(Article 26)
privacy and peace of mind.
G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010
Petitioner: ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO
Respondents: ISMAEL VELOSO III
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
This was a petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court Appeals of an
unlawful detainer case in favor of respondent. The cause of action was for damages
because the respondent supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation when
petitioners distributed copies of the abovementioned MTC decision to the
homeowners of Horseshoe Village while respondent's appeal was still pending before
the RTC. That from the time the said decision was distributed to said homeowners, the
respondent became the subject of conversation or talk of the town and by virtue of
which, greatly damaged respondent's good name within the community; his reputation
was besmirched; suffered sleepless night and serious anxiety; and was deprived of his
political career.
Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them since the MTC
decision in the unlawful detainer case was part of public records. On appeal, the CA
decreed that although court decisions are public documents, distribution of the same
during the pendency of an appeal was clearly intended to cause respondent some form
of harassment and/or humiliation so that respondent would be ostracized by his
neighbors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act imputed to petitioner constitutes any of those
enumerated in Arts. 26.
HELD:
Yes. The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our
civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human
personality must be exalted. Under this article, the rights of persons are amply
protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality,
It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records and
documents. However, this is not a case of the public seeking and being denied access
to judicial records and documents. The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by
petitioner of the MTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners,
who were not involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting
negatively respondent's good name and reputation among said homeowners. While
petitioners were free to copy and distribute such copies of the MTC judgment to the
public, the question is whether they did so with the intent of humiliating respondent
and destroying the latter's good name and reputation in the community.
(Article 26)
Zenaida Gregorio, petitioner, v. Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc. and Emma J.
Datuin, respondents GR No. 179799, September 11, 2009
FACTS: Respondents Emma J. Datuin (Datuin) and Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio) filed
an affidavit of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) against
petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio), a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. Datuin and
Sansio claimed that Gregorio delivered insufficiently funded bank checks as payment
for appliances Alvi Marketing bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then indicted for three
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 3,
Manila. The MTC issued a warrant of arrest and she was subsequently arrested by
armed operatives while visiting her family house in Quezon City. On December 5,
1997, Gregorio filed before the MTC a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and
Reinvestigation. She alleged that she could not have issued the bounced checks as she
did not have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn. This
was certified by the manager of the said bank. Gregorio also alleged that the signature
on the bounced checks were radically and patently different from her own signature.
The MTC granted the motion, and a reinvestigation was conducted. Subsequently, the
MTC ordered the B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed. On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a
complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Part of her complaint was that as a result of her wrongful
arrest and arraignment, she suffered helplessness, hunger and humiliation and being
distraught. Datuin and Sansio meanwhile filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that
Gregorio’s complaint arose from grounds of compensation arising from malicious
prosecution. On October 10, 2000, the RTC denied this Motion to Dismiss. Sansio and
Datuin then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was again denied in January 5,
2001. They went to the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the presiding judge of the RTC in denying their motions to dismiss and for
reconsideration. On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition
and ordering Gregorio’s damage suit to be dismissed.
ISSUE: Are Sansio and Datuin liable for damages to Gregorio?
HELD: Yes. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court decided that Gregorio’s rights “to
personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio
and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the
identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded
checks. . . . Because she was not able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was
falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Gregorio was
conveniently at her city residence while visiting her family. She suffered
embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to
spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering
that she had held several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in
the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her
arrest.”
(Article 31)
HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE FERNANDO S.
ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO VILLA Y
CUNANAN, Respondents (G.R. No. L-50959, dated 23 July 1980)
FACTS: Pedro Tayag, Sr., while riding on a bicycle, was hit by Philippine Rabbit Bus
bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74 driven in faster than prescribed
speed by Romeo Villa Y Cunanan on 02 September 1974 in Tarlac, Tarlac along
MacArthur Highway. The occurrence had him sustain physical injuries that caused his
immediate death and damages to his bicycle. The complaint filed by the petitioners
against the respondents on 25 September 1976, docketed as Civil Case No. 5114, was
suspended when the respondent Judge granted the motion of the respondents to
suspend the trial on the ground that the criminal case against the driver of the bus
Romeo Villa Y Cunanan was still pending in the same court, supported by Section 3,
Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court. In Criminal Case No. 836, accused Romeo Villa Y
Cunanan was acquitted of the crime of homicide on 25 October 1977. The respondent
Judge ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5114, acting upon the motions of the
respondents, to dismiss the case on the ground that the petitioners have no valid
cause of action against them given that the driver of the bus was acquitted in the
criminal action and of the petitioners, opposing with the argument that cause of action
is not based on crime, but on quasi-delict. Thereafter, the petitioners’ move to
reconsider was denied by the respondent Judge on 30 May 1979. The petitioners
presented the petition of certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of respondent
Judge. The respondents filed their comments afterwards.
ISSUE: Whether or not to consider the petition of certiorari introduced by the
petitioners.
HELD: The court rendered the order of dismissal by respondent Judge set aside, with
the lower court to pursue proceedings of Civil Case No. 5114. It was decided that
respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing Civil Case No. 5114. To underline the provisions of Article 31 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and in reference to the case Elcano vs. Hill (GR. No. L-24803),
the court held that the extinction of civil liability referred to in par. (e), Section 3, Rule
III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only (or from
other source) and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. The court also confirmed that all essential factors for the
cause of action as quasi-delict, are present, i.e. no pre-existing contract between the
two parties. The abovementioned rationale was then applied to this case. ‘The
petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the acquittal of the driver,
private respondent Romeo Villa Y Cunanan, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
836, is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-
delict.’ Hence, allowing the civil action to continue, regardless of the result of the
criminal proceeding.
(Article 28)
Case Digest
PHILIP S. YU, Petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC
OF MANILA, BRANCH XXXIV (34) and UNISIA MERCHANDISING CO., INC.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 86683 January 21, 1993
FACTS:
Unfair competition in commercial enterprises is the reason that Mr. Yu filed a case in
RTC stating that he was practically bypassed and that private respondent acted in
concert with FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into believing that the goods ordered
by the trading firm were intended for shipment to Nigeria although they were actually
shipped to and sold in the Philippines. Resolving plaintiff's motion embodied in the
complaint for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction after hearing, but without
prejudging the merits of the case, and finding from the evidences adduced by the
plaintiff, that the terms and conditions of the agency agreement between the plaintiff
and The House of Mayfair of England for the exclusive distributorship by the plaintiff of
the latter's goods, apertain to them; that there is no privity of contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant; that the controversy in this case arose from a breach of
contract by the FNF Trading of Germany, for having shipped goods it had purchased
from The House of Mayfair to the Philippines: that the House of Mayfair was
demanding payment of 4,500.00 from the FNF Trading for restitution of plaintiff's
alleged loss on account of the shipment of the goods in question here in the Philippines
and now in the possession of the defendant; it appears to the Court that to restrain the
defendant from selling the goods it has ordered from the FNF Trading of Germany,
would be without legal justification. Having the issuance of writ of injunction denied,
petitioner’s plea was brought to the filing of a petition for review on certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. But according to the appellate court, petitioner was not able to
demonstrate the unequivocal right which he sought to protect and that private
respondent is a complete stranger vis-a-vis the covenant between petitioner and
Mayfair. Apart from these considerations, the reviewing authority noted that
petitioner could be fully compensated for the prejudice he suffered. But the petitioner
anchors his plea for redress on his view that private respondent has distributed and
continues to sell Mayfair covering products in contravention of petitioner's exclusive
right granted by the covenant with the House of Mayfair. Temporary restraining order
was issued to last until further notice from this Court directed against private
respondent. Notwithstanding such, private respondent persisted in the distribution
which triggered petitioner's motion to cite private respondent's manager in contempt
of court.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court correctly agree with the lower court in disallowing the
writ solicited by herein petitioner due to reason that petitioner was not able to
demonstrate the unequivocal right which he sought to protect and that private
respondent is a complete stranger (or is it unfair competition that gave rise to such
which should be stressed upon so as to issue writ of injunction).
HELD:
The circumstance which respondent court overlooked was petitioner's suggestion,
which was not disputed by herein private respondent in its comment, that the House
of Mayfair in England was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the FNF
Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and
sold in the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person
who induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby
entitling the other contracting party to relief therefrom. The breach caused by private
respondent was even aggravated by the consequent diversion of trade from the
business of petitioner to that of private respondent caused by the latter's species of
unfair competition as demonstrated no less by the sales effected inspite of this Court's
restraining order. This brought the irreparable mischief which respondent court
overlooked when it refused to grant the relief simply because of the observation that
petitioner can be fully compensated for the damage. With this, SC issued the writ of
preliminary injunction.
(Article 27)
Zulueta vs Nicolas G.R. No. L-8252 January 31, 1958
Facts: Plaintiff instituted the present action on May 19, 1954 against the defendant to
recover moral pecuniary damages in the sum of P10,000 from the complaint for libel
filed by plaintiff against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff members of the
Philippine Free Press. The defendant fiscal after conducting an investigation rendered
an opinion that there was no prima facie case, that the alleged libelous statements
were made in good faith. As a consequence the fiscal absolved the said governor and prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal action may not be dismissed but not
the Free Press staff from crime of libel. dismissed.

