G.R. No.

101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, DAVIDE, JR., J.:
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches
GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE Earth."
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and
MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch
by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA
the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared
parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA
for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was
MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents
the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR.
that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are
surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and
equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI
"represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is
QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
prayed for that judgment be rendered:
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners, . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
vs. acting in his behalf to —
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents. (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The Solicitor General for respondents.
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of
7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with
rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and
fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool
which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which
have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals
that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should
be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six
per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the
distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from
drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers,
brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein
of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and
the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire
island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare
and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers
and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is
presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and
agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process
carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse
effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their
intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's
land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than
1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the
country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin
old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per
annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after
the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare
and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity
as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a
final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as
Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to
the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is
an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who
may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid
of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental
Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive
to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the
State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources
(sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind —
the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other
than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause
of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a
clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion
to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint
states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained,
the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order
on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action
as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based
on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the
people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging
than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment
clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are
not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by
the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the
public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief
is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners
to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory
that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action
to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same
cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains
effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other
forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the
said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common
and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case
and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to
the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not
hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged
order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging,
with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to
enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent
 and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions
based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in
its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the
sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed,
and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners —
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the
first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired
between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty
of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may
be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right
to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation
and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of
policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the development and the use
of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but
for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost
implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of
our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit
of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that
takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to
the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same
Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it
makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying
out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's
natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which
will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions
of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present
and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy)
and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that
is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said
policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its
powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to
protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights
of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of
the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes
is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself
stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-
heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the
TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question.
Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement
of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law.
The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions
of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that
the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-
impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for
obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because
he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform
Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
 . . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President
may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court
held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare
as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded
by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125
SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant
case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet
be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state
for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant
to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause
could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases
of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED,
and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No.
90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one
which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be
expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all,
the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the
basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount
purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were
constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the
men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which
might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are
these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had
been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October
16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district
by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao,
as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters
Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any
rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the
chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed
them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that
they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge
that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they
wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the
steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of
Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were
landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of
Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero
Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women
were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further
happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-
treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case.
Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or
less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others
assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return
to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were
putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable
number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of
the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties,
was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao
and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as
including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated,
and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court.
The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain
facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be
granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should
have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao
and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody
or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the
city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170
women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and
Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member
of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The
court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor
of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an
hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to
be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own
expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the
clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order,
December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were
produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had
been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the
police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated
the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to
the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the
provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed
between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and
offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in
Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging
that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women
had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of
Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent
Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and
that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due
deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that
the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the
court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the
women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann,
Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written
statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of
that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some
other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the
question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided
and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women,
of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was
taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13,
1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had
returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought
to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once
again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons
involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents,
through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with
their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on
notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced
the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by
other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located.
Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.
The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando
Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an
hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and
Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal
requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents'
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of
habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy
women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly
hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble
attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case
is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was
deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak
their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically
admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority
of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by
duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine
Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an
Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens
after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and
section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the
conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common
prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who
may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States
have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women
convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health
authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in
the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search
in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of
the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine
Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer
who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to
change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so
important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American
constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the
President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than
any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express.
Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of
delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or
even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so
insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities
of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves
such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise
the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute
could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within
the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall
be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will
sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna
Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter
how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard
individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller,
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea,"
said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ
of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary
question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government
of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of
the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may
recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an
action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation
as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands
provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a
general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a
place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it
be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less
than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation
of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person
to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a
fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting
officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these
prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they
have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a
crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the
instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be
referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one
unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that
the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the
guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal
procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ,
whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three
specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there
is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume
jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by
respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief
of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they
could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were
relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the
city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It
was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its
zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant
a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a
person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be
made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in
court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of
First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a
general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of
first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the
Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or
before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent
on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to
advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the
petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney,
were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts
of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of
their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must
be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of
the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have
amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the
writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under
no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the
mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this
is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be
perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve
a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by
officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a
distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as
if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal
belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where
they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly
waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The
chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take
a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then,
when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim
that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the
order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally
parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the
same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain
a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the
act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty
has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for
decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities
fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are
however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date
as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a
person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under
guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State.
The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was
composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices.
On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom
concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the
most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred
Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell
was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since,
as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the
following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue
the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six
centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of
blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke
could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was
such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its
benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus
acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the
protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole
instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as
I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the
case of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in
England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right,
but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon
this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but
his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or
person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free,
but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his
constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he
fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are
fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if
any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are
usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the
guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he
can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is
not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except
as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power
of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of
Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac.
Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had
been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by
the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband
directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant
until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the
child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it
was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the
writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher,
M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22.
That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a
judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt
of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a
command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some
lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it
could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the
possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no
longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the
absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does
not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful
excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of
contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was
done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is
not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether
there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not
producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo
[1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re
Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo,
Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was
directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia
three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the
writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of
Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia
before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his
control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed
the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The
court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to
produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them,
ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce
the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards
ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of
the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the
two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch
C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624;
Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by
the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas
corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders
of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they
did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court
on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were
thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the
record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November
before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the
response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there
were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be
permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on
the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were
open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3)
they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They
did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they
did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that
waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits
purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of
which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could
have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of
Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were
produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in
sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production
of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to
somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ
must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to
an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that
state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that
he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more
than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if
necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in
the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute
impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every
possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court
forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented
to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to
demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become
more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao,
placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up
the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While
charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and
while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with
our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our
finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this
unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it
should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus
proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance
with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of
Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an
hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain
person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to
vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must
order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a
person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a
contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In
re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception
of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its
authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the
orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not
exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The
hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction
by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would
seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the
city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-
motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners,
which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and
done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the
unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made
arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations
with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it
within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was
Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social
evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas
corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance
thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as
P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal
with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern
view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply
substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the
first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the
two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to
obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration
of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as
extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without
being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is

necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz
are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of
court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days
the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to
strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25,
1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
Petitioner-Organizations, namely: G.R. Nos. 147036-37 REFORM, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA GOOD GOVERNMENT, THE SOLICITOR
SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA GENERAL, PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS
SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), COCONUT INDUSTRY FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), and UNITED
REFORM MOVEMENT (COIR), BUKLOD NG COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB),
MALAYANG MAGBUBUKID, PAMBANSANG Respondents.
KILUSAN NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA x ------------------------------------------------------ x
(PAKISAMA), CENTER FOR AGRARIAN REFORM,
EMPOWERMENT AND TRANSFORMATION TEODORO J. AMOR, representing the Peasant G.R. No. 147811
(CARET), PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA Alliance of Samar and Leyte (PASALEY),
SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN (PKSK); Petitioner- DOMINGO C. ENCALLADO, representing
Legislator: REPRESENTATIVE LORETA ANN Aniban ng Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan
ROSALES; and Petitioner-Individuals, namely: (AMMANI), and VIDAL M. PILIIN, representing
VIRGILIO V. DAVID, JOSE MARIE FAUSTINO, the Laguna Coalition,
JOSE CONCEPCION, ROMEO ROYANDOYAN, Petitioners,
JOSE V. ROMERO, JR., ATTY. CAMILO L.
SABIO, and ATTY. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, - versus -
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
CARPIO, AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
VELASCO, JR., REFORM, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, GOOD GOVERNMENT, THE SOLICITOR
BRION, GENERAL, PHILIPPINE COCONUT
- versus - PERALTA, PRODUCERS FEDERATION, UNITED Promulgated:
BERSAMIN, COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,
DEL CASTILLO, Respondents. April 10, 2012
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR., x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, DECISION
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS- ABAD, J.:
BERNABE, JJ.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain
presidential decrees and executive orders of the martial law era relating to
the raising and use of coco-levy funds.
The Facts and the Case
On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 6260[1] that
established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of
the coconut industry through capital financing.[2] Coconut farmers were to
capitalize and administer the Fund through the Coconut Investment
Company (CIC)[3] whose objective was, among others, to advance the
coconut farmers interests. For this purpose, the law imposed a levy
of P0.55 on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100 kilograms
of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt
convertible into CIC shares of stock.[4]
About a year following his proclamation of martial law in the country or
on August 20, 1973 President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 276,[5] which established a Coconut Consumers
Stabilization Fund (CCS Fund), to address the crisis at that time in the
domestic market for coconut-based consumer goods. The CCS Fund was
to be built up through the imposition of a P15.00-levy for every first sale
of 100 kilograms of copra resecada.[6] The levy was to cease after a year
or earlier provided the crisis was over. Any remaining balance of the Fund
was to revert to the CI Fund established under R.A. 6260.[7]
A year later or on November 14, 1974 President Marcos issued P.D.
582,[8] creating a permanent fund called the Coconut Industry
Development Fund (CID Fund) to channel for the ultimate direct benefit
of coconut farmers part of the levies that they were already paying. The
Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was to provide P100 million as initial
capital of the CID Fund and, thereafter, give the Fund at least P0.20 per
kilogram of copra resecada out of the PCAs collection of coconut
consumers stabilization levy. In case of the lifting of this levy, the PCA
was then to impose a permanent levy of P0.20 on the first sale of every
kilogram of copra to form part of the CID Fund.[9] Also, under P.D. 582,
the Philippine National Bank (PNB), then owned by the Government, was
to receive on deposit, administer, and use the CID Fund.[10] P.D. 582
authorized the PNB to invest the unused portion of the CID Fund in easily
convertible investments, the earnings of which were to form part of the
Fund.[11]
In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755[12] which approved the
acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers to
enable such bank to promptly and efficiently realize the industrys credit
policy.[13] Thus, the PCA bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First
United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.[14] Due to changes in its
corporate identity and purpose, the banks articles of incorporation were
amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in the banks name from First
United Bank to United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).[15]
On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,[16] the Coconut
Industry Code, which consolidated and codified existing laws relating to
the coconut industry. The Code provided that surpluses from the CCS
Fund and the CID Fund collections, not used for replanting and other
authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of stock of
corporations, including the San Miguel Corporation (SMC), engaged in
undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil industries.[17] UCPB was
to make such investments and equitably distribute these for free to coconut
farmers.[18] These investments constituted the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D. 961 also provided that the coconut levy
funds (coco-levy funds) shall be owned by the coconut farmers in their
private capacities.[19] This was reiterated in the PD 1468[20] amendment of
June 11, 1978.
In 1980, President Marcos issued P.D. 1699,[21] suspending the collections
of the CCS Fund and the CID Fund. But in 1981 he issued P.D.
1841[22] which revived the collection of coconut levies. P.D. 1841 renamed
the CCS Fund into the Coconut Industry Stabilization Fund (CIS
Fund).[23] This Fund was to be earmarked proportionately among several
development programs, such as coconut hybrid replanting program,
insurance coverage for the coconut farmers, and scholarship program for
their children.[24]
In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order
(E.O.) 312,[25] establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to
provide immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage
the creation of a sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other
coconut products.[26] The Executive Order sought to establish a P1-billion
fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of
entities supported by those funds.[27] A committee was created to manage
the fund under this program.[28] A majority vote of its members could
engage the services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic
audits.[29]
[30]
At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which
created an irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the
Trust Fund). This aimed to providefinancial assistance to coconut farmers,
to the coconut industry, and to other agri-related programs.[31] The shares
of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Funds initial capital.[32] These
shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted approximately 27%
of the outstanding capital stock of SMC. E.O. 313 designated UCPB,
through its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank. The Trust
Fund Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the operations
of the Trust Fund.[33] The Committee would designate an external auditor
to do an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also request the
Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.[34]
To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission
on Good Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and other
government agencies to exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil
Case 0033, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
et al., which was then pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift the
sequestration over those shares.[35]
On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313.[36] This
notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner organizations and
individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s
312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468
unconstitutional. On April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner
organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2
of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being
unconstitutional.
The Issues Presented
The parties submit the following issues for adjudication:
Procedurally
 1. Whether or not petitioners special civil actions of certiorari under
Rule 65 constituted the proper remedy for their actions; and
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to bring the same
to court.
On the substance
3. Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds; and
4. Whether or not (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article III, Section
5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 are
unconstitutional.
The Rulings of the Court
First. UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that there are no
ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or before a government
official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions.[37] UCPB insists that the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction
with respect to issues of constitutionality or validity of laws and
presidential orders.[38]
But, as the Court previously held, where there are serious allegations
that a law has infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
the duty of the Court to look into such allegations and, when
warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitution.[39] Moreover,
where the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, as in
this case, the Court has the discretion to brush aside technicalities of
procedure.[40]
Second. The Court has to uphold petitioners right to institute these
petitions. The petitioner organizations in these cases represent coconut
farmers on whom the burden of the coco-levies attaches. It is also primarily
for their benefit that the levies were imposed.
The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as
taxpayers. The Court recognizes their right to restrain officials from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional
statute.[41] This so-called taxpayers suit is based on the theory that
expenditure of public funds for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds.[42]
Besides, the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a greater
participation in the affairs of government. Indeed, it provides for people's
initiative, the right to information on matters of public concern (including
the right to know the state of health of their President), as well as the right
to file cases questioning the factual bases for the suspension of the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. These
provisions enlarge the peoples right in the political as well as the judicial
field. It grants them the right to interfere in the affairs of government and
challenge any act tending to prejudice their interest.
Third. For some time, different and conflicting notions had been
formed as to the nature and ownership of the coco-levy funds. The Court,
however, finally put an end to the dispute when it categorically ruled
in Republic of the Philippines v. COCOFED[43] that these funds are not
only affected with public interest; they are, in fact, prima facie public
funds. Prima facie means a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by
some evidence to the contrary.[44]
 The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised
pursuant to law to support a proper governmental purpose. They were
raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the
benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The COA
reviewed the use of the funds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies
recognize their public character.[45]
The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in
the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.[46] Taxes are
enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by
the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and
for all its public needs.[47] Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed
pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276. The funds were
collected and managed by the PCA, an independent government
corporation directly under the President.[48] And, as the respondent public
officials pointed out, the pertinent laws used the term levy,[49] which
means to tax,[50] in describing the exaction.
Of course, unlike ordinary revenue laws, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276
did not raise money to boost the governments general funds but to provide
means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the
coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within
the police power of the State.[51] The funds sought to support the coconut
industry, one of the main economic backbones of the country, and to
secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers and farm workers. The
subject laws are akin to the sugar liens imposed by Sec. 7(b) of P.D.
388,[52] and the oil price stabilization funds under P.D. 1956,[53] as
amended by E.O. 137.[54]
Respondent UCPB suggests that the coco-levy funds are closely
similar to the Social Security System (SSS) funds, which have been
declared to be not public funds but properties of the SSS members and held
merely in trust by the government.[55] But the SSS Law[56] collects
premium contributions. It does not collect taxes from members for a
specific public purpose. They pay contributions in exchange for insurance
protection and benefits like loans, medical or health services, and
retirement packages. The benefits accrue to every SSS member, not to the
public, in general.[57]
Furthermore, SSS members do not lose ownership of their
contributions. The government merely holds these in trust, together with
his employers contribution, to answer for his future benefits.[58] The coco-
levy funds, on the other hand, belong to the government and are subject to
its administration and disposition. Thus, these funds, including its
incomes, interests, proceeds, or profits, as well as all its assets, properties,
and shares of stocks procured with such funds must be treated, used,
administered, and managed as public funds.[59]
Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. In Gaston v.
Republic Planters Bank,[60] the Court held that the State collected
stabilization fees from sugar millers, planters, and producers for a special
purpose: to finance the growth and development of the sugar industry and
all its components. The fees were levied for a special purpose and,
therefore, constituted special fund when collected. Its character as such
fund was made clear by the fact that they were deposited in the PNB (then
a wholly owned government bank) and not in the Philippine
Treasury. In Osmea v. Orbos,[61] the Court held that the oil price
stabilization fund was a special fund mainly because this was segregated
from the general fund and placed in what the law referred to as a trust
account. Yet it remained subject to COA scrutiny and review. The Court
finds no substantial distinction between these funds and the coco-levy
funds, except as to the industry they each support.
Fourth. Petitioners in G.R. 147811 assert that Section 2 of P.D. 755
above is void and unconstitutional for disregarding the public character of
coco-levy funds. The subject section provides:
Section 2. Financial Assistance. x x x and since the
operations, and activities of the Philippine Coconut Authority
are all in accord with the present social economic plans and
programs of the Government, all collections and levies which
the Philippine Coconut Authority is authorized to levy and
collect such as but not limited to the Coconut Consumers
Stabilization Levy, and the Coconut Industry Development
Fund as prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 582 shall not be
considered or construed, under any law or regulation,
special and/or fiduciary funds and do not form part of the
general funds of the national government within the
contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 711. (Emphasis ours)
The Court has, however, already passed upon this question
in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v.
Republic of the Philippines.[62] It held as unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D.
755 for effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize portions of the CCS
Fund to pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and
to deposit portions of the CCS Fund levies with UCPB interest free. And
as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like levies that PCA
is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary
funds to be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning
they shall be deemed private funds.
Identical provisions of subsequent presidential decrees likewise
declared coco-levy funds private properties of coconut farmers. Article III,
Section 5 of P.D. 961 reads:
Section 5. Exemptions. The Coconut Consumers
Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund
as well as all disbursements of said funds for the benefit of the
coconut farmers as herein authorized shall not be construed or
interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or
fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the
national government within the contemplation of P.D. No.
711; nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government funded
investment, or government share within the contemplation
of P.D. 898, the intention being that said Fund and the
disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit
of the coconut farmers shall be owned by them in their own
private capacities. (Emphasis ours)
Section 5 of P.D. 1468 basically reproduces the above provision,
thus
Section 5. Exemption. The Coconut Consumers
Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development
Fund, as well as all disbursements as herein authorized, shall
not be construed or interpreted, under any law or
regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of
the general funds of the national government within the
contemplation of P.D. 711; nor as subsidy, donation, levy
government funded investment, or government share within
the contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention being that said
Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized
for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by
 them in their private capacities: Provided, however, That the
President may at any time authorize the Commission on Audit
or any other officer of the government to audit the business
affairs, administration, and condition of persons and entities
who receive subsidy for coconut-based consumer products x x
x. (Emphasis ours)
Notably, the raising of money by levy on coconut farm production,
a form of taxation as already stated, began in 1971 for the purpose of
developing the coconut industry and promoting the interest of coconut
farmers. The use of the fund was expanded in 1973 to include the
stabilization of the domestic market for coconut-based consumer goods
and in 1974 to divert part of the funds for obtaining direct benefit to
coconut farmers. After five years or in 1976, however, P.D. 961 declared
the coco-levy funds private property of the farmers. P.D. 1468 reiterated
this declaration in 1978. But neither presidential decree actually turned
over possession or control of the funds to the farmers in their private
capacity. The government continued to wield undiminished authority over
the management and disposition of those funds.
In any event, such declaration is void. There is ownership when a
thing pertaining to a person is completely subjected to his will in
everything that is not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights
of another.[63] An owner is free to exercise all attributes of ownership: the
right, among others, to possess, use and enjoy, abuse or consume, and
dispose or alienate the thing owned.[64] The owner is of course free to
waive all or some of these rights in favor of others. But in the case of the
coconut farmers, they could not, individually or collectively, waive what
have not been and could not be legally imparted to them.
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article
III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds
are public funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be exacted
only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of
individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of
persons.[65]
The Court of course grants that there is no hard-and-fast rule for
determining what constitutes public purpose. It is an elastic concept that
could be made to fit into modern standards. Public purpose, for instance,
is no longer restricted to traditional government functions like building
roads and school houses or safeguarding public health and safety.Public
purpose has been construed as including the promotion of social
justice. Thus, public funds may be used for relocating illegal settlers,
building low-cost housing for them, and financing both urban and agrarian
reforms that benefit certain poor individuals. Still, these uses relieve
volatile iniquities in society and, therefore, impact on public order and
welfare as a whole.
But the assailed provisions, which removed the coco-levy funds
from the general funds of the government and declared them private
properties of coconut farmers, do not appear to have a color of social
justice for their purpose. The levy on copra that farmers produce appears,
in the first place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base. The concept
of farmers-businessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers
are victims of social injustice and so should be beneficiaries of the taxes
raised from their earnings.
It would altogether be different of course if the laws mentioned set
apart a portion of the coco-levy fund for improving the lives of destitute
coconut farm owners or workers for their social amelioration to establish
a proper government purpose. The support for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty and has long been an accepted exercise of
police power in the promotion of the common good.[66] But the
declarations do not distinguish between wealthy coconut farmers and the
impoverished ones. And even if they did, the Government cannot just
embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise.[67] Consequently, such declarations are void since
they appropriate public funds for private purpose and, therefore, violate the
citizens right to substantive due process.[68]
On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund shall not be construed
or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary
funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government, P.D.s 961
and 1468 seek to remove such fund from COA scrutiny.
This is also the fault of President Estradas E.O. 312 which deals
with P1 billion to be generated out of the sale of coco-fund acquired
assets. Thus
Section 5. Audit of Fund and Submission of Report. The
Committee, by a majority vote, shall engage the services of a
reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits of the
fund. It shall render a quarterly report on all pertinent
transactions and availments of the fund to the Office of the
President within the first three (3) working days of the
succeeding quarter. (Emphasis ours)
E.O. 313 has a substantially identical provision governing the
management and disposition of the Coconut Trust Fund capitalized with
the substantial SMC shares of stock that the coco-fund acquired. Thus
Section 13. Accounting. x x x
The Fund shall be audited annually or as often as
necessary by an external auditor designated by the
Committee. The Committee may also request the Commission
on Audit to conduct an audit of the Fund. (Emphasis ours)
But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of
P.D.s 755, 961 and 1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that remove
such funds and the assets acquired through them from the jurisdiction of
the COA violate Article IX-D, Section 2(1)[69] of the 1987
Constitution. Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power and authority to
examine uses of government money and property. The cited P.D.s and
E.O.s also contravene Section 2[70] of P.D. 898 (Providing for the
Restructuring of the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a
statute.
And there is no legitimate reason why such funds should be shielded
from COA review and audit. The PCA, which implements the coco-levy
laws and collects the coco-levy funds, is a government-owned and
controlled corporation subject to COA review and audit.
E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity. Its title, Rationalizing
the Use of the Coconut Levy Funds by Constituting a Fund for Assistance
to Coconut Farmers as an Irrevocable Trust Fund and Creating a Coconut
Trust Fund Committee for the Management thereof tends to
mislead. Apparently, it intends to create a trust fund out of the coco-levy
funds to provide economic assistance to the coconut farmers and,
ultimately, benefit the coconut industry.[71] But on closer look, E.O. 313
strays from the special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds in
that it permits the use of coco-levy funds for improving productivity in
other food areas. Thus:
Section 2. Purpose of the Fund. The Fund shall be
established for the purpose of financing programs of assistance
for the benefit of the coconut farmers, the coconut industry, and
other agri-related programs intended to maximize food
productivity, develop business opportunities in the
countryside, provide livelihood alternatives, and promote
anti-poverty programs. (Emphasis ours)
xxxx
Section 9. Use and Disposition of the Trust Income. The
Coconut Trust Fund Committee, on an annual basis, shall
determine and establish the amount comprising the Trust
Income. After such determination, the Committee shall
earmark, allocate and disburse the Trust Income for the
following purposes, namely:
xxxx
(d) Thirty percent (30%) of the Trust Income shall be
used to assist and fund agriculturally-related programs for
the Government, as reasonably determined by the Trust Fund
Committee, implemented for the purpose of: (i) maximizing
food productivity in the agriculture areas of the country, (ii)
enhancing the upliftment and well-being of the living conditions
of farmers and agricultural workers, (iii) developing viable
industries and business opportunities in the countryside, (iv)
providing alternative means of livelihood to the direct
dependents of agriculture businesses and enterprises, and (v)
providing financial assistance and support to coconut farmers in
times of economic hardship due to extremely low prices of
copra and other coconut products, natural calamities, world
market dislocation and similar occurrences, including financial
support to the ERAPs Sagip Niyugan Program established
under Executive Order No. 312 dated November 3, 2000; x x x.
(Emphasis ours)
Clearly, E.O. 313 above runs counter to the constitutional provision
which directs that all money collected on any tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose
only.[72] Assisting other agriculturally-related programs is way off the
coco-funds objective of promoting the general interests of the coconut
industry and its farmers.
A final point, the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,[73] Section
84(2),[74] the first part by the previously mentioned sections of E.O. 313
and the second part by Section 4 of E.O. 312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O.
313. E.O. 313 vests the power to administer, manage, and supervise the
operations and disbursements of the Trust Fund it established (capitalized
with SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a Coconut Trust Fund
Committee. Thus
Section 6. Creation of the Coconut Trust Fund
Committee. A Committee is hereby created to administer,
manage and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund,
chaired by the President with ten (10) members, as follows:
(a) four (4) representatives from the government
sector, two of whom shall be the Secretary of
Agriculture and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
who shall act as Vice Chairmen;
 (b) four (4) representatives from coconut farmers
organizations, one of whom shall come from a list
of nominees from the Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation Inc. (COCOFED);
(c) a representative from the CIIF; and
(d) a representative from a non-government
organization (NGO) involved in agricultural and
rural development.
All decisions of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be
determined by a majority vote of all the members.
The Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall perform the functions
and duties set forth in Section 7 hereof, with the skill, care,
prudence and diligence necessary under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in like capacity would
exercise.
The members of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be
appointed by the President and shall hold office at his pleasure.
The Coconut Trust Fund Committee is authorized to hire
administrative, technical and/or support staff as may be required
to enable it to effectively perform its functions and
responsibilities. (Emphasis ours)
Section 7. Functions and Responsibilities of the
Committee. The Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall have the
following functions and responsibilities:
(a) set the investment policy of the Trust Fund;
(b) establish priorities for assistance giving preference to
small coconut farmers and farmworkers which shall be
reviewed periodically and revised as necessary in
accordance with changing conditions;
(c) receive, process and approve project proposals for
financing by the Trust Fund;
(d) decide on the use of the Trust Funds income or net
earnings including final action on applications for
assistance, grants and/or loans;
(e) avail of professional counsel and services by retaining
an investment and financial manager, if desired;
(f) formulate the rules and regulations governing the
allocation, utilization and disbursement of the Fund;
and
(g) perform such other acts and things as may be
necessary proper or conducive to attain the purposes of
the Fund. (Emphasis ours)
Section 4 of E.O. 312 does essentially the same thing. It vests the
management and disposition of the assistance fund generated from the sale
of coco-levy fund-acquired assets into a Committee of five
members. Thus, Section 4 of E.O. 312 provides
Section 4. Funding. Assets acquired through the
coconut levy funds or by entities financed by the coconut levy
funds identified by the President for appropriate disposal or sale,
shall be sold or disposed to generate a maximum fund of ONE
BILLION PESOS (P1,000,000,000.00) which shall
be managed by a Committee composed of a Chairman and
four (4) members to be appointed by the President whose
term shall be co-terminus with the Program. x x x
(Emphasis ours)
In effect, the above transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse
coco-levy funds that P.D. 232 vested in the PCA and transferred the same,
without legislativeauthorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the
Committees mentioned above. An executive order cannot repeal a
presidential decree which has the same standing as a statute enacted by b) E.O. 313, for being in contravention of Section
Congress. 84(2) of P.D. 1445, and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) and Article
UCPB invokes the principle of separability to save the assailed laws VI, Section 29(3) of the Constitution.
from being struck down. The general rule is that where part of a statute is
void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid The Court has previously declared Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article
portion, if susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may stand and III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 unconstitutional.
be enforced. When the parts of a statute, however, are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, or compensations SO ORDERED.
for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In which case, if some
parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must consequently fall with them.[75]

But, given that the provisions of E.O.s 312 and 313, which as
already stated invalidly transferred powers over the funds to two
committees that President Estrada created, the rest of their provisions
became non-operational. It is evident that President Estrada would not
have created the new funding programs if they were to be managed by
some other entity. Indeed, he made himself Chairman of the Coconut Trust
Fund and left to his discretion the appointment of the members of the other
committee.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 147036-

37, PARTLY GRANTS the petition in G.R. 147811, and declares the
following VOID:

a) E.O. 312, for being repugnant to Section 84(2) of

P.D. 1445, and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the Constitution;
and
 [G.R. No. 144463. January 14, 2004]
SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION and
SPORTS AND GAMES ENTERTAINMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the Grant of Authority and
Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming,
executed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor of
respondent Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (also
referred to as SAGE).
The facts may be summarized as follows:
PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation
existing under Presidential Decree No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983
by then President Ferdinand Marcos. Pertinent provisions of said
enabling law read:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore
authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the
following objectives:
xxxxxxxxx
b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and
recreation, including sports, gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries,
etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of
chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines and which will: x x x (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate,
the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent in the
conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct
government involvement.
xxxxxxxxx
TITLE IV GRANT OF FRANCHISE
Sec.10. Nature and term of franchise. Subject to the terms and conditions
established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby granted for a period of
twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the
rights, privileges and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos,
clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e.
basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an
instrument denominated as Grant of Authority and Agreement for the
Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted SAGE
the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in
PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service
local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of
PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to
ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.
On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson,
Alicia Ll. Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board,
Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the
above-named document.
Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced
its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run
basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at
various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the
instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor
of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends
that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D.
1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that
the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet
gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the
internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined
exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being
an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of
authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation in
PAGCORs franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1869 which
provides:
Place. The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or
games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic of the Philippines. x x x
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall
under any of the categories of the authorized gambling activities
enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR
the right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling
casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports
gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines. He contends that internet gambling could not have been
[1]
included within the commonly accepted definition of gambling casinos,
clubs or other recreation or amusement places as these terms refer to
a physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or
gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law.
The issues raised by petitioner are as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PAGCOR IS AUTHORIZED UNDER
P.D. NO. 1869 TO OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES ON THE
INTERNET;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF ITS JURISDICTION, OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT
AUTHORIZED RESPONDENT SAGE TO OPERATE INTERNET
GAMBLING ON THE BASIS OF ITS RIGHT TO OPERATE AND
MAINTAIN GAMBLING CASINOS, CLUBS AND OTHER AMUSEMENT
PLACES UNDER SECTION 10 OF P.D. 1869;
III. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT GRANTED AUTHORITY TO SAGE TO OPERATE GAMBLING
ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERNET.
The above-mentioned issues may be summarized into a single
pivotal question: Does PAGCORs legislative franchise include the
right to vest another entity, SAGE in this case, with the authority to
operate Internet gambling? Otherwise put, does Presidential Decree
No. 1869 authorize PAGCOR to contract any part of its franchise to
SAGE by authorizing the latter to operate Internet gambling?
Before proceeding with our main discussion, let us first try to hurdle
a number of important procedural matters raised by the respondents.
In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE
insist that petitioner has no legal standing to file the instant petition as
a concerned citizen or as a member of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that he is not a real party-in-interest entitled to the avails of the
suit. In this light, they argue that petitioner does not have the requisite
personal and substantial interest to impugn the validity of PAGCORs
grant of authority to SAGE.
 Objections to the legal standing of a member of the Senate or
House of Representative to maintain a suit and assail the
constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of
various government agencies or instrumentalities are not without
precedent. Ordinarily, before a member of Congress may properly
challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the
government there must be an unmistakable showing that the
challenged official act affects or impairs his rights and prerogatives as
legislator. However in a number of cases, we clarified that where a
[2] [3]
case involves an issue of utmost importance, or one of overreaching
significance to society, the Court, in its discretion, can brush aside
procedural technicalities and take cognizance of the petition.
Considering that the instant petition involves legal questions that may
have serious implications on public interests, we rule that petitioner
has the requisite legal standing to file this petition.
Respondents likewise urge the dismissal of the petition for
certiorari and prohibition because under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, these remedies should be directed to any
tribunal, board, officer or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. They maintain that in exercising its
legally-mandated franchise to grant authority to certain entities to
operate a gambling or gaming activity, PAGCOR is not performing a
judicial or quasi-judicial act. Neither should the act of granting licenses
or authority to operate be construed as a purely ministerial
act. According to them, in the event that this Court takes cognizance
of the instant petition, the same should be dismissed for failure of
petitioner to observe the hierarchy of courts.
Practically the same procedural infirmities were raised in Del Mar
v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation where an almost
identical factual setting obtained. Petitioners therein filed a petition for
injunction directly before the Court which sought to enjoin respondent
from operating the jai-alai games by itself or in joint venture with
another corporate entity allegedly in violation of law and the
Constitution. Respondents contended that the Court had no
jurisdiction to take original cognizance of a petition for injunction
because it was not one of the actions specifically mentioned in Section
1 of Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents
likewise took exception to the alleged failure of petitioners to observe
the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In brushing aside the apparent
procedural lapse, we held that x x x this Court has the discretionary
power to take cognizance of the petition at bar if compelling reasons,
or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the
immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. [4]
In the case at bar, we are not inclined to rule differently. The
petition at bar seeks to nullify, via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed directly before this Court, the Grant of Authority and
Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming by
virtue of which SAGE was vested by PAGCOR with the authority to
operate on-line Internet gambling. It is well settled that averments in
the complaint, and not the nomenclature given by the parties,
determine the nature of the action. Although the petition alleges grave
[5]
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent PAGCOR, what it
primarily seeks to accomplish is to prevent the enforcement of the
Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting
and Internet Gaming. Thus, the action may properly be characterized
as one for Prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65, which incidentally,
is another remedy resorted to by petitioner.
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly
treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. [6]
Having disposed of these procedural issues, we now come to the
substance of the action.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to
corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be
exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public
control and administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the
government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is
Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the
franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to
whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the
charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of
the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always
defined in clear and unequivocal language. [7]
After a circumspect consideration of the foregoing discussion and
the contending positions of the parties, we hold that PAGCOR has
acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its
franchise to SAGE.
In the Del Mar case where a similar issue was raised when
PAGCOR entered into a joint venture agreement with two other
entities in the operation and management of jai alai games, the
Court, in an En Banc Resolution dated 24 August 2001, partially
[8]
granted the motions for clarification filed by respondents therein
insofar as it prayed that PAGCOR has a valid franchise, but only by
itself (i.e. not in association with any other person or entity), to operate,
maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai.
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE
whereby the former grants the latter the authority to operate and
maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming operations. In
essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege to actively
participate, partake and share PAGCORs franchise to operate a
gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that
constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The
grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but
must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its
terms and conditionalities. A corporation as a creature of the State is
presumed to exist for the common good. Hence, the special privileges
and franchises it receives are subject to the laws of the State and the
limitations of its charter. There is therefore a reserved right of the State
to inquire how these privileges had been employed, and whether they
have been abused. [9]
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators
and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter
to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable
franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate
its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare
non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it
has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the [10]
Court clarified that since ADC has no franchise from Congress to
operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or
permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative
franchise and not ride on PAGCORs franchise if it were to legally
operate on-line Internet gambling.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE
is declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
 ROMEO P. GEROCHI, G.R. No. 159796 Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and
KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come
and ENVIRONMENTALIST Present: before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of Republic
CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC.
Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform
(ECN), PUNO, C.J.,
Petitioners, QUISUMBING, Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge,[1] and Rule 18 of
YNARES-SANTIAGO, the Rules and Regulations (IRR)[2] which seeks to implement the said
-versus- SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the
CARPIO, Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued
(DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY CORONA, directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and
COMMISSION (ERC), CARPIO MORALES, collecting the said charge.[3] The assailed provision of law reads:
NATIONAL POWER AZCUNA,
CORPORATION (NPC), POWER TINGA, SECTION 34. Universal Charge. Within one (1) year
SECTOR ASSETS AND CHICO-NAZARIO, from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GARCIA, determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed
GROUP (PSALM Corp.), VELASCO, JR. and on all electricity end-users for the following purposes:
STRATEGIC POWER NACHURA, JJ.
UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), (a) Payment for the stranded debts[4] in excess of the amount
and PANAYELECTRIC Promulgated: assumed by the National Government and stranded contract
COMPANY INC. (PECO), costs of NPC[5] and as well as qualified stranded contract
Respondents. July 17, 2007 costs of distribution utilities resulting from the restructuring
of the industry;
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x (b) Missionary electrification;[6]

(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to

DECISION indigenous or renewable sources of energy vis--vis
imported energy fuels;
NACHURA, J.:
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one
centavo per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall
accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for
 watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall
be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC
Case No. 2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a
period not exceeding three (3) years. Charge for the Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour
(/kWh), or a total of P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from
The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which the Special
shall be passed on and collected from all end-users on a monthly Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power SectorAssets and
basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution
utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall be
remitted to the PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th)
of the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the
distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating entity not
connected to a distribution utility shall remit its corresponding
universal charge directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp.,
as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund
which shall be disbursed only for the purposes specified herein
in an open and transparent manner. All amount collected for the
universal charge shall be distributed to the respective
beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided by the
ERC.

The Facts

Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took
effect.[7]

On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power

Utilities Group[8] (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge
of its share for Missionary Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No.
2002-165.[9]
Liabilities Management Group (PSALM)[10] for the rehabilitation and
management of watershed areas.[11]
On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order[12] in ERC Case No.
2002-165 provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh
as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary
Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation
(TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-
users on a monthly basis.
On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision[13] (for ERC Case No.
2002-165) modifying its Order of December 20, 2002, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
provisional authority granted to petitioner National Power
Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in
the Order dated December 20, 2002 is hereby modified to the
effect that an additional amount of P0.0205 per kilowatt-hour
should be added to the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour provisionally
authorized by the Commission in the said Order. Accordingly,
a total amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby
APPROVED for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund
managed by PSALM as its share from the Universal Charge for
Missionary Electrification (UC-ME) effective on the following
billing cycles:
(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission
Corporation (TRANSCO); and
(b) July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).
Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to
collect the UC-ME in the amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour
and remit the same to PSALM on or before the 15 th day of the
succeeding month.
In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not
later than April 30, 2004, a detailed report to include Audited
Financial Statements and physical status (percentage of
completion) of the projects using the prescribed format.
Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-
SPUG and all distribution utilities (Dus).
SO ORDERED.
On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration
asking the ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the above-mentioned
Decision, which the ERC granted in its Order dated October 7, 2003,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by petitioner National Power
Corporation-Small Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 26,
2003 is hereby modified accordingly.
Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly
report on the following:
1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;
2. Location
3. Actual amount utilized to complete the project;
4. Period of completion;
5. Start of Operation; and
 6. Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME
funds, if any.
SO ORDERED.[15]

Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194,

authorizing the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its
2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds
for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.[16]

On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric

Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other
end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric
bills starting from the month of July 2003.[17]
Hence, this original action.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which
sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following
grounds:
1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the
EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18
of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected
from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The
power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the
delegation of said power to any executive or administrative
agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same
unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides
that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and
approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete
discretionary legislative authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine
where the funds collected should be used.
3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is
oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without
representation as the consumers were not given a chance to
be heard and represented.[18]
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics
of a tax and is collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that
the cases[19] invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory
purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case at
bench. In said cases, the respective funds[20] were created in order to
balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to
counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and
other variables which cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the
legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate powers to administrative
bodies.[21] Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed not for a
similar purpose.
On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) contends that unlike a tax which
is imposed to provide income for public purposes, such as support of the
government, administration of the law, or payment of public expenses, the
assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose,
which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry.
Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power.
On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited
authority or discretion as to the execution and implementation of the
provisions of the EPIRA.[22]
Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the
Universal Charge is not a tax because it is levied for a specific regulatory
purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power
industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the State's police
power. Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not
possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would
redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public,
and that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax
which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay.
Moreover, respondents deny that there is undue delegation of legislative
power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable
standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the powers
granted to it. Lastly, respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal
Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the
police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due
process.[23]

On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and

remit the amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and
Environmental Fund components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec.
34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-
165. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46[24] of the EPIRA,
which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its
IRR.[25]
 The Issues
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec.
34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative
power to tax on the part of the ERC.[26]
Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an
obvious procedural lapse.
Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly
denominated as a Complaint assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of
the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's
IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus standi. They impugn the
constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they sustained a direct
injury as a result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in
their electric bills.
However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
when they filed this Complaint directly with us. Furthermore, the
Complaint is bereft of any allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in order for the Court to
consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition.
Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987
Constitution[27] categorically provides that:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while
concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals,
does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which
to seek such relief.[28] It has long been established that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.[29] This circumstance alone warrants the outright
dismissal of the present action.
This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the
constitutional issue raised herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality
of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not resolved now, the issue will certainly
resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of this litigation, and
probably involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid
unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now.
The instant complaint is bereft of merit.
The First Issue
To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the States
power of taxation from the police power.
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse
is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes
the tax on the constituency that is to pay it. [30] It is based on the principle
that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain
availability is an imperious need.[31] Thus, the theory behind the exercise
of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government
cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being
of the people.[32]
On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. [33] It
is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the
three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the
Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the
supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property
as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power
grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens
patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.[34] We have held
that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost,
of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons.[35]
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers
rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue
is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition
is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is
incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.[36]
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA,
the State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked.
Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for
which the Universal Charge is imposed[37] and which can be amply
discerned as regulatory in character. The EPIRA resonates such regulatory
purposes, thus:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the
policy of the State:
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the
country;
(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability
of the supply of electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in
a regime of free and fair competition and full public
accountability to achieve greater operational and economic
efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of Philippine
products in the global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the
ownership base of the power generation, transmission and
distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public
and private sector entities in the process of restructuring the
electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and
services of electric utilities and other providers of electric
power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy
sources and infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and
renewable energy resources in power generation in order to
reduce dependence on imported energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the
assets and liabilities of the National Power Corporation
(NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body
and system to ensure consumer protection and enhance the
competitive operation of the electricity market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other
modalities of demand side management.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed
Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's
police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be
used as an implement of police power.[38] In Valmonte v. Energy
Regulatory Board, et al.[39] and inGaston v. Republic Planters
Bank,[40] this Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and
the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the exercise of
the police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmea v. Orbos[41] with
respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the instant
case is different from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal
Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under the
administration of PSALM.[42] The STF has some notable characteristics
similar to the OPSF and the SSF, viz.:
1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC
shall conduct a review to determine whether there is under-
recovery or over recovery and adjust (true-up) the level of
the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of an over-
recovery, the ERC shall ensure that any excess amount shall
be remitted to the STF. A separate account shall be created
for these amounts which shall be held in trust for any future
claims of distribution utilities for stranded cost recovery. At
the end of the stranded cost recovery period, any remaining
amount in this account shall be used to reduce the electricity
rates to the end-users.[43]
2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total
amount collected for the same is greater than the actual
availments against it, the PSALM shall retain the balance
within the STF to pay for periods where a shortfall occurs.[44]

3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration
of the STF shall be transferred to the DOF or any of the DOF
attached agencies as designated by the DOF Secretary.[45]
The OSG is in point when it asseverates:
Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special
Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No.
9136, is well within the pervasive and non-waivable power and
responsibility of the government to secure the physical and
economic survival and well-being of the community, that
comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police
power of the State.[46]
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the
same is an exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police
objectives. The STF reasonably serves and assures the attainment and
perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e.,
to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry.
The Second Issue
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata
non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is
based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind
of another. [47]
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of
legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed
as an exception to this principle.[48]Given the volume and variety of
interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to
the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative
bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized
fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid
exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be
not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the
only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries
of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.[49]
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in
relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and
conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.

Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year
from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed
and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users,
and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal
Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43(b)(ii) of the EPIRA
provides:
SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall promote
competition, encourage market development, ensure customer
choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured
electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized
to issue cease and desist order after due notice and hearing.
Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following key
functions in the restructured industry:
xxxx
(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act,
promulgate and enforce, in accordance with law, a National
Grid Code and a Distribution Code which shall include, but not
limited to the following:
xxxx
(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating
companies, the TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers:
Provided, That in the formulation of the financial capability
standards, the nature and function of the entity shall be
considered: Provided, further, That such standards are set to
ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the
minimum financial standards to protect the public interest.
Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and public
hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity
end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;
Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy
a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal
Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the EPIRA[50] clearly provides:
SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the
performance of its functions and for the attainment of its
objective, have the following powers:
xxxx
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded
contract costs of NPC which shall form the basis for ERC
in the determination of the universal charge;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the
proceeds from sales and other property contributed to it,
including the proceeds from the universal charge.
Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid
delegation of legislative power.
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient
standards the following: "interest of law and order;"[51] "adequate and
efficient instruction;"[52] "public interest;"[53] "justice
[54] [55]
equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and
efficiency;"[56] "standardization and regulation of medical
[57]
education;" and "fair and equitable employment
[58]
practices." Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure
the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security
and affordability of the supply of electric power[59] and watershed
rehabilitation and management[60] meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate
the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred
powers were challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy
Regulatory Commission,[61] the Court had occasion to say:
In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the
provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts.
Rather, the law must be read in its entirety, because a statute is
passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and
intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part
thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a
whole. Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the
EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see
that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory
body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement the
reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the
legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they
did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred
upon ERC's predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC
possesses only the powers and functions listed under Section 43
of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.
and
In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion[62] in the same case, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the
immensity of police power in relation to the delegation of powers to the
ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital public
utility, to wit:
Over the years, however, the range of police power was
no longer limited to the preservation of public health, safety and
morals, which used to be the primary social interests in earlier
times. Police power now requires the State to "assume an
affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are
the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy."
Police power is now exerted "to further the public welfare a
concept as vast as the good of society itself." Hence, "police
power is but another name for the governmental authority to
further the welfare of society that is the basic end of all
government." When police power is delegated to administrative
bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a
wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader dimension
in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take
a more active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in
society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting
as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. We
should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise.
This approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation
of electric power rates. Electric power generation and
distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that
affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important
factor in encouraging investment and promoting business. The
 engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery
of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as
a result of power outages or unreliable electric power
services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its
police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.
This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for
Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission[63] where the Court held that
the ERC, as regulator, should have sufficient power to respond in real time
to changes wrought by multifarious factors affecting public utilities.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue
delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in
the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users
is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without
representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned
per Resolution[64] of August 3, 2004.[65] Moreover, the determination of
whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue
which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is
precluded from reviewing the same.[66]
As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of
EPIRA:
One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress
in recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal
structure and regulatory framework for the electric power
industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the
expansion and improvement of the industry as the large
government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of
the industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical
constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largely
foreign, the jaded structure of the industry had to be addressed.
While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized
and monopolistic, the distribution side was fragmented with
over 130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The pervasive
flaws have caused a low utilization of existing generation
capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power rates; poor
quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable
performance of the government power sector; high system
losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for
overcoming these shortcomings.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of
the industry, including the privatization of the assets of the
National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a
competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various
government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains
the division of the industry into four (4) distinct
sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution andsupp
ly.
Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its
transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter.[67]
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and
to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative.[68] Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this
presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the
Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the
EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG,
JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G.
FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN.
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the
PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the first case has already settled
(1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended)
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating
an on-line lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be reopened.
Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the first case, petitioners suggest
that the two, in joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the questions in the present case, acted otherwise than
according to law. They cite the following statement in the opinion of the Court:
The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members
sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority was
thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there
have been changes in the membership of the Court, with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and
the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to
insist on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.
Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle suggestion, perhaps a Freudian slip, that the two
new appointees, regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first Kilosbayan case against the lotto (Kilosbayan,
et al. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who
were dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in the second lotto case." And petitioners ask,
"why should it be so?"
Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer. Their attempt at psychoanalysis, detecting a Freudian slip
where none exists, may be more revealing of their own unexpressed wish to find motives where there are none which they
can impute to some members of the Court.
For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to explain — rather than to justify — the majority's decision to
overrule the ruling in the previous case. It is simply meant to explain that because the five members of the Court who
dissented in the first case (Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.) and the two new members (Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ.) thought the previous ruling to be erroneous and its reexamination not to be barred by stare decisis, res
judicata or conclusiveness of judgment, or law of the case, it was hardly tenable for petitioners to insist on the first ruling.
Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds them together," implying some ulterior motives on the part
of the new majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is: None, except a conviction on the part of the five, who
had been members of the Court at the time they dissented in the first case, and the two new members that the previous
ruling was erroneous. The eighth Justice (Padilla, J.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a
real sense a lease agreement and therefore does not violate R.A. No. 1169.
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of
the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later reversed.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation made a " formal commitment not to ask for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case
and instead submit a new agreement that would be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and
with the Decision of the Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech lotto."
To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the Court finds has been purged of the features which
made the first contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its manifestation in the first case was the following:
1. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated
May 5, 1994, a copy of which was received on May 6, 1994.
2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease agreement consistent with
the authority of PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable
with the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in its Decision of May 5, 1995.
The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO.
There was thus no "formal commitment" — but only a manifestation — that the parties were not filing a motion for
reconsideration. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment," the six (6) dissenting Justices certainly could not be bound
thereby not to insist on their contrary view on the question of standing. Much less were the two new members bound by any
"formal commitment" made by the parties. They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous. Since in their view
reexamination was not barred by the doctrine of stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the case,
they voted the way they did with the remaining five (5) dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight.
Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in the decision, the first decision was erroneous and no
legal doctrine stood in the way of its reexamination. It can, therefore, be asked "with equal candor": "Why should this not be
so?"
Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a subsequent case because of change in the
membership of a court. In 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in Feliciano v. Aquinas, G.R. No. L-10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that
the phrase "at the time of the election" in §2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a candidate for
municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of age on the date of the election. On the other hand, the dissenters
argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he assumed office.
Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court again, as a candidate for municipal councilor stated
under oath in her certificate of candidacy that she was eligible for that position although she attained the requisite age (23
years) only when she assumed office. The question was whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. In People v.
Yang, 107 Phi. 888 (1960), the Court ruled she could not. Justice, later Chief Justice, Benison, who dissented in the first
case, Feliciano v. Aquinas, supra, wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that while the statement that the accused was
eligible was "inexact or erroneous, according to the majority in the Feliciano case," the accused could not be held liable for
falsification, because
the question [whether the law really required candidates to have the required age on the day of the
election or whether it was sufficient that they attained it at the beginning of the term of office] has not
been discussed anew, despite the presence of new members; we simply assume for the purpose of
this decision that the doctrine stands.
Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the membership of the Court with the retirement of two members
(Recess and Flex, JJ.) who had taken part in the decision in the first case and their replacement by new members (Barrera
and Gutierrez-David, JJ.) and the fact that the vote in the first case was a narrow one (6 to 5), the Court allowed that the
continuing validity of its ruling in the first case might well be doubted. For this reason it gave the accused the benefit of the
doubt that she had acted in the good faith belief that it was sufficient that she was 23 years of age when she assumed office.
In that case, the change in the membership of the Court and the possibility of change in the ruling were noted without
anyone — much less would-be psychoanalysts — finding in the statement of the Court any Freudian slip. The possibility of
change in the rule as a result of change in membership was accepted as a sufficient reason for finding good faith and lack of
criminal intent on the part of the accused.
Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous decision. This was the
lesson of Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). The Legal Tender Acts, which were passed during the Civil War, made U.S.
notes (greenbacks) legal tender for the payment of debts, public or private, with certain exceptions. The validity of the acts,
as applied to preexisting debts, was challenged in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869). The Court was then composed
of only eight (8) Justices because of Congressional effort to limit the appointing power of President Johnson. Voting 5-3, the
Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in which four others, including Justice Grier,
concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented. A private memorandum left by the dissenting Justices described
how an effort was made "to convince an aged and infirm member of the court [Justice Grier] that he had not understood the
question on which he voted," with the result that what was originally a 4-4 vote was converted into a majority (5-3) for holding
the acts invalid.
On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated to the Court William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley to fill
the vacancy caused by the resignation of Justice Grier and to restore the membership of the Court to nine. In 1871, Hepburn
v. Griswold was overruled in the Legal Tender Cases, as Knox v. Lee came to be known, in an opinion by Justice Strong,
with a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Chase and the three other surviving members of the former majority. There were
allegations that the new Justices were appointed for their known views on the validity of the Legal Tender Acts, just as there
were others who defended the character and independence of the new Justices. History has vindicated the overruling of the
Hepburn case by the new majority. The Legal Tender Cases proved to be the Court's means of salvation from what Chief
Justice Hughes later described as one of the Court's "self-inflicted wounds."1
We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party in
interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are
made against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the
basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are
inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing
to sue on constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:
Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the
courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity,
Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be
given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the
PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of
contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.
Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the
contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to
enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and
aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case
may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is
limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial
function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the
government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia before the Constitutional Commission, explaining the
provisions on independent people's organizations. There is nothing in the speech, however, which supports their claim of
standing. On the contrary, the speech points the way to the legislative and executive branches of the government, rather
than to the courts, as the appropriate fora for the advocacy of petitioners' views.2 Indeed, the provisions on independent
people's organizations may most usefully be read in connection with the provision on initiative and referendum as a means
whereby the people may propose or enact laws or reject any of those passed by Congress. For the fact is that petitioners'
opposition to the contract in question is nothing more than an opposition to the government policy on lotteries.
It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases
involving "paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue
but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds. (Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron,
176 SCRA 240 (1989); City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax measure is assailed as
unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994]) Voters are allowed to question the
validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774
[1967]) Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which
must be settled early. (Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84 Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Ass'n v. Feliciano, 121 Phi. 358 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965); CLU v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA
317 [1991]) Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives qua legislators. (Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales
v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 16,
1995 (Mendoza, J., concurring))
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers,
but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392,
403 (1980), to wit:
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83
[1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs.
Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay,
18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
 Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this
Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this
Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. (Emphasis
added)
Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits.
Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have standing to question government
contracts regardless of whether public funds are involved or not. In Gonzales v. National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786
(1979), petitioner filed a taxpayer's suit seeking the annulment of a contract between the NHC and a foreign corporation. The
case was dismissed by the trial court. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on the grounds of res judicata and pendency
of a prejudicial question, thus avoiding the question of petitioner's standing.
On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989), petitioner sought the annulment of a contract made by
the government with a foreign corporation for the purchase of road construction equipment. The question of standing was not
discussed, but even if it was, petitioner's standing could be sustained because he was a minority stockholder of the
Philippine National Bank, which was one of the defendants in the case.
In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 (1972), members of the city council were
allowed to sue to question the validity of a contract entered into by the city government for the purchase of road construction
equipment because their contention was that the contract had been made without their authority. In addition, as taxpayers
they had an interest in seeing to it that public funds were spent pursuant to an appropriation made by law.
But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are being misapplied or misappropriated. The controlling
doctrine is that of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that funds raised from contributions for the
benefit of the Cultural Center of the Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no standing to bring a taxpayer's
suit to question their disbursement by the President of the Philippines.
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because
no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as
legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
Finally, in Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987, we threw out a petition questioning another form of
lottery conducted by the PCSO on the ground that petitioner, who claimed to be a "citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of
three minor children," had no direct and personal interest in the lottery. We said: "He must be able to show, not only that the
law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of." In the case at bar, petitioners have not shown why,
unlike petitioner in the Valmonte case, they should be accorded standing to bring this suit.
The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different. Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the
cancellation of timber licenses was sustained in that case because the Court considered Art. II, §16 a right-conferring
provision which can be enforced in the courts. That provision states:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis)
In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in this case do not permit of such categorization.
Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to be
immoral. This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to decide and Congress has permitted lotteries
for charity.
Nevertheless, although we have concluded that petitioners do not have standing, we have not stopped there and dismissed
their case. For in the view we take, whether a party has a cause of action and, therefore, is a real party in interest or one with
standing to raise a constitutional question must turn on whether he has a right which has been violated. For this reason the
Court has not ducked the substantive issues raised by petitioners.
II. R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P No . 42, states:
§1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing
for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national character, and
as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One Thousand
Four Hundred Fifty-Nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such
frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be
promulgated by the Board of Directors.
B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and welfare-
related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether
domestic or foreign, except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A), for the purpose
of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for health programs, including the
expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and services, and/or charitable grants: Provided, That
such investments will not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are adequate as
may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority.
Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries
and other similar activities in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party because of the clause "except for
the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" in paragraph (B) of §1. Petitioners contend that the ruling is the law
of this case because the parties are the same and the case involves the same issue, i.e., the meaning of this statutory
provision.
The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first one. Petitioners also say
that inquiry into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The
general rule on the "conclusiveness of judgment," however, is subject to the exception that a question may be reopened if it
is a legal question and the two actions involve substantially different claims. This is generally accepted in American law from
which our Rules of Court was adopted. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 59 L.Ed.2d 147, 210 (1979); RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW 2d, ON JUDGMENTS, §28; P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN AND D. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n.2 [3rd Ed., 1988]) There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest
that this exception is inapplicable in this jurisdiction.
Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims involved are substantially different from those
involved in the prior case between the parties. As already stated, the ELA is substantially different from the Contract of
Lease declared void in the first case.
Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano, petitioners argue that the phrase "by itself or in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any other party" qualifies not only §1 (B) but also §1 (A), because the exception clause
("except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph [A]") "operates, as it were, as a renvoi clause which refers
back to Section 1(A) and in this manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously amending the text of Section 1(A)."
This interpretation, however, fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be
in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase "by itself." In other words, under
paragraph (B), the PCSO is prohibited from "engag[ing] in . . . investments, programs, projects and activities" if these involve
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities not only "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other
party but also "by itself." Obviously, this prohibition cannot apply when the PCSO conducts these activities itself. Otherwise,
what paragraph (A) authorizes the PCSO to do, paragraph (B) would prohibit.
The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority of the PCSO under paragraph (A), but rather the
authority granted to it by paragraph (B). The amendment of paragraph (B) by B.P. Blg. 42 was intended to enable the PCSO
to engage in certain investments, programs, projects and activities for the purpose of raising funds for health programs and
charity. That is why the law provides that such investments by the PCSO should "not compete with the private sector in
areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority."
Justice Davide, then an Assemblyman, made a proposal which was accepted, reflecting the understanding that the bill they
were discussing concerned the authority of the PCSO to invest in the business of others. The following excerpt from the
Record of the Batasan Pambansa shows this to be the subject of the discussion:
MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment after "adequate". The intention of the amendment is not
to leave the determination of whether it is adequate or not to anybody. And my amendment is to add
after "adequate" the words AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. As a mater of fact, it will strengthen the authority to invest in these
areas, provided that the determination of whether the private sector's activity is already adequate must
be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority.
Mr. ZAMORA. Mr. Speaker, the committee accepts the proposed amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
(2 RECORD OF THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, Sept. 6, 1979,
p. 1007)
Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and
other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so whether "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with others or "by
itself." This seems to be the only possible interpretation of §1 (A) and (B) in light of its text and its legislative history. That
there is today no other entity engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like does not detract from the validity of this
interpretation.
III. The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to be features of a joint
venture agreement, had been removed in the new contract. For instance, §5 of the ELA provides that in the operation of the
on-line lottery, the PCSO must employ "its own competent and qualified personnel." Petitioners claim, however, that the
"contemporaneous interpretation" of PGMC officials of this provision is otherwise. They cite the testimony of Glen Barroga of
the PGMC before a Senate committee to the effect that under the ELA the PGMC would be operating the lottery system
"side by side" with PCSO personnel as part of the transfer of technology.
Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of PCSO's franchise should be determined by facts and not by
what some officials of the PGMC state by way of opinion. In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that
§5 reflects the true intention of the parties. Thus, Art. 1370 of the Civil Code says that "If the terms of a contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." The
intention of the parties must be ascertained from their "contemporaneous and subsequent acts." (Art. 1371; Atlantic Gulf Co.
v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166 [1908]) It cannot simply be judged from what one of them says. On the other hand, the
claim of third parties, like petitioners, that the clause on upgrading of equipment would enable the parties after a while to
change the contract and enter into something else in violation of the law is mere speculation and cannot be a basis for
judging the validity of the contract.
IV. It is contended that §1 of E.O. No. 301 covers all types of "contract[s] for public services or for furnishing of supplies,
materials and equipment to the government or to any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities" and not only contracts of
purchase and sale. Consequently, a lease of equipment, like the ELA, must be submitted to public bidding in order to be
valid. This contention is based on two premises: (1) that §1 of E.O. No. 301 applies to any contract whereby the government
acquires title to or the use of the equipment and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials," and "equipment" are distinct from
each other so that when an exception in §1 speaks of "supplies," it cannot be construed to mean "equipment."
Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. For example, the term "supplies" is used in paragraph (a), which provides that a
contract for the furnishing of "supplies" in order to meet an emergency is exempt from public bidding. Unless "supplies" is
construed to include "equipment," however, the lease of heavy equipment needed for rescue operations in case of a calamity
will have to be submitted to public bidding before it can be entered into by the government.
In dissent Justice Feliciano says that in such a situation the government can simply resort to expropriation, paying
compensation afterward. This is just like purchasing the equipment through negotiation when the question is whether the
purchase should be by public bidding, not to mention the fact that the power to expropriate may not be exercised when the
government can very well negotiate with private owners.
Indeed, there are fundamental difficulties in simultaneously contending (1) that E.O. No. 301, §1 covers both contracts of
sale and lease agreements and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" can not be interchanged. Thus,
under paragraph (b) of §1, public bidding is not required "whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project
or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service." Following petitioners' theory, there
should be a public bidding before the government can enter into a contract for the lease of bulldozers and dredging
equipment even if these are urgently needed in areas ravaged by lahar because, first, lease contracts are covered by the
general rule and, second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (b) covers only "supplies" but not equipment.
To take still another example. Paragraph (d), which does away with the requirement of public bidding "whenever the supplies
under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders
or the offers received in each instance were exorbitant or nonconforming to specifications." Again, following the theory of the
petitioners, a contract for the lease of equipment cannot be entered into even if there are no bids because, first, lease
contracts are governed by the general rule on public bidding and, second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (d)
applies only to contracts for the furnishing of "supplies."
Other examples can be given to show the absurdity of interpreting §1 as applicable to any contract for the furnishing of
supplies, materials and equipment and of considering the words "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" to be not
interchangeable. Our ruling that §1 of E.O. No. 301 does not cover the lease of equipment avoids these fundamental
difficulties and is supported by the text of §1, which is entitled "Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts" and by the fact that the
only provisions of E.O. No. 301 on leases, namely, §§6 and 7, concern the lease of buildings by or to the government. Thus
the text of §1 reads:
§1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. — Any provision of law, decree, executive order or other
issuances to the contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for furnishing supplies,
materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities shall
be renewed or entered into without public bidding, except under any of the following situations:
a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may
involve the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;
b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity
which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service;
c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer
who does not have subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable
substitute can be obtained elsewhere at more advantageous terms to the
government;
d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed
on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the
offers received in each instance were exhorbitant or non-conforming to
specifications;
e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies
through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the government to be
determined by the Department Head concerned; and
f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government.
Indeed, the purpose for promulgating E.O. No. 301 was merely to decentralize the system of reviewing negotiated contracts
of purchase for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment as well as lease contracts of buildings. Theretofore, E.O.
No. 298, promulgated on August 12, 1940, required consultation with the Secretary of Justice and the Department Head
concerned and the approval of the President of the Philippines before contracts for the furnishing of supplies, materials and
equipment could be made on a negotiated basis, without public bidding. E.O. No. 301 changed this by providing as follows:
§2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. — In line with the principles of decentralization and
accountability, negotiated contracts for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials or
equipment may be entered into by the department or agency head or the governing board of the
government-owned or controlled corporation concerned, without need of prior approval by higher
authorities, subject to availability of funds, compliance with the standards or guidelines prescribed in
Section 1 hereof, and to the audit jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in accordance with existing
rules and regulations.
Negotiated contracts involving P2,000,000 up to P10,000,000 shall be signed by the Secretary and two
other Undersecretaries.
xxx xxx xxx
§7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. — The heads of agency intending to rent privately-owned
buildings or spaces for their use, or to lease out government-owned buildings or spaces for private use,
shall have authority to determine the reasonableness of the terms of the lease and the rental rates
thereof, and to enter into such lease contracts without need of prior approval by higher authorities,
subject to compliance with the uniform standards or guidelines established pursuant to Section 6
hereof by the DPWH and to the audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly authorized representative in
accordance with existing rules and regulations.
everything except real estate, which may be needed in the transaction of public
business, or in the pursuit of any undertaking, project, or activity, whether of the
nature of equipment, furniture, stationery, materials for construction, or personal
property of any sort, including non-personal or contractual services such as the
repair and maintenance of equipment and furniture, as well as trucking, hauling,
janitorial, security, and related or analogous services.
Thus, the texts of both E.O. No. 301, §1 and of P.D. No. 526, §§1 and 12, make it clear that only contracts for the purchase
and sale of supplies, materials and equipment are contemplated by the rule concerning public biddings.
Finally, it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and commonly used in place of contracts of purchase and sale
because of "multifarious credit and tax constraints" and therefore could not have been left out from the requirement of public
bidding. Obviously these credit and tax constraints can have no attraction to the government when considering the
advantages of sale over lease of equipment. The fact that lease contracts are in common use is not a reason for implying
that the rule on public bidding applies not only to government purchases but also to lease contracts. For the fact also is that
the government leases equipment, such as copying machines, personal computers and the like, without going through public
bidding.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED

In sum, E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment, and it was merely to
change the system of administrative review of emergency purchases, as theretofore prescribed by E.O. No. 298, that E.O.
No. 301 was issued on July 26, 1987. Part B of this Executive Order applies to leases of buildings, not of equipment, and
therefore does not govern the lease contract in this case. Even if it applies, it does not require public bidding for entering into
it.

Our holding that E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts of purchase and sale is conformable to P.D. No. 526,
promulgated on August 2, 1974, which is in pari materia. P.D. No. 526 requires local governments to hold public bidding in
the "procurement of supplies." By specifying "procurement of supplies" and excepting from the general rule "purchases"
when made under certain circumstances, P.D. No. 526, §12 indicates quite clearly that it applies only to contracts of
purchase and sale. This provision reads:

§12. Procurement without public bidding. — Procurement of supplies may be made without the benefit
of public bidding in the following modes:

(1) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;

(2) Emergency purchases;

(3) Direct purchases from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;

(4) Thru the Bureau of Supply Coordination; and

(5) Purchase from other government entities or foreign governments.

Sec. 3 broadly defines the term "supplies" as including —

G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-à-vis the vast and
overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and
tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic
due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle
sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental
writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime
both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the
Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need
for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US
Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility
of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged
in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States
Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United
States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum
Penalty — 5 years on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts;
Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty
— 5 years on each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33]
counts; Maximum Penalty — less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to
Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in
support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some
documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other
matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent,
through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting
copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in
abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or
access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of
the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter
dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999),
denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request
and supporting documents from the United States Government, pending
evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents
submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines
and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be
received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our
domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a
preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal
cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under
the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all
criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought
to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition,
request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any
objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury
information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by
strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure
orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to
disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law
enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any
further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United
States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States
Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of the subject information. This Department's denial of your request
is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides
that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United
States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The
Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign
governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in
connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be
effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons
must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him
an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein
petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court;
and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from
performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United
States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter
raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided
over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who
appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a
memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to
maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of;
from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the
United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any
act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary
injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on
August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are,
likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the
issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM
COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM
REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT
ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A
WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS,
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS
TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE
MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM
PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY
AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT;
AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also
issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents,
representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are
hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order
dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
 GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as
directed, filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are
patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both
parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the
two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would
necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of
which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution
would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24,
1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the
extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that
private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the
legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there
any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into
the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which
concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the
filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by
the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US
Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into
force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal
of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a
charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of
arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over
the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest
particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the
Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and
place of the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and
the designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for
evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request
fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or
convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents
to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an
attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task
of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the
identity and probable location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the
case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of
the offense for which extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the
offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the
prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph
3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would
provide probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had
been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other
competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the
accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No.
951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not
be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request
and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he
shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate
and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1],
Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition
with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court
take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for
extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective
extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1],
Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding
is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9
thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the
Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of
the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides
that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting
State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the
extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima
facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to
the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory
(Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal
cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the
required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is
extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also
determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political
one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).1âwphi1.nêt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following
query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the
Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the
supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their
sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or
not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which
is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly
provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice
has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that
there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For
while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign
Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the
Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of
Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its
accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department
of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post
office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice,
indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking
lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to
determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out
whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the
RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the
Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the
Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition
petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where
private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be furnished the request
and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a
reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of
the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending
the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority,
one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of
Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation
that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message
that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private
respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the
Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and
supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice,
eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by
himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA
Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative
determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class
by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to
say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and
sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face
and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable;
and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or
that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3,
RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the
exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation
of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United
States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities
coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by
means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents,
or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence,
which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-
making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to
rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It
does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts
and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only
purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the
facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a
final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to
evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the
rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its
only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the
law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.
Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The
body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition
can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation
procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the
wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of
liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages:
First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of
the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a
contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but
he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted
(Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days
after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically,
although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that
once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be
continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9,
RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted.
Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the
Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No.
1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as
during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is
akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets
off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal
law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes
of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to
make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain
constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions.
Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are
rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier
stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-
incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478;
Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the
right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative
investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could
result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court,
citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that
the revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation
than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth
against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft
Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr.
vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid
down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding
is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included
in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in
form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be
criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding
does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the
proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's
property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us,
involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys
precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the
time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to
eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or
penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result — the
arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may
result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his
arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8,
petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority
for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary
investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with
the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised
in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good,
which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due
process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression
and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both
States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only
worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are
alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with
which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation,
their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every
modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to
meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due
process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to
the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to
avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning
of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and
exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process which
requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing
pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings
as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals
are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon
notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute
the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding,
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due
process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits
and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the
respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such
as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the
preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges
(Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy
restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which
are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a
passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the
respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a
later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary
distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the
replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise
them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described
situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are
quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition
which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, §2 cl 2),
and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding
state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as
swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged
with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged
fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the
elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of
the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding
state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is
charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the
demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition
documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such
papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the
instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an
affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said
charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order
to confer jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35
C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment,
information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive
or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held
to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d
103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation
to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the
return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having
authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter
dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel.
In urgent cases, requests for the provincial arrest of an individual may be
made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department
of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request
for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition
request to the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State
prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that
the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties
provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the
offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that
the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute
that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. §3184). Said judge or magistrate is
authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the
extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is
extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it
has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b)
the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty
permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged
(Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify
extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath, charging
any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the
crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting
extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American
decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the
character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather
than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d
826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present,
it incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law
and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this
certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the
Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual
rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. §3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning
the motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However,
a person facing extradition may present whatever information he deems
relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether
to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins
and ends with one entity — the Department of State — which has the power to
evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the
person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's
determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of
Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having
satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the
request to the Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for
extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case,
perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken
over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted,
preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should
the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in
the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible
delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
 The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect the
fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government
that no right — that of liberty — secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the
Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of
the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not
enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency
will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the
strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It
is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under
Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of
the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343,
375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of
criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless,
accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are,
however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary
does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles
inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that
point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may
not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the
absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since
after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and
statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31
Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the
requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and
the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing
of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will
not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable
efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it
even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers
(such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and
those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his
Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature
of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time
due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently
necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed
with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of
administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity
and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand there is yet no
extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the
person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request
shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section
2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only
after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation
proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the
implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise
invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the
Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2)
the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern.
In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred.
These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"
(Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely
on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which
alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated
July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the
matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other
hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with
public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material
when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the
right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly
affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking,
every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of
public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply
because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the
people and any citizen has "standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said
action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of
deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section
1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public
concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14,
particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within
the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records,
and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official
government action from the U.S. Government. No official action from our country
has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign
relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this
constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the
balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for
the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no
official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the
invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition
hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government
by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.
The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant
controversy: Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in
the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause
in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon
the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the
Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign
relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations."
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in
the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local
courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between
a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of
the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs.
Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason
that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has
been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine
of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may
repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the
highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or
national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.
Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights
of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From
the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during
the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and
hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the
law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also
manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he
describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go
against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition
Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even
request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state,
and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35
C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy
surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that
everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized
the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly
confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations
in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the
respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's
theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite
Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ
or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when
the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not
available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition
has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide
therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides
that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions
are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated
guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process
in administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270
SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276
SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School
vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In
essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31
[1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in
the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may
have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments
under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount
consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to
the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission
(271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service
Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971
(Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may
be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in
the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes),
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be
effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of
due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is
that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal
investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee
must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal
way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy
of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a
statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional
provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the
employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a
reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his
defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in
support of his defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld
the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of
loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his
forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable
action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is
easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268
SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We
would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of

liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the
stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The
incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by
this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation
Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as
Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his
capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity
as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for
respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early
seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition
proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of
due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its
implementation are concerned, for transgressing the
fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The
Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is
possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and
oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and
respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner
Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L.
Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public
Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted
by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a
highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the
imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification
The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor
could the implementing rules and regulations issued by
respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of
legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction
No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads
in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes
of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the
presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along
streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device
to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety,
the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna
Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government
under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices;
[Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the
Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways,
including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct:
1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have
at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early
warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized
plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and
40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or
disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street
or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the
owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device
mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the
front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3.
The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause
Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein
described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of
motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for
each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall
also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to
effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall
closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or
appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on
November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No.
479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is
hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation
Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to
procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle,
one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any
brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule
and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the
implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5
They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977,
ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the
installation of early warning device as a pre-registration
requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30,
1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such
suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter
of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29,
1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32,
worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated
June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229,
as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use
of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following
rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative
Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented
provided that the device may come from whatever source and
that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD
specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative
order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except
motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially
numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this
Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial
number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and
official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the
motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda
in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take
effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by
respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works,
transportation, and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped
when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore
and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device
in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions
No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land
transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of
Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions
and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are
"oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are
"infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided,
onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-
called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per
set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the
precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory
and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well
provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better
substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed
for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and
Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a
restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on
October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F.
Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the
issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for
prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory
injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file
an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to
move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to
[issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date
and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court.16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he
Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the
factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations
and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17
they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI
(including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect
that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of
Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation
Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum
Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due
process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of
police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive,
arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral
unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are
without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the
Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer."18 Unlike
petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his
litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases
of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the
assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police
power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent
Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful
delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion
captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what
respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this
Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19
Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise
made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on
road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was
a signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General
Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and
dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of
petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the
implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of
rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot
be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for
decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset,
it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the
exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and
is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has
offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of
the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice
Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as
"nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case
of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision
after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the
doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice
Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense
it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe
v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above
sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government.
It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential,
insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice
Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope,
ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or
parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the
well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with
the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." 24
 2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner,
compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been
called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the
Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in
view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon,
and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as
national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to
be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the
National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was
likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of
Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations becomes
even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary
factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was
held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in
an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American
Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that
the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
in overthrowing the statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely
solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed
out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession
the necessary statistical information and data at the time he
issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation
cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early
warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of
the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976
involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's
statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As
aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no
doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the
statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case
here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is
that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning
devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could
mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could
likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled
vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such
Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful
study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged
repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to
conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible
limits of a pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of
oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the
Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device
requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for
car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking
lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,"
or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * *
because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from
this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking,
that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway,
or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary,
stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic.
On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum
lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it
an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an
ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the
motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision. 31
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional
deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General
"There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229,
as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or
compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning
device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle
owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles
with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or
obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even
personally make or produce this early warning device so long as
the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid
down in said letter of instruction and administrative order.
Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be
oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does
it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so
sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early
warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be
committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded
speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to
enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an
unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or
immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of
Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the
constitutional defects alleged against it.32
7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this
Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the
justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the
pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its
wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if
that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears
repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does
not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of
legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the
province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within
the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and
exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible
objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As
long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the
Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or
not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice
Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * *
* never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to
paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the
basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The
principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated
the respective authority of each department and confined its
jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute
its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to
be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly
litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain
unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The
attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar
as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom
cannot be sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of
non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any
support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the
trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements
from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such
an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v.
Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the
roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by
Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-
delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern
governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency
with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is
delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of
Congress being assumed." 34
 9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that
be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions
to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining
Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
(U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified
by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended
the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road
safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that
this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *."
36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of
international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court
reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on
the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive,
and categorical why such a casual observation should be taken
seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for
insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in
Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the
constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point
is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38
"Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere
 G.R. No. 204891, September 14, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REYNALDO ABAYON Y
APONTE, Appellant.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal of accused-appellant Reynaldo Abayon y Aponte (Abayon)
assailing the July 20, 2012 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03195. The CA decision affirmed the July 31, 2007 decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Pi�as City, and ordered him to pay
death indemnity to the heirs of Lourdes Chokilo, Aiza Delos Angeles, and Zenaida
Velos.
THE CASE
In an information dated July 29, 2002,3 Abayon was formally charged as follows: ChanRoblesV irtualawlibrary
"That on or about the 26th day of July 2002, in the City of Las Pi�as, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to cause damage to property, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and deliberately burn or set fire to the house and/or dwelling of
ROBERTO IGNACIO Y ANTONIO and TEODORO DELOS ANGELES Y GOIS
causing it to be burned and turned into ashes and as a result of said fire, victims
Lourdes Chokilo, Zenaida Velos and Aiza Delos Angeles who were then sleeping
inside the said house were also burned to death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Abayon entered a plea of not guilty when he was arraigned on August 20, 2002.
Trial on the merits followed the pre-trial where Abayon entered into stipulations
regarding specified documentary evidence presented by the prosecution.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that in the evening of July 25, 2002,
Abayon and his wife, Arlene, quarreled outside their residence. Since they rented an
apartment adjacent to others, their neighbors witnessed the entire incident. When
Arlene shouted for help because Abayon was strangling her, Corazon Requitillo
(Corazon) and her husband pacified them. Thereafter, Corazon took Arlene's two (2)
children and offered them the safety of her apartment as Abayon was still drunk.
At around 11:00 P.M. of the same day, Abayon's neighbors heard a hissing sound and
smelled leaking gas. When they came out of their houses to check, they saw Abayon
holding an LPG gas tank outside his apartment. Robert Ignacio Antonio (Robert), one
of his neighbors and his best friend, approached Abayon to ask what he was doing.
He heard Abayon say, "Putang ina, wala pala ako silbi! Inutil pala ako!"4 He also
noticed that Abayon was holding an unlit cigarette inserted between his left index and
middle fingers, that a match was on his left palm, and that his right hand was turning
on and off the gas tank. When he figured out what Abayon was trying to do, Robert
scolded him and said, "Putang ina mo, Boy! Magsusunog ka, idadamay mo pa
kami!"5 After that, he turned off the regulator of the gas tank and brought it to
Corazon's house for safekeeping.
At past midnight of July 26, 2002, the house (containing the units where Abayon and
his neighbors live) started to catch fire. The neighbors came out of their respective
units because of the thick smoke and the heat coming from the fire. As a result, the
house was completely burned down along with the personal effects of the residents.
Three (3) persons also died because of the fire,-namely: Lourdes Chokilo, the owner
of the house; Aiza Delos Angeles; and Zenaida Velos.
Expectedly, Abayon denied that he had caused the fire and raised the defense of alibi.
He admitted that he had an altercation with his wife and that he had left after he was
pacified by his neighbors. When he came back, Abayon realized that his wife and
children were not at home, so he decided to look for them at his sister-in-law's place
at Trece. Before he left, he brought inside his apartment the LPG tank and the kitchen
stove that had been placed outside. When Abayon saw Robert, he asked him to look
after his house while he searched for his family.
Abayon allegedly left for Trece at around 9 p.m. only to find out when he got there
that his family was not there. He then proceeded to his sister's house in Makati at
around 4 a.m. Again, he did not find his family there. He opted to stay at his sister's
place until 8:00 p.m. of July 26, 2002. He was arrested later when he showed up at his
residence.
In its July 31, 2007 decision, the RTC found Abayon guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of arson resulting in multiple homicide, defined and punished under Sec.
1, in relation to Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The trial
court held that the prosecution successfully established the elements of the crime
charged through circumstantial evidence. It gave no credence to Abayon's denial
because his neighbors � especially his best friend � positively identified him as the
person who had earlier attempted to burn his place down using an LPG gas tank; the
fire broke out later and razed the rooms they were renting.
On appeal, Abayon assailed the RTC decision on the ground that there was no direct
evidence showing that he had started the fire that burned down the house.
In its July 20, 2012 decision, the CA upheld Abayon's conviction based on the RTC's
appreciation of the circumstances proven by the prosecution. The CA held that the
proven circumstantial evidence sufficiently pointed to Abayon as the perpetrator of
the crime charged. The CA included an award of death indemnity worth P50,000.00
each in favor of the heirs of the three (3) victims.
Abayon filed the present appeal to challenge the CA decision.
OUR RULING
We affirm the conviction of Abayon and order him to pay civil damages on top of the
death indemnity.
There is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide.
In People v. Malngan,6 we held that there is no complex crime of arson with
homicide because the crime of arson absorbs the resultant death or is a separate crime
altogether, to wit:
Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a)
if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by
reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the
means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the
objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed � homicide/murder and arson.
From the body of the information filed, Abayon is charged with the crime of arson
because his intent was merely to destroy his family's apartment through the use of
fire. The resulting deaths that occurred, therefore, should be absorbed by the crime of
arson and only increases the imposable penalty to reclusion perpetua to death,
pursuant to Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613.
The prosecution established the elements of the crime of simple arson through
circumstantial evidence.
Simple arson, defined and punished under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1613, is essentially
the destruction of property by fire that is not under the circumstances enumerated
under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. In
prosecuting arson, whether destructive or simple, the corpus delicti rule is generally
satisfied by proof that a fire occurred, and that it was intentionally caused.7
chanrobleslaw
We point out that no one among the prosecution's witnesses actually saw Abayon
start the fire. The lower courts had to resort to circumstantial evidence since there was
no direct evidence proving his guilt.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that: "(a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus,
to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in a way that would leave no reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of the accused."8 chanrobleslaw
In the present case, the RTC enumerated the following circumstances leading to the
unavoidable conclusion that Abayon set the fire that engulfed not only his apartment
but his neighbors' as well:
ChanRob lesVirtualawlibrary
1. The quarrel of the accused with his wife who must have hurt the
accused when she told him that he was good-for-nothing "walang silbi,
inutil;" and shouting at him to leave the house (lumayas ka);
 2. His having muttered audibly, "walang silbi pala ako, inutil pala,"
indicative of his having harbored intense hatred for his wife against
whom he evidently wanted to get back at by burning the house;
3. While holding a match, and having opened the gas tank, such that
leaking gas smelled strongly, indicating that plenty of it leaked out
when he opened the gas tank;
4. His having been berated by his neighbor and best friend about his
intention to burn the house and his fear that his house, too, will be
burned;
5. The failure of the accused's sister to corroborate his defense of alibi;
6. The fact that his best friend, Robert Ignacio, not only did not
corroborate his claim that he entrusted his house to Ignacio, but also
and most importantly the testimonial of his best friend that he opened
the gas tank while muttering the words already mentioned, and while
holding a match and unlighted cigarette.9
The CA, for its part, enumerated the following circumstances pointing to Abayon's
guilt, as follows:
Chan RoblesV irtualawlibrary
1. On July 25, 2002, at about 9:00 in the evening, neighbors/witnesses
heard accused Reynaldo Abayon y Aponte and his wife Arlene by the
road of Block 5, Lot 4, Champaca Street, Paramount Village, Las
Pi�as, having a heated argument with the latter shouting at the
accused: "Putang ina mo! Walang silbi! Inutil ka! Lumayas ka dito."
2. Neighbors Corazon Requyitillo and her husband Eduardo came to the
aid of the distressed Arlene when she yelled "saklolo!", as the accused
began to strangle her.
3. Thereafter, at around 11:00 in the evening, next room-neighbor
Roberto Ignacio y Antonio and his wife Helen heard a hissing sound
and� sensed a robust� stench of leaking� gas� indicating that an
abundance of such had indeed seeped out.
4. Roberto Ignacio then proceeded to the place of the accused and saw
the latter holding an unlit cigarette and a match at his left hand while
twisting on and off the valve of the gas tank with his right and slurring
the words: "Putang ina, wala pala akong silbi! Inutil pala ako!"
Seeing this, Roberto scolded the latter and took the gas tank away.
5. A few moments later, at about twelve o'clock midnight of the same
night, a fire broke out. Said fire began at the room occupied by the
accused Reynaldo Abayon. The fire engulfed the whole house, killing
Lourdes Chokilo, Zenaida Veluz and Aiza delos Angeles.
6. During the trial, accused put up an alibi. However, he failed to produce
any witnesses to corroborate his defense notwithstanding the fact that
said witness were supposed to be with his own sister and sister-in-law.
To make matters worse, his "supposed best friend", Roberto Ignacio,
testified against him.
���������
x x x x10
We note that these circumstances all point out to the incidents from around 9:00 p.m.
(when the quarrel between Abayon and his wife started) until 11 p.m. (the time when
Abayon's alleged attempt to burn the houses was thwarted). The courts a quo did not
mention any circumstance that clearly links Abayon to the fire that broke out at past
midnight.
The records, however, also revealed that Abayon bought a match from Edmund
Felipe at around 12:15 a.m. When Edmund asked what the match was for,
Abayon uttered, "Wala, may susunugin lang ako."11 chanrobleslaw
To our mind, Edmund's statement clinches the case against Abayon insofar as
establishing his clear link to the fire that broke out at past 12 a.m.; it also makes all
the more significant the pieces of circumstantial evidence enumerated by both the
RTC and the CA especially in proving the motive for the crime, i.e., what led Abayon
to burn his and his neighbors' houses. The combination of all these circumstances,
vis-a-vis the statement of Edmund, leads to no other conclusion than that Abayon
deliberately started the fire that resulted in the death of three (3) innocent victims.
There could be no doubt on this conclusion: Abayon had the motive (i.e., he was
characterized as a 'good-for-nothing husband' by his wife during a violent
quarrel); he had made a previous attempt to start a fire (by turning on and off
the gas tank's regulator, while holding an unlighted cigarette and match); and he
bought a match at past midnight, stating to the vendor that he will use it to burn
something.
Denial cannot prevail over positive and categorical identification of the accused.
On the credibility of witnesses, we note the well-settled rule that the trial court is in
the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses. In the absence of any showing
of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been
overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual
findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain
binding on an appellate tribunal.12 chanrobleslaw
In People v. Gallarde,13 we distinguished the two types of positive identification of a
perpetrator of a crime and discussed their legal importance, thus: Chan Rob lesVirtualawlibrary
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of
being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types
of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of
the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the
very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is
the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and
right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken
together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to
the only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author
of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only
ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of
others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is
basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is
positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that
direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to� circumstantial
evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of
direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied
proper protection. [Emphasis supplied]
Without any showing of ill motive on the part of his neighbors (especially Robert,
who is his best friend) to falsely testify against Abayon, their categorical and positive
identification should prevail over alibi and denial. Corazon testified that he was a
neighbor of Abayon and that she saw him fighting with his wife before seeing him
outside her house holding an LPG tank. Robert, who was able to retrieve the LPG
tank from Abayon, actually tried to talk him out of what he was doing. Two (2) other
witnesses for the prosecution, who were likewise his neighbors, corroborated what
Corazon and Robert narrated.
As the RTC and the CA did, we view Abayon's denial to be self-serving and
undeserving of any credence in view of the testimonies of the eyewitnesses'
categorical, positive, and forthright identification of him the night the burning
incident happened.
The proper penalty and the awarded indemnities
The penalty for arson resulting to death under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613 is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since there was no aggravating circumstance alleged in the
information, the CA correctly sentenced Abayon to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua only.
We also point out that the CA awarded P50,000.00 death indemnity in favor of the
heirs of the three (3) victims. We increase this award to P75,000.00 pursuant to
People v. Jugueta;14 we also direct Abayon to further pay the victim's heirs
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,0000.00 as exemplary damages.15 chanrobleslaw
The records show rough estimates of the properties the families lost during the fire.16
In the absence of a showing that these estimated amounts had been actually expended
in a manner capable of substantiation by any document or receipt, the valuation
remains a mere estimate, and could not be the measure of an award for actual
damages.17 The failure to present competent proof of actual damages should not
deprive Abayon's neighbors of some degree of indemnity for the substantial economic
damage and prejudice they had suffered.18 chanrobleslaw
According to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty. For this purpose, the determination of the
temperate damages rests in the sound discretion of the courts.19 chanrobleslaw
Thus, we find it proper to award temperate damages to the Chokilo family in the
amount of P100,000.00; to the Ignacio family in the amount of P50,000.00; and to the
Balbas family in the amount of P50,000.00.

