Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan PDF

9/9/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 303
VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 309

Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
*
G.R. No. 125498. February 18, 1999.
CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A.

FACUNDO and REYNALDO G. MEJICA, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),
OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Public Officers; Commission on Audit; Audit; Words and

Phrases; “Disallowance” and “Suspension,” Explained.—At this
point, it may be useful to distinguish between a disallowance and
a suspension. A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or
credits to an account/accountable officer’s accountability due to
non-compliance with law or regulations. Thus, the auditor may
disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or
improper. A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of
action to debit/credit the account/accountable officer’s
accountability pending compliance with certain requirements. A
notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which
could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements,
like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also
issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which
the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory
or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned.
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigations;

The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not
mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them—the
preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the
investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from
each other.—It bears stressing that the exoneration of
respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the
automatic dismissal of the complaint against them. The
preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the
investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from
each other. The first involves the determination of the fact of the
commission of a crime; the second relates to the administrative
aspect of the expenditure of public funds. Accordingly, we hold
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165b9ffb4331ed96452003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/28
that the Ombudsman did not err in entertaining the complaint

filed by the Provincial Auditor against petitioners, nor the
Sandiganbayan in allowing trial to proceed, despite the pendency
of petitioners’ motions before the auditor.
_________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
310
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Criminal Procedure; The presence or absence of the elements

of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, the
truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on
the merits.—Petitioners argue that their opposition to the
disallowance, supported as it is by a certificate of acceptance and
completion, would betray the absence of the elements of evident
bad faith or negligence, and damage. They likewise claim that the
evidence does not establish conspiracy among them. The presence
or absence of the elements of the crime, however, is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. The same
applies to the alleged absence of any conspiracy between the
accused.
Same; Ombudsman; The Supreme Court has maintained a

consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of the
Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided
there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.—This
Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-
interference in the determination of the Ombudsman regarding
the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse
in the exercise of such discretion. In a recent decision, this Court,
quoting Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, stated the rationale
for this rule: . . . The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution
to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be grievously hampered
by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that
the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an

information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
Same; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; Public Officers; Salary

Grades; The position of “Municipal Mayor I” is assigned a Salary
Grade of 27, and comes within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.—At present, Volume III of the
1997 edition of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades, which was prepared by the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) pursuant to Republic Act No.
6758, otherwise known as the “Compensation and Position
Classification Act of
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VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 311
1989,” lists the following positions under Salary Grade 27,

including the position of “Municipal Mayor I”: x x x Earlier, in the
1989 version of the same Index, the Municipal Mayor was also
assigned a Salary Grade of 27. It appears, therefore, that
petitioner Mayor comes within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The Grade is

a means of grouping positions “sufficiently equivalent as to level of
difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification
requirements of the work” so that they may be lumped together in
“one range of basic compensation.”—With the advent of the new
Constitution, and in compliance therewith, Congress enacted R.A.
No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State “to
provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base
differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions.”
To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional prescription
to “(take) into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining
to, and the qualifications required” for the positions of
government officials and employees, Congress adopted the scheme
employed in P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions with
comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of
according such positions similar salaries. This scheme is known
as the “Grade,” defined in P.D. No. 985 as: Includ[ing] all classes
of positions which, although different with respect to kind or
subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of

requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes
of positions within one range of basic compensation. The Grade is
therefore a means of grouping positions “sufficiently equivalent as
to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification
requirements of the work” so that they may be lumped together in
“one range of basic compensation.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Salary Grade,” Defined.

—“Salary Grade” is “the numerical place on the Salary Schedule
representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Salary; A local government

official’s actual salary may be less than what the Salary Schedule
under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial
capability of his or her respective local government unit.—A local
312
government official’s actual salary may be less than what the

Salary Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the
class and financial capability of his or her respective local
government unit. This circumstance, however, has no bearing on
such official’s Grade. As the foregoing discussion shows, an
official’s salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position,
and ultimately by the nature of his position—the level of difficulty
and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the
work. To give credence to petitioners’ argument that Mayor
Rodrigo’s salary determines his Grade would be to misconstrue
the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the constitutional and
statutory policies behind said law.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mario G. Aglipay for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are

the Mayor and Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator, respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan,
while petitioner Alejandro A. Facundo is the former

