ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. VS. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

March 25, 1919

Facts:

Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportation of 170
prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He
claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano
Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being
boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption
that they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao,
had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.

The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the
Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus
to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were
deported to Mindanao against their will.

During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect,
Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing
Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.

Issue: WON the act of the Mayor is valid?

Held:

Government of laws.

"No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but
by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer
to any man either justice or right."

No official, no matter how high, is above the law.

"The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the
only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in
its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations
which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."
KURODA VS. JALANDONI

G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts:

Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Imperial Army and commanding
general of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines from 1943-1944. He is charged before a military
commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed to discharge his duties by permitting his troops to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces. The military
commission was establish under Executive Order 68. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War
Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by
the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947. Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American
lawyers, were appointed prosecutors in behalf of USA.

Kuroda’s arguments were:

(1)EO No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also
our local laws;

(2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed
the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged with “crime” not based on law, national or
international; and

(3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not qualified to
practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the
appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors violates our national sovereignty.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is valid and constitutional.

2. Whether or not rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the law
of the nation even if Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them.

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the
President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution. Article 2 of our Constitution
provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague
Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN,
including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of
aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war.
2. Rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based
on the generally accepted principals of international law. They form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution
has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition
of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may
have been or shall be a signatory. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and
Japan)
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge
Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the
Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine
government under the Japanese).

Issue: Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the American occupation?

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are
good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving
their authority from the laws of war.

Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and
war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of
the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with
a proclamation abrogating them.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III

(Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007)

Facts:

- Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue
of the legislative powers granted to her under the Freedom Constitution.
(1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA (World Health
Assembly) in 1981.
- In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the
instrument mandates that States should take measure to diminish infant mortality and should ensure
that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
- From 1982 – 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are
not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
- May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O.
51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR imposes a ban on
all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes
- June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction.
- August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO, enjoining the respondents from
implementing the assailed RIRR.
- Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC thereby amending and expanding
the coverage of the said law.
- DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various international
instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said international
instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the DOH in
the RIRR.

Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?

Sub-issue(s): W/n pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of
the land and may thus be implemented through an RIRR, if so, is the RIRR in accord with such international
agreements?

Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in turn is based
on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions however cannot
be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.

Ratio:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of domestic law in 2 ways:
(1) Transformation – an international law is transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation
 Treaties become part of law of the land through this method, pursuant to Art 7, Sec 21 – wherein
“no treaty or international agreement shall be valid..unless concurred by at least 2/3 of Senate”
 The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they haven’t been concurred in by the
required 2/3 vote.
  HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic law through local legislation that is
TMC.
 Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force of law but it’s TMC.
o While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, it did not adopt the latter’s
provision on the absolute prohibition on advertising of products within the scope of the
ICMBS. Instead the MC provides that advertising promotion or other marketing materials
may be allowed if such materials are approved by a committee.

(2) Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law
 This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The Philippines… adopts generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land

 In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary rules accepted as binding as a result
of two elements:
1.) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of the state
2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity.

 Generally accepted principles of international law refer to norms of general or customary

international law which are binding on all states, valid through all kinds of human societies,
and basic to legal systems generally

 Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary international law has two factors:
1.) Material factor – how states behave
 The consistency and the generality of the practice

2.) Psychological or subjective factor – why they behave the way they do
 Once state practice has been established, now determine why they behave they do. Is it
ouor of courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain type of behavior is obligatory)

 When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of customary international law which is then
incorporated into our domestic system

Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation, have they attained the status
of customary law and hence part of our law of the land?

- The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies of the UN.
- According to the WHO Constitution, it’s the WHA which determines the policies of the WHO, the
former also has the power to “adopt regulations concerning advertising and labeling of pharmaceutical
and similar products” and “to make recommendations to members on any matter within the
Organization’s competence”

- Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to recommendation is quite different
(1) Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on member states
(2) On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for its members unlike
regulations. Rather, they carry moral and political weight as they constitute the judgment on a health
issue of the collective membership of the highest body in the field of health.

- The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the subsequent WHA resolutions urging states to
implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.
- Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC through legislative enactment, the subsequent
WHA Resolutions, which provide for exclusive breastfeeding and prohibition on advertisements and
promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law.
- WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, which influence
state behavior. Soft law has been noted to be a rapid means of norm creation, in order to reflect and
respond to the changing needs and demands of constituents (of the UN.)
- As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered customary law, it must be
established that such rule is followed by states because it is considered obligatory (opinio juris).
- In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions
are in fact enforced or practice by member states. Further, they failed to establish that provisions of
pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of law of the
land.
- Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the WHA resolutions into domestic law. They cannot thus
be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law to be enacted by legislature.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

101 PHIL 155

Facts: The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business,
Republic Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” prohibiting aliens in general to
engage in retail trade in our country.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of RA No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that
said Act is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human
Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.

Held: The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality
of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. But the
nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of
the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in
the retail trade.

But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification
or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police
power of the State.
GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA

FACTS:

During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with
Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence,
the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from
abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and
corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status
of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance
of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one
which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits,
but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties.

No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances
which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an executive or an
international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law
or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”.
In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
IN RE: GARCIA

Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born
in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato
Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the
Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en
derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the
provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain,
he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations.

Issue:
Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?

Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition.

Ratio Decidendi:
The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain
cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice
thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines.
Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the
laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to
practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly
subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the
legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to modify
the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that
the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION,
GR 139465 (Jan. 18, 2000)

FACTS:

Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of Conspiracy to Commit Offense,
Attempt to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television, False Statement, and Election Contribution in
Name of Another.

During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the petitioner,
Secretary of Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the U.S. government, that he
be given ample time to comment regarding the extradition request against him after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers, and to suspend the proceeding in the meantime.

The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the RP – US Extradition
Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the U.S. in any
proceedings arising from an extradition request.

