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Article IX

CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
A. COMMON PROVISIONS

SECTION I. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be


independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commis·
sion on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

Independent constitutional bodies.


Aside from the t hree (3) grand departments or branches entrusted with
the exercise of the traditional powers of government, i.e., the Presidency
and ex~cutive offices, Congress, and the Supreme Court and lower courts ,
the Constitution has directly created independent bodies charged with
specific functions. Their creation is established in the Constitution because
of the extraordinary importance of their functions and the need to insulate
them from undesired political interference or press ure. Their independ-
ence cannot be assured if they were to be created me rely by statute.
/'tind~l' the Constitution , t hese agencies are thttl.Civil Servic~ommis­
sio'n, th!tommission on Electioo~the Commission on Audit, th~Commis­
sion on Human Rights 1 (Art. XIII , Sees. 17-19.), and the Office of the
Ombudsman. (Art. XI, Sees . 5-14.) The Electoral Tribun als and the Com-
mission on Appointments in. Congress (Art. VI, Sees. 11-19.) are likewise
directly created in the Constitution .
.hl...t.h._g~~.~.rc_Ls~ .9.fthe!I..Y.Q.W.~..I§ ..?.'9d_f'Jl19~i9.1'lli,.t.h.eyJtr~-~-l.l.Pregle wit.J!:jn
i.h~.iL9~.s.I!Jlere ~n9,_:w_:u~ ..Jh~r~fox.~ ... h~._c;Qn~~Q,jp t~t..r.~e.~j:1 _c;.9..Q~di:­
~t~ .{lml GQ~-~g.mtl . w.ith..t.he. ~~sid.~n.t, ..Con.gre.s.s.....avd..Jb.~ . ~tmr.:EliTie Cl?.!:!!t
Like t he other organs of the government, however, their acts are subject to
scrutiny by the Supreme Court on certiorari. <A-Sec. 7, see Art. VIII, Sec.
5[2).)

.. .1The term of office and othAr qualificatio ns and disabil it.ies ')f tht:! members of the
Commission 0:1 Human Rights shall he provided by law. I Art. XIII. Sec. 17.)

273
274 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sees. 2-4

SEC. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall,


during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither
shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which in any way may be
affected by the functions of h is office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirec tly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including govern-
ment-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Disabilities of members of Constitutional


Commissions.
The fiduciary nature of a public offic.q which the Constitution expressly
guards in the case of the President, the Vice President, members of the
Cabinet, a nd their deputies and assistants (Art. VII, Sec. 13.), and the
members of Cong:ess (Art.VI , Sees. 13-14.) is a lso protected in relation to
t he members of the Constitutional Commissions .
Their disabilities during their continuance in office are similar to those
imposed on the President and the Vice-President.

SEC. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners


shall be fixed by law and shall not b e d ecreased during their
tenure .

Compensation of members of Constitutional


Commissions.
Section 17 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) prescribes the initi?.l
annual salaries for the Chairman a nd Members of a Constitutional Com-
mission at P204,000 a nd Pl80,000, respectively, which can be increased
but not decreased by law during their continu ance in office. Any decrease
will affect only the Chairman or the Commissioners appointed s ubse-
quently to the enactment of the law. (see Art. VIII, Sec. 10.)
It would seem that Section 17 of Article XVH does not apply to the
Commission on Human Rights. (see Art. XIII, Sec. 17 .) Sa id provision
refers to the "Constitutional Commissions" which, under Article IX, do not
include the Commisl>ion on Human Rights. •

SEC. 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their


officials and employees in accordance with law.

Appointment and removal of officials


and employees.
As independent bodies charged with the sole a nd exclusive responsibil-
ity for the proper management of their respective offices, the four (4)
Sec. 5 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTlONAL COMMISSIONS 275
A. Common Provisions

Constitutional Commissions have, accordingly, the power to a ppoint their


own officials and employees and to remove them.
In th~JL~F.ci~~_Qf. .s uc h...P.Q:W..~ 1 _!h~y .S:r..e ~ ybj ect ..t~Lt.he .Jll:Qyjs ions of tlw
.Civil Service Law. Said law m ust, of course, be in accordance with the
pro.~isi~ns. of the--Constitution , particularly those on Civil Service. CArt. IX,
B-Sec. ll2); see Art. XIII, Sec. 18[10].)

Other common fea'iures.


In addition, to further insure the exercise of their powers and functions
with the highest degree of independence against outside influences, the
Constitutional Commissions have been given these common features:
(1) They are multi-headed bodies;
(2) They are categorized as "independent" by the Constitution;
( 3) Their power s a nd functions are defined in the ·Constitution;
(4) The Commissioners are required to be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines;
(5) Th eir terms of office are staggered with a two-year interval;
(6) The Commissioners appointed a re ineligible for reappointment for
a period beyond the maximum tenure of seven ( 7) years;
(7 ) Appointment t.o any vacancy is only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor;
(8) The Commissioners cannot be appointe d or designated in a tempo-
r ary or acting capacity; and
(9) The Commissioners are removable only by impeachment. 1Art. XI,
Sec. 2.)
The last five (5) features (Nos. 5 to 9) do not a pply to the Commission on
Human Rights. (Art. XIII, Sec. 17.) Note, however, that under the cited
provision, only "the term of office and other qualifications and disabilities
of the members of the Commission" are mentioned which shall be provided
by la w. 1
Under the law, a special retirement scheme is provided for members of
the constitutional commissions. 2

SEC. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their


approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly release d.

1
Although Article XI, Section 2 Flpeaks of "the members of the Constitutional Commis-
sion~;"without distinction, it refers only to the three (3) Constitutional Commissio n~ created
in Arti cle IX.
'S ee R.A. No. 3595, as amended hy R.A. No. 1568 and P.D. No. 1582. See Footnote 1.
276 T~XTROOK ON THE t'HJ LIPP1 NE CONSTITCTION Sees. 6-7

Fiscal autonomy.
Like the Supreme Court, the Con ~titutional Commissions enjoy fi scal
autonomy to s trengthen t heir independence in the perfo rmance of their
co n~titutional functions. Note, however, that unlik l~ in the case of the
judiciary (see Art. VIII, S ec. :u, there is no prohibition against the t'educ-
tion of the appropri a tion ~ fo r the Constitutional Commissi~'ms below tho
amount appropriateri for the previou s year.

SEC. 6. Each Commission en bane may promulgate its own


rules concerning pleadings and practice b efore it or before any
of its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.

Rules of procedure.
E ach Commission I'm brznc is authorized to promulgate its own rules
governing pleadi ngs a nd p ractice befo re it or any of its offices. (see Art.
VIII, Sec. fi[5] . .l Such rules shall not dimini sh, increase or modify substa n-
tive rights as distinguished fro m procedural rights. (see Ibid . )

SEC. 7. Each Commission shall d ecide by a majority vote of


a ll its Members any case or matter brought before it within si:"f~
~ays from the date of its submission for d 2cision or resolution.
A case or matter is d eem ed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
a ny decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty d ays from receipt of a copy thereof.

Rendition of decision and judicial


review.
( 1) Any case or matter brought befor e each Commission must be de-
cide d by a majority vote of all its members within sixty (60) days from the
date of its subm ission for decision or resolution. The period begins to run
from the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum (see Art. VIII.
Sec. 15[21.) requi red by th e rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself.
12) An aggr ieved party may bring any deci sion, order or ruling of each
Commission to the Supreme Court on certiorari (see Art. VIII, Sec. 5r2].)
within (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof. By certiorari, a party raises
questions of law in the Supreme Court. The findi ngs of fact made b"y a
Commission are conclusive upon the Supreme Court. (see Ibid., Sec. 5l2,
e].) Under C-Section 2(2 ), decisions, final order s or rulings of the Commis-
ART. IX. -CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSlONS 277
B. The Civil Servict> Commission

sion on Elections on election contests involving elective municipal and


barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable.
Congress is empowered to prescribe by law the manner and period of
review of the decision, ordt>r, or ruling of each Commission.

SEC. 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions


as may be provided by law.

Additional functions under the law.


In addition to their constitutional functions , "each Commission shall
perform such other functions as may be provided by law: ' Thus, by means
of legislation, the Commissions can be given the necessary measure of
flexibility in the discharge of their constitutional t asks . Of cou1·se, Con-
gress cannot diminish the powers and functions granted by the Constitu-
tion to the Commissions.

B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

SECTION 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the


Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners who shall b e natural-born citizens of the Philip-
pines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
ye ars of age, with proven capacity for public administration,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the elections immediate ly preceding their appointment.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appoint-
ments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Ofthose
first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any va-
cancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In
no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Composition of the Civil Servic;e Commission.


It is composed of a Chairman and t wo Commission er s. cSec. 1[1).) The
former Civil Service Commission before the 19n Constitution was a statu-
tory one-man Commission. 1 Its conversion into a collegiate body is envi-
sioned to enhance its independence on the theory that it will be more

:R.A. No. 2260, as amended by R.A. No. 6040.


278 TF.XTBOOK ON THE PHILIP P INE CONSl'T'J'UTION Re c. 1

r esistan t to political pressure or in f.!uence tha n a body h eaded b y a s ingle


i ndividua l.

Qualifications of members.
They are:
(1 ) Thr~y mu~t be n a tural-born citizens of the P h ilippines;
(2) They must be a t least thirty-five (:35 ) years of a ge at the tim e of
their a ppointme nt (r ath er t han a~sum ptio n of office );
(3) T h(>y must. be persons \Vith proven ca pu.city for public admi nistr a-
t ion. Knowl e~ge of law or experience in the practice of law is n ot regu ircd
hy the Constj t ution pres umably beca use the position calls m0rc (~Jl­
.i.s.l::I:ati~.!.Ui!:Y..!.ath er th a n ~L!<9J.J:l.P.Ctepce . Th ere m ust be a showin g
tha t they hav e heen 'i~"' thc"~'e f'v1~e"' as a n effective public administrator.
T his is necessary hecau:::le t h e Commissioners are r espon sib le for an agency
tha t performs significant func tions;2 and
(4) T hey m us t n ot have been candidates for any elective position in the
el ections imm ediately preceding the ir a p pointment. This requir eme n t in-
sures t he p olitical neutrali ty of pros pective a ppointees a n d effe ctively
precludes the appointment of JlOlitic.aUyrq:u~.lli:l.<~- I see S ec. 6.)
'-· .....( ; ...:... ... ~ f .... .. .. '- ·-"!"

Appointment and terms of office.


They sh all be a ppointed by the P resident wi t h t h e con:>ent of th e
Commission on Appointments for <1 term of seven (7 ) years wi t hout reap-
poi ntment. Of the Comm issi oners firs t a pp oin te d, one sh a ll h old offi ce fo r
seven (7) years, another for five \5 l y ears, and the third for three (3 ) y~ars
without reappointment .
Reappointment cannot be made in favor of a Commissioner who has been
jus t appointed for a term ofless than seven (7 J yea rs afler the expiration of his
term. Subsequent ap PQintm ents shall h e for a term of seven (7) years . The
appointment or designation of a ny Member in a temporary or acting capacity
is not a llowed.'1 (Sec. 1(2j .) ·

Rotational scheme of appointment


This sche me ofmtational a ppoin tme nt is i n tended to give continu ity to
th e Commission by allowing t h e term of only one Comm issioner to expire
every t&.o..J2).~s . Consequently, its m embers would invariably have the
benefits of th e experi ence of older members in the performance of its
fu n ctions. Moreover, it is unlikely, in the ordi nary course of e vents, that

~19811 lil'L Constilu tion Projcd . The Constitutional Com m i;;:;ions, p. l:i.
"Presiden t F . :-.-ia rcos appointed in an adin::! l:<lp arity t h e for rnt-r Chairman of the
Com mission on Audit who. nftct· serving for a n umber of yea r~; , was given a perrnt• nen t
appo intmen t fo r a ter m of seven (7i year;;.
Sec. 2 ART. IX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMlSSlONS 279
R. The Civil Service Commission

the same President will be ahle to appoint all the members of the Commis-
sion. This is also the policy in the other two Commissions. !infra.)
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both
indispensable to itR workability:
(1) The terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should ~tart on a
common date; and
(2) The appointment to any vacancy due to death, resignation. or dis-
ability should be only for thE> unexpired balance ofthe term of the predeces-
sor.
The starting point of the terms of office of the staggered 7-5-3 year
terms of the first appointees to the three (3) constitutional commissions.
regardless of the dates of their appointments and assumption of office, i:<
on Et.hruary 2, l@J..the date of the adoption of the Constitution.

Reasons for creation of the Commission.


The creation of an independent centralized agency having direction
and control over the civil service system and empowered to enforce civil
service legislations was believed essential to the operation of the system,
and its inclusion in the Constitution, an additional safeguard for the
successful implementation of the merit system.
A Civil Service Commis~ion created by statute is subject to reorganiza-
tion or abolition at any time. But even discounting this possibility, the
power over appropriations is a mighty weapon which Congre~s can readily
wield over the Commission. On the other hand, under his power of control,
the President can reverse or revise decisions of the Commission. Because of
its independence from the political branches of the government, a constitu-
tiona.l body as the Civil Service Commission could more effectively resist
the pressures of politicians and thus ensure that selection and advance-
ment in the Civil Service are attained through merit and fitness. 4

SEC. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, sub-


divisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations with
-Qri,gi~.c.b..arters.
·--·
.~...
(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fit:q_~ to be deter~ined, as far as
practica,ble, and, except to position~ which arelpolicy-determin·
ing, pri:rt'1arily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive
examination.
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be re-
moved or suspended except for cause provided by law.

'See 1970 UPLC Constitution Revision Proje-ct, pp. 653-655.


280 TEXTBOOK ON THI<~ PH lLlPl'l~E CONSTITUTLON Sec. 2

(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage,


directly or indirectly, in a ny electioneering or partisan political
campaign.
~) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees.
(6) Te mporary employees of the Gove rnment shall b e given
such protection as may be p1·ovided by law.

Meaning of Civil Service.


T he term Civil Servic_e m eans that professionalized body of men a nd
wom en who have made of the government service a hfetime career. It has
also been u sed to r efer to that portion of the public ser-vice that is "governed
by the meri t principle in the .selection of officers a nd employees.'' 1

Scope of the Civil Service.


The Civil Service embr aces every branch , agen cy, subdivision, and
im;trumentality of th e governme nt, includi ng every gover nment-owned or-
controlled corporation with origi na l charter .2 (Sec. 2[1].) The intention of
the Constitution is to extend t he r~quirements a nd benefits of t.he Civil
Service System over the administrative personnel of the entire governmen-
tal organization - nationa l an d local including the military esta blish-
ment.3
Un der the Constitution (see Ar t. XII, Sec. 16.1, only government-owned
or -cont rolled corporations can be created hy special law or charter. But
they can be created under the general incorporation law 4 in which case
they arc not embraced within the scope of the Sen ·ice.

Constitutional classification of positions


in the Civil Service.
On t he basis of appointment, the Constitution classifies positions in the
Civil Service into two principal groups/' namely:

' i''ield, Civil S~rvice Law 3 ( l9:Hl L


2Sect ion 2( I l placing em ployee!' of government-ow ned M -con trolled co rpora tio nf; u nder
t h e Ci'-i l Servi.:e is implemented hy Presidential DccreA No. 807 (infra. ! <tnd Prc;;idon tial
Decree No. 442 C L~tbor Gode of thP. P hilippines I is.succl M11y 1. 1974, cffe(:tive N o,·ember 1,
1974, as amend~~ ll.
;Not all th ~: provision~ of the C:on ~titution on the civil Hc rvice arc ,.;trictly abo u t the civil
scrviee only. (see R-Secs. G, 7, 8.i
'The Corporclt}()n Code of th e PhHippines,lB.P. 13lg . 68.1
:;l'~d.c.nt jal Decree.liD..Jilll ( Ci vii Service Decre e) ,·echu;sificd the category of po!;itions
in Lhe Civil Service (from compe Li i ive st•rvi ce, non -compt!ti tive or uncla;;~ified service. and
exP.mpt sen;icol into: < ll ~!.. ~'?IJD!.i.CJ' ch aracterized by: <a) entrance hased on merit and
fitness to he determ ined as far a s pr a ctic-able by competitiYe examiuat ions, or based on
highly t echnical qualifications; !h ) s~:~curity of t enure; and (c) opportu n it y for advancement tC>
Sec. 2 ART. IX. -CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 281
B. The Civil Service Commission

(1) .Corn.p.ctitiue. -Those whose appointments are made according to


merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examinations;" and
(2) J::!.g_n-co!!JJ2~Wive. -Those whose appointments do not haw to take
into account merit and fitness as determined by competitive examinatjons.
To the latter belongs those. positions described by the Constitution as
;'policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature."
(Sec. 2[2].) But their appointments shall still be made according to merit
and fitness.

The merit system.