Municipal Treasurer of the same municipality.
On 15 June 1992, the Municipality of San Nicolas,
represented by Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an agreement
with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for
the electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas, for
the sum of P486,386.18, requiring:
1. Installation of the two (2) units diesel power

generator (20) KVA, 220 W, (Battery start and
other accessories);
2. Installation of 24 rolls feeder lines with nos. 6, 8
and ten wires;
3. Installation of 40 units 4 x 4 wooden post with
accessories; and
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4. Construction of powerhouse with concrete

foundation double throw safety switches (double 1
pole, 250 amperes capacity of 220 V with fuse).
On 2 September 1992, Mejica, the Planning and

Development Coordinator of San Nicolas, prepared an
Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power
Generation project was 97.5% accomplished. Said report
was supposedly approved by Mayor Rodrigo and confirmed
by Larry Lu. On the basis of said report, payment of
P452,825.53 was effected by the Municipal Treasurer,
petitioner Facundo, to Philwood Construction.
On 14 August 1993, petitioners received a Notice of
Disallowance dated 21 June 1993 from the Provincial
Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who found
that as per COA (Commission on Audit) evaluation of the
electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project
(equivalent to P291,915.07) was actually accomplished. Of
the two units of generator supposedly purchased, only one
second-hand unit was delivered. The same generator broke
down after only two nights of operation. In addition,
instead of 40 wooden posts, only 27 were installed. The
powerhouse was only 65.635% completed. The Provincial
Auditor thus disallowed the amount of P160,910.46.
The graph below serves to illustrate the conflicts
between Mejica’s report and the COA’s:
Percentage
Accomplished
Amount paid by P452,825.53 93.0090% (accdg. to
Municipality Mejica’s
report)
Cost of Actual P291,915.07 60.0171% (accdg. to
Accomplishment COA
report)
Amount P160,910.46 33.08% (difference)
Disallowed
______________
1 Rollo, p. 44.
314

In September 1993, petitioners requested 2

the Provincial
Auditor to lift
3
the notice of disallowance and to re-inspect
the project. Petitioners reiterated their plea in 4a letter to
the Provincial Auditor dated 3 November 1993, attaching5
therewith a “Certificate of Acceptance and Completion”
signed by Clemente Arquero, Jr., Barangay Captain of
Caboloan, and Eusebio Doton, President of the Caboloan
Electric Cooperative. The Provincial Auditor, however,
allegedly did not act on petitioners’ requests.
On 10 January 1994, the Provincial Auditor filed a
criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman
against petitioners. Likewise impleaded were Larry Lu and
Ramil Ang, President and General Manager, and Project
Engineer, respectively, of Philwood Construction.
On 10 June 1995, Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa
approved the filing of an information against petitioners
6
for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before
the Sandiganbayan.
On 28 July 1995, petitioners filed a motion for
reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan granted said motion in an Order dated 22
April 1996.
On 7 November 1995, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor issued a memorandum recommending that the
charges against petitioners be maintained. The
Ombudsman approved said memorandum.
Petitioners thereafter filed before the Sandiganbayan a

motion to quash the information alleging, as grounds
therefor that (1) the facts alleged in the information did not
constitute an offense, and (2) the same information charged
more than one offense. Petitioners, however, did not
elaborate on these grounds. They instead faulted the
Provincial Auditor for insti-
________________
2 Annex “A” of Petition, Rollo, p. 39.

3 Annex “B” of Petition, id., at 40.
4 Annex “C” of Petition, id., at 41.
5 Annex “D” of Petition, id., at 42.
6 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
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VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 315

tuting the complaint against them notwithstanding the

pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance.
They also argued that the evidence against them did not
establish the element of damage nor the presence of any
conspiracy between them.
The Sandiganbayan denied said motion in an Order
dated 18 March 1996.
On 18 March 1996, the prosecution moved to suspend
petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners opposed the motion on
the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over
them. In a Resolution dated 2 July 1996, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over
petitioners and ordered the suspension of petitioners
pendente lite.
Petitioners thus filed before this Court the instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that the
Court annul: (a) the order of the Sandiganbayan denying
petitioners’ motion to quash, and (b) the resolution of the
same court upholding its jurisdiction over petitioners.
Petitioners likewise prayed that this Court issue a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the case.
On 28 August 1998, the Court resolved to issue the
temporary restraining order prayed for.
Petitioners allege the following grounds in support of
their petition:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ALLOWING THE

LITIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR
CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATING SECTION 3(E) OF THE ANTI-
GRAFT ACT (R.A. 3019) WHEN THE NOTICE OF
DISALLOWANCE STILL PENDS WITH THE PROVINCIAL
AUDITOR UNDER PETITIONERS’ PROTEST SUPPORTED BY
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE
REQUIRED ELEMENT OF ‘CAUSING UNDUE INJURY TO
ANY PARTY, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT’ AND GROSS
NEGLIGENCE.
316

II
THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS NO JURISDICTION TO

PROCEED AGAINST ALL THE PETITIONERS AND ALL THE
PROCEEDINGS THEREIN, PARTICULARLY THE ORDER OF
SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE PENDENTE LITE, ARE NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO.
III
THE ONGOING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE

SANDIGANBAYAN IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS UNDER
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AS IT WAS PRECEDED BY
HASTY, MALICIOUS, SHAM AND HASTY PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION INEVITABLY EXPOSING THEM TO A
PROLONGED ANXIETY, AGGRAVATION, EXPENSES, AND
HUMILIATION OF A PUBLIC TRIAL.
IV
THE PRECIPITATE SANDIGANBAYAN ORDER OF

SUSPENSION IS A LEGAL ERROR AS THE SAME
EVIDENTLY THE LACK OF THE REQUIRED COLD
NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL VIOLATING
PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER
7
THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND BILL OF RIGHTS.
The first ground raises two issues: (1) whether petitioners’

right to due process was violated by the filing of the
complaint against them by the Provincial Auditor, and (2)
whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in filing the information against petitioners. The

second questions the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over petitioners. The third and fourth grounds are related
to the first and are subsumed thereunder.
After a meticulous scrutiny of petitioners’ arguments,
we find the petition devoid of merit.
__________________
7 Rollo, pp. 20-21. Italics in the original.
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Petitioners contend that the institution by the Provincial

Auditor of the complaint despite the pendency of their
opposition to the notice of disallowance violates their right
to due process. They submit that “the issuance of a notice of
disallowance against (them) compels the provincial auditor
to either accept a settlement or adjudicate and decide on
‘the written explanation for the purpose of lifting/settling
the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the
ninety (90) day 8
period prior to its conversion into a
disallowance.’ ”
The italicized portion above is an excerpt from Section
44.6.4 of the State Audit Manual, which states in full:
Sec. 44.6.4. Auditor’s Responsibility re Evaluation of

Disallowance.—It shall be the responsibility of the auditor to
exercise professional judgment in evaluating, on the basis of the
facts and circumstances of each case as well as the pertinent
provisions of applicable laws, rules and regulations, the grounds
for a charge or suspension/disallowance of an account or
transaction.
It shall be the responsibility of the auditor to exercise sound
judgment in evaluating the written explanation of the
accountable/responsible/liable officer concerned for the purpose of
lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the
ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance.
(Italics supplied)
The aforequoted provision should be read9

in conjunction
with Section 82 of the State Audit Code, which states that:
(a) charge of suspension which is not satisfactorily explained

within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable
officer concerned shall become a disallowance, unless the
Commission or auditor concerned shall, in writing and for good
cause shown, extend the time for answer beyond ninety days.
______________
8 Id., at 188. Italics in the original.

9 Presidential Decree No. 1445.
318

At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between a

disallowance and a suspension. A disallowance is the
disapproval of a credit or credits to an account/accountable
officer’s accountability
10
due to non-compliance with law or
regulations. Thus, the auditor may disallow 11 an
expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or improper.
A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of
action to debit/credit the account/accountable officer’s
accountability12 pending compliance with certain
requirements. A notice of suspension is issued on
transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been
settled except for some requirements, like lack of
supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also
issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of
which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow
after satisfactory or
13
valid justification is submitted by the
parties concerned.
As stated in Section 82, supra, however, the suspension
shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is
“not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after
receipt or notice by the accountable officer concerned.” The
ninety-day period within which the accountable officer may
answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless be
extended by the Commission or the auditor for “good cause
shown.”
________________
10 Section 2k, Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-156-B. Section 3.9

of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993)
(Commission on Audit Circular No. 94-001) which superseded COA
Circular No. 85-156-B, defines disallowance as “the disapproval in audit of

a transaction, either in whole or in part.”
11 Section 19, id. See also Section 14 of the Manual on Certificate of
Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993).
12 Section 2r, id. Under Section 3.18 of the Manual on Certificate of
Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993), a suspension is “the deferment of
action to allow or disallow in audit a transaction pending compliance with
certain requirements.”
13 Section 21, id. See also Section 16, Manual on Certificates of
Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993).
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VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 319