Issue: Whether the plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action

Held: The Supreme Court held that the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when after the
investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is not a
ISSUES:
refusal, without just cause, to perform an official duty. As a general rule, a public
prosecutor, being a quasi-judicial officer empowered to exercise discretion or Whether there was a motion for suspension of the case by reason of prejudicial
judgment, is not personally liable for resulting injuries when acting within the scope of question.
his authority, and in the line of his official duty.
Whether the judge had a misconception of a prejudicial question.

Whether the defense involved an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue
(Article ) raised in the criminal action and its resolution to determine if the latter action may
proceed.

YAP VS. PARAS AND BARCELONA, SR.

HELD:
GR. NO. 101236 January 30, 1992
The petition is granted therefore Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.’s dismissal of Criminal
Petitioner: Juliana P. Yap
Case No. 1902-G dated April 17, 1991 and the Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the
Respondents: Martin Paras and Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan motion for reconsideration, are all reversed and set aside. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is
Malapatan, South Cotabato ordered reinstated for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.

Ponente: J. Cruz

FACTS:

On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate
estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years
later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for
P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yap learned
of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang and filed
a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General (Article 22)
Santos City. On April 17, 1991, before the arraignment, the trial judge motu proporio Republic v Lacap
issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that there is a prejudicial
question, citing Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125. The petitioner came to the Supeme Court G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
for relief in this special civil action for certiorari. Her contention is that where there is a
Ponente: Justice Austria-Martinez

FACTS:
The respondent, Carlito Lacap, doing business under the name and style
CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY had entered into contract with
the Philippine Government through the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH) on the validity of the awarded contract as a result of the bidding
process issued and duly published by the District Engineer of Pampanga dated January
27, 1992. The contract awarded was the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare and the
Contract Agreement was executed by the respondent and petitioner on September 25,
1992. The respondent assumed the works and made advances for the procurement of
materials and payment for labor costs as well. The project had been completed in
accordance with the approved layout and specifications, thus, the Office of the District
Engineer issued Certificate of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance to the respondent.
Consequently, the respondent sought for the payment of completed project. However,
the District Auditor of Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the release of the
particular funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of the respondent has
expired at the time the contract was executed—the DPWH based their decision to
defer the same.
ISSUES:
Whether the contractor (respondent) who entered into Contract Agreement
be denied of the payment he is being sought for the completed project or be paid of
the same although its license has expired at the time of the execution of its contract.
HELD:
Different legal bases have been cited to support the decision for this
argument. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the petitioner is compelled to pay the
respondent for the completed project. Under Article 22: “Every person who through an
act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.” It explicitly suggests that the issuance of the Certificate of Final
Inspection and Final Acceptance by the Office of the District Engineer to the
respondent, the government arguably gained from the said Contract Agreement. Also,
the argument of the petitioner did not suffice his claim that the respondent should not
grant him the payment on the ground that he secures expired contract’s license in
violation of the law. It is true that the contractor (respondent) violates the law. Section
35 of R.A. No. 4566, it explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or
attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or
assumes change in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of
this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false
evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or
license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall
be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a
fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos
(Emphasis supplied)
Based on Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 the contractor (respondent) is subject to
penalties violating the same, but it does not mean that the respondent would deprive
him of the payment due him. The Contract Agreement between the petitioner and
respondent fully satisfied both of them in terms of acceptance on the part of the
former and rendition of the particular service of the latter.
(Article 26)
People of the Philippines vs. Isauro Santiago
G. R. No. L-17663
May 30, 1962
Facts:
The case relates to the exposure of Arsenio H. Lacson, then Mayor of the City of
Manila, to public hatred and ridicule by one Isauro Santiago, in the course of a political
speech in Quiapo, Manila on the 5th of October 1959. Defendant, through an amplifier
system and in the presence of a crowd of around a hundred persons called out
“Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at
the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel" in which the
plaintiff filed an information for libel against the defendant on August 11, 1960.
Defendant, through his Motion to Quash Information, claimed that the charge is not
libel, but oral defamation, and the filing of information of the latter has already
prescribed.
 ISSUE:

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the
Whether or not the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under Article
criminal charge.
358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of
the same Code.

Held: HELD:

The Supreme Court, En Banc, held that the facts alleged in the information constitute
the crime of oral defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. The grounds
by which the information for libel was filed is the erroneous comparison of the media
radio and amplifier system. According to Summit Hotel Co. vs. National Broadcasting
Co. (PA-124 A.L.R. 963), “the rules governing such offense were declared inapplicable to
extemporaneous remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio
broadcast by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon.” The
statements, which were heard through an amplifier system, though defamatory, are
extemporaneous such that no manuscript or prepared text was read.
(Article 29)
No. The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the
accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature.

