed at the deceaseds chest. Suddenly, the gun went off,
causing the deceased to fall in a canal. Accused-appellant was able to get hold of the gun and again fired
at the deceased. Thereafter, he fled and hid in Manila until January 23, 1997, when he finally decided to
surrender to Mayor Alfredo M. Ouano and P/Supt. Rolando Borres

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant’s willingness to enter to a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
Homicide must be considered as a mitigating circumstance

RULING: No. The appeal has no merit. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
cannot be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. From the version of the prosecution, which the Court finds
credible, the deceased did not commit any unlawful aggression towards accused-appellant. On the
contrary, it was accused-appellant who was the aggressor when he shot the deceased who was unarmed
and raising his hands. In the same vein, the circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is unavailing.
It is settled that a person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful
aggression has ceased.

42
 In the instant case, accused-appellant was not justified in attacking the deceased as the latter had
his hands raised and was no longer poised to attack accused-appellant’s father at the time he was shot.
Nevertheless, the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation should be appreciated to mitigate
accused-appellant’s criminal liability. The requisites of this mitigating circumstance are: (1) that there be an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.

The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of accused-appellant. To be considered a mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender must be
spontaneous. The conduct of the accused, and not his intention alone, after the commission of the offense,
determines the spontaneity of the surrender. In People v. Mabuyo, we held that the surrender is not
spontaneous where it took the accused almost nine months from the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against him before he presented himself to the police authorities.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant thought his father whose face was bloodied and lying
unconscious on the ground was dead. Surely, such a scenario is sufficient to trigger an uncontrollable burst
of legitimate passion. His act, therefore, of shooting the deceased, right after learning that the latter was the
one who harmed his father, satisfies the requisite of the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation
under Paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

Wherefore, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. DU-3463, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Murder, is Affirmed
with the modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay in addition to the P50,000.00 death indemnity and the
costs, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as temperate damages and the amount of
P443,700.00 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased.

43
 CABUSLAY v. PEOPLE
September 30, 2005 G.R. No. 129875

FACTS:
Paquito Umas-as earned a living as a collector of payments for assorted articles that he sold
oncredit. One fateful morning, he was halted by a police upon reaching a checkpoint. The policeasked him
to show his ID. When he took out his ID from his left pocket and when it reached thefront man, one of the
policemen, who was identified as the petitioner, opened fire at the collectorwhose right hand was then
raised. Petitioner, who was four meters away from thecollector, consumed the entire magazine of
his M-16 armalite in firing at him. Thecollector fell to the ground and was still moving when the police
placed him on board avehicle and brought him to Kolambugan for medical attention. Petitioner interposed
self-defense and acting in the lawful performance of his duty as he claimed that the victimfired first at
Regencia, the police who was asking for the ID at the checkpoint.

ISSUE: Whether or not self-defense and lawful performance of duty under the circumstances exempts one
from criminal liability.

RULING: No. The 8 gunshot wounds suffered by Paquito negate any claim of self-defense. Hadpetitioner
merely defended himself from the victims unlawful aggression, one shot toimmobilize him would have been
enough. The nature and number of wounds inflicted bythe accused are important indicia which disprove a
plea for self-defense or defense ofstranger because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim
and not justdefend oneself. That the killing of Paquito resulted from the lawful performance of duty as a
policeofficer is of no defense where the victim was not committing any offense at the time.Cabuslay has not
sufficiently proven that the victim had indeed fired at Regencia wherethe alleged gun used by the victim
was not even presented in evidence. Killing thevictim under the circumstances of this case cannot be
considered a valid performance of a lawful duty by a man who had sworn to maintain peace and order and
to protect thelives of the people.

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 TY v. PEOPLE
September 27, 2004 G.R. No. 149275 439 SCRA 220

FACTS:
Ty’s mother and sister was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital. The total hospital bills
amounted to P1 million. After signing a contract of responsibility with the hospital, Ty issued 7 checks to
cover the said expenses, all of which were dishonored for being drawn against a closed a account. Manila
Doctors Hospital sued Ty for violation of BP 22.

In her defense, Ty alleged that she issued the checks because of an “uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury”. She averred that her mother threatened to commit suicide due to the inhumane treatment
she allegedly suffered while confined in the hospital. Ty was found guilty by the trial court of 7 counts of
violation of BP 22. Ty appealed wherein she reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear or avoidance of a greater evil or injury tenable to
warrant Ty’s exemption from criminal liability?

RULING: No. For the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and
(3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence
that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable
fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful,
or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.

In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was
compelled to issue the checksa condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could
be discharged for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of
the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable
fear contemplated by law.

To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the
fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere
instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.

45
 Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She
did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own
words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother
may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with
the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.

Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result
in a violation of B.P. 22.