Clearly, petitioners misinterpreted Section 44.6.4. First,

petitioners were not charged with suspension but
disallowance. Second, the “written explanation” referred to
in said section is “for the purpose of lifting the suspension
or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day
period prior to its conversion into a disallowance,” not for
contesting a disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully assert.
Section 44.6.4., therefore, finds no application in this case.
On the other hand, respondents correctly invoke
Sections 55 and 56 of Commission on Audit Circular No.
85-156-B, which respectively provide:
SECTION 55. REPORTING FRAUD/UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES
If after evaluation of the findings, the auditor is convinced that

the evidence sufficiently discloses the fraud and other unlawful
activities and identifies the perpetrators thereof, he shall prepare
the sworn statements of the examining witnesses and/or other
witnesses and make a report to the Manager/Regional Director
concerned, attaching thereto copies of the pertinent affidavits and
other supporting documents.
SECTION 56. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
If criminal prosecution is warranted, the Regional

Director/Manager concerned with respect to National Government
Agencies/Government Owned or Controlled Corporations or
Provincial/City Auditors with respect to local government units
shall prepare a letter-complaint and file the same with the
Tanodbayan or the local deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor within
ten (10) days from receipt of the report from the examining
auditor, attaching thereto copies of the sworn statements or
affidavits of witnesses and other pertinent documents.
Section 56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to

file a complaint before the Tanodbayan (now the
Ombudsman) when, from the evidence obtained during the
audit, he is convinced that “criminal prosecution is
warranted.” The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the
opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for
re-inspection pending in his office before he institutes such
complaint so long as there are
320

sufficient grounds to support the same. The right to due

process of the respondents to the complaint, insofar as the
criminal aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by
such institution. The respondents will still have the
opportunity to confront the accusations contained in the
complaint during the preliminary investigation. They may
still raise the same defenses contained in their motion to
lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses, in the
preliminary investigation. Should the Provincial Auditor
later reverse himself and grant respondents’ motions, or
should the COA, or this Court, subsequently absolve them
from liability during the pendency of the preliminary
investigation, the respondents may ask the prosecuting
officer to take cognizance of such decision. The prosecuting
officer may then accord such decision its proper weight.
It bears stressing that the exoneration of respondents in
the audit investigation does not mean the automatic
dismissal of the complaint against them. The preliminary
investigation, after all, is independent from the
investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct
from each other. The first involves the determination of the
fact of the commission of a crime; the second relates to the
14
administrative aspect of the expenditure of public funds.
Accordingly, we hold that the Ombudsman did not err in
entertaining the complaint filed by the Provincial Auditor
against petitioners, nor the Sandiganbayan in allowing
trial to proceed, despite the pendency of petitioners’
motions before the auditor.
II
Petitioners argue that their opposition to the disallowance,

supported as it is by a certificate of acceptance and
completion, would betray the absence of the elements of

evident bad faith or negligence, and damage. They likewise
claim that the evidence does not establish conspiracy
among them.
_________________
14 Cf. Ramos vs. Aquino, 39 SCRA 585 (1971).
321
VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 321

The presence or absence of the elements of the crime,

however, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense, the truth of which can 15be best passed upon after a
full-blown trial on the merits. The same applies to the
alleged absence of any conspiracy between the accused.
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent
policy of non-interference in the determination of the
Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause,
provided there
16
is no grave abuse in 17
the exercise of such
discretion. In a recent decision, 18 this Court, quoting
Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, stated the rationale
for this rule:
. . . The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the Court will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that
the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
Petitioners have failed to establish any such abuse on the

part of the Ombudsman.
_______________
15 Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700 (1995); Ocampo III vs.
Sandiganbayan, 236 SCRA 1 (1994).
16 Bienvenido Tan, Jr. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (Third