129 SCRA 558, 565-566 (May 31, 1984)

Petitioners: ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE

FARLEY BEDENIA

Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS

Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS:

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted
the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but
inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil (Article 28)
liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Calamba Medical Center, INC. vs National Labor Relations Commission, Ronaldo
Lanzanas and Merceditha Lanzanas
G.R. No. 176484 November 25, 2008
Facts: Dr. Ronaldo and Merceditha Lanzanas are both former employees of Calamba
Medical Center INC. Circumstances led to the termination of their employment
hospital. It was also found that a watchlist or watch out list containing the names of the
couple was in circulation among the local hospitals, and was allegedly distributed by a
stockholder of the petitioner.
The couple filed complaints for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) – Regional Arbitration Board which were consolidated and
docketed as NLRC CASE NO. RAB-IV-3-9879-98-L.
The NLRC, on appeal, awarded full backwages, separation pay, 500, 000 pesos in moral
damages each, exemplary damages of 250,000 pesos each, and 10% of the total award
for attorneys fees to the doctors on May 3, 2002.
The case was brought to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and on June 30, 2004, the
appellate court reinstated the NLRC decision, however the award to each of the
spouses no longer included the attorney fees and the moral and exemplary damages
were tempered to 100,000 pesos and 50,000 pesos.
Issue: Can the respondents, Doctor Ronaldo and Merceditha Lanzanas, claim more in
damages for the actions against them?
Held: The distribution of the watchlist constitutes as an unfair labor practice, due to its
intent to prevent further gainful employment of those listed. As such, Dr. Ronaldo and
Merceditha Lanzanas have a right to action for damages by Calamba Medical Center,
INC.
On November 25, 2008, the Court of Appeals reinstated the 10% of the total
judgement award as attorney fees as action for damages of unfair labor practices by
Calamba Medical Center, INC.
(Article 31)
G & S Transport Corporation, petitioner vs. Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa namely Ruby
B. Ochoa, Micaela B. Ochoa and Jomar B. Ochoa, respondents
(G.R. No. 170125 March 9, 2011)
FACTS:
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, husband of respondent Ruby B. Ochoa, died on the
night of March 10, 1995 while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S
Transport Corporation, petitioner-common carrier. Ruby Ochoa and her children,
Micaela and Jomar, through counsel, filed a complaint against G & S for damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was raffled to Branch 164 of
said court.
On December 27, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the
vehicular mishap caused by the negligence of Bibiano Padilla, the driver. It likewise
found the evidence adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees as insufficient.
Hence, the trial court declared G & S civilly liable to the heirs. However, for lack of
receipts or any proof of funeral expenses and other actual damages, the trial court
denied the heirs’ claim for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages for lack of
legal basis.
G & S filed a Notice of Appeal while the heirs filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. After G & S filed its Opposition (To Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Reconsideration), the trial court favored the heirs’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration
and thus declared them entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
Padilla was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide in an MTC
Decision but was later on acquitted in the RTC Decision.
Before the CA, G & S continued to insist that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. G & S also
argued that the proximate cause of Jose Marcial’s death is a fortuitous event and/or
the fault or negligence of another and not of its employee.
On the other hand, the heirs maintained that Padilla was grossly negligent in
driving the Avis taxicab on the night of March 10, 1995. In a Decision dated June 29,
2005, the CA ruled in favor of the heirs.
With respect to the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning
capacity, the CA declared the same unwarranted. It found the Certification issued by
Jose Marcial’s employer as self-serving, unreliable, and biased. Anent moral damages,
the CA reduced it to P200,000.00 as to make it proportionate to the award of
exemplary damages which is P50,000.00. CA denied both parties’ respective motions
for reconsideration.
Hence, G & S and the heirs filed their respective Petitions for Review on
Certiorari before the Supreme Court. The heirs’ petition was docketed as G.R. No.
170071 and that of G & S as G.R. No. 170125. These petitions were later consolidated
pursuant to this Court’s Resolution of November 21, 2005.
One of the grounds in the petition of G & S is that CA gravely erred in not
taking note of the fact that the petitioner’s employee had been acquitted of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting (in) homicide.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals made an error by not taking note of the fact that
Padilla, an employee of the petitioner, has been acquitted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide?
Held: NO. According to Article 31 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “When the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.”
The Supreme Court decided that “in this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily
for the recovery of damages arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly
committed by G & S.” The Court further said that “As a common carrier, G & S ‘is
bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances’.” However, Jose Marcial did not reach his destination due to the
accident and G & S failed to prove that it exercised diligence, thereby making it liable to
the heirs of Jose Marcial for breach of contract of carriage. Clearly, it is an independent
civil action arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by
reason of the same incident. Hence, regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in
said criminal case, same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case. There
was therefore no error on the part of the CA when it resolved this case without regard
to the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal case.
Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions of the MTC Decision in said criminal
case, we however find that those quoted portions were only meant to belie G & S’
claim that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the
delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without those quoted portions,
the appellate court’s ultimate finding that it was Padilla’s negligence which was the
proximate cause of the mishap would still be the same. This is because the CA has, in
fact, already made this declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact
that the MTC Decision from which the subject quoted portions were lifted has already
been reversed by the RTC is therefore immaterial.
(Article 20)

Sonny Romero Y Dominguez VS People of the Philippines, Isabel Padua, Regina Breis,
Minerva Montes and Ofelia Belando Breis

G.R. No. 167546

Promulgated: July 7, 2009

FACTS: On April 1, 1999 a JC Liner bus driven by the petition, Sonny Romero, and an
Apego taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head on collision that resulted in the
death of Gerardo Breis Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis
and Jimmy Padua. The incident also injured Edwin and Edmund Breis. Petition was
charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and
multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Camarines Sur MTC.
The trial acquitted the petitioner on November 9, 2000 of the crimes charged but was
held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of
P3,541,900 for actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate
damages and loss of earning capacity. Petitioner appealed to both the RTC and CA and
argued that the MTC made a mistake in making him civilly liable. Both the RTC and CA (Article )
affirmed the MTC decision.

Velayo vs. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can be held civilly liable for damages due to negligence.
G.R. No. L-7817, 31 October 1956

Ponente: Justice Felix

HELD: The court affirmed the MTC decision. Although the evidence failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the negligence of the petitioner, thus absolving him of
criminal liability, preponderant evidence is enough to hold him civilly liable for
damages.
FACTS:
The Commercial Air Lines, Inc. a.k.a. CALI and a corporation duly enlisted in the
Philippines was previously engaged in the air transport business. The Shell Company of
the Philippine Islands, Limited (defendant), a corporation enlisted in England, was
authorized to do business in the country. The defendant supplied the fuel needs of
CALI.
 On 6 August 1948, CALI set a meeting to inform all its creditors that the company was
in grave debt; the operation would be halted. Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald represented the
ISSUE: Whether the defendant committed a betrayal of trust and confidence
Shell Company of P.I., Ltd. in the meeting. CALI owed the defendant P152,641.68.