(1) Me.r.~t...4!!1~rmingd.J!Jr9.Jillh..~.QfJJ:Pgti.tjve examination-'.!.- As a general
rule, the selection of any appointee to any government position "shall be
made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable x x x by competitive examination." ([bid.)
It is obvious from the provision that the recruitment of government
personnel is not to be made on the basis of an indiscriminate or whimsical
method of selection or on consideration of friendship, kinship, partnership
or social connections. Merit and fitness as qualitative factors in the selec-
tion of civil servants have reference to personal qualifications for compe-
tence and ability to perform thE> official task. A person's qualifications in
this regard are to be determined by competitive examinations as far as
practicable. 7
(2) _Qtjter_!!_t~t_h,g_cj~o[_de~er"!f.'!:ing_Tl!:_eri~. -Where competitive exami-
nations are not practicable, other methods of determining merit and fitness
may be resorted to, such as by an investigation of school records, experi-
ence in actual work, achievements of a character relevant to the position to
be filled, and such other tests modern educational science has produced.~
According to Presidential Decree No. 907 (supra.), "graduation with honors
earned under the competitive atmosphere of the academic community is as
good as a qualifying mark in a competitive examination to determine merit
and excellence for public employment."

higher career positions; and (2) Nan·Cru:ccr Sert'i~e characteri1.ed by 1 <1'1 <'ntr:~nce -:,n oa;;es
other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the car.:-.::r ;;er\·ice: 1b1
,<enure which is limited to a period specified by law, or· which is coterminou~ wuh that of the
appointing authority ot· subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to thE- duration of a
particular project for which purpOse employment was made. (see SN:i'. 5 and o thereof.)
~sid~ntiaLDc~~e No.J!Q.? .<Ma1·ch 11, 1976), aR amende(! by Pn•:'idt-nti<tl Decree No.
893. i grants honor graduates (those who have earned at least cum ir11.de hon('r"' of four-year
O:•Jllcgc course eithet· second or first-grade civil service eligibility rating depending on the
;:·ositions to which they are appointed, whil<'.f,residential Dec.z:ee.~~Sept. 16, 1976)
:onfers civil service eligibilities on scientist~=~ and teC'hnnlo~;,>ical ~pECialists ha;;ed on t.h~ir
:J.Ualifications and the requirements of public service.' •ee al~o Pre:<. Decree No. 1408, June 8,
!9i8.1
'V.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. 413.
"Ibid.; sec also Presidential Decree No. 997, supra.
282 TEXTBOOK ON THF: l'HILIPPINg CONSTETUTION Sec. 2

(3) Ik1!!fJ..t.tir..o_f!l_ S)!Sl.~!!! ·


--The merit system, 9 as shown by experience
the world over, secures efficienc y in govern ment service a nd promotes
social justice. Efficiency r esults becaus e selection and promotion of ~m­
ployees is based not on political considera tions but on merit and fitness.
Social jus tice, on t he other hand, is subserved because the merit system
guarantees equality of opportunity (see Art. XIII , Sec. 1, supra.. ) to all
deserving applicants desirous of a career in public service. '('

Non-competitive positions.
They are the following:
(1) .P_olicy <l.f...ter:..! Jlining, where its occupa nt is vested wit.h the power of
fonnulating policies for the government or an y of its agencies, subdivi-
sions, or instrumentalities, like tha t of a member of the Cabinet;
( 2) Er.i1111J.Ii~rrfisismlffi...l, where its occupant enjoys more than the
ordinar y confidence of th e appointing power but bear s such close intimacy
which relieves the latter from mi!-!givings of betrayal of personal trust on
confidential matters of th e State , 11 like tha t of a private secretary; and
(3 ) _!Jighly techni£!!L where it s occupant is required to possess skill or
training in the supreme or superior degree, 12 like that of a scientist. The
position of legal counsel of a govern ment ~ow ned or -controlled corporation
is highly technical in nature, and at the same time pri marily confidential. 1'l
In such case, the occupant canno.t insist on a fixea or a definite term if the
la tter asped predominates.
Those holding primarily confid ential positions hold office at the pleas-
ure of the appointing power (e.g., private sec1·eta ries of certain officers;
confidential agents). 14 According to the Supreme Court, when such pleas-
ure turns into displeas ure, the incumbent is not removed fr om office, bu.,

9 Presidential Decree No. 1409 (.fum• 8, 197Hl creates in the CSC a Meri t System Boa!'d

re na med by the Administrative Code of Hl87 (Exec. Order No. 2n.! n11 the t-1erit System
Protection Board, whose primary function , Among {>t.he rs, is to hear un.:l dc(·ide cai'C!l brought
before it by officers a nd employees who feel aggrieved by determination of a ppoi nting
authoriti~s involving appointment, promotion , t r ansfer , detail, l!tC., a s well as complain ts
against ofticers in the government arisin g from violations of the merit. system.
1"1970 UPLC Constitution Project, p. 646. Letter of £nstructio n No. 799 IJan. 29, 1979)

direc ts every ministry (now d epartment.) and al'cncy of the gove rnm ent including govern -
ment-owned and -controlled corporatiQn ::; and regi onal offi ces to o~;tablish a Selection Board
and a P romotion Board to as$iSt the appointing authority in the sele<:tion and pr<>motion of
personnel in the Civil Service, and thereby implemen ts the merit syst em ordained by the
Constitution and th e Civil Service Law.
11 See Santos \ 'S . Mallari, 87 Phil. 289.

' 2Ibid.
'"See J:>.N. B. n•. Besa, L-26838, May 29, 1970.
"See, however, Cari no vs. ACC FA. L ·19080, Sept. 29, 1966; Gray vs. De Vera, L-23966,
May 22, 1969.
Sec. 2 ART.IX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIOl\t:
R. The Civil Service Commission

his term merely expires in much the same way that a person who has fixed
term of office is not removed upon the expiration of his term. 1 =-

Guarantee of security of tenure.


The merit system established in Section 2(2) does not necessarily imply
that the persons so appointed have securitv of tenure. There is thus in
Section 2(3) a guarantee of se~urity of tenure to officers and employees in
the Civil Service.
The constitutional guarantee is of utmost value in maintaining morale
and in promoting efficiency. Any employee whose continuance in office 1s
dependent upon the whim or pleasure of his superior, is likely to be the
victim of fear and insecurity. His inefficiency can be expected, as a matter
of course. under the above provision, if faithfully enforced, civil servants
can be confident of staying in their respective positions as long as they do
their work efficiently and wel1. 1G

Meaning of "for cause provided


by law."
(1) Substantive requirement. -The phrase17 means for reasons which
the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient ground for suspen-
sion or removal. It means legal cause or cause provided by an existing tau·,
and not mer~ly causes which the appointing power in the exercise of
discretion may deem sufficient. It implies, moreover, that such cause must
relate to and affect (as a general rule) the functionR of the office which the
officer or employee holds. 1 ~

'"Hernandez vs. Villegas, L-17287, June 2H. \965; Angeles vs. Mutuc. L-20:HJI) ~ov. :29.
1968: Salazar vs. ~1athay, .Jr. & Suhido. L-44061, Sept. 30, 1976.
'~See Taiiada and Fernando. op. cit., p. 1202.
17The following, among other!:>, are dedared to be grounds for ilisciplinary aC'tinn in

accordance with the civil service law:


(1} Di8honesty, oppres:;ion, or misconduct;
(2) Habitual drunkenness;
(3) Neglect of duty;
(4l Disgraceful or immoral conduct.;
(5J Being notoriously undesirable;
(6j Physical or mental incapacity;
l7 J Frequent absences or tat·dine:;s;
(8J Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duut-.;;:
C9} Insubordination;
OOi L~nding money at usurious rates of interests;
i 11 l Willful refusal to pay just debts:
( 12) Pnnmit of private business, vocation or profession w!thout :securing the pcrmis:sion
rcquir.~d; and
( 13) Nepotism. lsee Pres. Decr~e Xo. 807. Sees. 36[a]. 49. • Also Admini:ltrative Code of
1987, Book V, Title I. Subtitle A. St-ction 46.
1'Tec.:;on vs. Romero, 84 Phil. 74.
284 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Ser.. 2

(2) Procedural requirement. - Basically, the guarantee of procedural


due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard before one is
suspended or dismissedY' Under the law, no complaint against a civil
service official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in
writing and ~ubscribed and sworn to by the complainant.20

Abolition of position.
Congress may abolish any civil service office unless it is a constitu-
tional office. When the office itself is legally abolished, there is no removal.
Removal from office contemplates that the incumbent is separated but the
office or positicn itself subsists. The Constitution protects an officer or
employee only as long as the position remains. 21 No person has a vested
right to an office which cannot be disturbed by le'gislation. 2:l
Abolition, however, may not. be used as a cover for circumventing the
guarantee of security of tenure. Thus, it has been held that a civil service
officer or employee (in the local government) may not be removed by the
abolition of the office in bad faith.n
Th e principle that valid abolition of an office is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbent, does not apply to the judiciary. A judge's right
to his full term is not subject to the contingency that Congress may, for the
public good, abolish his office. (see Art. VIII, Sec. 2, par. 2 .)
In fine, abolition of an office is invalid if it involves an office provided in
the Constitution or a judicial position, or is done in bad faith.

-~.Qbi.P.U!.QD..~.9i\iO.l!t ~le.c.t(Qn~r~n.9..~nst9.ther
~an politi~~~mpaigq.
( 1) Ssif.e.gy.a.r._cf: _ggqjf!.s.t. !.he_. .SP.<!.il§. !'.J.~ti!.'!!:· - The principle of political
neutrality for civil servants finds its justi fication in the desire to secure
discipline and efficiency in the public service by doing away with the spoils
system. Many government employees have been accustomed to work for t he
candidacy of particular persons to assure security of t enure or to get
reward in the form of appointments or promotions in government positions
as sl!QiJL~..Y.i.<:!.~!X· It is, therefore, considered that the public service
"would be more truly devoted to the public welfare if public servants were
not overactive politically. " 24
Section 2(4) reinforces this neutrality principle.

19
Sec Reyes vs. Subido, 66 SCRA 203, Aug. 21, 1975.
20Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(c).
~'Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 9·i Phil. 903.
22Z2 R.C.L. 378-379; Baldoz vs. Office of the President, I.-44622, Aug. 26, 1977.
2''Briones v11. Osmena, 104 Phil. 588.
24
United P ublic Workerli vs. Mit chell , 330 U.S. 100.
Sec.~ ART. JX. - - <.;ONST1TU1'IOKAL COMMIS~IONS 285
R. The C ivil Sen·ice Cummitision

(2) f)y:_tm.t_Q[JN.LtisJJJ.atiQ..TJ:)n elections. - Officers a nd employees in the


Civil Service a r e "servants of the Stata a nd not the agent s of any politica l
group."25 Their loyalty l:>hould be t o the publi c service, not to the "rulers" of
the m oment. Under t he provis ion, their participation in any e lection is
limited to t hat of voting. In fact, it is an obligation, although it is not
m a nda t ory, of every citizen qualifie d to vote to r egist er a nd cast his vote.
(see Art. V, Sec. 1.) However, t hey have the right to express their views on
political issues provided such expression does not amount to any "election-
eering or pa rtisa n political campa ign ."
(3) OJ[icers _an.Q._employees covered. --The prohibi tion covers member s
of the armed forces (Art. XVI, Sec. 5[3]. ) but it refers only to t hose in t he
a ctive service, exclu ding those in the re_ser ve fqrce. 2 ~
Civil Service, as used in Section 2(4 ), refers only t o career service.
Elective officials and members of the Cabinet who are holding political
offices are not embraced in the prohibition . 2 ~

Meaning of electioneering or partisan


political campaign.
Under t he 1935 a nd the 1973 Constitu tions , the term used is "any
partis an political activity" which is practica lly synonymous with ''a ny
electioneering or par tisan political campaign" as used in Section 2( 4 ).
Both refer to acts des igned to h ave a candidate elected or not, or to
promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office. They
include such activities as participation in political campaigns, conventions,
caucuses , pa r a des or r allies, making s peeches or commentaries for or
against the e lection of any party or candidate, publishi ng or distribut ing
campa ign literature or materials, and soliciting votes or contribution s,
either directly or indirectly. 2 ~

Activities not covered.


( 1) ~rtisa n actil.;ity_. -The pr ohibition in Sect ion 2(4 ) is directe d
against "any e lectioneering or partisa n political campaign," and not against
every kind of political activity .J.fly political activit.Y..i.§. .P-SJ.!tisAg,.lf.it....is.
dire~t:~~-tQwar_d th e a dvancement of a part ic11Jar party ~!_.Q~at~ An
activity is qgt part jsa l} i~it i§ addn;1§§ed to th.e...at..tainment of the objective
·~qf i!l.s.~riug free, QrQ&rly.. _b.2.D&§t, peaceful. and...cr.edihle ..elections." (see C-
Sec. 2 f4]. }
( 2) }lgJ_r.J:§.~~Q!l.Q[..J.Li~li tical issu e>t... - Considering the freedom
of expression which is equally secured by the Constitution even to gove rn·

HCaillers vs. Bonif<1Ci11, 65 P hil. :32 1.


2 ~/hid.

27
Sce :::lantos vs. Yatco, 106 Phil. 745.
V'fhe Omnibus Election Code (B.P . Blg. lUll.), Section 79(b); Presidenti al Decree No.
807, Section 45.
2HH TEXT BOOK ON THE PHILIPPI NE CONST\'l'UTION s~c . 2

ment employees, th ey may express their vie ws on current political prob-


lems or issues, or mention the names of candidates for public office whom
t hey support. 20
(~) C.!J_]]lJ2.Q-.ign,?ng..fg_r._,_q_r__g.gq_ilJ:$.tJ!_-p_lg.bisc.~~__j_nj tia.£~_..Qr_r._eff!_~"!
qpestion. - Such participation does not constitute parlisun political activ-
ity. Plebiscite, initiative, or referendum is not a n election within the
meaning ofth.~ ,above prohibition. It involves only issues, not candidates for
public office,. 'Bence, officers a nd employees in th~ Career Civil Service can
actively pa;tici pate in the discussion of plebiscite, initiative, or referen-
dum issues without violating civil service rules and regula tions.

Right of government employees


to self-organization.
Section 2(5J grants to government employees in the civil service the
right to form unions enjoyed by workers in the private sector.:Jo A parallel
provision is Section 8 of the Bill of Rights which declares that "the right of
the peop le including t hose employed in the public and private sector s to
form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contra ry to la w
shall not be abridged." Eve n if th ere is no statement of the right to self-
org3ni zation in t he Constitution , governme nt workers can form associa-
tions for purposes not contrary to law.
The grant of the right to union ize was born out of the traditional
n eglect of government workers in terms of salaries, fringe benefits, promo-
tions and working conditions which are ta ken for granted in the priva te
sector. Through unions, government employees can promote their interest
an d the interest of t he public service. They can seek peaceful remedies for
their grievances and work for mutual benefits without going through the
long process normally provided unde r civil service regulations.

Rightotgo'leUlJD~nUmm!QY~s to ~.tr!.!i~-
(1 ) G,r..an,L.Qf...rigltt not advisable. - It is not clear whether or not the
constitutional gr;nt.ofti~; right to self-organiza tion carries with it the
right to strike. If the t wo rights are to be considered separate and distinct
from each other, t he a n swer must be in the negative for the latter right is
not expressly given; if otherwise, Section 2(5) together with Section 8 of the
Bill of Rights, must be construed , as granting the right to strike as well.
Be that as it may, to allow government workers to strike is not advis-
able in the long-run. A strike declared by members of the civil service can
paralyze or disrupt government operation and ultimat~ly prove prejudicial

29
See Presidential Decree No. 807, Sectio n 45.
Executive Orde\· No. 180 (June 1, 1987) provides guidelines for t.he exercise of the right
"0
,p,f Eo.,;er/)i-5"e.Ii,femployee::! t o organi~~· 1t doC,.s riot aJ?.ply't? !J:l.e'm"b.ef~ ~(.~he::!\r~i!i_Ji:Q.r.~·es o(.
the Philippi nes, incl uding police officers, policemen, firemen. and jail guards·.~ · · .,
...... - .
Sec. 3 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTI0t\AL CO~lMISSIOKS 287
B. The Civil Service Com rnission

to public interest. The right can be taken advantage of for political or


whimsical purposes, or for purposes other than for redress of legitimate
grievances...A..st.:r:ik~. by governm.ept e'!.l.t p1oyees ~:ould be u:>cd as a coer~ive
~pon. to destp.bilize the gover,nme_nt. ~- · · · · -
(2) .Righi_!lQLgr:.a_nteg_bv laU?.- - Even as the right to strike is constitu-
tionally granted, Congress may. by law, deny the right to strike to some
sectors of labor like m e mb~!r!. of the armed forces and police and fire-
fighting units, a nd even to civilian employees operating communications,
financial institutions and other vital public ser"ices. It can provide the
details fo r the exercise of the ri ght. Un der Sect ;on 3 t par. 2. ) of Article XIII,
the right to strike shall be exercised "in accordance with law," i.e ., subject
to limitations that may be provided by law.... 'tb.tl.e__ is no .la)L permitting
em pl o~o...strik.e.
public 1

"e~~n of tempor¥y emp~ee§_.


Employees in the government given tempora ry appointments do not
enjoy sec urity of tenure. They may be replaced anytim e a qualified civil
service eligible becom(!S available, or at the discretion of the ap,)ointing
authority with or without cause notwithstanding that their performance
meets the standards of public service d<.~ manded of them.
The Constitution mandates t hat tempurary employees in the govern ·
ment be given protection as may be provided by law. iSec. 2[61. • The aim of
s uch law is to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of temporary personnel
and to see to it that their sepa ration or replacement is made only for
justifiable reasons. Such laws may even grant to temporary employees who
have rendered continuous and faithful service benefits that accrue to
permane nt employees Y

SEC. 3. 1'he Civil Service Commission, as the central person·


nel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service
and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiv~ness, and courtesy in the civil serv-
ice. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards ~ystem, integrate
all human resources development programs for all levels and
ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel progra ms.

Powers and functions of the Commission.


In the performance of its powers and functions, the Commission as the
~ntr~.~er~~m.P.dJ~g.e.n~ __QLthe.. goyernrne&t, shall be guided by the objec-

~ 1 R.A. No. 6850 (feb. H. 199()) grants civil service t>ligiuil ity under ce rtain conditions to
government em.ptoyee:s appointed under p1 ovisioncl or t.emp,)rnry status who h ave rendered
a total of Reven (7) years of cfficit>nt sMvice.