In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate
damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid

WHEREFORE, the July 20, 2012 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 03195 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (a) the awarded civil indemnity is INCREASED from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;

(b) Reynaldo Abayon is directed to FURTHER PAY each of the victims' heirs the
amounts of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(c) he is also DIRECTED to PAY temperate damages in the amounts of P100,000.00

to the Chokilo Family; P50,000.00 to the Ignacio Family; and P50,000.00 to the
Balbas Family; and cralawlawlibrary

(d) Reynaldo Abayon is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid,

SO ORDERED
 [G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE,
ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the
state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition, that cannot be
[1]
taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those
who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a
single question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of
citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people
are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish
and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil
law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws
and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth
to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled
"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA
No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner
based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even
if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19
January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a
certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe
y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy
of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the
Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to
the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a
Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before
1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary
pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification
issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding
the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information
about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found,
c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of
Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration
No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a
copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the
said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003
for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed
his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed
for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any
other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824,
would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson,
and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier,"
and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G.
Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
 In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have
the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of
candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that
FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution,
the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action [2]
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
[3]
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution
provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law which power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No.
161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of
by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people
of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper
choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest
government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R.
No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging
the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission
in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be
the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has
constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as not (being)
[4]
justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on the
elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June
1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-
President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
Hearing the Same."Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members
of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary
form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly
affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless,
would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a
post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election
protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would
have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from
office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14
of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by
the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this
premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-
President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only
[5]
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not
include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications
of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson,
et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poea.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
 Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish
historical background on the concept of citizenship. regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church [13]

records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given
inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became
by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen"
highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it
to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the
difficult to point to one comprehensive law.Not all of these citizenship
holding of an office. Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine
[6]

laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands

the constituency of the "State," which he described as being
except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. [14]

composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to

achieve a self-sufficient existence. The concept grew to include one
[7]
who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was
seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether
the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of
differing views among experts; however, three royal decrees were
[15]

concomitant obligations, on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was

[8]
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines -
active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, the Royal Decree of 23
[16]

interests to the general interest of society. August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in
the Philippine Islands, and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of
[17]

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the

04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines
centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large,
by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. [18]

to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for

individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the
justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
[9]
Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89,
include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this
participate in the exercise of political power. The 20th century saw
[10]
country was included, would be governed by special laws. [19]

the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this
emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social
jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first
security. The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
[11]

categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and
final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.
[12]

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born

outside of Spain,
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present (c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
 (d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. [20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was
forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world
power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation
of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws,
which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898
between Spain and the United States. Under Article IX of the treaty,
[21]
the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its
Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may
remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event
all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such
property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on
their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof
to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in
which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress." [22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United
States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not
become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens"
under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them
to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first
time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of
the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." [23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was
an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day
of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-
born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11
April 1899. [24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the
Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no
citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the
view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common
law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of
territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed
those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. More [25]
about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the
following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein." [26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of
"Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word
"Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General
in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan,
"The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy
Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in
1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided
for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who
are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines
was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he
was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the
Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some
other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or
not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution
brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once
and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together
with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that
women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire
that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children
of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to
men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the
new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further
provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the
1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct the irregular situation generated by the questionableproviso in
the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years
of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." [27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August
1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history,
four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization,jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
[28]
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
[29]
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become
[30]
the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to
indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father
of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to
be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old
at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth
of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother,
Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to
be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born
on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,
married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity
of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the
marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be
that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was
84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the
fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the
custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner
and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his
Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence
for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the
facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in
relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and
the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by
petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his
argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the
originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or
is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the
entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty
in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is
usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested
origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which
makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred. [31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died
on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born
sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of
Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering
that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed
to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same
period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was
stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume,
that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was
also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the
Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete
records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation
(relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an
illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines
from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when
the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was
required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a
record of birth, a will, or a public document. Complementary to the
[32]
new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in
Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the
father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal
in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the
child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove
voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was
required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such
requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative
document of recognition. In Mendoza vs. Mella, the Court ruled -
[33] [34]
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which
is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance,
in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both
parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to
be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement
in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both
parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe
found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to
have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of
voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja, this Court defined what could
[35]
constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means
by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly
made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record
or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor
of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the
child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action
to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and
might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime
of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument,
"authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of
voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing
of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a
private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172,
Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article
256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has
[36]
ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child
should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if
the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before
August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to
break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate
and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely
govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if
any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the
individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship"
could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations
of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and
those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."
[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster, the Court has held:
[38]
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of
the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their
properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general,
the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of
the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law
of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is
significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil
Code, such as on successional rights and family relations. In
[39] [40]
adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child
of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights
under civil law and not his political status.
[41]
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish
family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and
successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in
the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-
up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth
were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these
bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were
codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination
survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of
our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should
remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge
on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil
Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not
necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or
Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the
declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a
person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made
before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between
the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before
the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together
with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one
house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing
in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do
hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan
Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando
Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged
while they were students at the University of the Philippines in
1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister
that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in
1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived
together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St.
(now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila
in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four
(4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my
nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that
he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of
January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has
[42]
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now
the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage.Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test
as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior
to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ
an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most
doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less
than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent
and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were
married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner
contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship
of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on
the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo, citingChiongbian vs. de
[43]
Leon and Serra vs. Republic.
[44] [45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus
curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of
them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under
the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look
closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan. This is a more complicated case. The case was
[46]
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio
Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate
son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that
he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said
that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore
was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate.This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter
dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs.
Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child,
and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long
ago by People vs. Cayat. I would grant that the distinction between
[47]
legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x
x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child
from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion
of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former
member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin
Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of
petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after
the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to
ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father
in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would
exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against
him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration
is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the
day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly
are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review,
possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed
under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC
for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit,
the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the
disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention
that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of
candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
 (2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity,
the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been
directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal
to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under
the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has
been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate
[48]

directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held. and willful.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix
take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections,
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X.
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of
Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having 2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave
that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have No Costs.
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would SO ORDERED.
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section
78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO
and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated
20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando
P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity
Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between
Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement
leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate
dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan – 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila – 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant
death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in
case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children).
In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and
sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife,
Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in
the 38th week of pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7
January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but
denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the
death and accident insurance.7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for
bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery
provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to
settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement
dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary
arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and
other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of
the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the
dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position
Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and
Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent
should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that
his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union
cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer
Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in
similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar
provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee
of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already
died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement
leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer
Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as
opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only
died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in
the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the
same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with
the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all
doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA
did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It
claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1)
death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s
case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code,
contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child
never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same
line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the
moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be
applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered
dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did
it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the
legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both
parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of
dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the parent-
employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the
legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its
sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were
irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of
the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of
bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an
unborn child constituted “company practice.”
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, issued a Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with
pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’
CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is “death”; (2) such
death must be of employee’s “dependent”; and (3) such dependent must be
“legitimate”.
On the other hand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as
provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4)
indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is “death”; (b) such death must be
of employee’s “dependent”; (c) such dependent must be “legitimate”; and (d) proper
legal document to be presented.18
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s
legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents
from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for
support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power
or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a
dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent,
unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING
[herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his
bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for
bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an
employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of
pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated
by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not
acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was
bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate
dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said
child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine
qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits
under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty.
Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted
death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term
“death” is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for
ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits
thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel]
that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born
alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus
could never be contemplated as a “death” as to be covered by the CBA provision,
undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the
dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow
and technical significance to the term “death of a legitimate dependent” as condition
for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following
[Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of “death” to speak of. The
Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with
anything less than “loss of human life”, especially for the expectant parents. In this
light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and
the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act
conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s]
insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses
this crucial point.20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is
clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be
applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a
juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X,
Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent,
spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the
dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under
Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal
document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the
provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for
denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on
the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms “death” and “dependent” as used in
the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there
is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover,
Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to
define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the
negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the
legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same
Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which
is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question
before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations
prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents.The
rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may
be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous
with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could
die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another for support;
one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.”
Under said general definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without
depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is
explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that
the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental
Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more
general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to
his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate
child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation
between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic
on the matter:
“Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”
(Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as
follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children —
legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present
case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that
their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said
child legitimate upon her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth
element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted
by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief
and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of
parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and
other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions
thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of
doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be
interpreted in favor of labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should
be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations
Commission,30 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed
decision that “when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are
equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor.” While petitioner
acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved
in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is
essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection
and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)],
we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of
social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by
sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265
(1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to
the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February
2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano
bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand
Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, * petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter,
PT & T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the
services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really
motivated PT & T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited
by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a
proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed
period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.1 Under the Reliever
Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of
the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private
respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who
went on leave during both periods.2 After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were
terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the
probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she
indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier,
that is, on May 26, 1991.3
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which
she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch
supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her
to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married
women for employment.4
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding
married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.5 Petitioner nonetheless
remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992,6 which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of
cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in
Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the information, and this
was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her
collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner7. All of these took place in a formal
proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who
had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment
of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed
view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was
apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company
rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its
decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful
discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that
Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not
be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the
reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT & T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of
November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent
NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect but, through the
ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex.
Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal
employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling
within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation
against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life,
provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II8 on the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure,
at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII9 (the
progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to
labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement
to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII 10 mandates that the State shall protect working women
through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor
Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory
to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 11
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 12 which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with
respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 13 which bans
the "mail-order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the
rights of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192 14 also known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act,"
which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment, admission,
training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322 15 increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private
sector; Republic Act No. 7877 16 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and
training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, 17 or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which
prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries
where their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code, 18 women's rights in the
field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130
involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with
facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor
and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments
shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman's right against
discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the
issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security
of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an
individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in
dispensing with the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called management
prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working
methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline,
dismissal, and recall of employees. 19 As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best
business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those
which may be provided by law. 20
In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor
laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from
employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved
principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch
supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is not
accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you." 21 Again, in the termination notice sent to her
by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not
only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company's
policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.") 22 Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that
petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise
be solidarily liable with the corporation. 23
Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T could not be properly characterized
as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a
stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her
civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it
should not be simulated. 24 It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer's
caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26
In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not because the latter got married
but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence
the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal.
Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage over the
concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent
may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy against its female employees
contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her
concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it supposedly has no
objection. In other words, PT & T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the
maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If
that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead of
proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true
management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions which confuse through less than
candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the
aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was,
however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondent's secretive conduct now complained of. It is then
apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly misappropriated
company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving.
Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections,
but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital
status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider
petitioner's submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a
perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent deliberately
misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether the
negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to
refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her
walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted
as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period
was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of
tenure. 27 On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee,
even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and
business of PT & T. 28 The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. 29
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent. 30 However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her
status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by
respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be condoned. It would be
unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally
justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to
the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months
suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT & T. The Labor
Code state, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition
of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 148, 31 better known
as the "Women and
Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, 32 entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The forerunner to
Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the
employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other
places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines, 33 a
decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective
flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was declared
void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married
women. Thus:
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or regulation with the codal provision
of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to
women employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged
in extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities
of their chosen profession.
 We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the
controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree
No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of
those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain
a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in
Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months
later, or on November 1, 1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all policies
and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary
of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in
appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards
for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the factor
that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set
forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight
attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be
established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in Section 9
of the New Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work . . . .
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that termination from employment of flight
attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own health,
safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its
concern is not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of
marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriage-
pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy
on flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as
it had been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of
Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-
marriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for
long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on
actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the
distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flight
attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or conditions relating to the marital
status of an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other.
Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected
by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of married women, but do not
apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal
statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of, among other things, sex. 35
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against married women. And, where the
employer discriminates against married women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is
unlawful. 36 Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a
"bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not
on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature
would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one
case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the restriction
was not related to the job performance of the flight attendants. 37
5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be
free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals
and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts
inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. 38 Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 39 Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that
petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the parties, that is, of
capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same should yield
to the common good. 40 It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other,
nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. 41 In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against
marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. 42 That it must be effectively interdicted here in
all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order
but imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED

Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should have
categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary
occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-
discrimination on the employment of women.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation 34 considered as
void a policy of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy
of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to
lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral
understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an
example of "discriminatory chauvinism" tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account
of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code,
Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015
HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON.
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE
G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO,
HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON.
SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO,
BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO
LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P.
JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO,
ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS
REYES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 207276
REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON.
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE
G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO,
HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON.
SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO,
BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO
LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P.
JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO,
ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS
REYES, RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 207282
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON.
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON.
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO
PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR.,
HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO,
BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO
LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSA,
RODOLFO SAMBAJON, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
RAMON JESUS P. PAJE in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SUBIC
BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, AND REDONDO PENINSULA
ENERGY, INC., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 207366
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON.
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, HON. ROLEN
C. PAULINO, HON EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES,
HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA
LIPUMANOGARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE
GAMBOA, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELHPERALTA,
ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO
GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO
ESQUILLO, ELLE·LATINAZO, EV ANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN
CARLO DELOS REYES, HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES AND REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC.,
Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before this Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 dated January 30, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated May 22, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00015, entitled "Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño,
et al. v. Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, et al."
Factual Antecedents
In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority· (SBMA), a government agency
organized and established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227,4 and Taiwan
Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would
supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).5
On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC
undertook to build and operatea coal-fired power plant.6 In the said MOU, TCC
identified 20 hectares of land at SitioNaglatore, Mt. Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport
Zone (SBFZ) as the suitable area for the project and another site of approximately 10
hectares tobe used as an ash pond.7 TCC intends to lease the property from SBMA
for a term of 50 years with rent fixed at$3.50 per square meter, payable in 10 equal 5-
year installments.8
On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) No. EC-SBFZ-ECC-69-21-500 in favor of Taiwan
Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC,9 for the
construction, installation,and operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed
(CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.10
On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July
28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy),11 a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with the primary purpose of
building, owning, and operating powerplants in the Philippines, among others.12
Accordingly, an Addendum to the said MOU was executed by SBMA and RP
Energy.13
RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty, Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP
Energy in applying for the issuance ofan ECC from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).14 On August 27, 2008, the Sangguniang
Panglungsodof Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing
the city government’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and
urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources ofenergy for Subic Bay.15
On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr.,
issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant.16
Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional components in its
proposed coal-fired power plant. Due to the changes in the project design, which
involved the inclusion of a barge wharf, seawater intake breakwater, subsea discharge
pipeline, raw water collection system, drainage channel improvement, and a 230kV
double-circuit transmission line,17 RP Energy requested the DENR Environmental
Management Bureau(DENR-EMB) to amend its ECC.18 In support of its request, RP
Energy submitted to the DENR-EMBan Environmental Performance Report and
Management Plan (EPRMP), which was prepared by GHD.19
On June 8, 2010, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and Development
Agreement (LDA) over a 380,004.456-square meter parcel of land to be used for
building and operating the coal-fired power plant.20
On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMBissued an amended ECC (first amendment)
allowing the inclusion ofadditional components, among others.21
Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the
ECC.22 Instead of constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally
planned, it now sought toconstruct a 1x300-MWcoal-fired power plant.23 In support
of its request, RP Energy submitted a Project Description Report (PDR) to the
DENR-EMB.24
On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC
(second amendment).25
On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Zambales issued Resolution
No. 2011-149, opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant at
SitioNaglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic, Zambales.26
On August 11, 2011, the Liga ng mga Barangayof Olongapo City issued Resolution
No. 12, Series of 2011, expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as
an energy source.27
On July 20, 2012, Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. Rafael
V. Mariano, Hon. Emerenciana A. De Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., Hon. Rolen C.
Paulino,Hon. Eduardo Piano, Hon. James de los Reyes, Hon. Aquilino Y. Cortez, Jr.,
Hon. Sarah Lugerna Lipumano-Garcia, Noraida Velarmino, Bianca Christine
Gamboa Espinos, Charo Simons, Gregorio Llorca Magdaraog, Rubelh Peralta, Alex
Corpus Hermoso,Rodolfo Sambajon, Rev. Fr. Gerardo Gregorio P. Jorge, Carlito A.
Baloy, Ofelia D. Pablo, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo, Evangeline Q. Rodriguez, and
John Carlo delos Reyes (Casiño Group) filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity
as Secretary of the DENR.28
On July 31, 2012, this Court resolved, among others, to: (1) issue a Writ of
Kalikasan; and (2) refer the case to the CA for hearing and reception of evidence and
rendition of judgment.29 While the case was pending, RP Energy applied for another
amendment to its ECC (third amendment) and submitted another EPRMP to the
DENR-EMB, proposing the construction and operation of a 2x300-MW coal-fired
power plant.30
On September 11, 2012, the Petition for Writ of Kalikasanwas docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 00015 and raffled to the Fifteenth Division of the CA.31 In the Petition, the
Casiño Group alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause grave
environmental damage;32 that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of
the municipalities of Subic,Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of
Olongapo;33 that the ECC was issued and the LDA entered into without the prior
approval of the concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the
Local Government Code (LGC);34 that the LDA was entered into without securing a
prior certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as
required under Section 59 of RA8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA Law);35 that Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO
2003-30) which allowsamendments of ECCs is ultra viresbecause the DENR has no
authority to decide on requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in the
absence of a new EIS;36 and that due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-30,
all amendments to RP Energy’s ECC are null and void.37
On October 29, 2012, the CA conducted a preliminary conference wherein the
parties, with their respective counsels, appeared except for Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño,
Hon. Rafael V. Mariano, Hon. Emerencia A. De Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Mario
Esquillo, Elle Latinazo,Evangeline Q. Rodriguez, and the SBMA.38 The matters
taken up during the preliminary conference were embodied in the CA’s Resolution
dated November 5, 2012, to wit:
I. ISSUES
A. Petitioners (Casiño Group)
1. Whether x x x the DENR Environmental Compliance Certificate (‘ECC’ x
x x) in favor of RP Energy for a 2x150 MW Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant
Project (‘Power Plant,’ x x x ) and its amendment to 1x300 MW Power Plant,
and the Lease and Development Agreement between SBMA and RP Energy
complied with the Certification Precondition as required under Section 59 of
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (‘IPRA
Law,’ x x x);
2. Whether x x x RP Energy can proceed with the construction and operation
of the 1x300 MW Power Plant without prior consultation with and approval of
the concerned local government units (‘LGUs,’ x x x ), pursuant to Sections
26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code;
3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DENRAdministrative Order No. 2003-30
(‘DAO No. 2003-30,’ x x x ) providing for the amendment of an ECC is null
and void for being ultra vires; and
4. Whether x x x the amendment of RPEnergy’s ECC under Section 8.3 of
DAO No. 2003-30 is null and void.
B. Respondent RP Energy
1. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can be collaterally
attacked;
1.1 Whether x x x the same is valid until annulled;
2. Whether x x x petitioners exhausted their administrative remedies with
respect to the amended ECC for the 1x300 MW Power Plant;
2.1 Whether x x x the instant Petition is proper;
 3. Whether x x x RP Energycomplied with all the procedures/requirements for
the issuance of the DENR ECC and its amendment;
3.1 Whether x x x a Certificate of Non-Overlap from the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples is applicable in the instant case;
4. Whether x x x the LGU’s approval under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code is necessaryfor the issuance of the DENR ECC and its
amendments, and what constitutes LGU approval;
5. Whether x x x there is a threatened or actual violation of environmental
laws to justify the Petition;
5.1 Whether x x x the approved 1x300 MW Power Plant complied
with the accepted legal standards on thermal pollution of coastal
waters, air pollution, water pollution, and acid deposits on aquatic and
terrestrial ecosystems; and
6. Whether x x x the instant Petition should be dismissed for failure to comply
with the requirements of properverification and certification of nonforum
shopping with respect to some petitioners.
C. Respondent DENR Secretary Paje
1. Whether x x x the issuance of the DENR ECC and its amendment in favor
of RP Energy requires compliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law, as well
as Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code;
2. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can be collaterally attacked
in this proceeding; and
3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 is valid.
II. ADMISSIONS/DENIALS
Petitioners, through Atty. Ridon, admittedall the allegations in RP Energy’s Verified
Return, except the following:
1. paragraphs 1.4 to 1.7;
2. paragraphs 1.29 to 1.32; and
3. paragraphs 1.33 to 1.37.
Petitioners made no specific denial withrespect to the allegations of DENR Secretary
Paje’s Verified Return. x x x
Respondent RP Energy proposed the following stipulations, which were all admitted
by petitioners, through Atty. Ridon, viz:
1. The 1x300 MW Power Plant is not yet operational;
2. At present, there is no environmental damage;
3. The 1x300 MW Power Plant project is situated within the Subic Special
Economic Zone; and
4. Apart from the instant case, petitioners have not challenged the validity of
Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30.
Public respondent DENR Secretary Paje did not propose any matter for stipulation.39
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Casiño Group presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Raymond V. Palatino, a
two-term representativeof the KabataanPartylist in the House of Representatives;40
(2) Alex C. Hermoso, the convenor of the Zambales-Olongapo City Civil Society
Network,a director of the PREDA41 Foundation, and a member of the Zambales
Chapter of the Kaya NatinMovement and the Zambales Chapter of the People Power
Volunteers for Reform;42 and (3) Ramon Lacbain, the ViceGovernor of the Province
of Zambales.43
RP Energy presented five witnesses,namely: (1) JunisseP. Mercado (Ms. Mercado),
an employee of GHD and the Project Directorof ongoing projects for RP Energy
regarding the proposed power plant project;44 (2) Juha Sarkki (Engr. Sarkki), a
Master of Science degree holder inChemical Engineering;45 (3) Henry K. Wong, a
degree holder of Bachelor of Science Major in Mechanical Engineering from
Worcester Polytechnic Institute;46 (4) Dr. Ely Anthony R. Ouano (Dr. Ouano), a
licensed Chemical Engineer, Sanitary Engineer, and Environmental Planner in the
Philippines;47 and (5) David C. Evangelista (Mr. Evangelista), a Business
Development Analyst working for RP Energy.48
SBMA, for its part, presented its Legal Department Manager, Atty. Von F. Rodriguez
(Atty. Rodriguez).49
The DENR, however, presented no evidence.50
Meanwhile, on October 31, 2012, a Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) was issued in
connection with RP Energy’s application for the 2x300-MW coal-fired power
plant.51
On November 15, 2012, the DENR-EMB granted RP Energy’s application for the
third amendment to its ECC, approving the construction and operation of a 2x300-
MW coal-fired power plant, among others.52
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 30, 2013, the CA rendereda Decision denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasanand the application for an environment protection order due to the failure of
the Casiño Group to prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology was violated or threatened.53 The CA likewise found no reason to nullify
Section 8.3 ofDAO No. 2003-30. It said that the provision was not ultra vires,as the
express power of the Secretary of the DENR, the Director and Regional Directors of
the EMB to issue an ECC impliedly includes the incidental power to amend the
same.54 In any case, the CA ruled that the validity of the said section could not
becollaterally attacked in a petition for a writ of kalikasan.55
Nonetheless, the CA resolved to invalidate the ECC dated December 22, 2008 for
non-compliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law56 and Sections 26 and 27 of the
LGC57 and for failure of Luis Miguel Aboitiz (Mr. Aboitiz), Director of RP Energy,
to affix his signature in the Sworn Statement of Full Responsibility, which is an
integral part of the ECC.58 Also declared invalid were the ECC first amendment
dated July 8, 2010 and the ECC second amendment dated May 26, 2011 in view of
the failure of RP Energy to comply with the restrictions set forth in the ECC, which
specifically require that "any expansion of the project beyond the project description
or any change in the activity x x x shall be subject to a new Environmental Impact
Assessment."59 However, as to the ECC third amendment dated November 15, 2012,
the CA decided not to rule on its validity since it was not raised as an issue during the
preliminary conference.60
The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it was
issued without the prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as
required under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC,61 and in violation of Section 59,
Chapter VIII ofthe IPRA Law, which enjoins all departments and other governmental
agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that the area affected
does not overlap with any ancestral domain.62 The CA noted that no CNO was
secured from the NCIP prior to the execution of the LDA,63 and that the CNO dated
October 31, 2012 was secured during the pendency of the case and was issued in
connection with RP Energy’s application for a 2x300-MW coalfired power plant.64
Thus, the CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the
privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the application for an environmental protection
order. The prayer to declare the nullity of Section 8.3 of the DENR Administrative
Order No. 2003-30 for being ultra vires is DENIED; and the following are all
declared INVALID:
1. The Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC Ref. Code: 0804-011-
4021) dated 22 December 2008 issued in favor of respondent Redondo
Peninsula Energy, Inc. by former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr. of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources;
2. The ECC first amendment dated 08 July 2010 and ECC second amendment
dated 26 May 2011, both issued in favor ofrespondent Redondo Peninsula
Energy, Inc. by OIC Director Atty. Juan Miguel T. Cunaof the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Environmental Management Bureau;
and
3. The Lease and Development Agreement dated 08 June 2010 entered into by
respondents Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Redondo Peninsula
Energy, Inc. involving a parcel of land consisting of ₱380,004.456 square
meters.
SO ORDERED.65
The DENR and SBMA separately moved for reconsideration.66 RP Energy filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration,67 attaching thereto a signed Statement of
Accountability.68 The Casiño Group, on the other hand, filed Omnibus Motions for
Clarification and Reconsideration.69
On May 22, 2013, the CAissued a Resolution70 denying the aforesaid motions for
lack of merit. The CA opined that the reliefs it granted in its Decision are allowed
under Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases as the
reliefs enumerated therein are broad, comprehensive, and nonexclusive.71 In fact,
paragraph (e) of the saidprovision allows the granting of "such other reliefs" in
consonance with the objective, purpose, and intent of the Rules.72 SBMA’s
contention that the stoppage of a project for non-compliance with Section 59 of the
IPRA Law may only be done by the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples was also brushed aside by the CA as the Casiño Group did not file a case
under the IPRA Law but a Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan, which is available to all
natural or juridical persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated, or threatened to be violated.73 As to RP Energy’s belated
submission of a signed Statement of Accountability, the CA gaveno weight and
credenceto it as the belated submission of such document, long after the presentation
of evidence of the parties had been terminated, is not in accord with the rules of fair
play.74 Neither was the CA swayed by the argument that the omitted signature of
Luis Miguel Aboitiz is a mere formal defect, which does not affect the validity of the
entire document.75 The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, respondents Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority’s
Motion for Reconsideration dated 18 February 2013, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Secretary Ramon Jesus P. Paje’s Motion for Reconsideration dated
19 February 2013, and Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc.’s Motion for Partial
Reconsideration dated 22 February 2013, as well as petitioners’ OmnibusMotions for
Clarification and Reconsideration dated 25 February 2013,are all DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.76
Unsatisfied, the parties appealed to this Court.
The Casiño Group’s arguments
The Casiño Group, in essence, argues that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan as it
was able to prove that the operation of the power plant would cause environmental
damage and pollution, and that thiswould adversely affect the residents of the
provinces of Bataan and Zambales, particularly the municipalities of Subic, Morong,
Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo. It cites as basis RP Energy’s EIS, which
allegedly admits that acid rain may occur in the combustion of coal;77 that the
incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the project site may
increasedue to exposure to suspended particles from plant operations;78 and that
increased sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions may occur during
plant operations.79 It also claims that when the SBMA conducted Social
Acceptability Policy Consultations with different stakeholders on the proposed power
plant, the results indicated that the overall persuasion of the participants was a clear
aversion to the project due to environmental, health, economic and socio-cultural
concerns.80 Finally, it contends that the ECC third amendment should also be
nullified for failure to comply with the procedures and requirements for the issuance
of the ECC.81
The DENR’s arguments
The DENR imputes error on the CAin invalidating the ECC and its amendments,
arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is
beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan.82 And even if it is within the
scope, there is no reason to invalidate the ECC and its amendments as these were
issued in accordance with DAO No. 2003-30.83 The DENR also insists that contrary
to the view of the CA, a new EIS was no longer necessary since the first EIS was still
within the validity period when the first amendment was requested, and that this is
precisely the reason RP Energy was only required to submit an EPRMP in support of
its application for the first amendment.84 As to the second amendment, the DENR-
EMB only required RP Energy to submit documents to support the proposed revision
considering that the change in configuration of the power plant project, from
2x150MW to 1x300MW, was not substantial.85 Furthermore, the DENR argues that
no permits, licenses, and/or clearances from other government agencies are required
in the processing and approval of the ECC.86 Thus, non-compliance with Sections 26
and 27 of the LGC as well as Section 59 ofthe IPRA Law is not a ground to invalidate
the ECC and its amendments.87 The DENR further posits that the ECC is not a
concession, permit, or license but is a document certifying that the proponent has
complied with all the requirements of the EIS System and has committed to
implement the approved Environmental Management Plan.88 The DENR invokes
substantial justice so that the belatedly submitted certified true copy of the ECC
containing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz on the Statement of Accountability may be
accepted and accorded weight and credence.89
SBMA’s arguments
For its part, SBMA asserts that since the CA did not issue a Writ of Kalikasan, it
should not have invalidated the LDA and that in doing so, the CA acted beyond its
powers.90 SBMA likewise puts in issue the legal capacity of the Casiño Group to
impugn the validity of the LDA91 and its failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.92 In any case, SBMA contends that there is no legal basis to invalidate the
LDA as prior consultation under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC is not required in this
case considering that the area is within the SBFZ.93 Under RA 7227, it is the SBMA
which has exclusive jurisdiction over projects and leases within the SBFZ and that in
case of conflict between the LGC and RA 7227, it is the latter, a special law, which
must prevail.94 Moreover, the lack of prior certification from the NCIP is alsonot a
ground to invalidate a contract.95 If at all, the only effect of non-compliance with the
said requirement under Section 59 of the IPRA Law is the stoppage or suspension of
the project.96 Besides, the subsequent issuance of a CNO has cured any legal defect
found in the LDA.97
RP Energy’s arguments
RP Energy questions the proprietyof the reliefs granted by the CA considering that it
did not issue a writ of kalikasanin favor of the Casiño Group.98 RP Energy is of the
view that unless a writ of kalikasanis issued, the CA has no power to grant the reliefs
prayed for in the Petition.99 And even if it does, the reliefs are limited to those
enumerated in Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
and that the phrase "such other reliefs" in paragraph (e) should be limited only to
those of the same class or general nature as the four other reliefs enumerated.100 As
to the validity of the LDA, the ECC and its amendments, the arguments of RP Energy
are basically the same arguments interposed by SBMA and the DENR. RP Energy
maintains that the ECC and its amendments were obtained in compliance with the
DENR rules and regulations;101 that a CNO is not necessary in the execution of
anLDA and in the issuance of the ECC and its amendments;102 and that prior
approval of the local governments, which may be affected by the project, are not
required because under RA 7227, the decision of the SBMA shall prevail in matters
affecting the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), except in matters involving
defense and security.103 RP Energy also raises the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies on the part of the Casiño Group.104 Preliminaries
This case affords us an opportunity to expound on the nature and scope of the writ of
kalikasan. It presents some interesting questions about law and justice in the context
of environmental cases, which we will tackle in the main body of this Decision.
But we shall first address some preliminary matters, in view of the manner by which
the appellate court disposed of this case.
The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan,105 which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases,106 was issued by the Court pursuant to its power to
promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,107 in
particular, the individual’s rightto a balanced and healthful ecology.108 Section 1 of
Rule 7 provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ.- The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical
person, entity authorized by law, people’s organization, nongovernmental
organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an
extraordinary remedy,which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual
violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a
magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and territorial
boundaries.109 It is intended "to provide a strongerdefense for environmental rights
through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement,
implementation and legislation have fallen short"110 and seeks "to address the
potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats."111
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this
extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property ofinhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Expectedly, the Rules do not definethe exact nature or degree of environmental
damage but only that it must be sufficientlygrave, in terms of the territorial scope of
such damage, so as tocall for the grant ofthis extraordinary remedy. The gravity
ofenvironmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-
to-case basis.
If the petitioner successfully proves the foregoing requisites, the court shall render
judgment granting the privilege of the writ of kalikasan. Otherwise, the petition shall
be denied. If the petition is granted, the court may grant the reliefs provided for under
Section 15of Rule 7, to wit: Section 15. Judgment.- Within sixty (60) daysfrom the
time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or
denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing
acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental
laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private
person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private
person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of
the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private
person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final
judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual
petitioners.
It must be noted, however,that the above enumerated reliefs are non-exhaustive. The
reliefs that may be granted under the writ are broad, comprehensive and non-
exclusive.112
Prescinding from the above, the DENR, SBMA and RP Energy are one in arguing
that the reliefs granted by the appellate court, i.e.invalidating the ECC and its
amendments, are improper because it had deniedthe Petition for Writ of
Kalikasanupon a finding that the Casiño Group failed to prove the alleged
environmental damage, actual or threatened, contemplated under the Rules.
Ordinarily, no reliefs could and should be granted. But the question may be asked,
could not the appellate court have granted the Petition for Writ of Kalikasanon the
ground of the invalidity of the ECC for failure to comply with certain laws and rules?
This question is the starting point for setting up the framework of analysis which
should govern writ of kalikasan cases.
In their Petition for Writ of Kalikasan,113 the Casiño Group’s allegations, relative to
the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, may be grouped into two.
The first set of allegations deals withthe actual environmental damage that will occur
if the power plant project isimplemented. The Casiño Group claims that the
construction and operation of the power plant will result in (1) thermal pollution of
coastal waters, (2) air pollution due to dust and combustion gases, (3) water pollution
from toxic coal combustion waste, and (4) acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial
ecosystems, which will adversely affect the residents of the Provinces of Bataan and
Zambales, particularly the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, and the
City of Olongapo.
The second set of allegations deals with the failureto comply with certain laws and
rules governing or relating to the issuance ofan ECC and amendments thereto. The
Casiño Group claims that the ECC was issued in violation of (1) the DENR rules on
the issuance and amendment of an ECC, particularly, DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
Procedural Manual for DAO 2003-30 (Revised Manual), (2) Section 59 of the IPRA
Law,and (3) Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC. In addition, it claims that the LDA
entered into between SBMA and RP Energy violated Section 59 of the IPRA Law.
As to the first set of allegations, involving actual damage to the environment, it is not
difficult to discern that, if they are proven, then the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan
could conceivably be granted.
However, as to the second set of allegations, a nuanced approach is warranted. The
power of the courts to nullify an ECC existed even prior to the promulgation of the
Rules on the Writ of Kalikasanfor judicial review of the acts of administrative
agencies or bodies has long been recognized114 subject, of course, to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.115
But the issue presented before us is nota simple case of reviewing the acts of an
administrative agency, the DENR, which issued the ECC and its amendments. The
challenge to the validity ofthe ECC was raised in the context of a writ of
kalikasancase. The question then is, can the validity of an ECC be challenged viaa
writ of kalikasan?
We answer in the affirmative subject to certain qualifications.
As earlier noted, the writ of kalikasanis principally predicated on an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and
territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged
defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove
such defects or irregularities, but mustalso provide a causal link or, at least, a
reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC
and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the
petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum
with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This must
be so ifwe are to preserve the noble and laudable purposes of the writ against those
who seek to abuse it.
An example of a defect or an irregularity in the issuance of an ECC, which could
conceivably warrant the granting of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of kalikasan,
is a case where there are serious and substantial misrepresentations or fraud in the
application for the ECC, which, if not immediately nullified, would cause actual
negative environmental impacts of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules,
because the government agenciesand LGUs, with the final authority to implement the
project, may subsequently rely on such substantially defective or fraudulent ECC in
approving the implementation of the project.
To repeat, in cases of defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC, it is not
sufficient to merely allege such defects or irregularities, but to show a causal link or
reasonable connection with the environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules. In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was
shown or even attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a
mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC. This
would havebeen sufficient reason to disallow the resolution of such issues in a writ of
kalikasan case.
However, inasmuch as this is the first time that we lay down this principle, we have
liberally examined the alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC and
find that there is only one group of allegations, relative to the ECC, that can be
reasonably connected to anenvironmental damageof the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules. This is withrespect to the allegation that there was no environmental
impact assessment relative to the first and second amendments to the subject ECC. If
this were true, then the implementation of the project can conceivably actually violate
or threaten to violate the right to a healthful and balanced ecology of the inhabitants
near the vicinity of the power plant. Thus, the resolution of such an issue could
conceivably be resolved in a writ of kalikasan case provided that the case does not
violate, or is anexception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
primary jurisdiction.116
As to the claims that the issuance of the ECC violated the IPRA Law and LGC and
that the LDA, likewise, violated the IPRA Law, we find the same not to be within the
coverage of the writ of kalikasanbecause, assuming there was non-compliance
therewith, no reasonable connection can be made to an actual or threatened violation
of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under
the Rules.
To elaborate, the alleged lackof approval of the concerned sanggunians over the
subject project would not lead toor is not reasonably connected with environmental
damage but, rather, it is an affront to the local autonomy of LGUs. Similarly, the
alleged lack of a certificate precondition that the project site does not overlap with an
ancestral domain would not result inor is not reasonably connected with
environmental damage but, rather, it is an impairment of the right of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains.
These alleged violationscould be the subject of appropriate remedies before the
proper administrative bodies (like the NCIP) or a separate action to compel
compliance before the courts, as the case may be. However, the writ of kalikasan
would not be the appropriate remedy to address and resolve such issues.
Be that as it may, we shall resolve both the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case
and those which are not, commingled as it were here, because of the exceptional
character of this case. We take judicial notice of the looming power crisis that our
nation faces. Thus, the resolution of all the issues in this case is of utmost urgency
and necessity in order to finally determine the fate of the project center of this
controversy. If we were to resolve only the issues proper in a writ of kalikasancase
and dismiss those not proper therefor, that will leave such unresolved issues open to
another round of protracted litigation. In any case, we find the records sufficient to
resolve all the issues presented herein. We also rule that, due to the extreme urgency
of the matter at hand, the present case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.117 As we have often ruled, in exceptional cases, we can
suspend the rules of procedure in order to achieve substantial justice, and to address
urgent and paramount State interests vital to the life of our nation.
Issues
In view of the foregoing, we shall resolve the following issues:
1. Whether the Casiño Group was able to prove that the construction and
operation of the power plant will cause grave environmental damage.
1.1. The alleged thermal pollution of coastal waters, air pollution due
to dust and combustion gases, water pollution from toxic coal
combustion waste, and acid deposition to aquatic and terrestrial
ecosystems that will becaused by the project.
1.2. The alleged negative environmental assessment of the project by
experts in a report generated during the social acceptability
consultations.
1.3. The alleged admissions of grave environmental damage in the EIS
itself of the project.
2. Whether the ECC is invalid for lackof signature of Mr. Luis Miguel
Aboitiz, as representative of RP Energy, in the Statement of Accountability of
the ECC.
3. Whether the first and second amendments to the ECC are invalid for failure
to undergo a new environmental impact assessment (EIA) because of the
utilization of inappropriate EIA documents.
4. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of the IPRA
Law, is a precondition to the issuanceof an ECC and the lack of its prior
issuance rendered the ECC invalid.
5. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of the IPRA
Law, is a precondition to the consummation of the Lease and Development
Agreement (LDA) between SBMA and RPEnergy and the lack of its prior
issuance rendered the LDA invalid.
6. Whether compliance with Section 27, in relation to Section 26, of the LGC
(i.e., approval of the concerned sanggunianrequirement) is necessary prior to
the implementation of the power plant project.
7. Whether the validity of the third amendment to the ECC can be resolved in
this case.
Ruling
The parties to this case appealed from the decision of the appellate court pursuant to
Section 16, Rule7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, viz:
Section 16. Appeal.- Within fifteen (15) days from the date of notice of the adverse
judgment or denialof motion for reconsideration, any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court under Rule45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal may raise questions
of fact. (Emphasis supplied)
It is worth noting that the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on
appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court— because ofthe extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan.118 Thus, we shall review both questions of law and
fact in resolving the issues presented in this case.
We now rule on the above-mentioned issues in detail.
 I.
Whether the Casiño Group was able to prove that the construction and operation of
the power plant will cause grave environmental damage.
The alleged thermal pollution of coastal
waters, air pollution due to dust and
combustion gases, water pollution from
toxic coal combustion waste, and acid
deposition in aquatic and terrestrial
ecosystems that willbe caused by the
project.
As previously noted, the Casiño Group alleged that the construction and operation of
the power plant shall adversely affect the residents of the Provinces of Bataan and
Zambales, particularly, the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, and the
City of Olongapo, as well as the sensitive ecological balance of the area. Their claims
of ecological damage may be summarized as follows:
1. Thermal pollution of coastal waters. Due to the discharge of heated water
from the operation of the plant, they claim that the temperature of the affected
bodies of water will rise significantly. This will have adverse effects on
aquatic organisms. It will also cause the depletion of oxygen in the water. RP
Energy claims that there will beno more than a 3°C increase in water
temperature but the Casiño Group claims that a 1°C to 2°C rise can already
affect the metabolism and other biological functions of aquatic organisms
such asmortality rate and reproduction.
2. Air pollution due to dust and combustion gases. While the Casiño Group
admits that Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal technology, which will be
used in the power plant, is a clean technology because it reduces the emission
of toxic gases, it claims that volatile organic compounds, specifically,
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) will also be emitted under the CFB.
PAHs are categorized as pollutants with carcinogenic and mutagenic
characteristics. Carbon monoxide, a poisonous gas, and nitrous oxide, a lethal
global warming gas, will also be produced.
3. Water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste. The waste from coal
combustion or the residues from burning pose serious environmental risk
because they are toxic and may cause cancer and birth defects. Their release to
nearby bodies of water will be a threatto the marine ecosystem of Subic Bay.
The project is located in a flood-prone area and is near three prominent
seismic faults as identified by Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology. The construction of an ash pond in an area susceptible to
flooding and earthquake also undermines SBMA’s duty to prioritize the
preservation of the water quality in Subic Bay.
4. Acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. The power plant will
release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxides and 886 tons of sulfur dioxide per year.
These oxides are responsible for acid deposition. Acid deposition directly
impacts aquatic ecosystems. It is toxic to fish and other aquatic animals. It
will also damage the forests near Subic Bay as well as the wildlife therein.
This will threaten the stability of the biological diversity of the Subic Bay
Freeport which was declared as one of the ten priority sites among the
protected areas in the Philippines and the Subic Watershed and Forest
Reserve. This will also have an adverse effect on tourism.119
In its January 30, 2013 Decision, the appellate court ruled that the Casiño Group
failed to prove the above allegations.
We agree with the appellate court.
Indeed, the three witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not experts on the CFB
technology or on environmental matters. These witnesses even admitted on cross-
examination that theyare not competent to testify on the environmental impact of the
subject project. What is wanting in their testimonies is their technical knowledgeof
the project design/implementation or some other aspects of the project, even those not
requiring expertknowledge, vis-à-vis the significant negative environmental impacts
which the Casiño Group alleged will occur. Clearly, the Casiño Group failed to carry
the onusof proving the alleged significant negative environmental impacts of the
project. In comparison, RP Energy presented several experts to refute the allegations
of the Casiño Group.
As aptly and extensively discussed by the appellate court:
Petitioners120 presented three (3) witnesses, namely, Palatino, Hermoso, and
Lacbain, all of whom are not experts on the CFB technology or even on
environmental matters. Petitioners did not present any witness from Morong or
Hermosa. Palatino, a former freelance writer and now a Congressman representing
the Kabataan Partylist, with a degree of BS Education major in Social Studies,
admitted that he is not a technical expert. Hermoso, a Director of the PREDA
foundation which is allegedly involved on environmental concerns, and a member of
Greenpeace, is not an expert on the matter subject of this case. He is a graduate of BS
Sociology and a practicing business director involved in social development and
social welfare services. Lacbain, incumbent ViceGovernor of the Province of
Zambales, anaccounting graduate with a Master in Public Administration, was a
former BancoFilipino teller, entertainment manager, disco manager, marketing
manager and college instructor, and is also not an expert on the CFB technology.
Lacbain also admitted that he is neither a scientist nor an expert on matters of the
environment.
Petitioners cited various scientific studies or articles and websites culled from the
internet. However, the said scientific studiesand articles including the alleged Key
Observations and Recommendations on the EIS of the Proposed RPE Project by Rex
Victor O. Cruz (Exhibit "DDDDD") attached to the Petition, were not testified to by
an expert witness, and are basically hearsay in nature and cannot be given probative
weight. The article purportedly written by Rex Victor O. Cruz was not even signed by
the said author, which fact was confirmed by Palatino. Petitioners’ witness, Lacbain,
admitted that he did not personally conduct any study on the environmental or health
effects of a coal-firedpower plant, but only attended seminars and conferences
pertaining to climate change; and that the scientific studies mentioned in the
penultimate whereas clause of Resolution No. 2011-149 (Exhibit "AAAAA") of the
Sangguniang Panlalawiganof Zambales is based on what he read on the internet,
seminars he attended and what he heard from unnamed experts in the field of
environmental protection.
In his Judicial Affidavit (Exhibit "HHHHH"), Palatino stated that he was furnished by
the concerned residents the Key Observations and Recommendations on the EIS of
Proposed RPE Project by Rex Victor O. Cruz, and that he merely received and read
the five (5) scientific studies and articles which challenge the CFB technology.
Palatino also testified that: he was only furnished by the petitioners copies of the
studies mentioned in his Judicial Affidavit and he did not participate in the execution,
formulation or preparation of any of the said documents; he does not personally know
Rex Cruz or any of the authors of the studies included in his Judicial Affidavit; he did
not read other materials about coal-fired power plants; he is not aware of the
acceptable standards as far as the operation of a coal-fired power plant is concerned;
petitioner Velarmino was the one who furnished him copies of the documents in
reference to the MOU and some papers related to the case; petitioner Peralta was the
one who e-mailed to him the soft copy ofall the documents [letters (a) to (o) of his
Judicial Affidavit], except the LGU Resolutions; and he has never been at the actual
Power Plant projectsite. It must be noted that petitioners Velarmino and Peralta were
never presented as witnesses in this case. In addition, Palatino did not identify the
said studies but simplyconfirmed that the said studies were attached to the Petition.
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the
witness knows of his orher personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the
witness’ own perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which
he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or read or
heard those matters. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as
proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is notlimited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements. There are several
exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which are learned
treatises under Section 46 of Rule 130, viz:
"SEC. 46. Learned treatises. -A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a
subjectof history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a
matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the
subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet
is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject."
The alleged scientific studies mentioned in the Petition cannot be classified as learned
treatises. We cannot take judicial notice of the same, and no witness expert in the
subjectmatter of this case testified, that the writers of the said scientific studies are
recognized in their profession or calling as experts in the subject.
In stark contrast, respondent RP Energy presented several witnesses on the CFB
technology.
In his Judicial Affidavit, witness Wong stated that he obtained a Bachelor of Science,
Major in Mechanical Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute; he is a
Consulting Engineer of Steam Generators of URS; he was formerly connected with
Foster Wheeler where he held the positions of site commissioning engineer, testing
engineer, instrumentation and controls engineer, mechanical equipment department
manager, director of boiler performance and mechanical design engineering and
pulverized coal product director. He explained that: CFB stands for Circulating
Fluidized Bed; it is a process by which fuel is fed to the lower furnace where it is
burned in an upward flow of combustion air; limestone, which is used as sulfur
absorbent, is also fed to the lower furnace along with the fuel; the mixture offuel, ash,
and the boiler bed sorbent material is carried to the upper part of the furnace and into
a cyclone separator; the heavier particles which generally consist of the remaining
uncombusted fuel and absorbent material are separated in the cyclone separator and
are recirculated to the lower furnace to complete the combustion of any unburned
particles and to enhance SO2 capture by the sorbent; fly ash and flue gas exit the
cyclone and the fly ash is collected in the electrostatic precipitator; furnace
temperature is maintained in the range of 800° to 900° C by suitable heat absorbing
surface; the fuel passes through a crusher that reduces the size to an appropriate size
prior to the introduction into the lower furnace along with the limestone; the
limestone is used as a SO2 sorbent which reacts with the sulfur oxides to form
calcium sulfate, an inert and stable material; air fans at the bottom of the furnace
create sufficient velocity within the steam generator to maintain a bed of fuel, ash,
and limestone mixture; secondary air is also introduced above the bed to facilitate
circulation and complete combustion of the mixture; the combustion process
generates heat, which then heats the boiler feedwater flowing through boiler tube
bundles under pressure; the heat generated in the furnace circuit turns the water to
saturated steam which is further heated to superheated steam; this superheated steam
leaves the CFB boiler and expands through a steam turbine; the steam turbine is
directly connected to a generator that turns and creates electricity; after making its
way through the steam turbine, the low-pressure steam is exhausted downwards into a
condenser; heat is removed from the steam, which cools and condenses into water
(condensate); the condensate is then pumped back through a train of feedwater
heaters to gradually increase its temperature beforethis water is introduced to the
boiler to start the process all over again; and CFB technology has advantagesover
pulverized coal firing without backend cleanup systems, i.e., greater fuel flexibility,
lower SO2 and NOx emissions. Moreover, Wong testified, inter alia, that: CFBs have
a wider range of flexibility so they can environmentally handle a wider range of fuel
constituents, mainly the constituent sulfur; and is capable of handling different types
of coal within the range of the different fuelconstituents; since CFB is the newer
technology than the PC or stalker fire, it has better environmental production; 50
percent ofthe electric generation in the United States is still produced by coal
combustion; and the CFB absorbs the sulfur dioxide before it is emitted; and there
will be a lower percentage of emissions than any other technology for the coal.
In his Judicial Affidavit, Sarrki, stated that: he is the Chief Engineer for Process
Concept in FosterWheeler; he was a Manager of Process Technology for Foster
Wheeler from 1995 to 2007; and he holds a Master of Science degree in Chemical
Engineering.He explained that: CFB boilers will emit PAHs but only in minimal
amounts, while BFB will produce higher PAH emissions; PAH is a natural product of
any combustion process; even ordinary burning, such as cooking or driving
automobiles, will have some emissions that are not considered harmful; it is only
when emissions are of a significant level that damage may be caused; a CFB
technology has minimal PAH emissions; the high combustion efficiency of CFB
technology, due to long residence time of particles inside the boiler, leads to minimal
emissions of PAH; other factors such as increase in the excess air ratio[,] decrease in
Ca/S, as well as decrease in the sulfur and chlorine contents of coal will likewise
minimize PAH production; and CFB does not cause emissions beyond
scientificallyacceptable levels. He testified, inter alia, that: the CFB technology is
used worldwide; they have a 50% percent share of CFB market worldwide; and this
will be the first CFB by Foster Wheeler in the Philippines; Foster Wheeler
manufactures and supplies different type[s] of boilers including BFB, but CFB is
always applied on burning coal, so they do not apply any BFB for coal firing; CFB
has features which have much better combustion efficiency, much lower emissions
and it is more effective as a boiler equipment; the longer the coal stays inthe
combustion chamber, the better it is burned; eight (8) seconds is already beyond
adequate but it keeps a margin; in CFB technology, combustion technology is
uniform throughout the combustion chamber; high velocity is used in CFB
technology, that is vigorous mixing or turbulence; turbulence is needed to get contact
between fuel and combustion air; and an important feature of CFB is air distribution.
In his Judicial Affidavit, Ouano stated that: he is a licensed Chemical Engineer,
Sanitary Engineer and Environmental Planner in the Philippines; he is also a
chartered Professional Engineer inAustralia and a member of the colleges of
environmental engineers and chemical engineers of the Institution of Engineers
(Australia); he completed his Bachelor in Chemical Engineering in 1970, Master of
Environmental Engineering in 1972 and Doctor of Environmental Engineering in
1974; he also graduated from the University of Sydney Law School with the degree
of Master of Environmental Law in 2002 and PhD in Law from Macquarie University
in 2007. He explained in his Judicial Affidavit that: the impacts identified and
analyzed in the EIA process are all potential or likely impacts; there are a larger
number of EIA techniques for predicting the potential environmental impacts; it is
important to note that all those methods and techniques are only for predicting the
potential environmental impacts, not the real impacts; almost all environmental
systems are non-linear and they are subject to chaotic behavior that even the most
sophisticated computer could not predict accurately; and the actual or real
environmental impact could only be established when the project is in actual
operation. He testified, inter alia, that: the higher the temperature the higher the
nitrous oxide emitted; in CFB technology, the lower the temperature, the lower is the
nitrogen oxide; and it still has a nitrogen oxide but not as high as conventional coal;
the CFB is the boiler; from the boiler itself,different pollution control facilities are
going to be added; and for the overall plant with the pollution control facilities, the
particulate matters, nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide are under control. (Citations
omitted)121
We also note that RP Energy controverted in detail the afore-summarized allegations
of the Casiño Group on the four areas of environmental damage that will allegedly
occur upon the construction and operation of the power plant:
1. On thermal pollution of coastal waters.
As to the extent of the expected rise in water temperature once the power plant is
operational, Ms. Mercado stated in her JudicialAffidavit thus:
Q: What was the result of the Thermal Plume Modeling that was conducted for RP
Energy?
A: The thermal dispersion modeling results show that largest warming change
(0.95°C above ambient) is observed in the shallowest (5 m) discharge scenario. The
warmest surface temperature change for the deepest (30 m) scenario is 0.18°C. All
the simulated scenarios comply with the DAO 90-35 limit for temperature rise of 3°C
within the defined 70 x 70 m mixing zone. The proposed power plant location is near
the mouth of Subic Bay, thus the tidal currents influence the behavior of thermal
discharge plume. Since the area is well-flushed, mixing and dilution of the thermal
discharge is expected.
It also concluded that corals are less likely to be affected by the cooling water
discharge as corals may persist in shallow marine waterswith temperatures ranging
from 18°C to 36°C. The predicted highest temperature of 30.75°C, from the 0.95°C
increase in ambient in the shallowest (5 m) discharge scenario, is within this
range.122
In the same vein, Dr. Ouano stated in his Judicial Affidavit:
Q: In page 41, paragraph 99 of the Petition, it was alleged that: "x x x a temperature
change of 1°C to 2°C canalready affect the metabolism and other biological functions
of aquatic organisms such as mortality rate and reproduction." What is your expert
opinion, if any, on this matter alleged by the Petitioners?
A: Living organisms have proven time and again that they are very adaptable to
changes in the environment. Living organisms have been isolated in volcanic vents
under the ocean living on the acidic nutrient soup of sulfur and other minerals emitted
by the volcano to sub-freezing temperature in Antarctica. Asa general rule,
metabolism and reproductive activity [increase] with temperature until a maximum is
reached after which [they decline]. For this reason, during winter, animals hibernate
and plants become dormant after shedding their leaves. It is on the onset of spring that
animals breed and plants bloom when the air and water are warmer. At the middle of
autumn when the temperature drops to single digit, whales, fish, birds and other living
organisms, which are capable of migrating, move to the other end of the globe where
spring is just starting. In the processes of migration, those migratory species have to
cross the tropics where the temperature is not just one or two degrees warmer but 10
to 20 degrees warmer. When discussing the impact of 1 to 2 degrees temperature
change and its impact on the ecosystem, the most important factors to consider are –
(1) Organism Type – specifically its tolerance to temperature change (mammals have
higher tolerance); (2) Base Temperature – it is the temperature over the optimum
temperature such that an increasewill result in the decline in number of the
organisms; (3) Mobility or Space for Migration (i.e., an aquarium with limited space
or an open ocean that the organism can move to a space more suited to [a] specific
need, such as the migratory birds); and (4) Ecosystem Complexity and Succession.
The more complex the ecosystem the more stable it is as succession and adaptation
[are] more robust.
Normally, the natural variation in water temperature between early morning to late
afternoon could be several degrees (four to five degrees centigrade and up to ten
degrees centigrade on seasonal basis). Therefore, the less than one degree centigrade
change predicted by the GHD modeling would have minimal impact.123
On cross-examination, Dr. Ouano further explained—
ATTY. AZURA:
x x x When you say Organism Type – you mentioned that mammals have a higher
tolerance for temperature change?
DR. OUANO:
Yes.
ATTY. AZURA:
What about other types of organisms, Dr. Ouano? Fish for example?
DR. OUANO:
Well, mammals have high tolerance because mammals are warm[- ]blooded. Now,
when it comes to cold[-]blooded animals the tolerance is much lower. But again when
you are considering x x x fish [e]specially in open ocean you have to remember that
nature by itself is x x x very brutal x x x where there is always the prey-predator
relationship. Now, most of the fish that we have in open sea [have] already a very
strong adaptability mechanism.And in fact, Kingman back in 1964 x x x studied the
coal reefaround the gulf of Oman where the temperature variation on day to day basis
varied not by 1 degree to 2 degrees but by almost 12 degrees centigrade. Now, in the
Subic Bay area which when you’re looking at it between daytime variation, early
dawn when it is cold, the air is cold, the sea temperature, sea water is quite cold. Then
by 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon it starts to warm up. Sothe variation [in the] Subic
Bay area is around 2 to 4 degrees by natural variation from the sun as well as from the
current that goes around it. So when you are talking about what the report has said of
around 1 degree change, the total impact x x x on the fishes will be minimal. x x x
ATTY. AZURA:
x x x So, you said, Dr. Ouano, that fish, while they have a much lower tolerance for
temperature variation, are still very adaptable. What about other sea life, Dr. Ouano,
for example, sea reptiles?
DR. OUANO:
That’s what I said. The most sensitive part of the marine ecology is physically the
corals because corals are non-migratory, they are fix[ed]. Second[ly] x x x corals are
also highly dependent on sunlight penetration. If they are exposed out of the sea, they
die; if theyare so deep, they die. And that is why I cited Kingman in his studies of
coral adaptability [in] the sea ofOman where there was a very high temperature
variation, [they] survived.
ATTY. AZURA:
Would you be aware, Dr. Ouano, if Kingman has done any studies in Subic Bay?
DR. OUANO:
Not in Subic Bay but I have reviewedthe temperature variation, natural temperature
variation from the solar side, the days side as well as the seasonal variation. There are
two types of variation since temperatures are very critical. One is the daily, which
means from early morning to around 3:00 o’clock, and the other one is seasonal
variation because summer, December, January, February are the cold months and
then by April, May we are having warm temperature where the temperature goes
around 32-33 degrees; Christmas time, it drops to around 18 to 20 degrees so it[']sa
variation of around seasonal variation of 14 degrees although some of the fish might
even migrate and that is why I was trying to put in corals because they are the ones
that are really fix[ed]. They are not in a position to migrate in this season.
ATTY. AZURA:
To clarify. You said that the most potentially sensitive part of the ecosystem would be
the corals. DR. OUANO:
Or threatened part because they are the ones [that] are not in a position to migrate.
ATTY AZURA:
In this case, Dr. Ouano, with respectto this project and the projected temperature
change, will the corals in Subic Bay be affected?
DR. OUANO:
As far as the outlet is concerned, they have established it outside the coral area. By
the time it reaches the coral area the temperature variation, as per the GHD study is
very small, it[’]s almost negligible.
ATTY AZURA:
Specifically, Dr. Ouano, what does negligible mean, what level of variation are we Predicted GLC126 for 1-hr National Ambient Air Quality
talking about? averaging period Guideline Values