HELD: Yes. Section 37 of the insolvency law was violated. The defendant transferred
During the meeting, CALI's board of directors raised the proposal to sell CALI’s assets to
the credit at the time of CALI’s unstable financial situation without other creditors’
Philippine Air Lines (PAL). The corporation’s balance sheet was also presented to the
knowledge and despite an agreement that a fair distribution must be met first prior to
assembled parties; part of it was a C-54 plane in the United States.
making a legal move. Legal bases were cited including Article 23 of the Civil Code which
states that, “Even when an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not
due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity
The creditors agreed to have a working group composed of three parties to come up
if through the act or event he was benefited.”
with an agreement to distribute the assets, and that a representative must be
appointed; and that all creditors should refrain from claiming their assets, and
appearing before an insolvency court unless no agreement was met. Mr. Fitzgerald was
The court ordered the defendant to pay Mr. Velayo twice the amount of the value of
appointed representative.
the plane for compensatory and exemplary damages.

On 9 August 1948, the working committee’s first meeting took place. The members
tried to agree on the equal distribution of assets. At the same time, the defendant
assigned its credit against CALI to Shell Oil Company, Inc., an American venture, for
$79,440.00. On 10 August 1948, the amount was raised to $85,081.29.
(Article 34)

On 12 August 1948, Shell Oil Company, Inc. filed a formal complaint against CALI before
the Superior Court of California, for the collection of said credit. A writ of attachment G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003
was also applied for and issued against the C-54 plane. The writ meant that Shell Oil HAMBON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Company, Inc. alone would benefit from selling the plane.

