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Introduction
Drilling performance offshore on the North West Shelf of Australia Determining the Technical Limit
from 1968 to 1992 was erratic. A simple plot of time vs. total depth The Theoretical Well. The first stage in the development of a
(Fig. 1) showed unacceptable scatter and a high average drilling technical limit well time was the construction of a theoretical well.
time, particularly when benchmarked against published data (No- The theoretical well assumed a flawless operation on the basis of
erager et al.1). The conclusion was the well construction process current knowledge and design technology. It was made up of
was not in control. The company developed a plan to remedy this activities and durations that were derived from collective experi-
when faced with an upcoming development project (Wanaea and ence. Assumptions included, for example, no midsection trips
Cossack subsea development). required to change bit or bottomhole assembly (BHA), no reaming
An aggressive target setting and planning methodology was (stable hole), no waiting on equipment, no wiper trips,2,3 and no
developed on the basis of question, “What is possible?” rather significant circulating time. This diverged from the assumptions
than the question, “What can be improved?” to get the desired made by Kadaster5 for a normal well. We concluded that to include
performance. such times would have included technical shortcomings in the plan.
The approach was greatly influenced by achievements in other The goal was to highlight technical shortcomings as the focus for
parts of the world. Some new drilling operations standards were set action and change, rather than accept, them.
in the North Sea during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, as The well construction was broken into easily definable sections
documented by Shute et al.2. A major factor claimed in the success to calculate a theoretical well, such as drilling a 171⁄2-in. hole,
of this work came from time analysis, which rigorously pursued the running and cementing 133⁄8-in. casing, and drilling a 121⁄4-in. hole.
identification and removal of drilling problems. Work by Huber et This produced about 9 to 16 sections depending on the design detail
al.3 in the North Sea took a similar approach, which also produced of the particular well. The sections were then broken into subac-
excellent results. tivities as shown in the following example.
The high level objective for the Wanaea and Cossack projects Section: 171⁄2-in. Hole. Lay down 26-in. BHA; pick up 171⁄2-in.
was the requirement for highly productive wells and low construc- BHA; run in hole; drill shoe; perform leak-off test; drill 171⁄2-in.
tion cost. Work carried out to maximize well productivity had the hole; circulate bottoms up; and, pull out of hole.
highest priority because of the potential pay back and has been The aim of breaking each section down was to define sufficient
documented by Walters.4 The focus of this paper was the reduction design detail to enable estimating of actual durations; too much
of well costs. detail became cumbersome to work with. Durations were then
With time as the predominant cost driver for well cost (70% of estimated for each subgroup. Drilling time assumed a 10 minute
the well cost was time sensitive), time reduction took priority over connection time3 and rate of penetration (ROP) from the best bit
unit cost reduction. Application of the “ What is possible?” question runs in the area. A well time produced by this method often resulted
in disbelief of the short duration calculated (see Table 1).
By developing the theoretical well’s technical limit in a group
Copyright 1998 Society of Petroleum Engineers session, it was possible to bring about a shift in paradigms about
This paper (SPE 51181) was revised for publication from paper SPE 35077, first
what was, and is possible.
presented at the 1996 IADC/SPE Drilling Conference held in New Orleans, 12–15
March. Original manuscript received for review 12 July 1996. Revised manuscript
received 30 April 1997. Paper peer approved 17 April 1998. Removable Time. The difference between actual well time and
*Now with Chevron Overseas Petroleum Inc. theoretical well time was called removable time. It included con-
Fig. 2—Diagrammatic representation of the relationship be- Cossack 2 22.0 42.3 13.6 28.7
tween the theoretical well, invisible lost time, technical limit, and Cossack 3 22.0 51.5 22.3 29.2
conventional lost time.
Wanaea Cossack
Technical
Section No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 Limit
Run TGB 2.25 2.00 3.00 2.50 1.50 6.50 2.50 2.50 1.50
Drill 36-in. hole 9.50 8.50 11.00 19.50 7.50 18.00 9.00 15.50 7.50
Run 30-in. casing 10.50 7.00 6.00 6.75 4.60 9.50 10.25 8.50 4.60
Drill 26-in. hole 28.25 33.00 23.00 27.25 27.75 28.50 30.50 25.75 23.00
Run 20-in. casing 10.25* 11.50 13.50 13.50 13.50 11.50 13.50 15.00 10.25
Run Bop 13.25 13.50 13.00 10.00 16.25 17.00 9.00 10.75 9.00
Drill 17 1⁄2-in. hole 133.25 110.00 118.00 117.50 114.75 155.50 172.75 174.00 110.00
Run 13 3⁄8-in. casing 32.50 23.50 36.25 21.75 25.00 22.50 22.75 23.00 21.76
Drill 12 1⁄4-in. hole 270.25 201.50 119.50 105.50 106.50 319.00 122.75 193.75 106.60
Run 9 5⁄8-in. casing 44.00 25.00 27.50 24.25 44.75 24.50 42.25 23.75 23.76
Drill 8 1⁄2-in. hole 130.25 53.00 72.00 90.75 71.25 61.00 98.50 111.25 53.00
Log 49.00 71.00 54.00 36.50 43.00 22.75 62.0m 36.50
Run liner 59.50 25.00 37.50 41.25 23.50 42.50 42.50 23.50
Clean out 44.00 37.50 26.50 45.00 69.50 26.60
Total hours 684.5 640.00 576.25 227.25 511.00 785.00 668.50 715.25 466.26
Total days 28.5 26.70 24.00 23.20 21.30 32.70 27.90 29.80 19.00
reached and then planned their removal. The time taken to drill and waiting on weather (WOW), 13%; and other, 15%. Clearly, if the
complete wells would be the indication of the ability to understand bit/BHA and mud problems were addressed, then 72% of the
and manage the variables. removable time would be eliminated. Drilling and completing
Approximately 9 months were spent planning the startup of outside cyclone season would potentially remove another 13%
operations. The planning process used the theoretical well and because of WOW.