DR. OUANO: SO2 45.79 µg/Nm3 340 µg/Nm3

NO2 100.8 µg/Nm3 260 µg/Nm3
If you are talking about a thermometer, you might be talking about, normally about .1
degrees centigrade. That’sthe one that you could more or less ascertain. x x x CO 10 µg/Nm3 35 µg/Nm3

ATTY. AZURA: Predicted GLC for 8-hr averaging National Ambient Air Quality
period Guideline Values
Dr. Ouano, you mentioned in youranswer to the same question, Question 51, that
there is a normal variation in water temperature. In fact, you said there is a variation CO 0.19 mg/ncm 10 µg/Nm3
throughout the day, daily and also throughout the year, seasonal. Just to clarify, Dr.
Ouano. When the power plant causes the projected temperature change of 1 degree to
Predicted GLC for 24-hr averaging National Ambient Air Quality
2 degrees Celsius this will be in addition to existing variations? What I mean, Dr.
period Guideline Values
Ouano, just so I can understand, how will that work? How will the temperature
change caused by the power plant work with the existing variation? DR. OUANO: SO2 17.11 µg/Nm3 180 µg/Nm3
NO2 45.79 µg/Nm3 150 µg/Nm3
There is something like what we call the zonal mixing. This is an area of
approximately one or two hectares where the pipe goes out, the hot water goes out. So
that x x x, we have to accept x x x that [throughout it] the zone will be a disturb[ed] Predicted GLC for 1-yr averaging National Ambient Air Quality
zone. After that one or two hectares park the water temperature is well mixed [so] that period Guideline Values
the temperature above the normal existing variation now practically drops down to
almost the normal level.124 SO2 6.12 µg/Nm3 80 µg/Nm3
NO2 No standard ---
2. On air pollution due todust and combustion gases.
CO No standard ---
To establish that the emissions from the operation of the power plant would be
compliant with the standards under the Clean Air Act,125 Ms. Mercado stated in her 272. Q: What other findings resulted from the Air Dispersion Modeling, if any?
Judicial Affidavit thus:
A: It also established that the highest GLC to CleanAir Act Standards ratio among
271. Q: What was the result of the Air Dispersion Modeling that was conducted for possible receptors was located 1.6 km North NorthEast ("NNE") of the Power Plant
RP Energy? Project. Further, this ratio was valued only at 0.434 or less than half of the upper limit
set out in the Clean Air Act. This means that the highest air ambient quality
A: The Air Dispersion Modeling predicted that the Power Plant Project will produce disruption will happen only 1.6 km NNE of the Power Plant Project, and that such
the following emissions,which [are] fully compliant with the standards set by DENR: disruption would still be compliant with the standards imposed by the Clean Air
Act.127
The Casiño Group argued, however, that, as stated inthe EIS, during upset conditions,
significant negative environmental impact will result from the emissions. This claim
was refuted by RP Energy’s witness during cross-examination:
ATTY. AZURA:
If I may refer you to another page of the same annex, Ms. Mercado, that’s page 202
of the same document, the August 2012. Fig. 2-78 appears to show, there’s a Table,
Ms. Mercado, the first table, the one on top appears to show a comparison in normal
and upset conditions. I noticed, Ms. Mercado, that the black bars are much higher
than the bars in normal condition. Can you state what this means?
MS. MERCADO:
It means there are more emissions that could potentially be released when it is under
upset condition.
ATTY. AZURA:
I also noticed, Ms. Mercado, at the bottom part of this chart there are Receptor IDs,
R1, R2, R3 and so forth and on page 188 of this same document, Annex "9-
Mercado," there is a list identifying these receptors, for example, Receptor 6, Your
Honor, appears to have been located in Olongapo City, Poblacion. Just so I can
understand, Ms. Mercado, does that mean that if upset condition[s] were to occur, the
Olongapo City Poblacion will be affected by the emissions? MS. MERCADO:
All it means is that there will be higher emissions and a higher ground concentration.
But you might want to alsopay attention to the "y axis," it says there GLC/CAA
[Ground Level Concentration/Clean Air Act limit]. So it means that even under upset
conditions… say for R6, the ground level concentration for upset condition is still
around .1 or 10% percent only of the Clean Air Act limit. So it’s still much lower
than the limit.
ATTY. AZURA:
But that would mean, would it not, Ms. Mercado, that in the event of upset
conditions[,] emissionswould increase in the Olongapo City Poblacion?
MS. MERCADO:
Not emissions will increase. The emissions will be the same but the ground level
concentration, the GLC, will be higher if you compare normal versus upset. But even
if it[’]s under upset conditions, it is still only around 10% percent of the Clean Air
Act Limit.
xxxx
J. LEAGOGO:
So you are trying to impress upon this Court that even if the plant is in an upset
condition, it will emit less than what the national standards dictate?
MS. MERCADO:
Yes, Your Honor.128
With respect to the claims that the powerplant will release dangerous PAHs and CO,
Engr. Sarrki stated in his Judicial Affidavit thus:
Q: In page 42, paragraph 102 of the Petition, the Petitioners alleged that Volatile
Organic Compounds ("VOC") specifically Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon
("PAH") will be emitted even by CFB boilers. What can you say about this?
A: Actually, the study cited by the Petitioners does not apply to the present case
because it does not refer to CFB technology. The study refers to a laboratory-scale
tubular Bubbling Fluidized Bed ("BFB") test rig and not a CFB. CFB boilers will
emit PAHs but only in minimal amounts. Indeed, a BFB will produce higher PAH
emissions.
xxxx
Q: Why can the study cited by Petitioners not apply in the present case?
A: The laboratory-scale BFB used in the study only has one (1) air injection point and
does not replicate the staged-air combustion process of the CFB that RP Energy will
use. Thisstaged-air process includes the secondary air. Injecting secondary air into the
system will lead to more complete combustion and inhibits PAH production. There is
a study entitled "Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) Emissions from a Coal-
Fired Pilot FBC System" byKunlei Liu, Wenjun Han, Wei-Ping Pan, John T. Riley
found in the Journal of Hazardous Materials B84 (2001) where the findings are
discussed.
Also, the small-scale test rig utilized in the study does not simulate the process
conditions (hydrodynamics, heat transfer characteristics, solid and gas mixing
behavior, etc.) seen in a large scale utility boiler, like those which would be utilized
by the Power Plant Project.
xxxx
Q: Aside from residence time of particles and secondary air, what other factors, if
any, reduce PAH production?
A: Increase in the excess air ratio will also minimizePAH production. Furthermore,
decrease in Calcium to Sulfur moral ratio ("Ca/S"), as well as decrease in the sulfur
and chlorine contents of coal will likewise minimize PAH production. This is also
based on the study entitled "Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) Emissions
from a Coal-Fired Pilot FBC System" by Kunlei Liu, Wenjun Han, Wei-Ping Pan,
John T. Riley.
In RP Energy’s Power Plant Project, the projected coal to be utilized has low sulfur
and chlorine contents minimizing PAH production. Also, due to optimum conditions
for the in-furnace SO2capture, the Ca/S will be relatively low, decreasing PAH
production.
Q: In paragraph 104 of the Petition, it was alleged that "Carbon monoxide (CO), a
poisonous, colorless and odorless gas is also produced when there is partial oxidation
or when there is not enough oxygen (O2) to form carbon dioxide (CO2)." What can
you say about this?
A: CFB technology reduces the CO emissions of the Power Plant Project to safe
amounts. In fact, I understand that the projected emissions level of the Power Plant
Project compl[ies]with the International Finance Corporation ("IFC") standards.
Furthermore, characteristics of CFB technology such as long residence time, uniform
temperature and high turbulence provide an effective combustion environment which
results [in] lower and safer CO emissions.
Q: I have no further questions for youat the moment. Is there anything you wish to
add to the foregoing?
A: Yes. PAH is a natural product of ANY combustion process. Even ordinary
burning, such as cooking or driving automobiles, will have some emissions that are
not considered harmful. It is only when emissions are of a significant level that
damage may be caused.
Given that the Power Plant Project will utilize CFB technology, it will have minimal
PAH emissions. The high combustion efficiency of CFB technology, due to the long
residence time of particles inside the boiler, leads to the minimal emissions of PAH.
Furthermore,other factors such as increase in the excess air ratio, decrease in Ca/S, as
well as decrease in the sulfur and chlorine contents of coal will likewise minimize
PAH production. CFB does not cause emissions beyond scientifically acceptable
levels, and we are confident it will not result in the damage speculated by the
Petitioners.129
3. On water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste.
With regard to the claim that coal combustion waste produced by the plant will
endanger the health of the inhabitants nearby, Dr. Ouano stated in his Judicial
Affidavit thus:
Q: In page 43, paragraph 110 of the Petition, it was alleged that: "[s]olid coal
combustion waste is highly toxic and is said to cause birth defects and cancer risks
among others x x x." What is your expert opinion, if any, on this matter alleged by the
Petitioners?
A: Coal is geologically compressed remains of living organisms that roamed the earth
several million years ago. In the process of compression, some of the minerals in the
soil, rocks or mud, the geologic media for compression, are also imparted into the
compressed remains. If the compressing media of mud, sediments and rocks contain
high concentration of mercury, uranium, and other toxic substances, the coal formed
will likewise contain high concentration of those substances. If the compressing
materials have low concentration of those substances, then the coal formed will
likewise have low concentration of those substances. If the coal does not contain
excessive quantities of toxic substances, the solid residues are even used in
agriculture to supply micronutrients and improve the potency of fertilizers. It is used
freely as a fill material in roads and other construction activities requiring large
volume of fill and as additive in cement manufacture. After all, diamonds that people
love to hang around their necks and keep close to the chest are nothing more than the
result of special geologic action, as those in volcanic pipes on coal.130
RP Energy further argued, a matter which the Casiño Group did not rebut or refute,
that the waste generated by the plant will be properly handled, to wit:
4.1.49 When coal is burned in the boiler furnace, two by-products are
generated - bottom and fly ash. Bottom ash consists oflarge and fused
particles that fall to the bottom of the furnace and mix with the bed media.Fly
ash includes finegrained and powdery particles that are carried away by flue
gas into the electrostatic precipitator, which is then sifted and collected. These
by-products are non-hazardous materials. In fact, a coal power plant’s Fly
Ash, Bottom Ash and Boiler Slag have consequent beneficial uses which
"generate significant environmental, economic, and performance benefits."
Thus, fly ash generated during the process will be sold and transported to
cement manufacturing facilities or other local and international industries.
4.1.50 RP Energy shall also install safety measures to insure that waste from
burning of coal shall be properly handled and stored.
4.1.51 Bottom ash will be continuously collected from the furnace and
transferred through a series of screw and chain conveyors and bucket elevator
to the bottom ash silo. The collection and handling system is enclosed to
prevent dust generation. Discharge chutes will be installed at the base of the
bottom ash silo for unloading. Open trucks will be used to collect ash through
the discharge chutes. Bottom ash will be sold, and unsold ash will be stored in
ash cells. A portion of the bottom ash will be reused as bed materialthrough
the installation of a bed media regeneration system (or ash recycle). Recycled
bottom ash will be sieved using a vibrating screen and transported to a bed
material surge bin for re-injection into the boiler.
4.1.52 Fly ash from the electrostatic precipitator is pneumatically removed
from the collection hopper using compressed air and transported in dry state to
the fly ash silo. Two discharge chutes will be installed at the base of the fly
ash silo. Fly ash can either be dry-transferred through a loading spout into an
enclosed lorry or truck for selling, re-cycling, or wet-transferred through a wet
unloader into open dump trucks and transported to ash cells. Fly ash discharge
will operate in timed cycles, with an override function to achievecontinuous
discharge if required. Fly ash isolation valves in each branch line will prevent
leakage and backflow into non-operating lines.
4.1.53 Approximately 120,000m² will be required for the construction of the
ash cell. Ash will be stacked along the sloping hill, within a grid of
excavations (i.e. cells) with a 5m embankment. Excavated soils will be used
for embankment construction and backfill. To prevent infiltration [of] ash
deposits into the groundwater, a clay layer with minimum depth of400mm
will be laid at the base of each cell. For every 1-m depth of ash deposit, a 10-
cm soil backfill will be applied to immobilize ash and prevent migration via
wind. Ash cell walls will be lined with high-density polyethylene to prevent
seepage. This procedure and treatment method is in fact suitable for disposal
of toxic and hazardous wastes although fly ash is not classified as toxic and
hazardous materials.131
Anent the claims that the plant is susceptible to earthquake and landslides, Dr. Ouano
testified thus:
J. LEAGOGO:
In terms of fault lines, did you study whether this project site is in any fault line?
DR. OUANO:
There are some fault linesand in fact, in the Philippines it is very difficult to find an
area except Palawan where there is no fault line within 20 to 30 [kilometers]. But then
fault lines as well as earthquakes really [depend] upon your engineering design. I
mean, Sto. Tomas University has withstood all the potential earthquakes we had in
Manila[,] even sometimes it[’]s intensity 8 or so because the design for it back in
1600 they are already using what we call floating foundation. So if the engineering
side for it[,] technology is there to withstand the expected fault line [movement]. J.
LEAGOGO:
What is the engineering side of the project? You said UST is floating.
DR. OUANO:
The foundation, that means to say you don’t break…
J. LEAGOGO: It[’]s there.132

Floating foundation. What about this, what kind of foundation? 4. On acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems.

DR. OUANO: Relative to the threat of acid rain, Dr. Ouano stated in his Judicial Affidavit, thus:

It will now depend on their engineering design, the type of equipment… Q: In page 44, paragraph 114 of the Petition, it was alleged that "the coalfired power
plant will release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxides (NOx) per year and 886 tons of sulfur
J. LEAGOGO: dioxide (SO2) per year. These oxides are the precursors to the formation of sulfuric
acid and nitric acid which are responsible for acid deposition." Whatis your expert
No, but did you read it in their report? opinion on this matter alleged by the Petitioners?

DR. OUANO: It[’]s not there in their report because it will depend on the supplier, A: NO2 is found in the air, water and soil from natural processes such as lightning,
the equipment supplier. bacterial activities and geologic activities as well as from human activities such as
power plants and fertilizer usage in agriculture. SO2 is also found in air, water and
J. LEAGOGO: soil from bacterial, geologic and human activities. NO2 and SO2 in the air are part of
the natural nitrogen and sulfur cycle to widely redistribute and recycle those essential
So it[’]s not yet there? chemicals for use by plants. Without the NO2 and SO2 in the air, plant and animal
life would be limited to small areas of this planet where nitrogen and sulfur are found
DR. OUANO: in abundance. With intensive agricultural practices, nitrogen and sulfur are added in
the soil as fertilizers.
It[’]s not yet there in the site but it is also covered inour Building Code what are the
intensities of earthquakes expected of the different areas in the Philippines. Acid rain takes place when the NO2 and SO2 concentration are excessive or beyond
those values set in the air quality standards. NO2 and SO2 in the air in concentrations
J. LEAGOGO: lower than those set in the standards have beneficial effect to the environment and
agriculture and are commonly known as micronutrients.133
Have you checked our geo-hazard maps in the Philippines to check on this project
site? On clarificatory questions from the appellate court, the matter was further dissected
thus:
DR. OUANO:
J. LEAGOGO:
Yes. It is included there in the EIA Report.
x x x The project will release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxide per year. And he said, yes;
J. LEAGOGO: that witness answered, yes, itwill produce 886 tons of sulfur dioxide per year. And he
also answered yes, that these oxides are the precursors to the formation of sulfuric
It[’]s there? acid and nitric acid. Now my clarificatory question is, with this kind of releases there
will be acid rain?
DR. OUANO:
DR. OUANO:
No. You also answered in Question No. 61, "acid raintakes place when the NO2 AND
SO2 concentration are excessive." So whendo you consider it as excessive?
J. LEAGOGO:
DR. OUANO:
Why?
That is something when you are talking about acid…
DR. OUANO:
J. LEAGOGO:
Because it[’]s so dilute[d].
In terms of tons of nitrous oxide and tons of sulfur oxide, when do you consider it as
J. LEAGOGO: excessive?

It will? DR. OUANO:

DR. OUANO: It is in concentration not on tons weight, Your Honor.

Because the acid concentration is so dilute[d] so that it is not going to cause acid rain. J. LEAGOGO:

J. LEAGOGO: In concentration?

The acid concentration is so diluted that it will not cause acid rain? DR. OUANO:

DR. OUANO: In milligrams per cubic meter, milligrams per standard cubic meter.

Yes . J. LEAGOGO:

J. LEAGOGO: So being an expert, whatwill be the concentration of this kind of 1,888 tons of nitrous
oxide? What will be the concentration in terms of your…?
What do you mean it[’]s so diluted? How will it be diluted?
DR. OUANO:
DR. OUANO:
If the concentration is in excess ofsomething like 8,000 micrograms per standard
Because it[’]s going to be mixed withthe air in the atmosphere; diluted in the air in cubic meters, then there isalready potential for acid rain.
the atmosphere. And besides this 886 tons, this is not released in one go, it is released
almost throughout the year. J. LEAGOGO:

J. LEAGOGO: I am asking you, Dr. Ouano, you said it will release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxide?
DR. OUANO:
Yes .
J. LEAGOGO:
In terms of concentration, what will that be?
DR. OUANO:
In terms of the GHD study that will result [in] 19 milligrams per standard cubic
meters and the time when acid rain will start [is when the concentration gets] around
8,000 milligrams per standard cubic meters. So we have 19 compared to 8,000. So
weare very, very safe.
J. LEAGOGO:
What about SO2?
DR. OUANO:
SO2, we are talking about ... youwon’t mind if I go to my codigo. For sulfur dioxide
this acid rain most likely will start at around 7,000 milligrams per standard cubic
meter but then … sorry, it[’]s around 3,400 micrograms per cubic meter. That is the
concentration for sulfur dioxide, and in our plant it will be around 45 micrograms per
standard cubic meter. So the acid rain will start at 3,400 and the emission is estimated
here to result to concentration of 45.7 micrograms.
J. LEAGOGO:
That is what GHD said in their report.
DR. OUANO:
Yes. So that is the factor of x x x safety that we have.134
Apart from the foregoing evidence, wealso note that the above and other
environmental concerns are extensively addressed in RP Energy’s Environmental
Management Plan or Program(EMP). The EMP is "a section in the EIS that details
the prevention, mitigation, compensation, contingency and monitoring measures to
enhance positive impacts and minimize negative impacts and risks of a proposed
project or undertaking."135 One of the conditions of the ECC is that RP Energy shall
strictly comply with and implement its approved EMP. The Casiño Group failed to
contest, with proof, the adequacy of the mitigating measures stated in the aforesaid
EMP.
In upholding the evidence and arguments of RP Energy, relative to the lack of proof
as to the alleged significant environmental damage that will be caused by the project,
the appellate court relied mainly on the testimonies of experts, which we find to be in
accord withjudicial precedents. Thus, we ruled in one case:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies of experts, they may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of
the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within
the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning
by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom
he testifies,the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and
observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve
to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected;
it isto be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case
and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effects (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the
expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial
court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable inthe absence of an abuse of that
discretion.136
Hence, we sustain the appellate court’s findings that the Casiño Group failed to
establish the alleged grave environmental damage which will be caused by the
construction and operation of the power plant.
In another vein, we, likewise, agree with the observationsof the appellate court that
the type of coal which shall be used in the power plant has important implications as
to the possible significant negative environmental impacts of the subject project.137
However, there is no coal supply agreement, as of yet, entered into by RP Energy
with a third-party supplier. In accordance with the terms and conditions of the ECC
and in compliance with existing environmental laws and standards, RP Energy is
obligated to make use of the proper coal type that will not cause significant negative
environmental impacts.
The alleged negative environmental
assessment of the project by experts in a
report generated during the social
acceptability consultations
The Casiño Group also relies heavily on a report on the social acceptability process of
the power plant project to bolster itsclaim that the project will cause grave
environmental damage. We purposely discuss this matter in this separate subsection
for reasons which will be made clear shortly.
But first we shall present the pertinent contents of this report.
According to the Casiño Group, from December 7 to 9, 2011, the SBMA conducted
social acceptabilitypolicy consultations with different stakeholders on RP Energy’s
proposed 600 MW coal plant project at the Subic Bay Exhibition and Convention
Center. The results thereof are contained in a document prepared by SBMA entitled
"Final Report: Social Acceptability Process for RP Energy, Inc.’s 600-MW Coal
Plant Project" (Final Report). We notethat SBMA adopted the Final Report as a
common exhibit with the Casiño Group in the course of the proceedings before the
appellate court.
The Final Report stated that there was a clear aversion to the concept of a coal-fired
power plant from the participants. Their concerns included environmental, health,
economic and socio-cultural factors. Pertinent to this case is the alleged assessment,
contained in the Final Report, of the potential effects of the project by three experts:
(1) Dr. Rex Cruz (Dr. Cruz), Chancellor of the University of the Philippines, Los
Baños and a forest ecology expert, (2) Dr. Visitacion Antonio, a toxicologist, who
related information as to public health; and (3) Andre Jon Uychiaco, a marine
biologist.
The Final Report stated these experts’alleged views on the project, thus:
IV. EXPERTS’ OPINION
xxxx
The specialists shared the judgment that the conditions were not present to merit the
operation of a coal-fired power plant,and to pursue and carry out the project with
confidence and assurance that the natural assets and ecosystems within the Freeport
area would not be unduly compromised, or that irreversible damage would not occur
and that the threats to the flora and fauna within the immediate community and its
surroundings would be adequately addressed. The three experts were also of the same
opinion that the proposed coal plant project would pose a wide range of negative
impacts on the environment, the ecosystems and human population within the impact
zone.
The specialists likewise deemed the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA)
conducted by RPEI to be incomplete and limited in scope based on the following
observations:
i. The assessment failed to include areas 10km. to 50km. from the operation
site, although according tothe panel, sulfur emissions could extend as far as
40-50 km.
ii. The EIA neglected to include other forests in the Freeport in its scope and
that there were no specific details on the protection of the endangered flora
and endemic fauna in the area. Soil, grassland, brush land, beach forests and
home gardens were also apparently not included in the study.
iii. The sampling methods used inthe study were limited and insufficient for
effective long-term monitoring of surface water, erosion control and terrestrial
flora and fauna.
The specialists also discussed the potential effects of an operational coalfired power
plant [on] its environs and the community therein. Primary among these were the
following:
i. Formation of acid rain, which would adversely affect the trees and
vegetation in the area which, in turn, would diminish forest cover. The acid
rain would apparently worsen the acidity of the soil in the Freeport.
ii. Warming and acidification of the seawater in the bay, resulting in the bio-
accumulationof contaminants and toxic materials which would eventually lead
to the overall reduction of marine productivity.
 iii. Discharge of pollutants such as Nitrous Oxide, Sodium Oxide, Ozone and
other heavy metals suchas mercury and lead to the surrounding region, which
would adversely affect the health of the populace in the vicinity.
V. FINDINGS
Based on their analyses of the subject matter, the specialists recommended that the
SBMA re-scrutinize the coal-fired power plant project with the following goals in
mind:
i. To ensure its coherence and compatibility to [the] SBMA mandate, vision,
mission and development plans, including its Protected Area Management
Plan;
ii. To properly determine actual and potential costs and benefits;
iii. To effectively determine the impacts on environment and health; and
iv. To ensure a complete and comprehensive impacts zone study.
The specialists also urged the SBMA to conduct a Comprehensive Cost And Benefit
Analysis Of The Proposed Coal Plant Project Relative To Each Stakeholder Which
Should Include The Environment As Provider Of Numerous Environmental Goods
And Services.
They also recommended an Integrated/Programmatic Environmental Impact
Assessmentto accurately determine the environmental status of the Freeport
ecosystem as basis and reference in evaluating future similar projects. The need for a
more Comprehensive Monitoring System for the Environment and Natural
Resourceswas also reiterated by the panel.138
Of particular interest are the alleged key observations of Dr. Cruz on the EIS prepared
by RP Energy relative to the project:
Key Observations and Recommendations on the EIS of Proposed RPE Project
Rex Victor O. Cruz
Based on SBMA SAP on December 7-9, 2011
1. The baseline vegetation analysis was limited only within the project site
and its immediate vicinity. No vegetation analysis was done in the brushland
areas in the peninsula which is likely to be affected in the event acid rain
forms due to emissions from the power plant.
2. The forest in the remaining forests inthe Freeport was not considered as
impact zone as indicated by the lack ofdescription of these forests and the
potential impacts the project might have on these forests. This appears to be a
key omission in the EIS considering that these forests are well within 40 to 50
km away from the site and that there are studies showing that the impacts of
sulphur emissions can extend as far as 40 to 50 km away from the source.
3. There are 39 endemic fauna and 1 endangered plant species (Molave) in the
proposed project site. There will be a need to make sure that these species are
protected from being damaged permanently in wholesale. Appropriate
measures such as ex situconservation and translocation if feasible must be
implemented.
4. The Project site is largely in grassland interspersed with some trees. These
plants if affected by acid rain or by sulphur emissions may disappear and have
consequences on the soil properties and hydrological processes in the area.
Accelerated soil erosion and increased surface runoff and reduced infiltration
of rainwater into the soil.
5. The rest of the peninsula is covered with brushland but were never included
as part of the impact zone.
6. There are home gardens along the coastal areas of the site planted to
ornamental and agricultural crops which are likely to be affected by acid rain.
7. There is also a beach forest dominated by aroma, talisai and agoho which
will likely be affectedalso by acid rain.
8. There are no Environmentally Critical Areas within the 1 km radius from
the project site. However, the OlongapoWatershed Forest Reserve, a protected
area is approximately 10 kmsouthwest of the projectsite. Considering the
prevailing wind movement in the area, this forest reserve is likely to be
affected by acid rain if it occurs from the emission of the power plant. This
forest reserve is however not included as partof the potential impact area.
9. Soil in the project site and the peninsula is thin and highly acidic and
deficient in NPK with moderate to severe erosion potential. The sparse
vegetation cover in the vicinity of the projectsite is likely a result of the highly
acidic soil and the nutrient deficiency. Additional acidity may result from acid
rain that may form in the area which could further make it harder for the
plants to grow in the area that in turn could exacerbate the already severe
erosion in the area. 10. There is a need to review the proposalto ensure that the
proposed project is consistent with the vision for the Freeport as enunciated in
the SBMA Master Plan and the Protected Area Management Plan. This will
reinforce the validity and legitimacy of these plans as a legitimate framework
for screening potential locators in the Freeport. Itwill also reinforce the trust
and confidence of the stakeholders on the competence and authority of the
SBMA that would translate in stronger popular support to the programs
implemented in the Freeport.
11. The EGF and Trust Fund (Table 5.13) should be made clear that the
amounts are the minimum amount and that adequate funds will be provided by
the proponent as necessary beyond the minimum amounts. Furthermore the
basis for the amounts allocated for the items (public liability and
rehabilitation) in Trust Fund and in EGF (tree planting and landscaping,
artificial reef establishment) must be clarified. The specific damages and
impacts that will be covered by the TF and EGF must also be presented
clearly at the outset to avoid protracted negotiations in the event of actual
impacts occurring in the future.
12. The monitoring plan for terrestrial flora and fauna is not clear on the
frequency of measurement. More importantly, the proposed method of
measurement (sampling transect) while adequate for estimating the diversity
of indices for benchmarking is not sufficient for long[-]term monitoring.
Instead, long[-]term monitoringplots (at least 1 hectare in size) should be
established to monitor the long[-]term impacts of the project on terrestrial
flora and fauna.
13. Since the proposed monitoring of terrestrial flora and fauna is limited to
the vicinity of the project site, it will be useful not only for mitigating and
avoiding unnecessary adverse impacts ofthe project but also for improving
management decisions if long[-]term monitoring plots for the remaining
natural forests in the Freeport are established. These plots will also be useful
for the study of the dynamic interactions of terrestrial flora and fauna with
climate change, farming and other human activities and the resulting
influences on soil, water, biodiversity, and other vital ecosystem services in
the Freeport.139
We agree with the appellate court that the alleged statements by these experts cannot
be given weight because they are hearsay evidence. None of these alleged experts
testified before the appellate court to confirm the pertinent contents of the Final
Report. No reason appears in the records of this case as to why the Casiño Group
failed to present these expert witnesses.
We note, however, that these statements, on their face, especially the observations of
Dr. Cruz, raise serious objections to the environmental soundness of the project,
specifically, the EIS thereof.It brings to fore the question of whether the Court can, on
its own, compel the testimonies of these alleged experts in order to shed light on these
matters in view of the rightat stake— not just damage to the environment but the
health, well-being and,ultimately, the livesof those who may be affected by the
project.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts with
means and methods to obtain sufficient information in order to adequately protect
orsafeguard the right to a healthful and balanced ecology. In Section 6 (l)140 of Rule
3 (Pre-Trial), when there is a failure to settle, the judge shall, among others,
determine the necessity of engaging the services of a qualified expert as a friend of
the court (amicus curiae). While, in Section 12141 of Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), a
party may avail of discovery measures: (1) ocular inspection and (2) production or
inspection of documents or things. The liberality of the Rules in gathering and even
compelling information, specifically with regard to the Writ of Kalikasan, is
explained in this wise: [T]he writ of kalikasanwas refashioned as a tool to bridge the
gap between allegation and proof by providing a remedy for would-be environmental
litigants to compel the production of information within the custody of the
government. The writ would effectively serve as a remedy for the enforcement of the
right to information about the environment. The scope of the fact-finding power could
be: (1) anything related to the issuance, grant of a government permit issued or
information controlled by the government or private entity and (2) [i]nformation
contained in documents such as environmental compliance certificate (ECC) and
other government records. In addition, the [w]rit may also be employed to compel the
production of information, subject to constitutional limitations. This function is
analogous to a discovery measure, and may be availed of upon application for the
writ.142
Clearly, in environmental cases, the power toappoint friends of the court in order to
shed light on matters requiring special technical expertise as well as the power to
order ocular inspections and production of documents or things evince the main thrust
of, and the spirit behind, the Rules to allow the court sufficient leeway in acquiring
the necessary information to rule on the issues presented for its resolution, to the end
that the right toa healthful and balanced ecology may be adequately protected. To
draw a parallel, in the protection of the constitutional rights of an accused, when life
or liberty isat stake, the testimonies of witnesses may be compelled as an attribute of
the Due Process Clause. Here, where the right to a healthful and balanced ecology of
a substantial magnitude is at stake, should we not tread the path of caution and
prudence by compelling the testimonies of these alleged experts?
After due consideration, we find that, based on the statements in the Final Report,
there is no sufficiently compelling reason to compel the testimonies of these alleged
expert witnesses for the following reasons.
First, the statementsare not sufficiently specificto point to us a flaw (or flaws) in the
study or design/implementation (or some other aspect) of the project which provides a
causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the construction and
operation ofthe project vis-à-vis potential grave environmental damage. In particular,
they do not explain why the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) contained in the
EIS of the project will notadequately address these concerns.
Second, some of the concerns raisedin the alleged statements, like acid rain, warming
and acidification of the seawater, and discharge of pollutants were, as previously
discussed, addressed by the evidence presented by RP Energy before the appellate
court. Again, these alleged statements do not explain why such concerns are not
adequately covered by the EMP of RP Energy.
Third, the key observations of Dr. Cruz, while concededly assailing certain aspects of
the EIS, do not clearly and specifically establish how these omissions have led to the
issuance of an ECC that will pose significant negative environmental impacts once
the project is constructed and becomes operational. The recommendations stated
therein would seem to suggest points for improvement in the operation and
monitoring of the project,but they do not clearly show why such recommendations
are indispensable for the project to comply with existing environmental laws and
standards, or how non-compliance with such recommendations will lead to an
environmental damage of the magnitude contemplatedunder the writ of kalikasan.
Again, these statements do not state with sufficient particularity how the EMP in the
EIS failed to adequately address these concerns.
Fourth, because the reason for the non-presentation of the alleged expert witnesses
does not appear on record, we cannot assume that their testimonies are being unduly
suppressed.
By ruling that we do not find a sufficiently compelling reason to compel the taking of
the testimonies of these alleged expert witnesses in relation to their serious objections
to the power plant project, we do not foreclose the possibility that their testimonies
could later on be presented, in a proper case, to more directly, specifically and
sufficientlyassail the environmental soundness of the project and establish the
requisite magnitude of actualor threatened environmental damage, if indeed present.
After all, their sense ofcivic duty may well prevail upon them to voluntarily testify, if
there are truly sufficient reasons tostop the project, above and beyond their
inadequate claims in the Final Report that the project should not be pursued. As
things now stand,however, we have insufficient bases to compel their testimonies for
the reasons already proffered.
The alleged admissions of grave
environmental damage in the EIS of the
project.
In their Omnibus Motions for Clarification and Reconsideration before the appellate
court and Petition for Review before thisCourt, the Casiño Group belatedly claims
that the statements in the EIS prepared by RPEnergy established the significant
negative environmental impacts of the project. They argue in this manner:
Acid Rain
35. According to RP Energy’s Environmental Impact Statement for its proposed 2 x
150 MW Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant Project, acid rain may occur in the
combustion of coal, to wit – x x x x
During the operation phase, combustion of coal will result in emissions of particulates
SOx and NOx. This may contribute to the occurrence of acid rain due to elevated SO2
levels in the atmosphere. High levels of NO2 emissions may give rise to health
problems for residents within the impact area.
xxxx
Asthma Attacks
36. The same EPRMP143 mentioned the incidence of asthma attacks [as a] result of
power plant operations, to wit –
xxxx
The incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the project site
may increase due to exposure to suspended particulates from plant operations.144
RP Energy, however, counters that the above portions of the EIS were quoted out of
context. As to the subject of acid rain, the EIS states in full:
Operation
During the operation phase, combustion of coal will result in emissions of
particulates, SOx and NOx. This may contribute to the occurrence of acid rain due to
elevated SO2 levels in the atmosphere. High levels of NO2 emissions may give rise
to health problems for residents within the impact area. Emissions may also have an
effect onvegetation (Section 4.1.4.2). However, the use of CFBC technology is a
built-in measure that results in reduced emission concentrations. SOx emissions will
beminimised by the inclusion of a desulfurisation process, whilst NOx emissions will
be reduced as the coal is burned at a temperature lower than that required to oxidise
nitrogen.145 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the subject of asthma attacks, the EIS states in full:
The incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the project site
may increase due to exposureto suspended particulates from plant operations. Coal
and ash particulates may also become suspended and dispersed into the air during
unloading and transport, depending on wind speed and direction. However, effect on
air quality due to windblown coal particulates will be insignificant as the coal
handling system will have enclosures (i.e. enclosed conveyors and coal dome) to
eliminate the exposure of coal to open air, and therefore greatly reduce the potential
for particulates from being carried away by wind (coalhandling systems, Section
3.4.3.3). In addition, the proposed process will include an electrostaticprecipitator that
will remove fly ash from the flue gas prior to its release through the stacks, and so
particulates emissions will be minimal.146 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with RP Energy that, while the EIS discusses the subjects of acid rain and
asthma attacks, it goes on to state that there are mitigating measures that will be put in
place to prevent these ill effects. Quite clearly, the Casiño Group quoted piecemeal
the EIS in sucha way as to mislead this Court as to its true and full contents.
We deplore the way the Casiño Group has argued this point and we take this time to
remind it that litigants should not trifle withcourt processes. Along the same lines, we
note how the Casiño Group has made serious allegations in its Petition for Writ of
Kalikasanbut failed to substantiate the same in the course of the proceedings before
the appellate court. In particular, during the preliminary conference of this case, the
Casiño Group expressly abandoned its factual claims on the alleged grave
environmental damage that will be caused by the power plant (i.e., air, water and land
pollution) and, instead, limited itself to legal issues regarding the alleged non-
compliance of RP Energy with certain laws and rules in the procurement of the
ECC.147 We also note how the Casiño Group failed to comment on the subject
Petitions before this Court, which led this Court to eventually dispense with its
comment.148 We must express our disapproval over the way it has prosecuted
itsclaims, bordering as it does on trifling with court processes. We deem itproper,
therefore, to admonishit to be more circumspect in how it prosecutesits claims.
In sum, we agree with the appellate court that the Casiño Group failed to substantiate
its claims thatthe construction and operation of the power plant will cause
environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan.
The evidence it presented is inadequate to establish the factual bases of its claims.
II.
Whether the ECC is invalid for lack of signature of Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz (Mr.
Aboitiz), as representative of RP Energy, in the Statement of Accountability of the
ECC.
The appellate court ruled that the ECC is invalid because Mr. Aboitiz failed to sign
the Statement of Accountability portion of the ECC.
We shall discuss the correctness ofthis ruling on both procedural and substantive Okay. On the same page, page 3, there’s a Statement of Accountability.
grounds. Procedurally, we cannot fault the DENR for protesting the manner by which
the appellate court resolved the issue of the aforesaid lack of signature. We agree with MS. MERCADO:
the DENR that this issue was not among those raised by the Casiño Group in its
Petition for Writ of Kalikasan.149 What is more, this was not one of the triable issues Yes, Your Honor.
specificallyset during the preliminary conference of this case.150
J. LEAGOGO:
How then did the issue oflack of signature arise?
Luis, who is Luis Miguel Aboitiz?
A review of the voluminous records indicates that the matterof the lack of signature
was discussed, developed or surfaced only inthe course of the hearings, specifically, MS. MERCADO:
on clarificatory questions from the appellate court, to wit:
During that time he was the authorized representative of RP Energy,
J. LEAGOGO:
Your Honor.
I would also show to you your ECC, that’s page 622 of the rollo. I am showing to you
this Environmental Compliance Certificate dated December 22, 2008 issued by Sec. J. LEAGOGO:
Jose L. Atienza, Jr. of the DENR. This is your "Exhibit "18." Would you like to go
over this? Are you familiar with this document? Now, who is the authorized representative of RP Energy?

MS. MERCADO: MS. MERCADO:

Yes, it[’]s my Annex "3," Your Honor. It would be Mr. Aaron Domingo, I believe.