Petitioner: GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON

The stockholders of CALI, unaware of the settlement between the two companies,
decided to discuss the sale of CALI's properties to PAL. On 7 October 1948, CALI learned Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES
about the defendant’s move thus, filed a petition for insolvency.
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Mr. Velayo was appointed Assignee of CALI in the legal proceedings, and sought a writ
of injunction to hold back the complaint filed in the U.S. The court denied the petition.
A Philippine court would not be in a position to enforce its orders against the Shell Oil
Company which happened to be an American corporation outside the Philippine
jurisdiction. Mr. Velayo eventually confined his action to recover damages against the
defendant. The court dismissed the complaint, and an appeal was made.
FACTS:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio,
a complaint for damages for the injuries and expenses he incurred last December 9,
1985. However, the Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence filed on January 8, 1986 was already dismissed by the Municipal Trial
Court of Tuba, Benguet due to lack of petitioner’s interest and that the dismissal was
with respect to both the criminal and civil case.
After the trial, the RTC of Baguio ruled that the petitioner is entitled to
damages. However, the Court of Appeals, in its decision on March 8, 1995, refused to
affirm the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissed the petitioner’s claim for
damages based on Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended in 1988, which is the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an independent civil action
be duly dismissed for failure to make reservation to file a separate civil action in a
criminal case filed arising from the same act or omission of the accused?
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the petitioner should have reserved his right to
separately institute the civil action for damages. Due to this failure, the civil case was
deemed impliedly instituted with the Criminal Case No. 2049 which was then
previously dismissed by the Court. In effect, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages
subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed.
(Article 21)
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
219 SCRA 115
Facts: The petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian National studying medicine
at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; while the private respondent
name is Marilou Gonzales who works in the cafeteria of the said school. She is 22 years
old, single, Filipina of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community. Gashem courted and proposed to marry her which she accepted on the
premise that they would be married. The petitioner even went to the province of the
private respondent to ask the approval of her parents. The petitioner forced her to
live with him in his apartment in which she allowed herself to be deflowered by him.
After about two months, the petitioner began to change and started to maltreated her
even threatened to kill her and later repudiated their marriage agreement. No
marriage came hence an action for breach of promise to marry.
Issue: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case and whether
or not a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong.
Held: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable
wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so.
Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme
or perceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because
of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and wilful injury
to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that
such injury should have been committed in manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.
(Article 36)
Berbari vs. Concepcion
G.R. No. L-16189 February 26, 1920
Ponente: Justice Torres
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent, judge of the first court of
first instance, praying that the criminal cause for estafa found against him be declared
null and void due to a prejudicial question; wherein, petitioner received a sum arising
from an agreement of capital subscription from a debtor-third party and is still awaiting
further payment.
Issue:
Whether the civil action sought after by the petitioner to settle the pending
prejudicial question is apt and correct, thereby removing any criminal liability.
Held:
The fact that the petitioner appropriated himself a sum of money from the
foregoing agreement goes to show that a contract have been entered into. The debtor-
third party’s future payment as demanded by the petitioner that resulted into his filed
civil action cannot be construed as a prejudicial question. Prejudicial question is
understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal action that requires a
decision before a final judgment is rendered in the principal action with which said
question is closely connected.
Petitioner’s civil action that asks for settlement of payment is a prejudicial
question. However, it does not ascertain whether or not he committed the crime of
estafa filed against him by the debtor-third party. If any action at all must be
suspended, it would be the civil action and in no way the criminal action once reason
for the latter has been found against the petitioner.
(Article 19)
G.R. No. L – 19313 January 19, 1962
DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, Petitioner, vs. ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL., Respondents
FACTS: While the Commission on Appointments was not in session, then President
Carlos P. Garcia made appointments, on December 29, 1961 including Dominador R.
Aytona, as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, who on the same day, took the
corresponding oath.
At noon on December 30, 1961, President – elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office
and on December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia
after Macapagal had been proclaimed elected by Congress on December 13, 1961.
President Macapagal then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the
Central Bank on January 1, 1962 and the latter qualified immediately.
Both ad interim appointees exercised the powers of their office on January 2, 1962.
Castillo informed Aytona of his title and the latter was prevented from holding office in
the Central Bank the next day and thereafter, prompting a proceeding which is
practically a quo warranto, challenging the former’s right to exercise the powers of
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona Claims he was validly appointed, had qualified
for the post, making Castillo’s appointment void. Castillo replies that the appointment
of Aytona had been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 as issued by President
Macapagal.
ISSUE: Whether President Macapagal had the power to issue the order of cancellation
of the ad interim appointments made by President Garcia, even after the appointees
had already qualified.
HELD: The Court, exercising its judgment and discretion dismissed the action as
instituted by Aytona. With the separation of powers, it resolves that it must not
disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling the “midnight” or
“last – minute” appointments.
Customarily, when a president makes appointments, he has the benefit of the advice of
the Commission on Appointments. In ad interim appointments, he exercises a special
prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either
previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining
to them the reason for selection. In this case, where the Commission that will consider
the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the appointment, and
where the names are to be submitted by successor who may not wholly approve of the
selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such appointments. It is
difficult to believe that in signing several appointments in one night, President Garcia
exercised such caution which was required and expected of him.
The underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the appointee has
qualified is the latter’s equitable rights. Yet, it is uncertain if such equity is present in
the situation, considering the circumstances detracting from that degree of good faith,
morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. It
might be argued that the appointees, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the
maneuver to beat the deadline. Occasions wherein not only strict legality, but also
fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account.
(Article 24)
TERESITA DIO versus ST. FERDINAND MEMORIAL PARK, INC. and MILDRED F.
TANTOCO
G.R. No. 169578 November 30, 2006
FACTS:
On December 11, 1973, Teresita Dio agreed to buy, on instalment basis, a
memorial lot from the St. Ferdinand Memorial Park, Inc. (SFMPI) in Lucena City. The
36-square-meter memorial lot is particularly described as Block 2, Section
F, Lot 15. The purchase was evidenced by a Pre-Need Purchase Agreement dated
December 11, 1973 and denominated as Contract No. 384. She obliged herself to
abide by all such rules and regulations governing the SFMPI dated May 25, 1972.
SFMPI issued a Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care dated April 1,
1974 denominated as Contract No. 284. The ownership of Dio over the property was
made subject to the rules and regulations of SFMPI, as well as the government,
including all amendments, additions and modifications that may later be adopted. Rule
69 of the Rules reads:
Rule 69. Mausoleum building and memorials should be constructed
by the Park Personnel. Lot Owners cannot contract other
contractors for the construction of the said buildings and
memorial, however, the lot owner is free to give their own design
for the mausoleum to be constructed, as long as it is in
accordance with the park standards. The construction shall be
under the close supervision of the Park Superintendent.
In the early part of October 1986, Dio informed SFMPI, through its president
and controlling stockholder, Mildred F. Tantoco, that she was planning to build a
mausoleum on her lot and sought the approval thereof.
On December 23, 1986, Dio filed a Complaint for Injunction with
Damages against SFMPI and Tantoco before the RTC of Lucena City. She averred that
she was not aware of Rule 69 of the SFMPI Rules and Regulations; the amount
of P100, 000.00 as construction cost of the mausoleum was unconscionable and
oppressive. In addition Plaintiff was initially surprised by Tantoco’s statement because
she knew that their contract did not provide for such stipulation.
On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendants.
Upon appeal the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner had knowledge of Rule 69 of SFMPI Rules and
Regulations for memorial works in the mausoleum areas of the park when the
Pre-Need Purchase Agreement and the Deed of Sale was executed.
HELD:
The supreme courts declared that “Basic is the principle that contracts, once
perfected, bind both contracting parties. The parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. It follows that
obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Petitioner is an experienced businesswoman. She doubtlessly dealt with
numerous documents, and is therefore presumed to know the import thereof.
We are not persuaded by petitioner’s claim that Rule 69 of respondent’s rules
and regulations is unreasonable and oppressive because the provision unduly restricts
her right of ownership over the property.
The validity or enforceability of the impugned contracts will have to be
determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the situation of
the parties concerned. Indeed, Article 24 of the New Civil Code provides that “[in] all
contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage
on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender
age, or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.” In this case,
however, there is no reason for the Court to apply the rule on stringent treatment
towards contracts of adhesion. To reiterate, not only is petitioner educated, she is
likewise a well-known and experienced businesswoman; thus, she cannot claim to be
the weaker or disadvantaged party in the subject contracts so as to call for a strict
interpretation against respondents. Moreover, she executed the Pre-Need Purchase
Agreement and Deed of Sale without any complaint or protest. She assailed Rule 69 of
the Rules and Regulations of respondent SFMPI only when respondents rejected her
request to cause the construction of the mausoleum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52311 dated May 10, 2005, and the Resolution
dated September 6, 2005, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.”
(Article 20)
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO)
G.R. No. 142943.
April 3, 2002
FACTS: Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located
at Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Both also engaged in the export of furniture.
The defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company's (MERALCO) inspectors headed by
Emmanuel Orlino conducted an inspection on the said avenue. The house of the
Quisumbings were inspected by the defendant after observing a standard operated
procedure. After the inspection, it was found out that the meter has been tampered.
The results were relayed to the plaintiff's secretary who shared the information to the
owners. The owners were advised that defendant will bring the meter for laboratory
testing and if the meter did turn out to be tampered, electrical services of the plaintiffs
will be disconnected. After an hour, the inspectors informed the plaintiffs that meted
had been indeed tampered and they need to pay P178,875.01 so that their electric
would not be disconnected. The electric service was immediately reconnected. Still, the
plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and also alleging the defendant of acted maliciously
and disconnecting the electricity without due process and without regard with the
plaintiff's rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner and the respondent are entitled to damages.
HELD: The petitioners are entitled to moral damages although in a reduced amount
only, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Moral damages are recovered when the
rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due
process of law, are violated. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. In this case, the requisites of law must be
complied with before the disconnection of electrical supply can be effected. The
petitioners' claim for actual damages, however, was not granted due to failure to
provide proof. On the other hand, the petitioners were ordered to pay the respondent
the billing differential of P193,332.96. The respondents were able to present sufficient
evidences regarding the amount differential.
(Article 19)
University of the East vs. Jader
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago
FACTS: Romeo A. Jader, respondent, in his first semester of his last school year (School
Year 1987-1988) at the University of the East College of Law, failed to take the regular
final examination in Practice Court I for which he received an incomplete grade. He
filed an application in the second semester, for the removal of the incomplete grade
given by his professor in the aforementioned subject. The application was approved by
the Dean after payment of the required fee. The respondent took the examination.
After which, his grade was submitted by the professor. It was a failing grade of 5.
On the other hand, after deliberation of the Dean and Faculty members of the
College, respondent's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation
for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988). He was
among the students who were given invitations to participate in the commencement
exercises for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws. The respondent attended the said
ceremonies, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was
called, with her mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and
his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by the Dean a
rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma.
During his review for the bar examinations, he learned of the deficiency in his
grade and was not able to take the bar examination. He sued his college for moral and
exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence of not urgently informing his
deficiency.
ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution may be held to have acted in bad
faith for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all
requirements for graduation when such is not.
HELD: The court held that the “Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the
result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by
the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good
faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another,
even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the
school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its
professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the
computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control,
much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs,
particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance
with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that
exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to
the submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive control means
that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused
the damage or injury.”
 other prior to the party, fails to show that the act of Ms. Lim was driven by animosity
against Mr. Reyes. The attribution of the alleged misconduct of Ms. Lim to her age and
(Article 21) working environment is a lame argument that cannot be considered.