The private respondent filed with the RTC against the petitioner Hon. Ralph Lantion (presiding judge RTC
Manila Branch 25) a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the petitioner, the Secretary of
DFA, and NBI from performing any acts directed to the extradition of the respondent, for it will be a
deprivation of his rights to due process of notice and hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the basic rights of due process over
the government’s duties under a treaty?

RULING:

Yes. According to the principle of “Pacta Sunt Servanda”, parties to a treaty should keep their agreements
to good faith. However, Sec. 2 of Art. 2 of the Constitution (incorporation clause) provides that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land”.

Incorporation clause is applied when there is a conflict between the international law and local/municipal
law. However, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal court.

The fact that the international law has been made part of the law of the land does not imply the primacy
of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Rules of international law are
given an equal standing with, but not superior to, the national legislative enactment. The principle of “Lex
Posterior Derogat Priori” clarifies that a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. And
the Republic of the Philippines considers its Constitution as the highest law of the land, therefore, both
statutes and treaty may be invalidated if they are conflict with the constitution.
LIM VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 151445

Facts:
In the beginning of 2002, the personnel of Armed Forces of the United States started to arrive in
the Philippines which will participate in the Balikatan 02-1 pursuant to the VFA (Visitig Forces
Agreement) signed in 1999. The Balikatan 02-1 is a simulation of joint military maneuvers or
exercises of Filipino and American which was pursuant to MDT (Mutual Defense Treaty) a
bilateral agreement entered into by the Philippine Government and United States Government
in 1951. The entry of the American troops in the Philippines is partly rooted from the campaign
of US President George W. Bush against international terrorism as a result of terrorist attacks in
United States which was the cause of numerous loss of lives.
The petitioners, Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando, as citizens, lawyers, and taxpayers, filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition and attacking the constitutionality of Balikatan 02-1 or
the joint exercise. Subsequently, they were joined by SANLAKAS and Partido ng Manggagawa by
filing a petition-in-intervention, the claimed that some of their members were situated in the
places were the exercise are being conducted.
However the Solicitor General, claimed that there were lack of locus standi, does not invlve tax
spending, and there is no proof of direct personal injury.

Issue:
WON the Balikatan02-1 is covered by the VFA.
WON the VFA is constitutional.

Held:
The VFA permits the US personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact
meaning of which was undefined. The permit under VFA grants US personnel a wide scope of
undertaking subject only to approval of the Philippine Government. In general US personnel must
abstain from any activities inconsistent with the agreement, and in particular, from an political
activities. All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
In aid of the case at bar, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 and 32 which
contains the provisions governing the interpretation of international agreements. The cardinal
rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presume to verbalise the
intentions of the parties.
The word activities in the view of the court it was deliberately made that way to give both parties
a leeway for negotiations. In this manner, the US forces may sojourn in the territory of the
Philippines for purposes other than military. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to
the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1, a mutual anti-
terrorism, advising, assisting and training exercise falls under the context of the agreement.
From the facts obtaining, the court find that the Balikatan 02-1 joint military exercises has not
intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for correction on the part of the
court. The respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Wherefore, the petition and petition-in-intervention are hereby dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper regional trial
court.
ALIH VS. CASTRO CASE DIGEST
151 SCRA 279
June 23, 1987

Facts:

A group of more than 200 Philippine marines and home defense forces raided the compound occupied by
the petitioners (Rizal Alih et. al.) is search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The people
inside the compound resisted the invasion and a crossfire between the Philippine marines and the petitioner
occurred, resulting in number of casualties. The petitioners surrendered the next morning and 16 occupants
were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military
also inventoried and confiscated several M16 rifles, M14 rifle, rifle grenades and rounds of ammunition.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order.
Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence
against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing being violative of
their right against self-incrimination. Petitioner argued that the arms and ammunition were taken without a
search warrant as required by law under Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, and it be declared inadmissible in
relation to Sec 4 (2) of the 1973 Constitution.

Respondent justified their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders and that the
measures was necessary due to the aggravation of peace and order problem in their place.

Issue:

Whether or not the confiscated items shall be considered admissible.

Whether or not the finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-test is protected by the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

Ruling:

No, superior orders cannot countermand the Constitution. There is no excuse for the constitutional shortcuts
done by the military. Also, the aggravation of peace and order problem in their place does not excuse the
non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure (Art III Sec. 2,
1973 Philippine Constitution).

The arrest does not fall also under the warrantless arrest provided for by Rule 113 Sec. 5 of the Rules of
Court. Therefore, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in
evidence in any proceedings against petitioners.

With respect to the finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing, the acts are not covered by the
protection against self-incrimination, for it only applies to testimonial compulsion.
GR NO. 45892 JULY 13, 1938

People Vs Lagman

Facts:

In these two cases, the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo De Sosa are charged with a violation
of Sec 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 11 known as the “National Defense Law”. It is alleged that these two
appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully
refused to register in the military service, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so.
Evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear
before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the
said appellants inspite of these notices have not registered up to date of filing of the information.

The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the
military service because Primitivo De Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to
support and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support and has no military leaning and does not wish
to kill or be killed.

Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of
imprisonment with the costs.

Issue:

Whether or not appellants failure to register in the Military service in violation of Sec 60 of Commonwealth
Act Nr. 1 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Sec 4 Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:

“Sec. 4The prime duty of the government is to serve ad protect the people. The government may call upon
the people to defend the State and in fulfillment thereof, all citizen may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military services does not go against this
Constitutional provision, but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the state cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization
of an army to the will of the citizen would be to make the duty of the government excusable should there
be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

The right of the government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of it duty to defend the
state and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty and property of the citizen.

In Jacobson and Massachussets, it was said that a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against
his will, against his pecuniary interest and against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in
the ranks of the army of his country and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.

The circumstances that the appellant have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their
duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can
ask for deferment in complying with their duty and at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary
allowance to attend to those responsibilities.

Judgment Affirmed.
CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO
G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004

Facts:
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the “Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence” (Guidelines) issued by
respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the
DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus,
he filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo,
as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.

Issues:
1. whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;
2. whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?;

Ruling:
1. Authority of the PNP Chief

It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary.
Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.