J. LEAGOGO: J. LEAGOGO:

I would like to refer you to page 3 of the ECC dated December 22, 2008. Page 2
refers to the Environmental Compliance Certificate, ECC Ref. No. 0804-011-4021.
That’s page 2 of the letter dated December 22, 2008. And on page 3, Dr. Julian
Amador recommended approval and it was approved by Sec. Atienza. You see that
on page 3?
MS. MERCADO:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. LEAGOGO:
Please tell the Court why this was not signed by Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, the
Statement of Accountability?
Because the Statement of Accountability says, "Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, Director,
representing Redondo Peninsula Energy with office address located at 110 Legaspi
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, takes full responsibility in complying with all
conditions in thisEnvironmental Compliance Certificate [ECC][.]" Will you tell this
Court why this was not signed?
MS. MERCADO:
It was signed, Your Honor, but this copy wasn’t signed. My apologies, I was the one
who provided this, I believe, to the lawyers. This copy was not signed because
during….
J. LEAGOGO:
But this is your exhibit, this is yourExhibit "18" and this is not signed. Do you agree
with me that your Exhibit "18" is not signed by Mr. Aboitiz?
MS. MERCADO:
That’s correct, Your Honor.151
We find this line of questioning inadequate to apprise the parties that the lack of
signature would be a key issue in this case; as in fact it became decisive in the
eventual invalidation of the ECC by the appellate court.
Concededly, a court has the power to suspend its rules of procedure in order to attain
substantial justice so that it has the discretion, in exceptional cases, to take into
consideration matters not originally within the scope of the issues raised in the
pleadings or set during the preliminary conference, in order to prevent a miscarriage
of justice. In the case at bar, the importance of the signature cannot be seriously
doubted because it goes into the consent and commitment of the project proponent to
comply with the conditions of the ECC, which is vital to the protection of the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology of those who may be affected by the project.
Nonetheless, the power of a court tosuspend its rules of procedure in exceptional
cases does not license it to foist a surprise on the parties in a given case. To illustrate,
in oral arguments before this Court, involving sufficiently important public interest
cases, we note that individual members of the Court, from time to time, point out
matters that may not have been specifically covered by the advisory (the advisory
delineates the issues to be argued and decided). However, a directive is given to the
concerned parties to discuss the aforesaid matters in their memoranda. Such a
procedure ensures that, at the very least, the parties are apprised that the Court has
taken an interest in such matters and may adjudicate the case on the basis thereof.
Thus, the parties are given an opportunity to adequately argue the issue or meet the
issue head-on. We, therefore, find that the appellate court should have, at the very
least, directed RP Energy and the DENR to discuss and elaborate on the issue of lack
of signature in the presentation of their evidence and memoranda, beforemaking a
definitive ruling that the lack thereof invalidated the ECC.This is in keeping with the
basic tenets of due process.
At any rate, we shall disregard the procedural defect and rule directly on whether the
lack of signature invalidated the ECC in the interest of substantial justice.
The laws governing the ECC, i.e., PresidentialDecree No. (PD) 1151 and PD 1586,
do not specifically state that the lack of signature in the Statement of Accountability
has the effect of invalidating the ECC. Unlike in wills or donations, where failure to
comply withthe specific form prescribed by law leads to its nullity,152 the applicable
laws here are silentwith respect to the necessity of a signature in the Statement of
Accountability and the effect of the lack thereof. This is, of course, understandable
because the Statement of Accountability is a mere off-shoot of the rule-making
powers of the DENR relative tothe implementation of PD 1151 and PD 1586. To
determine, therefore, the effect of the lack of signature, we must look atthe
significance thereof under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Rules of the
DENR and the surrounding circumstances of this case.
To place this issue in its proper context, a helpful overview of the stages of the EIA
process, taken from the Revised Manual, is reproduced below:
Figure 1-3 Overview of Stages of the Philippine EIA Process153
1.0 SCREENING Screeningdetermines if a project is covered or not covered by the
PEISS.154 If a project is covered, screening further determines what
document type the project should prepare to secure the needed
approval, and what the rest of the requirements are in terms of EMB
office of application, endorsing and decision authorities, duration of
processing.
2.0 SCOPING Scopingis a Proponent-driven multi-sectoral formal process of
determining the focused Terms of Reference of the EIA Study. Scoping
identifies the most significant issues/impacts of a proposed project, and
then, delimits the extent of baseline information to those necessary to
evaluate and mitigate the impacts. The need for and scope of an
Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) is also done during the scoping
session. Scoping is done with the local community through Public
Scoping and with a third party EIA Review Committee (EIARC)
 through Technical Scoping, both with the participation of the DENR-
EMB. The process results in a signed Formal Scoping Checklist by the
review team, with final approval by the EMB Chief.
EIA STUDY and The EIA Studyinvolves a description of the proposed project and its
3.0 REPORT alternatives, characterization of the project environment, impact
PREPARATION identification and prediction, evaluation of impact significance, impact
mitigation, formulation of Environmental Management and Monitoring
Plan, withcorresponding cost estimates and institutional support
commitment. The study results are presented in an EIA Reportfor
which an outline is prescribed by EMB for every major document type
EIA REPORT Review of EIA Reportsnormally entails an EMB procedural screening
4.0 REPORT and for compliance with minimum requirements specified during Scoping,
EVALUATION followed by a substantive review of either composed third party experts
commissioned by EMB as the EIA Review Committee for PEIS/EIS-
based applications, or DENR/EMB internal specialists, the Technical
Committee, for IEE-based applications. EMB evaluates the EIARC
recommendations and the public’s inputs during public
consultations/hearings in the process of recommending a decision on
the application. The EIARC Chair signs EIARC recommendations
including issues outside the mandate of the EMB. The entire EIA
review and evaluation process is summarized in the Review Process
Report (RPR) of the EMB, which includes a draft decision document.
5.0 DECISION Decision Making involves evaluation of EIA recommendations and the
MAKING draft decision document, resulting to the issuance of an ECC, CNC or
Denial Letter. When approved, a covered project is issued its certificate
of Environmental Compliance Commitment (ECC) while an application
of a non-covered project is issued a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC). Endorsing and deciding authorities are designated by AO 155
42, and further detailed in this Manual for every report type. Moreover,
the Proponent signs a sworn statement of full responsibility on
implementation of its commitments prior to the release of the ECC. 156
The ECC is then transmitted to concerned LGUs and other GAs for
integration into their decisionmaking process. The regulated part of EIA
Review is limited to the processes within EMB control. The timelines
for the issuance of decision documents provided for in AO 42 and DAO
2003-30 are applicable only from the time the EIA Report is accepted
for substantive review to the time a decision is issued on the
application.
MONITORING. Monitoring, Validation and Evaluation/Audit stage assesses
6.0 performance of the Proponent against the ECC and itscommitments in
VALIDATION, the Environmental Management and Monitoring Plans to ensure actual
and impacts of the project are adequately prevented or mitigated.
EVALUATION/
AUDIT
The signing of the Statement of Accountability takes placeat the Decision Making
Stage. After a favorable review of its ECC application, the project proponent, through
its authorized representative, is made to sign a sworn statement of full responsibility
on the implementation ofits commitments prior to the official release of the ECC.
The definition of the ECC in the Revised Manual highlights the importance of the
signing of the Statement of Accountability:
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) - a certificate of Environmental
Compliance Commitment to which the Proponent conforms with, after DENR-EMB
explains the ECC conditions, by signing the sworn undertaking of full responsibility
over implementation of specified measures which are necessary to comply with
existing environmental regulations or to operate within best environmental practices
that are not currently covered by existing laws. It is a document issued by the
DENR/EMB after a positive review of an ECC application, certifying that the
Proponent has complied with all the requirements of the EIS System and has
committed to implement its approved Environmental Management Plan. The ECC
also provides guidance to other agencies and to LGUs on EIA findings and
recommendations, which need to be considered in their respective decision-making
process.157 (Emphasis supplied)
As can be seen, the signing of the Statement of Accountabilityis an integral and
significant component of the EIA process and the ECC itself. The evident intention is
to bind the project proponentto the ECC conditions, which will ensure that the project
will not cause significant negative environmental impacts by the "implementation of
specified measures which are necessary to comply with existing environmental
regulations or tooperate within best environmental practices that are not currently
covered by existing laws." Indeed, the EIA process would be a meaningless exercise
if the project proponent shall not be strictly bound to faithfully comply withthe
conditions necessary toadequately protect the right of the people to a healthful and
balanced ecology.
Contrary to RP Energy’s position, we, thus, find that the signature of the project
proponent’s representative in the Statement of Accountability is necessary for the
validity of the ECC. It is not, as RP Energy would have it, a mere formality and its
absence a mere formal defect.
The question then is, was the absence of the signature of Mr. Aboitiz, as
representative of RP Energy, in the Statement of Accountability sufficient ground to
invalidate the ECC?
Viewed within the particular circumstances of this case, we answer in the negative.
While it is clear that the signing of the Statement of Accountability is necessary for
the validity ofthe ECC, we cannot close oureyes to the particular circumstances of
this case. So often have we ruled that this Court is not merely a court of law but a
court of justice. We find that there are several circumstances present in this case
which militate against the invalidation of the ECC on this ground.
We explain.
First, the reason for the lack of signature was not adequately taken into consideration
by the appellate court. To reiterate, the matter surfaced during the hearing of this case
on clarificatory questions by the appellate court, viz:
J. LEAGOGO:
Please tell the Court why this was not signed by Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, the
Statement of Accountability?
Because the Statement of Accountability says, "Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, Director,
representing Redondo Peninsula Energy with office address located at 110 Legaspi
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, takes full responsibility in complying with all
conditions in this Environmental Compliance Certificate [ECC][.]" Will you tell this
Court why this was not signed?
MS. MERCADO:
It was signed, Your Honor, but this copy wasn’t signed. My apologies, I was the one
who provided this, I believe, to the lawyers. This copy was not signed because
during…
J. LEAGOGO:
But this is your exhibit, this is yourExhibit "18" and this is not signed. Do you agree
with me that your Exhibit "18" is not signed by Mr. Aboitiz?
MS. MERCADO:
That’s correct, Your Honor.158 (Emphasis supplied)
Due to the inadequacy of the transcriptand the apparent lack of opportunity for the
witness to explain the lack of signature, we find that the witness’ testimony does not,
by itself, indicate that there was a deliberate or malicious intent not to sign the
Statement of Accountability.
Second, as previously discussed, the concerned parties to this case, specifically, the
DENR and RP Energy, werenot properly apprised that the issue relative to the lack of
signature would be decisive inthe determination of the validity of the ECC.
Consequently, the DENR and RPEnergy cannot be faulted for not presenting proof
during the course ofthe hearings to squarely tackle the issue of lack of signature.
Third, after the appellate court ruled in its January 30, 2013 Decision that the lack of
signature invalidated the ECC,RP Energy attached, to its Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, a certified true copy of the ECC, issued by the DENREMB, which
bore the signature of Mr. Aboitiz. The certified true copy of the ECC showed that the
Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24, 2008.159
The authenticity and veracity of this certified true copy of the ECC was not
controverted by the Casiño Group in itscomment on RP Energy’s motion for partial
reconsideration before the appellate court nor in their petition before this Court. Thus,
in accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,
it remains uncontroverted that the ECC on file with the DENR contains the requisite
signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the Statement of Accountability portion.
As previously noted, the DENR and RPEnergy were not properly apprised that the
issue relative to the lack ofsignature would be decisive in the determination of the
validity of the ECC. As a result, we cannot fault RP Energy for submitting the
certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the appellate court had
invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack ofsignature in its January 30, 2013
Decision.
We note, however, that, as previously discussed, the certified true copy of the
Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24, 2008 or two
days after the ECC’s official release on December 22, 2008. The aforediscussed rules
under the Revised Manual, however, state that the proponent shall sign the sworn
statement of full responsibility on implementation of its commitments priorto the
release of the ECC. Itwould seem that the ECC was first issued, then it was signed by
Mr. Aboitiz, and thereafter, returned to the DENR to serve as its file copy.
Admittedly, there is lack of strict compliance with the rules although the signature
ispresent. Be thatas it may, we find nothing in the records to indicate that this was
done with bad faith or inexcusable negligence because of the inadequacy of the
evidence and arguments presented, relative to the issue of lack of signature, in view
of the manner this issue arose in this case, as previously discussed. Absent such
proof, we are not prepared to rule that the procedure adopted by the DENR was done
with bad faithor inexcusable negligence but we remind the DENR to be more
circumspect in following the rules it provided in the Revised Manual. Thus, we rule
that the signature requirement was substantially complied with pro hac vice.
Fourth, we partly agree with the DENRthat the subsequent letter-requests for
amendments to the ECC, signed by Mr. Aboitiz on behalf of RP Energy, indicate its
implied conformity to the ECC conditions. In practical terms, if future litigation
should occur due to violations of the ECC conditions, RP Energy would be estopped
from denying its consent and commitment to the ECC conditions even if there was no
signature in the Statement of Accountability. However, we note that the Statement of
Accountability precisely serves to obviate any doubt as to the consent and
commitment of the project proponent to the ECC conditions. At any rate, the
aforesaid letter-requests do additionally indicate RP Energy’s conformity to the ECC
conditions and, thus, negate a pattern to maliciously evade accountability for the ECC
conditions or to intentionally create a "loophole" in the ECC to be exploited in a
possible futurelitigation over non-compliance with the ECC conditions.
In sum, we rule that the appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the
ground of lack of signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECC’s Statement of Accountability
relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the appellate court. While
the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC, the particular circumstances of
this case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue
of lack ofsignature in order for them to present controverting evidence and arguments
on this point, as the matter only developed during the course of the proceedings upon
clarificatory questions from the appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy cannot be
faulted for submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the
ECC had been invalidated on the ground of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013
Decision of the appellate court.
The certified true copy of the ECC, bearing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the
Statement of Accountability portion, was issued by the DENR-EMB and remains
uncontroverted. Itshowed that the Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr.
Aboitiz on December 24, 2008. Although the signing was done two days after the
official release of the ECC on December 22, 2008, absent sufficient proof, we are not
prepared to rule that the procedure adoptedby the DENR was done with bad faith or
inexcusable negligence. Thus, werule that the signature requirement was substantially
complied with pro hac vice.
III.
Whether the first and second amendments to the ECC are invalid for failure to
undergo a new environmental impact assessment (EIA) because of the utilization of
inappropriate EIA documents.
Upholding the arguments of the Casiño Group, the appellate court ruled that the first
and second amendments tothe ECC were invalid because the ECC contained an
express restriction that any expansion of the project beyond the project description
shall be the subject of a new EIA. It found that both amendments failed to comply
with the appropriate EIA documentary requirements under DAO 2003-30 and the
Revised Manual. In particular, it found that the Environmental Performance Report
and Management Plan (EPRMP) and Project Description Report (PDR), which RP
Energy submitted tothe DENR, relative to the application for the first and second
amendments, respectively, were not the proper EIA document type. Hence, the
appellate court ruled that the aforesaid amendments were invalid.
Preliminarily, we must state that executive actions carry presumptive validity so that
the burden of proof is on the Casiño Group to show that the procedure adopted bythe
DENR in granting the amendments to the ECC were done with grave abuse of
discretion. More so here because the administration of the EIA process involves
special technical skill or knowledge which the law has specifically vested in the
DENR.
After our own examination of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual as well as the
voluminous EIA documents of RP Energy appearing in the records of this case, we
find that the appellate court made an erroneous interpretation and application of the
pertinent rules.
We explain.
As a backgrounder, PD 1151 set the Philippine Environment Policy. Notably, this law
recognized the right ofthe people to a healthful environment.160 Pursuant thereto, in
every action, project or undertaking, which significantly affects the quality of the
environment, all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms,
and entities were required to prepare, file and include a statement (i.e., Environmental
Impact Statement or EIS) containing:
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking;
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented;
(c) alternative to the proposed action;
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the
environment are consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the
longterm productivity of the same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable
resources, a finding must be made that such use and commitment are
warranted.161
To further strengthen and develop the EIS, PD1586 was promulgated, which
established the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS). The
PEISS is "a systems-oriented and integrated approach to the EIS system to ensure a
rational balance between socio-economic development and environmental protection
for the benefit of present and future generations."162 The ECC requirement
ismandated under Section 4 thereof:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation ofEnvironmentally Critical Areas and
Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon
recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation
declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally
critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such
declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his dulyauthorized
representative. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The PEISS consists of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, which is
mandatory for private orpublic projects thatmay significantly affect the quality of the
environment. It involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of the project on
the environment, designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement
measures addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the
community’s welfare.163
PD 1586 was implemented by DAO 2003-30 which, in turn, set up a system or
procedure to determine when a project is required to secure an ECC and when it is
not. When an ECC is not required, the project proponent procures a Certificate of
Non-Coverage (CNC).164 As part of the EIA process, the project proponent is
required to submit certain studies or reports (i.e., EIA document type) to the DENR-
EMB, which willbe used in the review process in assessing the environmental impact
of the project and the adequacy of the corresponding environmental management plan
or program to address such environmental impact. This will then be part of the bases
to grant or deny the application for an ECC or CNC, as the case may be.
Table 1-4 of the Revised Manual summarizes the required EIA document type for
each project category. It classifies a project as belonging to group I, II, III, IV or V,
where:
I- Environmentally Critical Projects (ECPs) in either Environmentally Critical
Area (ECA) or Non-Environmentally Critical Area (NECA),
II- Non-Environmentally Critical Projects (NECPs) in ECA,
III- NECPs in NECA,
 IV- Co-located Projects, and
V- Unclassified Projects.
The aforesaid table then further classifies a project, as pertinent to this case, as
belonging to category A,B or C, where:
A- new;
B- existing projects for modification or re-start up; and
C- operating projects without an ECC.
Finally, the aforesaid table considers whether the project is single or co-located.165
After which, it states the appropriateEIA document typeneeded for the application for
an ECC or CNC, as the case may be.
The appropriate EIA document type vis-à-vis a particular project depends on the
potential significant environmental impact of the project. At the highest level would
be an ECP, such as the subject project. The hierarchy of EIA document type, based on
comprehensiveness and detail of the study or report contained therein, insofar as
single projects are concerned, is as follows:
1. Environmental Impact Statement166 (EIS),
2. Initial Environmental Examination167 (IEE) Report,
3. Initial Environmental Examination168 (IEE) Checklist Report,
4. Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan169 (EPRMP),
and
5. Project Description170 (PD) or Project Description Report (PDR).
Thus, in the course of RP Energy’s application for anECC, it was required by the
DENR-EMB to submit an EIS because the subject project is: an ECP, new and a
single project.
The present controversy, however, revolves around, not an application for an ECC,
but amendments thereto.
RP Energy requested the subject first amendment to its ECC due to its desire to
modify the project design through the inclusion of a barge wharf, seawater intake
breakwater, subsea discharge pipeline, raw water collection system, drainage channel
improvement and a 230-kV double transmission line. The DENR-EMB determined
that this was a major amendment and, thus, required RP Energy to submit an EPRMP.
The Casiño Group argued, and the appellate court sustained, that an EPRMP is not
the correct EIA document type based on the definition of an EPRMP in DAO 2003-
30 and the Revised Manual.
In DAO 2003-30, an EPRMP is defined as:
Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) —
documentation of the actual cumulative environmental impacts and effectiveness of
current measures for single projects that are already operating but without ECC's, i.e.,
Category A-3. For Category B-3 projects, a checklist form of the EPRMP would
suffice;171 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, the table in Section 5 of DAO 2003-30 states that an EPRMP is required for
"A-2: Existing and to beexpanded (including undertakings that have stopped
operations for more than 5 years and plan to re-start with or without expansion) and
A-3: Operating without ECC."
On the other hand, the Revised Manual delineates when an EPRMP is the proper EIA
document type, thus:
For operating projects with previous ECCs but planning or applying for clearance to
modify/expand or re-start operations, or for projects operating without an ECCbut
applying to secure one to comply with PD 1586 regulations, the appropriate
document is not an EIS but an EIA Report incorporating the project’s environmental
performance and its current Environmental Management Plan. This report isx x x anx
x x Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) for single
project applications x x x172 (Emphasis supplied)
In its "Glossary," the Revised Manual defines an EPRMP as:
Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) - documentation
of the actual cumulative environmental impacts and effectiveness of current measures
for single projects that are already operating but without ECCs.173 (Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, Table 1-4, in the Revised Manual, states that an EPRMP is required for "Item
I-B: Existing Projects for Modification or Re-start up (subject to conditions in Annex
2-1c) and I-C: Operating without ECC."
From these definitions and tables, an EPRMP is, thus, the required EIA document
type for an ECP-single project which is:
1. Existing and to be expanded (including undertakings that have stopped
operations for more than 5 years and plan to re-start with or without
expansion);
2. Operating but without ECCs;
3. Operating projects with previous ECCs but planning or applying for
clearance to modify/expand orre-start operations; and
4. Existing projects for modification or re-start up.
It may be observed that, based from the above, DAO2003-30 and the Revised Manual
appear to use the terms "operating"and "existing" interchangeably. In the case at bar,
the subject project has not yet been constructed although there have been horizontal
clearing operations at the project site.
On its face, therefore, the theory of the Casiño Group, as sustained by the appellate
court — that the EPRMP is not the appropriate EIA document type— seems plausible
because the subject project is not: (1) operating/existing with a previous ECC but
planning or applying for modification or expansion, or (2) operating but without an
ECC. Instead, the subject project is an unimplemented or a non-implemented,
hence,non-operating project with a previous ECC but planning for modification or
expansion.
The error in the above theory lies in the failure to consider or trace the applicable
provisions of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual on amendments to an ECC.
The proper starting point in determining the validity of the subject first amendment,
specifically, the propriety of the EIA document type (i.e., EPRMP) which RP Energy
submitted in relation to its application for the aforesaid amendment, must of necessity
be the rules on amendments to an ECC.174 This is principally found in Section
8.3,Article II of DAO 2003-03, viz:
8.3 Amending an ECC
Requirements for processing ECC amendments shall depend on the nature of the
request but shall be focused on the information necessary to assess the environmental
impact of such changes.
8.3.1. Requests for minor changes to ECCs such as extension of
deadlines for submission of post-ECC requirements shall be decided
upon by the endorsing authority.
8.3.2. Requests for major changes to ECCs shall be decided upon by
the deciding authority.
8.3.3. For ECCs issued pursuant to an IEE or IEE checklist, the
processing of the amendment application shall not exceed thirty (30)
working days; and for ECCs issued pursuant to an EIS, the processing
shall not exceed sixty (60) working days. Provisions on automatic
approval related to prescribed timeframes under AO 42 shall also
apply for the processing of applications to amend ECCs. (Emphasis
supplied)
Implementing the afore-quoted section, the Revised Manual pertinently states in
Section 2.2, paragraph 16:
16) Application Process for ECC Amendments
Figure 2-4 presents how Proponents may request for minor or major changes in their
ECCs. Annex 2-1c provides a decision chart for the determination of requirements for
project modifications, particularly for delineating which application scenarios will
require EPRMP (which will be subject to Figure 2-1 process) or other support
documentations (which will be subject to Figure 2-4 process). Figure 2-4, in turn,
provides:
 Figure 2-4. Flowchart on Request for ECC Amendments175
Scenario 1: Request for Minor
Amendments
1. Typographical error
2. Extension of deadlines for submission 2. Increase in production capacity or auxiliary
of post-ECC requirement/s
3. Extension of ECC validity
4. Change in company name/ownership
5. Decrease in land/project area or
production capacity
6. Other amendments deemed
"minor" at the discretion of the
EMB CO/RO Director
1 [Start]
Within three (3) years from ECC
issuance (for projects not started)176
OR at any time during project
implementation, the Proponent prepares
and submits to the ECC-endorsing
DENR-EMB office a LETTER-
REQUEST for ECC amendment,
including data/information, reports or
documents to substantiate the requested
revisions.
Letter-Request to an EPRMP to the EMB
2 CO/RO while for those with Programmatic ECC,
Scenario 2: Request for Major Amendments a PEPRMP may need to be submitted to the
EMB CO to support the request. It is important
1. Expansion of project area w/in catchment to note that for operating projects, the
described in EIA appropriate document is not an EIS but an EIA
Report incorporating the project’s historical
environmental performance and its current EMP,
component of the original project subject to specific documentary requirements
detailed in Annex 2-1cfor every modification
3. Change/s in process flow or technology scenario.
4. Addition of new product
3
5. Integration of ECCs for similar or dissimilar
but contiguous projects (NOTE: ITEM#5 IS
The ECC-endorsing EMB office assigns For EPRMP/PEPRMP-based requests, EMB
PROPONENT’S OPTION, NOT EMB’S)
a Case Handler to evaluate the request forms a Technical/Review Committee to
evaluate the request. For other requests, a Case
6. Revision/Reformatting of ECC Conditions
Handler may solely undertake the evaluation.
EMB CO and RO will process P/EPRMP for
7. Other amendments deemed "major" at the
PECC/ECC under Groups I and II respectively.
discretion of the EMB CO/RO Director
(Go to Figure 2-1)
1[Start]
3 4
Within three (3) years from ECC issuance (for
projects not started)177 OR at any time during
project implementation, the Proponent prepares
ECC-endorsing Authority decides on the ECC-endorsing/issuing Authority (per Table 1-4)
and submits to the ECC-endorsing DENR-EMB
Letter-Request, based on CH decides on Letter
office a LETTER-REQUESTfor ECC
recommendation Requests/EPRMP/PEPRMP/Other documents
amendments, including data/information, reports
based on EMB CH and/or Tech/Review
or documents to substantiate the requested
Committee recommendations.
revisions.
Maximum Processing Time to Issuance Max Processing Time to Issuance of Decision
2
of Decision
For projects that have started implementation,
EMB CO 7 workdays CO CO EPRMP RO RO
EMB evaluates request based on Annex 2-1cfor
PEPRMP PEPRMP EPRMP
various scenarios of project modification.
Documentary requirements may range from a
 EMB RO 7 workdays 120 90 60 30 in the original EIA incremental impacts from
Report additional land development
workdays workdays workdays workdays will have been addressed in
the approved EMP
Other document applications: max 30 workdays
(EMB CO and RO) 2. Expansion of It is assumed the ECC Amendment
land/project area modification proposal may /Environmental Performance
OUTSIDE catchment have significant potential Report and Management
or environment impacts due to absence of Plan (EPRMP)
described in the prior assessment as to how
Noteworthy in the above, which is pertinent to the issue at hand, is that the original EIA Report the project may affect the
amendment process squarely applies to projects not started, such as the subject proposed expansion area
project, based on the phrase "[w]ithin three (3) years from ECC issuance (for projects
not started) x x x". 3. Increase in capacity or Non-exceedance of PDR ECC Amendment /Letter
auxiliary component of (non covered project) Request with brief
Annex 2-1c, in turn, provides a "Decision Chart for Determination of Requirements the original project threshold is assumed that description of additional
For Project Modification." We reproduce below the first three columns of Annex 2- which will eithernot impacts are not significant; capacity or component
1c, as are pertinent to the issue at hand: entail exceedance of
PDR (non-covered Modification scenario and
ANNEX 2-1c project) thresholds or decision process are
EMP & ERA can still applicable to both
DECISION CHART FOR DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR address impacts & risks nonimplemented and
PROJECT MODIFICATION178 arising from operating projects issued
modification ECCs
Proposed Modifications Analysis of Proposed Resulting Decision 4. Increase in capacity or Exceedance of PDR (non- ECC Amendment
to the Current Project Modifications Document/Type of EIA auxiliary component of covered) threshold is /Environmental Performance
Report Required the original project assumed that impacts may be Report and Management
which will either potentially significant, Plan (EPRMP)
Operational projects, or those exceed PDR particularly if modification
which have stopped for ≤5 (noncovered project) will result to a next higher
years and plan to re-start thresholds, or EMP & level of threshold range
For Groups I and II EISbased ERA cannot address
Projects with an ECC impacts and risks Modification scenario and
applying for modification arising from decision process are
modification applicable to both
1. Expansion of Since the modification will ECC Amendment /Letter nonimplemented and
land/project area w/in be in an area already Request with brief operating projects with or
catchment or described and evaluated in description of activities in without issued ECCs
environment described the original EIA Report, the additional area
5. Change/s in process EMP and ERA can still
flow or technology address impacts & risks
arising from modification
EMP and ERA cannot
address impacts & risks
arising from modification
6. Additional component Activity is directly lessening ECC Amendment /Letter
or products which will or mitigating the project’s
enhance the impacts on the environment. Project Description Report of
environment (e.g. due However, to ensure there is
to compliance to new no component in the
stringent requirements) modification which fall
or lessen impacts on under covered project types,
the environment (e.g. EMB will require disclosure
thru utilization of waste of the description of the
into new products) components and process with
which the new product will
be developed.
7. Downgrade project size No incremental adverse
or area or other units of impacts; may result to lower
measure of thresholds project threshold or may
limits result to non-coverage
8. Conversion to new Considered new application
project type (e.g. but with lesser data
bunker-fired plant to requirements since most
gas-fired) facilities are established;
environmental performance
in the past will serve as
baseline; However, for
operating projects, there may
be need to request for Relief
from ECC Commitment prior
to applying for new project
type to ensure no balance of
environmental
ECC Amendment /Letter
Request with brief process
description
9.
ECC Amendment
/Environmental Performance
Report and Management
Plan (EPRMP)
Request with consolidated
new project component and
integrated EMP
10.
From ECC Amendment to
Relief of ECC Commitments
(Conversion to CNC):
/Letter-Request only
New ECC /EIS
accountabilities from the
current project
Integration of ECCs for No physical change in ECC Amendment /Letter
similar or contiguous project size/area; no change Request with consolidated
projects in process/technology but Project Description Report
improved management of and integrated EMP
(Note: Integration of continuous projects by
ECCs is at the option of having an integrated
the Proponent to planning document in the
request/apply) form or an integrated ECC
(ECC conditions will be
harmonized across projects;
conditions relating to
requirements within other
agencies’ mandates will be
deleted)
Revision/ Reformatting No physical change on the ECC Amendment /Letter
of ECC Conditions project but ECC conditions Request only
relating to requirements
within other agencies’
mandates will be deleted
We now apply these provisions to the case at bar.
To reiterate, the first amendment to the ECC was requested by RP Energy due to its
planned change of project design involving the inclusion of a barge wharf, seawater
intake breakwater, subseadischarge pipeline, raw water collection system, drainage
channel improvement and a 230-kV double transmission line. The DENR-EMB
determined179 that the proposed modifications involved a major amendment because
it will result in anincrease in capacity or auxiliary component, as per Scenario 2,Item
#2 of Figure 2-4:
Scenario 2: Request for Major Amendments
1. Expansion of project area w/in catchment described in EIA
 2. Increase in production capacity or auxiliary component of the original Note that the Chart expressly states that, "[m]odification scenario and decision
project180 process are applicable to both non-implementedand operating projects withor without
ECCs."183 To recall, the subject project has not been constructed and is not yet
3. Change/s in process flow or technology operational, although horizontal clearing activities have already been undertaken at
the project site. Thus, the subject project may be reasonably classified as a non-
4. Addition of new product implemented project with an issued ECC, which falls under Item#4 and, hence, an
EPRMP is the appropriate EIA document type.
5. Integration of ECCs for similar or dissimilar but contiguous projects
(NOTE: ITEM#5 IS PROPONENT’S OPTION, NOT EMB’S) This lengthy explanation brings us toa simple conclusion. The definitions in DAO
2003-30 and the Revised Manual, stating that the EPRMP is applicable to (1)
6. Revision/Reformatting of ECC Conditions operating/existing projectswith a previous ECC but planning or applying for
modification or expansion, or (2) operating projects but without an ECC, were not an
7. Other amendments deemed "major at the discretion of the EMB CO/RO exclusive list.
Director
The afore-discussed provisions of Figure 2-4, in relation to Annex 2-1c, plainly show
The Casiño Group does not controvert this finding by the DENR-EMB and we find that the EPRMP can, likewise, be used as an appropriate EIA document type for a
the same reasonably supported by the evidence on record considering that, among single, non-implemented project applying for a major amendment to its ECC,
others, the construction of a 230-kVdouble transmission line would result in major involving an increase in capacity or auxiliary component, which will exceed PDR
activities outside the project site which could have significant environmental impacts. (non-covered project) thresholds, or result in the inability of the EMP and ERA to
address the impacts and risks arising from the modification, such as the subject
Consequently, the amendment was considered asfalling under Item#4 of Annex 2-1c, project.
and, thus, the appropriate EIA document typeis an EPRMP, viz:
That the proposed modifications in the subject project fall under this class or type of
4. Increase in capacity or Exceedance of PDR (non- ECC Amendment amendment was a determination made by the DENR-EMBand, absent a showing of
auxiliary component of covered) thresholds is /Environmental Performance grave abuse of discretion, the DENR-EMB’s findings are entitled to great respect
the original project which assumed that impacts may be Report and Management because it is the administrative agency with the special competence or expertise to
will either exceed PDR potentially significant, Plan (EPRMP)182 administer or implement the EIS System. The apparent confusion of the Casiño
(non-covered project) particularly if modification Group and the appellate court is understandable. They had approached the issue with
thresholds, or EMP & will result to a next higher a legal training mindset or background. As a general proposition, the definition of
ERA cannot address level of threshold range terms in a statute or rule is controlling as to its nature and scope within the context of
impacts and risks arising legal or judicial proceedings. Thus, since the procedure adopted by the DENR-EMB
from modification Modification scenario and seemed to contradict or go beyond the definition of terms in the relevant issuances,
decision process are the Casiño Group and the appellate court concluded that the procedure was infirm.
applicable to both
nonimplemented and However, a holistic reading of DAO2003-30 and the Revised Manual will show that
operating projects with or such a legalistic approach inits interpretation and application is unwarranted. This is
without issued ECCs181 primarily because the EIA process is a system, not a set of rigid rules and definitions.
In the EIA process, there is much room for flexibility in the determination and use
ofthe appropriate EIA document type as the foregoing discussion has shown.184 To
our mind, whatshould be controlling is the guiding principle set in DAO 2003-30 in
the evaluation of applications for amendments to ECCs, as stated in Section 8.3
thereof: "[r]equirements for processing ECC amendments shall depend on the nature
of the requestbut shall be focused on theinformation necessary to assess the
environmental impact of such changes."185
This brings us to the next logicalquestion, did the EPRMP provide the necessary
information in order for the DENR-EMB to assess the environmental impact of RP
Energy’s request relative to the first amendment?
We answer in the affirmative.
In the first place, the Casiño Group never attempted to prove that the subject EPRMP,
submitted by RP Energy to the DENR-EMB, was insufficient for purposes of
evaluating the environmental impact of the proposed modifications to the original
project design. There is no claim that the data submitted were falsified or
misrepresented. Neither was there an attempt to subpoena the review process
documents of the DENR to establish thatthe grant of the amendment to the ECC was
done with grave abuse of discretion or to the grave prejudice of the right to a healthful
environment of those who will beaffected by the project. Instead, the Casiño Group
relied solely on the definition of terms in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual,
which approach, as previously discussed,was erroneous.
At any rate, we have examined the contents of the voluminous EPRMP submitted by
RP Energy and wefind therein substantial sections explaining the proposed changes
as well as the adjustments that will be made in the environmental management plan in
order to address the potential environmental impacts of the proposed modifications to
the original project design. These are summarized in the "Project Fact Sheet"186 of
the EPRMP and extensively discussed in Section 4187 thereof. Absent any claim or
proof to the contrary, we have no bases to conclude that these data were insufficient
to assess the environmental impact of the proposed modifications. In accordance with
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the DENR-EMB
must be deemed to have adequately assessed the environmental impact of the
proposed changes, before granting the request under the first amendment to the
subject ECC.
In sum, the Revised Manual permits the use of an EPRMP, as the appropriate EIA
document type, for major amendments to an ECC, even for an unimplemented or
non-implementedproject with a previous ECC, such as the subject project.
Consequently, we find that the procedure adopted by the DENR, in requiring RP
Energy to submitan EPRMP in order to undertake the environmental impact
assessment of the planned modifications to the original project design, relative to the
first amendment to the ECC, suffers from no infirmity.
We apply the same framework of analysis in determining the propriety of a PDR, as
the appropriate EIA document type, relative to the second amendment to the subject
ECC.
Again, the Casiño Group, as sustained by the appellate court, relied on the definitions
of a PDR in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual:
Project Description (PD) — document, which may also be a chapter in an EIS, that
describes the nature, configuration, use of raw materials and natural resources,
production system, waste or pollution generation and control and the activities of a
proposed project. It includes a description of the use of human resources as well as
activity timelines, during the pre-construction, construction, operation and
abandonment phases. It is tobe used for reviewing co-located and single projects
under Category C, aswell as for Category D projects.188
xxxx
a) For new projects: x x x For non-covered projects in Groups II and III, a x x x
Project Description Report (PDR) is the appropriate document to secure a decision
from DENR/EMB. The PDR is a "must" requirement for environmental enhancement
and mitigation projects in both ECAs (Group II) and NECAs (Group III) to allow
EMB to confirm the benign nature of proposed operations for eventual issuance of a
Certificate ofNon-Coverage (CNC). All other Group III (non-covered) projects do not
need to submit PDRs – application is at the option of the Proponent should it need a
CNC for its own purposes, e.g. financing pre-requisite. For Group V projects, a PDR
is required to ensure new processes/technologies or any new unlisted project does not
pose harm to the environment. The Group V PDR is a basis for either issuance of a
CNC or classification of the project into its proper project group.
b) For operating projects with previous ECCs but planning or applying for clearance
to modify/expand or re-start operations, or for projects operating without an ECC but
applying to secure oneto comply with PD 1586 regulations, the appropriate document
is not an EIS but an EIA Report incorporating the project’s environmental
performance and its current Environmental Management Plan. This report is either an
(6) Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) for single 3. Extension of ECC validity
project applications or a (7) Programmatic EPRMP (PEPRMP) for co-located project
applications. However, for small project modifications, an updating of the project 4. Change in company name/ownership
description or the Environmental Management Plan with the use of the proponent’s
historical performance and monitoring records may suffice.189 5. Decrease in land/project area or production capacity