G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005 The absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY and expose him to ridicule and shame, makes it highly unlikely that she would shout at
BISAYA” him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty
years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of
Facts: Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed
On 13 October 1994, Roberto Reyes alleged that he was invited by Dr. Violeta incredible.
Filart to join her in the party of Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka, the former general manager of Under Article 21 the nature of the act to be able to claim damages must be
Nikko Hotel. The said party was organized by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the intentional.
hotel for the past twenty (20) years. The guest list was limited to approximately sixty
(60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees. Knowing that Mr. In this case, it was not proven that Ms. Ruby Lim has a motive to intentionally
Reyes was not one of those invited, Ms. Lim asked the former to leave the party. Mr. embarrass Mr. Reyes in asking him to leave the party wherein he was not invited. Thus,
Reyes claimed that he was asked to leave the party in a scandalous manner. On the Ms. Lim is not liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
other hand, Ms. Lim claimed that she asked Mr. Reyes politely and discreetly.
The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly.
The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages
as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to
leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruby Lim is liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:
No. Ms. Ruby Lim is not liable under Article 21.

Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1)
There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

In the determination of the manner in which Mr. Reyes was asked to leave, the
court reviewed the findings of fact. Mr. Reyes himself admitted that when Ms. Lim
asked him to leave she was so close to him to a point that they almost kissed. This
suggested that Ms. Lim did not intend herself to be heard by other people to the (Article 26)
embarrassment of Mr. Reyes. The fact that these two did not personally know each
People of the Philippines vs. Isauro Santiago
G. R. No. L-17663
May 30, 1962
Facts:
The case relates to the exposure of Arsenio H. Lacson, then Mayor of the City of
Manila, to public hatred and ridicule by one Isauro Santiago, in the course of a political
speech in Quiapo, Manila on the 5th of October 1959. Defendant, through an amplifier
system and in the presence of a crowd of around a hundred persons called out
“Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at
the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel" in which the
plaintiff filed an information for libel against the defendant on August 11, 1960.
Defendant, through his Motion to Quash Information, claimed that the charge is not
libel, but oral defamation, and the filing of information of the latter has already
prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under Article
358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of
the same Code.
Held:
The Supreme Court, En Banc, held that the facts alleged in the information constitute
the crime of oral defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. The grounds
by which the information for libel was filed is the erroneous comparison of the media
radio and amplifier system. According to Summit Hotel Co. vs. National Broadcasting
Co. (PA-124 A.L.R. 963), “the rules governing such offense were declared inapplicable to
extemporaneous remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio
broadcast by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon.” The
statements, which were heard through an amplifier system, though defamatory, are
extemporaneous such that no manuscript or prepared text was read.
(Article 36)
ABUNADO V. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004)
Facts
On September 18, 1967, Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceño at the
Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco. In 1988, Narcisa left for Japan to work but
returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an
extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home. Narcisa found that Salvador is
cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also found out that Salvador contracted a
second marriage with certain a Zenaida Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan
in San Mateo, Rizal. On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador
against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against
Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December
24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children
with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no
evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989,
upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for
his commission in the military. Salvador was convicted for bigamy by the trial court.
Salvador petitioned for a review and claims that his petition for annulment/declaration
of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy
case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.

Issue
Whether the petition for annulment or nullity of marriage was a prejudicial
question, hence the proceedings in the bigamy case should be suspended.
Held
No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in
view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The declaration of
the judicial declaration of nullity is immaterial to the prosecution of the criminal case of
bigamy because such crime has been consummated during the period wherein the
marriage is supposedly subsisting. The innocence or guilt of the petitioner is not
determined by the annulment case. A marriage is deemed valid until the declaration of
its nullity or a judicial declaration of annulment.
(Article 27)
G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
PHILIPPINE MATCH CO., LTD. VS. THE CITY OF CEBU and JESUS E. ZABATE, Acting City
Treasurer
FACTS: This case is about the legality of the tax collected by the City of Cebu on sales of
matches stored by the Philippine Match Co., Ltd. in Cebu City but delivered to
customers outside of the City.
Ordinance No. 279 of Cebu City (approved by the mayor on March 10, 1960 and also
approved by the provincial board) is "an ordinance imposing a quarterly tax on gross
sales or receipts of merchants, dealers, importers and manufacturers of any
commodity doing business" in Cebu City. It imposes a sales tax of one percent (1%) on
the gross sales, receipts or value of commodities sold, bartered, exchanged or
manufactured in the city in excess of P2,000 a quarter.
Section 9 of the ordinance provides that, for purposes of the tax, "all deliveries of
goods or commodities stored in the City of Cebu, or if not stored are sold" in that city,
"shall be considered as sales" in the city and shall be taxable.
It assails the legality of the tax which the city treasurer collected on out-of- town
deliveries of matches, to wit: (1) sales of matches booked and paid for in Cebu City but
shipped directly to customers outside of the city; (2) transfers of matches to newsmen
assigned to different agencies outside of the city and (3) shipments of matches to
provincial customers pursuant to salesmen's instructions.
The company in its letter of April 15, 1961 to the city treasurer sought the refund of the
sales tax paid for out-of-town deliveries of matches. It invoked Shell Company of the
Philippines, Ltd. vs. Municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, 105 Phil. 1263. In that case
sales of oil and petroleum products effected outside the territorial limits of Sipocot,
were held not to be subject to the tax imposed by an ordinance of that municipality.
The city treasurer denied the request. His stand is that under section 9 of the ordinance
all out-of-town deliveries of latches stored in the city are subject to the sales tax
imposed by the ordinance.
On August 12, 1963 the company filed the complaint herein, praying that the ordinance
be d void insofar as it taxed the deliveries of matches outside of Cebu City, that the city
be ordered to refund to the company the said sum of P12,844.61 as excess sales tax
paid, and that the city treasurer be ordered to pay damages.
After hearing, the trial court sustained the tax on the sales of matches booked and paid
for in Cebu City although the matches were shipped directly to customers outside of
the city. The lower court held that the said sales were consummated in Cebu City
because delivery to the carrier in the city is deemed to be a delivery to the customers
outside of the city.
But the trial court invalidated the tax on transfers of matches to salesmen assigned to
different agencies outside of the city and on shipments of matches to provincial
customers pursuant to the instructions of the newsmen It ordered the defendants to
refund to the plaintiff the sum of P8,923.55 as taxes paid out the said out-of-town
deliveries with legal rate of interest from the respective dates of payment.
The city did not appeal from that decision. The company appealed from that portion of
the decision upholding the tax on sales of matches to customers outside of the city but
which sales were booked and paid for in Cebu City, and also from the dismissal of its
claim for damages against the city treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Cebu erred in imposing tax sales on matches which
were perfected and paid for in Cebu City but the matches were delivered to customers
outside of the City.
HELD: We hold that the appeal is devoid of merit bemuse the city can validly tax the
sales of matches to customers outside of the city as long as the orders were booked
and paid for in the company's branch office in the city. Those matches can be regarded
as sold in the city, as contemplated in the ordinance, because the matches were
delivered to the carrier in Cebu City. Generally, delivery to the carrier is delivery to the
buyer (Art. 1523, Civil Code; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Yangco, 38 Phil. 602).
The sales in the instant case were in the city and the matches sold were stored in the
city. The fact that the matches were delivered to customers, whose places of business
were outside of the city, would not place those sales beyond the city's taxing power.
Those sales formed part of the merchandising business being assigned on by the
company in the city. In essence, they are the same as sales of matches fully
consummated in the city.
Furthermore, because the sellers place of business is in Cebu City, it cannot be sensibly
argued that such sales should be considered as transactions subject to the taxing
power of the political subdivisions where the customers resided and accepted delivery
of the matches sold.
The company in its second assignment of error contends that the trial court erred in
not ordering defendant acting city treasurer to pay exemplary damages of P20,000 and
attorney's fees.
Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is attributable to
malice or inexcusable negligence. In this case, it cannot be said that the city treasurer
acted wilfully or was grossly t in not refunding to the plaintiff the taxes which it paid
under protest on out-of-town sales of matches.
The record clearly reveals that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified
under section 9 of the tax ordinance in collecting the sales tax on out-of-town
deliveries, considering that the company's branch office was located in Cebu City and
that all out-of-town purchase order for matches were filled up by the branch office and
the sales were duly reported to it.
The city treasurer acted within the scope of his authority and in consonance with his
bona fide interpretation of the tax ordinance. The fact that his action was not
completely sustained by the courts would not him liable for We have upheld his act of
taxing sales of matches booked and paid for in the city.
(Article 24)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO CASIPIT Y RADAM
G.R. NO.88229 May 31, 1994