At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee
the obligation. The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation

46
 MAMANGUN v. PEOPLE
February 2, 2007 G.R. No. 149152

FACTS:
Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his fellow police
officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, which
prompted residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard and proceeded to the rooftop
of Antonio Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the
rooftop and saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who was ahead of the
group, fired his gun once and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener Contreras (not the suspect) –
Contreras died of the gunshot wound.

According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the policemen to the lighted
rooftop. He was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to Ayson,
Mamangun pointed his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which Mamangun
replied, “Anong hindi ako?” and shot him.

The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark rooftop when
Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run. Mamangun shouted “Pulis, tigil!”
whereupon the person stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamangun’s head. This prompted
Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police claim that Contreras only said “Hindi ako, hindi ako” only
when they approached him. Mamangun then asked “Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are
policemen here.” Mamangun reported the incident to the desk officer who directed investigator Hernando
Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later on found a steel pipe on the roof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the petitioner’s
fulfillment of his duty

RULING: No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding the
petitioner’s testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability. Per
Sandiganbayan’s observations, the defense was self-serving for the accused and biased with respect to his
co-policemen-witnesses because: after supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by
Mamangun, it is contrary to human experience for a man (who is not the suspect) to attack one of three
policemen with drawn guns.

Mamangun’s admission that he did not ask the victim “Why did you try to hit me, if you are not the
one?” clearly belies their claim. The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that
the victim instinctively shielded himself instead. Additionally, petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him
was not initially reported to the desk and was only conveniently remembered when the investigator found a
pipe in the crime scene.

47
Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not completely justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal
gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was absent, which leads to the failure
of the petitioner’s plea. Also, there can only be incomplete justification (a privileged mitigating
circumstance) in the absence of a necessary justifying circumstance the injury was caused by necessary
consequence of due performance of duty.

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 PEOPLE v. ANCHETA
November 29, 1938 G.R. No. L-45344 66 Phil 638

FACTS:
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, all the fifteen persons originally included as
accused in this case, were members of a constabulary detachment in the municipal district of Balabac,
Province of Palawan. The appellant Ancheta, with the rank of third lieutenant, was their commander. The
appellant Del Rosario was a sergeant, while the appellant Gaspi was a private. Ancheta became engaged
who belonged to one of the most prominent families in that municipal district. Bibiana had two brothers
named Cirilo and Rufo. About six months, prior to the occurence of the events which gave rise to this case,
the engagement of Ancheta to Bibiana was broken. Whether because of this rupture or some other reason,
the relations between Ancheta and the Sanson brothers appeared to be quite strained. The Sanson family
was running a store located on the ground floor of their house facing the main street. On that fateful
Sunday morning, January 13, 1935, Bibiana, her two brothers, and the deceased Salazar were gathered in
the store. After the mass and while passing in front of the store, Ancheta was assaulted and beaten by the
Sanson brother and and received multiple bruises and cuts about the face. In the course of the scuffle
Ancheta fell down, and while Cirilo grappled with him, Rufo continued to box him. Ancheta carried a pistol
on his waist, and while he was thus being attacked by the Sanson brothers, the deceased Salazar took the
pistol and kept it. The evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to what transpired afterwards. It is likewise in
conflict as to what motivated the assault perpetrated on Ancheta by the Sanson brothers.
This case grew out of an affray which took place in a small and isolated community, the municipal district of
Balabac, Province of Palawan. Appellants, with twelve others, all members of the constabular, were charge
in the Court of First Instance of Palawan with having murdered Guillermo Salazar who was at the time the
justice of the peace of the said municipal district.

Upon motion of the prosecution, one of the accused, Isaac de Guzman, was excluded from the
information and used as a state witness. After due trial, the court found the appellants Isidoro del Rosario
and Benito Gaspi guilty of the crime charged, as principals, and the appellant Vicente P. Ancheta, as
accomplice, and sentenced each of the first two to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the last the
penalty of not less than six years and one day of prision mayor and not more than twelve years and one
day of reclusion temporal. The three appellants were further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Guillermo Salazar in the sum of P1,000, pro rata, to suffer the other accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The eleven remaining accused were acquitted.

The trial court held that there was no proof of conspiracy despite the information alleged that the
fifteen accused conspired to kill Salazar, According to the findings of the court, Salazar was shot and killed
by Gaspi while the former was being assaulted by Del Rosario; and although there was no expressed
finding of conspiracy between these two appellants, they were both found guilty of the alleged crime, as
principals. The appellant Ancheta was found guilty, as accomplice, for having failed to restrain his co-
appellants from the commission of the alleged criminal act. The Solicitor-General maintains that the
appellant Ancheta, like his two co-appellants, is guilty of murder, as principal.