xxxx 6. Other amendments deemed "minor" at the discretion of the EMB CO/RO
Director192
Project Description (PD) - document, which may also be a chapter in an EIS, that
describes the nature, configuration, use of raw materials and natural resources, — because (1) there is no increase in capacity; (2) it does not constitute any
production system, waste or pollution generation and control and the activities of a significant impact; and (3) its EMP and ERA as specified in the submitted EPRMP
proposed project. It includes a description of the use of human resources as well as remain the same.193 Relative to Annex 2-1c, the requested amendment was, in turn,
activity timelines, during the pre-construction, construction, operation and determinedto fall under Item#3:
abandonment phases.190
3. Increase in capacity or Non-exceedance of PDR ECC Amendment /Letter
We will no longer delve intothe details of these definitions. Suffice it to state, similar auxiliary component of (non covered project) Request with brief
to the discussion on the EPRMP, that if we go by the strict limits of these definitions, the original project thresholds is assumed that description of additional
the PDR relative to the subject second amendment would not fall squarely under any which will either not impacts are not significant; capacity or component195
of the above. entail exceedance of
PDR (non-covered Modification scenario and
However, again, these are not the only provisions governing the PDR in the Revised project) thresholds or decision process are
Manual. EMP & ERA can still applicable to both non-
address impacts & risks implemented and operating
After the favorable grant of the first amendment, RP Energy applied for another arising from projects issued ECCs194
amendment to its ECC, this time inconsideration of its plan to change the modification
configuration of the project from 2 x 150 MWto 1 x 300 MW. In practical terms, this
meant that the subject project will still produce 300 MW of electricity but will now
We make the same observation, as before, that the above applies to an
make use of only one boiler (instead of two) to achieve greater efficiency in the
unimplemented or non-implemented project with a previous ECC, like the subject
operations of the plant. The DENR-EMB determined191 this amendment to be minor,
project. Although it may be noted thatthe proposed modification does not squarely
under Scenario 1, Item#6 of Figure 2-4:
fall under Item#3, considering that, as previously mentioned,there will be no increase
in capacity relative to the second amendment, still, we find nothing objectionable to
Scenario 1: Request for Minor
this classification by the DENR-EMB, for it seems plain enough that this
classification was used because the modification was deemed too minor to require a
Amendments
detailed project study like an EIS or EPRMP. Since this is the classification most
relevant and closely related to the intended amendment, following the basic precept
1. Typographical error
that the greater includes the lesser, the DENR-EMB reasonably exercised its
discretion in merely requiring a letter request with a brief description of the
2. Extension of deadlines for submission of post-ECC requirement/s
modification.
As earlier noted, the PDR is the EIA document type with the least detail, and, thus,
applicable to such minor modifications. Thus, the DENR-EMB cannot be faulted for
requiring RPEnergy to submit a PDR relative to its application for the second
amendment. Consequently, as before, we findthat the Revised Manual supports the
procedure adopted by the DENR-EMB in requiring RP Energy to submit a PDR in
order to assess the environmental impact of the planned modifications relative to the
second amendment.
In their Petition before this Court, the Casiño Group boldly asserts that "[t]here is
nothing in the Project Description Report that provides an environmental impact
assessment of the effects of constructing and operating a single 300-MW generating
unit."196 However, to our dismay, as in their other serious allegations in their
Petition for Writ ofKalikasan, the same is, likewise, baseless. Apart from such a
sweeping claim, the Casiño Group has provided no evidence or argument to back up
the same.
An examination of the PDR readily reveals that it contains the details of the proposed
modifications197 and an express finding that no significant environmental impact
will be generated bysuch modifications, as in fact it is expected that the operation of
the power plant will become more efficient as a result of the change from 2 x 150
MW to 1 x 300 MW configuration.198 Consequently, the PDR merely reiterates the
same mitigating measures that will presumably address the minor modifications to the
project design. Again, no evidence was presented to show substantial errors or
misrepresentations in these data or their inadequacy for providing the bases for the
DENR-EMB to assess the environmental impact of the proposed modifications under
the second amendment.
In fine, absent proof to the contrary, bearing in mind that allegations are not proof, we
sustain the procedure adoptedby the DENR-EMB in requiring RP Energy to submit a
PDR and, on the basis thereof, approving the request for the second amendment.
In another vein, we note that the appellate court proceeded from the erroneous
premise that the EIA is a document, when it repeatedly stated that the amendments to
the ECC require a new EIA, and not merely an EPRMP or PDR. The appellate court
relied on the provisoin the ECC, which stated that "[a]ny expansion of the project
beyond the project description or any change in the activity or transfer of location
shall besubject to a new Environmental Impact Assessment."199
However, as correctly pointed out by the DENR and RP Energy, the EIA is not a
document but a process:
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) — processthat involves evaluating and
predicting the likely impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on the
environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also
includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures
addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the community's
welfare.The process is undertaken by, among others, the project proponent and/orEIA
Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee, affected communities and other
stakeholders.200 (Emphasis supplied)
When the provisoin the ECC, therefore, states that a new EIA shall beconducted, this
simply means that the project proponent shall be required to submit such study or
report, as warranted by the DENR Rules and circumstances, which will sufficiently
aid the DENR in making a new EIA and, thus, determine whether to grant the
proposed amendment (or project modification). Aswe have seen, consistent with
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, the DENR required RP Energy to submit an
EPRMP and a PDR relative to the latter’s request involving the first and second
amendments, respectively, which led to the new EIA of the project in compliance
with the provisoof the ECC.
Verily, the various EIA documents, such as the EPRMP and PDR, are mere tools
used by the DENR to assess the environmental impact of a particular project. These
documents are flexibly used by the DENR, as the circumstances warrant, in order to
adequately assess the impacts of a new project or modifications thereto. Being the
administrative agency entrusted with the determination of which EIA document type
applies to a particular application for an amendment to an ECC, falling as it does
within its particular technical expertise, wemust accord great respect to its
determination, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
In sum, we find that the appellate court erred when it ruled that the first and second
amendments to the subject ECC wereinvalid for failure to comply with a new EIA
and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. The appellate court failed to
properly consider the applicable provisions in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual
on amendments to ECCs. Our examination of the provisions on amendments to
ECCs, as well as the EPRMP and PDR themselves, shows that the DENR reasonably
exercised its discretion in requiring an EPRMP and a PDR for the first and second
amendments, respectively. Through these documents, which the DENR reviewed, a
new EIA was conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. Hence, absent
sufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality, relative to both the
procedure and substance of the amendment process, we uphold the validity of these
amendments.
IV.
Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), under Section 59 of the IPRA Law,
is a precondition to the issuance of anECC and the lack of its prior issuance rendered
the ECC invalid.
The appellate court ruled that the ECC issued in favor of RP Energy on December 22,
2008 is invalid because the CNO covering the subject project was issued only on
October 31, 2012 or almost fouryears from the timeof issuance of the ECC. Thus, the
ECC was issued in violation of Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing
rules which require that a CNO be obtained prior to the issuance of a government
agency of, among others, a license or permit. In so ruling, the appellate court
implicitly upheld the Casiño Group’s argument that the ECC is a form of government
license or permit pursuant to Section 4 of PD 1586 which requires all entities to
securean ECC before (1) engaging in an environmentally critical project or (2)
implementing a project within an environmentally critical area.
The DENR and RP Energy, however, argue that an ECC is not the license or permit
contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules as may
be deduced from the definition, nature and scope of an ECC under DAO 2003-03 and
the Revised Manual. The DENR explains that the issuance of an ECC does not
exempt the project proponent from securing other permits and clearances as required
under existing laws, including the CNO, and that the final decision on whether a
project will be implemented lies with the concerned local government unit/s or the
lead government agency which has sectoral mandate to promote the government
programwhere the project belongs.
We agree with the DENR and RP Energy.
Section 59, Chapter VIII of the IPRA Law provides:
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other governmental
agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any
concession,license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement,
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with
any ancestral domain.Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based
investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned:
Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no
department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation
may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while
there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall
have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not
satisfied the requirement of this consultation process. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 9, Part II, Rule VIII of National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) Administrative Order No. 01-98201 states:
SECTION 9. Certification Precondition Prior to Issuance of any Permits or Licenses.
—
a. Need for Certification. No department of government or other agencies
shall issue, renew or grant anyconcession, license, lease, permit, or enter into
any production sharing agreement without a prior certification from the NCIP
that the area affected does not overlap any ancestral domain.
b. Procedure for Issuance ofCertification by NCIP.
1) The certification, above mentioned, shall be issued by the Ancestral
Domain Office, only after a field based investigation that such areas
are not within any certified or claimed ancestral domains.
2) The certification shall be issued only upon the free, prior, informed
and written consent of the ICCs/IPs who will be affected by the
operation of such concessions, licenses or leases or production-sharing
agreements. A written consent for the issuance of such certification
shall be signed by at least a majority of the representatives of all the
households comprising the concerned ICCs/IPs. (Emphasis supplied)
As may be deduced from its subtitle, Section 59 requires as a precondition, relative to
the issuance of any concession, license, lease or agreement over natural resources, a
certification issued by the NCIP that the area subject thereof does not lie within any
ancestral domain.202 This is in keeping with the State policy to protect the rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral
domains in order to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being as well as to
recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of such ancestral domain.203
The IPRA Law and its implementing rules do not define the terms "license" and
"permit" so that resort to their plain or ordinary meaning in relation to the intendment
of the law is appropriate.
A "license" has been defined as "a governmental permission to perform a particular
act (such as getting married), conduct a particular business or occupation, operate
machinery or vehicles after proving capacity and ability to do so safely, or use
property for a certain purpose"204 while a "permit" has been defined as "a license or
other document given by an authorized public official or agency (building inspector,
department ofmotor vehicles) to allow a person or business to perform certain
acts."205
The evident intention of Section 59, in requiring the CNO prior to the issuance of a
license or permit, is to prevent the implementation of a project that may impair the
right of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. The law seeks to ensure that a project
willnot overlap with any ancestral domain prior to its implementation and thereby
pre-empt any potential encroachment of, and/or damage to the ancestral domains of
ICCs/IPs without their prior and informed consent.
With these considerationsin mind, we now look atthe definition, nature and scope of
an ECC in order to determine if it falls within the ambit of a "license" or "permit" to
which the CNO requirement, under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing
rules, finds application. Section 4 of PD 1586 provides, in part:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and
Projects. — The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon
recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation
declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally
critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any
suchdeclared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President orhis duly authorized
representative.For the proper management of said critical project or area, the
President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies,
institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of
government personnel, and their specific functionsand responsibilities. (Emphasis
supplied)
While the above statutory provision reveals that the ECC is an indispensable
requirement before (1) the conduct of an environmentally critical project or (2) the
implementation of a project inan environmentally critical area, it does not follow that
the ECC is the "license" or "permit" contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law
and its implementing rules.
Section 3(d), Article I of DAO 2003-03 defines an ECC in this wise:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. —
For the purpose of this Order, the following definitions shall be applied:
xxxx
d. Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) — document issued by the
DENR/EMB after a positive review of an ECC application, certifying that based on
the representations of the proponent, the proposed project or undertaking will not
cause significant negative environmental impact. The ECC also certifies that the
proponent has complied with all the requirements of the EIS System and has
committed to implement its approved Environmental Management Plan. The ECC
contains specific measures and conditions that the project proponent has to undertake
beforeand during the operation of a project, and in some cases, during the project's
abandonment phase to mitigate identified environmental impacts.
In turn, Section 1.0, paragraphs 3 and 6 of the Revised Manual provide, in part:
3) Purpose of the EIA Process
As a basic principle, EIA is used to enhance planning and guide decisionmaking. In
this Manual, EIA is primarily presented in the context of a requirement to integrate
environmental concerns in the planning process of projects at the feasibility stage.
Through the EIA Process, adverse environmental impacts of proposed actions are
considerably reduced through a reiterative review process of project siting, design and
other alternatives, and the subsequent formulation of environmental management and
monitoring plans. A positive determination by the DENR-EMB results to the issuance
of an Environmental Compliance Commitment (ECC) document, to be conformed to
by the Proponent and represents the project’s Environmental Compliance Certificate.
The release of the ECC allows the project to proceed to the next stage of project
planning, which is the acquisition of approvals from other government agencies and
LGUs, after which the project can start implementation.
xxxx
6) The EIA Process inRelation to Other Agencies’ Requirements It is inherent upon
the EIA Process to undertake a comprehensive and integrated approach in the review
and evaluation of environment-related concerns of government agencies (GAs), local
government units (LGUs) and the general public. The subsequent EIA findings shall
provide guidance and recommendations to these entities as a basis for their decision
making process.
a) An Inter-agency MOA on EIS Streamlining was entered into in 1992 by 29
government agencies wherein ECC of covered projects was agreed to be a
prerequisite of all other subsequent government approvals;
b) DENR Memo Circular No. 2007-08 issued on 13 July 2007 reiterates in
effect the intent of the MOA and reinforces the role of the ECC/CNC as a
guidance document to other agencies and LGUs, as follows:
i) "No permits and/or clearances issued by other National Government
Agencies and Local Government Units shall be required in the
processing of ECC or CNC applications.
ii) The findings and recommendations ofthe EIA shall be transmitted
to relevant government agencies for them to integrate in their decision
making prior to the issuance of clearances, permits and licenses under
their mandates.
iii) The issuance of an ECC or CNC for a project under the EIS
System does not exempt the Proponent from securing other
government permits and clearances as required by other laws. The
current practice of requiring various permits, clearancesand licenses
only constrains the EIA evaluation process and negates the purpose
and function of the EIA."
iv) Henceforth, all related previous instructions and other issuances
shall be made consistent with the Circular.
c) "Permits, licenses and clearances" are inclusive of other national and local
government approvals such as endorsements, resolutions, certifications, plans
and programs, which have to be cleared/approved or other government
documents required within the respective mandates and jurisdiction of these
agencies/LGUs.
xxxx
f) The final decision whether a project will be implemented or not lies either with the
LGUs who have spatial jurisdiction over the project or with the lead government
agency who has sectoral mandate to promote the government program where the
project belongs, e.g. DOE for energy projects; DENR-MGB for mining
projects.(Emphasis supplied)
As can be seen, the issuance of the ECC does not, by and of itself, authorize the
implementation of the project. Although it is indispensable before the covered project
can be commenced, asper Section 4 of PD 1586,the issuanceof the ECC does not, as
of yet, result inthe implementation of the project. Rather, the ECC is intended to,
among others, provide guidance or act as a decision-making tool to other government
agencies and LGUs which have the final authority to grant licenses or permits, such
as building permits or licenses to operate, that will ultimately result in, or authorize
the implementation of the project or the conduct of specific activities.
As a consequence, we find that the CNO requirement under Section 59 of the IPRA
Law is not required to be obtained prior to the issuance of an ECC. As previously
discussed, Section 59 aims to forestall the implementation of a project that may
impair the right of ICCs/IPs totheir ancestral domains, by ensuring or verifying that a
project will not overlap with any ancestral domain prior to its implementation.
However, because the issuance of an ECC does not result in the implementation of
the project, there is no necessity to secure a CNO prior to an ECC’s issuance as the
goal orpurpose, which Section 59 seeks to achieve, is, at the time of the issuance of
an ECC, not yet applicable.
In sum, we find that the ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under Section
59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules. Hence, there is no necessity to secure
the CNO under Section 59 before an ECC may be issued and the issuance of the
subject ECC without first securing the aforesaid certification does not render it
invalid.
V.
Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), under Section 59 of the IPRA Law,
is a precondition to the consummation of the Lease and Development Agreement
(LDA) between SBMA and RP Energy and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the
LDA invalid.
We now turn to the applicability of Section 59 of the IPRA Law to the LDA entered
into between the SBMA and RP Energy on June 8, 2010. Similar to the ECC, the
LDA was entered into prior to the issuance ofthe CNO on October 31, 2012.
Before this Court, SBMA and RP Energy reiterate their arguments on why the CNO
is no longer necessary in the instant case, to wit:
1. Prior to entering into the LDA withRP Energy, SBMA entered into a lease
agreement with HHIC206 -Philippines, Inc. and a CNO was already issued
therefor which, for all intents and purposes, is applicable to the area leased by
RP Energy being part of contiguous lots in Redondo Peninsula.
2. The site of the power plant project is very distant from the boundaries of the
lone area at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone covered by an Aeta Community’s
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT).
3. There was no indigenous community within the vicinity of the project area
as stated in RP Energy’s EIS.
4. The land where the project is located was subsequently classified as
industrial by the SBMA. 5. The scoping/procedural screening checklist
classified as "not relevant" the issue of indigenous people.
6. Ms. Mercado, who was part of the team which prepared the EIS, testified
that she visited the project site ten or more times and did not see any Aeta
communities there.
7. Mr. Evangelista testified that the project site used to be a firing range of the
U.S. Armed Forces which would make it impossible to be a settlement area of
indigenous communities.
8. Atty. Rodriguez stated that the project site is not covered by a CADT and
that from the start of negotiations on the LDA, the SBMA Ecology Center
verified with the NCIP that there was no application for said area to be
covered by a CADT.
RP Energy further argues that, in any case, as a matter of prudence, it secured a CNO
from the NCIP. On October 31, 2012, the NCIP issued the subject CNO over the
project site, which should erase any doubt as to whether it overlaps with an ancestral
domain.
Upholding the arguments of the Casiño Group, the appellate court ruled that SBMA
failed to comply with the CNO requirement and, thus, the LDA entered into between
SBMA and RP Energy is invalid. It rejected the reasons given by SBMA and RP
Energy, to wit:
1. RP Energy’s reliance on its own field investigation that no indigenous
community was found within the vicinity is unavailing because it was not the
field investigation by the NCIP required by the IPRA Law.
2. RP Energy acknowledged that Aetas were among the earliest settlers in the
municipality where the project will be built. Hence, it was not clearly shown
that in 2008, at the time the LDA was entered into, there were no
indigenouscommunities in the project site.
3. SBMA’s representation that the project site is industrial relies on a letter
dated March 5, 2008 and the scoping checklist, which are hearsay evidence.
4. The statements of Atty. Rodriguez have no probative value because he is
not an officer of SBMA Ecology Center oran officer of NCIP.
5. At the time the CNO was issued on October 31, 2012, and the field
investigation relative thereto was conducted by the NCIP, the project site no
longer reflected the actual condition on December 22, 2008 when the LDA
was entered into because the households which occupied the site had already
been relocated by then.
 6. SBMA, prior to entering into a lease agreement with HHIC, secured a
CNO, but oddly did not do the same with respect to the lease agreement with
RP Energy, considering that both leases cover lands located within the same
peninsula. RP Energy appears to have been accorded a different treatment.
7. The CNO issued in favor of HHIC cannot justify the lack of a CNO for the
power plant project because the two projects are situated in different
locations: the HHIC project is located in Sitio Agusuhin,while the power plant
project is located in Sitio Naglatore.
While we agree with the appellate court that a CNO should have been secured prior to
the consummation of the LDA between SBMAand RP Energy, and not after, as was
done here, we find that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the
subsequent and belated compliance withthe CNO requirement does not invalidate the
LDA.
For convenience, and as starting point of ouranalysis, we reproduce Section 59 of the
IPRA Law below:
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other governmental
agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any
concession, license or lease, or entering into any productionsharing agreement,
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with
any ancestral domain.Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based
investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned:
Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no
department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation
may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while
there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall
have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not
satisfied the requirement of this consultation process. (Emphasis supplied)
The law is clear but its actual operation or application should not be interpreted
beyond the bounds of reason or practicality.
We explain.
Indeed, a CNO is required prior to the grant of a lease by all government agencies,
including the SBMA. Again, the evident intention is to prevent the impairment of the
right of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. A lease, such as the LDA under
consideration, would result in, among others, granting RP Energy the right to the use
and enjoyment of the project site to the exclusion of third parties.207 As such, the
lease could conceivably encroach on an ancestral domain if the CNO is not first
obtained.
However, implicit in the operation of Section 59 is the practical reality that the
concerned government agency must make a preliminary determinationon whether or
not to obtain the required certification in the first place. To expound, a government
agency, which wishes to lease part of its property located near Padre Faura Street,
Manila City could not, and should not be reasonably expected to obtain the CNO, as
it is obviously inapplicable to its planned lease. In contrast, a government agency,
which intends to lease a property in a valley or mountainous region, where indigenous
communities are known to reside, conduct hunting activities, perform rituals, or carry
out some other activities, should be reasonably expected to secure the CNO prior to
consummating the planned lease with third persons.
Even if the indigenous community does not actuallyreside on the proposed lease site,
the government agency would still be required to obtain the CNO preciselyto rule out
the possibility that the proposed lease site encroaches upon an ancestral domain. The
reason for this is that an ancestral domain does not only cover the lands actually
occupied by an indigenous community, but all areas where they have a claim of
ownership, through time immemorial use, such as hunting, burial or worship grounds
and to which they have traditional access for their subsistence and other traditional
activities.208
The wording of the law itself seems to presuppose that if the concession, lease,
license or production-sharing agreement is over natural resources, then the CNO
should be first obtained. This is because the lastterm, "production-sharing
agreement," normally refers to natural resources. But the problem arises as to what
should be considered "natural resources"; for a vacant lot, nearPadre Faura Street, or a
forest land, in Mt. Banahaw, could both beconsidered as "natural resources,"
depending on the restrictive or expansive understanding of that term.
After due consideration, we find that the proper rule of action, for purposes of
application of Section 59, is that all government offices should undertake proper and
reasonable diligence in making a preliminary determination on whether to secure the
CNO, bearing in mind the primordial State interest in protecting the rights of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. They should consider the nature and location of
the areas involved; the historical background of the aforesaid areas relative to the
occupation, use or claim of ownership by ICCs/IPs; the present and actual condition
of the aforesaid areas likethe existence of ICCs/IPs within the area itself or within
nearby territories; and such other considerations that would help determine whether a
CNO should be first obtained prior to granting a concession, lease, license or permit,
or entering into a production-sharing agreement.
If there are circumstances that indicate that a claim of ownership by ICCs/IPs may be
present or a claim of ownership may be asserted in the future, no matter how remote,
the proper and prudent course ofaction is to obtain the CNO. In case of doubt, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of securing the CNO and, thus, the government
agency is under obligation tosecure the aforesaid certification in order to protect the
interests and rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. This must be so if we are
to accord the proper respect due to, and adequately safeguard the interests and rights
of, our brothers and sisters belonging to ICCs/IPs in consonance with the
constitutional policy209 to promote and protect the rights of ICCS/IPs as fleshed out
in the IPRA Law and its implementing rules.
In the case at bar, we find, applying this rule of action, that the SBMA should have
first secured a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP Energy for the following
reasons.
First, the Subic area is historicallyknown to be the home of our brothers and sisters
belonging to the Aeta communities. In particular, the EIS210 itself of RP Energy
noted that Aeta communities originally occupiedthe proposed project site of the
power plant. Thus, even if we assume that, at the time of the ocular inspection of the
proposed project site in 2008, there were no Aeta communities seen thereat, as
claimed by RP Energy, the exercise of reasonable prudence should have moved
SBMA and RP Energy to secure a CNO in order to rule out the possibility that the
project site may overlap with an ancestral domain. This is especially so, in view of
the observation previously made, that lack of actual occupation by an indigenous
community ofthe area does not necessarily mean that it is not a part of anancestral
domain because the latter encompasses areas that are not actually occupied by
indigenouscommunities but are used for other purposes like hunting, worship or
burial grounds.
Second, SBMA and RP Energy claim that the SBMA Ecology Center verified with
the NCIP that the project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain. However,
the person, who allegedly did the verification, and the officer from the NCIP, who
was contacted in this alleged verification, were not presented in court. Assuming that
this verification did take place and that the SBMA Ecology Center determined that
there is no pendingapplication for a CADT covering the project site and that the
presently recognized CADT of Aeta communities is too far away from the project
site, it still does not follow that the CNO under Section 59 should have been
dispensed with. The acts of individual members ofa government agency, who
allegedly checked with the NCIP that the project site does not overlap with an
ancestral domain, cannot substitute for the CNO required by law. The reason is
obvious. Such posture would circumvent the noble and laudable purposes of the law
in providing the CNO as the appropriate mechanism in order to validly and officially
determine whether a particular project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain.
It would open the doors to abuse because a government agency can easily claim that
it checked with the NCIP regarding any application for an ancestral domain over a
proposed project site while stopping short of securing a CNO. To reiterate, the legally
mandated manner to verify if a project site overlaps with an ancestral domain is the
CNO,and not through personal verification by members of a government agency with
the NCIP.
Third, that the project site was formerlyused as the firing range of the U.S. Armed
Forces does not preclude the possibility that a present orfuture claim of ancestral
domain may be made over the aforesaid site. The concept of an ancestral domain
indicates that, even if the use ofan area was interrupted by the occupation of foreign
forces, it may still be validly claimed to be an ancestral domain.211
Fourth, that the project site was subsequently classified by the SBMA as forming part
of an industrial zone does not exempt it from the CNO requirement. The change in
the classification of the land is not an exception to the CNO requirement under the
IPRA Law. Otherwise, government agencies can easily defeat the rights of ICCs/IPs
through the conversion of land use.
Fifth, SBMA argues that the CNO issued to HHIC should, for all intents and
purposes, be applicable to RP Energy. However, ascorrectly ruled by the appellate
court, the CNO issued to HHIC’s shipyard cannot be extended to RP Energy’s project
site because they involve two different locations although found within the same land
mass. The CNO issued in favor of HHIC clearly states that the findings in the CNO
are applicable only to the shipyard location of HHIC. Last, the steps taken by SBMA,
in securing a CNO prior to its lease agreement with HHIC, was the proper and
prudent course of action that should have been applied to the LDA with RP Energy. It
does notmatter that HHIC itself asked for the CNO prior to entering into a lease
agreement with SBMA, as claimed by SBMA, while RP Energy did not make such a
request because, as we have discussed, SBMA had the obligation, given the
surrounding circumstances, to secure a CNO in order to rule out the possibility that
the project site overlapped with an ancestral domain.
All in all, we find, applying the foregoing rule of action,that SBMA should have
secured a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP Energy. Considering that
Section 59 is a prohibitory statutory provision, a violation thereof would ordinarily
result in the nullification of the contract.212 However, we rule that the harsh
consequences of such a ruling should not be applied to the case at bar.
The reason is that this is the first time that we lay down the foregoing rule of action so
much so that it would be inequitable to retroactively apply its effects with respect to
the LDA entered into between SBMA and RPEnergy. We also note that, under the
particular circumstances of this case, there is no showing that SBMA and RP Energy
had a deliberate or ill intent to escape, defeat or circumvent the mandate of Section 59
of the IPRA Law. On the contrary, they appear to have believed in good faith,
albeiterroneously, that a CNO was no longer needed because of the afore-discussed
defenses they raised herein. When the matter of lack of a CNO relative to the LDA
was brought to their attention, through the subject Petition for Writ ofKalikasan filed
by the Casiño Group, RP Energy, with the endorsement of SBMA, promptly
undertook to secure the CNO, which was issued on October 31, 2012 and stated that
the project site does not overlap with any ancestral domain.213
Thus, absent proof to the contrary, weare not prepared to rule that SBMA and RP
Energy acted inbad faith or with inexcusable negligence, considering that the
foregoing rule of action has not heretofore been laiddown by this Court. As a result,
we hold that the LDA should notbe invalidated due to equitable considerations
present here.
By so ruling, we clarify that we reject RP Energy’s claim that the belated submission
of the CNO is an "over compliance" on its part. Quite the contrary, as we have
discussed, the CNO should have been first secured given the surrounding
circumstances of this case.
In the same vein, we reject SBMA’s argument thatthe belated application for, and
submission of the CNO cured whatever defect the LDA had. We have purposely
avoided a ruling to the effect that a CNO secured subsequent to the concession, lease,
license, permit or production-sharing agreement will cure the defect. Such a ruling
would lead to abuse of the CNO requirement since the defect can be cured anyway by
a subsequent and belated application for a CNO. Government agencies and third
parties, either through deliberate intent or negligence, may view it as an excuse not to
timely and promptly secure the CNO, even when the circumstances warrant the
application for a CNO under the aforediscussed rule of action, tothe damage and
prejudice of ICCs/IPs. Verily, once the concession, lease, license or permit is issued,
or the agreement is entered into without the requisite CNO, consequent damages will
have already occurred if it later turns out that the site overlaps with anancestral
domain. This is so even if the ICCs/IPs can have the project stopped upon discovery
thatit overlapped with their ancestral domain under the last proviso214 of Section 59.
To prevent this evil, compliance with the CNO requirement should be followed
through the aforediscussed rule of action.
In sum, we rule that a CNO should have been secured prior to the consummation of
the LDA between SBMA and RP Energy. However, considering that this is the first
time we lay down the rule of action appropriate to the application of Section 59, we
refrain from invalidating the LDA due to equitable considerations.
VI.
Whether compliance with Section 27, inrelation to Section 26, of the LGC (i.e.,
approval of the concerned sanggunianrequirement) is necessary prior to the
implementation of the power plant project.
Sustaining the arguments ofthe Casiño Group, the appellate court ruled that the
subject project cannot beconstructed and operated until after the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunianrequirement, under Section 27 of the LGC, is complied with.
Hence, the ECC and LDA could not be validly granted and entered into without first
complying with the aforesaid provision. It held that all the requisites for the
application of the aforesaid provision are present. As to the pertinent provisions of
RA 7227 or "TheBases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," which grants
broad powers of administration to the SBMA over the Subic Special Economic
Zone(SSEZ), the appellate court ruled that RA 7227 contains a provision recognizing
the basic autonomy ofthe LGUs which joined the SSEZ. Thus, the LGC and RA
7227should be harmonized whereby the concerned sanggunian’spower to approve
under Section 27 must be respected.
The DENR impliedly agrees with the Casiño Group that compliance with Section 27
is still required but without clearly elaborating its reasons therefor.
The SBMA and RP Energy, however, argue that the prior approval of the concerned
sanggunianrequirement, under Section 27, is inapplicable to the subject project
because it is located within the SSEZ. The LGC and RA 7227 cannot be harmonized
because of the clear mandate of the SBMA to govern and administer all investments
and businesses within the SSEZ. Hence, RA 7227 should be deemed as carving out an
exception to the prior approval of the concerned sanggunianrequirement insofar as the
SSEZ is concerned.
We agree with the SBMA and RP Energy.
Preliminarily, we note that Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC contemplate two
requirements: (1) prior consultations and (2) prior approval of the concerned
sanggunian,viz:
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of
Ecological Balance. — It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-
owned or -controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and
implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover,
and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units,
non governmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals
and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the peopleand the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that
will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in
Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian
concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to
be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the Casiño Group only questions the alleged lack of the prior
approval of the concerned sanggunians under Section 27 of the LGC. Thus, we shall
limit our discussion to the resolution of this issue. (Parenthetically, we note that prior
consultations, as required by Section 26 of the LGC, appear to have been complied
with. This may begleaned from the EIS of RPEnergy which contains the
documentation of the extensive public consultations held, under the supervision of the
DENR-EMB, relative to the subject project, as required by the EIA process,215 as
well as the socialacceptability policy consultations conducted by the SBMA, which
generated the document entitled "Final Report: Social Acceptability Process for RP
Energy, Inc.’s 600-MW Coal Plant Project," as noted and discussed in an earlier
subsection.216)
We also note that the Casiño Group argues that the approval of the concerned
sanggunian requirement was necessary prior to the issuance of the ECC and the
consummation of the LDA; the absence of which invalidated the ECC and LDA.
We shall no longer discuss at length whether the approval of the concerned
sanggunian requirement must be complied with prior to the issuance of an ECC. As
discussed in an earlier subsection, the issuance of an ECC does not, by itself, result in
the implementation of the project. Hence, the purpose or goal of Sections 26 and 27
of the LGC,like Section 59 of the IPRA Law, does not yet obtain and, thus, the ECC
may be issued evenwithout prior compliance with Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC.
We, thus, limit the discussion as to whether the approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement should have been complied with prior to the consummation of the LDA,
considering that the LDA is part of the implementation of the subject project and
already vests in RP Energy the right to the use and enjoyment of the project site, asin
fact horizontal clearing activities were already undertaken by RP Energy at the
project site by virtue of the LDA.
The prior approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement is an attribute and
implementation of the local autonomy granted to, and enjoyed by LGUs under the
Constitution.217 The LGU has the duty to protect its constituents and interests in the
implementation of the project. Hence, the approval of the concerned sanggunian is
required by law to ensure thatlocal communities partake in the fruits of their own
backyard.218
For Section 27, in relation to Section 26, to apply, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the planning and implementation of the project or program is vested in a
national agency or government-owned and-controlled corporation, i.e., national
programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local
community; and (2) the project or program may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover,
extinction of animal or plant species, or call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in the locality where the project will be implemented.219
In the case at bar, the two requisites are evidently present: (1) the planning and
implementation of the subject project involves the Department of Energy, DENR, and
SBMA; and (2) the subject project may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of
non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction
of animal or plant species,or call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in the locality where the project will be implemented. Hence, Section 27 of
the LGC should ordinarily apply.
It is not disputed that no approval was sought from the concerned sangguniansrelative
to the subject project.1a\^/phi1 Whatis more, the affected LGUs have expressed their
strong oppositions to the project through various sanggunian resolutions.220
However, it is also undisputed that the subject project is located within the SSEZ and,
thus, under the territorial jurisdiction of the SBMA pursuant to RA 7227.
Thus, we are tasked to determine the applicability of the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunian requirement, under Section 27 of the LGC, relative to a project
within the territorial jurisdiction of the SBMA under RA 7227.
RA 7227 was passed on March 13, 1992 in the aftermath of the Mount Pinatubo
eruption and the closure of the Subic Naval Base ofthe U.S. Armed Forces. It sought
to revivethe affected areas by creating and developing the SSEZ into a "self-
sustaining industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate
employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote
productive foreign investments."221 The SSEZ covered the City of Olangapo and
Municipality of Subic in the Province ofZambales and the lands and its contiguous
extensions occupied by the former U.S. Naval Base, which traversed the territories of
the Municipalities of Hermosa and Morong in the Province of Bataan. Under Section
12 of RA 7227, the creation of the SSEZ was made subject to the concurrence by
resolution of the respective sanggunians of the City of Olongapo and the
Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, viz:
SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. — Subject to the concurrence by
resolution of the sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the
sangguniang bayanof the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is
hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of
Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied
by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and
defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as
the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a
proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days
after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall submit its resolution
of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the office of the President.
Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the
metes and bounds of the Zone as provided herein.
Subsequently, the aforesaid sanggunians submitted their respective resolutions of
concurrence and the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 532, Series of
1995, defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.
In Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,222 we described the
concept of SSEZ as a Freeport:
The Freeport was designed to ensurefree flow or movement of goods and capital
within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest their
capital in a business climate with the least governmental intervention. The concept
ofthis zone was explained by Senator Guingona in this wise:
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, the special economic zone is successful in many
places, particularly Hong Kong, which is a free port. The difference between a special
economic zone and an industrial estate is simply expansive in the sense that the
commercial activities, including the establishment of banks, services, financial
institutions, agro-industrial activities, maybe agriculture to a certain extent.
This delineates the activities that would have the least of government intervention,
and the running of the affairs of the special economic zone would be run principally
by the investors themselves, similar toa housing subdivision, where the subdivision
owners elect their representatives to run the affairs of the subdivision, toset the
policies, to set the guidelines.
We would like to see Subic area converted into a little Hong Kong, Mr. President,
where there is a hub of free port and free entry, free duties and activities to a
maximum spur generation of investment and jobs.
While the investor is reluctant to come in the Philippines, as a rule, because of red
tape and perceived delays, we envision this special economic zone to be an area
where there will be minimum government interference.
The initial outlay may not only come from the Government or the Authority as
envisioned here, but from them themselves, because they would be encouraged to
invest not only for the land but also for the buildings and factories. As long as they
are convinced that in such an area they can do business and reap reasonable profits,
thenmany from other parts, both local and foreign, would invest, Mr. President.223
(Emphasis in the original)
To achieve the above-mentioned purposes, the law created SBMA to administer the
SSEZ. In the process, SBMA was granted broad and enormous powers as provided
for under Section 13(b) of RA 7227:
Sec. 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –
xxxx
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority - The Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority, otherwise knownas the Subic Authority, shall
have the following powers and function: (1) To operate, administer, manage
and develop the ship repair and ship building facility, container port, oil
storage and refueling facility and Cubi Air Base within the Subic Special
Economic and Free-port Zone as a free market in accordance with the policies
set forth in Section 12 of this Act;
(2) To accept any local or foreign investment, business or enterprise,
subject only to such rules and regulations to be promulgated by the
Subic Authority in conformity with the policies of the Conversion
Authority without prejudice to the nationalization requirements
provided for in the Constitution;
(3) To undertake and regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of utilities, other services and infrastructure in the Subic
Special Economic Zone including shipping and related business,
stevedoring and port terminal services or concessions, incidental
thereto and airport operations in coordination with the Civil
Aeronautics Board, and to fix just and reasonable rates, fares charges
and other prices therefor;
(4) To construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and maintain on its own
or through contract, franchise, license permits bulk purchase from the
private sector and build-operate transfer scheme or joint-venture the
required utilities and infrastructurein coordination with local
government units and appropriate government agencies concerned and
inconformity with existing applicable laws therefor;
(5) To adopt, alter and use a corporate seal; to contract, lease, sell,
dispose, acquire and own properties; to sue and be sued in order to
carry out its duties and functions as provided for in this Act and to
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use and public
purpose;
(6) Within the limitation provided by law, to raise and/or borrow the
necessary funds from local and international financial institutions and
to issue bonds, promissory notes and other securities for that purpose
and to secure the same by guarantee, pledge, mortgage deed of trust, or
assignment of its properties held by the Subic Authority for the
purpose of financing its projects and programs within the framework
and limitation of this Act;
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism related activities
subject to priorities and standards set by the Subic Authority including
games and amusements, except horse racing, dog racing and casino
gambling which shall continue to be licensed by the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon
recommendation of the Conversion Authority; to maintain and
preserve the forested areas as a national park;
(8) To authorize the establishment ofappropriate educational and
medical institutions;
 (9) To protect, maintain and develop the virgin forests within the
baselands, which will be proclaimed as a national park and subject to a
permanent total log ban, and for this purpose, the rules and regulations
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and other
government agencies directly involved in the above functions shall be
implemented by the Subic Authority;
(10) To adopt and implement measures and standards for
environmental pollution control of all areas within its territory,
including but not limited to all bodies of water and to enforce the
same. For which purpose the Subic Authority shall create an Ecology
Center; and
(11) To exercise such powers as may be essential, necessary or
incidental to the powers granted to it hereunder as well as to carry out
the policies and objectives of this Act. (Emphasis supplied) The
Implementing Rules of RA 7227 further provide:
Sec. 11. Responsibilities of the SBMA. Other than the powers and functions
prescribed in Section 10 of these Rules, the SBMA shall have the following
responsibilities:
(a) The SBMA shall exercise authority and jurisdiction over all economic activity
within the SBF224
xxxx
(f) Consistent with the Constitution, the SBMA shall have the following powers to
enforce the law and these Rules in the SBF:
xxxx
(8) to issue, alter, modify, suspend or revoke for cause, any permit, certificate,
license, visa or privilege allowed under the Act or these Rules;
xxxx
(11) to promulgate such other rules, regulations and circulars as may be necessary,
proper or incidental to carry out the policies and objectives of the Act, these Rules, as
well as the powers and duties of the SBMA thereunder.225
As can be seen, the SBMA was given broad administrative powers over the SSEZ and
these necessarily include the power to approve or disapprove the subject project,
which is within its territorial jurisdiction. But, as previously discussed, the LGC
grants the concerned sangguniansthe power to approve and disapprove this same
project. The SBMA asserts that its approval of the project prevails over the apparent
disapproval of the concerned sanggunians. There is, therefore, a real clash between
the powers granted under these two laws.
Which shall prevail?
Section 12 of RA 7227 provides:
Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. x x x
The abovementioned zone shall be subjected to the following policies:
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the
Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall bedeveloped into a self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in
and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments;
xxxx
(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall
be governed by their respective charters and the municipalities shall operate and
function in accordance with Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. (Emphasis supplied)
This section sets out the basic policies underlying the creation of the SSEZ. Indeed, as
noted by the appellate court, Section 12(i) expressly recognizes the basic autonomy
and identity of the LGUscomprising the SSEZ. However, the clause "[e]xcept as
herein provided" unambiguously provides that the LGUs do not retain their basic
autonomy and identitywhen it comes to matters specified by the law as falling under
the powers, functions and prerogatives of the SBMA.
In the case at bar, we find that the power to approve or disapprove projects within the
SSEZ is one such power over which the SBMA’s authority prevails over the LGU’s
autonomy. Hence, there isno need for the SBMA to secure the approval of the
concerned sangguniansprior to the implementation of the subject project.
This interpretation is based on the broad grant of powers to the SBMA over all
administrative matters relating to the SSEZ under Section 13 of RA 7227, as afore-
discussed. Equally important, under Section 14, other than those involving defense
and security, the SBMA’s decision prevails in case of conflict between the SBMA
and the LGUs in all matters concerning the SSEZ, viz.:
Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local Government
Units.
(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Subic Authority shall exercise administrative powers,
rule-making and disbursement of funds over the Subic Special Economic
Zonein conformity with the oversight function of the Conversion Authority.
(b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local government
units concerned on matters affecting the Subic Special Economic Zone other
than defense and security, the decision of the SubicAuthority shall prevail.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the subject project does not involve defense or security, but rather business
and investment to further the development of the SSEZ. Such is in line with the
objective of RA 7227 to develop the SSEZ into a self-sustaining industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center. Hence, the decision of the SBMA would
prevail over the apparent objections of the concerned sanggunians of the LGUs.
Significantly, the legislative deliberations on RA 7227, likewise, support and confirm
the foregoing interpretation. As earlier noted, Section 13 b(4) of RA 7227 provides:
Sec. 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –
xxxx
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority - The Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, otherwise knownas the Subic Authority, shall have the
following powers and function: x x x x
(4) To construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and maintain on its own or through
contract, franchise, license permits bulk purchase from the private sector and build-
operate transfer scheme or joint-venture the required utilities and infrastructure in
coordination with local government units and appropriate government agencies
concerned and in conformity with existing applicable laws therefor;
In the Senate, during the period of amendments, when the provision which would
eventually become the afore-quoted Section 13 b(4) of RA 7227 was under
consideration, the following exchanges took place:
Senator Laurel. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Laurel is recognized.
Senator Laurel. Relative to line 27 up to line 31 of page 16, regarding the provision to
the effect that the Authoritywill have the following functions: "to construct, acquire,
own, etcetera," that is all right.
My motion is that we amend this particular line, starting from the word "structures",
by deleting the words that follow on line 31, which states: "in coordination with local
government unitsand", and substitute the following in place of those words:
"SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE SANGGUNIAN OF THE AFFECTED
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND IN COORDINATION WITH."
So, this paragraph will read, as follows: "to construct, own, lease, operate, and
maintain on its own or through contract, franchise, license permits, bulk purchase
from the private sector and build-operate-transfer scheme or joint venture the required
utilities and infrastructure SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE
SANGGUNIAN OF THE AFFECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND IN
coordination with appropriate government agencies concerned and in conformity with
existing applicable laws therefor."
The President. What does the Sponsor say?
Senator Shahani. I believe this would cripple the Authority. I would like to remind
our Colleagues that in the Board of Directors, the representatives of the local
government units that agree to join with the Subic Special Economic Zone will be
members of the Board so that they will have a say, Mr. President. But if we say
"subject," that is a very strong word. It really means that they will be the ones to
determine the policy.
So, I am afraid that I cannot accept this amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Laurel. May I respond or react, Mr. President.
The President. Yes.
Senator Laurel. The Constitution is there,very categorical inthe promotion and
encouragement of local autonomy, and mandating Congress to enact the necessary
Local Government Code with emphasis on local autonomy.
We have now Section 27 of the new Local Government Code which actually provides
that for every projectin any local government territory, the conformity or concurrence
of the Sanggunian of every such local government unit shall be secured in the form of
resolution—the consent of the Sanggunian.
The President. Well, both sides have already been heard. There is the Laurel
amendment that would make the power of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority to
construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and maintain on its own or through contract,
franchise, license, permits, bulk purchases from private sector, buildoperate-and-
transfer scheme, or joint venture, the required utilities and infrastructure, subject to
approval by the appropriate Sanggunian of the local government concerned.
This amendment to the amendment has been rejected by the Sponsor. So, we are
voting now on this amendment.
As many as are in favor of the Laurel amendment, say Aye. (Few Senators: Aye.)
Those who are against the said amendment, say Nay. (Several Senators: Nay.)
Senator Laurel. Mr. President, may I ask for a nominal voting.
The President. A nominal voting should beupon the request of one-fifth of the
Members of the House, but we can accommodate the Gentleman by asking for a
division of the House. Therefore, those in favor of the Laurel amendment, please raise
their right hands. (Few Senators raised their right hands.)
Senator Laurel. I was asking, Mr. President, for a nominal voting. The President. A
nominal voting can be had only upon motion ofone-fifth of the Members of the Body.
Senator Laurel. That is correct, Mr. President. But this issuch an important issue
being presented to us, because this question is related to the other important issue,
which is: May an elected public official of a particular government unit, such as a
town or municipality, participate as a member of the Board of Directors of this
particular zone.
The President. The ruling of the Chair stands. The division of the House is hereby
directed.
As many as are infavor of the Laurel amendment, please raised (sic) their right hands.
(Few Senators raised their right hands.)
As many as are against the said amendment, please do likewise. (Several Senators
raised their right hands.)
The amendment is lost.226 (Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the legislature rejected the attempts to engraft Section 27’s prior
approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement under the LGC into RA 7227.
Hence, the clear intent was to do awaywith the approval requirement of the concerned
sangguniansrelative to the power ofthe SBMA to approve or disapprove a project
within the SSEZ.
The power to create the SSEZ is expressly recognized in Section 117 of the LGC,
viz.:
TITLE VIII.
Autonomous Special Economic Zones
SECTION 117. Establishment of Autonomous Special Economic Zones. — The
establishment by law of autonomous special economic zones in selected areas of the
country shall be subject to concurrence by the local government units included
therein.
When the concerned sanggunians opted to join the SSEZ, they were, thus, fully aware
that this would lead to some diminution of their local autonomy in order to gain the
benefits and privileges of being a part of the SSEZ.
Further, the point of Senator Shahani that the representation of the concerned LGUs
in the Board of Directors will compensate for the diminution of their local autonomy
and allow them to be represented in the decision-making of the SBMA is not lost on
us. This is expressly provided for in Section 13(c) of RA 7227, viz:
SECTION 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. —
xxxx
(c) Board of Directors. — The powers of the Subic Authority shall be vested in and
exercised by a Board of Directors, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall be
composed of fifteen (15) members, to wit:
(1) Representatives of the local government units that concur to join the Subic
Special Economic Zone;
(2) Two (2) representatives from the National Government;
(3) Five (5) representatives from the private sector coming from the present
naval stations, public works center, ship repair facility, naval supply depot and
naval air station; and
(4) The remaining balance to complete the Board shall be composed of
representatives from the business and investment sectors. (Emphasis supplied)
SBMA’s undisputed claim is that, during the board meeting when the subject project
was approved, exceptfor one, all the representatives of the concerned LGUs were
present and voted to approve the subject project.227 Verily, the wisdom of the law
creating the SSEZ; the wisdom of the choice of the concerned LGUs to join the
SSEZ; and the wisdom ofthe mechanism of representation of the concerned LGUs in
the decision-making process of the SBMA are matters outside the scope of the power
of judicial review. We can only interpret and apply the law as we find it.
In sum, we find that the implementation of the project is not subject to the prior
approval of the concerned sanggunians, under Section 27 of the LGC, and the
SBMA’s decision to approve the project prevails over the apparent objections of the
concerned sangguniansof the LGUs, by virtue ofthe clear provisions of RA 7227.
Thus, there was no infirmity when the LDA was entered into between SBMA and RP
Energy despite the lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians. VII.
Whether the validity of the third amendment to the ECC can be resolved by the Court.
The Casiño Group argues that the validity of the third amendment should have been
resolved by the appellate court because it is covered by the broad issues set during the
preliminary conference.
RP Energy counters that this issue cannot be resolved because it was expressly
excluded during the preliminary conference.
The appellate court sustained the position of RP Energy and ruled that this issue was
not included in the preliminary conference so that it cannot be resolved without
violating the right todue process of RP Energy.
We agree with the appellate court.
Indeed, the issue of the validity of the third amendment to the ECC was not part of
the issues set during the preliminary conference, as it appears at that time that the
application for the third amendment was still ongoing. The following clarificatory
questions during the aforesaid conference confirm this, viz.:
J. LEAGOGO:
So what are you questioning in your Petition?
ATTY. RIDON:
We are questioning the validity of the amendment, Your Honor.
J. LEAGOGO: Yes, Your Honor.

Which amendment? J. LEAGOGO:

ATTY. RIDON: Because there is no amended ECC yet for the 2 x 300 or 600. That’s clear enough for
all of us.
From 2 x 150 to 1 x 300, Your Honor.
ATTY. RIDON:
J. LEAGOGO:
Yes, Your Honor.228
Your Petition does not involve the 2 x 300 which is still pending with the DENR.
Because you still have remedies there, you can make your noise there, you can Given the invocation of the right to due process by RP Energy, we must sustain the
question it to your heart[’]s content because it is still pending appellate court’s finding that the issue as to the validity of the third amendment
cannot be adjudicated in this case.
xxxx
Refutation of the Partial Dissent.
J. LEAGOGO:
Justice Leonen partially dissents from the foregoing disposition on the following
Atty. Ridon, I go back to my question. We’re not yet talking of the legal points here. grounds:
I’m just talking of what are you questioning. You are questioning the 1 x 300?
(a) Environmental cases, such asa petition for a writ of kalikasan, should not,
ATTY. RIDON: in general,be litigated viaa representative, citizen or class suit because of the
danger of misrepresenting the interests— and thus, barring future action due
Yes, Your Honor. to res judicata— of those not actually present in the prosecution of the case,
either because they do not yet exist, like the unborn generations, or because
J. LEAGOGO: the parties bringing suit do not accurately represent the interests ofthe group
they represent or the class to which they belong. As an exception, such
Because it was 2 x 150 and then 1 x 300? representative, citizen or class suit may be allowed subject to certain
conditions; and
ATTY. RIDON:
(b) The amendments to the ECC, granted by the DENR in favor of RP Energy,
Yes, Your Honor. are void for failure to submit a new EIS in support of the applications for
these amendments to the subject ECC, and a petition for writ of kalikasanis
J. LEAGOGO: not the proper remedy to raise a defect inthe ECC.

Up to that point? We disagree.

ATTY. RIDON: A.
Justice Leonen’s proposition that environmental cases should not, in general, be
litigated via a representative, citizen or class suit is both novel and ground-breaking.
However, it isinappropriate to resolve such an important issue in this case, in view of
the requisites for the exercise of our power of judicial review, because the matter was
not raised by the parties so that the issue was not squarely tackled and fully
ventilated. The proposition will entail, as Justice Leonen explains, an abandonment
or, at least, a modification of our ruling in the landmark case of Oposa v.
Factoran.229 It will also require an amendment or a modification of Section 5 (on
citizen suits), Rule 2 ofthe Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. Hence, it is
more appropriate to await a case where such issues and arguments are properly
raisedby the parties for the consideration of the Court.
B.
Justice Leonen reasons that the amendments to the subject ECC are void because the
applications therefor were unsupported by anEIS, as required by PD 1151 and PD
1586. The claim is made that an EIS is required by law, even if the amendment to the
ECC is minor, because an EIS is necessary to determine the environmental impact of
the proposed modifications to the original project design. The DENR rules, therefore,
which permit the modification of the original project design without the requisite EIS,
are void for violating PD 1151 and PD 1586.
We disagree.
Indeed, Section 4 of PD 1151 sets out the basic policy of requiring an EIS in every
action, project or undertaking that significantly affects the quality of the environment,
viz:
SECTION 4. Environmental Impact Statements. — Pursuant to the above enunciated
policies and goals, all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations, as well as private
corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and include in every action,
projector undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the environmenta
detailed statement on —
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking;
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented;
(c) alternative to the proposed action;
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the
environment are consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the
long-term productivity of the same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or nonrenewable
resources, a finding must be made that such use and commitment are
warranted.
Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all agencies
having jurisdiction over, or special expertise on, the subject matter involved shall
comment on the draft environmental impact statement made by the lead agency
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the same. (Emphasis supplied)
As earlier stated, the EIS was subsequently developed and strengthened through PD
1586 which established the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System.
Sections 4 and 5 of PD 1586 provide:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and
Projects.1avvphi1 The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon
recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation
declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally
critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such
declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the
President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies,
institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of
government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a) prepare
the proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or area(s); (b) establish
ambient environmental quality standards; (c) develop a program of environmental
enhancement or protective measures against calamituous factors such as earthquake,
floods, water erosion and others, and (d) perform such other functions as may be
directed by the President from time to time.
SECTION 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. — All other projects,
undertakings and areas not declared by the President as environmentally critical shall
be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to submit an environmental
impact statement. The National Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry
of Human Settlements may however require non-critical projects and undertakings to
provide additional environmental safeguards as it may deem necessary. (Emphasis
supplied)
These laws were, in turn, implemented by DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual.
As correctly noted by Justice Leonen,Presidential Proclamation No. 2146 was
subsequently issued which, among others, classified fossil-fueled power plants as
environmentally critical projects.
In conformity with the above-quoted laws and their implementing issuances, the
subject project, a coal power plant, was classified by the DENR as an
environmentally critical project, new and single. Hence, RP Energy was required to
submit an EIS in support of its application for an ECC. RP Energy thereafter
complied with the EIS requirement and the DENR, after review, evaluation and
compliance with the other steps provided in its rules, issued an ECC in favor of RP
Energy. As can be seen, the EIS requirement was duly complied with.
Anent Justice Leonen’s argument thatthe subsequent amendments to the ECC were
void for failure to prepare and submit a new EIS relative to these amendments, it is
important to note thatPD 1586 does not state the procedure to be followed when there
is an application for an amendment to a previously issued ECC. There is nothing in
PD 1586 which expressly requires an EIS for an amendment to an ECC.
In footnote 174 of the ponencia, it is stated:
Parenthetically, we must mention that the validity of the rules providing for
amendments to the ECC was challenged by the Casiño Group on the ground that it is
ultra vires before the appellate court. It argued that the laws governing the ECC do
not expressly permit the amendment of an ECC. However, the appellate court
correctly ruled that the validity of the rules cannot be collaterally attacked.
Besides,the power of the DENR to issue rules on amendments of an ECC is
sanctioned under the doctrine of necessary implication. Considering that the greater
power todeny or grant an ECC is vested by law in the President or his authorized
representative, the DENR, there is no obstacle to the exercise of the lesser or implied
power to amend the ECC for justifiable reasons. This issue was no longer raised
before this Court and, thus, we no longertackle the same here.
Because PD 1586 did not expressly provide the procedure to be followed in case of
an application for an amendment toa previously issued ECC, the DENR exercised its
discretion, pursuant to its delegated authority to implement this law, in issuing DAO
2003-30 and the Revised Manual.
Justice Leonen’s argument effectively challenges the validity of the provisions in
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual relative to amendments to an ECC for being
contrary to PD 1151 and 1586.
We disagree.
First, to repeat, there is nothing in PD 1586 which expressly requires an EIS for an
amendment to an ECC.
Second, as earlier noted, the proposition would constitute a collateral attack on the
validity of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, which is not allowed under the
premises. The Casiño Group itself has abandoned this claim before this Court so that
the issue is not properly before this Court for its resolution.
Third, assuming that a collateral attack on the validity of DAO 2003-30 and the
Revised Manual can be allowed in this case, the rules on amendments appear to be
reasonable, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
Essentially, the rules take into consideration the nature of the amendment in
determining the proper Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) document type that
the project proponent will submit in support of its application for an amendment to its
previously issued ECC. A minor amendment will require a less detailed EIA
document type, like a Project Description Report (PDR), while a major amendment
will require a more detailed EIA document type, like an Environmental Performance
Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) or even an EIS.230
The rules appear to be based on the premise that it would be unduly burden some or
impractical to require a project proponent to submit a detailed EIA document type,
like an EIS, for amendments that, upon preliminary evaluation by the DENR, will not
cause significant environmental impact. In particular, as applied to the subject project,
the DENR effectively determined that it is impractical to requireRP Energy to, in a
manner of speaking, start from scratch by submitting a new EIS in support of its
application for the first amendment to its previously issued ECC, considering that the
existing EIS may be supplemented by an EPRMP to adequately evaluate the
environmental impact of the proposed modifications under the first amendment. The
same reasoning may be applied to the PDR relative to the second amendment. As
previously discussed, the Casiño Group failed to provethat the EPRMP and PDR
were inadequate to assess the environmental impact of the planned modifications
under the first and second amendments, respectively. On the contrary, the EPRMP
and PDR appeared to contain the details of the planned modifications and the
corresponding adjustments to bemade in the environmental management plan or
mitigating measures inorder to address the potential impacts of these planned
modifications. Hence, absent sufficient proof, there is no basis to conclude that the
procedure adopted by the DENR was done with grave abuse of discretion.
Justice Leonen’s proposition would effectively impose a stringent requirement of an
EIS for each and every proposed amendment to an ECC, no matter how minor the
amendment may be. While this requirement would seem ideal, in order to ensure that
the environmental impact of the proposed amendment is fully taken into
consideration, the pertinent laws do not, however, expressly require that such a
procedure be followed.As already discussed, the DENR appear to have reasonably
issued DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manualrelative to the amendment process of an
ECC, by balancing practicality vis-à-vis the need for sufficient information in
determining the environmental impact of the proposed amendment to an ECC. In fine,
the Court cannot invalidate the rules which appear to be reasonable, absent a showing
of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
We next tackle Justice Leonen’s argument that a petition for certiorari,and not a writ
of kalikasan,is the proper remedy to question a defect in an ECC.
In general, the proper procedure to question a defectin an ECC is to follow the appeal
process provided in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After complying with the
proper administrative appeal process, recourse may be made to the courts in
accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, as
earlier discussed, in exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan may be availed of to
challenge defects in the ECC providedthat (1) the defects are causally linked or
reasonably connected to an environmental damage of the nature and
magnitudecontemplated under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan, and (2) the case does
not violate, or falls under an exception to, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and/or primary jurisdiction.
As previously discussed, in the case at bar, only the allegation with respect to the lack
of an EIA relative to the first and second amendments to the subject ECC may be
reasonably connected to such an environmental damage. Further, given the extreme
urgency of resolving the issue due to the looming power crisis, this case may be
considered as falling under an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, the aforesaid issue may be conceivably resolved in a
writ of kalikasan case.
More importantly, we have expressly ruled that this case is an exceptional case due to
the looming power crisis, so that the rules of procedure may be suspended in order to
address issues which, ordinarily, the Court would not consider proper in a writ of
kalikasan case. Hence, all issues, including those not proper in a writ of kalikasan
case, were resolved here in order to forestall another round of protracted litigation
relative to the implementation of the subject project.
Conclusion
We now summarize our findings:
1. The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casiño Group failed to
substantiate its claims thatthe construction and operation of the power plant
will cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the
writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented evidenceto
establish that the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage,
through its Environmental Management Plan, which will ensure thatthe
project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and
standards;
2. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack
of signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECC’s Statement of Accountability relative
to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the appellate court. While
the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC, the particular
circumstances of this case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not
properly apprised of the issue of lack of signature in order for them to present
controverting evidence and arguments on this point, as the issue only arose
during the course of the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the
appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy cannot be faulted for submitting the
certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC had been
invalidatedon the ground of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013 Decision
of the appellate court. The certified true copy of the ECC, bearing the
signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the Statement of Accountability portion, was
issued by the DENR-EMB, and remains uncontroverted. It showed that the
Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24,
2008. Because the signing was done after the official release of the ECC on
December 22, 2008, wenote that the DENR did not strictly follow its rules,
which require that the signing of the Statement of Accountability should be
done before the official release of the ECC. However, considering that the
issue was not adequately argued norwas evidence presented before the
appellate court on the circumstances at the time of signing, there is
insufficient basis to conclude that the procedure adoptedby the DENR was
tainted with bad faith or inexcusable negligence. We remind the DENR,
however, to be more circumspect in following its rules. Thus, we rule that the
signature requirement was substantially complied with pro hac vice.
3. The appellate court erred when it ruled that the first and second
amendments to the ECC were invalid for failure to comply with a new EIA
and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. It failed to properly
consider the applicable provisions in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual
for amendment to ECCs. Our own examination of the provisions on
amendments to ECCs in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, as wellas the
EPRMP and PDR themselves, shows that the DENR reasonably exercised its
discretion in requiring an EPRMP and a PDR for the first and second
amendments, respectively. Through these documents, which the DENR
reviewed, a new EIA was conducted relative to the proposed project
modifications. Hence, absent sufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion
or patent illegality, relative to both the procedure and substance of the
amendment process, we uphold the validity of these amendments;
4. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC for failure to comply
with Section 59 of the IPRA Law.1âwphi1 The ECC is not the license or
permit contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing
rules. Hence, there is no necessity to secure the CNO under Section 59 before
an ECC may be issued, and the issuance of the subject ECC without first
securing the aforesaid certification does not render it invalid;
5. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the LDA between SBMA and
RP Energy for failure to comply withSection 59 of the IPRA Law. While we
find that a CNO should have been secured prior to the consummation of the
LDA between SBMA and RP Energy, considering that this is the first time we
lay down the rule of action appropriate to the application of Section 59, we
refrain from invalidating the LDA for reasons of equity;
6. The appellate court erred when it ruled that compliance with Section 27, in
relation to Section 26, of the LGC (i.e., approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement) is necessary prior to issuance of the subjectECC. The issuance of
an ECC does not, by itself, result inthe implementation of the project. Hence,
there is no necessity to secure prior compliance with the approval of the
concerned sanggunian requirement, and the issuance of the subject ECC
without first complying with the aforesaid requirement does not render it
invalid. The appellate court also erred when it ruled that compliance with the
aforesaid requirement is necessary prior to the consummation of the LDA. By
virtue of the clear provisions of RA 7227, the project is not subject to the
aforesaid requirement and the SBMA’s decision to approve the project
prevails over the apparent objections of the concerned sanggunians. Thus, the
LDA entered into between SBMA and RP Energy suffers from no infirmity
despite the lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians; and
7. The appellate court correctly ruled thatthe issue as to the validity of the
third amendment to the ECC cannot be resolved in this case because it was not
one of the issues set during the preliminary conference, and would, thus,
violate RP Energy’s right to due process. WHEREFORE, the Court resolves
to:
1. DENY the Petition in G.R. No. 207282; and
2. GRANT the Petitions in G.R.Nos. 207257, 207366 and 207276:
2.1. The January 30, 2013 Decision and May 22, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00015
are reversed and set aside;
2.2. The Petition for Writ of Kalikasan, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 00015, is denied for insufficiency of evidence;
2.3. The validity of the December 22, 2008 Environmental
Compliance Certificate, as well as the July 8, 2010 first
amendment and the May 26, 2011 second amendment thereto,
 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in favor of Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc., are
upheld; and