·-··
2R8 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPI NE CONSTI'J'UTION Sec. 3

tives as laid down in the Constitution to establish a career service and to


promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and
courtesy in the Civil Service as well as the economic, social, and other
policies of the government. 1
Under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Oct. 6, 1975), otherwise known as
the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, the Q~v.i.l_S~rvice Commission
has, a mong others, the fo llowing g.n.w.e.u_&P..4f).!Il~tiQ.!.H'l:. · . - · -···-······· ·- ·
(!,Admi nister and enforce the constitutional and :statutory provisions
on the merit system;
(2) Prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the Civil Service
and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient, and effec·
tive personnel administraiion in the government;
(4J Supervise and coordinat-e the co~duct of civil service examinations;
(5) Approve appoin tments, whether original or promotional, to posi -
tions in the civil :service;
(6) Inspect and audit periodically the personnel work programs of the
different departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities
of the government;
(1) H ear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted di -
rectly with it or brought to it on appeal; and
(/:}) P erform such other functions as properly belonging to a central
personnel agency.z
The Decree declares t hat the Civil Service Commission sha ll be the cen-
tral personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules
governing the selection, utilization, training and discipline of civil serv-
ants.:i

lmportanc~ cf a permanent civil service.


(1) The work of the government would never be done ifthere were only
the Je gislators, Cabinet members and other he ads of offices to do it. These
people cannot be expected to collect taxes, audit accounts, inspect factories,
take censuses, arrest criminals , to say nothing of keeping bookR, delivering

'See Presidential Decree No. 110. (Jan. 26, 1973)


2Sce Pres idential De(:ree No. 807, Section 9; see Letter of I nstruction No. 319. (issued
Sept. 23, 1975.)
"Presidential Dec ree No. 807, Se.~ tion 1. Presidential Decree No. 1218 (Oct. 14, 1977)
esta blishes a Civil Service Academy to implement centralized training programs for the Civil
Scn·vi ce. I.ettc1· of Instruction ~o. 785 (Dec. 22, 1978), on the other h and, (Teates "a National
Planning and Coordinating Secretariat for the purpose of designing 11nd implornenting
reorientation a nd motivational train ing programs and special course for civil service persou·
nel in e ach ?rfinistry in pursuance of the n eed to internalize government reforrns."
Sec. a ART. 1X. - COI'\STITUTIO NAL COM.MISSION::3 289
B . 'flH: Civil Service C.ornmiAsion

mails, and carrying messa ges . Such manifold tasks lmany of them purely
clerical, but many othe rs not a t. all so) fall, rather, to t he body of officia ls
and employees known as the permanent. civil service.
(2) It is this great body of men and women that translates law into
action from one end of the country to the other a nd b1·ings the goYernment
into its daily contacts with the rank and file of the citizenry. It is likewise
this reservoir of experience and knowledge that furnishes those who, fo r
the time being, have been entrusted with the reins of government with
much of the information required in shaping and enacting policies on a
mul titude of subjects.
Indeed, there r.an be no denying that without the a ll-pervading and
unremitting work of the civil servants, "government would be only a jumble
of rules and regulations suspended in mid-air, without force or effect upon
the people. "~

Purpose of providing a civil service system.


__
T.h~ cht~~ mo.li~ .. ts. JQ _fqrm. ~.....mQ.fu.s siQI.lli~d. ..b~f..PJI..hlic__
s.erx.Qnts
pusses~.-~tain ..d.c,gr.e~fJ.mi.niD_g_and compet~.!!£~ ..n~c~s~?-...!Y..~2 _c~~t_
ilie.J.:.Oml2lex and diver.siti~_taak...of admini.s.tfring__the affairs Q.fgyygnu_n.~.L-,
The executive busi ness of running the country and of advising the
rulers of the country is a matter fm- specialists. It cannot be learned in a
few weeks by the casual supporters of any new government. The civi l
service has been established "as an unchanging carefully constructed in-
strument which is r eady for use by whatever political party may happen to
form the government of the day.''''

Basicrequis,~es ofa. .c.iyil ~er.yi~~~Y~~~-~·


For a civil service system' to be operated succei'isfully, certain basic
requisites must be ful fi lied.
(J' M~r_it §.Y8t:i11lU.W.d.3JCf.;.t.JJ:~t:uil t.e.tll.l..!:e. - I t is esse ntial that appoint-
ments m ust be made strictly on the basis of merit and that the persons
appointed enjoy security of tenure; otherwise, the r ecruiting of competent
and h onest civil servants cannot be expected.
<~> f.Q},_iti,J;QLIJ&J4mlli:;.. - The other requisite is that th e civil service
mu st be politically nl:!utl·al. (see Sec. 2f41.J If the civil servant is to dis-

'F.A. Ogg., op. cit .. p . 118.


·'1970 lJPLC Comtitution R+~v i,;ion Projoct, p. 654.
1'Pct.er du Sawtoy , The Civil Service !.1957 ), p. 58.

' The ci,•il ser,·icc in the Phili ppines wa~ first cstabli:;hcd in 1900 by Act No. fi of t h e
P hilippine Commission t:ntitled -An Act for thc Esta blishm(:nt and Maintenance of an
Efficient and Hone:-;! Ci vil Sen·ir.:e in the .Philippine Islands ... It provided the frarn<; wnrk for a
merit-based civil se n ·i{·e .iyst~m manda ting the appoi mment and promotion to government
pc)sitions according t o ID{'l"it and lhrough comp{'tith·e exa m inations as far as pmcticablc.
290 TEXTBOOK 0~ TH E PHILIPPI NE CONSTITUTION Sees. 4-0

cha rge his duties faithfully, impar tially a nd efficiently. he should not be
beholden to whatever political party is in the saddle. 8

SEC. 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath


or affirmation to uphold and defend this t.:!onsti.tution.

Oath to defend and support the Constitution.


The requireme~t as to the taking of an oath to support a nd defend the
Constitution is a standard provision in con~:;titutions.' (see Art. VII, Sec. 5. )
Section 4 includes empl oyees among those required to take the oath. Under
the provision, the oath of office must be taken before assuming the position
or office or before beginning to discharge the duties thereof. It may be
t a ken before a ny person authorized by law to adminis~er oath.
Section 5( 1) of Article XVI imposes the same requirement on members
of the armed forces.

SEC. 5. The Congress s hall provide for the standardization of


compensation c f government officials and employees, including
those in government-owned or -controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the respon·
sibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their
positions.

Standardization of compensation.
(1) Salaries to be fixed by law. - To solve the problem of salary
dis parities in the civ il service system which have been a sour~e of dissatis-
faction and dissension for many governmen t employees, t he Constitution
directs Congress to provide for the standardization of the compensation of
government offici als and employees, including those in government-owned
or -controlled cor porations. This means t hat thei r salaries shall be fixed by
law ar.d in th e case of employees in government corporations, they shall no
longer b e the subject of col lective bargaining agreement with the manage-
ment of such corpora tion.
In view of the a bove provision, legislations granting s p~;!cial salaries
would be unconstitutional.
(2) Matters to be taken into consideration. -- Congress shaH t a ke into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifica-
tions required for, the positions concerned (Sec. 5.) in fixing the rates of
compensation allowable. An equitable and r ealistic salary scale based on

8 See 1970 UPLC ConRtitutional Revision Project, p . 654.


1 /bid., p 6613.
Sec3. 6 ·7 ART. IX.- · CONSTTTlJTIO!':AL C:OM.YIISSIONS 291
H. The Civil S~rvice Com mil"~ ion

the principle of equal pay for ~qua! work for all government employees is
another essential facto1· for promoting "morale, efficiency, integrity, re-
:';ponsiveness, progressivene::.s, and courtesy in the Civil Service .''
Sect ion 18 of Article XVl li (Transitory P rovisions) speaks of inaea.se of
the salary scal ~s of ofii eials and t:!mployees of the National Gove1·nme nt
other than the officials m entioned in Section 17 of Articl e XVIII whose
annual salaries have been fixe d by the Constitution.

SEC. 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall,


within one year after s ucb election, be appointed to any office in
the Government or any government-owned or ·contr olled corpo·
rations or in a ny of their subsidiaries.

Ineligibility for appointment of defeated


candidate in an election.
A can didate \vho has lost in an election js likewise disqualified for
appointment or reappointment to any office in the government, or in any
government-owned or -controlled corporation. including any of its subsidi-
a r ies within one ( 1J year following such election.
The purpose is to sto p the practice whereby one with political connec-
tion aspires for an ch·ctive position with the hope that e ven if h e should
lose he could still be appointed to a n office or reinstated to his former
position in the govern ment. This practice of rewarding defeated candidates
is defini tely a tra nsgression of the will of the e lectorate in that the candi-
dates they did not wish Lo hold public office~ are rewarded with an office
after their defeat.
The provision i::; directed agai nst all defeated candidates hut more
particularly, a gainst the so-called "poli tical lameducks."l

SEC. 7. No elective official shall be e ligible fo1· appointment


or designation in any c apacity to any public office or position
during his tenure.
Unless otherwise a llowed by law or by the primar y functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office
or e mployme nt in th~ Governme nt or any subdivision, agency or
ins b·umenta lity thereof, jncluding government-owned or -con-
t rolled corporations or t heir s ubsidiaries.

''I'he term "lru:ccduck': i;; " !c rm taken fro m th~· ,.,,ca bul<~ry of AmeriC<1n poli t ic,; <111d
means an clediv<! official wb o i:; me rel y rom ple t ing hi;. term whi ch i R abou t to ~~xp ire with the
concomitan t los~ ofj.>oliticul intl u!:ncc. ~fter f;li ling in his bid liH· r·c-election.
292 TJ:':X1'HOOK ON THB P HILIPPINJ:': CONSTITUTION Sec. 7

Ineligibility for appointment of elective


officials.
Section 7 seeks to minjmiz.e t he so-call ed "J!noils systew," the practice
by which public offices are distributed among the m embers of the victori-
ous party, and their relatives and supporter s. Together with Section 6, it
enhances the chance of others for holding public offi ce. (see Art. II, Sec. 20.)
During .his__t.enur.e. in off1ce (not term of office), any elective official is
disqualified for a ppointment or designation (not from being a candidate or
being elected) to any public office or position in the government, whether
n ational or local , including governm ent-owned or -controlled corpora tions.
(see Sec. 2[1].) A law allowing such appointment is void! He may be
appointed pr ovided h e forfeits h is seat. (see Art. VI, Sec. 13.)

Prohibition against holding more than one


position by appointive officials.
An a ppointi ve offi cial may hold any other offi ce or employment in t he
government, including govern ment-owned or -controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries only ·when all owed by law or when required by the
primary functions of his position. Th e rule aims to remedy the problem of
appointive offici als holding multipl e positions which prevent t hem from
devoting full time to their principal function s and result in double or
multiple com pensation . (Sec. 8 .)
In the first case {when allowed by law), the pos itions m ay be t otally
unrelated to each other. In the second case {when functions a re r el ated),
the prohibitjon does not a pply even in the absence of an e nabling la w.
The prohibition is more strict in the case of t he President, Vice-Presi-
dent, the members of t he Cabine t and their deputies and assistants. They
m ay hold any other office or. employment only when specifically authorized
by the Constitution itself. (see Ar t. VII, Sees. 3[par. 2), 13(par. 1]; Art. VIII,
Sec. 81.1]; Art. XII , Sec. 9f.par. lJ.) These officials exercise more powers;
h ence, the n eed for more checks to avoid the possibility of abuse and
conflict of interest in the condu ct of t heir office.
Section 7 applies to all officials other than t hose mentioned in Article
VII, Sec. 13 (par. 1 thereof. ).2 In any case, the appointive official is not
entitled to receive additional, double or indirect compensation unless spe-
cifically authorized by la w. (Sec. 8.)

1The phrase "unless otherwit:~e provided by law" in the 1973 Cons ti tu tion p rovision (Art.

XII, B-Sec. 4[ 11 ther~of. i was delet ed.


1 Executivt: Order No. 284 (J uly 25, 1987) authori:tes the holding of other government

offices or po~itions by me mbers of the Cabinet, und ersecretaries, <issistant secretaries, and
other appointive officials of the E.xecutive Department under ccrt.ain conditions. It contra-
venes Section 13 (par. 1.) of Article Vll.
Sec. 8 ART. IX. - CONSTJ'TU'l'lONAL COM~USSTONS 293
B. The Civil Service Commist;ion

SEC. 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee


shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, un:
less specifical,.h_Jmthorized by ~' nor accept without the
consent of the Cona:re!!§, any pt·esent, emolument, office, or title
~f'an_y_kind from any foreign government.
£.ens.iOllS_O.r _na.tyj!.f.ru:Lshall not be considered as additional,
double, or indirect compe n sation.

Prohibition against additional, double,


or indirect compensation.
This provision 1 is designed to counter the evils of dvuble compensation.
(1) Specifically, double compensation produces unemployment because
it eY..cludes other persons from the service, and results in inequalities in
compensation, in the case for instance, where a subordi nate because of his
other salary, receives a higher salary than a superior. ~
(2) It may likewise produce confusion and even irregularity, concealing
from public notice the r eal compensation of a govcrnml:!nt officer or·em·
ployee. In order that the people may know the real compensation of an
officer or employee, it is necessary that the salary be from one definite
source .3 For this purpose, the a bove prohibition against additional, double,
or indirect compensation has been incorporated in the Constitution.
:< Q~Hu.:t.~.r .<>r. _m~~l !!U9VXP..ttc.~.. .J2CI._di~.m~..
4
Jr.ee wa..~er. _QLQlr.~tric lig.h!
§~rv..l~~, ~.t.<:!, •..m:.a.P-t..e<t .%D..Qffi.C§!U®s.tillt.t.e_ .addition ul com p~n.s..a.ti9~-,

Exceptions to the prohibition .


The constitutional prohibition does not apply where:
(.l) The payment of additional , double or indirect compensation to a
particular officer or employee is speci{i~Q.ll.r. .authQ[j_~d _Qy_~ (Sec. 8. ) in
individual instances where t he payment of such compensation appears not
only just but necessary. 5 The prohibition is aimed against the giving of
extra compensation by executive or administrative order;
(2) The additional compensation is received not from the goyernmeot
or its entities; and
' (3) There are ~-difil j.lli.l!?ffi.c;e.§.. each of which has its own duties and
compensation , in which case both may be held by one person at the same

1Under the 1935 Constitution, the prohibition applies only to appointive officials or

employees.
~ 1970 UPLC Constitution Revision Project, p. 665.
' V.G. Since, op. cit., p. 421.
"[tis "daily allowance" given "for each day an officer or empluyee wat!i away from his
home base." (Lexal Laborntorie;; vs. NAtional Chemical Industrie;; Workers' Union-I'AFLU,
L-24632, Oct. 26, 1968.)
·'Sadueste vs. Mun. of Suriga.o, 72 Phil. 485.
294 TEXTBOOK 0~ THF. PHILIPPINE CONS'l' I.TUT!O!\ s~c . 1

time . He is, in the eyes of the law, t wo office rs .6 The.. prohibition. .refers to
_qQ_\J_Q.le compen.~~J..i.9.n .ruHLUQt...t.l.u io.uble_ap.p.ointments and..t.he performanc~
_of.f~:n ~-~~-Q.fl~ _gf..m_o.r~_thmu:m ~ __q_ffi ce.: 7 Jlui..the Q(fi£er_m~y ..d.I:.~w.....th~~l an:
aJ..t~che.d. tQ_the ..secQnd.IWsitiun Qol_y__i\~C is s pecifi~ a uthorized by
,la_w_,
For purposes of the prohibi tion , P.~.!J~~-Q!l1?._9_Lgra.tl}._i~i-~s ~ re n ot co._J;\_~_j~­
~:r~ ~-.JtqgitioJl.<lL. ~Q\l.l.?.~ Ql.:j~dir~-~t.-~~J!l~I}.sa~~!l ·
([b id., par. 2. J H ence, a
retiree who is re-e mp loyed in th e gove rnment may continue to r eceive h is
pensions in addition t o his compensation.

PJ:Q.h.tl>!~!~n .!11g_~ins_t a!t.~~ta'l~e of _SJ!Y.J!.r~t,


~,.1r.9.m..M¥..fO.ntign state._
The pr ohibition a gain st the acceptan ce of any present, emolument or
official title of a ny kind from an y foreign sta te or g overnment~ is founde d in
a just jealousy of alien influence in domestic affairs .9 The purpose then is to
discourage and preven t fo reign influence in the rffa irs <>f our govornment . 10
~ .is... pxohibit.e.dis...thc_ru;;~eil~-ot.a. Jne~~llt: ..Qffic;@J I.L9t1'gE.5!...b~
th.~..&O.Y~lJ11n.~nl9.LC!..fu.r~J_gn -~.t~.1e.lH i.!l.th.u.s..P.eimissjble..fa.r...an..offi cia! of the
elliliP.PiQ~.. R~_pj.l_Ql.ic..li.o. l}s,;_c_w . i<\..l2rlv.at~ ..QI_p.erao.naUift..f.mm..a k j D i or head
.Qi.a fonii gn...g:o.:.t:.ern m ent. 1 1
The prohib ilion is directed only ~gain st. pub_lic officers_ a nd employees.
A pri vate citizen could, therefor·e, a ccept a gift or title fro m a foreign
gover n m ent without r unning a foul of t h i:: prohibition. 12

C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections


composed of a Chairman a nd six Commissioners who sha ll be
natural-born citizens ofthe Philippines and, at the tir.oe of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority therecf, including the Chairman, shall be m e mbe rs of
the Philippine Bar who have bee n engaged in the practice oflaw
for at least ten years.

~ 1 Jni ted Sta tes vs. Sa u nd~rs. 20 IJ.S. 126.