Division), G.R. No. 128764, 10 July 1998; Rene Knecht and Cristina de
Knecht vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, as Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No.
121916, 26 June 1998; Leonila Garcia-Rueda vs. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et al.,
G.R. No. 118141, 5 September 1997; Camanag vs. Guerrero, 268 SCRA
473 (1997); Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 659 (1996); Olivarez
vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 15.
17 Annie Tan vs. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. Nos. 114332
& 114895, September 10, 1998.
18 228 SCRA 718 (1995).
322

III
Petitioners next question the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan. They contend that Mayor Rodrigo occupies
a position of Grade 24 and is, therefore, beyond the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 19
Before the passage of Republic Act No. 7975 on 30
March 1995, the pertinent20 portions of Section 4 of
Presidential Decree
21
No. 1606, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1861, read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law
is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that
offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried
by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
x x x.
________________
19 Entitled “An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural

Organization of the Sandiganbayan, amending for that Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended.”
20 Entitled “Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special
Court to be known as “Sandiganbayan” and for Other Purposes,”
promulgated 10 December 1978.
21 Entitled “Amending the Pertinent Provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Relative to the Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and for other purposes,” promulgated 23 March 1983.
323
VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 323

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 subsequently redefined the

jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court such that the pertinent
portions of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of

regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade
“27” and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the

sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher

rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as

Grade “27” and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
324

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade
“27” and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials

and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section
in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying

positions corresponding to salary grade “27” or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx
Then Associate, now Chief Justice, Hilario Davide

explained the
22
effects of these amendments in People vs.
Magallanes:
As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan

partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction
23
in cases involving
24
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and
25
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, it
retains only
________________
22 249 SCRA 212 (1995).

23 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
24 Entitled, “An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property
Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceeding Therefor.”
25 Article 210, Direct Bribery; Article 211, Indirect Bribery; and Article 212,
Corruption of Public Officials.
325
VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 325

cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a,

Section 4 above and, generally, national and local officials
classified as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758). Moreover, its
jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer
determined by the prescribed penalty, viz., that which is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of
P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public
officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4
above. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over
civil and criminal
26 27
cases
28
filed pursuant
29
to or in connection with
E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A.
The apparent intendment of these amendments is to ease

the dockets of the Sandiganbayan and to allow the Anti-
Graft Court to focus its efforts on the trial of those
occupying higher positions in government, the proverbial
“big fish.” Section 4, as amended, freed the Sandiganbayan
from the task of trying cases involving lower-ranking
government officials, imposing such duty upon the regular
courts instead. The present structure is also intended to
benefit these officials of lower rank, especially those
residing outside Metro Manila, charged with crimes related
to their office, who can ill-afford the expenses of a trial in
Metro30
Manila. As the Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
9825 states:
___________________
26 Creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government.

27 Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally
Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business
Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees.
28 Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth
of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos,
Members of Their Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close
and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, and Nominees.
29 Amending E.O. No. 14.
30 Introduced by Representatives Garcia (P.), Starke, Damasing,
Apostol, Abueg, Abaya, Sator, Panes and other members of the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice.
326

One is given the impression that only lowly government workers

or the so-called ‘small fry’ are expediently tried and convicted by
the Sandiganbayan. The reason for this is that at present, the
Sandiganbayan has the exclusive and original jurisdiction over
graft cases committed by all officials and employees of the
government, irrespective of rank and position, from the lowest-
paid janitor to the highly-placed government official. This
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan must be modified in such a way
that only those occupying high positions in the government and
the military (the big fishes) may fall under its exclusive and
original jurisdiction. In this wise, the Sandiganbayan can devote
its time to big time cases involving the “big fishes” in the
government. The regular courts will be vested with the
jurisdiction of cases involving less-ranking officials (those
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade twenty-seven
(27) and below and PNP members with a rank lower than Senior
Superintendent. This set-up will prove more convenient to people
in the provinces. They will no longer have to travel to Manila to
file their complaint or to defend themselves. They can already file
their complaint or their defense before the Regional Trial Court or
the Municipal Trial Court in their respective localities, as the case
may be.
To distinguish the “big fish” from the “small fry,” Congress

deemed the 27th Grade as the demarcation between those
who should come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and those within the regular courts.’
(While H.B. No. 9825 originally intended only officials of