2.4. The validity of the June 8, 2010 Lease and Development

Agreement between Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and
Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. is upheld.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military
Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his
own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY
(PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC
MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB),
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P.
CUDIA, and on her own behalf, Petitioner-Intervenor.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal commitment to
uphold what is morally and ethically righteous at the most critical and trying times,
and at the most challenging circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma
between what is true and right as against his security, well-being, pleasures and
comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor and those that [define] his values. A
man of an honorable character does not think twice and chooses the fore. This is the
essence of and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing truth and
righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of one's basic rights and privileges.1
The Procedural Antecedents
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for himself and in behalf of his
son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and Berteni Catalufta
Causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application
for extremely urgent temporary restraining order (TRO).2
In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for TRO and
instead, required respondents to file their comment on the petition.3
On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave to intervene, attaching thereto the petition-
in-intervention.4 Per Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court granted the motion
and resolved to await respondents' comment on the petition.5
A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014, recommending the
admission of the petition-in-intervention and adopting it as an integral part of their
petition.6 On May 20, 2014, petitioner-intervenor filed a manifestation with motion
for leave to admit the Final Investigation Report of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The Report8 was relative to CHR-CAR Case No.
2014-0029 filed by the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for
themselves and in behalf of their son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC)
members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet lCL
Cudia's rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.
Subsequently, on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a motion for leave to adopt the
submission of the CHR Report.10 The manifestation was granted and the motion was
noted by the Court in its Resolution dated July 7, 2014.
After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed their
Consolidated Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a motion, petitioner-intervenor filed a
Reply, which was later adopted by petitioners.13 Submitted as Annex "A" of the
Reply was a copy of the CHR Resolution dated May 22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR
Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted the same on August 11, 2014 and
October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit the case for
early resolution,15 which the Court noted in a Resolution dated August 11, 2014 and
October 3, 2014.16
The Facts
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the
country's premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio
City. He belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As
claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively called
"petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he was supposed to graduate with honors as
the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet
graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets
had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria
Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from
the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was from 1 :30-
3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05
p.m. (1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class issued
a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two
(2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x. "17 Cadets 1 CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda,
Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.18
On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They
were logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation
of the concerned cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out
that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our
instructor Sir."19
On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
Immediately, Cadet lCL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The
latter told him that the basis of the punishment was the result of his conversation with
Dr. Costales, who responded that she never dismissed her class late, and the protocol
to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than scheduled. When he expressed his
intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the punishment, he was · advised to
put the request in writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia addressed his
Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin L. Leander,
Senior Tactical Officer (STO), asserting:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class
ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also.
Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next class without any intention of
being late Sir.20
A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the
request of Cadet 1 CL Cudia and to indicate if there were other cadets belonging to
the same section who were also late.
On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing
out that, based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a
result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty imposed. Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1
CL Cudia came to know of the denial of his request only on January 24, 2014 upon
inquiry with Maj. Leander.
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was informed that
Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for violation of the Honor Code. The Honor
Report stated:
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that
his 4th period class ended at l 500H that made him late in the succeeding class.22
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1 CL
Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet lCL Cudia learned that it
was based on Maj. Hindang's conversations with their instructors and classmates as
well as his statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He then
verbally applied for and was granted an extension of time to answer the charge
against him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light on the matter, was on
emergency leave.
On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet lCL Cudia, conveying:
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a report
dated november. When maj hindang ask me, no time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)
All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last december. Whc i
told, i wud presume they wil finish early bee its grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23
The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales, who
reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang were not in the same time reference when the
latter asked her.
Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor Report. He
averred:
Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell
rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms.
Costales. After which, I and Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for some query with regards
(sic) to the deductions of our previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered our
question. She then told me that she will give the copy of our section grade, so I
waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then she came out of the room
and gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I immediately
went to our 5ti period class which is ENG412.
With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:
1. How could this be lying?
2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up
to that honor report)?
3. What are his assumptions?
I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be reopened and
carefully reviewed for I did not violate the honor code/system, I can answer NO to
both questions (Did I intend to deceive? Did I intend to take undue advantage?) and
for the following reasons:
1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized
given the fact that no face-to-face personal conversation with Ms.
Costales was conducted to clarify what and when exactly was the issue
at hand.
2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation.
3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for
reconsideration of meted punishment) further supports my explanation
in my delinquency report.
4. My understanding of the duration of the "CLASS" covers not just a
lecture in a typical classroom instruction but includes every transaction
and communication a teacher does with her students, especially that in
our case some cadets asked for queries, and I am given instruction by
which (sic) were directly related to our CLASS. Her transaction and
communication with our other classmates may have already ended but
ours extended for a little bit.
I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under my
instruction to wait, and the other cadets still have business with
me, it is reasonable enough for him to say that "Our class was
dismissed a bit late" (dealing with matter of seconds or a
minute particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)
And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended on
time (1500H).
(signed)
M COSTALES
w/ attached certification
5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and
did not attempt to conceal anything that happened or I did.
6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk
Company[,] and I had a conversation with regards (sic) to the same
matter for which he can give important points of my case.
7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a witness that I waited for
Ms. Costales. 24
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The Foxtrot
Company was designated as the investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1 CL
Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1 CL Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab,
2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as members.25 Soon after, the team
submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending that the case be
formalized.
The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. The Presiding
Officer was Cadet 1 CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine (9) voting members were
Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1 CL Kim Adrian R.
Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1 CL ShuAydan G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G.
Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko Angelo C.
Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked to document the entire proceedings were 4CL
Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus 11.27 Those who observed
the trial were Cadets 1 CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino,
Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL
Umaguing.28
The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted until early
morning the next day. Cadet lCL Cudia was informed of the charge against him, as to
which he pleaded "Not Guilty." Among those who testified were Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the
hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia again appeared and was called
to the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified
under oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting members
followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The members cast their votes
through secret balloting and submitted their accomplished ballot sheets together with
their written justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet lCL
Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet lCL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon
the order ofHC Chairman Cadet 1 CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting
members went inside a chamber adjoining the court room for further deliberation.
After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer announced the 9-0
guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring hours, was then
informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He
was immediately placed in the PMA Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal.
On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to the HC
Chairman, the full text of which stated:
WRITTEN APPEAL
14 NOVEMBER 2013
This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class", my
explanation on this delinquency report when I received it, is that "Our class was
dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly from 4th period class ... etc". Knowing
the fact that in my delinquency report, it is stated that ENG412 classes started 1500H
and I am late for two minutes, it is logical enough for I (sic) to interpret it as "I came
1502H during that class". This is the explanation that came into my mind that time. (I
just cannot recall the exact words I used in explaining that delinquency report, but
what I want to say is that I have no intention to be late). In my statements, I convey
my message as "since I was not the only one left in that class, and the instructor is
with us, I used the term "CLASS", I used the word "DISMISSED" because I was
under instruction (to wait for her to give the section grade) by the instructor, Ms.
Costales. The other cadets (lCL MIRANDA, lCL ARCANGEL) still have queries and
business with her that made me decide to use the word "CLASS", while the others
who don't have queries and business with her (ex: lCL NARCISO and 1 CL DIAZ)
were also around.
Note:
The four named cadets were also reported late.
Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec XVII,
CCAFPR s2008)
It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not linger in the place of instruction
after the section has been dismissed. EXCEPT when told or allowed to do so by the
instructor or by any competent authority for official purposes. "
The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells rang (indicating
the end of class hour, 1500H). I waited for her for about 45 seconds to 1 minute and
30 seconds, that made me to decide to write "a little bit late" in my explanation.
Truly, the class ENDED 1500H but due to official purpose (instruction by Ms.
Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic schedule (to which I am not in control
of the circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H and 5th PD class 1500H-1 600H),
and since Ms. Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I used the word
"CLASS".
19 December 2013
I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits and 13 Touring
hours. Not because I don't want to serve punishment, but because I know I did
nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction, and believing that my reason is justifiable and
valid, that is why I approached our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify
and ask why it was awarded that day.
In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor and he even
added that they have a protocol to dismiss the class, 15 minutes or 10 minutes before
1500H. I explained:
Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period
class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also.
Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class without any intention of
being late Sir.
These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my delinquency report, in
here, I specified the conflict in the schedule and again, I have no intention to be late.
After explaining it further with these statements, my tactical officer said that since I
was reported in a written form, I should make an appeal in a written form. Thinking
that he already understood what I want to say, I immediately made an appeal that day
stating the words that I used in having conversation with him.29
Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014, wherein
Dr. Costales attested:
1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with
Cadet CUDIA in making query about their latest grades in OR432 and/or
results of UEl outside the ACADS office. The following facts may explain
their queries on 14 November 2013:
a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.
b. That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are
informed during Thursday, either in class or posted grades in the
bulletin board (grades released was [sic J based on the previous LEs:
latest LE before UE was Decision Trees).
c. That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded due to
(sic) other cadets have not taken the UE. Cadets were allowed to verify
scores but not to look at the papers.
d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed Cadet
NARCISO and ARCANGEL verified grades. The two cadets said that
they verified something with me after the OR432 class and they were
with Cadet CUD IA. That the statements of the three (3) cadets are all
the same and consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.
2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the
specific time that I dismissed the class. To this date, I [cannot] really recall an
account that is more than two (2) months earlier. According to my records,
there was a lecture followed by an LE during (sic) on 14 November 2013. To
determine the time of my dismissal, maybe it can be verified with the other
members of class I was handling on that said date.30
Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day, January · 24, as it
found no reason to conduct a re-trial based on the arguments and evidence
presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim that the written appeal was not acted upon
until the filing of the petition-in-intervention.32
From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the Headquarters
Tactics Group (HTG) conducted an informal review to check the findings of the HC.
During the course of the investigation, Prof. Berong was said to have confirmed with
the Officer-in-Charge of the HC that classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or
1505H), and that Cadet lCL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412, verified
before the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and STO that the class started not
earlier than scheduled.
Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the Formal
Investigation Report to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for review. The next day, the
SJA found the report to be legally in order.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the Commandant
of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar
Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet lCL
Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec.
VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date, Special Orders No. 26 was
issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on indefinite leave of
absence without pay and allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval of
his separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him from future appointment and/or
admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements
to the PMA. 33
Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss
Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the
Commandant of Cadets requesting for reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a
cadet.34
Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ), the sister of Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
posted his plight in her Face book account. The day after, the Spouses Cudia gave a
letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez), the new PMA
Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1 voting of the HC.35 Copies of which
were furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and other concerned military officials.
Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet lCL Cudia's case. The
latter, in turn, referred the matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).
On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen.
Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a reinvestigation following the
viral Facebook post of Annavee demanding the intervention of the military
leadership.
Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was issued directing
all PMA cadets to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia by not talking to him and by separating
him from all activities/functions of the cadets. It is said that any violation shall be a
"Class 1" offense entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours confinement.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not given a copy of the order and learned about it only from
the media.36 According to an alleged news report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes
Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
Among his offenses were: breach of confidentiality by putting documents in the
social media, violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to resign, and
smearing the name of the PMA.37
On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for additional time,
until March 4, 2014, to file an appeal on the ground that his intended witnesses are in
on-the-job training ( OJT).38 As additional evidence to support his appeal, he also
requested for copies of the Minutes of the HC proceedings, relevant documents
pertaining to the case, and video footages and recordings of the HC hearings.
The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO) in Baguio City.
The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a) letter of appeal
of the Spouses Cudia dated February 18, 2014; (b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case; and ( c) guidance from Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen. Costales,
Jr.), the CRAB Chairman, informed Cadet lCL Cudia that, pending approval of the
latter's request for extension, the CRAB would continue to review the case and
submit its recommendations based on whatever evidence and testimonies received,
and that it could not favorably consider his request for copies of the HC minutes,
relevant documents, and video footages and recordings of the HC hearings since it
was neither the appropriate nor the authorized body to take action thereon.39
Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1 CL Cudia wrote a letter to Maj. Gen.
Lopez reiterating his request.40
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members and Maj. Gracilla for
alleged violation of the human rights of Cadet lCL Cudia, particularly his rights to
due process, education, and privacy of communication.41
On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for additional time,
until March 19, 2014, to file his appeal and submit evidence. PAO also wrote a letter
to AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for
immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet 1CL
Cudia's requests.42
Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the
following events transpired:
On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public Attorney
Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other hand, the CRAB submitted a report to the
AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.44
On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the denial of
Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests for extension of time to file an Appeal Memorandum in
view of the ample time already given, and to be furnished with a copy of relevant
documents because of confidentiality and presumption of regularity of the HC
proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO, then filed an Appeal
Memorandum46 before the CRAB.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching
thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47 On the same day, Special Orders No. 48 was
issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed
of the CRAB members and PMA senior officers to conduct a deliberate investigation
pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry
was not just to find out whether the appeal has merit or may be considered but also to
investigate possible involvement of other cadets and members of the command
related to the incident and to establish specific violation of policy or regulations that
had been violated by other cadets and members of the HC.49
On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney had a dialogue
with Maj. Gen. Lopez. On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its
preliminary findings, which recommended the following:
a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty -
1 Not guilty vote;
b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt Cudia
as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor Committee;
c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-
fledge graduating cadet and allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March 2014;
d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of
Cudia's Case.50
On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with Pres.
Aquino and Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin.
The President recommended that they put in writing their appeal, requests, and other
concerns. According to respondents, the parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia would
not join the graduation but it was without prejudice to the result of the appeal, which
was elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff. The President then tasked Gen. Bautista to
handle the reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the
group conducting the review.
Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia
received a letter dated March 11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General
and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for the AFP Chief of Staff, affirming the
CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s appeal. It held:
After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds that the action of the PMA
CRAB in denying the appeal for reinvestigation is legally in order. There was enough
evidence to sustain the finding of guilt and the proprietary (sic) of the punishment
imposed. Also, your son was afforded sufficient time to file his appeal from the date
he was informed of the final verdict on January 21, 2014, when the decision of the
Honor Committee was read to him in person, until the time the PMA CRAB
conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son at the
Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained subject to the Academy's policy
regarding visitation. Further, there was no violation of his right to due process
considering that the procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and PMA CRAB
was consistent with existing policy. Thus, the previous finding and recommendation
of the Honor Committee finding your son, subject Cadet guilty of "Lying" and
recommending his separation from the Academy is sustained.
In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for lack of
merit.51 Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final
Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1 CL Cudia's appeal.52
Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special investigation board tasked to probe the
case submitted its final report to the President.53 Pursuant to the administrative
appeals process, the DND issued a Memorandum dated May 23, 2014, directing the
Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete records of the case for purposes
of DND review and recommendation for disposition by the President.54
Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to
CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029, concluding and recommending as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights-
CAR Office finds PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
against the officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee and .. certain PMA
officials, specifically for violations of the rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P.
CUDIA to dignity, due process, education, privacy/privacy of communication, and
good life.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to indorse to
competent authorities for their immediate appropriate action on the following
recommendations:
1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the "9-Guilty, 0-
Not Guilty" verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being null
and void; to uphold and respect the "8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty" voting
result and make an official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in favor
of Cadet Cudia;
2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands
rest the ends of justice and fate of Cadet Cudia, to:
2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of
the Philippine Military Academy;
2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the
degree of Bachelors of Science; and
2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript
'of his academic records for his BS degree, without conditions
therein as to his status as a PMA cadet.
3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide legal services to Cadet
Cudia in pursuing administrative, criminal and civil suits against the
officers and members of the Honor Committee named hereunder, for
violation of the Honor Code and System and the Procedure in Formal
Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the ballot,
tampering the true result of the voting, perjury, intentional omission in
the Minutes of substantive part of the formal trial proceedings which
are prejudicial to the interest of justice and Cadet Cudia's fundamental
rights to dignity, non-discrimination and due process, which led to the
infringement of his right to education and even transgressing his right
to a good life.
3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ
3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO, JR.
3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC. TARAYAO
3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of
the AFP
3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of
the AFP
3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of
the AFP
3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)
3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (record)
4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent
authorities should investigate and file appropriate charges against Maj.
VLADIMIR P. GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of
Cadet Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the
protection of the right to privacy of Cudia who was then billeted at the
PMA Holding Center;
5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent
authorities should investigate Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG
for his failure and ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a
competent Tactical Officer and a good father of his cadets, in this case,
to Cadet Cudia; for failure to respect exhaustion of administrative
remedies;
6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philppines, the PMA Superintendent, to immediately
cause the comprehensive review of all rules of procedures, regulations,
 policies, including the so-called practices in the implementation of the
Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt new policies, rules of procedures
and relevant regulations which are human-rights based and consistent
with the Constitution and other applicable laws;
7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law
defining and penalizing ostracism and discrimination, which is
apparently being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in this
jurisdiction;
8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as
priority, the passage of an anti-ostracism and/or anti-discrimination
law; and
9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to
ensure respect and protection of the rights of those who testified for
the cause of justice and truth as well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent authorities on the
foregoing CHR recommendations.
Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted service to
the complainants (the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia),
and all the respondents. Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the
Secretary of National Defense, His Excellency The President of the Philippines, The
Public Attorneys' Office.
SO RESOLVED.55
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP Chief
of Staff and the CRAB. The letter, which was addressed to the Spouses Cudia and
signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in whole:
This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26 March 2014
appealing for a reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Honor Committee on the case of your son, Cadet 1 CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.
After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision of the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code
System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this Office has found no substantial basis to disturb
the findings of the AFP and the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is
no competent evidence to support the claim that the decision of the Honor Committee
members was initially at 8 "Guilty" votes and 1 "Not Guilty" vote. The lone affidavit
of an officer, based on his purported conversation with one Honor Committee
member, lacks personal knowledge on the deliberations of the said Committee and is
hearsay at best.
Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot
be adopted as basis that Cadet Cudia's due process rights were violated. Apart from
being explicitly preliminary in nature, such recommendations are anchored on a
finding that there was an 8-1 vote which, as discussed above, is not supported by
competent evidence.
In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this Office has been guided by the precept
that military law is regarded to be in a class of its own, "applicable only to military
personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system
of discipline separate from that of civilians" (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007,
10 August 2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office regarded the findings of the AFP
Chief, particularly his conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the proceedings
that ensued, as carrying great weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the findings of the
AFP Chief and the PMA CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR
COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET
FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER
DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT:
 A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case, Cadet
First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was deprived of his right to have access to
evidence which would have proven his defense, would have totally belied the
charge against him, and more importantly, would have shown the irregularity
in the Honor Committee's hearing and rendition of decision
B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the decisions
arrived at by the Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and
the Philippine Military Academy
C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy have afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudia nothing but a sham trial
D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy violated their own rules and principles as
embodied in the Honor Code
E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy, in deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudia's case, grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so as to
defy the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the unquestionable fact that the
former should yield to the latter.
II
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR
COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT CADET
FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY VIOLATING THE
HONOR CODE
III
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION
INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT
THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition, respondents
presented the issues below:
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
I.
THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE INCLUDED
IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF 2014 AND BE
ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS
ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT.
II.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL
WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.
III.
MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE
RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. IV. IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL
REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON CADET
CUDIA'S APPEAL.
V.
WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST EXERCISE
CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR PREMATURELY
INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY MATTERS.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
VI.
CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED
CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.
 VII.
THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO
IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT
AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.
VIII.
CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets despite the
absence of statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.
Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful
statements in the explanation for his tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the Honor
Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly accorded to
Cadet Cudia.
The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee, by incorporating
executive session/chambering, was adopted to further strengthen the voting procedure
of the Honor Committee. Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any
pressure from the other voting members of the Honor Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.
The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on the Honorable
Court, and are, at best, recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was dismissed from
the PMA.58
The Ruling of the Court
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Propriety of a petition for mandamus
Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia be included in the list of graduating cadets and for him to take part in the
commencement exercises was already rendered moot and academic when the
graduation ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa Class took place on March 16, 2014.
Also, a petition for mandamus is improper since it does not lie to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus
petition could not be availed of to compel an academic institution to allow a student
to continue studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not a right. In this
case, there is a clear failure on petitioners' part to establish that the PMA has the,
ministerial duty to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list, much less award him with
academic honors and commission him to the Philippine Navy. Similar to the case of
University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 it is submitted that the PMA
may rightfully exercise its discretionary power on who may be admitted to study
pursuant to its academic freedom.
In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1 CL Cudia to
participate in the PMA 2014 commencement exercises could no longer be had, the
Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed for. They add that Garcia enunciated that
a respondent can be ordered to act in a particular manner when there is a violation of
a constitutional right, and that the certiorari aspect of the petition must still be
considered because it is within the province of the Court to determine whether a
branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.
We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus
may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty.
An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to
or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must
have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to
a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to
perform the duty.61
In this case, petitioners pray for, among others: Also, after due notice and hearing, it
is prayed of the Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus to:
1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, including inclusion in the yearbook;
2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the commencement
exercises if he completed all the requirements for his baccalaureate degree;
3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he
deserves, and the commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign;
4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its
records of the proceedings taken against Cadet Cudia, including the video
footage and audio recordings of the deliberations and voting, for the purpose
of allowing the CRAB to conduct intelligent review of the case of Cadet
Cudia;
5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all the records
without requiring Cadet Cudia to submit new evidence if it was physically
impossible to do so;
6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the certification signed by Dr.
Costales, the new evidence consisting of the affidavit of a military officer
declaring under oath that the cadet who voted "not guilty" revealed to this
officer that this cadet was coerced into changing his vote, and other new
evidence if there is any;
7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who is
allowed to participate actively in the proceedings as well as in the cross-
examinations during the exercise of the right to confront witnesses against
him; and
8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the CRAB to
allow Cadet Cudia a representation of a counsel.62
Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:
A. xxx
B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:
a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold the
8 Guilty -1 Not Guilty vote;
b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce
Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the
Honor Committee;
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-
fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma and awards.63
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates
of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the commencement
exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies
pushed through on March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the roll of
graduates.
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and
entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards, and
commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the same cannot be granted in a
petition for mandamus on the basis of academic freedom, which We shall discuss in
more detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that these matters are within the
ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond the
province of the Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant
awards, and commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the
part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words of
Garcia:
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion
appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the
position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this case,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a
mandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an
official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment.66 For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to
perform the act sought to be mandated.67
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners,
which pertain to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the absence of a clear and
unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone
to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion; it
will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or
which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled
by law.68
The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since, as
argued by petitioners, the Court is empowered to settle via petition for certiorari
whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents in dismissing
Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.
Factual nature of the issues
According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require the Court to
make findings of fact because it sets forth several factual disputes which include,
among others: the tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in , his ENG412 class and his
explanation thereto, the circumstances that transpired in the investigation of his
Honor Code violation, the proceedings before the HC, and the allegation that Cadet 1
CL Lagura was forced to change his vote during the executive session/"chambering."
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal issues.
Rather than determining which between the two conflicting versions of the parties is
true, the case allegedly centers on the application, appreciation, and interpretation of a
person's rights to due process, to education, and to property; the interpretation of the
PMA Honor Code and Honor System; and the conclusion on whether Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant case involves questions of
fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed questions of
fact and law. Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted
and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.
On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the
question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of
law.69 The petition does not exclusively present factual matters for the Court to
decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of more importance is the
determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due process, to education, and to
property in the context of the Honor Code and the Honor System, and, if in the
affirmative, the extent or limit thereof. Notably, even respondents themselves raise
substantive grounds that We have to resolve. In support of their contention that the
Court must exercise careful restraint and should refrain from unduly or prematurely
interfering in legitimate military matters, they argue that Cadet 1 CL Cudia has
necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of his entry
into the PMA, and that the Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing the
imposition of disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent
with the peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues, aside from being purely legal being
purely legal questions, are of first impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to
make a categorical ruling.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition pending
President Aquino’s resolution of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' appeal. They say that there is an
obvious non-exhaustion of the full administrative process. While Cadet 1 CL Cudia
underwent the review procedures of his guilty verdict at the Academy level - the
determination by the SJA of whether the HC acted according to the established
procedures of the Honor System, the assessment by the Commandant of Cadets of the
procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the evaluation of the PMA
Superintendent to warrant the administrative separation of the guilty cadet, and the
appellate review proceedings before the CRAB - he still appealed to the President,
who has the utmost latitude in making decisions affecting the military. It is contended
that the President's power over the persons and actions of the members of the armed
forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171
of Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act''). As
such, the President could still overturn the decision of the PMA. In respondents' view,
the filing of this petition while the case is pending resolution of the President is an
irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For them, comity dictates that courts
of justice should shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President Aquino
effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They claim that his family exerted
insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration of the HC recommendation from the
APP officials and the President, but was in vain. The circumstances prior to, during,
and after the PMA 2014 graduation rites, which was attended by President Aquino
after he talked to Cadet lCL Cudia's family the night before, foreclose the possibility
that the challenged findings would still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist
that the· rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute based on the
Corsiga v. Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.
We rule for petitioners.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until
the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. The rationale behind the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that "courts, for reasons of law,
comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities, who are
competent to act upon the matter complained of, have been given the appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum."74 In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United States,75 which was
cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving a
decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the
military before appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve
the balance between military and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial
resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly
resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.76
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due course to the petition
despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the fact
that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the
President finally issued its ruling, which sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and
the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event bars any objection to the
petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Court's interference within military affairs
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v. Councilman78
to support their contention that judicial intervention would pose substantial threat to
military discipline and that there should be a deferential review of military statutes
and regulations since political branches have particular expertise and competence in
assessing military needs. Likewise, in Orloff v. Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80
it was allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme Court that the military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.
According to respondents, the U.S. courts' respect to the military recognizes that
constitutional rights may apply differently in the military context than in civilian
society as a whole. Such military deference is exercised either by refusing to apply
due process and equal protection doctrines in military cases or applying them but with
leniency.
In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial review in
cases attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to military
affairs. Such respect is exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved entail a
substantial consideration of legitimate governmental interest. They suppose that
allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case to prosper will set an institutionally dangerous
precedent, opening a Pandora's box of other challenges against the specialized system
of discipline of the PMA. They state that with the PMA's mandate to train cadets for
permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and procedure necessarily
must impose h different standard of conduct compared with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the State's check-and-
balance machinery, specifically mandated by Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to
ensure that no branch of the government or any of its officials acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of, discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not
deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They cite Schlesinger and Parker, which were
invoked by respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82
wherein the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals on
account of issues posed concerning due process and violations of constitutional rights.
Also, in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this Court, petitioners note that We, in fact,
exercised the judicial power to determine whether the APP and the members of the
court martial acted with grave abuse o.f discretion in their military investigation.
Petitioners' contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government, not the
courts, with superintendence and control over the military because the courts
generally lack the competence and expertise necessary to evaluate military decisions
and they are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular
intrusion upon military authority might have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity,
We rule that the facts as well as the legal issues in the U.S. cases cited by respondents
are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Instead, what applies is the
1975 U.S. case of Andrews v. Knowlton,85 which similarly involved cadets who
were separated from the United States Military Academy due to Honor Code
violations. Following Wasson v. Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v. Knowlton,87
Andrews re-affirmed the power of the district courts to review procedures used at the
service academies in the separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen. While it
recognized the "constitutional permissibility of the military to set and enforce
uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics," it said that the courts "have
expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial access for review of military
determinations." Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was opined that it has been well
settled that federal courts have jurisdiction "where there is a substantial claim that
prescribed military procedures violates one's constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S.
Congress eventually made major revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) by expressly providing, among others; for a direct review by the U.S.
Supreme Court of decisions by the military's highest appellate authority.89
Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still formidable. In
this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope
of judicial power by mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only
"to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.90 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.91
The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of the Due Process
Clause, be considered a governmental activity. As ruled in Andrews:
The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation process at
the Academy has been sufficiently formalized, and is sufficiently interdependent, so
as to bring that committee's activities within the definition of governmental activity
for the purposes of our review. While the Academy has long had the informal practice
of referring all alleged violations to the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship
between that committee and the separation process has to a degree been formalized. x
xx
Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or informal, the Honor
Committee under its own procedures provides that a single "not guilty" vote by a
member ends the matter, while a "guilty" finding confronts a cadet with the hard
choice of either resigning or electing to go before a Board of Officers. An adverse
finding there results not only in formal separation from the Academy but also in a
damaging record that will follow the cadet through life. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a grand jury, is clearly part of the
process whereby a cadet can ultimately be adjudged to have violated the Cadet Honor
Code and be separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the committee's
procedures and determinations on the separation process is sufficiently intertwined
with the formal governmental activity which may follow as to bring it properly under
judicial review92
No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present Constitution
declares it as a matter of principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military.93 Consistent with the republican system of checks and balances, the
Court has been entrusted, expressly or by necessary implication, with both the duty
and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
legislative or executive action.94
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties
Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not the same as
that of a civilian because the former' s rights have already been recalibrated to best
serve the military purpose and necessity. They claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col.
Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De Villa95 recognized that, to a certain degree, individual rights
of persons in the military service may be curtailed by the rules of military discipline
in order to ensure its effectiveness in fulfilling the duties required to be discharged
under the law. Respondents remind that, as a military student aspiring to a
commissioned post in the military service, Cadet 1 CL Cudia voluntarily gave up
certain civil and political rights which the rest of the civilian population enjoys. The
deliberate surrender of certain freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets' Honor
Code Handbook. It is noted that at the beginning of their academic life in the PMA,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, along with the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking
to stand by the Honor Code and the Honor System.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including the right
to due process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution,96 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended by E.O. No.
100598), AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor
System, military professionalism, and, in general, military culture. They maintain that
the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly and in bad faith misapplied the Honor
Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet lCL Cudia's case considering that
these should not be implemented at the expense of human rights, due process, and fair
play. Further, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they can never
overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the latter.
Petitioners stress that the statement that "a cadet can be compelled to surrender some
civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented" simply
pertains to what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women
of integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain vices and the right to freely
choose what they want to say or do. In the context of disciplinary investigation, it
does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers to the
cadets' rights to privacy and to remain silent.
We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private
interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one
that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school.99 In fact, the
Honor Code and Honor System Handbook of the PMA expresses that, "[as] a training
environment, the Cadet Corps is a society which has its own norms. Each member
binds himself to what is good for him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be part of
the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the good
of the group."100
It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were adopted
by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct
has constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence,
disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a
must.101 For that reason, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process.
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the due process
clause must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe sanctions of
being expelled from a course of college instruction which he or she has pursued with
a view to becoming a career officer and of probably
being forever denied that career.103
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not specifically
pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military academy due to honor
violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the petition that sought to annul the directive
from then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners from
testifying before the Congress without her consent. We ruled that petitioners may be
subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of
Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction imposed on
petitioner since the conditions for his "house arrest" (particularly, that he may not
issue any press statements or give any press conference during the period of his
detention) are justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two cases,
the constitutional rights to information, transparency in matters of public concern, and
to free speech - not to due process clause - were restricted to better serve the greater
military purpose. Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be
used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA.
They argue that Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for
the attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System do not
state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service. To
them, the Honor Code and Honor System are "gentleman's agreement" that cannot
take precedence over public interest - in the defense of the nation and in view of the
taxpayer's money spent for each cadet. Petitioners contend that, based on the Civil
Code, all written or verbal agreements are null and void if they violate the law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, and public safety.
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose disciplinary measures and
punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the Academy.
Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets since it is deemed reasonably written into C.A.
No. 1. Moreover, although said law grants to the President the authority of
terminating a cadet's appointment, such power may be delegated to the PMA
Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the
inherent right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations that it may deem
necessary for the maintenance of school discipline, which is specifically mandated by
Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military
educational institution of the AFP in accordance with Section 30,105 Article III of
C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,106 Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of
E.O. No. 292 ("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution that enjoys
academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,108 it was held
that concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose
discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help
College of Rizal, Inc.109 and Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,110 the PMA
has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to expel) given the high degree of
discipline and honor expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code
as basis of the HC' s decision to recommend his dismissal from the PMA. When he
enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA for four years, he knew or should have
been fully aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and the
corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these standards.
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic
freedom is not absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant disregard of the right to
due process and the 1987 Constitution. Although schools have the prerogative to
choose what to teach, how to teach, and who to teach, the same does not go so far as
to deprive a student of the right to graduate when there is clear evidence that he is
entitled to the same since, in such a case, the right to graduate becomes a vested right
which takes precedence over the limited and restricted right of the educational
institution.
While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents are
more in line with the facts of this case. We have ruled that the school-student
relationship is contractual in nature. Once admitted, a student's enrolment is not only
semestral in duration but for the entire period he or she is expected to complete it.111
An institution of learning has an obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is imbued with public
interest because of the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over a educational
institutions.113
The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. "[It] has
consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind -it gives rise to
bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide
students with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic
requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations."114
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning,115 has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935,
1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,117 which
enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of a university: To determine for itself on
academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be
taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study.118 An educational institution has the
power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its
government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable
to the successful management of the college.119 It can decide for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference
except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some
restraint.120 Indeed, "academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged
license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An
equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19
of the Civil Code, that every 'person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."'121
The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic
freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival."122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a
mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's
disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating.123 In this
regard, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary
sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate
disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,125
this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an
atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution
requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such
rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty,
and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if
not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school
teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis
in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the
duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of
humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal
discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and
technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry
out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible,
effective and worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than
in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to
admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel,
as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the
withholding of graduation privileges.126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after
graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto. In University of the Phils.
Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,127 We upheld the university's withdrawal of a
doctorate degree already conferred on a student who was found to have committed
intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935
Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom
or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of
higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending
to the choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can
and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the
honor and distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained
through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or
distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon
the "graduation" of a student, .as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the
"graduation" of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the
investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able
to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many
investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not
have been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for
the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the
University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the
recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a
degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject
to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a
student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers
that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be
more objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon an
individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of
academic excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of
self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the
USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and
in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not
jeopardized.128
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes;
nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.129 Essentially,
education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and
reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to education," students have a concomitant
duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.131 Every citizen has a right to
select a profession or, course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements.132 The PMA is not different. As the primary
training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are
the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is
the minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each
cadet's action. It is the cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor.
Throughout a cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds
as well the members of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-
called "Long Gray Line."
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets' character
development. It defines the desirable values they must possess to remain part of the
Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so essential in a military organization; and
it makes them professional military soldiers.133 As it is for character building, it
should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet
Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an officer of the AFP and as a
product of the PMA.134
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of achieving the
cadets' character development and as ways by which the Academy has chosen to
identify those who are deficient in conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical
standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that
graduates have strong character, unimpeachable integrity, and moral standards of the
highest order.136 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is
characterized as "correctional and educational in nature rather than being legalistic
and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be prepared to accept full
responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the service above
self-interest or loyalty to friends or associates. "137 Procedural safeguards in a
student disciplinary case
Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more appropriate in
determining the minimum standards for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions. Similarly, with the guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was accorded due process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA fell short in
observing the important safeguards laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v.
Judge Dames II,140 which set the minimum standards to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman
did not entirely do away with the due process requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as
the Court merely stated that the minimum requirements in the Guzman case are more
apropos.
Respondents rightly argued.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue as it held that
although both Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of due
process, the latter case is more apropos since it specifically deals with the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the procedural rights of students in
disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of Go v.
Colegio De San Juan De Letran.142
In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process, to wit:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; ( 4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice;144 that the proceedings may be
summary;145 that cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation or
hearing;146 and that the required proof in a student disciplinary action, which is an
administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of
evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."147
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the
individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.148 As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is
among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is
given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process - it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence
on which a fair decision can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation
of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be heard through pleadings and where
the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.150
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate a cadet's honor violation need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that – The Spirit of the Honor Code
guides the Corps in identifying and assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested
in legal precedents in cases involving Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of
the Honor Code dare not look into these precedents for loopholes to justify
questionable acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own advantage.
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in a
substantive way. Technical and procedural misgivings of the legal systems may avert
the true essence of imparting the Spirit of the Code for the reason that it can be used
to make unlawful attempt to get into the truth of matters especially when a cadet can
be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and
System to be implemented. By virtue of being a cadet, a member of the CCAFP
becomes a subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadet's actions are bound by the
existing norms that are logically applied through the Code and System in order to
realize the Academy's mission to produce leaders of character - men of integrity and
honor.151
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:
2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the state's Justice System but
it does not demean its Spirit by reducing the Code to a systematic list of externally
observed rules. Where misinterpretations and loopholes arise through legalism and its
technicalities, the objective of building the character of the cadets becomes futile.
While, generally, Public Law penalizes only the faulty acts, the Honor System tries to
examine both the action and the intention.152
Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue
judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy. It has been said
that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its primary business is to
fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and that over-
proceduralizing military determinations necessarily gives soldiers less time to
accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and complex due process
hearing could sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last
for several days or weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with legal and
procedural' points, and legal motions and evidentiary objections that are irrelevant
and inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and confuse the dismissal proceedings and
make them unmanageable. Excessive delays cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to
the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and, generally, to the Armed
Forces. A good balance should, therefore, be struck to achieve fairness, thoroughness,
and efficiency.154 Considering that the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia is one of first
impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the particular
issue of a dismissed cadet's right to due process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S.
jurisprudence for some guidance. Notably, our armed forces have been patterned after
the U.S. Army and the U.S. military code produced a salutary effect in the military
justice system of the Philippines.155 Hence, pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S.
military code and practices have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that "due process" is a
flexible concept, requiring consideration in each case of a variety of circumstances
and calling for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.156
Hagopian opined:
In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental action
adversely affecting private interests may properly be taken, it must be recognized that
due process is not a rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied undeviatingly
to any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which depends upon
the balancing of various factors, including the nature of the private right or interest
that is threatened, the extent to which the proceeding is adversarial in character, the
severity and consequences of any action that might be taken, the burden that would be
imposed by requiring use of all or part of the full panoply of trial-type procedures,
and the existence of other overriding interests, such as the necessity for prompt action
in the conduct of crucial military operations. The full context must therefore be
considered in each case.157 (Emphasis supplied)
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum standards of
due process required in the dismissal of a cadet. Thus:
[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may not proceed
arbitrarily but must observe due process of law. x x x Nevertheless, the flexibility
which is inherent in the concept of due process of law precludes the dogmatic
application of specific rules developed in one context to entirely distinct forms of
government action. "For, though 'due process of law' generally implies and includes
actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to
some settled course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is not universally true." x x
x Thus, to determine in any given case what procedures due process requires, the
court must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected
and of the government interest involved, taking account of history and the precise
circumstances surrounding the case at hand.
While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the subject matter
before it may validly affect private interests, in particularly vital and sensitive areas of
government concern such as national security and military affairs, the private interest
must yield to a greater degree to the governmental. x x x Few decisions properly rest
so exclusively within the discretion of the appropriate government officials than the
selection, training, discipline and dismissal of the future officers of the military and
Merchant Marine. Instilling and maintaining discipline and morale in these young
men who will be required to bear weighty responsibility in the face of adversity -- at
times extreme -- is a matter of substantial national importance scarcely within the
competence of the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted that because of these factors
historically the military has been permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary
procedures than the civilian authorities.
We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the dismissal of a Cadet
from the Merchant Marine Academy that he be given a fair hearing at which he is
apprised of the charges against him and permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance of
the parties x x x the rudiments of a fair hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet
must be apprised of the specific charges against him. He must be given an adequate
opportunity to present his defense both from the point of view of time and the use of
witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest, however, that the Cadet must be
given this opportunity both when demerits are awarded and when dismissal is
considered. The hearing may be procedurally informal and need not be
adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are equally
controlling in cases where cadets were separated from the military academy for
violation of the Honor Code. Following the two previous cases, it was ruled that in
order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to
be dismissed or separated from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised
of the specific charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present
his or her defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and
other evidence.159 Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far from what
We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine
School of Business Administration160 and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.161
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed
the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the
Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the
report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the
case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he
replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating
team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the
honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to
conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the
charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain
his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After
a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the '
Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the
Academy level - from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets,
and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the
HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review
was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to
conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to
appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from
the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the factual
findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by
the Court, unless such findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the findings is irregular;
when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, We
find no reason to deviate from the general rule. The grounds therefor are discussed
below seriatim:
As to the right to be represented by a counsel –
For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1 CL Cudia the right to
be represented by a counsel who could actively participate in the proceedings like in
the cross-examination of the witnesses against him before the CRAB or HC, if
remanded. This is because while the CRAB allowed him to be represented by a PAO
lawyer, the counsel was only made an observer without any right to intervene and
demand respect of Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights.163 According to them, he was not
sufficiently given the opportunity to seek a counsel and was not even asked if he
would like to have one. He was only properly represented when it was already
nearing graduation day after his family sought the assistance of the PAO. Petitioners
assert that Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has the right to answer
the charges against him or her with the assistance of counsel, if desired.
On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera v. The
Auditor General165 in asserting that the right to a counsel is not imperative in
administrative investigations or non-criminal proceedings. Also, based on Cadet lCL
Cudia's academic standing, he is said to be obviously not untutored to fully
understand his rights and express himself. Moreover, the confidentiality of the HC
proceedings worked against his right to be represented by a counsel. In any event,
respondents claim that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsel's
advice in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL Cudia is guaranteed the right to have
his counsel not just in assisting him in the preparation for the investigative hearing
before the HC and the CRAB but in participating fully in said hearings. The Court
disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating
that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The
assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v.
Civil Service Commission,166 the Court held that "a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the
charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel." Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because
assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other
aspects of the hearing. Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where the
hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the government does not proceed
through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and educated, where his
knowledge of the events x x x should enable him to develop the facts adequately
through available sources, and where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole
are fair, due process does not require representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to representation
by counsel, as a function of due process, in military academy disciplinary
proceedings.168 This rule is principally motivated by the policy of "treading lightly
on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the
military establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad confines of
constitutional due process" and the courts' views that disciplinary proceedings are not
judicial in nature and should be kept informal, and that literate and educated cadets
should be able to defend themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was ruled that the
importance of informality in the proceeding militates against a requirement that the
cadet be accorded the right to representation by counsel before the Academic Board
and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the training and education needed to
understand his rights and express himself, the cadet should be capable of doing
so.170 In the subsequent case of Wimmer v. Lehman,171 the issue was not access to
counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of oneself, examine and cross-
examine witnesses, make objections, and argue the case during the hearing. Disposing
of the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the
argument that an individual of a midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected
because he is expected to be able to care for himself and others, often under difficult
circumstances, and who has full awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's
advice, was deprived of due process by being required to present his defense in
person at an investigatory hearing.
In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
was given the option or was able to seek legal advice prior to and/or during the HC
hearing, it is indubitable that he was assisted by a counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact,
when the CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the case. The requirement of due
process is already satisfied since, at the very least, the counsel aided him in the
drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum and even acted as an observer who
had no right to actively participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the cross-
examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts that the offense committed
by Cadet 1 CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the hearings before the HC and
the CRAB were investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet lCL Cudia's
excellent-academic standing puts him in the best position to look after his own vested
interest in the Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –
Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11, 2014 letter
Cadet lCL Cudia's request for documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC
hearings, the vital evidence negating the regularity of the HC trial and supporting his
defense have been surely overlooked by the CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for
them, the answers on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived of due process and
whether he lied could easily be unearthed from the video and other records of the HC
investigation. Respondents did not deny their existence but they refused to present
them for the parties and the Court to peruse. In particular, they note that the Minutes
of the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation Report dated
January 20, 2014 were considered by the CRAB but were not furnished to petitioners
and the Court; hence, there is no way to confirm the truth of the alleged statements
therein. In their view, failure to furnish these documents could only mean that it
would be adverse if produced pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court.172
For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of confidentiality of records, petitioners
contend that it is the ministerial duty of the HC to submit to the CRAB, for the
conduct of intelligent review of the case, all its records of the proceedings, including
video footages of the deliberations and voting. They likewise argue that PMA' s
refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet 1 CL Cudia under the guise of
confidentiality reveals another misapplication of the Honor Code, which merely
provides: "A cadet who becomes part of any investigation is subject to the existing
regulations pertaining to rules of confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to the
creed of secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed without proper guidance from those with
authority" (IV. The Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet Observer). This
provision, they say, does not deprive Cadet 1 CL Cudia of his right to obtain copies
and examine relevant documents pertaining to his case.
Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages, and recordings
relevant to the HC hearings are favorable to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's cause, and,
consequently, to rule that respondents' refusal to produce and have them examined is
tantamount to the denial of his right to procedural due process. They are mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any documents, witness
testimony, or oral or written presentation of facts submitted at the hearing that would
support Cadet 1 CL Cudia's defense. The Court may require that an administrative
record be supplemented, but only "where there is a 'strong showing or bad faith or
improper behavior' on the part of the agency,"173 both of which are not present here.
Petitioners have not specifically indicated the nature of the concealed evidence, if
any, and the reason for withholding it. What they did was simply supposing that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's guilty verdict would be overturned with the production and
examination of such documents, footages, and recordings. As will be further shown in
the discussions below, the requested matters, even if denied, would not relieve Cadet
1 CL Cudia's predicament. If at all, such denial was a harmless procedural error since
he was not seriously prejudiced thereby.
As to the ostracism in the PMA –
To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and evidence because
Special Order No. 1 issued on February 21, 2014, which directed the ostracism of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left him without any opportunity, to secure statements of his own
witnesses. He could not have access to or approach the cadets who were present
during the trial and who saw the 8-1 voting result. It is argued that the Order directing
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's ostracism is of doubtful legal validity because the Honor Code
unequivocally announced: "x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing the cruel method
of ostracizing Honor Code violators, PMA will not have to resort to other humiliating
means and shall only have the option to make known among its alumni the names of
those who have not sincerely felt remorse for violating the Honor Code."
On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the petition-in-
intervention attached a full text copy of the alleged Special Order No. 1. In any case,
attributing its issuance to PMA is improper and misplaced because of petitioners'
admission that ostracism has been absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned
activity consistent with the trend in International Humanitarian Law that the PMA has
included in its curriculum. Assuming that said Order was issued, respondents contend
that it purely originated from the cadets themselves, the sole purpose of which was to
give a strong voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring that they did not tolerate Cadet 1
CL Cudia's honor violation and breach of confindentiality of the HC proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and unlikely that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was ostracized by his fellow cadets. They manifest that as early as
January 22, 2014, he was already transferred to the Holding Center. The practice of
billeting an accused cadet at the Holding Center is provided for in the Honor Code
Handbook. Although within the PMA compound, the Holding Center is off-limits to
cadets who do not have any business to conduct therein. The cadets could not also
ostracize him during mess times since Cadet 1 CL Cudia opted to take his meals at
the Holding Center. The circumstances obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was
issued clearly foreclose the possibility that he was ostracized in common areas
accessible to other cadets. He remained in the Holding Center until March 16, 2014
when he voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary to his claim, guests were also free to visit
him in the Holding Center.
However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL Cudia suffered from ostracism in the
PMA. The practice was somehow recognized by respondents in their Consolidated
Comment and by PMA Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news report. The CHR
likewise confirmed the same in its Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For them, it does
not matter where the ostracism order originated from because the PMA appeared to
sanction it even if it came from the cadets themselves. There was a tacit approval of
an illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for ostracism would have been charged
by the PMA officials. Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not choose to
take his meals at the Holding Center as he was not allowed to leave the place.
Petitioners opine that placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is inconsistent
with his or her presumed innocence and certainly gives the implication of ostracism.
We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-inintervention
attached a full text copy or even a pertinent portion of the alleged Special Order No.
1, which authorized the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence
and contents are of doubtful veracity. Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never
be granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an admission of Cadet 1
CL Mogol during the CHR hearing that, upon consultation with the entire class, the
baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy Board, they issued an ostracism order against
Cadet 1 CL Cudia.174 While not something new in a military academy,175
ostracism's continued existence in the modem times should no longer be
countenanced. There are those who argue that the "silence" is a punishment resulting
in the loss of private interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may
render illusory the possibility of vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty
by the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism practically denies the accused
cadet's protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be
presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.
As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the same.
The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has been
found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or
she may stay and wait for the disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on
full-duty status and shall be billeted at the HTG Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the
U.S., the purpose of "Boarders Ward" is to quarter those cadets who are undergoing
separation actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered , therein until
final disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the segregation of cadets
in the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary authority of Academy officials.
It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with respect to decisions made by Army
authorities, 'orderly government requires us to tread lightly on the military domain,
with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military establishment to
govern its own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also,
in Birdwell v. Schlesinger,178 the "administrative segregation" was held to be a
reasonable exercise of military discipline and could not be considered an invasion of
the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.
Late and vague decisions –
It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the charge against him
and the decisions arrived at by the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision
was furnished to him, and if any, the information was unjustly belated and the
justifications for the decisions were vague. He had to constantly seek clarification and
queries just to be apprised of what he was confronted with.
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty" verdict, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
immediately inquired as to the grounds therefor, but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered that
it is confidential since he would still appeal the same. By March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen.
Lopez informed Cadet 1 CL Cudia that the CRAB already forwarded their
recommendation for his dismissal to the General Headquarters sometime in February-
March 2014. Even then, he received no decision/recommendation on his case,
verbally or in writing. The PMA commencement exercises pushed through with no
written decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from the Office
of the Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the Cudia family
received the same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down
with specificity the factual and legal bases used by the CRAB and even by the Office
of the Adjutant General. There remains no proof that the CRAB and the PMA
considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it being uncertain as to what
evidence was weighed by the CRAB, whether the same is substantial, and whether
the new evidence submitted by him was ever taken into account.
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's· practice of orally declaring
the HC finding, not putting it in a written document so as to protect the integrity of
the erring cadet and guard the confidentiality of the HC proceedings pursuant to the
Honor System. Further, they aver that a copy of the report of the CRAB, dated March
10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1 CL Cudia because it was his parents who filed
the appeal, hence, were the ones who were given a copy thereof.
Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a constitutional
mandate stating that "[no] decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,"179 such
provision does not apply in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews
require a specific form and content of a decision issued in disciplinary proceedings.
The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook also has no written rule on the matter.
Even if the provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a point-by-point
consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary.180
What counts is that, albeit furnished to him late, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was informed of
how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the reviewing body, assuring that it went through the processes of
legal reasoning. He was not left in the dark as to how it was reached and he knows
exactly the reasons why he lost, and is able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.
As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –
Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only
President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the power to appoint and remove a
cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to the HC as the sole body to
determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower the PMA to
adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for recommending the cadet's dismissal.
In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HC's
finding of guilt in terminating his military service.
Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all
records without requiring Cadet 1 CL Cudia to submit new evidence if it is physically
impossible for him to do so. In their minds, respondents cannot claim that the CRAB
and the PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC recommendation and heard Cadet lCL
Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the letter from the Office of the AFP Adjutant
General, "[in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained the findings
and recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal filed
by the subject Cadet." However, the Final Investigation Report of the CRAB was
dated March 23, 2014. While such report states that a report was submitted to the
AFP General Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was only on March 12,
2014 that it was designated as a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual
that the CRAB would do the same things twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded
suspicion that the CRAB never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first
time it came out with its report, and the Final Investigation Report was drafted merely
as an afterthought when the lack of written decision was pointed out by petitioners so
as to remedy the apparent lack of due process during the CRAB investigation and
review.
Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper assessment of the
procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict against Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They
assert that the higher authorities of the PMA did not merely rely on the findings of the
HC, noting that there was also a separate investigation conducted by the HTG from
January 25 to February 7, 2014. Likewise, contrary to the contention of petitioners
that the CRAB continued with the review of the case despite the absence of necessary
documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of the case and even conducted
another investigation by constituting the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body. For
respondents, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof in showing bad faith
on the part of the PMA. In the absence of evidence to the contrary and considering
further that petitioners' allegations are merely self-serving and baseless, good faith on
the part of the PMA' s higher authorities is presumed and should, therefore, prevail.
We agree with respondents.
The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited role of
investigating and determining whether or not the alleged offender has actually
violated the Honor Code.181 It is given the responsibility of administering the Honor
Code and, in case of breach, its task is entirely investigative, examining in the first
instance a suspected violation. As a means of encouraging self-discipline, without
ceding to it any authority to make final adjudications, the Academy has assigned it
the function of identifying suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners' assertion,
the HC does not have the authority to order the separation of a cadet from the
Academy. The results of its proceedings are purely recommendatory and have no
binding effect. The HC determination is somewhat like an indictment, an allegation,
which, in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case, the PMA-CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the
U.S., it was even opined that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the
Honor Committee level because it is only a "charging body whose decisions had no
effect other than to initiate de nova proceedings before a Board of Officers."184
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by the due process clause and
that irregularities in its proceedings were in fact committed, still, We cannot rule for
petitioners. It is not required that procedural due process be afforded at every stage of
developing disciplinary action. What is required is that an adequate hearing be held
before the final act of dismissing a cadet from the military academy.185 In the case of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets, and the
PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A separate investigation was also
conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the
case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior
officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. The
Board/Body actually held hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of
commendation, petitioners find it "unusual" that the CRAB would do the same things
twice and suspect that it never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first
time it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture that deserves scant
consideration.
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –
According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The people
behind Cadet ICL Cudia's charge, investigation, and conviction were actually the
ones who had the intent to deceive and who took advantage of the situation. Cadet 1
CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1
CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1 CL, was part of the team which conducted the
preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet I CL Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously
charged Cadet 1 CL Cudia with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly,
conniving with and tutoring his fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving solutions
to a retake exam) but the charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a
non-voting member, he was in a position of influence and authority. Thus, it would be
a futile exercise for Cadet 1 CL Cudia to resort to the procedure for the removal of
HC members.186
Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given to Cadet
I CL Cudia, his family, or his PAO counsel. During one of her visits to him in the
Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was advised to convince his son to resign and
immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later became the CRAB Head,
also categorically uttered to Annavee: "Your brother, he lied!" The CRAB
conferences were merely used to formalize his dismissal and the PMA never really
intended to hear his side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA's clear
resolve to dismiss him no matter what.
For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's allegation that Maj. Hindang acted
in obvious bad faith and that he failed to discharge his duty to be a good father of
cadets when he "paved the road to [Cadet 1 CL Cudia's] sham trial by the Honor
Committee" is an unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj. Hindang was
given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he revoked the penalty awarded because of his
explanation. However, all revocations of awarded penalties are subject to the review
of the STO. Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the established
procedure followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to investigate the
circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia's tardiness. Respondents add that bad
faith cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to the actions
taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1 CL Narciso and Arcangel who
also arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1 CL Cudia did
not admit his being late and effectively evaded responsibility by ascribing his
tardiness to Dr. Costales.
As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was likewise "in bad faith and
determined to destroy [Cadet 1 CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own" because the
former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in November 2013,
respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there is failure to
note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a non-voting member of the HC. Further, he cannot
be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is the HC Chairman and
nothing less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives of
the HC are elected from each company, while the HC Chairman is elected by secret
ballot from the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1 CL Cu'dia
believed that there was bias against him, he should have resorted to the procedure for
the removal of HC members provided for in the Honor Code Handbook.
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the
PMA to prevent Cadet 1 CL Cudia from graduating because the Academy does not
stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic
standing, the separation militates against PMA' s mission to produce outstanding,
honorable, and exceptional cadets.
The Court differs with petitioners.
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing of
actual bias, petitioners' allegations do not hold water. The mere imputation of ill-
motive without proof is speculative at best. Kolesa teaches us that to sustain the
challenge, specific evidence must be presented to overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must
convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weaknesses, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individual
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if
the guarantee of due process is to be implemented.187
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be awarded,
he is not an adversary of the cadet but an educator who shares an identity of interest
with the cadet, whom he counsels from time to time as a future leader.188 When the
occasion calls for it, cadets may be questioned as to the accuracy or completeness of a
submitted work. A particular point or issue may be clarified. In this case, the question
asked of Cadet 1 CL Cudia concerning his being late in class is proper, since there is
evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have occurred and there is
reasonable cause to believe that he was involved in the breach of regulations.189
For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the non-
toleration clause of the Honor Code, i.e., "We do not tolerate those who violate the
Code." Cadets are reminded that they are charged with a tremendous duty far more
superior to their personal feeling or friendship.190 They must learn to help others by
guiding them to accept the truth and do what is right, rather than tolerating actions
against truth and justice.191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be characteristically
honorable; they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action of their
peers, seniors, or subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1 CL Mogol exactly did,
although he was later proven to have erred in his accusation. Note that even the
Honor Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes that interpretation of one's
honor is generally subjective.193
Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1 CL' Raguindin and
Mogol as well as Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to grind against Cadet 1 CL Cudia
and were bent on causing, no matter what, the latter's downfall, their nefarious
conduct would still be insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the preliminary and
formal investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body are
collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that the proceedings/hearings conducted were
merely a farce because the three personalities participated therein is tantamount to
implying the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the competence, independence,
and integrity of the other members who constituted the majority. Again, in the
absence of specifics and substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give credence
to this baseless insinuation.
As to the HC executive session/chambering –
Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the case of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia because two voting rounds took place. After the result of the secret
balloting, Cadet 1 CL Mogol ordered the voting members to go to a room without the
cadet recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura, was asked to explain
his "not guilty" vote. Pressured to change his vote, he was made to cast a new one
finding Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was discarded and replaced.
There was no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was mentioned in the
HC formal report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6, 2014 was
submitted by petitioners since he purportedly recalled Cadet 1 CL Lagura telling him
that he was pressured to change his "not guilty" vote after the voting members were
"chambered." In the sworn statement, Commander Tabuada said:
1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I [cannot]
remember exactly the date but sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of
January 2014, I was in my office filling up forms for the renewal of my
passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had business with my staff;
2. When he was about to leave I called him. "Lags, halika muna dito," and he
approached me and I let him sit down on the chair in front of my table. I told
and asked him, "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah ... ano ha ang nangyari? Mag-
Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka." He replied, "Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko
sa kanya sir", and I asked him, "Oh, bakit naging guilty di ha pag may isang
nag NOT GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied "Chinamber ako sir, bale pinapa-
justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya
binago ko, sir." So, I told him, "Sayang sya, matalino at mabait pa naman" and
he replied "oo nga sir". After that conversation, I let him go.194
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed voting
manipulation since, under the rules, it is required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes
finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing in the procedure that permits the HC
Chairman to order the "chambering" of a member who voted contrary to the majority
and subjects him or her to reconsider in order to reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is
there an order from the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning the HC procedure
or approving any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The
HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their own rules and principles as embodied in
the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from the established procedures, the second
deliberation should be considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves a
substantive right which cannot be unceremoniously changed without a corresponding
amendment/revision in the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. In their view,
"chambering" totally defeats the purpose of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly
destroys the very essence and philosophy behind the provisions of the Honor System,
which is to ensure that the voting member is free to vote what is in his or her heart
and mind and that no one can pressure or persuade another to change his or her vote.
They suggest that if one voting member acquits an accused cadet who is obviously
guilty of the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from the HC through the
vote of non-confidence as provided for in the Honor Code.195 Anent the above
arguments, respondents contend that a distinction must be made between the concepts
of the Honor Code and the Honor System. According to them, the former sets the
standard for a cadet's, minimum ethical and moral behavior and does not change,
while the latter is a set of rules for the conduct of the observance and implementation
of the· Honor Code and may undergo necessary adjustments as may be warranted by
the incumbent members of the HC in order to be more responsive to the moral
training and character development of the cadets. The HC may provide guidelines
when the Honor System can be used to supplement regulations. This being so, the
voting process is continuously subject to change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict automatically
acquits a cadet from the charge of Honor violation. The voting members only write
either "guilty" or "not guilty" in the voting sheets without stating their name or their
justification. However, this situation drew criticisms since there were instances where
a reported cadet already admitted his honor violation but was acquitted due to the
lone vote of a sympathetic voting member.
In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that should the
voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would automatically sanction a jury type of
discussion called "executive session" or "chambering," which is intended to elicit the
explanation and insights of the voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny of the
minority or lone dissenter from prevailing over the manifest proof of guilt. The
assailed voting practice has been adopted and widely accepted by the PMA Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014 since their first year in the Academy. The allegations of
conspiracy and sham trial are, therefore, negated by the fact that such practice was in
place and applied to all cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL
Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests solely on the
personal conviction of the dissenter/s, without any compulsion from the other voting
members. There can also be no pressuring to change one's vote to speak of since a
vote may only be considered as final when the Presiding Officer has affixed his
signature.
To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements, respondents raise the argument that the
Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet 1 CL Lagura for inquiry.
Aside from his oral testimony made under oath, he submitted to the Board/Body an
affidavit explaining that:
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval
Warfare to ask permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason
that I will be attending our baseball game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit
out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B T ABU ADA PN, our Head Department Naval
Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he said: "Talagang nadali
si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because
of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang
mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi." Then I answered:
"Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta
muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng
Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh
naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir." He
replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa
naman at matalino."196
Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit executed on March
12, 2014, which he submitted before the CHR wherein he attested to the following:
3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for Honor
Code violation committed by Cadet Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member,
we are the one who assess or investigate the case whether the reported Cadet
is Guilty for his actions or not.
4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT GUILTY" among the
nine (9) voting members of the Honor Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for
Lying.
5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that after the proceedings
and before the presiding Officer told the members to vote, I was confused of
the case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered some facts from the investigation to
make my decision but for me it is not yet enough to give my verdict of guilty
to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote "NOT GUILTY" with a reservation in my
mind that we will still be discussing our verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1 or 7-
2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be enlightened with the other's
justifications.
6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that the vote is
8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty. By way of practice and as I predicted, we
were told to go inside the anteroom for executive meeting and to discuss our
respective justifications. I have been a member for two (2) years and the
voting committee will always go for executive meeting whenever it will meet
8-1 or 7-2 votes.
7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that enlightened
my confusions that time. I gave a thumbs-up sign and asked for another sheet
of voting paper. I then changed my vote from "NOT GUILTY" to "GUILTY"
and the voting members of the Honor Committee came up with the final vote
of nine (9) votes for guilty and zero (0) votes for not guilty.
9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict was
GUILTY of LYING. After that, all persons inside the courtroom went back to
barracks.
10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt Jocson
and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng boto? ., I
answered: "Nasa process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo." They also asked
who were inside the Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt
Mogol. That was the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to me.
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of
Naval Warfare to asked (sic) permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy
duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside the
Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about
to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head
Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him and
he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I
was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee
proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko
naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir.
Kaya [yung} Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamher.
Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-
isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh
naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. "
He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia,
mabait pa naman at matalino. "197
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1 CL Lagura, as
the lone dissenter, was made to explain in the presence of other HC members, who
were in disagreement with him, gives a semblance of intimidation, force, or pressure.
For them, the records of the HC proceedings, which were not presented assuming
they actually exist, could have been the best way to ensure that he was free to express
his views, reject the opinion of the majority, and stick to his decision. Also, it was
pointed out that Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in his affidavit why he
initially found Cadet 1 CL Cudia "not guilty" and what made him change his mind.
His use of general statements like he "was confused of the case " and "saw things that
enlightened my confusions " could hardly suffice to establish why he changed his
vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission of ·Cadet 1 CL Lagura during the CHR
investigation that he was the only one who was given another ballot sheet while in the
chamber and that he accomplished it in the barracks which he only submitted the
following day. However, as the CHR found, the announcement of the 9-0 vote was
done immediately after the HC came out from the chamber and before Cadet 1 CL
Lagura submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.
We rule for respondents.
As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely provides:
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the Board will
call for the members to vote whether the accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A
unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY decides that a cadet is found guilty of violating
the Honor Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of
conducting "executive session" or "chambering" is not at all prohibited. The HC is
given leeway on the voting procedures in' actual cases taking into account the
exigency of the times. What is important is that, in the end, there must be a
unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor Code.
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its written procedure,199 We still
rule that there is nothing inherently wrong with the practice of "chambering"
considering that the presence of intimidation or force cannot automatically be inferred
therefrom. The essence of secret balloting and the freedom to vote based on what is in
the heart and mind of the voting member is not necessarily diluted by the fact that a
second/final voting was conducted. As explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol before the
CRAB:
13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights regarding
the case at hand. The other members, on the other hand, would be given the chance to
explain their votes as well as their insights to the dissenting voter. The decision to
change the vote of the dissenting voter rests solely on his personal conviction. Thus,
if he [or she] opted not to change his/her vote despite the discussion, his [or her] vote
is accorded respect by the Honor Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere allegation is
definitely not evidence.1âwphi1 It must be substantiated and proved because a person
is presumed to be innocent of a crime or wrong and that official duty has been
regularly performed.201
The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura should settle the issue. Before
the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he consistently denied that
he was pressured by the other voting members of the HC. His representation must be
accepted as it is regardless of whether he has satisfactorily elaborated his decision to
change his vote. Being the one who was "chambered," he is more credible to clarify
the issue. In case of doubt, We have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1 CL Lagura
observed the Honor Code, which clearly states that every cadet must be his or her
own Final' Authority in honor; that he or she should not let other cadets dictate on
him or her their sense of honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any person can
have confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will be fair and just in
dealing with him; that his actions, words and ways are sincere and true.203
As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as not putting on record the
initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Lagura's bringing of his ballot sheet to and
accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no longer dwell on the same for
being harmless procedural errors that do not materially affect the validity of the HC
proceedings.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there is no
clear time reference as to when was the actual dismissal or what was the exact time of
dismissal - whether it should be the dismissal inside the room or the dismissal after
the section grade was given by Dr. Costales -in the minds of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj.
Hindang, and the HC investigators and voting members. They claim that during long
examinations, the time of dismissal was usually five minutes before the class was set
to end and the protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was not observed.
When Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory language that Cadet 1 CL Cudia perverted
the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not state what was the
true time of dismissal. He did not mention whether the truth he was relying on was 5
or 15 minutes before the scheduled end of class.
It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business was to ask Dr. Costales a
query such that his business was already finished as soon as she gave an answer.
However, a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
must stay and wait for the section grade. At that point in time, he was no longer in
control of the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr. Costales never categorically
stated that Cadet lCL Cudia was lying. She recognized the confusion. Her text
messages to him clarified his alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted during its
investigation that she could not exactly recall what happened in her class on
November 14, 2013.
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that ENG412
class started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously not late. If,
as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he was late two (2) minutes in his 1500-
1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents, however,
claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late.
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the view that
what appears to have caused confusion in the minds of respondents is just a matter of
semantics; that the entire incident was a product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is
malicious for them to insinuate that Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely used incorrect
language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam Webster's Dictionary, petitioners argue
that "dismiss" means to permit or cause to leave, while "class" refers to a body of
students meeting regularly to study the same subject. According to them, these two
words do not have definite and precise meanings but are generic terms. Other than the
words "class" and "dismiss" used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, which may actually be used
in their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about what he said. Thus, the answer
he chose might be wrong or not correct, but it is not false or not true.
For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are evidently truthful and with no
intent to deceive or mislead. He did not manipulate any fact and was truthful of his
explanation. His .. statements were clear and unambiguous but were given a narrow-
minded interpretation. Even the Honor Code acknowledges that "[e]xperience
demonstrates that human communication is imperfect at best, and some actions are
often misinterpreted."
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's transcript of records reflects not
only his outstanding academic performance but proves his good conduct during his
four-year stay in the Academy. He has above-average grades in Conduct, with grades
ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore, far from
the truth.
On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was obviously quibbling, which, in the military parlance, is tantamount to
lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth. He lied by making untruthful statements
in his written explanation. Respondents want Us to consider the following:
First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal investigation, Dr.
Costales testified that a class is dismissed as long as the instructor is not there and the
bell has rung. In cases of lesson examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed from the
time they have answered their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his
Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment, "We had an LE that day (14
November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up,
reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx" Clearly, at
the time Cadet Cudia submitted his papers, he was already considered dismissed.
Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H)
or "a bit late."
Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his tardiness.
After submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave and attend his next class.
However, he initiated a conversation with Dr. Costales regarding their grades. He was
not under instruction by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.
Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body,
Dr. Costales clarified her statements in her written explanation. She explained that the
"instruction to wait" is a response to Cadet Cudia' s request and that it was not her
initiated instruction. Clearly, there was no directive from Dr. Costales for Cadet
Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the contrary, it was them who wanted to meet
with the instructor. Third, contrary to Cadet Cudia's explanation, his subsequent class,
ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In the informal
review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the HC, Professor Berong
confirmed that her English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or
1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412
also testified that their class started as scheduled (3 :05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and
not earlier.204
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1 CL Cudia had no
intention to mislead or deceive but merely used wrong and unfitting words in his
explanations. For them, considering his academic standing, it is highly improbable
that he used incorrect language to justify his mistake. Respondents' arguments are
tenable.
The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot pass upon
factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence
considered in the proceedings below. Moreover, We reiterate the long standing rule
that factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not
finality by the Court. In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no
evidence that the findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not
supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the procedure
which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. With respect to
the core issue of whether lying is present in this case, all investigating and reviewing
bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the
Philippines (CCAFP) states: "We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate
among us those who do. "
The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. " Cadets violate the Honor Code
by lying if they make an oral or written statement which is contrary to what is true or
use doubtful information with the intent to deceive or mislead.205 It is expected that
every cadet's word is accepted without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is true
without qualification; and that the cadets must answer directly, completely and
truthfully even though the answer may result in punitive action under the CCPB and
CCAFPR.206
To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
justified that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by
our instructor Sir." Subsequently, in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted
Punishment to Maj. Leander, he reasoned out as follows:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class
ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also.
Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next class without any intention of
being late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed
quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been defined in
one U.S. case as follows:
A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly
wording what he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When he
knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because it is
an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly and
completely telling the cause of his being late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a half-truth.
The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an honor
violation are:
1. The act and/or omission, and
2. The intent pertinent to it.
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent to commit
or omit the act itself.209
The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally are:
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the honorable
thing.210
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily
be inferred from the facts, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded
expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.211 In this case, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's intent to deceive is manifested from the very act of capitalizing on the use of
the words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of the matter is that the ordinary usage of
these two terms, in the context of an educational institution, does not correspond to
what Cadet 1 CL Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that sense, the words are not
generic and have definite and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and
Narciso already constitute a "class." The Court cannot agree that such term includes
"every transaction and communication a teacher does with her students." Clearly, it
does not take too much intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia should have
been accurate by pinpointing who were with him when he was late in the next class.
His deceptive explanation is made more obvious when compared with what Cadets 1
CL Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which was: "We
approached our instructor after our class."212
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14, 2013 was
five or fifteen minutes ahead of the scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that even
Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for Cadet 1 CL Cudia, consistently admitted
before the HC, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR that he was
already dismissed when he passed his LE paper.213 During the hearing of the
Board/Body, she also declared that she merely responded to his request to see the
results of the UE 1 and that she had reservations on the phrases "under my
instruction" and "dismissed a bit late" used in his letter of explanation to the HC. In
addition, Dr. Costales manifested her view before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia of inquiring about his grade outside their classroom after he submitted his LE
paper is not part of the class time because the consultation, being cadet-initiated, is
voluntary.214 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a new business was initiated
by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1 CL Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the section
grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a responsible cadet who is
fully aware of the time constraint has the last say, that is, to politely decline the
invitation and immediately go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet 1 CL
Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that he already lost control over the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia cunningly chose words which led to
confusion in the minds of respondents and eventually commenced the HC inquiry.
His case is not just a matter of semantics and a product of plain and simple
inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful explanation
constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia .. While his Transcript
of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding academic performance but his
excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his four-year stay in the PMA,215 it
does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is enough to
say that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another
time."216 While the TOR may be received to prove his identity or habit as an
exceptional PMA student, it does not show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as
cadet accused of committing a specific Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty
cadet from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines
Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave
(Class 1) delinquency which merits a recommendation for a cadet's dismissal from the
PMA Superintendent. The same is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that the Honor
Code does not accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no difference
between a little lie and a huge falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor
Code has always been considered as an absolute yardstick against which cadets have
measured themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System
seek to assure that only those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and
honor are produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally
permissible for the military "to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of
conduct and ethics. " Thus, in violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits
his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet breached the Honor
Code, the offense warrants his or her dismissal since such a policy may be the only
means to maintain and uphold the spirit of integrity in the military.217 They maintain
though that in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case there is no need to distinguish between a
"little lie" and a "huge falsehood" since he did not lie at all. Absent any intent to
deceive and to take undue advantage, the penalty imposed on him is considered as
unjust and cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the penalty of
dismissal is not commensurate to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with honors
and what he allegedly committed does not amount to an academic deficiency or an
intentional and flagrant violation of the PMA non-academic rules and regulations.
Citing Non, petitioners argue that the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the
offense. Further, lsabelo, Jr. is squarely applicable to the facts of the case. Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was deprived of his right to education, the only means by which he may have a
secure life and future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his
acceptance that violation of the Honor Code warrants the ultimate penalty of
dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to resolve. Indeed, the
sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet 1 CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he
entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in Andrews219 wherein it was held
that, while the penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and,
therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted the disposition of the district
court, thus:
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that he has
violated the Honor Code is known to all cadets even prior to the beginning of their
careers there. The finding of a Code violation by hypothesis includes a finding of
scienter on the part of the offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and tragic
consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not an unconstitutionally arbitrary one,
but rather a reasonable albeit severe method of preventing men who have suffered
ethical lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of admonitions or lesser
penalties for single violations might be more compassionate --or even more effective
in achieving the intended result --is quite immaterial to the question of whether the
harsher penalty violates due process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR's recommendations.
The CHR, they note, is a constitutional body mandated by the 1987 Constitution to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights,
and to conduct investigative monitoring of economic, social, and cultural rights,
particularly of vulnerable sectors of society. Further, it was contended that the results
of CHR's investigation and recommendations are so persuasive that this Court, on
several occasions like in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural
Resources221 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,222 gave its
findings serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the Court to hear what
an independent and unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights223
ruled that the CHR is merely a recommendatory body that is not empowered to arrive
at a conclusive determination of any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely
recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that the
CHR's constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.224 As held in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of subsequent cases,226 the CHR is
only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not
empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies.
The power to investigate is not the same as adjudication:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
xxxx
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether
in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x x
to subject to an official probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm
L Sec. 257; xx x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx
to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority.1âwphi1 To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. xx Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment. "226