~Quim~on v t<. Ozaeta , 9R Phil. 705.
"This portion of ihe provision was formerly fou nd in Arti cle IV (Bi ll of Ri ghts), Soction
9( l j of t h e 1935 Con~titution, and iram;ferrcd t o Article XV <Gener a l Provisions), Section 5 of
the 197:~ Constitu t io n. Sec Sec. 46 , P n·sidenti al Dee re~ ~o . 807.
0See Ma lcolm & 1.aurcl, op . cit., p. 440.

'°Cooley, Con st . Limit., 8th ed., p. 64 5.


"V.G. Si"co. t>p cit. , p. 702 .
12
1970 UPLC Cons ti t ution Revision l'roj(!Ct.,Ji. H9.__.
Sec. 1 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTJONAL COMMISSIONS 295
C. The Commission ou Elections

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed


by the Presidentwith the consent ofthe Commission on Appoint·
ments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
fil'st appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,
two Members f.>r five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a tempo-
rary or acting capacity.

Composition of the Commission on Elections.


It is comp0sed of a Chairman and six (6) Commissioners. The 1973
Constitution increased the membe~ship from three (3) in the 1935 Charter
to nine (9) on the theory that it would make it more difficult for the
Commission to become the "captive" of any political party or group or any
person who might be interested in the Commission deciding or taking
action one way or the other. It was held by many that the bigger member-
ship of the Commission, the less likely it was to be "bought" or influen,ced, 1
'rhe new Constitution opted for a ~~Y~P..-.ill~.D- collegiate body. In the
final andysi8, what is more important than the size of the Commission on
Elections is the possession of the qualities of integrity, moral character,
and independence ofr.1ind by its members in the face of the feeling of public
distrust towards this agency because of its alleged partiality and partisan-
ship in past elections and the massive frauds and poll-related \'iolence that
attended them.

Qualifications of members.
They are:
(1) They must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
(2) They must be at least thirty-five (35) years of age at the time of
their appointment;
(3) They must be at least holders of a coll(~ge degree; and
(4) They must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections.
The Constitution requires that a majority of the members, including
the Chairman, must be .members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law f(,r at least ten (10) year1-;. (Sec. lll].)
Apparently, the reason for this requirement is the fact that the Comnds-
sion exercises quasi-judicial powers.

1 1970 UPLC Constitution Re\'bion Project, p. 576.


296 Tf~XTDOOK 0!\ THE PHILIPPINE CO~STITUTION Sec. 2

Appointment and terms of office.


The Chairman and the Commissioners are appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
(7) ye ars without reappointment. Of the Commissioners first appointed,
three (3) shall hold office for seven ( 7 ) year s, two (2) for five ( 5) years, and
the last members for three (3) years, without reappointment.
The Constitution likewise provides, as in the case of the members ofthe
Civil Service Commission a nd the Commission on Audit, for a staggered
term of two years interval. A member appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve
only for the unexpired term to prese1·ve the staggered terms of office. It has
been obBerved that this st aggering of term also makes th e Commission a
continuing and self-perpetuating body a nd consequently, its members would
have the benefit of the experience of the older members in the performance
of its functions. The contin uity of its tenure as a body makes for greater
stability for its policies and decisions and serves as a guarantee against
arbitrary action which is likely to occur in a body handling partisan
question s.~

Appointments or designations in temporary or acting capacity are also


not allowed. (Sec. 1[2].)

Purpose of the Commission.


As previously stated, in democracies, the people f(~presen t the sover-
eign power of the S tate. (see Art. V, Sec. 1.) T his sovereign authority is
given expression t hrough the exercise of the right of suffrage by the quali-
fied voters.
The pu.rity of elections is on~ of the fundamental requisites of popular
government.:1 It is obvious that the sanctity of the ballot and the free and
honest expression of the popular will can best be protected by an independ-
ent office whose sole work is to enforce laws on elections. The Commission
on Elections is organized for that purpose. The intention is to place it
outside the influence of political parties and the control of the legislative,
..!xecutive, and j udicial organs of the government. It is an independent
administrative tribunal, co-equal with the other departments in respect to
the powers vested in it:1

SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the


following powers and functions:
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
(1)
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and r ecall.

2See V.G. Sinco, op. c:it., p. 576.


1
Abcede vs. l mperial. l Oa Phil. 136.
•\'.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. :iH2.
Sec. 2 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 297
C. The Commission on Elections

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests


relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elec-
tive regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate juris-
diction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of election
officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orde1•ly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other require-
ments, must present their platform or program of government;
and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise
be refused registration.
Flm:mcial CQ..I}~ributiol).&..from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candi-
dates related to elections constitute interference in national
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for
the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investi-
gate and, where appropriate, prosecute ~ases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to mini-
mize election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penal·
ize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.
298 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 2

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer


or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedi-
ence to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehen-
sive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite , initiative,
referendum, or recall.

Powt.r.~.J!~.9JYn~!lof!s. .Qf th~ ..99..1!'~tssio_f!..


The Commission on Elections pe_r(orm.s .executive as well as i~~i.£.i~l
functions. Section 2 enumer ates th e powers and functions of the Comrnis·
'Sion, to wit:
(1) To .enforce l.aw.s....r.£.l.a.ti.IJ.e.-1!2 ..tfl£...£..o.n.dM:.~L ..Q[J~{e.ction ~. etc. - The
Commis sion on Elections has the power to annul or cancel illegal registry
lists of voter s and t o order the preparation of a new one; 1 t o cancel the
canvass of election r et urn s of a Boar d of Canvasser s a nd order a new one
where certain ret urns were illegally excl uded ;~ a nd to suspend t he procla-
mation of winning candidates pending an inquiry intn irregularities brought
to its attention. 3
T he power vested in the C ommi~:;sion includes the power to enfor ce a nd
administer laws relative to the conduct of plebi scit es, initiatives, referenda
a nd r ecalls which are not, strictly s peaking, "elections'' (Sec. 2f l]. );
(2) To 4.~cid.~ .s:.l&.cJ.iJUl contests. - There is an election contest when a
defeated candidate for elective public office questions the r ight to said
offi ce of one who h as been proclaimed elected ther eto, the question being on
th e elect iond, r eturns, or qualifications of the protestee. (Sec. 2(21.) Its
purpose is to ascert ain the candida te lawfully elected to office. The t erm
also includes any contest involving the right to an elective office, m ade
before the proclam ation of the winner , whether or not t he contestant is
claiming the offi ce in dis pute. 1!1 ~.~.e ~a. ~ e L h.g~~~~r..Lof_~l~~t.~Q ~~. o f k:1~a ng~.
officials , it is limited to proceedings aft,e r the· proclamation of the winu..~~
~~· fl.o-i>i·.e.j?.~.o~J.~~~~iO~· co~~!.9:v.~~~-~~~ ~~i~iiO.~~.~. 4 .. .. .... - . .. - ·---- ·- -· ·-· - -

El~c;li9J.Lc_ont~s ts involving z:.~_g!gE-~1. EEQVin£i_111, and city.. offJJ:i~l s are


placed under the exclusive j urisdiction of the Commis sion on Elections .
r·iot~ -that-el"e~ti~n~ontest.s for iliwlid_gi\i -aiic[~~ID:ang~y otfiilli!i are-Und'e"r.
the j urisdiction oLregianalJ ,rial ®1\!16. ~unicipa 1 t ri al caur,ts, r espec-
tively, subject to appeal to the Commission whose aeJision s or rulings a re
final, executory and not appeala ble, subject to certiorari review by the
Supreme Cou r t (see Art . VIII , Sec. 5[2]. );

' PrudentP. vs. Genuino, L-5222, N ov. 6, 1951, cited \n l<'elician<' v.,;. Lugay, 93 Phil. 744.
2
De Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil. 68G; Abendante vs. Rela t o, 94 Phil. 8.
3
Albano vs. Alvarez, L-19200, Jan . 31 , 1962.
•Taule vs. Santos, 200 SC RA 512 .
Sec. 2 ART. IX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 299
C. The Commission on Elections

{3) To_d.~dde.a.U £J.U£s.iiQTJ.$ _qff~ting_f:kcti.on..§. - The Commission has


no jurisdiction over questions involving thti_right to vote wr..ich includes
qualifications and disqualifications of voters}: the right of a person to be
registered as voter, _the right to cast his vote, ~he validity of his ballot and
other allied questions. Sl!~h..9.~-~-~tim1~alLb~ s!_~~iged by the~urts;';
(4) '[Q..s/&pu..t.iz.e. la.w_m/Qrs:e.mer:ll ag_eacie:;;. -Note, however, that the
deputizing should be with the cancurre.ru:e. .af the..PresideJ.lt, since such
agencies are under his jurisdiction. This limitation seeks to make the
holding of "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections" fh~ jo~t
responsibility of the President and the Commission; ·
(5) .I.Q..!.'!!.g{§.fe...'.'Jl.C!.lW~.al.Q..q..rti.e.B......ftc. and accredit its citizens' arms. -
This provision is one of the reforms intended to make our political system
more responsive to the needs and demands of the times. Political parties
(in{ra.) which: (~) have no platform or program of government, or (b) seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or (c}refuse to
uphold and adhere to the Constitution, or (d) are supported by any foreign
government.-; sh.alLhe.....refu.s.e.d_registratioll. Religious denominations and
sects are not allowed to be registered as political parties in view of the
vrinciple of separation between the church and the State. (Art. II, Sec. 6.)
A.~<;~ptance of financial contribution§ from foreign governments and
their agencies- related t"o elections'1s a ground for th~ cancellation of the
registration of a political party or organization. Such contributions are
declared as constituting in:terferenc.e in our internal affa!p;.
Citizens' arms accredited by the COMELEC are supposed to be com-
pletely neutral and non-partisan in assisting the COMELEC in the conduct
of elections, etc.;
(6) ToJi_l'!__E(}_titio.!l:.§.....fnvg_t?t.igg.te...fJJl.d..pJ:J:lS£CJJ.te. -The powers given to
the COMELEC under Section 2(6) are new. It can exercise these powers on
its own initiative even in the absence of any complaint;
(7) .Xa..rec.am~. - As the body charged with the duty of
enforcing and administering laws relative to the conduct of elections, etc.,
it has also the duty to recommend measures as would effect more improve·
ments on the election laws of the country such as those that would curb
overspending, ensure the enforcement of the fair·and-equal exposure rule
for political parties and their candidates, including limitation of places
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and prevent a strong party or
candidate from taking U'n.due advantage of the weakness of the others.
Under the Constitution, it has the power to prevent and penalize all forms
of election frauds, offenses and malpractices, nuisance candidacies (candi-
date has no bona fide intention to run for office}, or other similar acts;

~Nacionalista Party v,;_ Commi!;Sion on Elections. 84 Phil. 149.


gFO!()igJ1_ill~t...i_t~ti!Jn_§_a.!l9...Qr_ga_E_i_~ati_:>_~-~-~e not covered. Jhe purpose of support must be
political as to influence local politics. ·Support" includes any assistance other than the giving
of "financial contributions''; it may only involve financial contributions.
SGO TEXTBOOK ON THR PHJLJPPINF. CO~STITUTION Sec. 2

(8) 1'~m!!l~11rfi_ reftJJ!...l!..!!L.DL.fi~nary action. - The President


may or may not follow the recommendation of the C~mmission. Howt!ver,
since the deputization was with the concurrence of the President, it is
unlikely that he will disregard the recommendation of the Commission. As
to the officers and employees appojnted by the Commission, it can remove
them for cause;
(9) J'.f!_!.Ub!r~,it .r:.l!J!.~rt. --· The report required should contain a descrip-
tion on how a previous election (regular or special), plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall was conducted and what laws or regulations, if any,
were violated. The Commission may also make recommendations with
respect to flaws or defects it has discovered in the enforcement of the
election laws. Without the provision, the Commission, because of its inde-
pendence, may refuse to give any information at all to other branches of the
governm~mt; 7 and

(10) J._'Qpe_~ff!..r..m..QrJ7-er:_[ynction..s_.- Under present law, the Commission


has also, among others, the follm.ving powers and functions:
(a)· To exercise supervision and control over national and local
officials required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections;
(b)' To promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provi-
sions of the Election Code;
(c( To enforce and executl;l its decisions, orders and instructions;
and
(d) To carry out a continuing campaign to educate and inform the
public on election matters, and the necessity for clean, free, orderly,
and honest elections.~ (see A-Sec. 8.)

F:inality of dQcisions..:.
Under Section 2(21, where the election contests involve el~.~tj~~Lm.mlic..i­
~_l ..~n..~ :t>ar~~g~y_.Qf!lsi~~. the decisions, final orders or rulings· of the
~"' ,. Commission on Elections shall be fi.!!~J..t-!'!~.£~.!Q.!Y and not appealab~. 9
'·: ," . Those involving elective regional, provincial, and city officials :may. b.e
<·' ~~EP~~!~~ .t.?..~l~~ _?~~Il..r..em.e. q~mr~.:
A decision usually becomes final after a certain period of time (e.g., 30
days) unless an appeal is made to a higher body as may be provided by law
or the Constitution. Under Section 2(2), the decision, etc., of the Commis-
sion instantly becomes final after rendition.

7
1970 UPLC Constitution Revision Project, p. 581.
8
See the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Big. 881.), Section 52; ahw, Administ1·ative Code
of 1987, E"-ec. Order No. 292, Book V, Subtitle C. Section 2.
~This does not p~cu£w.rar.Wurisdictio:n of the Supreme Court when thl'l"e is grave
abuse of disct·etion. (see Rules of Court, l{ule 65, Sec. 1.)
Sec. 3 ART. IX. -· CONS'I''ITUTIONAL COM.MISSJO~S ao1
C. Tht Cummi!lsion on F.lcctions

A final decision is conclusive upon the parties, i.e., it. terminates the
matter at issue covered by such decision. thus precluding any furth er
litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest C()ncern-
ing the same. Such decision leaves nothing for the Commission to do except
to execute or enforce it, and, therefore, cannot be appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Rationale of registration of political


parties.
If the State is to extend equal protection to all political parties, it is
essential that the State s hould know and be acqu ainted with what they
stand for, how they are organized, how they operate. etc. 10
Registration is the means by which the go\·ernmc nt is enabled to
supervise and regulate the activities of political part ies. 11 It is also in-
tended to inform the people of the parties' existence and of their respective
programs of government to enable them to consider wi::ely to which party
they should pledge their support. 1:t
The role of the Commission on Elections insofar a~ r egi::;tra tion is
concerned is purely ministerial/·~ i.e., its duty to accept the registration is
definite and mandatory, which it must perform ~· ithout any powe r to
exercise its own judgment or discretion. Howe,·er, ~> ~~u~_dmominq.­
~!Qn,~nd sect §hall b~ regif!~!;'J:Q.c;l.g_§..!U)Qli.t.k.sl..uartr~ tho;;;e which seek to
~,E_thejr...gQaLth.ru.u.gh ..Y.iolence oti:~unlawful m ean~:: or refuse to nphotd.
.~9.9J.9.!t_~re _t_e>..the._CQnilitJ.t.tiQn._or which are :<:npported by any foreign
~Y.fltnment... (Sec. 2f.5J.) Because ofthe important role of political parties in
our d emocratic society, it is essential that the State should regulate or
super vise t hem.

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may s it en bane or in


two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre·
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided :that motiona.fo.c.recon-
!i.kl.~.r.~tim! ~_f..de.ci.siona. shall be .decided by the. ,C ommission. ell
Jum&..
Hearing of election cases.
T he Commission on Elections may sit en bnnt: or in two di\·isions. All
election cases (see Sec. 2[2].) includi ng pre-proclamation controver sies

16
S ponsorship speech. Del P. A. Ortiz, S.J., 1971 Con;;titutiona l Co nvention.
11
Peralta vs. CO~lELEC . L·4 7';'71. .Y1arch 11. 19';'5.
' 2Sponsorship speech. Del. S.S. Aldequer. 1971 Constitution••) C<)nve.1tion.
•sSponsor~>hip speech, Del. R.T. Fajardo. 1971 Constitutional Convention.
302 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sees. 4-5

shall be heard and decided in division..-However, motions for reconsidera-


tion of decisions shall be decided en bane.
The Commission is empowered to promulgate its rules of prucedure in
order to expedite the disposition of election contests. Congress may, by
legislation, fix a period for the rendit ion of decisions for election cases. 1

SEC. 4. The Commission may, during the election period,


supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all fran·
chises or permits for the operation of transportation and other
public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Govern-
ment or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or -controlled corporation or
its subsidiary. Such s upervision or regulation shall aim to en-
sure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public inform a-
tion campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.

Regulation of public ujilities and media.


The above authority given to the Commission is to be exercised for the
purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest, peacefu l, and credible e l ecti ons~·
and only during the election period. {see Sec. 9. ) Note that government-
owned or -controlled corporations are among those that may be supm·vised
or regulated by the Com mission. The provision seeks to place all candi-
dates on more or less equal footin g in making known their qualifications
and platform s a nd their stand on various public issues a nd equalize their
opportunities of winning at the polls.
Section 4 applies to plebiscites, particularly to one relative to constitu-
tional amendmcnts.t (see Art. XVII .)

'SEC. 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sen-


tellce for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall
be granted by the President without the favorable recommenda-
tion of the Commission.

1Under the 1973 Constitution, "all election cases shall be decided within ninety (90} days

from the date of their submission for decision!' (Art. XU, C·Sec. 3 thereof.) Not infrequently
in the past, dela ys in the rendi tion of decisions had allowed the wrong men to occupy elective
positions for practically the entire t erms of the office so tha t the people's wi ll was thereby
nullified.
1
U nited Democratic Oppos ition IUN£D0l vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17, April 3, 1981.
Sec. 6 ART. IX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 303
C. The Commission on Elections

Pardon, etc. of violators of election taws .