49
 The Solicitor-General takes the view that the appellants were engaged in the commission of an
unlawful act when Salazar was shot and killed by Gaspi.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vicente Ancheta is liable as either accomplice or principal to the crime of Murder

RULING: No. Vicente Ancheta must be acquitted. It is undisputed that the evidence fails to show that there
was even an attempt on the part of any of the soldiers to shoot anyone of the Sanson brothers. What the
evidence for the prosecution tends to show is that upon seeing the Sanson brothers, Ancheta wanted to
shoot them, but was prevented by Del Rosario and Baquiao. Granting this to be true, it reveals that Del
Rosario and Baquiao who, as sergeant and corporal, respectively, were in charge of the expedition sent out
to arrest the Sanson brothers and Salazar, preserved their self-control, and did not run amuck, as some of
the witnesses for the prosecution would have us believe. That Gaspi shot Salazar in defense of Del
Rosario's life is, we believe, established by a preponderance of evidence. Gaspi, is, therefore, except from
criminal liability. (Revised Penal Code, article 11, clause 3.) It follows that Ancheta and Del Rosario must
also be acquitted.

Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence in this case, we are inclined to believe that, in convicting the
appellants, the trial court was unduly influenced, unconsciously no doubt, by the local atmosphere which
seems to have been strongly unfavorable to the appellants. This is indicated by the facts that the appellants
and their codefendants in the court below were even prosecuted and convicted for the crime of sedition,
which action the Solicitor-General, upon a more calm and careful review of the evidence, later admitted to
have been unwarranted, when he asked for a reversal of the judgment of conviction for the said crime of
sedition. While it may appear to the mind of the average person that there was an altogether excessive
show of force on the part of the members of the constabulary involved in this case when they effected the
arrest of the Sanson brothers and Salazar, we must bear in mind that we are dealing here with men who
were trained to take no chances in an emergency and to uphold their authority by force of arms. And while
we may not approved of their conduct in this particular instance, we must not allow such consideration to
affect our judgment as to their guilt or innocence of the particular crime now imputed to them. The judgment
appealed from must be reversed, and the appellants acquitted.

50
 PEOPLE v. ULEP
September 20, 2000 340 SCRA 688

FACTS:
On Dec 22 1995, Buenaventura Wapili appeared to have gone crazy and kept on running without
any particular direction. SPO1 Ulep, together with Espadera and Pillo, arrived at the scene armed with M-
16 rifles and saw the naked Wapili approaching them.

The police claimed that Wapili was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili’s relatives
and neighbours said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool. SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and
told Wapili to put down his weapons ar they would shoot him. When Wapili was only about 2-3 meters away
from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the
victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head and literally
blew his brains out.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused should be acquitted on the basis of his claim that the killing of the victim
was in the course of the performance of his official duty as a police officer, and in self-defense

RULING: It cannot be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a necessary consequence of
accused-appellant’s due performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. The evidence does
not favor his claim of self-defense. Accused-appellant SPO1 Ernesto Ulep is found guilty of Homicide,
instead of murder.

The accused must prove the presence of 2 requisites: (1) that he acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance of the duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.

There were two stages of the incident:

1. The victim threatened the safety of the police officers by menacingly advancing towards them. Up to that
point, his decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the victim’s further advance was justified
under the circumstances.
2. When he fatally shot the victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no chances, even after the latter
slumped to the ground due to multiple gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the police officers. He
cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty.

The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant
attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any danger to his life. Moreover, there treachery is
not attendant, thus the offense is only murder. Victim was given more than sufficient warning before he was
shot. The instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par 5 had the two conditions therefore concurred.

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 PEOPLE v. CABRERA
March 4, 1922 G.R. No. 17748 100 SCRA 424

FACTS:
The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and they want to inflict
revenge for the following reasons:
(1) On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the household of a
constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said policeman.
(2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by a Manila police and was mortally wounded. A day
after the incident, a rumor spread among the Constabulary that the Police who shot Macasinag was back to
his original duties while Macasinag was declared dead. There were also rumors that the said shooting was
ordered.

On the night of December 15 some members of the Constabulary escaped their barracks through a
window (they saw out the window bars). They had rifles and ammunitions and were organized in groups
under the command of their sergeants and corporals. They attacked some Manila policemen in these
specific instances:
(1) On Calle Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot and killed an American Policeman and his
friend.
(2) The Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passer-by, causing a death and wounding most of the
passengers.
(3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain William E. Wichman (asst. chief of
police in Manila) was shot and killed together with Saplala

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not there is connivance/conspiracy between the accused-
(2) Whether Graciano Cabrera et al.’s act will be considered done under fulfillment of duty

RULING:

(1) Yes. Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances
which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by
their acts the same object, one performing one part and another another part of the same, so as to
complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they
were engaged in a conspiracy to the effect that object. It is incontestable that all of the defendants were
imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge them on the police force of Manila. A common feeling
of resentment animated all.

(2) No. The accused are properly convicted of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law- Sedition, in its
more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the
subject makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force of

52
outside of legal methods any one of five objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon
the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal
government.

The counsel contested that it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended
party a public functionary, and what really happened was a fight between two armed bodies of the
Philippine Government. The court held that this contention is without foundation. The Treason and Sedition
Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. What is important is that there is a public
rising to incite or inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the
Insular government or of a provincial or municipal government.

53