The power to make laws – the legislative power – is vested in Congress. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that “delegata potestas non potest delegari” –
“delegated power may not be delegated.”

The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible.
It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body
to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils,
commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the
power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.

Act No. 1780 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to approve or
disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for
personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time.
Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper
enforcement of the Act.

By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently,
the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latter’s
licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses
for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the
PNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions” on such “matters as may
be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties” of the PNP.

2. Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the
Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of
the State’s police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations,
necessary to the common good and general welfare.

The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace
and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the
New People’s Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo
deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of
the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive.
In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What
they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish
to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.
Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes.
With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns.
On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Aglipay v. Ruiz (64 Phil 201, 1937)

Facts:

Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of Philippine Independent Church filed a case against Director of
Posts, prohibiting him from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33 rd International
Eucharistic Congress (of the RCC). He assailed that this act is violative of Art VI Sec 23(3) of the then 1935
Constitution (now Art VI Sec 29(2) of 1987 Constitution) – violative of provision against appropriating
public funds or property for the support of any sect or religious institution (among others). Act No. 4502
appropriated 62k for Director of Posts, giving him discretion to issue postage stamps that would be
“advantageous to the Government”.

ISSUE: WoN the issuance of the stamps violated the constitutional prohibition that no public fund or
property shall be appropriated for the support of any sect or religious institution.

HELD: Issuance is not unconstitutional.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous
to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money
or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however,
the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and
sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936,
incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned
merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people". It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed,
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and
the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital
of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps
in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply
because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which
could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated
by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated.
Garces vs. Estenzo

FACTS:

Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed. These resolutions

have been ratified by 272 voters, and projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the

altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused

to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church funds were used

in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case

against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a

representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.

The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and

Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation in the freedom of religion stated in the Constitution

HELD:

No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image,
therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to
give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution , since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.

EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF EWING TP., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)

Appeal from the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey.
Justice Black
Doctrine: The establishment Clause does not prevent a State from extending the benefits of state
laws to all citizens without regard for their religious affiliation and does not prohibit tax raised
funds to form part of a general program under which students from both public and private parochial
schools may benefit
Facts:
 A New Jersey statute authorizes its local school districts to make rules and contracts for the
transportation of children to and from schools. The appellee, a township board of education, acting
pursuant to this statute authorized reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for the
bus transportation of their children on regular busses operated by the public transportation system.
Part of this money was for the payment of transportation of some children in the community to
Catholic parochial schools.
 The appellant, in his capacity as a district taxpayer, filed suit in a State court challenging the right
of the Board to reimburse parents of parochial school students
 State court held that the legislature was without power to authorize such payment under the State
constitution. The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed, holding that neither the statute
nor the resolution passed pursuant to it was in conflict with the State constitution or the provisions
of the Federal Constitution in issue.

ISSUES and JUDGMENTS

1. Whether or not the New Jersey statute providing free bus fares for students from any type of
school violates the Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause)? NO

Contention: The statute authorizes the State to take by taxation the private property of some and bestow
it upon others, to be used for their own private purposes.

 This argument, if valid, would apply equally to prohibit state payment for the transportation of
children to any non- public school, whether operated by a church, or any other nongovernment
individual or group. But, the New Jersey legislature has decided that a public purpose will be served
by using tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of all school children, including those who attend
parochial schools.
 The fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal desires of the
individuals most directly affected is certainly an inadequate reason for us to say that a legislature
has erroneously appraised the public need.

2. Whether or not such statute is contrary to the prohibition embodied in the First Amendment
(Non-establishment clause)? NO

Contention: The statute and the resolution forced inhabitants to pay taxes to help support and maintain
schools which are dedicated to, and which regularly teach, the Catholic Faith. This is alleged to be a
use of State power to support church schools. The New Jersey statute is challenged as a 'law respecting
an establishment of religion.'
 History: A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws whic
compelled them to support and attend government favored churches. Dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes
support government-sponsored churches whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen an
consolidate the established faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters. It reached its dramatic climax in Virgin
in 1785-86 when the Virginia legislative body was about to renew Virginia's tax levy for the support of the established churc
Madison and Jefferson led the fight against this tax
Madison : a true religion did not need the support of law; that no person, either believer or non-believer, should be taxed
support a religious institution of any kind
Jefferson: to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinf
and tyrannical
 Non-establishment clause: State 'shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.'
 The Fourteenth Amendment did not strip the states of their power to meet problems previously left
for individual solution
 There was difficulty in drawing the line between tax legislation which provides funds for the
welfare of the general public and that which is designed to support institutions which teach
religion.
 The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever from they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
 In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
'a wall of separation between Church and State.'
 The amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their
own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith,
because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.
 The First Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them

The decision of the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, holding that neither the statute nor the
resolution passed pursuant to it was in conflict with the State constitution or the provisions of the Federal
Constitution in issue is AFFIRMED

WIKEPEDIA
Summary: After repealing a former ban, a New Jersey law authorized payment by local school boards
of the costs of transportation to and from schools - including private schools. Of the private schools that
benefited from this policy, 96% were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing
Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion through the mechanism of reimbursing
parents and students for costs incurred as a result of attending religious schools violated both the New
Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After a loss in the New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals, then the state's highest court, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal
constitutional grounds. The US SC affirmed the appealed decision (5-4 decision).
Engel vs. Vitale

Facts

A New York State law required public schools to open each day with the Pledge of Allegiance and a
nondenominational prayer in which the students recognized their dependence upon God. The law allowed
students to absent themselves from this activity if they found it objectionable. A parent sued on behalf of
his child, arguing that the law violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue: Whether school-sponsored nondenominational prayer in public schools violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.