.;~The purpose of this provision is to avoid any possibility of the President
granting pardon, amnesty (see Art. VII, Sec. 19.), parole, or suspension of
sentence to violators of law or rules and regulations concerning elections,
who may belong to his party or for political reasons.

Meaning of parole.
Paro~ is a method by which a prisoner who has served a portion of his
sentence is conditionally released but remains in legal custody, the condi-
tion being that in case of r.lisbehavior, he shall be imprisoned. A parole
does not pardon the prisoner.

Meaning of suspension of sentence.


A sus.vensifJll...d'_ sentea.c;&.. ~~~ the postponement of the execution of a
sentence for an indefinite time. It is different from ff:P!:~~ (see Art. VII,
Sec. 19.) in that the latter postpones the execution of a sentence to a fixed
or definite date.

SEC. 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to


evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the
provisions of this Article.

Meaning of political party.


A.R.Qtiticq(_par.t.Y may be defined as voluntary organization of citizens
advocating certain principles and policies for the general conduct of gov-
ernment and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adop-
tion, designates and supports certain of its leade1·s as candidates for public
office. 1 The chief aim of political party is to gain control of the government.
The term has also been defined as "an association of voters believing in
certain principles of government form~d to urge the adoption and execution
of such principles in governmental affairs through officers of like belief."2
It includes organizations which are ordinarily non-political such as those of
farmers, labor, women, urban poor, and other sectors presenting or sup-
porting candidates in electionsr

Free and open party system.


(1) Growth of political parties encouraged. -The Constitution encour-
ages the development of more than two political parties. It provides that ua
free and open party system should be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people x x x.'' (Sec. 6.) This constitutional policy of

1 See Brooks, Political Partie;; and Electoral Reforms (1923), p. 14.


2 Peralta vs. COMELEC, L-47771, March 11, 1978.
304 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 6

promoting a t least th ree (3) major political parties will, in effect, allow the
format ion of as many political parti es as can win popular support in any
district all over the cou ntry. (see Ar t . II, Sec. 26.}
The pa rty-list m ethod (Sec. 7 .) of electing r epresentatives to represent
sectoral interests in Congress is also expected to pave the way for the full
operation of a multi- party system in our country .3 (see Art. VI , Sec. 5[1, 2].)
This system usua lly exi.sts in the pa rliamentary form of government (e.g.,
Belgium, Switzerla nd ) where there is a sharing of governmental power by a
coalition of parties because no single political party is str ong enough to
exercise control. Coa lition of parties inheres in the multi-party syste m .
British politics is dominated by two parties - the Conservative and t he
Labor.
(2) Experience under the t wo-party system. - The 1935 Constitu t ion
created a n inflexible t wo-party system- the majority party or the party in
power and the dominant minority or opposition party, with the latter
charge d with the t ask of cons tructive "fi~~~J!~~~ on:' of the former .4 The
result was a syst em wh ich worked to place political power under the
virtua l monopoly of two pa rties, wh ich were r eally two factions of the same
party, giving rise to wha t has been called a ''.l,ulip~r.f!.Qn.~lr.ul.~' or '!palitics...o£
lle.r.aonalitie.B....an.Q.p.Qt.. cl.id.E1!i.§" in either party which found it unnecessary
to present a distinct political ideology or platform of gove rnment.~ By law,
the t.wo par ties monopolized elections and took t urns of governance to the
exclusion of a ll t h e rest. thus per pet uating dynasties on both sides. 6

"The very purpo.s~ of the party-lisl is to promote multi-party system. (see Sec. 2, R.A. No.
7941.) The 1987 Constitu tion. however, alth ough it. eli minated the two-party provision of th e
1973 Con:;titution !Art. Xll, C-Secs. 8, 9[2J ther eof.), does not expressly mandate a multi-par ty
system. It merely removes the constraints on a freely evolved party system. Neither does it
prohibit a t.wo-party system. In "a free and open party system ," the people may prefer a two-pa ny
o1· three-pArty system hlter by supporting particular parties and their candida tes. To those who
favor the restoration of the t wo-party syste m, tlw multiple party system is actually a fc1r m of
deception becaus e once the election is over, the variou::; parties which lost or the minor it ies in
Congr ess join t he a dministrat ion party in a coalit ion or a lliance t o stay in power. This ph enom-
enon h as further w~.akened t h e int egrit y of ou r politica l party system and prevented t he growth
of political parties into ideologically-based public institutioM .
There is . therefore, no nP.cd to ame nd the Constitution in order to provide for t he
adoption of a two-party s ys tem. Such system, lis practised in the Un ited States, is not
mandated in the L'S Cons titution. It has evolved ~ the course of time a s a res ul t of a
practica l need and pop u lar preference.
•In a t wo-part.y syst em , t h ere are sma ller parties vying for political power bui th ere are
only t wo big in fluen tial pa r t ies, one being in control of t he political organs of the governme nt,
particularly at least- the executive branch, a nd the other h tiving the second largest share of
political power.
5 The principal re ason for party affi lia tion, then and now, is the personality of t h e

preside n tial standard bearer or party leader a nd his charisma. From t he pra ctical point of
vi ew, i t cou ld likewis e be his win n abilit y and the promise of political p atrona ge.
6
F r om t he inaugu r ation of our Republic in 1946 up t o t h e declara t ion of martia l law in
1972, the body politic was alt e rnately u nder the domina nt hold of the t wo existing major
politic~o~l parties, the Nacionalista and the Liberal. Their membership in th e voter~:~' regis t ra-
tion hoards, etc. (see Sec. 8.1gave them a tremendous built-in advantage over minor poli tical
parties and independent cand idates who did not enjoy t h e same right.
Sec. 6 ART. IX. - CONST£Tt;TIO:-:AL COM:\HSS£0NS
C. The Commission on Election~

The 1973 Constitution adopted a multi-party system but it was amended


in 1981, restoring the constitutional policy under the 1935 Charter of
promoting the establishment of a strong two-party system. Under Section
6, all political parties are given equal opportunities to compete for the
control of the government.
(3) ~;r.j~g.nd demeriJ~. -The two-party system has become a tradi-
tion under the presidential system. If it has worked successfully in ~orne
countries, notably in the United States, there seems to be no reason why it
cannot be made successful in the Philippine~. Our country had become
trained and experienced in the two-party system, making it a formidable
component of our political culture for such a long time.
()!.) On the other hand, the development of more parties makes the
political climate more democratic. This means that political contests
will be open to all groups regardless of ideologies, including the Com-
munist Party heretofore listed as an illegal organization for its advo-
cacy of the violent overthrow of the government. If allowed to compete
in an open constitutional arena, it perhaps would foreswear violence to
capture power. (see Sec. 2l5J.) The greater the number of candidates,
the wider the latitude of choice of the electorate and the less hotly
contested the election than in a two-party system where oftentimes
only two persons vie for the same seat and campaigns become highly
personal, thereby beclouding the real issues involved in the elections.
Cf3·) A multi-party system, howeYer, can lead to ~talemates and
secret arrangements when no single party can obtain a clear majority
in the elections. Worse, the legislature may be so seriously fragmented
that no room for common agreement may be found among the different
pa1·ties. The ] 973 Constitution originally provided for a multi-party

From the declaration of martial law .until th~ ouster of former President Ferdinand
Marcos in February, 1986, the country had a prattically one· party system. The ruling part:•
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), ~:onlrolled almost all elective positions in the go,·ernmer.t
except in 1984 when a number of opposition candidate.;< were elected to t.hc Bat;,;.an;:
Pamban~a.
Tn the May 1:1, 1992 synchronized national and local elections, 10 plllitical p,;,~r;e;.
including two (2) coalitions of fou1· (4) parties fl\'P, LP-PDP, LABAN. KBI.. l.DP. ~PC. PRP.
Lakas-NUCD) present.ed seven (7) presidential teams. over WO senat.orial eanclidat.:,o f(,r 24
seats and numerous bets for congressional and local posit.ion!l- all in all, 87. ~-:-o cana;date;;.
There were 11. candidates (one withdrew on the eve of the election) for Pr.. ,-:d"nt in the
:vtay 11, 1998 national elections.
In the M~:~y 10, 2004 national elections, the mOl'!:! dominant aili<inr~~. e,;ch of them
composed of at lea!;t three (3J g1·oups of political parties, included the K·.Jo!i-;\ :.r. ng Katapatan
at Karaha.san para sa Kinabuko.8an lK-4), Alyan..~a. ng Pag·a~<a lPag·a,;a . and Koalisyon ng
Nagka.kaisang Pilipi!lo (K.lllPl. which were rcprcsent.ed by their ;;tand<~rd bearers. namely,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Raul Roco, and Fernando Poe .•Jr. respectively.
It. is claimed that multi·parties are fit for the parliamentary ~y:Hem where the Prime
Minister is elected by the :-:~embers of Parliament and can only be incompatibly applied to the
p1·esidential system where the President is elected by popular ,·ote. Where there are se\·~ral
p1·esidential candidates, the probability is that the winner may get less than the majority
vote.
:306 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPI NE CONSTl'rUTlON Sec. 7

system on the theory that with such a system, elections would be


decided on issues and not on personalities. However, the 1980 local
elections s pawned several splintered parties . Candidates of se veral
parties espousing parochial views may draw t he people's attention
away from mor e impor t ant national issues.
(4) Need for a strong opposition party. -In a r eal democracy, th ere is a
need for a strong opposition pa rty to fiscalize effectively the acts of those
who hold the r eins of power a s well as to serve as a channel through which
the people may air their legitimate grievances. Thus, the party system
operates as a means to avoid r esort to violence in order to effect changes
and reforms in government.

SEC. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organiza-


tion, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under
the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Party-list system.
(1) Concept. -The part x-.list system is a mechanism of proportional
r£!presentation in the election of representatives in. the House of Repre·
sentatives from marginalized or underrepresent ated national, regional
a nd sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections. It is part of the electo ral process that enables
!'>mall polit ical pa r ties and m arginalized and un derrepresented sectors t o
obtain possible r epresentation in th e Hou se of Representatives which tra-
ditionally is domi nat ed wit h big political machinery.
(2) Votes cast for political p arties. - Under the party-list system,
people will not vote the name of the nominee of the party-list, hut the party
itself. Political parties which obtain a sufticie nt percentage of votes cast
will be allowed to name th eir r epresentatives to th e House of Representa-
tives. The number of representatives depends on th e total votes obtained
by such pa rt ies. Thus, if a part y r eceived 10% of t he votes cast, it will get
10% of the seats allowed for par ty-list repre::;entatives. The scheme will
give more chances to different parties to be represented in Congress in line
with the constit utional policy to promote a multi- party system.
(3) Sectora.l or functional r ep resentation in stitutionalized. - Votes cast
in favor of a political party, organization or coalition (i.e. , block voting) are
not valid except as provided by t he Constit ut ion under th e party-lis t
system (Sec. 7. ) for the election of t he 20% membership in t he House of
Representative~. The party-list system institution alizes for the first time
sectoral or functional representa tion in the lawmaking body in addition to
territorial r epresentation by congressional districts. (see Art. VI, Sec. 5[1,
2].) The rul e, th er efore, is "no vote cast- no vote count" except on ly votes
cast under th e party-list system.
(4) Voter has two votes. - With t he pa rty-list system, a voter h as two
\'otes; one for the ' district representative and a nother for a pa r ty or or-
Sec. 8 ART. IX. - CONSTITe1'10~AL COl\C\·1TSSICJNS Cl07
C. The Commi:;J<ion on E kctionR

ganization participating in the party-list he wants represented in the


House of Representatives. In the former. he votes for his candidate by
name, while in the latter, he writes th<' name of the political party. The
n ames of the nominees shall not be included in the certified list of regis-
tered participating parties. The nomi nee/s of the parties which qualified by
capturing t.he minimum number of votes will be pror.laimed e lected. 1
(5) Counting o( votes. - The voting shall be at large and not by sector,
hence, all votes obtained by a party regard lb:< Qf constituency shall be
tallied on a nationwide basis. The percentage c,f ,·otes garnered by a party
shall be computed in relati on to the total \ Ote::: ca~t for the par t.y-list.
nationwide.
(6) Allm:ation of party-list seat.<;. -The partiE-s :;ha ll be ranked from
highest. to lowest based on the number and percent agt: of vntes garnered
during the election5. Only a maximum of three' 3 • ::c;:,ts may be aHowed per
party. Seat!'i are allocated at the rate of one c 1 · :Oeat pt2r 2<:'r of total votes
obtained. Unallocated seats shall be distributed among the parties which
have not yet obtained the maximum three 1:31 seat:: pro->ided they have
obtainl:!d at least 2<ft, of t he votes. The variance of pE.-rcentage in excess of
2% or 4% (equivalent to 1 or 2 s~ ats that ha\"(· already been obtained
respectively) shall be ranked and be the basis for allocating the remaining
5eats.

SF~C. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions regis-


t e re d under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the
voters' registration boards, boards ofelection inspectors, boards
of canvassers, or othe r similar bodies. However, they shall be
e ntitled to appoint poll watch ers in accordance with law.

Membership of political parties, etc.


in registration boards, etc.
:-' Under Section 8, it is no longer allowed for political parties, or organi-
zations, including coalitions registered under the party-list system, to be
r epresented in the registration boards, boards of election inspectors (which
arc in charge of the conduct of elections and the pre paration of election
returns), boards of canvassers (which proclaim the winning candidates on
the basis of such returns), or other similar bodies. Such m~m bership is not
deemed necessary to protect their political interest. Political part ies regis-
tered under the party-list'system have no individu al candidates.
The representation of numerous parties in said bodies would lead to
un·~uly proceedings. In view of the constitutional prohibition, such right

' lJnder R.A. ~o. 794: ; Sec. 2. th1m~of ), a party und1!r the party-list system must have
r1:1<:eived "at least two per centum (2<;; J of the total vote;; CH •.,~ for the system" to qualify for a
:<eat for i ts nominee. The minimum thn•::;ho ld prevents th~~ proliferatio n of small political
gr·oup~:; without sub;;tantial support fr(tnl the sector~ they lWek to represent. (sec An. VI, Sec.
5.)
308 TEXTBOOK mr THE PHILIPPINE CONSTIT UTfO N Sees. 9-10

cannot be gra nted by law. They a re, however, entit led to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law to protect t heir political interests. All
political parties have thus equal protection. The law shall defi ne t he
prerogatives of the watchers.

SEC. 9. Unless o therwise fixed by the Commission in s pe cial


cases. the e le ction p e riod sb all comme~c-~ uinety dRYs before the
day of election and shall end t.hirty..days thereafter.

Election period.
This section prescribes the election period . l;i shall commence 90 days
befor e the day of election (national or local) a nd shall end 30 days thereaf-
t er. It does n ot, h.o.1~r.. fix. an nn a lter.able .p.eriod..o.f90...dt:J.Y.~ for. . ru:u~.l~
s;ami?aign. 1 ·

The Commission or the Congress, in s pecial cases, may change the ·


duration of t he election period. (Sec. 9.) The limitation is designed t o
minimize partis an political activities and expensive election contest. '
,CJ'_rn.P-~Ig~~~-
The election period is not the sa me a s ca mpaign period. The former
inclu des the 30 days a fte r the e lection while the latter can only be for a
maximum of 9 0 da ys part of which is intended for t.he Commission to
prepar e for t h e elect ion , t he pr inting and distribut ion of formR, appoint-
m ent of mem be rs i n the registra t ion boards, etc. and other preparatory
acts.
tfl'he campa ign period ma y thu s be less t han th e 9 0-day pre-election
period.2

SEC. J.O. Bona fide candidates for a ny public office s h all be


tree from an y form of harassment and dis crimination.

Protection against harassment


and discrimination.
The Cons ti tution recognizes the right of bona fide candida tes for any
public office to be protected fr om a ny form of harassment or d iscrimination.
The provision is in li ne with the g uarantee in the Bill of Righ ts that n o
person sh a ll "be denied the equal protection of t he laws ." (Art. III, Sec . 1.)
It is deemed n eceRsary in order to protect th e inter e st of candidates who d o

1
0cceila vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 755, J an. 28 , 1980.
>under the Omnibus E lection C:ode, the per!od of campaign is as follows: Presiden tia l
a n d Vice-Presidential election - 90 days; mt.!mbers of t h e BataRang Pambansa (now Con -
gress) and Local ell'ction - 45 days; and Barangay election - 15 d ays. The campa ign periods
do not include the day before th.: day of the election. (Sec. 3, B.P. Big. 881.}
Sec. 1 ART. IX . ·- CONSTITUTIONAL COMM IS~fONS 309
D. The Commissio n on ,\ud it

not belong to any existing political party. If the State guarantees equal
protection to groupR of individuals such as political parties, it is but logical
and a matter of elementary justice that the same protection be made
available to individuals separately, without discrimina tion in any form.'
Congress may, by legislation, provide sanctionH for this constitutional
provision. It is the duty, particularly, of the executive branch and the
Commission on Elections, to see to it that the above right is implemented.

SEC. 11. Funds certified by the Commission as n ecessary to


defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections,
plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, sh a ll be provided
in the regular or special a ppropriations and, once approved,
shall be released automatically upon certification by the Chair-
man of the Commission.

Automatic release of appropriations.


The rule laid down in the above provision enhances the independence of
t he Commission on Election s. It is obligator y on the pa r t of Congress to
provide in the regular or special appropriations the fun ds cer tified by the
Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for holding an election,
plebiscite, recall, initiative, or referendum. Once approved. they shall he
released automatically upon certification ofihe Chainna n of the Commission.