Grade 28 and above as within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the resulting law
included officials of Grade 27.) Thus, officials occupying
positions of Grade 27 and above, charged with crimes
referred to in Section 4 a. and b., are within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; those
below come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Although some positions of Grade 27 and above are
stated by name in Section 4 a., the position of Municipal
Mayor is not among them. Nevertheless, Congress provided
a catchall in Section 4 a. (5), thus:
327
VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 327

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27”
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
Such a catchall is necessary, for it would be impractical, if

not impossible, for Congress to list down each position
created or will be created pertaining to Grades 27 and
above.
At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades,
which was prepared by the Department of Budget and 31
Management (DBM) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758,
otherwise known as the “Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989,” lists the following positions
under Salary Grade 27, including the position of
“Municipal Mayor I”:
Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Assistant Regional Cabinet Secretary
Assistant Regional Executive Secretary
Board Member I
Chairman, Police Regional Appellate Board
Chief of Mission, Class II
City Government Department Head III
City Trial Court Judge
Clerk of the Commission
Commission Member I
Court Attorney VI
Court of Appeals Reporter II
Deputy Administrator I
Deputy Commissioner I
Deputy Executive Director III
Deputy Insurance Commissioner
Director III
Executive Clerk of Court II
Executive Director II
Government Corporate Attorney III
Graft Investigation Officer II
_______________
31 An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification

System in the Government and Other Purposes. R.A. No. 6758 went into effect on
July 1, 1989 per Section 23 thereof.
328

Municipal Mayor I
Professor IV
Project Manager III
Prosecutor II
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
Public Attorney IV
Regional Treasurer
Register of Deeds IV
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II
Scientist II
Solicitor II
Special Prosecution Officer II
State Counsel IV
SUC President I
SUC Vice-President III
Earlier, in the 1989 version of the same Index, the

Municipal Mayor was also assigned a Salary Grade of 27. It
appears, therefore, that petitioner Mayor comes within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners, however, claim that at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime on or about 2 September
1992, Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public ranking public
official impleaded in this case, was receiving a monthly
salary of P10,441.00. Such amount is supposedly
equivalent to a fourth step increment in Grade 24 under
the Salary
**
Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No.
6758:
SEC. 7. Salary Schedule.—The Department of Budget and

Management is hereby directed to implement the Salary Schedule
prescribed below:
_______________
** Note, however, the P1.00 discrepancy between petitioner’s alleged

salary and the salary prescribed under the 4th step increment for Grade
24.
329
VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 329

Salary Schedule
Grade 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
xxx
24 10,135 10,236 10,339 10,442 10,646 10,652 10,768 10,866
xxx
Petitioners conclude that Mayor Rodrigo, at the time of the

commission of the alleged crime, was occupying a Grade 24
position and, thus, not within the Sandiganbayan’s original
and exclusive jurisdiction, as defined in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7975.
This is a simplistic, and altogether incorrect,
interpretation of the law.
Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of

compensation of government officials and employees, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for
their positions.
This provision is not unique to the 1987 Constitution. The

1973 Constitution, in Section 6, Article XII thereof,
contains a very similar provision pursuant to which then
President Marcos, in the exercise of32 his legislative powers,
issued Presidential Decree No. 985.
However, with the advent of the new Constitution, and
in compliance therewith, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758.
Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State “to
provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base
differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties
and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the

positions.”
To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional
prescription to “(take) into account the nature of the
responsibili-
________________
32 A Decree Revising the Position Classification and Compensation

Systems in the National Government, and integrating the same.
330

ties pertaining to, and the qualifications required” for the

positions of government officials and employees, Congress
adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for
classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and
qualifications for the purpose of according such positions
similar salaries. This scheme is known as the “Grade,”
defined in P.D. No. 985 as:
Includ[ing] all classes of positions which, although different with

respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently
equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of 33
such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.
The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions “suffi-

ciently equivalent as to level of difficulty and
responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of
the work” so that they may be lumped together in “one
range of basic compensation.”
Thus, Congress, under
34
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, fixed
the Salary Grades of officials holding constitutional
positions, as follows:
SEC. 8. Salaries of Constitutional Officials and their Equivalent.