Ruling

Yes (8-1)

Reasoning

The majority, via Justice Black, held that school-sponsored prayer violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. The majority stated that the provision allowing students to absent themselves from this
activity did not make the law constitutional because the purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent
government interference with religion. The majority noted that religion is very important to a vast majority
of the American people. Since Americans adhere to a wide variety of beliefs, it is not appropriate for the
government to endorse any particular belief system. The majority noted that wars, persecutions, and other
destructive measures often arose in the past when the government involved itself in religious affairs.

Concurrence

Justice Douglas

In his concurrence, Justice Douglas took an even broader view of the Establishment Clause, arguing that
any type of public promotion of religion, including giving financial aid to religious schools, violates the
Establishment Clause.

Dissent

Justice Stewart

Justice Stewart argued in his dissent that the Establishment Clause was only meant to prohibit the
establishment of a state-sponsored church, such as the Church of England, and not prohibit all types of
government insolvent with religion. In particular, he found that the nondenominational nature of the prayer
and the "absentee" provision removed constitutional challenges.
Islamic Di’wah

Facts:

Petitioner Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. is is a non-governmental

organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
Respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 which designated respondent OMA
(Office on Muslim Affairs) the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other
related regulatory activities resulting to the lost revenues on the part of the petitioner. Petitioner
assails the constitutionality of EO 46 first on the provision on the Separation of Church and State.
It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, the subject EO
was issued with utter haste and without even consulting Muslim people's organizations like
petitioner before it became effective.

Issue: Whether or not EO 46 violates the principle of separation of Church and State?

Ruling: Yes. OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the
integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their
beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." Furthermore, OMA does not intrude into purely
religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion"
provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Classifying a food product as halal
is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs.
By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims
what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

Accordingly, only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. But in the case at bar,
we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim organizations, like herein
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health
of muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue
halal certifications.
Bayan vs. Zamora

Facts:

The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements
of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. Pres. Joseph
Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action: Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision
cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty, b) it must be duly concurred in by the
senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required
by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state. Respondents, on the other hand,
argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and
effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

Issue: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?

Held: Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops
or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose
of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate. The
Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section 25,
Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty
Calalang vs. Williams

Facts:

Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a
writ of prohibition against the respondents.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending
from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530
pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from
7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director
of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed
in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The
Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10, 1940.

The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be
enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass
and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.

Issue:

1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom
of locomotion?

2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people?

Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail
over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.

2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
est suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence

among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”

THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

Almeda Vs.Court of Appeals, G.R. 113412, April17,1996

Doctrine: LIFTING OF USURY CEILING; DOES NOT GRANT BANKS CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY
TO RAISE INTEREST; RULE UNDER CB CIRCULAR 905. - While the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates
was lifted by C.B. Circular 905, nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting respondent
bank carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave its borrowers or
lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. Borrowing represents a transfusion of capital from lending
institutions to industries and businesses in order to stimulate growth. This would not, obviously, be the effect
of PNB’s unilateral and lopsided policy regarding the interest rates of petitioners’ borrowings in the instant
case.

Facts: Between 1981 and 1984, petitioners made several partial payments on the loan totaling
P7,735,004.66, a substantial portion of which was applied to accrued interest. On March 31, 1984,
respondent bank, over petitioners’ protestations, raised the interest rate to 28%, allegedly pursuant to
Section III-c (1) of its credit agreement. Said interest rate thereupon increased from an initial 21% to a high
of 68% between March of 1984 to September, 1986.
Petitioners protested the increase in interest rates, to no avail. Before the loan was to mature in March,
1988, the spouses filed on February 6, 1988 a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as
Civil Case No. 18872. In said petition, which was raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Ignacio Capulong,
the spouses sought clarification as to whether or not the PNB could unilaterally raise interest rates on the
loan, pursuant to the credit agreement’s escalation clause, and in relation to Central Bank Circular No. 905.
As a preliminary measure, the lower court, on March 3, 1988, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the Philippine National Bank from enforcing an interest rate above the 21% stipulated in the credit
agreement. By this time the spouses were already in default of their loan obligations.
Invoking the Law on Mandatory Foreclosure (Act 3135, as amended and P.D. 385), the PNB countered
by ordering the extrajudicial foreclosure of petitioners’ mortgaged properties and scheduled an auction sale
for March 14, 1989. Upon motion by petitioners, however, the lower court, on April 5, 1989, granted a
supplemental writ of preliminary injunction, staying the public auction of the mortgaged property.

Issue/s: 1) Whether or not respondent bank was authorized to raise its interest rates from 21% to as high
as 68% under the credit agreement; and 2) Whether or not respondent bank is granted the authority to
foreclose the Marvin Plaza under the mandatory foreclosure provisions of P.D. 385.

Held: We cannot, at this point, conclude that respondent DBP together with the Bancom people actually
misappropriated and misspent the $5million loan in whole or in part although the trial court found that there
is ‘persuasive’ evidence that such acts were committed by the respondent. This matter should rightfully be
litigated below in the main action. Pending the outcome of such litigation, P.D. 385 cannot automatically be
applied for if it is really proven that respondent DBP is responsible for the misappropriation of the loan, even
if only in part, then the foreclosure of the petitioner’s properties under the provisions of P.D. 385 to satisfy
the whole amount of the loan would be a gross mistake. It would unduly prejudice the petitioner, its
employees and their families.

Furthermore, petitioners made a valid consignation of what they, in good faith and in compliance with
the letter of the Credit Agreement, honestly believed to be the real amount of their remaining obligations
with the respondent bank. The latter could not therefore claim that there was no honest-to-goodness
attempt on the part of the spouses to settle their obligations. Respondent bank’s rush to inequitably invoke
the foreclosure provisions of P.D. 385 through its legal machinations in the courts below, in spite of the
unsettled differences in interpretation of the credit agreement was obviously made in bad faith, to gain the
upper hand over petitioners.
 In the face of the unequivocal interest rate provisions in the credit agreement and in the law requiring
the parties to agree to changes in the interest rate in writing, we hold that the unilateral and progressive
increases imposed by respondent PNB were null and void. Their effect was to increase the total obligation
on an eighteen million peso loan to an amount way over three times that which was originally granted to
the borrowers. That these increases, occasioned by crafty manipulations in the interest rates is
unconscionable and neutralizes the salutary policies of extending loans to spur business cannot be
disputed.
Estrella Ondoy vs. Virgilio Ignacio

Art II Sec 10 of the Constitution of the Philippines : The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
Facts:

Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According to the chief
engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the workforce. He was invited by friends
to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. Therefore, Estrella was asking for
compensation from the death of her son while in the respondent’s employ. However, the statement given
by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and therefore dismissed the claim for
lack of merit. Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was also denied by the Secretary of
Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is social justice applicable
in this case?