D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit com-


posed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience,
or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been
c andidates for any elective position in the elections immediately
prece ding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of
the Commission belong to the same profession.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be ap-
pointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without r eappointment.
Ofthose first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commis·
sioner for three years. without reappointment. Appointment to

1
Report No. 1, Committee on Political Parties. 1971 Con:;t.itutio nal Convention.
310 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. I

any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any Membe r be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Composition of the Commission on Audit.


It is composed of a Chairman a nd two Commissioners. (Sec. 1[ 11.) The
1935 Constitution provided for the General Auditing Office under the
direction and control of the Auditor Genera l. Its conversion into a three~
man collegiate body in the 1973 Constit ution is designed to make it more
r esistant to pressures from the legislative and executive branches and
other offices of the government than an office headed by a singl e indi-
vidual.
The increase in membership 1s also deemed necessary to enable the
Commission to cope with its ever expanding audit respons ibility which
embraces every agency of the gove rnment a nd encompasses every govern-
mental activity.

Qualifications of members.
They a re the following:
( 1) They must be natural-born citizens of the Philippin es;
(2) They must be at least thirty-five (35) years of age at the ti.ne of
their appointment;
(3) They must be certifi ed public accou ntan ts with not less tha n ten
(10) years of auditing experience or members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years; a nd
(4) They must not have been candidates for any electi ve position in the
elections preceding their appointment.
The r equirement that the members should either be a CPA or a lawyer
is in order to enable them to carry out their functions and duties efficiently
and intelligently without relying merely upon t heir subordina te employ-
ees. The very nature of their functions calls for competence both in the field
of law and accountancy. At no time, therefore, sha11 all members of the
Commission belong to the same profession .

Appointment and terms of office.


The Chairman and the Commissioners a r e appointed by the Pr.esident
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of s even
(7) years without reappointment. The Commissioners first a ppointe d for a
term of less than seven (7) years are likewise ineligible for reappointment.
The Constitution also provides for the rotation of the appointments at
regular and fixed intervals of two (2) years. A member appointed to any
vacancy s hall serve only for the unexpire d portion of the term of the
predecessor.
Sec. 2 ART. IX.·- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISS£0NS 311
D. The Commission on Audit

The. appointment or designation of any member in a tempo1·ary or


acting capacity is similarly prohibited. 1 (Sec. 1[2].)

Purpose of the Commission.


The .Co.mmission on Audit has been establi ..hed ai aR iRd9p91HlQnt--body
~_Sf}_e_ tQi!:.!h.~.:t
govern.menU:e.Y.e.Due.s and expenditures are duly account.Qd
lor an.d th.e..publiU.JJD.it'5 .are...not.disposed of except in conformity wjth the..
ilJH'P9Se.fq_r .which s\lcbJ\m.~.have..heen..ap.J:U:Qp.riate.d. It is obvious that
Congress itself is not in a position to oversee and supervise the actual
expenditure of each and every appropriation. (see Art. VI, Sec. 29( 1}.) That
is where the Commission on Audit comes in. Envisioned as the fearless and
efficient guardian of the public treasury, it is this office through which the
people may be able to know whether or not the agencies of the government
have used their money properly and honestly, in accordance with law and
due regard to economy and efficiency.
The overriding objective is to make the accountability of publ~c officers
entrusted with receipt, custody or disposal of public funds a reality. The
importance, therefore, of the Commission on Audit cannot be overesti-
mated.

SEC. 2. ( 1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power,


authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures
or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or -controlled corporations with original charters, and on a
post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and
offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution; (h) autonomous state colleges and universities;
(e) other government-owned or -controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries; and (sl} such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control sys-
tem of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission
may adopt such measures, including temporary or special
pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Govern-
ment and, for such period as may be provided by law, pre-
serve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining
thereto.

;See Note 3. under R-SP-rtion 1.


312 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILLPPIN.I<~ CONSTT'J'UTIO!\ Sec. 2

(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, sul1ject


to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit
and examination, establish the techniques and methods re-
quired therefor, and -promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disal-
lowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive , extravagant, or
·· unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties.

Powers and functions of the Commission.


They are the followi ng:
( 1) I .a exam.in.e.. audi:t.... Md.~t.t.k..Q.~9..QJJ../11§. ·-· The Commission on Audit
has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all ac-
counts pertaining to:
(,). The revenue and receipts ofihe government or any of its subdi-
visions, agencies or instrumentalities, including on a post-audit basis
the four (4) classes of entities mentioned; and
(j~l) All expenditu res or us es offunds and property owned or held in
trus{ by, or pertaining to tbe government, etc. 1
Where the ' internal control system of the audited agencies are in-
adequate, the Commission is empowered to adopt measures to correct the
deficiencies. (Sec. 2[1] .) There is an auditing unit in every government
office, agency, subdivision, or instrumentality all over the country;
(2) Ta.. a.c.t .as.££n.t.rru..£tr:..c..cu!!?:.~i11:g.9mc.~..Qf the government. -The Com-
mission on Audit keeps the general accounts of the gov~"i-~ment and, for
such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other
supporting papers pertaining thereto. (lbid.j Thus, th e Commission is
made the official custodian of all government records of accounts. By this
arrangement, the Commission is able to maintain a system of accounts
that records all the transactions involving the col.lection of public funds ,
their payments into the treasury, and their expenditures and disburse-
ments;2

'Under Pre&idential .D~!l~ree No. 1445 i.Governrnent Audi ting Code of the Philippines), its
auciting responsibility includes non-gove rnmental entities subsidized by the government
(e.g., firms with outstanding loans from govl'rnment linanci!1g inst it u t ion.;;!, those requi r ed
to pay levies or government ~;hare, t hose which have received coun t.erpa r t funds from the
governm ent, or those partly funded by donations through the gov'!rnment {e.g ., Commission
on Population l POPCOMlJ, th e $;<iu ''ulhority, however, pertaini.ng on ly t.o the audit oftho:-;e
funds or subsidies coming from or through the government. Upon direction of the President.
the Commission shall li.kt'wisa l:lXt'rCit<~:! visit.orial authority O\·er non-gove1·nmenta! entities
whose loans are guaranteed by th e gvve rnmcnt, provided that s uch authori ty shall pertain
only to at::dit of the governmant't~ co ntingeni liability. (Sec. 29 thereof: see Pres. Decree No.
898.}
tv.G. Sinco, op. cit .. p. :399.
Sec. 2 ART. TX.- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIO:-\S 313
D. The Commission on Audit

(3) l:o.cJ.e[il}e the scope of.its ~ud_U_ Q._!J:_d examiT].g_tion .. ~tc. -The Com-
mission has exclusive authority to define the !":cope of its audit and exami-
nation and establish the techniques and methods required thereof. (Sec.
2[2].) This means that Congress is without power to enact laws on the
matter. The aim of the Constitution is to elevate public sector auditing
standards and to make techniques and procedures more effective and
reliable so that they will be at least at par with external auditing in the
private sector. This will require the application of the latest trends and
developments in the auditing profession;
( 4) Xo.pmmulga..t_e arcoun~il]g_qi.J...cJ. _g_l!.fl..it_i!.l_g_r.u l es anq__rggy.l:illi!l.lHi. -
Such rules and regulations shall include those for the prevention as well as
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive. extravagant or uncon-
scionable expenditures or uses of government funds and p1·operty. (Ibid.)
Under the 1935 Charter, in cases of expenditure;$ of funds or property
which, in the opinion of the Auditor General. were irregular, etc., his duty
was confined to merely bringing "to the attention of the proper administra-
tive officers" such expenditures. So long a~ the transaction was legal, albeit
irregular, etc., unwise or unsound, the Auditor General could not legally
disallow it.
Now, a violation of the rules and regulations empowers the Commis-
sion on Audit to disapprove expenditures of public funds, making it a real
guardian ofthe public treasury. Note that the rule-making authority of the
Commission regarding the matter of preventing and disallowing irregular,
etc., expenditures or uses of public funds is also made exclusive. This is
deemed desirable to remove legislative and executive jnterference in this
atea which may frust.rat~ the very purpose of the Constitution in entrust-
ing the task of preventing such expenditures to the COA;3
(5 J '[Q_submiJ..g_n_an~Italf?ng,_ncig.J.rw...ort _g n.d..~C1ll11111md.m.eaaure.t;. -
It is this function of the Commission on Audit which will enable Congress
to know how faithfully its appropriations laws have been carried out, and
guide it in the enactment of the appropriations law for the following year.
The report to the President will inform him of the manner by which the
departments under him have used the funds allotted to their various
administrative activities and thus enable them to tell whether or not their
administration has been economical and efficient4 (see Art. VIII, Sec. 16. );
and
(6J ];'..Q__p.~rfo.r.rr.J... Qther d_ytie8 and [U1};91iQ!l2t..- Under present law, the
Commission on Audit has .also the function or authority, among others, to
adjust and enforce the settlement of accounts subsisting between agencies
of the governwent; to assist in the collection and enforcement of all debts
and claims, and the restitution of all funds or the replacement or payment

3
1986 UP Law Constitution Proj~iCt. Constitutional Commis$ions, p. 38.
~v.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. 40i.
314 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION S ec. 2

at a r easonable price of pr oper ty, found to be due t he government qr any of


its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities; to compromise or. release
any claims or settle lia bility to any government agency not exceeding
PlO,OOO.OO; to examine and a udit the books, records and accounts of public
utilities in connection with the fixing of rates of every nature, etc. 5 (see A-
Sec. 8.)
l'he Commission on Audit is expressly directed by the Constitution to
~di.t. the
books.. of .accounts of Congress and publis h annually the itemized
expenditures fox ~?.ch me mber .. (Art: VI , Sec. 20 .)

Concept of examination, auditing,


and settlement of accounts.
(1) Congress as the "fund .raising authority".. 9f the government raises
money through taxation, bond issues, and other mean s. All the money thus
raised are "covered" or t ur ned into the governme nt treasury that takes
ch a r ge of their physical custody. The Commission on Audit examines the
r ecords of the treasury sh owing these receipts, checks up the funds paid
into t h at office , and a udits t h e books containing th eir entry. 6
(2) T o audit is to adjust; to allow or reject; t o ascert ain; to make a
formal or official examination or verification of a n accou nt or books of
accounts for the purpose of ascertaining their correctnes!'l. They are consid-
ered a udited or approved if supported by such writ t en evidence with regard
to t he transaction recorded, as may, in the opinion of the Commission on
Audit, be considered sufficient to establish the correctness of the indi-
vidual entries and the truth of the accounts.
The Commission is not t h e internal audit or of the government. It is
r eally the sole external audit.or of all government depa rt ments and agen -
cies including government-owned or -contr olled corpor ations. · ··
(3) To settle m eans to establish , t o fix, t o free from uncertainty. It
involves the making of a certification of the balances due in favor of or
again st the govE>rnment. Thus, the Commision on Audit is said to settle an
account when after review in audit the same is foun d in order and, hence,
pronounced closed. This is a function which is n ot performed by private
auditors.
By settling accounts due to or from the government, the COA auditor
r enders a decision on t he legality of claims not unlike t h a t exercised by a
court . His conclusions are not m ere opinion s as in the case where he
conducts an audit.

•s ee Sections :34, 35. :Hi, a n d 38, Presidential Decree N o. 1445 (June 11, 1978J; alRo
Pres idential Der.ree No. 24::! (J uly 9 . 1973) which provides for administrative adjudication of
claims hctween or among government offices.
~. G . Sinco, op. cit., p . 40H.
Sees. 3-4 ART. IX. - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 315
D. The Commission on Audit

(4) An account has been defined as detailed statement of the mutual


demands in the nature of debit and credit between parties, arising out of
contract or some fiduciary relation. 7 As used in the Constitution, the term
is limited to "something which may be adjusted and liquidated by an
arithmetical process." Thus, the Commission has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of claims for unliquidated (undetermined) damages. 8

SEC. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the


Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any
investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction ofthe Commis-
sion on Audit.

Exemption of any government entity


or its subsidiary.
All entities of the gover:nm~~t <?r..i_ts ~!!.b§JQ!~ri.~_!? ~·.i.th. i!1vcs.tm..~nt 9f
l!l!.l;>.!i~.
funds are subj~ct t.o__a!l~jt a.t:l:Q_~~a.l1}ination by the_.CQ.mmiss!~~_on..
A,!ldit Any law exempting from the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit any such entity or subsidiary in any guise whatever or any invest-
ment of public funds will be unconstitutional and void. 1

SEC. 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and


the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report
covering the financial condition ancl operation of the Govern-
ment, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, includ-
ing government-owned or -controlled corporations, and non-
governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend meas-
ures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It
shall submit such other reports as may be required by law.

Submission of report to the President


and Congress.
The Commission on Audit is required to submit to the President and
Congress, within the time prescribed by law, an annual report of the
financial condition and operation of the Government, its subdivisions,

7 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 167.

acompania General de Tabacos vs. French and Unson. 39 PhiL :~4: Phil. Operations, Inc.
vs. Auditor General, 94 Phil. 868.
1
The late President l!'erdinand Marcos. under hi.> lawmaking power, exempted many
government-owned or -contl·olled entities from COA jurisdiction giving rise to the suspicion
that it was done to facilitate or hide illegal expenditure:> or diversions of their funds and
other assets. Millions of pesos of government funds from the National Treasury were found to
have been siphoned by the former regime to various corporate subsidiaries which were placed
beyond COA audit.
316 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 4

agencies, etc., including non-government entities, subject to its audit. 1 (see


Sec. 2LlJ. )
It is also required to recommend measures to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Government and its s ubdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities, etc. and to submit s uch other reports as may be required
by law.

- oOo-

1.lt.A. No. 7226 (.March 12, 1992) reqnires the Commission on Audit to submit to Co n-

gress Annual Reports of amounts obligated, warrants issued, and expenditures made in each
municipality, province nnd city by National Government agencies and instrumentalities,
incl uding government.-owncd corporation~; .
Sec. 12 ART. XVI. - GENERAL PROVIS10:\""S 507

In the formulation and implementation of policies, the State must


consider the customs, tradit ions, beliefs, rights and interest s of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and develop-
ment. (sec Art. II, Sec. 22: Art. VI, Sec. 5; Art. X, Sees. 15-21; Art. XII. Sec.
8; Art. XIII, Sec. 6; Art. XI\· . Sec. 17.)

- oOo -
••<

,.,../"/'
"/....................
···
Articte XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Consti-


tution may be proposed by:
(l) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.

Amendment and revision distinguished. ---


Both denote a change in the Constitution. But w,hiYe{i;;;~ndment is a
change effected in some_..P.arl"SOf the Constitution withoul considedh{(tne
whole document><.r.edsi~n 1 is a re-writing or substantial changing in the
Constitution viewed in its entirety.2

Importance of the amending procedure.


(1) Mechanism for responding to cha!l.ging condition.B . -No Constitu-
tion, however gifted its framers , i1> likely U> prove adequate for an indefinite
period. There are problems that no human foresight can anticipate. As
conditions are never static, so must the fundamental law be fre ed from the
constraint of rigidity. While it is r educed to writing, it should not be devoid
of the element of flexibility. Thus, a well-written charter must not only
safeguard individual rights and organize the government but indicate how
it may be amended 3 in order to make it r esponsive to changing economic,
social, and political conditions.
(2). A safe_ty ualue against ~~~Qr.t to rev.olution.. - Not much reflection is
needed to show that without an amending process, the only alternative to

' In the 1935 Charter, there was no provision for a revision of the Constitution. It
provided oniy for amendment which, howe ver, was interpreted to include revision. (see
Occeiia vs. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1, April 2, 1981.) TheTe was n o provi!'ion fixing the date for
h olding the plebiscite.
2
~ . A Gonza les, op. cit., p. 71.
·see Justice (la ter Chief Justice) E.M. Fernan do, "The Bill of Rights" (1972 ed.l, pp. 38-
39.

508
Sec. 2 ART. XVII. - A~fENDME NTS OR RE \"ISIO~ ~ 509

bring about the necessary changes would be through r evolution. In this


way, the article on amendments provides a safety valve. 4

Methods by whlch amendments or revision


may be proposed.
Sections 1 and 2 prescribe three (3) methods for proposing any am~ ;.d ­
ment to, or revision of the Constitution, namely:
( 1) By Congress, as a constituent assembly, upon a vote of thrt-.::·
fourths of all its members · Sec. l[a].), votintf
. /
separately;. 5
~) By a consti:utioca! com·ention p'cilled for t he purpose (Sec. 1[2]. : or
(.3) By the people directly, through initiative upon petition of the re-·
quired number of regi$tere-d Yoters. (Sec. 2, par. L l
It is to be noted that the vote requirement is more stringent if the
amendments are proposed by Congress itself. This is to insure more delib-
erations and deeper study and con sideration of the merits of the proposed
changes to the fundamenta l law.

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise b e


directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a peti·
tion of at least twelve per centu" of the total number of regis·
t ered voters, of which every legislative district must be r epre-
sented by at least !_~e per e:entum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution
nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.