All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in accordance
with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1
CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him of a future. Cliche though it
may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the "be-all and end-all" of his existence. A
cadet separated from the PMA may still continue to pursue military or civilian career
elsewhere without suffering the stigma attached to his or her dismissal. For one, as
suggested by respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the
enlistment and reenlistment in the APP Regular Force, provides under Section 14 (b)
thereof that priority shall be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS
cadets.227 If the positions open does not appeal to his interest for being way below
the rank he could have achieved as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1 CL Cudia could still
practice other equally noble profession or calling that is best suited to his credentials,
competence, and potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that choice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin
Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144681 June 21, 2004
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN
HERMOGENES P. POBRE, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO
PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN RODOLFO P. DE
GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R.
POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO
II, petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S.
NAVARRO, JOSE RAMONCITO P. NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and
GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R. RAQUENO,
MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS, KARANGALAN D.
SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER, MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR,
ALICIA S. LIZANO, MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T.
MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A. GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C.
ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B. BUNAGAN,
ROGELIO B. ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO,
EVELYN S. ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO
P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS, ACHILLES J. PERALTA, CORAZON
M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO, MA. LUISA S.
GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO, FERNANDO T.
CRUZ, MELVIN M. USITA, RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY,
CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L. SERRANO, FEDERICO L.
CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAÑEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY, BERNARDITA B.
SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M.
BERNARDO, JR., HUBERT S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG,
DAYMINDA G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H. CABUHAT, NANCY J.
CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C.
CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D. DORADO,
SAIBZUR N. EDDING, VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V. FERNANDEZ,
JR., MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA, NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY
B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS,
PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B.
SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA. ANA and YOLANDA P. UNICA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to
nullify the Decision,1 dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 37283. The appellate court affirmed the judgment2 dated December 19, 1994, of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530.
The trial court allowed the respondents to take their physician’s oath and to register as
duly licensed physicians. Equally challenged is the Resolution3 promulgated on
August 25, 2000 of the Court of Appeals, denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine,
Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure
Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board).
Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their
names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine
successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects
in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and
Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven
Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne,
another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-
Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima
got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than
90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools
was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were
true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking
phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as
physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine.4 The PRC
asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly
or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an
expert mathematician and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de
Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and
Ob-Gyne of the said examination.
On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of
the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of
examinees from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine
showed that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high
but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some
unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause
"strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the
examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc."5
For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in
the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees
gained early access to the test questions."6
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S.
Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M.
Pagilagan (Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity) filed a special civil action for
mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case
No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their
petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging
respondents with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection
with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results
of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687
by the PRC.
On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530 granting the
preliminary mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It ordered the
petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and
enter their names in the rolls of the PRC.
The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.
On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 31701, with the
dispositive portion of the Decision ordaining as follows:
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower court against petitioners
is hereby nullified and set aside.
SO ORDERED.7
Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to this Court in
G.R. No. 112315. In our Resolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied the petition for
failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the instant petition, the
pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to
reduce the testimonies of their respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers.
This was without prejudice to cross-examination by the opposing counsel.
On December 13, 1993, petitioners’ counsel failed to appear at the trial in the
mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15. The trial court then ruled that
petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses.
On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating
the reasons for her non-appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the
witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial court denied the motion for lack
of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration that
followed on the ground that adverse counsel was notified less than three (3) days
prior to the hearing.
Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with Adm. Case No.
1687, the respondents herein moved for the issuance of a restraining order, which the
lower court granted in its Order dated April 4, 1994.
The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
115704, to annul the Orders of the trial court dated November 13, 1993, February 28,
1994, and April 4, 1994. We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.
On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction is GRANTED and the Orders of
 December 13, 1993, February 7, 1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994
of the RTC-Manila, Branch 52, and all further proceedings taken by it in
Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby DECLARED NULL and
VOID. The said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners’ counsel to cross-
examine the respondents’ witnesses, to allow petitioners to present their
evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits
on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Costs against respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.
A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the petitioners filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of the
appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners asked for the suspension of the proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid motion,
cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and
28, 1994.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional
Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at the trial of Civil
Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of the respondents herein, the trial court ruled that
herein petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the herein respondents. Trial
was reset to November 28, 1994.
On November 25, 1994, petitioners’ counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial
court judge for alleged partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day the Motion to
Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the
Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for
decision.
On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case No.
93-66530, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the
petitioners and intervenors (except those with asterisks and footnotes in pages
1 & 2 of this decision) [sic],9 to take the physician’s oath and to register them
as physicians.
It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any
administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the
petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and consistent
with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.10
As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118437, entitled Professional Regulation
Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan, praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be
consolidated with G.R. No. 117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit
himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch.
On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice of Appeal11 in Civil
Case No. 93-66530, thereby elevating the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37283.
In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was consolidated with G.R. No.
117817.
On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for being
moot. The petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise DISMISSED on the ground
that there is a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor
General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more circumspect in her
dealings with the courts as a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with accordingly.
 SO ORDERED.12
While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel
V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners in Civil Case No. 93-66530, joined by
twenty-seven intervenors, to wit: Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo,
Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A.
Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao,
Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M.
Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R.
Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B.
Sanchez, Maria Rosario L. Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-
Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P.
Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, manifested
that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its
dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by intervenors Mary
Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador,
Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig,
Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C.
Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa
SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace
E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The Court of Appeals ruled that its
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not apply to them.
On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, with the
following fallo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, We
hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.13
In sustaining the trial court’s decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that the
respondents complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the
licensure examination for physicians in February 1993. They all passed the said
examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act No. 2382,14 they
should be allowed to take their oaths as physicians and be registered in the rolls of the
PRC.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT
OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO.
112315 AFFIRMING THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION
DECLARING THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO THE
MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES, THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE
SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS COULD
PROCEED DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
NO. 1687, WHICH WAS PRECISELY LODGED TO DETERMINE THE
MORAL FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS.15
To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of
law in sustaining the judgment of the trial court that respondents are entitled to a writ
of mandamus?
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case. They point
out that for a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and it is the duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. Thus, mandamus may be availed of only when the duty
sought to be performed is a ministerial and not a discretionary one. The petitioners
argue that the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own
pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31701 that the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine
becomes discretionary on the PRC if there exists some doubt that the successful
examinee has not fully met the requirements of the law. The petitioners stress that this
Court’s Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that there was no
showing "that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in rendering
the questioned judgment" in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that
our Resolution in G.R. No. 112315 has long become final and executory.
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure examinations for
physicians, the petitioners have the obligation to administer to them the oath as
physicians and to issue their certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to
Section 2016 of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283,
found that respondents complied with all the requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382.
Furthermore, respondents were admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure
examinations and had passed the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act
No. 2382, the petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths as physicians
and register them.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name
of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to
some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed, or from operation of law.17 Section 3 of Rule 6518 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which the other is entitled.
We shall discuss the issues successively.
1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue Certificates of
Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382.
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official
concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving discretion.19 Moreover, there must be
statutory authority for the performance of the act,20 and the performance of the duty
has been refused.21 Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the
duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and register respondents as physicians under
the Medical Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the records:
It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and intervenor-appellees
have fully complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the
licensure examinations for physicians conducted and administered by the
respondent-appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993. Stress, too, must
be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed the same
examinations.22
The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
petitioners should allow the respondents to take their oaths as physicians and register
them, steps which would enable respondents to practice the medical profession23
pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959?
The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in
concluding that the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the
Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule
in statutory construction that each part of a statute should be construed in connection
with every other part to produce a harmonious whole, not confining construction to
only one section.24 The intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from
the statute taken as a whole, not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly,
Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in conjunction with the
other provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had the
ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register
them as physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of the Medical Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses
the word "shall" with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the
petitioners "shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have
satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board." In statutory construction
the term "shall" is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when
an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician’s license, the
Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician,
pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical Act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry
concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by the
respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was
phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised
grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts have to be
appropriately resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to
conduct administrative investigations and "disapprove applications for examination or
registration," pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section
126 thereof. In this case, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm.
Case No. 1687 against the respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to
practice medicine, as required by Section 927 of Rep. Act No. 2382. In its Decision
dated July 1, 1997, the Board ruled:
WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the respondents[’]
examination papers in the Physician Licensure Examinations given in
February 1993 and further DEBARS them from taking any licensure
examination for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from the date of the promulgation
of this DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled
examinations for physicians after the lapse of the period imposed by the
BOARD.
SO ORDERED.28
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained, according
to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in abeyance the administration of the
Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus
does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board shall not issue a
certificate of registration only in the following instances: (1) to any candidate who
has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense
involving moral turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable
conduct after the investigation by the Board; or (3) has been declared to be of
unsound mind. They aver that none of these circumstances are present in their case.
Petitioners reject respondents’ argument. We are informed that in Board Resolution
No. 26,29 dated July 21, 1993, the Board resolved to file charges against the
examinees from Fatima College of Medicine for "immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and
deceit in the Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry examinations." It likewise
sought to cancel the examination results obtained by the examinees from the Fatima
College.
Section 830 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires
to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the
corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may
only be administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." The
operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or
obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance."31 Gleaned from Board
Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that the respondents
"satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify
the examination results obtained by the respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been
established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a
legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right.32 There
must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded.33 It is long
established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted
by the government.34
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right35 of every citizen to select
a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements.36 But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State
to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the
people.37 Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular
pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In
a previous case, it may be recalled, this Court has ordered the Board of Medical
Examiners to annul both its resolution and certificate authorizing a Spanish subject,
with the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the University of
Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the
examination required by the Philippine Medical Act.38 In another case worth noting,
we upheld the power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants into medical
schools through admission tests.39
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a
profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in
an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the
exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such
privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however,
require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.40
Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant
or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down
license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license
to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without
prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the
exercise of their power.41
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No.
2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of
medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and
conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s
license, or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege
to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the
licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than
satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable
from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite
showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met,
the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
thwarting the legislative will.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed
the petition for mandamus below for being premature. They argue that the
administrative remedies had not been exhausted. The records show that this is not the
first time that petitioners have sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. This
issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which petition we referred to the Court of
Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. On motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, the appellate court denied the motion to
dismiss on the ground that the prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial
court and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R.
No. 118437, the petitioners sought to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 insofar as it did not order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-
66530. In our consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817 &
118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo opined that:
Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved in the instant
petition has been rendered meaningless by an event taking place prior to the
filing of this petition and denial thereof should follow as a logical
consequence.42 There is no longer any justiciable controversy so that any
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.43 It should be
recalled that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court granted the
writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents, which decision was
received by petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23
December 1994, petitioners filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy
available to them was to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
they in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December 1994.44
The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the aforecited ruling.
Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies
in the instant case advance their cause any.
Section 2645 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative and judicial
remedies that respondents herein can avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board
of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should the
PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the
President; and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to
bring the case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule,
mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still available.46 However,
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where, as in this
case, a pure question of law is raised.47 On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be
laid at the door of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to
dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.
As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera, Fernando F.
Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan,
Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R.
Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura
M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia
S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-
Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth
M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E.
Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P.
Navarro manifested to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
37283, that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for
its dismissal insofar as they were concerned. A similar manifestation and motion were
later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G.
Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G.
Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli
A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses,
Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano,
Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. Following
these manifestations and motions, the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283
decreed that its ruling would not apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as the instant case is
a petition for review of the appellate court’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, a
decision which is inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will similarly not
apply to them.

As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta,

Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr.,
Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and
Samuel B. Bangoy, herein decision shall not apply pursuant to the Orders of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, dropping their names from the suit.

Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining respondents, namely:

Arlene V. de Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I. Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy,
Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio
V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as
the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed

decision dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283,
which affirmed the judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering petitioners to administer
the physician’s oath to herein respondents as well as the resolution dated August 25,
2000, of the appellate court, denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil Case
No. 93-66530, and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980
ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner,
vs.
VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL
FISHING ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or
THE COMPENSATION APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF, Department of
Labor, respondents.
Fernardo R. Moreno for petitioner.
Feliciano Tumale for private respondents.
E. V. Espanol for public respondent.
FERNANDO, C.J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the claim for
compensation filed by petitioner, the mother of one Jose Ondoy, who was
drowned while in the employ of private respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. Whatever
be the cause for the failure to do so, it is admitted that there was no
controversion. Such omission, fatal in character, was sought to be minimized
by the filing of a motion to dismissed based on the alleged absence of an
employment relationship. What cannot be ignored, however, is that
subsequently, in the hearing of such claim private respondent submitted
affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that
the deceased a fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a member of the
working force, but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the
vessel, and thereafter was found dead. The referee summarily ignored the
affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent employer to the effect "that sometime
in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual
performance of his work with said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and
died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty." 1 The
hearing officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack of merit. 2 A motion for
reconsideration was duly filed, but in an order dated August 29, 1977, the
then Secretary of Labor, now Minister Blas F. Ople, denied such motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 3 Hence this petition for review.
1. In La Mallorca v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 this Court
explicitly held that the failure to controvert "is fatal to any defense that
petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a host of decisions in
compliance with the clear and express language of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Any Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility. 5 The
opinion noted thirty decisions starting from Bachrach Motor Co. v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission 6 to Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission. 7 Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It
was further noted that nine more decisions had been rendered by this Court
starting from Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 9 to Abong
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 10 By the time respondent
secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration, a host of decisions
that speaks to the same effect had been promulgated. 11 It clearly, appears,
therefore, that the failure of the referee to grant the award ought to have been
remedied and the motion for reconsideration granted.
2. The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes
Shipping Corporation v. Otadoy, 12 there was not even any direct testimony
that the deceased was drowned while in the performance of his duty. All that
could be alleged was that he "was lost at sea while in the employ of petitioner.
13 Nonetheless, the award for compensation was sustained. Likewise, the
ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva 14 was cited with approval. Thus:
"The fact that the employee was found missing while on board the petitioner's
vessel MV 'Caltex Mindanao' became known to the captain of the vessel on
10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956 when the petitioner
transmitted to the respondent Compensation WCC For in No. 3 stating that
the employee was 'Lost at sea and presumed dead as of October 10, 1956,'
and that it was controverting the respondent's claim. 15 In the present case,
there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was not
controverted. Under the circumstances, the failure to grant the claim finds no
justification in law.
3. It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical, to the
effect that the deceased was drowned while "in the actual performance of his
work" with the shipping enterprise of private respondent. Even without such
evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of
compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability
arose in the course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being
cast on the person or entity resisting the claim. Time and time again this her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00 for burial expenses; and P600.00 as attorney's
Court has stressed such statutory provision. It suffices to mention cases fees. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against private
decided from January to April of this year. 16 An appraisal of the counter- respondent Virgilio Ignacio.
affidavits submitted by two employees of private respondent and thereafter
beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left the vessel for a drinking
spree certainly cannot meet the standard required to negate the force of the
presumption of compensability.

4. Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim

warranted because of the doctrine that the findings of facts of an
administrative agency must be accorded due weight and consideration. An
excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. Workmen's Compensation Commission
17 finds pertinence: "The claim merits scant consideration for this Court is
authorized to inquire into the facts when the conclusions are not supported by
substantial or credible evidence. 18

5. This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely

adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving
all doubts in favor of the claimant. So it has been since the first leading case
of Francisco v. Conching 19 decided a year after the 1935 Constitution took
effect. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission 20 is not amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at
this late date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of
the high estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the
constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor. 21 Further: "No
other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed
legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern
for social justice and protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the
judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible,
would result in frustrating such a national policy. 22 Lastly, to quote from the
opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of social justice is
in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed in
Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure
able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter
compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.' 23

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrelita B.

Ondoy is awarded the sum of, P6,000.00 as compensation for the death of