Ruling:

Yes.

Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It merely disregarded
the statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of social justice applied in
this case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court recognized the right of the petitioner to the
claim of compensation because her son was shown to have died while “in the actual performance of his
work.” To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, The Court quoted
another case “as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources
to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the stricter
compliance.”
Summary: Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights (GR 100150, 5 January
1994)
Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights
[GR 100150, 5 January 1994]
En Banc, Vitug (J): 12 concur

Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an Executive Officer
of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to,
and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and members of the North Edsa Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al. were given a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July 1990)
within which to vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo, et. al.
were informed by Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July
1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang
Salaysay) with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon, Carlos Quimpo, Carlito
Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing
Simon, et. al. "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR. On
the basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular
inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al. carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia, the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial
assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light housing materials and food
under the Commission's supervision and again directed Simon, et. al. to "desist from further demolition, with the
warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." A motion to dismiss, dated
10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12 September 1990 hearing, Simon, et. al. moved
for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved, and
likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the
CHR cited Simon, et. al. in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia
despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR
issued an Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss. In an Order,
dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al. filed the petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, questioning the extent of the authority
and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be prohibited from further hearing and investigating CHR Case
90 —1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

Issue: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the “order to desist” against the demolition of Fermo, et. al.’s
stalls, and to cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the CHR order.

Held: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human
Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations; such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and
hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been
meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within
the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil that what are
sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by
Fermo, at. al. on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins
the North EDSA of Quezon City which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which
is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its is not, in fact, extant.
Be that as it may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining herein, the Court not prepared
to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of Fermo, et. al. can fall
within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only
to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like,
in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) herein,
however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. As
held in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, "The constitutional provision
directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to
issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly
said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication. Evidently,
the 'preventive measures and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the action is pending
[within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of preliminary injunction
is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the
rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

The early nineteen twenties marked the height of the American dream. The population, in particular
the middle class, made their dreams of a house with a white picket fence, a reality. The economy was
flourishing as a direct result of the stock market boom. The resent economic upturn created national
stability and most people’s trust in the United States governing in terms of finical stability; however, World
War Two had just concluded which made some people skeptical of foreigners. The sense of nationalism
was also at a high. The nation possessed gilded age Supreme Court justices. In the year 1923 the court
was head by Chief Justice, William Howard Taft.

On May 25, 1920 Robert T. Meyer, an instructor (teacher) at Zion Parochial School taught Raymond
Parpart, a ten year old boy, how to read in the language of German. This violated a State of Nebraska law
that had been on the books since April 9, 1919. This law stated, “

"Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational, parochial

or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language than the English language.

Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only after a pupil
shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of
graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which the child resides.

Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars
($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or be confined in the county jail for any period
not exceeding thirty days for each offense.

Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its passage and
approval.”[i]

Meyer had unlawfully instructed a student, in a language other than English (German), who had not yet,
“attained and successfully passed the eighth grade.”[ii] Since this law was on was in effect, and the events
took place in the State of Nebraska the plaintiff, Meyer was tried and then convicted in Hamilton County,
Nebraska’s district court.

Meyer appealed the decision of the district court of Hamilton County, Nebraska to the supreme
court. The question at hand being, “Does the Nebraska statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process clause?”[iii] The Due Process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment in question states, “No
state…shall deprive any person of life liberty or property without due process of law.”[iv] This was an
argument never before presented to the Supreme Court.

The case identified the justification upon creating the legislation. The State of Nebraska created
this piece of legislation because the lawmakers of Nebraska had witnessed, “baneful effects of permitting
foreigners, who had taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their children in the language of
their native land. The result of that condition was found to be inimical to our own safety.”[v] The state felt
it was safer to restrict any teaching to foreigners children by not allowing the learning of any langue other
than English until such time (after the completion of eighth grade) that, “it became a part of them.”[vi] This
is part of the argument that the Supreme court of Nebraska vocalized to conclude the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment unbroken and concluded it was rather “a valid exercise in police power.”

An additional aspect of this law that the plaintiff’s side used in the argument was that the legislation
excluded the teachings of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew because they are, “the so-called ancient or dead
languages'” and therefore “are not 'within the spirit or the purpose of the act.” However, “German, French,
Spanish, Italian, and every other alien speech are within the ban.”[vii]

It could not be concluded that the knowledge of German couldn’t be considered harmful. The Court
also vocalized, “It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction, in that it applies to all citizens of
the state and arbitrarily interferes with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign ancestry, and prevents
them, without reason, from having their children taught foreign languages in school. That argument is not
well taken, for it assumes that every citizen finds himself restrained by the statute.”[viii]

The Supreme court identified that they had not attempted to clarify the precise independences guarantee
in the word “liberty” stated in the Fourteenth amendment but did take several into account. These several
rights defined in the meaning included, “it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”8 In implying the meaning of the “liberty” included in the
Fourteenth amendment the Supreme Court pronounced the ability of the lawmakers of Nebraska to decide,
“what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by
the courts...“ It was decided that proper state objectives were not related to state regulations of liberty in an
adequate manor. For these reasons the Supreme Court ruled the law unconstitutional and stated, “The
judgment of the court belo must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.”[ix] In conclusion the law was reversed.
This Supreme Court decisions was immensely important, for it set the precedent for foreign
languages taught in a school setting. This determination also created a foundation for foreign language
controversy and requirements in years to follow.