—Pursuant to Section 17, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the
salary of the following officials shall be in accordance with the
Salary Grades indicated hereunder:
Salary Grade
President of the Philippines 33
Vice-President of the Philippines 32
President of the Senate 32
Speaker of the House of Representatives 32

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 32
________________
33 Section 3h, P.D. No. 985.

34 “Salary Grade” is “the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing
multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class.” (Section 2s, P.D. No. 985.)
331
VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 331

Senator 31
Member of the House of Representatives 31
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court 31
Chairman of a Constitutional Commission under Article IX, 31
1987 Constitution
Member of a Constitutional Commission under Article IX, 30
1987 Constitution
The Department of Budget and Management is hereby

authorized to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to
the foregoing Officials, where applicable, and may be assigned the
same Salary Grades based on the following guidelines:
xxx
As indicated in the aforequoted section, Congress delegated

the rest of this tedious task (of fixing Salary Grades) to the
DBM, subject to the standards contained in R.A. No. 6758,
by authorizing the DBM to “determine the officials who are
of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where
applicable,” and to assign them the same Salary 35
Grades
subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.
_______________
35 GRADE 33—This Grade is assigned to the President of the Republic

of the Philippines as the highest position in the government. No other
position in the government service is considered to be of equivalent rank.
GRADE 32—This Grade is limited to the Vice President of the Republic of
the Philippines and those positions which head the Legislative and
Judicial Branches of the government, namely: the Senate President,
Speaker of the House of Representatives and Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. No other positions in the government service are considered to be of
equivalent rank.
GRADE 31—This Grade is assigned to Senators and members of the

House of Representatives and those with equivalent rank as follows: the
Executive Secretary, Department Secretary, Presidential Spokesman,
Ombudsman, Press Secretary, Presidential Assistant with Cabinet Rank,
Presidential Adviser, National Economic and Development Authority
Director General, Court of Appeals Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice, Secretary of the Senate, Secretary of the House of
Representatives, and President of the University of the Philippines.
An entity with a broad functional scope of operations and wide area of
coverage ranging from top level policy formulation to the provision of
technical and administrative support to the units under it, with functions
comparable to the aforesaid positions in the preceding paragraph, can be
consid-
332

For positions below those mentioned under Section 8,

Section 9 directs the DBM to prepare the “Index of
Occupational Services” guided by 36
(a) the Benchmark
Position prescribed in Section 9, and (b) the following
factors:
___________________
ered organizationally equivalent to a Department, and its head to that

of a Department Secretary.
GRADE 30—Positions included are those of Department
Undersecretary, Cabinet Undersecretary, Presidential Assistant, Solicitor
General, Government Corporate Counsel, Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court, Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice-President, National
Economic and Development Authority Deputy Director General,
Presidential Management Staff Executive Director, Deputy Ombudsman,
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan, Special Prosecutor, University of the Philippines
Executive Vice-President, Mindanao State University President,
Polytechnic University of the Philippines President and President of other
state universities and colleges of the same class.
Heads of councils, commissions, boards and similar entities whose
operations cut across offices or departments or are serving a sizeable
portion of the general public and whose coverage is nationwide or whose
functions are comparable to the aforecited positions in the preceding
paragraph, may be placed at this level.
The equivalent rank of positions not mentioned herein or those that
may be created hereafter shall be determined based on these guidelines.
xxx
36
Benchmark Position Schedule

Position Title Salary Grade
Laborer I 1
Messenger 2
Clerk I 3
Driver I 3
Stenographer I 4
Mechanic I 4
Carpenter II 5
Electrician II 6
Secretary I 7
Bookkeeper 8
Administrative Assistant 8
Education Research Assistant I 9
Cashier I 10
Nurse I 10
Teacher I 10
Agrarian Reform Program Technologist 10
Budget Officer I 11
Chemist I 11
333
VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 333

(1) the education and experience required to perform

the duties and responsibilities of the position;
(2) nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the
completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external
relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment;
and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the
job.
Pursuant to such authority, the DBM drafted the 1989

Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary
Grades, later revised in 1997. In both versions, the position
of Municipal Mayor was assigned a Salary Grade 27.
That petitioner received a salary less than that
prescribed for such Grade is explained by Sections 10 and
19 (b) of R.A. No. 6758, which respectively provide:
SEC. 10. Local Government Units (LGUs).—The rates of pay in