FACTS:
Guillermo Casipit yRadam, 22 at the time of the incident, appeals to insist on his
innocence after being found guilty of raping Myra Reynaldo, 14 years old and a sixth
grader back then. The two are neighbors in Victoria, Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 19
September 1986, Myra was invited by Guillermo to the town of Alaminos to buy rice
and bananas but went to Dagupan instead because of cheaper prices. The two watched
a movie and had dinner before proceeding to Victoria. It rained hard on their way
home so they decided to stay in a hut in the open field of Barangay Talbang. Inside the
hut, Guillermo forced himself into Myra and Myra could not stop him as he was big and
strong. After arriving at their respective homes, Myra narrated to her aunt
NenitaRabadon everything that took place inside the hut. The two then reported the
incident to the authorities and headed to the Western Pangasinan General Hospital for
a medical examination the following afternoon.
Guillermo denied all the charges and contested that he and Myra were sweethearts
long before the incident. According to him, Myra gave her consent to the sexual
intercourse that took place in the hut since they are lovers. Guillermo contended that
Myra was probably induced by her aunt Nenitato file the case. Further, the accused
argued that their movie date and stay in the hut until morning are indicative of Myra’s
attraction to Guillermo, thereby nullifying her claim of being forced into having sexual
intercourse with him.
ISSUE:
Which should the court believe – Guillermo’s or Myra’s version of the incident?
HELD:
The court found Guillermo Casipit y Radam guilty of raping Myra Reynaldo and
affirmed his sentence of reclusion perpetua. Further, the indemnity in favor of Myra
was increased to P50,000.00 from P30,000.
According to the court, Myra, at that time, was only 14 years old, an innocent barrio
lass who placed her trust on appellant that day. Her immediate disclosure of the
incident to her family and to the authorities and submission to medical examination
augments the truthfulness of her case. Further, records showed that she was not a
woman of a flirtatious nature to provoke Guillermo to have sex with her.
The ruling was based on the State’s role as parenspatriae– having the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to
fully protect themselves.The court placed more weight on Myra’s testimony because of
its “marked receptivityto lend credence to the testimonies of victims who are tender
years regarding their versions of what transpired.”
(Article 22)
VIRGILIO C. CRYSTAL and GLYNNA F. CRYSTAL, petitioners vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondent
Facts:
On September 5, 1995 Virgilio C. Crystal and Glynna F. Crystal obtained a P3,000,000
loan from Citytrust Banking Corporation secured by a mortgage of land. In 1996, Bank
of the Philippine Islands (BPI) merged with and absorbed Citytrust. Due to the failure of
the petitioners to settle the loan, the mortgaged land was foreclosed and sold in a
public auction on July 21, 1997, to the highest bidder, BPI, amounting to P5,604,000.
The respondent subsequently filed on March 19, 2001, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu a complaint against the petitioners for the collection of the deficiency of
mortgage obligation and damages alleging that the total mortgage obligation
amounted to P6,490,623.18resulting to a deficiency of P886,623.18 to earn 27%
interest from the date of the auction sale to January 1, 2001 and 20% per annum for
January 1, 2001 to March 15, 2001. In addition to the claim are the incidental expenses
incurred after the bidding amounting to P1,665,946.69, thus, a total claim of
P3,425,386.27. The petitioners argued that they were not informed of the interest
rates per annum, thus, the foreclosure should be null and void due to BPIs violation of
the Truth in Lending Act. RTC reduced the petitioner’s obligation to P5,248,888.65 due
to the excessive charges for interests, penalty charges, liquidated damages and
attorney’s fees. Thus, RTC ordered BPI to pay the petitioners P319,111.35 plus interest
of 12% per annum from July 21, 1997 until the debt is fully paid. On BPIs appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, but deleted the award of interest.
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were denied.
Thereupon, both parties filed their petitions to the Supreme Court.The respondent’s
petitionwas denied in G.R. 180129 for failure to sufficiently show that the appellate
court committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution. The
subject of the petitioner’s petition is the deletion of RTC’s decision of imposing of
interest on the amount to be returned by the respondents.

