MAGALONA VS.

ERMITA

FACTS:

In 1961, Congress passed RA 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 1958, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by RA 5446, correcting some errors in RA 3046 reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that
the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:

1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty
of Paris and ancillary treaties.
2. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-
free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
3. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime
area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the
baseline regime of nearby territories.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital
step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation
of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that
extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its
archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the
resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.

DISCUSSIONS:

The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the
outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as
internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic
doctrine.

NOTE:
Territorial Sea – 12 n. mi.
Contiguous Zone – 24 n. mi.
Exclusive Economic Zone – 200 n. mi.
Continental Shelf – 200 n. mi.
Extended Continental Shelf – 350 n. mi.
ARIGO VS. SWIFT

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia.
On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side
of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in
the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause
and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu,
and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE: Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.

HELD: Yes. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing officialmilitary duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of
the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal
State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity
subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting
from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the
provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention
affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A
foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of
the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep
seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance
of customary international rules on navigation.”
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not
mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with
the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by
its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising
leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate
in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.
PCA Case

CASE DESCRIPTION:

On 22 January 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against the People’s
Republic of China under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the
“Convention”), “with respect to the dispute with China over the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines in the
West Philippine Sea.” On 19 February 2013, China presented a Note Verbale to the Philippines in which it
described “the Position of China on the South China Sea issues,” and rejected and returned the Philippines’
Notification. The Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as Registry in this arbitration.

FACTS:

Three year Process:

This ruling by an arbitral tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, comes after a 3-year process pursued by
Manila but snubbed by Beijing.

The Philippines made the following moves in pursuing the case for the past 3 years:

 Filing a case against China on January 22, 2013

 Submitting a 4,000-page pleading or memorial on March 30, 2014

 Submitting a 3,000-page supplemental memorial on March 17, 2015

 Appearing before the arbitral tribunal in The Hague from July 7-13, 2015, to argue that the
tribunal has the right to hear the Philippines’ case

 Returning to The Hague to discuss the merits of its case against China from November 24-30,
2015

ISSUE: WoN China has a valid claim over the South China Sea

HELD: No. Arbitral Tribunal Key Rulings:

The so-called "9-dash line" is invalid: "The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to
claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the '9-dash line.'"
Reclaimed islands have no exclusive economic zone: "The Tribunal noted that the current presence of
official personnel on many of the features is dependent on outside support and not reflective of the capacity
of the features... (and) ....that none of the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones.

"The Tribunal found that it could – without delimiting a boundary – declare that certain sea areas are within
the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible
entitlement of China."

China has behaved unlawfully: "China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its exclusive
economic zone. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law-enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a
serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels."

Beijing has damaged the environment: China's large-scale land reclamation has "caused severe harm
to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems."

Island building should have stopped during the dispute process: The panel said it had no jurisdiction
over the military standoff at Second Thomas Shoal, where Chinese and Philippine military and law
enforcement vessels are locked in confrontation.

However, "China's recent large-scale reclamation and construction of artificial islands was incompatible
with the obligations on a state during dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as China has... destroyed
evidence of the natural condition of features of the South China Sea that formed part of the Parties' dispute."
EDU VS. ERICTA

ISSUE: Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order 2 is constitutional and valid.

RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the
state." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in
the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.
The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order
No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such
administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing
what was set forth in the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that
local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of
the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether
or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what
job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic
Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety
which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of
the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give
life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse.
His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by
respondent Galo.

PVTA VS. CIR

FACTS:

This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.
1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and
the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.
2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for
certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore
exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

Held: YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has
become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the
present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner
can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private
respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of
governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because
petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was
beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does
not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation
that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has
only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly
be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for
astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot
suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.