LGUs shall be determined on the basis of the class and financial
capability of each LGU: Provided, That such rates of pay shall not
exceed the following percentages of the rates in the salary
schedule prescribed under Section 7 hereof:
____________________
Agriculturist I 11
Social Welfare Officer I 11
Engineer I 12
Veterinarian I 13
Legal Officer I 14
Administrative Officer II 15
Dentist III 16
Postmaster IV 17
Forester IV 18
Associate Professor I 19
Rural Health Physician 20
334

For Provinces/Cities For Municipalities

Special Cities 100%
1st Class 100% 90%
2nd Class 95% 85%
3rd Class 90% 80%
4th Class 85% 75%
5th Class 80% 70%
6th Class 75% 65%
SEC. 19. Funding Source.—The funding sources for the amounts

necessary to implement this Act shall be as follows:
xxx
(b) For local government units, the amount shall be charged

against their respective funds. Local government units which do
not have adequate or sufficient funds shall only partially
implement the established rates as may be approved by the Joint
Commission under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1188:
Provided, That any partial implementation shall be uniform and
proportionate for all positions in each local government unit:
Provided further, That savings from National Assistance to Local
Government Units (NALGU) funds may be used for this purpose.
x x x. (Italics supplied.)
Thus, a local government official’s actual salary may be

less than what the Salary Schedule under Section 7
prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability
of his or her respective local government unit. This
circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official’s
Grade. As the foregoing discussion shows, an official’s
salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position,
and ultimately by the nature of his position—the level of
requirements of the work. To give credence to petitioners’
argument that Mayor Rodrigo’s salary determines his
Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No.
6758, and ignore the constitutional and statutory policies
behind said law.
Petitioner mayor’s position having been classified as
Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758, and having
been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019, petitioner is
335
VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 335

People vs. Batidor
subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined

by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7975. By virtue of the same Section 4 a., as
amended, his co-accused are also subject to the Anti-Graft
Court’s jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on
28 August 1996 LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (C.J., Chairman), Melo and Pardo, JJ.,

concur.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—Hopefully, the Supreme Court is not being

impertinent if it were to urge COA, in the exercise of its
awesome powers, to act with extreme care and judicious
consideration of all attendant circumstances in order to
ensure that innocent public officials may not have to
undergo the trial and pains that always go with an
indictment for an offense. (Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 302
SCRA 118 [1999])
——o0o——
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9/9/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 303

VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 309

CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A.

Public Officers; Commission on Audit; Audit; Words and

Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigations;

that the Ombudsman did not err in entertaining the complaint

310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

Criminal Procedure; The presence or absence of the elements

Same; Ombudsman; The Supreme Court has maintained a

fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an

Same; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; Public Officers; Salary

VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 311

Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

1989,” lists the following positions under Salary Grade 27,

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The Grade is

difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Salary Grade,” Defined.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Salary; A local government

312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

government official’s actual salary may be less than what the

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are

while petitioner Alejandro A. Facundo is the former

1. Installation of the two (2) units diesel power

VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 313

4. Construction of powerhouse with concrete

On 2 September 1992, Mejica, the Planning and

314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In September 1993, petitioners requested 2

Petitioners thereafter filed before the Sandiganbayan a

2 Annex “A” of Petition, Rollo, p. 39.

VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 315

tuting the complaint against them notwithstanding the

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ALLOWING THE

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS NO JURISDICTION TO

THE ONGOING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE

THE PRECIPITATE SANDIGANBAYAN ORDER OF

The first ground raises two issues: (1) whether petitioners’

discretion in filing the information against petitioners. The

7 Rollo, pp. 20-21. Italics in the original.

VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 317

Petitioners contend that the institution by the Provincial

Sec. 44.6.4. Auditor’s Responsibility re Evaluation of

The aforequoted provision should be read9

(a) charge of suspension which is not satisfactorily explained

8 Id., at 188. Italics in the original.

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between a

10 Section 2k, Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-156-B. Section 3.9

Circular No. 85-156-B, defines disallowance as “the disapproval in audit of

VOL. 303, FEBRUARY 18, 1999 319

Clearly, petitioners misinterpreted Section 44.6.4. First,

SECTION 55. REPORTING FRAUD/UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES

If after evaluation of the findings, the auditor is convinced that

SECTION 56. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION

If criminal prosecution is warranted, the Regional

Section 56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sufficient grounds to support the same. The right to due