offset well analysis to develop an engineering workscope and The development of the theoretical well activities and times
determine the resources needed. Execution of the engineering provided a baseline for further analysis of the sequences required.
workscope involved getting engineers and contractors to under- Program evaluation review technique charts were constructed,
stand potential obstacles to achieving the technical limit and then typically listing 300 tasks/well, and used to undertake critical path
manage them. analysis. A number of activities were removed from the critical path
Approximately 175 days were identified as removable time from by introducing new tools and/or techniques.
a total of 435 days on the eight offset wells. The problems identified The engineering planning work had a big impact on the speci-
by analysis are shown in Fig. 3 as a Pareto chart. Significantly, the fication of the drilling rig needed for the project. The cost of the
invisible lost time was categorized as bit/BHA, 47%; mud, 23%; higher rig specification was easily justified against the potential
Fig. 3—Results of the removable time study performed on eight offset wells. Categorized by bit/BHA, mud, WOW,
and other.
efficiencies indicated by the theoretical well time. The result allowed technical limit time had been underestimated), a new time was
fit for purpose rig selection and, ultimately, sole source negotiation of defined for the next well. If it was removable, solutions were
the selected rig rather than a low bid tendering process. developed that would prevent reoccurrence of the event.
A number of other factors were addressed during the planning Similar to the approach taken by Kadaster,5 the use of a total
stage and were influential in the overall success of the project. quality management (TQM) approach was found to be very effec-
These included identification and management of risk; communi- tive (see the TQM feedback loop in Fig. 4). The feedback system
cation of the plan to all involved, to gain ownership and shared was very broad in it’s application and became very efficient with
goals; and, preoffshore review of procedures, sequence of events, proper resourcing from either company or contractor.
and equipment. Initially, offshore personnel were uncomfortable reporting
against the technical limit because every nonconformance, large or
Operations. Invisible lost time was made very visible in the small, was exposed. It was important that management encouraged
operational phase of the project. Any activity time deviation from and supported the offshore team in pursuit of the ideal standards
the technical limit schedule was reported on the daily report. If the that had been set. A no-blame environment was essential and
deviation was negative (i.e., time reduced), the time expected on practiced with vigor.
future wells was adjusted downward and a new technical limit was The measurement of operations against the technical limit sched-
defined. If the deviation was positive (i.e., extra time taken), it was ule was extremely powerful. No better way was found to highlight
analyzed for cause. If the extra time taken was unavoidable (i.e., the and pursue maximum opportunity for improvement.
Fig. 5—Days to total depth (TD) for wells drilled on the North West Shelf between 1968 and
1992. Results from Wanaea and Cossack have been included to show the improvement made.
Starting New
Technical Actual Removable Effective Technical
Section Limit Time Time Time Limit
Removable
Time
Number Problem (hours) Cause Action and Solution
1 Back-off in 17 1⁄2-in. hole 187.25 High drilling torque as a Reduce drilling parameters. Eliminate
result of formation and string weak-points, review drilling
aggressive drilling. procedures.
2 Twist off 2 3⁄8-in. drillpipe in liner 97.00 Excess weight on pipe. Procedures. Source stronger pipe.
Minimize use.
3 Cleanout of cement in liner 71.00 Plug not bumped, no shear Reviewed procedures. Developed inner
indication. string method.
4 Dropped junk basket and nut 64.00 Nut backed off downhole. Weld nut to shank. Review tool
procedures.
5 Correction run in 12 1⁄4-in. hole 44.00 Right hand bit walk and drop Review bit and BHA selection. Allow left
too high. hand lead.
6 No cement in 9 5⁄8-in. shoe 29.00 Mud syphoning through top Reviewed cement head design. Increased
drive when changing over to shoe track to 3 joints. Plan to bump plug
release dart. and pressure test casing.
7 Dropped 20-in. casing 24.00 Backup tong slipped. Review top drive and casing procedures.
8 Rig downtime (total) 22.00 Various equipment problems, Review maintenance planning.
critical path maintenance.
9 Problem landing CGB 18.00 Incorrect bolts-quality Use correct bolts. Review procedures.
control. Cuttings build up at
wellhead.
10 Washout in Monel DC 14.00 Stress corrosion cracking. Inspect all monels internal (boroscope).
Review quality assurance/quality control
procedures.
11 Trip in 17 1⁄2-in. slow ROP 11.00 Bit balling. Use PDC bit. Review mud system.
12 Logging failure 4.00 Intermittent short in tool Tool returned for repair. Calibrate backup
connection. before use.
13 Miscellaneous 42.50 Small events. As available resources allow.
Fig. 6 —Comparison of the effective time and removable time wells drilled
before the start of the project and Wells 1 and 3. The inefficiency shown is
a result of advancing the technical limit and taking a backward view.
Fig. 7—Comparison of the effective time and removable time for the
comparable portions of the completions. Again inefficiency can be shown
by taking a backward view from the final technical limit.