Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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G.R. No. 139251. August 29, 2002.
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
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of TS/GCIG on June 15, 1992. The nature of her
appointment was “promotion” and her employment status
was “temporary,” since the position is a Career Executive
Service Office 9(CESO) and petitioner lacks the required
CES eligibility.
On February 24, 1993 petitioner was administratively
charged with: (1) neglect of duty, (2) incompetence in the
performance of official duties, (3) conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and (4) directly or indirectly
having financial and material interest
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in any transaction
requiring the approval of her office.
In the meantime, petitioner appealed the status of her
temporary appointment to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), which on March 12, 1993, issued Resolution No. 93-
990, holding that a CES eligibility is required to a CES
position, and even if one possesses such eligibility, still the
appointment cannot be considered permanent unless an
appointment to the11 rank has been granted by the President
of the Philippines.
On June 10, 1993, respondent, through its President,
Fernando M. Miranda, Jr., wrote petitioner, informing her
that “by operation of law, your appointment shall be
deemed terminated and shall automatically cease to have
further force and effect at the close of office hours on the
expiration of your appointment.” She was also advised that
the pendency of the administrative case 12
against her
precludes any renewal of her appointment.
Petitioner, through counsel, then sought the opinion of
the Executive Director of the Career Executive Service
Board who, on August 31, 1993, replied that a temporary
appointment to a CES position can be revoked at any time
by the appointing authority, without waiting for a specific
period to lapse; that the filing of an administrative case
does not automatically revoke the appointment nor does it
affect the validity of the temporary appointment; and
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8 Ibid.
9 Id., pp. 52-53.
10 Id., p. 6.
11 Id., p. 179.
12 Id., p. 57.
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13 Id, p. 65.
14 Id,, pp. 71-72.
15 Id., pp. 73-86.
16 Id., pp. 89-91.
17 Id., pp. 92-93.
18 Id., pp. 96-99.
19 Supra,, Note No. 1.
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“I
“II
“III
“IV
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“As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the
position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that
position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no
security of tenure in respect of that position. As held in Achacoso
v. Macaraig:
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23 G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49 citing Cuevas v. Bacal,
347 SCRA 338 (2000).
24 Rollo, p. 17.
25 Dimayuga v. Benedicto, G.R. No. 144153, January 16, 2002, 373
SCRA 652.
26 Achacoso v. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235, 239-240 [1991].
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It was also ruled that the contract was void and cannot27be
the basis for the claim that Palmera abandoned his post.
The foregoing circumstances are not present in
petitioner’s case. For one, it cannot be deduced that she did
not understand the implications of her promotional, albeit
temporary, appointment. In the first place, she was under
no obligation to accept such promotion, for there is no law
that compels an employee to accept a promotion, as a
promotion is in the nature of 28a gift or reward, which a
person has a right to refuse. And although she was
formerly holding a permanent appointment, she accepted
such temporary appointment. Having done so, petitioner
had abandoned or given up her former position. When she
accepted the temporary appointment, in effect, she
abandoned her right to security of tenure as we have ruled
in Romualdez v. Civil Service Commission, to wit:
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Petition denied.
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