Amendments proposed by the people


through initiative.
Sections 2 and 4 (par . 2. ' enshrined for the first time the "pe~l e power"
to effect changes in the fundamental law. Under the concept of initiative
{see Art. VI , Sec. 32.), the people may directly propose amendments to the
Cons titution should Congress be remiss in its duty under the two (2)
traditional modes available to it.
(1) Requirements.- They are as follows:

'See Justice- (later Chief Justice • E.M. Fernando, "The Constitution of the Philippines,"
(1974 ed .), p. 23.
6 Unlike the 1935 Constitu t ion !Art. XV, See. 1 thereof. ), Section 1 does nnt mention

Congress having to convene in "joint session assembled" for the purpose of proposing consti-
tutional amendments. Still Congress a cts as a constituent body when it proposes amend·
ments to the Constitution although it mee ts a nd votes separately.
510 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 3

(a ) There must be a petition of at least.l2% of the total number of


registered voters;
(b) Every legislative district must be r epresented by at least, 3% of
the registered voters thereof; and -
(c) The amendment through initiative is not made within five (5)
years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener tli"an
once every five (5) years thereafter .
(2) Minimum percentage of electorate. - O nce the r equired number of
voters' signatures is complied with, Congress is bound to submit the pro-
posed amendments to the people in a plebiscite. (Sec. 4, par. 2.) The
implementing law will have t o pro\i de a system of verification of· the
signatures. Note that the minimum percentage of the electorate must be
satisfied both on the national and district levels. ,..Thus, if a legislative
district is represented by only 29i: of the registered voters thereof, t he
power of initiative cannot be exercised although the petition is signed by
more than 12% of the total number of registered voters.
These requirements are designed to ensure that a sizeable portion of
the population really desire to propose the amendment and at the same
time avoid frequent changes in the fundament al law which are not condu-
cive to political stability.
(3) Deferment. - The deferment is provided to give Congress sufficient
time to create and refine the mechanism for implementing the third mode
of proposing constitutional a mendments. Congress is required to provide
by law for the implementation of the exercise of the right. (Sec. 2. )
(4 ) Initiative limited to amendm ents. - Note that the Constitution
.limits the people's initiative to me re "'amendments" or simple changes, a nd
r eserves "revision s" or major changes fe.g., from presidential to parliamen -
tary, from bicamera l to unicameral) for a constituent assembly or a consti-
tutional convention.

SEC. 3. The Congress m ay, by a vote of two-thirds of all its


Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote
of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.

Methods by which a constitutional


convention may be called.
A constitutional convention may be called for the purpose of proposing
an amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution in two ways, namely:
(1) Congress by two-thirds vote of all its members may call a constitu-
tional convention; or
(2) Congress by a majority vote of all its members (in case neither the
3/4 nor. 2/3 vote can be mustered) may toss the ques tion to ca ll a constitu-
tional convention to the electorate in an election. {Sec. 3.) The question
Sec. 4 ART. XVII. - AMENDMENTS 0}{ REVISIONS 511

shall be decided by the majority of the votes cast in the corresponding


plebiscite. (see Sec. 4, par. l.l
There was no provision in the 1935 Constitution regarding this alterna-
tive of submitting to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

Meaning of constitutional convention.


AcQnstitutional conventionjs a body assembled for the express purpose
of framing a ConstitutioTI;Or revising th.~. exi.sti~C'Jnstitution, or fornm-
lating amendments to itl for the approval of the electorate. Being t he direct
representative of the people vested with the authority to draft the funda-
mental law of the State, its members have to be elected by the qualified
voters. 2

Constitution drafted by an appointive


Constitutional Commission.
The present Constitution was drafted by a Commission created under
Article V of the Provisional Constitution promulgated under Procll'l.mation
No. 3 issued by the President on March 25, 1986. Its members were ap-
pointed by the President pursuant to Proclamation No.9 issued on April23,
1986, "the law governing the Constitutional Commission of 1986." (see
Introduction-E.) The Provisional Constitution abolished the Batasang
Pambansa, the then legislative body, and vested in the President, as head
of the revolutionary government, full legislative powers. The power of the
President to create the Constitutional Commission and appoin t its mem·
bers was r ecognized since it was never questioned in court.
During the period of martial law, the President himself proposed the
approved amendments to the 1973 Constitution which were submitted to
the people for ratification.
The Constitutional Commission of 1986, by the nature of its functions,
was no different from a constitutional convention with elected members,
and it, therefore, possessed the same statu s and powers. (see Introduction-
E .)

SEC. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution


under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
than sixty days nor.later than -.fnety days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a m~ority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall

1 V.G. Sinco, op. cit., p. 43.


2Ibid., p. 50.
51 2 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHIU PPI NE CONSTITUTION Sec. 4

be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days
after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition.

Ratification by the people.


Rqtif'ication means the direct approval by the people of the amendment
to, or re vision of, the Constitution . It is the final a ct t o make a ny change in
the Constitution valid as part thereof. This power of ratification upholds
the principle that "sovereign ty r esides in the people." (Ar t. II, Sec. 1.)
In order that the amendment or r e\"ision proposed by Congress or by a
constitutional convention or by the people thr ough initiative may be valid
as part of the Constitution, the same must be ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscit e (see Art. V, Sec. 1. ) called for t he purpose.
The plebiscit~ must be held not ea rlier than 60 days nor later than 90
days after the a pproval of such amendment or r evision or certifi cation of
the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition, as the ca se
may be . (Sec. 4.) The minimum period of 60 days is deemed adequa te to
provide the voters sufficient infor mat ion a nd time for intelligent considera-
tion or study of the proposed change or revision . The constituent body may
fix t he date within t he period prescribe d when the people may act. The time
limit of 90 days prevents undue delay in the holding of the plebiscite. I

- cOo -

1
The suffici ency of the period dur i ng whi ch a mendments ar e s ubmjtted to the people
before they vot e either to a ffirm or r eject depends on the complexity and intricacy of t he
que~tions presented. (Al mario vs. Alba, 127 SCRA 69, Jan. 25, 1984.)
514 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sees. 2·4

SEC. 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representa-


tives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first
twelve obtaining the highest number ofvctes shall serve for six
years and the remaining twelve for three years.

Term of office of Senators, Representatives,


and local officials first elected.
This is provided in the above section. The elections for members of
Congress were held s.i.multaneously on the 2nd Monday of May, 1987. (Sec.
1.) H ence, they will have a term of office of five (5) years ending on June 30,
1992.
The effect of the second paragraph is that beginning 1995 and every
three (3) years thereafter, there will be an election for twelve (12) Senators
with a term of six (6) years. The Senate, like the Constitutional Commis-
sions (Art. IX.), is a continuing body.

SEC. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, procla·


mations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed, or revoked.

All existing laws, etc., remain valid until


amended, repealed or (evoked.
Section 3 (together with Sections 10, 11, and 15.) seeks to prevent any
disruption in the orderly functioning of government. It does not apply to
laws, etc., inconsistent with the new Constitution which are automatically
deemed repealed upon its ratification. Neither does it apply to secret and
unpublished decrees, if any, issued by the former President under his
martial law powers and Amendment No. 6 t o the 1973 Constitution. Being
unknown, they cannot be considered part of the laws of the land.
It is a standard provision of proposed n ew constitutions to provide for
the continuing efficacy of existing legislationa not inconsistent with the
proposed fundamental law to ensure the continuity and stability of govern-
ment operations during the period of t ransition and. to insure t hat vested
rights and existing ohligations derived thereunder are protected and ob-
served.

SEC. 4. All existing treaties or international agreements


which have not been ratified shall not be renewed or extended
without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Mem-
bers of the Senate.
Sec. 5 ART. XVIII . - T RANSITORY PROVlSl ONS 515

Renewal or extension of existing treaties


or international agreements.
Section 4 r ecognizes the validity of existing treaties or international
agreements enter ed into by the Philippine government. H owever, th ose
which have not been ratified can only be renewed or extended with the
concurrence of a t least 2/3 of a ll the members of the Senate.

SEC. 5. The six·year term of the incumbent President and


Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of electioDB, here~y extended to
noon of June 30, 1992. /,
The first regular elections for the Presiie'nt and Vice-Presi-
dent under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Mon day
of May, 1992.

Six-year term for incumbent President


and Vice-President extended.
Section 5 assumes that th1:1 incumbent President and Vice-Preside nt
were duly elected in the February 7, 1986 election held under the 1973
Constitution which provided a six-year term of office. For purposes of
synchronization of elections, the term is ext.,ended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The term of office of t he President a nd Vice-President who will be elected in
the first election for said positions under the new Constitution sh a ll begin
at s aid time and date followin g their election which sha ll be held on t he 2nd
Monday of May, 1992.
Section 5 is one of the controversial provi sion$ which generated heated
debates both inside and outside the Constitutional Commission and were
raised as issues against the ratification of the new Constitution. There is,
however , no dispute on the legal power of the Comm iss ion, being an inde-
pendent body, to fix the term of office of t he incumbent President and Vice -
President. ·
Those who a rgued for a n ew presidential election claimed that:
(1) Proclamation No. 3 is specific that the incumbent P resident and
Vice-President took over the reins of government through a revolution "in
defiance of the p rovisions of the 1973 Constitution ." To effect a tra nsition to
constitutional government, the holding of elections at all level s wa s neces-
sary;
(2J To hold on to power wi thout any electoral mandate would be violat-
ing the principle that in a republican and d emocratic state , sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them,
which is provided both in the dra ft Constitution a nd the 1973 Constitution;
(3) To fix their t erm of office would in effect constitutionalize a r evolu-
tion without the benefit of an election:
fil 6 TEXTBOOK-ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 5

· 4J They were t!lected under the 1973 Constitution but they were not
proclaimed under said Constitution and the laws then in force. By aboli sh-
ing the Batasang P ambansa and establishing a revolutionary government,
they were barred from invoking the results of the February 7, 1986 "sna p"
presidential election and thereby abandoned t heir right to a fix ed term.
With the establishment of the constitutional government under the new
Constitution, their term of office would automatically come to an end;
(5) To grant a fixed term to the incumbent President and Vice-Presi-
dent would be immor al, the Constitutional Commission being an appointive
body, and would make it vulnerable to attack on its independence; and
(6) Holding of elections for President and Vice-President was a major
key to political stability and the high costs of election should not be given as
an excuse. It would settle once and for all any doubt as to whether or not
they really won in the election.
Among the arguments given in support of Section 5 a re as fo llows:
(1) The revolutionary government established after the February 7,
1986 election cannot be equated with other revolutionary governments
established through armed r ebellion without absolutely any legal claim to
power. It was orought about by an election regularly called under an
existing Constitution and by a peaceful revolution. The incumbent Presi-
dent and Vice-President assumed offi ce on the basis of their having won in
t h at election, deriving their power to go\·ern from t h e people themselves;
(2) The revolutionary government adopted practically all the provi-
sions of the 1973 Constitution. In providing "for an orderly transition to a
government under a new Constitution ... Proclamation No. 3 contemplates a
transition from one constitution to another. There is no mention at all in
Proclamation No. 3 of a Presidential a nd Vice-Presidential election;
(3) The revolution that installed the incumbent President and Vice-
President is a unique one-· without parallel in the history of mankind. It
was witnessed not only by the Filipino people but by the whole world . It
took place because of the electoral cheating described as "unparalleled in
its fraudulence" which was likewise witnessed not only by t he Filipino
people but by the whole world. It took place because the Filipino people
were convinced that the incumbent President a nd Vice-President duly won
the election. It was a "people's revolution" in the t ruest sense;
(4) The majority of the Filipino people believed that the former Presi-
dent lost in the "snap" election as shown by the continuous public accept~
ance and support given to the provisional government without any resist-
ance whatsoever from the people and by its recognition and acceptance by
the community of n ations. Section 4 does not grant a term to the incumbent
President a nd Vice-President; it merely affirms a hi storical fact;
(5i Although the members of the Constitutional Commission that drafted
the new Constitution were appointed by the incumbent President, the fact
i.s that they were appointed pursuant to t he provisions of Proclamation No.9,
upon nomination of "political parties, civic, religious, ethnic, or other sectoral
Sees. 6-8 ART. XVTTI. - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 517

groups or by individual citizens." It is publicly known that the incumbent


President never interfered in any way with the work of that b'Jdy; and
(6) If the people really desired a new presidential and vice-presidential
election, they would vote against the new Constitution. The claim that
without such an election the government would continue to be unstable was
based on conjecture.

SEC. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise


legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
I
Transitory legislative power of President. :'
I
Section 6 is merely a confirmation of the 14gislative powers recognized
as already existing in favor of the incumbeni. .,President by virtue of the
issuance of Proclamation No. 3 promulgating th~Provisional Constitution.
As head of the revolutionary government, and ·there being no legislative
body, Section 1 of Article II of the Provisional Constitution conferred sole
legislative authority on the President. It provides: "Until a legislature is
elected and convened under a new Constitution, the President. shall con·
tinue to exercise legislative power." Both provisions make it clear tha t the
legislative power of the incumbent President shall terminate upon the
convening of the First Congress.

SEC. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by


appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors
the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2),
Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.

Appointment of nominees to sectoral seats.


Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list
of nominees by the respective sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral repre-
sentation. The manner of choosing the sectoral representatives during the
transition period was not left to Congress because of the desire of the
Constitutional Commission to have sectoral representation implemented
right away.

SEC. 8. Until otherwise provided by the Congress, the Presi-


dent may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed
of the heads of all local government units comprising the Metro-
politan Manila area.

Metropolitan Authority may be


constituted.
Under Section 11, Article X, Congress may, by law, create special
metropolitan political subdivisions subject to a plebiscite with the compo-
5 18 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sees. 9-11

nent cities and municipalities retaining their basic autonomy. The jurisdic-
tion of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be
limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Until such law is enacted, the President may constitute the Metropolitan
Authority in Metropolitan Manila. It shall be composed of the original four (4)
city mayors and thirteen (13) municipal mayors in the area. Six (6) munici-
palit ies (Pasig, Mandaluyong, Makati, Marikina, Muntinlupa, and Las Piiias)
have since become cities. Novaliches in Quezon City is now a city.
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) created by
R.A. No. 7924 , which took effect on March 22, 1995, replaced the former
Metro Manila Authority (MMA).

SEC. 9. A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate


until it is converted into a regular province or until its compo-
nent municipalities are reverted to the mother province.

Sub-provinces to continue to exist


and operate.
Sub-provinces are essentially extensions of the r egular provinces. They
automatically assume the regular status of provinces once they meet the
requirements prescribed by law. (see Art. X, Sec. 1.) They may be abolished
by Congress by reverting it~ component municipalities to the mother prov-
inces as provided by law.

SEC. 10. All courts existing at the time of the ratification of


this Constitution shall continue to exercise their jurisdiction,
until otherwise provided by law. The provisions of the existing
Rules of Court, judiciary acts, and procedural laws not incon-
sistent with this Constitution shall remain operative unless
amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or the Congress.

Existing courts to continue.


Pursuant to this provision -
(1) The Supreme Court and lower courts existing at the time of the
ratification of the new Constitution shall continue to exercise their jurisdic-
tion unless otherwise provided by law; and
(2) The provision of th e existing Rules of Coutt, judiciary acts and
procedural laws not inconsistent with the new Constitution shall continue
in force unless subsequently a mended or repealed by the Supreme Court (in
the case of the Rules of Court) or Congress.

SEC. 11. The incumbent Members of the Judiciary shall


continue in office until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or
are removed for cause.
Sees. 12-13 ART. XVIII. ·-TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 519

Incumbent members of the judiciary ·


to continue in office.
This section allows members of the judiciary at the time of the ratifica-
tion of the new Constitution to continue in office until they reach the age of
70 years or become incapacitated to discharge their duties. They may,
however, be removed for cause.
Pending the ratification of the new Constitution, the power to remove
judges of lower courts was possessed by the Supreme Court (see Art. VIII,
Sec. 11.) and members of the Supreme Court were removable only by the
President for any of the causes which are grounds for impeachment. (see
Art. XI, Sec. 2.)

·sEC. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year..a.fte~_tbe


ratification of this Constitution. adopt a systematic plan to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending
in the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity
of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.

Adoption of a systematic plan to expedite reso-


lution of pending cases in courts.
Section 12 takes cognizance of the huge backlog of cases pending in
regular courts as well as in special courts and quasi-judicial bodies particu-
larly in the regular courts. Such a systematic plan has assumed a crucial
urgency as the number of cases filed in courts continues to increase through
the years. (see Art. III, Sec. 16; Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1].)
The Supreme Court is given a period of one (1) year from the ratifica-
tion of the new Constitution to adopt for itself and the lower courts the
plan. It is not clear whether the time frame of one (1) year applies also with
respect to a similar plan to be adopted for all special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies.

SEC. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification
of this Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision or
resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by
the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as
practicable.

Legal effect of lapse of maximum period


for rendering judicial decision.
Under Section 11(1), Article X of the 1973 Constitution (now Sec. 15{1),
Art. VIII.), "the maximum period within which a case or matter shall be
decided or resolved from the date of its submission shall be 18 months [now
24 months] for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme
520 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sees. 14-15

Court, 12 months for all inferior UowerJ collegiate courts and th r ee (3)
months for all other inferior [lower] courts." Section 13 r equires the Su-
preme Court to determine the legal effect of the lapse, before the ra tifica-
tion of the new Constitution , of the applicable periods without the corre-
sponding decision or resolution having been r endered.
The new Constitution makes the periods mandatory with res pect to
cases or matters filed after its effect i,·ity. (see Art. VIII, Sec. 15Ll] ; see
however , Sec. 14, infra. )

SEC.I4. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4). Section 15


of Article VIIl of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters
. filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the appli-
cable period lapses after such ratification.

Where applicable period for rendition of judicial decision


lapses after ratification of Constitution.
Section 15(1), Article VIII prescribes the mandatory maximum periods
within which cases or m atters must be decided by the various courts. It
refers to cases or ma t ters filed after the effe ctivity of the new Constitution .
Section 14 ma kes it clear that paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 15, Article
VIII likewise apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of the
new Constitution when the a pplicabl e period lapses after such ratification.

SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Com-


mission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit shall continue in office for one year after the ratification
of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or
b ecome incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or
appointed to a new term thereunder. In no case shall any
Member serve longer than seven years, including s ervice before
the ratification of this Constitution.