This decision was well justified by the way the Due Process clause of the Fourteen amendments
articulates. Also specifically by the way the supreme court interpreted by the word “liberty”. This argument
and law created and enforced by the state of Nebraska also has little justification when you acknowledge
the United States of America is inhabited by immigrants or ancestors who were immigrants.
Pierce vs. Society of Sisters

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary restraining order
prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send their
children to public school. Appellants appealed the order.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or guardian’s right
to decide the mode in which their children are educated. State’s may not usurp this right when the
questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.

Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies
or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college
preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from
enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children
between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary
restraining orders.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control?

Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has
no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees’
schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty
to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th
Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their
children are educated.
 MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee

vs.

FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant

(58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974)

Facts:

Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiary and
authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority. The lower court
decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate
provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the child’s welfare. The defendant appealed for the
case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He
is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.

Issue:

Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an
insurance policy from the deceased.

Ruling:

With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs
against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that “the father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has
acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership,
and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he
lives.”

With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of
maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is
supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the
judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae
is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the
legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional
provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If,
as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit
of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate
would have led the lower court to decide as it did.

The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In
order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond
in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total
amount of P5,000.00."
PEOPLE vs. RITTER
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-appellant: Heinrich Stefan Ritter

FACTS

On or about October 10, 1986, accused Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside
his hotel room in Olongapo City. Inside the hotel room, the accused told them to take a bath. When Rosario
came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by the accused and to join him in bed. At
that time, Jessie was already asleep but Rosario touched him to call his attention. When he looked, he saw
the accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate but it would
not fit. The following morning the accused left after paying the children. Rosario then told Jessie that the
accused inserted something in her vagina. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked
her whether the object was already removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie
claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her
vagina and when he asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed.

Seven months later, Rosario was brought to the hospital with bloodied skirt, unconscious and foul
smelling. After 6 days, Rosario got serious and was pronounced dead subsequent to her operation with a
portion of a sexual vibrator extracted from her vagina.

A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter. The Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
rendered a decision declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing the rationale of Art 4 of the Revised
Penal “He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. The Supreme Court however,
reversed the judgment of the lower court and acquitted Ritter.

ISSUE

Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability

RULING

It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not
criminally liable may still be civilly liable. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla
v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house. Circumstances
forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who
have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as
reflected in the records of the case. Though the SC is acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide, it emphasizes that it is not ruling that he is innocent or blameless.

It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an
airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier
stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal
canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death. The Court cannot convict on probabilities or
possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the
payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.

The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public
policy (Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing
them with money. The Court cannot overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the
Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the
appellant should not and cannot be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, the Court
awarded damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.

The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER
is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00
by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot.
Department of Education vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
Fundamental Principles and State Policies: Rearing of the Youth

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its
rule that- A student shall be allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT. After 3 successive failures, a student
shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on
constitutional grounds.

Facts: Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology. The
petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it
again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of
Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and
quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT
scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave
of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the
above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process and
equal protection.

Held: No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission
to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education.

Ratio:

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor.
This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer
the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to
it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is
certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent
unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical
profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at
least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the
appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the
sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of
square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should
have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took
decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for
which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped
with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because
we are a nation of misfits.
 Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge Case Digest™
Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191, March 21, 1978

Facts:
On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas
corpus, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the preliminary examination which led to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of
Mariveles, Bataan, (1) failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether
there was a probable cause. (2) He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted
the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. (3) It was in
the amount of P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner.

As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978.
Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the
excessive character of the bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond
Guide issued by the Executive Judge in Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P8,000.00.

Issue:
Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was
constitutionally deficient?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court declared that the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of
this Court of March 15, 1978.

The Court issued the following Resolution:

“Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant
to section 191of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old minor, to order the release of
the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his
Counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice
to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law.” This Court
should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code.

Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive.
IMBONG VS. OCHOA

KEY TAKE-AWAY: The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and enhancement of existing
reproductive laws. It seeks to enhance the population control program of the government in order to
promote public welfare. However, when coercive measures are found within the law, provisions must be
removed or altered in order to ensure that it does not defy the Constitution by infringing on the rights of the
people.

PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.

CONSOLIDATION OF 14 CASES NAMELY:

DATE/GR PETITIONER RESPONDENT

NO/SCRA

April 8, 2014, James M. Imbong Lovely-Ann C.
G.R. No. Imbong, for themselves and in behalf of
204819 their minor children, Lu Cia Carlos
Imbong and Bernadette Carlos Imbong
and Magnificat Child Development
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution
Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Executive
Secretary; Hon. Florencio B. Abad,
Secretary, Department Of Budget And
Management; Hon. Enrique T. Ona,
Secretary, Department Of Health; Hon.
Armin A. Luistro, Secretary, Department Of
Education, Culture And Sports; and Hon.
Manuela. Roxas II, Secretary, Department
Of Interior and Local Government