Issue:
Should interest be imposed on the surplus to be returned by the respondents?
Held:
Yes, hence, the petition is granted.The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified in
that the respondent, Bank of the Philippine Islands will return P319,111.35
representing the excess amount from the foreclosure sale, to bear interest at 6% per
annum starting from the time the trial court rendered it’s judgment on September 27,
2004, not after the filing of the complaint, until the finality of this decision. Legal
interest of 12% per annum shall be imposed on the judgment award inclusive of
interest from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
(Article 33)
DIONG BI CHU, alias PATRICK CHANG, CHANG KA HEE and LU LIONG CORPORATION,
Petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, as
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI; JAIME NAVOA and
MILAGROS DE LEOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 49588 : December 21, 1990
FACTS:
Private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos filed a criminal case against
petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang" and Chang Ka Hi alias "Chang Ka Hee"
with estafa. The charge against Chang Ka Hee was dismissed on the ground that he had
nothing to do with the transaction. Military Commission No. 3 rendered judgment
acquitting petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang", holding that the transaction
between the parties was a joint venture, requiring each party to contribute to a
common fund.
As an offshoot of the criminal case, private respondents filed a civil action against
Diong Bi Chu, Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong Corporation for recovery of damages arising
from guaranty and fraud, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Petitioners moved
for the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed against them, on the ground that
the same is barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3 and by private
respondents' failure to reserve their right to file a separate civil action. The court
denied said motion to dismiss.
A petition was then filed by herein petitioners before the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court dismissed said petition, holding that the civil action for damages under
Art. 33 of the Civil Code is independent of the criminal case and that the dismissal of
the criminal case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner Diong
Bi Chu do not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the civil action for damages against
them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil action for damages based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil
Code is barred by a prior judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
HELD:
Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that "(I)n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence."
To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision, only a
preponderance of evidence is required. An acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to
the filing of an action for civil damages, for one may not be criminally liable and still be
civilly liable. Thus, the outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or
conviction, is really inconsequential and will be of no moment in the civil action. The
civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the
reservation.
Applying the foregoing principles, despite the validity of the acquittal of Diong Bi Chu
and the dismissal of the criminal case against Chang Ka Hee by Military Commission No.
3, such fact does not deprive private respondents of their right to recover civil damages
against said persons based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.
(Article 24)
ELADlA DE LIMA vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS CO.
G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988
FACTS:
On June 3, 1958, an accident between a Laguna Tayabas Co. (LTB) bus and Seven-up
Bottlers Co. delivery truck resulted to the death of an LTB passenger named Petra dela
Cruz. Two other LTB passengers namely Eladia de Lima and Nemesio Flores also
incurred physical injuries. De Lima, Flores and the heir of dela Cruz filed suits to the bus
company.
In December 29, 1971, the petitioners requested to expedite the decision of the case
with the hope that the legal interest is to be given immediately from the date of the
decision. By January 31, 1972, the decision was given. Again, the petitioners reiterated
their request for the modification of the decision in such a way that the effectivity is to
be rolled back to December 27, 1963. Furthermore, the heir of dela Cruz filed a
reconsideration for the increase of indemnity from P3,000 to P12,000. With this
pending motion for reconsideration, LTB filed an appeal for the case. The appellate
court turned down the motion for reconsideration of the plaintiffs indicating that an
appeal should have been filed for the awarding of the legal interest. The petition was
reviewed in 1988, thirty years after the actual incident.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the effectivity of the decision is to be rolled back as requested by the
plaintiffs.
b. Whether the lower court was erroneous in the delay of the decision for the increase
in the claim of the heir of Petra dela Cruz.
HELD:
The court granted the petition noting that the plaintiffs were unable to make an appeal
in the lower court due to the fact that the petitioners are seeking judicial remedy as
impoverished individuals. They were hopeful that the adjudged amount will be
provided to them by the transportation company. With the case pending for thirty
years, the court aptly found this as a sufficient justification to grant the legal interest as
well as the increase in indemnity.
It was found that the rolling back of the effectivity date was necessary to compensate
for the monetary loss the plaintiffs incurred from the accident, death and court
proceedings. Moreover, the claim for Petra dela Cruz was increased from P3,000.00 to
P30,000.00. The decision was immediately executory in response to the identified
urgent need of the plaintiffs.
(Article 23)
DEL MONTE CORPORATION-USA, PAUL E. DERBY, JR., DANIEL COLLINS and LUIS
HIDALGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE BIENVENIDO L. REYES
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 74, Malabon, Metro Manila,
MONTEBUENO MARKETING, INC., LIONG LIONG C. SY and SABROSA FOODS,
INC., respondents.
FACTS:
On July 1, 1994, Del Monte Corporation-USA (DMC-USA) and Montebueno Marketing,
Inc. (MMI) entered in a Distributorship Agreement, the latter being as exclusive
distributor of products in the Philippines for a period of five (5) years, renewable for
two (2) consecutive five (5) year periods The Agreement provided, among others, for
an arbitration clause which states -
12. GOVERNING LAW AND ARBITRATION
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of California and/or, if
applicable, the United States of America. All disputes arising out of or relating to this
Agreement or the parties’ relationship, including the termination thereof, shall be
resolved by arbitration in the City of San Francisco, State of California, under the Rules
of the American Arbitration Association. The arbitration panel shall consist of three
members, one of whom shall be selected by DMC-USA, one of whom shall be selected
by MMI, and third of whom shall be selected by the other two members and shall have
relevant experience in the industry x x x x
MMI appointed Sabrosa Foods, Inc. (SFI), with the approval of petitioner DMC-USA, as
MMI's marketing arm to concentrate on its marketing and selling function as well as to
manage its critical relationship with the trade.
On 3 October 1996, MMI, SFI and MMI's Managing Director Liong Liong C. Sy filed a
Complaint against petitioners DMC-USA, Paul E. Derby, Jr., Daniel Collins and Luis
Hidalgo, and Dewey Ltd. before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila,
their complaint is on the alleged violations by petitioners of Arts. 20, 21, and 23 of the
Civil Code.
The complainant claimed, DMC-USA products continued to be brought into the country
by parallel importers despite the appointment of private respondent MMI as the sole
and exclusive distributor of Del Monte products thereby causing them great
embarrassment and substantial damage. They alleged that the products brought into
the country by these importers were aged, damaged, fake or counterfeit. The
complainant had exhausted all possible avenues for the resolution and settlement of
their grievances and that as a result of the fraud, bad faith and malice they should be
held responsible for all the actual expenses incurred by private respondents in the
delayed shipment of orders which resulted in the extra handling thereof, the actual
expenses and cost of money for the unused Letters of Credit (LCs) and the substantial
opportunity losses due to created out-of-stock situations and unauthorized shipments
of Del Monte-USA products to the Philippine Duty Free Area and Economic Zone; that
the bad faith, fraudulent acts and willful negligence of petitioners, motivated by their
determination to squeeze private respondents out of the outstanding and ongoing
Distributorship Agreement in favor of another party.
On 21 October 1996 petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings invoking
the arbitration clause in their Agreement. In a Resolutioni dated 23 December 1996 the
trial court deferred consideration of petitioners. On 15 January 1997 petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. On 11 November 1997 the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings was denied by the trial court
ISSUE:
Petitioner’s Motion to suspend proceedings on complaint filed at Regional Trial Court
of Malabon, Metro Manila, invoking the arbitration clause in their Agreement.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED
There is no doubt that arbitration is valid and constitutional in our jurisdiction.
Even before the enactment of RA 876, this Court has countenanced the settlement of
disputes through arbitration.
The Agreement between petitioner DMC-USA and private respondent MMI is a
contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties
and produce effect as between them, their assigns and heirs. Clearly, only parties to
the Agreement, i.e., petitioners DMC-USA and its Managing Director for Export Sales
Paul E. Derby, Jr., and private respondents MMI and its Managing Director LILY SY are
bound by the Agreement and its arbitration clause as they are the only signatories
thereto. Petitioners Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and private respondent SFI, not
parties to the Agreement and cannot even be considered assigns or heirs of the parties,
are not bound by the Agreement and the arbitration clause therein. Consequently,
referral to arbitration in the State of California pursuant to the arbitration clause and
the suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2637-MN pending the return of the
arbitral award could be called for but only as to petitioners DMC-USA and Paul E.
Derby, Jr., and private respondents MMI and LILY SY, and not as to the other parties in
this case thus, Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and private respondent SFI, not parties
to the Agreement and cannot even be considered assigns or heirs of the parties, are
not bound by the Agreement and the arbitration clause therein.