Incumbent members of the Constitutional


Commissions to continue in office.
In t he case of the members of the judiciary, t hey shall continue in office
until they reach t he age of 70 years unless they become incapacitated or be
removed for cause. (Sec. 11.) Under Section 15, t he incumbent members of
t he Gonstitutional Commissions sh all continue in office for one (1) year
after t he ratification of the new Constitution unless t hey are sooner re-
moved for cause or become incapacitated.
A m ember appointed to a new term is not allowed to serve longer than
seven (7) years, including service before t he r atifica tion of t he new Consti-
tution.
Sees. 16-17 ART. XVIII. -TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 521

SEC. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the


service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution
shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retire·
ment and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of
general application in force at the time of their separation. In
lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be consid-
ered for employment in the Government or in any of its subdivi·
sions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-
owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This
provision also applies to career officers whose resignation.
tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.

Right of separated civil service employees


and career officers.
Section 16 applies to employees who were separated from the service
not for cause but as a result of the reorganization mentioned and career
')fficers whose resignations tendered in line with the existing policy have
been accepted. They are given the option to avail of the separation pay and
the retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the law or to be
considered for employment in the government.

SEC. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the Presi·


dent shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand
pesos; the Vice-President, the President ofthe Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each; the
Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of
the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand
pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commis·
sions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.

Annual salaries of constitutional officers.


The annual salaries provided for constitutional officers above may be
increased or decreased by Congress subject to the following restrictions:
(1) President and Vice-President. - their salaries shall not be de-
creased during their tenure and any increase shall take effect only after the
expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was
approved (Art. VII, Sec. 6.);
(2) Members of Congress. -increase in compensation shall take effect
only after the expiration of the full term of all the members approving such
increase (Art. VI, Sec. 10.);
522 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHTLIPPINf: CONSTITUTION Sees. 18-20

' 3) Members of the Judiciary. - their salaries shall not be decreased


but they may be increased during their continuance in cffice (Art. VIII, Sec.
10 . .1; and
(4) Members of the Constitutional Commissions. -their s alaries shall
not be decreased but they may be incr eased during their tenure. (Art. IX, A-
Sec. 3.)

SEC. 18. At the earliest possible time, the Government shaH


increase the salary scales of the other officials and employees of
the National Government.

Increase of salary scales of other


officials and employees.
Section 18 "balances" the increase in the salaries of constitutional
officers. (Sec. 17.) It is a directive to the government to upgrade the salaries
of the officials and employees of the national government at the earliest
possible time, that is, it should study right away the sala ry scales so that
the salary increases could be implemented, if possible, at once. (see Art. IX,
B-Sec. 5. )

SEC. 19. All properties, records, equipment, buildings, facili-


ties and other assets of any office or body abolished or reorgan·
ized under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 cr this
Constitution shall be transferred to the office or body to which
its powers, functions, and responsibilities substantially pertain.

Disposition of properties, records, etc.


Under this section, all properties, records, equipment, buildings, facili-
ties and other assets of any office or body abolished or reorganized shall be
transferred to the office or body to which its powers, fun ctions and respon-
sibilities substantially pertain. Note that the provision does not mention
the personnel of the aboli shed or r eorganized office or body.

SEC. 20. The first Congress shall give priority to the deter-
mination of the period for the full implementation of free public
secondary education.

Full implementation ot free public


secondary education.
Under Section 2, Article XIV on Education, the State is manda ted to
establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary
and high school levels. Free public elementa ry education has long been
implemented. Congress is directed by Section 20 to give priority to the
Sees. 21-23 ART. XVIII. -TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 523

determination of the period for the full implementation of free public


secondary education.
In other words, the Constitution intends that full implementation be
made as soon as possible when the finances of the government permit it.

SEC. 21. The Congress shall provide efficacious procedures


and adequate remedies for the reversion to the State of all lands
of the public domain and real rights connected therewith which
were acquired in ,;olation of the Constitution or the public land
laws, or through conupt practices. No transfer or disposition of
such lands or real rights shall be allowed until after the lapse of
one year from the ratification of this Constitution.

Reversion to State of illegally acquired public lands


and real rights connected therewith.
Section 21, in effect. declares as null and void all acquisitions of lands of
the public domain and real rights connected therewith in violation of the
1973 Constitution and the public land laws or through corrupt practices.
(see Sec. 26.) Congress is mandated to provide by law efficacious procedures
and adequate remedies for the reversion to the State of all said properties.
Their transfer or disposition within one (1) year from the ratification of
the new Constitution is prohibited. The period of one ( 1) year is deemed a
sufficient time within which Congress can enact the law mentioned.

SEC. 22. At the earliest possible time. the Government shall


expropriate idle or abandoned agricultural lands as may be
defined by law, for distribution to the beneficiaries of the
agrarian reform program.

Expropriation of idle or abandoned lands.


The State is mandated to undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, to own
directly or collectively, the lands they till. To this end, it shall encourage
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands. (Art. XIII, Sec.
4.) Section 22 refers to private agricultural lands which are idle or aban·
doned as may be defined by law. The government shall expropriate them at
the earliest possible time for distribution to the beneficiaries of the agrar-
ian 1·eform program.

SEC. 23. Advertising entities affected by paragraph (2),


Section 11 of Article XVI of this Constitution shall have five
years from its ratification to comply on a graduated and propor-
tionate basis with the minimum Filipino ownership require-
ment therein.
TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITU'l'lON Sees. 24-25

Compliance by advertising companies with mini-


mum Filipino ownership requirement.
Under Section 11(2), Article XVI, only Filipino citizens or corporations
or associations at least 70% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens
shall be allowed to engage in advertising industry. Advertising entities
affected by the requirement are given a maximum period of five (5) years
from the ratification of the Constitution to comply on a graduated and
proportionate basis with the minimum Filipino ownership requirement.

SEC. 24. Private armies and other armed groups not recog-
nized by duly constituted authorities shall be dismantled. All
·p aramilitary forces including Civilian Horne Defense Forces not
consistent with the citizen armed force established in this
Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, con·
verted into the regular force.

Private armies and other armed groups


to be dismantled.
The constitu tional mandate has become necessary in view of numerous
cases of human rights abuses and other illegal acts attributed to such
armed groups as well as paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense
Forces (CHDF). Most CHDF were barangay captains and members. They
were organized by the military during the previous regime to help fight
insurgency. In many instances in the past, these armed units were utilized
for partisan purposes. However, paramilitary forces including CHDF, where
appropriate (i.e., they meet the stan dards and requirements, after they
have been properly screened and trained to make it consistent with the
citizen armed force) s hall be converted into the r egular forces in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for they can help the latter in dealing with the
insurgency problem and protecting the people particularly in far-flung
areas of the country.
The Con~titution recognizes the natural right of the people to defend
themselves against dangers to their lives and property. The "vigilante"
concept, however, must be "consistent with the citizen armed force estab-
lished in this Constitution." (see Art. XVI, Sec. 4.) This means that the
mann(~r of citizens defense must be provided by law.

SEC. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement be·


tween the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Sec.26 ART. XVI!I. -TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 525

Requirements for allowing foreign military


bases in the Philippines.
The Constitution gi\·es cognizance to the validity and term of effectivity
of the 1947 R.P.-U.S. Military Bases Agreement (MBA) which expired in
September 16, 1991. The. Constitution, by Section 25, recognizes and honors
this agreement. After 1991, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall
be allowed only under the following requirements or conditions:
( 1) The terms thereof are contained in a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate; 1
(2) When Congress so requires, the treaty must be ratified by a major-
ity of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose; and
(3) The agreement is recognized also as a treaty by the other contract-
ing party.
The MBA was an executive agreement entered into between the Presi-
dent of the Philippines and the President of the United States. But while it
is a treaty as far as the Philippines is concerned because it was ratified by
the Philippine Senate. it was a mere executive agreement as far a;;: the
United States is concerned because it was never ratified b:'· the Cnited
States Senate. An executive agreement does not require legislative concur-
rence. It is binding only upon the heads of States entering into them. (see
Art. VIII, Sec. 4[2].) Thus, all disbursements under the MBA for the Philip-
pines have to be approved by the U.S. Congress. A treaty, on the other
hand, requires the concurrence of the legislative body to b~ valid and
effective. It is an international agreement binding upon the States as
parties thereto. (see Art. VII, Sec. 21.)
Section 25 is clear that the MBA as an executive agreement must
terminate in 19~1 beyond the sole power of the President on her own
exclusive authority except in the form of a treaty with the United States
which requires concurrence by our Senate.

SEC. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze or-


ders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation
to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for
not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this
Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by
the President, the· Congress may extend said period.
A sequestration or freeze order ~hall be issued only upon
showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the
sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered

:The Philippine Senate, in Senate Resolution No. 141, dated S4;!ptember 16, 1991.
rejected the proposed Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security allowing U.S. military
bases in the Philippines.
526 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Sec. 26

with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification
of this Cons titution, the corresponding judicial action or pro·
ceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For
those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or pro·
ceeding shall be commenced "";thin six months from the issu·
ance thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically
lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein
provided.

Sequestered or frozen properties.


By sequestration, property is pro-..isionally taken into custody pending
determination of its ownership. In relation to wealth proved to be ill-gotten,
the property will be confiscated in favor of the government. The purpose of
a freeze order is to prevent the unauthorized or unlawful dispo·s ition of
contested property. (see Art. XI, Sec. 15.) A sequestration or freez e order is
to be distinguis hed from a search wa rrant. The latter may be issued only by
a judge and only upon showing of a probable cause. (see Art. III, Sec. 2.)
Under Executive Order No. 1 (May 12, 1986) which created t he Presi-
dential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), the said agency is em-
powered to sequester or freeze all ill-gotten assets and properties in the
Philippines of the deposed President and his immediate family, r elatives,
business associates, dummies and agents. This authority shall remain to be
operative for not more than 18 months after the ratification of the new
Constitution. The period may be extended by Congress if demanded by the
national interest as certified by the President. In any event, after ratifica-
tion , any such order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case,
and the order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall be
forthwith registered with the proper court. If no corresponding judicial
action or proceeding is filed within six (6) months from ratification or
issuance, as the case may be, the sequestration or freeze order is deem ed
automatically lifted.
The PCGG has been charged with violations of human and property
rights and other unconstit utional acts in a number of cases reaching up to
the Supreme Court in pursuing its t ask to r ecover alleged ill -gotten wealth
by the former President, his relatives, and cronies. From the viewpoint of
the PCGG, extraordinary process is required to recover suspected ill-gotten
wealth as it does not involve a simple case of malversation of public funds
or graft; incriminating documents obtained by t he government "speak of
grand larceny, of the plunder of an entire nation - an offense , unfortu-
nately, which does not appear in our statute books. Exis ting laws s uch as
the Anti-Graft Law did not anticipate a crime of such magnitude and
cannot cope with a series of acts that involve so many persons, here and
abroad, and which touch ed so many States and territorial units. Were the
PCGG to give previous notice and conduct a hearing before it could issue a
Sec. 27 ART. XVIII. - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 527

writ of sequestration, the ill-gotten wealth sought would probably disap-


pear before the scheduled date of h earing." 1 An aggr ieved pa r ty is not
without any legal reme dy since he can invoke judicial processes to have his
property released.

SEC. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately


upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held for t he purpose and sha ll supersed e all previous Constitu-
tions.
T h e foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines was a pproved by the Constitutional Commission of
1986 on the twelfth day of October Ninet een hundred a nd eighty-
six, and accordingly signed on the fifteenth day of October
Nine teen hundred and eighty-six at the Plenary Hall, National
Government Center, Quezon City, by the Commissioners whose
signatures are h ereunder affixed.

Effectivity of the new Constitution.


The 19fl7 Constitution took effect immediately upon its ratification by a
,..majority of t he votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose held on
··· February 2, 1987. Its ratification was a nnounced on Feb:t~a ry 11, 1987 by
Proclamation No: 58. 1
The rat ification has the effect of completely repealing all previous
Constitutions - the 1935, 1973 and the Provisional Constitutions. It also
marked the establishment of a new Republ ic which was folt'owed by t he full
restoration of democratic ins titutions with the election of members of
Congress on May 2, 1987, provincial, city and municipa l officials on J anu-
ary 18, 1988, and barangay officials on March 28, 1989.
Legally, the new Constitution superseded only the Provisional Consti-
tut ion becaus e it was the only Constitution then in force and effect. How-
ever, t here were people who still claimed t hat the 1935 Constitution or the
1973 Constitution was still in forct.

-· oOo --

1According to Chairma n Jov ito R. Salonga in a speech before the Ateneo College of Law

on the •Practical Legal Aspect~; of Recovering Ill -Gotten Wealth," Aug. 25 , 1986.
1 0fficially, the new Constitution wok effect on February 11, 1987. Section 27, however,

is very clear that the "Constitution shall t~tke- effect immediately upon its ratification" which
took place on February 2, 1987, the day of the plebiscite . wh en the votes were cast.
Proclamation No. 149 (Jan. 24, 2002) declares Fe bruary 2 of every year as Constit ution
Day, making its cele bration as a non-working h oliday.
ORDINANCE*
This last part of the Constitution apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the different legisla-
tive districts in provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with t he number of their respective inhabitants, as follows :,

METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA:


Manila, six (6); Quezon City, four (4); Caloocan City, two (2); Pasay
City, one (1); Malabon and Navotas. one (1); San Juan and Mandaluyong,
one (1); Marikina, one (1); Makati, one (1); Pasig, one (1); Paranaque, one
( 1); Las Pinas aad Muntinlupa, one (1); Pateros and Taguig, one (1 );
Valenzuela, one ( l) L

REGION I !
Abra, one {1); Benguet with the City of Baguio, two (2); Ilocos Norte with
Laoag City, two (2); llocos Sur, two (21: La Union, two (2 ); Mountain Province,
one ( 1); Pangasinan with the Cities of Dagupan and San Carlos, six (6)

REGION II:
Batanes, one (1); Cagayan, three •3); Ifugao, one (1); lsabela, four (4);
Kalinga-Apayao, 2 one ( 1); Nueva Vizcaya, one (1 ); Quirino, one ( 1)

REGION III:
Bataan, two (2 ); Bulacan, four 14 ); Nueva Ecija, with the Cities of
Cabanatuan, Palayan and San J ose, four (4); Pampanga with Angeles City,
four (4); Tarlac, three (3); Zambales with Olongapo City, two (2)

REGION IV:
Aurora, one ( 1); Batangas, with the Cities of Batangas and Lipa, four
(4); Cavite with the Cities of Tagaytay, Cavite and Trece Martires, three

*The areas comprised within each legislative distr ict are omit ted.
1
Makati, Pasig, Muntinlupa, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Las P ii'las, Paranaque, Taguig,
and Valenzuela are now citie11. Makati and P araiiaque now have two (2) legislative districts.
The number of representatives will have to he increased. R.A. No. 8535 creates the City of
Novaliches in Quezon City but its creation was rejected by the people in a plebiscite.
:!They are now two (2) separate provinces.

528
ORDINANCE 529

(3); Laguna with San Pablo City, four (4); Marinduque, one (1); Occidental
Mindoro, one ( 1); Oriental Mindoro, two (2); Palawan with Puerto Prince sa
City, two (2); Quezon with Lucena City, four (4); Rizal, two (2); Romblon,
one (1)

REGIONV:
Albay with Legazpi City, three (3); Camarines Norte, one (1); Camarines
Sur including the Cities of Naga and lriga, four (4); Catanduanes, one (1);
Masbate, three (3); Sorsogon, two (2)

REGION VI:
Aklan, one (1); Antique, one (1}; Capiz including Roxas City, two (2);
Iloilo, five (5); Iloilo City, one (1); Negros Occidental, with the Cities of San
Carlos, Cadiz, Bago, La Carlota, and Silay, six (6); Bacolod City, one (1)

REGION VII:
Bohol, with Tagbilaran City, three (3); Cebu, with the Cities of Danao,
Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue, and Toledo, six (61; Cebu City, two (2); ~egros
Oriental, with the Cities of Bais, Canlaon, and Dumaguete, three {3J;
Siquijor, one (1)

REGION VIII:
Leyte, with the Cities ofTacloban and Ormoc, five (5); Southern Leyte,
one (1); Eastern Samar, one (1); Northern Samar, two (2); Samar with
Calbayog City, tw<' (2)

REGION IX:
Basilan, one ( 1); Sulu, two (2); Tawi-Tawi, one (1); Zamboanga Del
Norte with the Cities of Dapitan and Dipolog, three (3); Zamboanga Del
Sur, with Pagadian City, three (3); Zamboanga City, one (1)

REGION X:
Agusan del Norte, with the City ofButuan, two (2); Agusan del Sur, one
(1); Bukidnon, three (3); Camiguin, one (1); Misamis Occidental with the
Cities of Oroquieta, Ozamiz and Tangub, two (2); Misamis Oriental with
Gingoog City, two (2); c·agayan de Oro City, one (1); Surigao Del Norte with
the City of Surigao, two (2)

REGION XI:
Davao del Norte, three (3); Davao Oriental, two (2); Davao Del Sur, two
(2); Davao City, three (3); South Cotabato with General Santos City, three
(3); Surigao Del Sur, two (2)
530 TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

REGION XII:
Lanao Del Norte with Iligan City, two (2); Lanao Del Sur with Marawi
City, two (2); Maguindanao with Cotabato City, two (21; North Cotabato,
two (2); Sultan Kudarat, one (1)

The Ordinance also provides:


"Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make
minor adjustments of the reappointment herein made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to
at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to
on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph '3 1, Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out
of which such new province wa~ created or where the city, whose
population has so increased, is geographically located shall be corre-
spondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjust-
ment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the
election.
Sec. 4. This Ordinance shall be appended to the Constitution pro-
posed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and shall be submitted
to a plebiscite simultaneously with such Constitution, and shall take
effect upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such
plebiscite.
Adopted, October 16, 1986."

-oOo-

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