GR. No. ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
204934 FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
[ALFI], represented by its President,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro,
Department of Education, Culture and
Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN,
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare
C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. &
and Development, HON. MANUELA.
Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista,
and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F
B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol
and Management, HON. ARSENIO M.
Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and
BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning
on behalf of their minor children,
Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
Therese Antonette C. Tansingco,
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN,
Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel
represented by its Chairperson, Remedios
Femando C. Tangsingco, Carlo
lgnacioRikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH
Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo
INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented
C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V.
by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE
Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE
themselves and on behalf of their minor
 children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta &
Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses
Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor
for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor,
Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C.
Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses
Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho
for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children Margarita Racho,
Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari
Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses
Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho
for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children Michael Racho, Mariana
Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho,
Chessie Racho & Laura Racho,
Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy
M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor
children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian
Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro,
Emily R. Laws, Joseph R. Laws &
Katrina R. Laws
GR No. TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE
204957 VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA,
GR No. SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO
204988 CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor
B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in
his personal capacity, ROSEVALE
FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member
of the school board and in his personal
capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON,
IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP.
NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC,
EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and
MARLON I. YAP,
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Donato Marcos,
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Education; and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local
Government
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents
GR No. EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR.,
205003
GR No. EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE
205043 CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE
APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GR No. PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF
205138 XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein
represented by its National President,
Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo, and in his own
behalf, Atty. Lino
E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte,
Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z.
Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo,
Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal,
Michael Eugenio 0. Plana, Bienvenido
C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and
Baldomero Falcone,
GR No. REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D.,
205478 JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D.,
CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND
JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO,
M.D.,
collectively known as Doctors For Life,
and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL
ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE,
CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO,
and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively
known as Filipinos For Life,
GR No. SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD
205491 AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA
F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA,
FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J.
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social
Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO
BALISACAN, Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority,
HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, DirectorGeneral,
Food and Drugs Administration, THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine
Commission on Women,
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health;
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local
Government,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
of the Republic of the Philippines,
 Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
posterity
GR No. PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES
205720 FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by
Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director,
and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN
B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES,
ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I.
GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES,
RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON
CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L.
POLICARPIO III,
GR No. MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION,
206355 INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA,
ATTY. CITA BORROMEOGARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI
CATALUNA CAUSING
GR No. JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M.
207111 IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B.
LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q.
VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R.
ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO,
GR No. COUPLES FOR CHRIST
207172 FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN
CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-
SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS
FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO.
GR No. ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and
207563 ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health, and
 HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management

FACTS
 Petition: to declare provisions of Republic Act No. 10354 as unconstitutional
 Factual Antecedents
 December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No. 10354 also known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH LAW)
 The president’s imprimatur and support for the said law lead to a range of petitions against the
law leading to iuris controversy in court. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were placed by
numerous parties. All in all, 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention were filed.
 March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement of the law took place
 March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues and arguments raised, the court issued Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which lead to a 120 day halt on the implementation of the legislation
 Due to further arguments and debates from opposing parties, the SQAO was extended until
further orders of the court last July 16, 2013
 Statute Involved:
 Republic Act 10354, “The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012”
 Position of Petitioner:
o Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA 10354 are unconstitutional as they violate the
rights to life, to health, to freedom of expression and speech, to the privacy of families, to
academic freedom, to due process of law, to equal protection, and against involuntary
servitude. They also intrude on the autonomy of local governments and the ARMM, and
violate natural law. Furthermore, they claim that Congress’ delegation of authority to the
FDA in determining which should be included in the EDL is invalid.
 Position of Respondent
 There is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination
 Some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law
 The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.
 ISSUES
 Procedural
o Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
o Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy
o Whether the Court may apply facial challenge
o Whether or not the petitions are praying for declaratory relief
o Whether the petitions violate the One Subject/One Title Rule
 Substantive
o Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates
 Right to Life
 Right to Health
 Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
 The Family
 Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
 Due Process
 Equal Protection
  Involuntary Servitude
 Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM
 Natural Law
o Whether or not Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should
be included in the EDL is valid
 HELD
 Procedural
o Whether or not the court may exercise its power of judicial review - YES
 While the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results. The following requisites for judicial review were met: (a) there
mustbe an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (
c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case
o Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy – YES
 Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident
that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
 Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners
or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law
for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to
be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
o Whether the Court may apply facial challenge – YES
 The scope of application of facial challenges extends to the regulation of free speech,
but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
 Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.
o Whether or not Locus Standi applies – YES
 Regardless of whether the petitioners are directly injured of affected by the RH Law or
not, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest." The RH Law falls under transcendental importance as it drastically
affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
o Whether or not the petitions are praying for declaratory relief - YES
 Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs, not declaratory reliefs, and so
the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65.
o Whether the petitions violate the One Subject/One Title Rule – NO
  In a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law, both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. Thus, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
had the intention to deceive the public regarding the contents of the said law.
 Substantive
o Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates
 Right to Life – NO
 Constitution intended that 1.) conception to refer to the time of fertilization and 2.)
the protection of the unborn upon said fertilization
 Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those that kill a fertilized ovum)
 Contraceptives that prevent union of sperm and egg are thus permissible
 It is the intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to prevent the enacting
of a law that legalizes abortion.
 RH law prohibits abortion
 RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime
 RH law prohibits abortifacients
 Right to Health - NO
 With the provisions of RA 4729 still in place, the status quo on the sale of
contraceptives is maintained and the Court believes that there are adequate
measures that ensure that the public has access to contraceptives that have been
determined safe following testing, evaluation, and approval by the FDA
 Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech – NO and YES
 RH law does not violate guarantee of religious freedom via the state-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of the people
including the petitioners. This is because in doing so, the state would be adhering
to one religions, making a de facto state religion which is contrary to religious
freedom.
 The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable
 There limits to the exercise of religious freedom (compelling state interest test)
 Benevolent neutrality
 RH law does not violate the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be
spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition (sec.7, 23, 24)
 However, RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling
medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of
penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections
 The Family - YES
 Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which needs only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision in order to undergo reproductive procedures intrudes into
martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for
the family as the basic social institution. Not only that, but the exclusion of parental
consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which declares that the rearing of children by
parents is a natural right.
 Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom – UNDECIDED
 The court decided that making a ruling on Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education, is premature. The Department of Education has not yet created
 a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education, thus the
constitutionality of the specifics in such a curriculum still cannot be determined.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education
program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education.
 Due Process - NO
 The definitions of several terms pinpointed by the petitioners in the RH Law are
not vague.
 Private health care institution = private health care service provider.
 “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include giving information
and performing medical procedures, so hospitals run by religious groups can
be exempted.
 “incorrect information” connotes a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead
the public.
 Equal Protection - NO
 It is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the
State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled,
women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
 Involuntary Servitude - NO
 The State has the power to regulate the practice of medicine in order to ensure the
welfare of the public. Not only that, but Section 17 only encourages private and
non-government RH service providers to give pro bono service; they do not incur
penalties if they refuse. Conscientious objects are exempt if their religious beliefs
do not allow them to provide the said services.
 Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM – NO
 The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Under
paragraph (c) of Section 17, unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGUs. Not only that, but LGUs are merely encouraged
and not compelled to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not
mandatory. Lastly, Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 deor the Organic
Act of the ARMM merely outlines the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government and does not indicate the State’s abdication to create laws in the name
of public welfare.
 Natural Law – disregarded
 Natural law, according to the Court, is not recognized as proper legal basis for
making decisions
o Whether or not Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which
should be included in the EDL is valid- YES
 Under RA 3720, the FDA, being the primary and sole premiere and only agency that
ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, has the power and
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods
 Final Ruling
o Petitions partially granted. The RA 10354 is declared constitutional, and Status Quo Ante
Order lifted with respect to provisions of RA 10354 that have been declared as
 constitutional. However, the following provisions and their corresponding provisions in the
RH-IRR have been declared unconstitutional:
 Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
 Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails
and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
 Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the
consent of the spouse;
 Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
 Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
 Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
 Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering
of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;
 Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Dissenting Opinion

Leonen, J.

I. Preliminary Considerations

 None of the petitions properly present an “actual case or controversy” which deserves the exercise
of judicial review. The consolidated petitions do not provide the proper venue to decide on
fundamental issues. The law in question is needed social legislation.
  An actual case or controversy is “one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or
based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.”
 No locus standi. Petitioners, by no stretch of the imagination, cannot be representative of the
interests of “the entire Filipino nation.” Not all Filipinos are Roman Catholics. Not all Filipinos are
from the Visayas. Certainly not all Filipinos have a common interest that will lead to a common
point of view on the constitutionality of the various provisions of the RH law.

II. Substantive Discussions

 The court cannot make a declaration on the beginning of life. Any declaration on this issue will be
fraught with contradictions. Even the Constitutional Commissioners were not in full agreement;
hence, the use of the word “conception” rather than “fertilized ovum” in Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution. There were glaring factual inaccuracies peddled during their discussion.
 The Constitutional Commission deliberations show that it is not true that the issue of when life
begins is already a settled matter. There are several other opinions on this issue. The Constitutional
Commissioners adopted the term “conception” rather than “fertilized ovum.”
 Insisting that we can impose, modify or alter rules of the Food and Drug Administration is usurpation
of the executive power of control over administrative agencies. It is a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, which recognizes that “[e]ach department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.” The system of
checks and balances only allows us to declare, in the exercise of our judicial powers, the Food and
Drugs Administration’s acts as violative of the law or as committed with grave abuse of discretion.
Such power is further limited by the requirement of actual case or controversy.
 The petitions have failed to present clear cases when the provisions for conscientious objection
would truly amount to a violation of religion. They have not distinguished the relationship of
conscience and specific religious dogma. They have not established religious canon that conflict
with the general provision of Sections 7, 17 and 23 of the law. The comments in intervention in fact
raise serious questions regarding what could be acceptable Catholic doctrine on some issues of
contraception and sex as only for procreation.

Separate Concurring Opinion

Carpio, J.

I. Preliminary Considerations

The court is not competent to declare when human life begins. The issue with regards to this must
be settled within the scientific and medical community.

II. Substantive Discussions

RA No. 10354 protects the ovum upon its fertilization (without actually saying that life begins here).
The issue then, of whether life begins during fertilization or when the ovum plants itself on the
uterus wall, is covered as this protects at both stages.
 Although the law does not provide a definition of conception, it has provisions that embody the
policy of the state to protect the travel of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. The law states that
it will provide means which do not prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by
the Food and Drug Administration.

Separate Concurring Opinion

Brion, J.

I. Preliminary Considerations

 The petitions are ripe for judicial review. The petitions allege actions by the legislature and by the
executive that lie outside the contemplation of the Constitution. A controversy exists appropriate
for this Court's initial consideration of the presence of grave abuse of discretion: and consequent
adjudication if the legislative and executive actions can be so characterized.

II. Substantive Discussions

 While the RH Law generally protects and promotes the unborn’s right to life, its Section 9 and its
IRR fail in their fidelity to the Constitution and to the very terms of the RH Law itself. It fails to adopt
the principle of double effect under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
 The Court should formulate guidelines on what the government can actually procure and distribute
under the RH law, consistent with its authority under this law and Section 12, Article II to achieve
the full protection the Constitution envisions.
 The attack on Section 14’s constitutionality is premature because that the lack of an implementing
curriculum by the Department of Education makes it premature to rule on constitutionality. The
court cannot determine yet how parental rights will be affected since the specifics of what would be
taught under the RH education program do not yet exist.
 The RH Law’s implementation could have political and economic consequences. It could also
produce social consequences by ushering in behaviors and perceptions about sex, marriage, and
family that are vastly different (in a negative way) from the norm.
 Section 23(a) (l) of the RH Law is an unconstitutional subsequent punishment of speech. It has
overreached the permissible coverage of regulation on the speech of doctors and other health
professionals. The existing information dissemination program found in the RH law is sufficient in
providing information about available reproductive health services and programs, and the existing
regulatory framework for their practice already sufficiently protects against such negligence and
malpractice. Furthermore, the said section can create a chilling effect for those in the profession.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and GRACE DE GUZMAN

FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
“Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and
July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under
civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When
petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from
the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an
employee.

HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free
to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best
business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is
afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company,
and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor
code:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition
of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated,
or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason
of marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and
it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy
followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its
indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not
only for order but also imperatively required.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatory

Whether or not Grace’s act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence

Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed

HELD:

There was discrimination. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of the marriage of a female employee.

Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it
dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly
that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.

Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty

Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be
properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because
she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by
that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified
from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be
simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s
caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or
unjustified.

However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned
and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of
Grace from work.

Grace attained regular status as an employee

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she
was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of
150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal
would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible
conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.

There was illegal dismissal

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just
cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back
wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.

On Stipulation against Marriage

In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence,
ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation. Petition dismissed.